Insolvability Of The Hard-Problem Of Consciousness

The argument presented here, establishes that the ``hard problem of consciousness'' is not merely unsolved but intrinsically unsolvable within the formal domain of physics. 

Physics is a closed descriptive system whose primitives are quantities defined by measurable reference operations---mass, charge, distance, time, and their derived relations. That is, in order for Physics to account for an observation, Physics can only account for entities that are defined within, physics, say, by marks on a rod in a laboratory in France. 

Conscious experience, by contrast, lacks any operational referent: there exists no measurable standard or definable object corresponding to pain, awareness, or qualia. Consequently, consciousness cannot be expressed or derived within the language of physics. That is, there is no ‘pain’ object in a laboratory to which Physics can refer measurements to. ‘Pain’ is a first person experience only. Only the first person ‘feels’ pain. They cannot send a message to another that allows the other to experience the same ‘pain’. Attempts to define any aspect of experience always result in semantic self-reference rather than physical specification. That is, words such as ‘aware’, ‘feel’, ‘know’, ‘understand’, ‘consciousness’ all refer to each other in the same loop. They cannot break out to physics terms such as ‘the speed of light’, ‘Plank’s constant’, ‘electronic charge’ and so forth. 

keywords:  hard problem of consciousness, physics, self referal, unsolvable, insolverable, chalmers, undefinable, first person