Granice prawa dostępu do informacji publicznej w świetle konstytucji

The article deals with the limits of the right of access to public information resulting from Art. 61 sec. 1 and 2 of the Constitution from the perspective of the doctrinal interpretation of this provision made with the use of concepts instruments such as the concept of legal situation and the concept of subjective public rights. In determining the limits of the right of access to public information, the Author emphasises the importance of the reflexive impact of the principle of openness of public life, the complete, material and norm–rule character of a norm constituting the source of the constitutional right of access to public information in terms of defining the subject of this right, and the nature of the right to access public information itself. As a political and, only created, not declared, public subjective right with a positive content. Against this background, the subjective boundaries of the right of access to public information have been presented and two levels of subject boundaries have been distinguished, i.e. internal boundaries determined by the scope of the subject of this right, characterised by the fact that they are not determined by factors external to it, such as the freedoms and rights of other persons, but only with the constitutional understanding of the legal definition of “activities of entities” and the external boundaries defined by the legislator not in relation to the scope of the notion of public information, but in relation to the issue of gaining access to this type of information.