LESSONS FROM THE RUSSIAN - UKRAINIAN WAR

Dealing with the war experience has always been and remains a priority in the history of military science. The lessons learned from the Russo-Ukrainian War and their analysis can provide all countries' armed forces with significant input in formulating defense policy, including the development of military forces, planning and organization of military operations, and the use of military technology. This research article aims to predict the outcome of the war based on analysis of the aims and achievements of the opposing sides in the war, the Russian narrative on the war, the nature of the Russian threat to Europe and Western Russophobia and review the lessons learned by defence policy experts of NATO, the EU, the US, China, Russia, and Ukraine. The most important lesson for NATO is that it must commit itself to helping Ukraine win because a Russian victory would only lead to a more destructive war in Europe. The European Union believes that a long-term Russia strategy is needed for preventing Russian aggression against EU/NATO members, former Soviet republics, and containing Moscow's influence in EU candidate countries and the so-called global South. The main conclusion for the US is that the US military should be prepared to conduct protracted large-scale military operations. For China is that there is the need to create a real-time information ecosystem to increase agility, flexibility, and effectiveness of military operations. For Russia is that the general goal of wars today has shifted from the capture and retention of territory to domination over the economic, ideological, and mental space of the enemy and the military activity of the opposing side is made impossible mainly by reducing its military-economic potential. Ukraine has identified three key trends as lessons from the war (the rise of drone warfare, demographic decline, and the need for simultaneously maintained ability to repel long-range enemy attacks and the ability to strike in depth against the enemy), which will be taken into account in the development of armed forces. The author concludes that the above lessons learned represent commitments of EU/NATO and Ukraine to continue fighting with Russia, efforts of Russia to achieve the declared aims of the limited military operation with the support of China, Iran, and North Korea, and preparations of the two interested sides for a possible US-China military conflict.  These commitments, efforts, and preparations, together with the unsuccessful efforts to end the war in Ukraine, can result in a new arms race, a NATO-Russia armed conflict, or, in the worst case, a world war.