Published February 7, 2025 | Version v1
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THE DISMANTLING OF THE SECURITATE AND THE EMERGENCE OF ROMANIA'S NEW INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES

Creators

  • 1. Institute of the Romanian Revolution of December 1989

Description

Amid the outbreak of diversionary-terrorist attacks across Romania on the evening of 22 December 1989, the way in which the newly established political authority—the Council of the National Salvation Front (CFSN) — handled relations among the country’s security structures (the Army/Ministry of National Defence, the Securitate/Department of State Security – DSS, and the Ministry of the Interior) constitutes another controversial episode in the history of the December 1989 Romanian Revolution. Examining these fraught, bloody relationships from December 1989 sheds light on how the CFSN and, later on, the National Salvation Front (FSN), together with various military figures, would engage in the political battles up until 20 May 1990, as well as their subsequent involvement in Romania’s post-December political stage.

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References

  • 1.Revoluţia Română din Decembrie 1989. Documente (The Romanian Revolution of December 1989. Documents), vol. I, Editors: Ion Calafeteanu (coordinator), Gheorghe Neacşu, Daniela Osiac, Sebastian Rusu, Cluj-Napoca, Mega Publishing House, 2009. 2. Alesandru Duțu, Revoluţia din Decembrie 1989. Cronologie (The Revolution of December 1989. Timeline)/2nd edition, revised and supplemented, Craiova, Sitech Publishing House, 2010. 3."The MApN authorities, which from 22 December 1989 had assumed the protection of the IJMI, failed to prepare records confirming the presence, voluntary surrender, or detention conditions of Securitate personnel. This shortcoming is also apparent in those military units where certain Interior Ministry cadres reported voluntarily or were brought in following their arrest," the official historians of the Romanian Army point out in The Romanian Revolution of December 1989 (cited in Armata Română în Revoluția din Decembrie 1989/The Romanian Army in the December 1989 Revolution, 2nd revised and supplemented edition, Bucharest, Militară Publishing House, 1998). 4.Archive of the December 1989 Romanian Revolution Institute/IRRD 1989, Fund I, File no. 51. 5.Trupele de Securitate (1949 – 1989)/The Securitate Troops (1949 - 1989), Editors: Florica Dobre, Camelia Duică, Silviu B. Moldovan, Liviu Țăranu, Bucharest, Nemira Publishing House, 2004. 6.Vasile Mălureanu , Evenimentele din decembrie 1989 în percepția unui ofiţer de informaţii interne (III/The Events of December 1989 through the Eyes of an Internal Intelligence Officer (III)), in Vitralii - Lumini și umbre, Year II, no. 5, December 2010. 7.Gheorghe Dragomir , Recviem pentru spioni/Requiem for Spies, vol. I, Bucharest, România în Lume Publishing House, 2006. 8.In their volume about the Romanian Army's role in the December 1989 Revolution, the authors inserted the following commentary on relations between MApN units and those of the Interior Ministry and Securitate: "We cannot concur with the statements made in A New Year Born in Blood, published by Interior Ministry officers in 1998, which states on page 286 that from 23 December 1989, «a genuine repression campaign was unleashed against Interior Ministry personnel, even reaching the point of physical elimination». The incidents referred to in that book (the deaths of Generals Nuță and Mihalea, Colonel Trosca, the conscripts of the Securitate Troops killed at Otopeni, etc.) in no way support this claim. They were isolated incidents, unrelated among themselves, each with specific causes and occurring under its own conditions, making it impossible to arrive at such a reckless conclusion by any standard logic. As that same publication itself concedes (p. 272), «in the majority of cities across the country (Sibiu being an exception), the local military unit commanders understood the circumstances and took steps to pacify tensions, protect Interior Ministry units and personnel, maintain public order and calm etc.»" (Apud The Romanian Army during the Revolution…, p. 208–209). 9.The audio recording is preserved in the author's private archive and in the IRRD Archives, Fund I. 10. Virgil Măgureanu , Alex Mihai Stoenescu , De la regimul comunist la regimul Iliescu/From the Communist Regime to the Iliescu Regime, Bucharest, RAO Publishing House, 2008. Former SRI Director Virgil Măgureanu , concludes: "Based on available data in the Securitate archives for these final months, the line units that were collecting essential information about what was underway did not manage to process it or compile it into informative bulletins that were even remotely coherent, so no decisive measures were taken". 11. Major General Marin Neagoe had been Nicolae Ceaușescu's personal aide-de-camp since 1954.
