Paradoxes in the co-evolution of contagions and institutions
Authors/Creators
- 1. University of Vermont
- 2. Rovira i Virgili University
- 3. University of Maine
Description
Epidemic models study the spread of undesired agents through populations, be it infectious diseases through a country, misinformation in social media, or pests infesting a region. In combating these epidemics, we rely neither on global top-down interventions, nor solely on individual adaptations. Instead, interventions commonly come from local institutions such as public health departments, moderation teams on social media platforms, or other forms of group governance. Classic models, which are often individual or agent-based, are ill-suited to capture local adaptations. We leverage developments of institutional dynamics based on cultural group selection to study how groups attempt local control of an epidemic by taking inspiration from the successes and failures of other groups. Incorporating institutional changes into epidemic dynamics reveals paradoxes: a higher transmission rate can result in smaller outbreaks as does decreasing the speed of institutional adaptation. When groups perceive a contagion as more worrisome, they can invest in improved policies and, if they maintain these policies long enough to have impact, lead to a reduction in endemicity. By looking at the interplay between the speed of institutions and the transmission rate of the contagions, we find rich co-evolutionary dynamics that reflect the complexity of known biological and social contagions.
Notes
Files
hello-gmes-main.zip
Files
(18.7 MB)
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Additional details
Related works
- Is cited by
- 10.48550/arXiv.2310.03672 (DOI)
- Is derived from
- https://github.com/jstonge/hello-gmes (URL)