Theistic Arguments and an Evidentialist Approach in Richard Swinburne

Abstract

This study examines how Richard Swinburne epistemically justifies belief in God through probabilistic reasoning. Rejecting the claim that classical theistic arguments can yield metaphysical certainty, Swinburne bases belief not on deductive proof but on high probability, using Bayesian probability theory to defend the rationality of theism. The study first outlines the conceptual and historical background of evidentialism and then situates Swinburne’s position within this context. While he treats the ontological argument with caution and excludes it from his cumulative case, his analysis centers on the cosmological, teleological, moral, and religious experience arguments, which together form a cumulative inductive case. Examined alongside Reformed epistemology and contemporary critiques, Swinburne’s approach presents theistic belief as a rationally defensible commitment grounded in probabilistic reasoning and epistemic responsibility.