  • 12. From 8 January 1990 onward, on the orders of the Minister of National Defence, General of the Army Nicolae Militaru , the staff of the 5th Security and Guard Directorate of the Securitate were taken under the Army's supervision and protection, being stationed in three MApN barracks positioned along Bucharest's outer beltway. The staff of Directorate V were provided with decent acommodation, meals, and news updates. The Military Prosecutor's Office conducted investigations into all members of the 5th Directorate concerning the missions they had received and carried out during December 1989. 13. Teodor Filip, Secretele USLA/USLA Secrets, Craiova, Obiectiv Publishing House, 1999. 14. "Dear citizens, my Romanian brothers, this is Colonel General Iulian Vlad , commander of the security forces and the Ministry of the Interior. In these historic times, the Ministry of the Interior, the Securitate, all its units, together with the Romanian Army, are fighting side by side to save our national identity and the Romanian people. The Ministry of the Interior and all its armed forces have renounced the elements loyal to Ceaușescu. Romanian brothers, in these critical moments, let us remain united. Trust in us! Help us and we will not betray your trust!" . 15. Alex Mihai Stoenescu , Din culisele luptei pentru putere (1989 – 1990). Prima guvernare Petre Roman/Behind the Scenes of the Power Struggle (1989 – 1990). The first Petre Roman government, Bucharest, RAO Publishing House, 2006. 16. In conversations with Alex Mihai Stoenescu , Petre Roman states: "Brucan insisted very strongly on Iulian Iulian Vlad's duplicity(...) And we were saying. "Well, but...". I was opposing perhaps for reasons other than Iliescu. I was thinking that we didn't need more enemies at the moment, because things were heading towards normalization". 17. On 10 January 1991, former security colonel Vasile Mălureanu wrote in a report regarding the conduct of former security officers from the First Directorate: "The report, with approval for establishing the 'Art-Culture' problem file no. 001603 opened on 17 January 1974, was destroyed by me on 22 December 1989". (Apud CNSAS Archive, Documentary fund, file no. 120, vol. 1, f. 1). 18. Viorel Roșu, De la Securitate la Doi și un sfert, via SRI/From Securitate to Doi și un sfert, via SRI, Bucharest, RAO Publishing House, 2008. 19. Marius Oprea, Moștenitorii Securității/The Heirs to the Securitate, Bucharest, Humanitas Publishing House, 2004. 20. He was arrested on 19 February 1990. 21. IRRD Archives, Fund I, File 38. 22. Virgil Măgureanu was there as national security advisor to CFSN President Ion Iliescu . Concerning his role at the time, Virgil Măgureanu testifies: "And I must admit that many of my actions at the time were under the pressure of the events that unfolded. I had to issue various directives to the various units of this Military Council and to communicate if something was happening in one part or another that had to be brought to the attention of the president. Whether in the form of daily bulletins or phone notes. I wanted to make sure it wasn't perceived that I was a mere hireling. I operated at the necessary level and ensured all decisions and information were handled appropriately, discussing directly with the respective department heads" (Apud Virgil Măgureanu , Alex Mihai Stoenescu , De la regimul comunist.../From the Communist Regime..., p. 145). 23. Regarding the presence of the former head of the External Information Directorate of Securitate (1959 - 1978), Virgil Măgureanu explains: "The person called Nicolae Doicaru I believe had a much less defined role than GVV had. Doicaru, having been removed not long before from leading this department, could act as an intermediary between the new authorities and the operational situation in the country. think Doicaru was simply appointed to give an appearance of legitimacy to that power transfer to someone representing the new authorities. And nothing more. If you will recall, Doicaru never took on any role nor was he ever called to any assignment in shaping the new service" (Apud Ibidem, p. 140 - 141). 