Optimal Lottery
Creators
- 1. Laboratoire d'Economie d'Orléans
- 2. London School of Economics
Description
This article proposes an equilibrium approach to lottery markets in which a firm designs an optimal lottery to rank-dependent expected utility (RDU) consumers. We show that a finite number of prizes cannot be optimal, unless implausible utility and probability weighting functions are assumed. We then investigate the conditions under which a probability density function can be optimal. With standard RDU preferences, this implies a discrete probability on the ticket price, and a continuous probability on prizes afterwards. Under some preferences consistent with experimental literature, the optimal lottery follows a power-law distribution, with a plausibly extremely high degree of prize skewness.
Files
Lottery9.pdf
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