Aligning herders with society for wildfire prevention: economic incentives and collective action

The present study explores the economic nature and property rights related to the provision of forest fire prevention. Fire protection is consumed collectively and can be co-produced by beneficiaries. Hence, we test features that may facilitate agents’ coordination in the emergence of decentralized solutions, and the role economic incentives and government intervention may have for a successful low risk maintenance. A review of scholar literature on common-pool resources and public goods allow for distinguish forest-related problems in the Mediterranean and establish the framework for analysing facilitating factors for collective action. Several case studies have been assessed in this frame, namely: public contracts with shepherds, public grants for herders and voluntary agreements private forest owners-herders, always with the purpose of lowering biomass in fuel breaks for fire prevention. Accumulation of shrub biomass in forests is a relatively recent phenomenon, what may preclude for successful, spontaneous self-management solutions. Government involvement is present in all cases in different degrees and is justified by the conservation of forest externalities to society at large. Results show that external (usually government) support is required for catalyzing agreements and covering start-up expenses. There is a large expectation in this pastoral approach, seen as potentially more financially sustainable that traditional mechanical interventions, given the reduced costs for the administration while it also provides a marketable product. Secondary benefits accrue: an innovation in the social role of herders, incentives for indigenous cattle races conservation and better coordination between departments. Compensation payments are seen as a deserved reward for the effort incurred by herders due to grazing in less attractive areas for their business. Private owners agreements with herders are more likely to take place in areas with previous experiences of cooperation, high risk perception and with potential grant for herders. Normative measures that oblige the direct beneficiaries to take care of their own fire prevention may also induce to similar programmes. In general, society is still unaware about these initiatives.