Published January 29, 2013
| Version 12557
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CEO Duality and Firm Performance: An Integration of Institutional Perceptive with Agency Theory
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The recommendation of the committee on corporate
governance for public companies in Nigeria, that the position of the
CEO be separated from board chair has generated serious debate
among scholars and practitioners. They have questioned the
appropriateness of implementing corporate governance model that is
based on Anglo-Saxon agency problem characterized by dispersed
ownership structure; where markets for corporate control, legal
regulation, and contractual incentives are the key governance
mechanisms. This paper strives to resolve the argument by adopting
an institutional perspective in testing the agency theory on board
duality. The study developed a theoretical and empirical model to
better understand how ownership structure influences agency conflict
and how such affects firm performance. Hence, the study examines
the relationship between CEO duality and firm performance using
two institutional ownership structures – dispersed ownership and
concentrated ownership structures. The empirical results show that
CEO duality is negatively correlated with firm performance in
Nigeria irrespective of the firm-s ownership structure. The findings
give credence to the recommendation of the Peterside Commission
on the need to separate the position of CEO from board chair.
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References
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