



The Association for
Asian Studies

Masculinizing the Nation: Gender Ideologies in Traditional Korea and in the 1890s-1900s
Korean Enlightenment Discourse

Author(s): Vladimir Tikhonov

Source: *The Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 66, No. 4 (Nov., 2007), pp. 1029-1065

Published by: Association for Asian Studies

Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20203240>

Accessed: 19-09-2017 09:29 UTC

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at <http://about.jstor.org/terms>



JSTOR

Association for Asian Studies is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to *The Journal of Asian Studies*

Masculinizing the Nation: Gender Ideologies in Traditional Korea and in the 1890s–1900s Korean Enlightenment Discourse

VLADIMIR TIKHONOV

This paper deals with ideal masculine types in the gender discourse of Korea's modernizing nationalists during the late 1890s and early 1900s. It begins by outlining the main gender stereotypes of Korea's traditional neo-Confucian society, and it argues that old Korea's manhood norms were bifurcated along class lines. On one hand, fighting prowess was accepted as a part of the masculinity pattern in the premodern society of the commoners. On the other hand, the higher classes' visions of manhood emphasized self-control and adherence to moral and ritual norms. The paper shows how both premodern standards of masculinity provided a background for indigenizing the mid-nineteenth century European middle-class ideal of "nationalized" masculinity—disciplined, self-controlled, sublimating the sexual impulses and channeling them toward the "nobler national goals," and highly militarized—in early modern Korea.

PROLOGUE

EPISODE 1. LATE SUMMER/EARLY autumn of the year 1906, Tokyo, Japan. A self-financing Waseda student sent a lengthy letter that would soon be printed in the first two issues of the monthly journal *T'aekük hakpo*, published by Korean students beginning in August–September 1906. This student, Ch'oe Namsön (1890–1957) was from the rich family of a Chinese medicine trader in Seoul and was age seventeen according to the traditional reckoning in Korea at that time. His name would later come to symbolize both the glory of the pioneering studies of Korea's mythology and religion and what many disparagingly referred to as the pro-Japanese collaboration of the colonial period.

The letter was entitled "The Sacrificial Spirit" (*Hönsinjök chöngsin*). Penned in an eloquent style in mixed Sino-Korean script and peppered with classical Chinese citations, it was meant to edify fellow Korean students in Tokyo on the subject of what sort of "right resolve" might be most helpful for "displaying the real essence of the 4 thousand year-old spirit of Korea" and "contributing to the state one of these days, after having mastered the essence of the New World during studies abroad." The "virtues" conducive to the "right resolve"

Vladimir Tikhonov (vladimir.tikhonov@ikos.uio.no) is an Associate Professor in the Department of Culture Studies and Oriental Languages at the University of Oslo.

in such cases were first dutifully put forward: the “[ability] to rouse oneself [to action]” (*pun’gi*), “bravery in action” (*yongwang*), “indefatigable, indomitable [spirit shown] in trials” (*paekchölpuryo*, *mannanpulgul*), and so on. This list of wishes was followed by the statement that the sacrificial spirit was the most central virtue, and the following lesson illustrated how this sacrificial spirit was displayed by Ch’oe’s heroes in history:

Who was the one who managed to revive the nation in downfall, restore its fallen fortunes, and build a veritably great power in the Northern Continent? It is the achievement of Peter the Great, made possible by his sacrificial spirit. Who was the one who managed to restore the lands of the state divided into a myriad of small fiefdoms, to consolidate the chaotic management of the state affairs, and to unify tens of the petty dispersed states under the Prussian Crown? It is the achievement of Bismarck, made possible by his sacrificial spirit. Look at Christ, who was born in a little village as a son of a little artisan, but succeeded in widely propagating [his] doctrine and saving the living beings, being revered throughout the eternal ages! Whose force, whose achievement is this? The people of the whole world would unanimously reply that it was done by the blood shed on the cross. Look at Jeanne d’Arc, who was born in an out-of-the-way, little hamlet, in a remote province, as a farmer’s daughter, but rose to command armies and defeat a strong enemy, being [the figure] everybody in the country pinned their hopes upon! Whose mission, whose fiat is this? It would also be answered unanimously that [her glory] was solidified by martyrdom on the scaffold. The same is true in the cases of Luther, the great man of religion, who founded the New Roman Church, and Washington, the builder of the New World, who established Republican rule. One was risking death in resisting the Pope of Rome, while the other was prepared to die resisting the metropolitan country. That is the firm evidence that those possessing a sacrificial spirit, have to go through all sorts of ups and downs in life, having hair-breadth escapes from imminent death [at some points], in order to obtain good results in the end.

