Supplementary replication material for articles published in the journals of the Econometric Society (Econometrica, Quantitative Economics, and Theoretical Economics)
Published November 1, 2024 | Version v1
Software Open

Replication package for "Choices and Outcomes in Assignment Mechanisms: The Allocation of Deceased Donor Kidneys"

Authors/Creators

  • 1. ROR icon Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • 2. ROR icon Stanford University
  • 3. ROR icon Yale University

Description

Agarwal, N., Hodgson, C., & Somaini, P. (2020). Choices and outcomes in assignment mechanisms: The allocation of deceased donor kidneys (No. w28064). National Bureau of Economic Research.

Files

replication_package.zip

Files (2.6 GB)

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md5:0d633685516c57fdd01ec702c537b9e0
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