24. The book Direcţia de Informaţii Militare între ficţiune şi adevăr/Military Intelligence Directorate between Fiction and Truth (Bucharest, 1994, 264 p.) mentions (p. 151) that Lieutenant General Marin M. Pancea took command of the DIA on 24 January 1990 and led it until 4 January 1991, when he was appointed Secretary of the Supreme Council for the Defense of the Country (CSAT). 25. The character can be identified as Virgil Măgureanu , the future director of the Romanian Intelligence Service (1990 - 1997). The media attacks by Ion Mihai Pacepa against the SRI regarding the institution's takeover of Nicolae Ceaușescu's secret accounts, while omitting the existence of the SIE—which had originated from the DIE structure (UM 0544)— strengthen the hypothesis of a "conflict" between Virgil Măgureanu and the generals from SIE. This "conflict" is related to "The Professor's" desire to take control of Romanian foreign intelligence. Ion Mihai Pacepa . 26. Virgil Măgureanu believed that the DIA chief, Vice Admiral Ştefan Dinu , refused to take command of CIE when asked to provide CFSN with all available information upon assuming command. "However, even today - states Virgil Măgureanu - I still cannot shake the impression that Dinu wanted to evade responsibility, to collaborate with information in clarifying the situation" (Apud Virgil Măgureanu , Alex Mihai Stoenescu , De la regimul comunist.../From the Communist Regime..., p. 141). 27. In May 1992, the GRUP Association within SIE, led by the elusive "Colonel Alexandru", wrote to the poet Adrian Păunescu in Totuşi iubirea magazine, requesting him to become involved and advocate for the eradication of the "Caraman legacy," which had materialised into numerous acts of corruption within SIE. 28. This date marks the anniversary of Romania's External Intelligence Service. 29. On 6 January 1998, Law No.1 on the organisation, functioning and activities of SIE was passed, a normative act that is currently in force.
  • 30. Virgil Măgureanu asserts that Mihai Caraman established total control over the foreign services "in an overly selfish and egocentric manner, making it very difficult to push for the reform of the service" (Apud Virgil Măgureanu , Alex Mihai Stoenescu , De la regimul comunist.../From the Communist Regime..., p. 253). 31. Referring to Ioan Talpeș's tenure as director of SIE, Virgil Măgureanu states: "For Ioan Talpeș, collaboration with the CIA originated from different premises, bringing immediate profit as early as 1992–1993, in that the mentioned individual (Ioan Talpeş – editor's note) systematically and not always in response to American requests or pressures, handed over the entire network of covered officers, the «most discreet and intelligent» part of the entire Securitate". 32. Published in the Official Gazette, Year II, No 2, Friday, 5 January 1990. 33. The archives of the 4th Military Counterintelligence Directorate was taken over by the Army's intelligence structures and remains in their possession to this day. See, in this respect, the interview with the head of the SRI Archive, Florin Pintilie, in Jurnalul Naţional, Year XIII, Monday, 16 May 2005, p. 8 – 9. 34. Domnița Ștefănescu, Cinci ani din istoria României. O cronologie a evenimentelor (decembrie 1989 – decembrie 1994)/Five Years of Romanian History. A Timeline of Events (December 1989 - December 1994), Maşina de scris Publishing House, Bucharest, 1995. 35. Vice Admiral (Ret.) Stefan Dinu , Condamnat la discreție/Condemned at Will, Bucharest, Neverland Publishing House, 2009. 36. Colonel Vergil Andronache, former First Deputy Commander of UM 0215 and former counterintelligence officer, narrates in an interview with journalists Vlad Stoicescu and Liviana Rotaru, published in the daily newspaper Evenimentul Zilei on 17 June 2010, that he was summoned to the Government on 28 December 1989 under conditions where the new leaders "had a problem: they could not anticipate the reactions of the Romanians" and "were confused". Petre Roman kept wondering "what mechanisms were set into motion for thousands of Romanians to take to the streets" explains the former colonel of UM 0215 (See: http://www.evz.ro/detalii/știri/adjunctul-doi-și-unsfert-vorbește-după-20-de-ani-898342.html). 