Presentation Open Access
The solution to Arrow's difficulty in social choice (sheets)
Colignatus, Thomas
These are the sheets of a presentation on June 8 2018, at the conference of Dutch and Flemish political science. These sheets give an overview, and see "Voting Theory for Democracy" (VTFD) for precision. Arrow's theorem is that four axioms would be reasonable and morally required each by themselves, but together they result into a contradiction. The deduction stands but the interpretation can be rejected. Arrow confuses voting and deciding. The axiom of "pairwise decision making" can be rejected - and Arrow's label "independence of irrelevant alternatives" is distractive. A method that many would find interesting is Borda Fixed Point.
This is an update of the sheets of my presentation on March 16 2001 for the Social Choice group in Tilburg, The Politicologenetmaal 2018 has this link: https://politicologenetmaal.eu See Voting Theory for Democracy at https://zenodo.org/record/291985
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- Publication date:
- June 4, 2018
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- Keyword(s):
- Social Choice Arrow's Impossibility Theorem Borda Fixed Point Cordorcet Voting Theory for Democracy
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- Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial No Derivatives 4.0 International