A Failed State of Security: An Analysis of Causality and Victim Blaming in Cybersecurity Incidents

The cybersecurity industry has developed an organized victim-blaming infrastructure that systematically excuses actual criminals while condemning breached organizations. This analysis examines the philosophical, legal, and practical failures of current accountability frameworks through the lens of 2024-2025's unprecedented breach escalation—including Change Healthcare's 192.7 million affected individuals, PowerSchool's compromise of 62.4 million students, and Ticketmaster's 560 million exposed customer records.

Drawing from classical philosophy (Virgil, Hume, Bacon) through contemporary causation theory, the analysis demonstrates that adversaries who deliberately initiate attack sequences constitute the proximal cause of breaches—not organizational security decisions. The "but-for" test clearly identifies criminal action as cause-in-fact: absent adversary attacks, no breaches occur regardless of defensive posture.

Current approaches prove counterproductive. With 5.5 billion accounts compromised globally in 2024 (an eightfold increase), regulatory proliferation imposing compliance burdens without security improvement, and law enforcement achieving minimal prosecution success, reflexive victim condemnation actively undermines collective defense by discouraging transparency and information sharing.

Progress requires fundamental reorientation: adversary-focused deterrence, software vendor liability, realistic regulatory standards with safe harbor provisions, harmonized requirements, and frameworks rewarding transparency. Until accountability shifts from victims to actual perpetrators, the failed state of security will persist.