ENI6MA vs. AZTEC: Rosario–Wang Proof (RWP) — a pairing-free proof-of-knowledge vs. Aztec ZKP

Technical white paper comparing two confidentiality-proof paradigms. The paper introduces the Rosario–Wang Proof (RWP) and ENI6MA architecture — a stateless, session-entropic, manifold-to-projection proof-of-knowledge that verifies membership via XOR and Boolean accumulators — and contrasts it with the pairing-based AZTEC ZKP (bn128, CRS, Fiat–Shamir). Key themes: verifier cost models, trust/setup tradeoffs (CRS trapdoor vs. session masks), platform portability (carrier-neutral bitwise ops vs. bn128 precompiles), and post-quantum posture (Grover-bounded vs. discrete-log assumptions). Practical guidance and per-equation cost models (TRWP vs. TAZTEC) are provided for architects targeting EVM, WASM, and mobile verifiers.

AZTEC offers a rigorous pairing-based NIZK, with strong algebra and a practical EVM pathway. But its advantages are
conditional on a perfect ceremony and on paying at least one pairing per verify. ENI6MA/RWP’s advantages are unconditional in those dimensions: there is no ceremony to get wrong, no trapdoor to guard, and no pairing to pay, ever.
The acceptance logic is a deterministic Boolean accumulator over session-fresh projections; the complexity is pure linear in the number of checked records; and the post-quantum narrative is anchored in the denial of reusable oracles, which
caps the attacker’s advantage to Grover-type √· speedups on per-session spaces.

The RWP verifier uses only CPU-native primitives; consequently its performance is stable across carriers (WASM, mobile,
embedded), and audits focus on straight-line logic rather than multi-precision field arithmetic or side-channel-sensitive curve code. 

Trapdoor-free vs. trapdoor-fragile. AZTEC’s binding depends on a secret parameter y generated during the CRS ceremony. If y is ever recovered, an adversary can craft out-of-range commitments that nonetheless satisfy the pairing equation.