Analyzing the Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) Program
Authors/Creators
- 1. Department of Mechanical and Energetical Engineering, Institute National Polytechnique Félix Houphouët Boigny (INP-HB), Yamoussoukro, Ivory Coast
Description
ABSTRACT
The Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) Card is a form of identification that is required for all maritime or offshore workers who need unescorted access to secure areas of MTSA regulated facilities. These measures are all to protect U.S. owned ports from terrorist activity. Those seeking unescorted access to secure areas aboard affected vessels, and all Coast Guard credentialed merchant mariners, must obtain a TWIC. Within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and United States Coast Guard (USCG) jointly administer the TWIC program. By relying on multiple authentication methods (credential, personal identification number or password and biometric information) as well as strong application authentication, the TWIC provides a higher level of security than verification methods currently in use. The biometrics used reduces significantly the risk of fraudulent or altered credentials and the risk of unauthorized access. With the TWIC heavy security system, companies implementing the TWIC card will build the necessary trust required in business-to-consumer and business to-business activities. Also, the TWIC allows securing the supply chain from the beginning to the end and ensuring that no information and components are compromised. Although the TWIC is a powerful security tool, the widespread detailed information collected by TSA poses the direct risk that this information, in the wrong hands, could enable precisely the safety threat that these programs seek to prevent. In this era of widespread identity theft, it is imperative that TSA consider carefully the potential danger of disseminating the highly sensitive personal information gathered.
Files
EJAET-6-1-40-51.pdf
Files
(466.5 kB)
| Name | Size | Download all |
|---|---|---|
|
md5:bfac17032192f276f32a1f8a36136b34
|
466.5 kB | Preview Download |
Additional details
References
- [1]. Transportation Security Administration, Frequently Asked Questions, Web. https://web.archive.org/web/20140810125731/http://www.tsa.gov/stakeholders/frequently-asked-questions-0, 2014.
- [2]. Teamsters, Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC), Web. https://teamster.org/transportation-workers-identification-credential-twic-program, 2017.
- [3]. General Accounting Office (GAO), Transportation Worker Identification Credential: Card Reader Pilot Results Are Unreliable, Security Benefits Need to Be Reassessed, Web. https://www.gao.gov/mobile/products/GAO-13-198, 2013.
- [4]. Transportation Security Administration, TWIC Card and Reader Technology, Web. https://www.tsa.gov/for-industry/twic-card-reader-technology, 2014.
- [5]. Office of Inspector General (OIG), Review of Coast Guard's Oversight of the TWIC Program, Web. https://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/2018/OIG-18-88-Sep18.pdf, 2018.
- [6]. S Parsons, Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC), Web. https://www.aapa-ports.org/files/SeminarPresentations/05_Security_Safety_Parsons_Steve.pdf, 2005.
- [7]. A Lipowicz, GAO despite advances, TWIC problems remain, Web. https://web.archive.org/web/20070430192515/http://www.gcn.com/online/vol1_no1/43463-1.html, 2007.
- [8]. Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT), Encyclopedias, Web. https://www.encyclopedia.com/politics/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/ident-automated-biometric-identification-system?, 2004.
- [9]. Office of Inspector General (OIG), TWIC Background Checks are not as Reliable as They Could Be, Web. https://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/2016/OIG-16-128-Sep16.pdf, 2016.
- [10]. A Lipowicz, Delay of Game. More problems beset DHS' beleaguered TWIC program, Washington Technology, 2017, 22 (4)
- [11]. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) for the Reader Requirements for U.S. Coast Guard, Web. https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/pia-19-uscg-twicreader-PIA-20130325_0.pdf, 2013.
- [12]. D Krapf, TWIC Is Still Useless and a big waste of money, Web. https://web.archive.org/web/20141022024128/http://www.workboat.com/blogpost.aspx?id=15526, 2014.
- [13]. D Bryant, Maritime Security & The Useless TWIC, Web. https://www.marinelink.com/news/maritime-security-useless344893.aspx, 2012.
- [14]. R Clarke, Cryptography in Plain Text, Electronic Privacy Information Center-Privacy Law and Policy Reporter, 1998, 3(2), 24-27. Web. http://www.epic.org/privacy/ssn, 1998.
- [15]. L Thalheim, J Krissler & PM Ziegler, Body Check - Biometric Access Protection Devices and their Programs put to the test, c't Magazine, 114, 2002.
- [16]. T Matsumoto, Gummy and Conductive Silicone Rubber Fingers: Importance of Vulnerability Analysis, In Y. Zheng (ed.) Advances in Cryptology - ASIACRYPT 2002, Queenstown, New Zealand, 2002, 5, 574-575.