Conference paper Open Access

Exploiting flexibility of end-users at DSO-TSO levels acting in dynamic coalitions

Fernando Lezama; Tiago Pinto; Ricardo Faia; Zita Vale

In this paper, we propose and analyze a coalitional game in which end-users with different characteristics and preferences can cooperate to offer their flexibility to upper-level entities such as the DSO and TSO. We formulate the problem as a cooperative game in which users need to decide the percentage of flexibility they want to offer to DSO and TSO, while searching for the coalition structures that maximize their utilities. Finding the optimal coalition structure that maximizes the sum of payoffs (i.e., social welfare) is a complex combinatorial problem that cannot be efficiently solved for large instances. Therefore, we evoke the use of computational intelligence algorithms to find near-optimal solutions that can provide higher pay-offs in acceptable times than, for example, the grand coalition and independent coalitions.

This work has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under project DOMINOES (grant agreement No 771066), from FEDER Funds through COMPETE program and from National Funds through (FCT) under the project UID/EEA/00760/2019, and grants CEECIND/01811/2017, SFRH/BD/133086/2017.
Files (362.9 kB)
All versions This version
Views 4444
Downloads 2626
Data volume 9.4 MB9.4 MB
Unique views 4141
Unique downloads 2323


Cite as