37. All memoirs dedicated to the history of this unit, as well as the media, cite 1 February 1990 as the establishment date of the unit. On the website of the well-known unit (http://www.dgipi.mai.gov.ro) 7 February 1990 is mentioned as the founding date of UM 0215. I opted for the latter. 38. See: http://www.evz.ro/doi-si-un-sfert-dinadevar-toti-oamenii-presedintelui-898231.html, accessed on 28.10.2014, at 21.45. 39. Gelu Voican-Voiculescu had arranged for the transfer of Colonel Viorel Tache from UM 02418 Bucharest to his office, together with Colonel Baiu Ion and Colonel Mugurel Florescu (See: http://www.evz.ro/detalii/știri/adjunctul-doi-și-un-sfert-vorbește-după-20- de-ani-898342.html). 40. Colonel Florin Calapod previously affiliated with the 4th Securitate Directorate, was retired due to misconduct during a foreign mission. His association with Colonel Tache facilitated his appointment as head of UM 0215. He passed away in 2003. 41. In an interview with Alex Mihai Stoenescu , Viorel Roșu also referred to other acts of "political policing" carried out by officers of the former Third Counterintelligence Directorate. These included placing public and political figures under diplomatic watchlists at Western embassies in Bucharest, such as Doina Cornea , Mircea Dinescu , Ion Caramitru etc. 42. Virgil Măgureanu noted that the former Securitate structures, integrated into the Ministry of National Defence, were still strictly adhering to their final order, which prohibited involvement in any events or intelligence-gathering activities, thereby isolating themselves from information flows. 43. Reflecting on the events in Târgu-Mureș in March 1990, Virgil Măgureanu emphasised that the incompetence of the military authorities, who falsely assured the state leadership of their control, contributed negatively to the unfolding of events. "They provided misinformation - declared Virgil Măgureanu Măgureanu, Virgil- and, worse, there were provocateurs who escalated tensions. That was one of the overt attempts—others were more covert—to ignite, both figuratively and literally, the situation in Transylvania as part of a plan to separate it from Romania. (...) Claims were made that the Securitate provoked these events. However, the Securitate was confined to barracks. During my visit to Târgu-Mureș, I inspected the units; they were all confined to their premises, and none of them were allowed to be visible on the streets". (Apud Virgil Măgureanu , Alex Mihai Stoenescu , De la regimul comunist.../From the Communist Regime…, p. 167). 44. Virgil Măgureanu was considered one of Leonte Răutu's protégés. Răutu had been under Securitate surveillance for his influence over cadres and students, characterised by a Stalinist rejection of Romania's independence, particularly national communism, and a personal hatred towards the Romanian leader representing this movement. 45. General (Ret.) Mircea Chelaru, former Chief of the General Staff of the Romanian Army (15 February - 31 October 2000) and head of the Counterintelligence Division of the SRI (1990), briought serious accusations against the SRI and its director, Virgil Măgureanu Măgureanu, Virgil, regarding their involvement in the events of 13 - 15 June 1990 (See: Caietele Revoluției (The Revolution Records), no. 4 - 5/29 - 30, 2010, p. 35 - 85). Regarding these events, Virgil Măgureanu remarked: "Despite our efforts on the night of 13–14 June 1990 to counteract the miners' arrival, the bureaucratic apparatus within the economic ministries - and, as it turned out, some individuals within the SRI (acting without orders in this respect)—sought their assistance. I want to emphasise that no senior leader (including Iliescu) requested their intervention. Instead, a genuine complicity arose within the bureaucratic system, which was still largely composed of individuals from the former communist regime". 46. The involvement of former Securitate officers within the SRI has consistently been a contentious issue between civil society and the institution. The 15% figure for Securitate personnel within the SRI has repeatedly surfaced in post-December official statements by SRI and state decision-makers. 47. Mihai Pelin, Trecutul nu se prescrie. SIE&SRI/The Past Cannot Be Written Off. SIE&SRI, Bucharest, Kullusys Publishing House, 2004