Published September 30, 2023 | Version 1
Journal article Open

The Impact of IMSI Catcher Deployments on Cellular Network Security: Challenges and Countermeasures in 4G and 5G Networks

Authors/Creators

  • 1. ROR icon University of Sulaimani

Description

IMSI (International Mobile Subscriber Identity) catchers, also known as "Stingrays" or "cell site simulators," are rogue devices 
that pose a significant threat to cellular network security [1]. IMSI catchers can intercept and manipulate cellular communications, 
compromising the privacy and security of mobile devices and their users. With the advent of 4G and 5G networks, IMSI catchers have become more sophisticated and pose new challenges to cellular network security [2].

This paper provides an overview of the impact of IMSI catcher deployments on cellular network security in the context of 4G and 5G networks. It discusses the challenges posed by IMSI catchers, including the unauthorized collection of IMSI numbers, interception of communications, and potential misuse of subscriber information. It also highlights the potential consequences of IMSI catcher deployments, including the compromise of user privacy, financial fraud, and unauthorized surveillance. The paper further reviews the countermeasures that can be employed to mitigate the risks posed by IMSI catchers. These countermeasures include network-based solutions such as signal analysis, encryption, and authentication mechanisms, as well as user-based solutions such as mobile applications and device settings. The paper also discusses the limitations and effectiveness of these countermeasures in the context of 4G and 5G networks.

Finally, the paper identifies research gaps and future directions for enhancing cellular network security against IMSI catchers in the era of 4G and 5G networks. This includes the need for improved encryption algorithms, authentication mechanisms, and detection techniques to effectively detect and prevent IMSI catcher deployments. The paper also emphasizes the importance of regulatory and policy measures to govern the deployment and use of IMSI catchers to protect user privacy and security.

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Additional details

Dates

Accepted
2023-09-30

References

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