Understanding Nuclear Proliferation: A Theoretical Analysis

Introduction

Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a renewed attempt on part of strategic analysts to see whether nuclear proliferation has a future.1 A theoretical debate on how nuclear proliferation can be explained is also underway. Those engaged in this activity have been trying to understand the “proliferation puzzle” and what causes underlie its continued operation.

The problem, however, is that this exercise is quite futile unless it is firstly understood that the concept of nuclear proliferation has not been adequately defined. What makes it further problematic is the question on how to separate or whether at all nuclear proliferation can be separated from other processes such as arms races and alliances. The lack of information does not make the situation any rosier. What this results in is that conclusions are reached upon the policies and possible trends in countries that are not open about their nuclear weapons programs utilising the analysis of countries that are more open about their nuclear weapons programs. So, when proliferation of nuclear weapons in opaque states is sought to be explained with examples, analysis from nuclear weapons states, it is bound to create problems of analysis. 

An attempt to understand nuclear proliferation is further hampered by the fact that both the levels of analysis and the agent-structure debate are centrally involved in the proliferation debate. The fact that they are subjects in their own right does not make the attempt any easier.