Then, after dwelling at some length on the self-sacrificial qualities of great general Zhuge Liang (181–234); Song dynasty loyalist Wen Tianxiang (1236–83), who was martyred by the conquering Mongols; and Ming dynasty Confucian martyr Yang Jisheng (1516–55), who was executed for his critical attacks against the powers that be, Ch’oe proceeded to conclude that this self-sacrificial spirit was the strongest force permeating, creating, and recreating the whole universe, and also the decisive factor in all human lives: “as soon as we utter our first cry after being born, we have to begin the hostilities, fighting hard against myriads of demons of all kinds in order to acquire freedom for both body and spirit,” and the self-sacrificial spirit is the driving force of this unending fight. And what should be the ultimate aim of the struggle for survival on the part

of all Koreans? Ch'oe ended his contribution with a question about how long it may take before "we will fly the sacred Korean flag above the eight regions of the world, its wind blowing in four directions, the people of all the states on five continents kneeling down before its majestic power and all the living beings in the three worlds bathing in its glory" and appealed to readers to "exert yourselves" in order to realize this purpose (Allen 2005; Ch'oe Namsŏn 1906).

Episode 2. In July 1909, approximately three years after Ch'oe's appeal to his fellow students saw the light of the day, a baseball team consisting of Ch'oe's fellows, seniors and juniors—Tokyo-based Korean students—held a tournament in Tokyo, essentially one of the earliest between the Korean teams in Korean baseball history.¹ The tournament song, obviously written by some of the Korean students in Tokyo and entitled "Juvenile Men" (*Sonyŏn namja*), struck a correspondent of the influential Seoul daily *Hwangŏng sinmun* as "moving human feelings" and was published in full by the newspaper on July 22, 1909:

Oh, young men of iron bones and muscles, endeavour to display your patriotic spirit!

It came, came, came, the age of action for our boys!

Refrain: Train to stand up to the tens of thousands, and to acquire achievements in the later battles,

Are not the great endeavours of the matchless heroes our aim?

Nurture your competitiveness, spirit and attentiveness while developing your bodies!

We enter the well-aired, spacious stadium as if we are flying at ease.

The hot blood of the virtuous gentlemen is circulating well, and the legs and arms of the Independence Army soldiers are nimble.

Even if thunder and axes appear before us, we will not tremble, not even a little

One by one, we go from one interesting contest to another, through all the playing of maritime battles and infantry.

Beat the drums of victory where the Triumphal Arch is to be! (Yi Hangnae 1989, 70).

The song later acquired an unusual popularity among young and nationalistically minded Koreans abroad. Republished twice in the pages of the fiercely anti-Japanese *Sinhan minbo* (*New Korea's Newspaper*, established on February 10, 1909, in San Francisco), on February 15, 1911, and September 2, 1915, it was sung on the occasion of the sports competitions at the Young Korean Military School (1909–14) in Nebraska (before March 1910 situated in Kearney, then

¹The available records suggest that the very first one was played by the Hwangŏng (Seoul) Young Men's Christian Association's team against the National German Language School's team in Seoul, February 17, 1906 (Yi Insuk 2000).

moved to Hastings)—a training institution for “young Korean patriots,” in which its founder, famous nationalist activist Pak Yongman (1881–1928), known for his consistent advocacy of military service in the independent Korea of the future and the obligatory military training for Korean young people in the United States, envisioned the seeds of the battle-ready Korea of the later days. By 1941, it had become known as the “Song of the National Independence Restoration Army” (*Kwangbokkun’ga*), achieving the status of an unofficial anthem of sorts for U.S.-based nationalist Korean youth (Pang 1989, 22–37).

Both Ch’oe’s flowery literary appeal and fairly unsophisticated song of the pioneer baseball players may be taken as rather telling textual evidence of the ways in which later 1900s Korean students in Tokyo—predominantly males, mostly teenagers or slightly older, from higher or middle-class family backgrounds (Kim Kiju 1993)—imagined the ideal masculine features of a modern man. Ch’oe might enlist Jeanne d’Arc among his ideals of the sacrificial spirit, but it did not change the essential masculine orientation of the text, as the French heroine was taken as a functional male in her presumed role of commander of the army and without any visible connection to her biological femininity. While Ch’oe’s text presents a romanticized description of the ideal male’s morale and life goals, the song of the baseball players focuses more on bodily details, “iron bones and muscles” and “nimble legs and arms” figuring rather prominently among them. But the references to the patriotic spirit and to the Independence Army—one may assume that George Washington’s army is meant, as Korea’s own anti-Japanese Confucian “righteous armies” (*üibyöng*) were never addressed using this term in the censored press during the time of the Japanese Protectorate (1905–10)—do not leave any doubts as to the contextual relationship between the two texts. Both highlight different aspects of the same discourse on the ideal male, which obviously had currency in the Korean student milieu of the later 1900s in Tokyo and which visibly incorporated both elements of politicized moralizing and the “politics of body” in the Foucauldian sense of the word.

The ideal male is described in both texts as, first and foremost, an individual who is inseparably related to the state, which he either serves in a self-sacrificial manner (“virtuous, patriotic gentlemen,” Bismarck, Jeanne d’Arc) or rules (Peter the Great). The church—founded and reformed by Ch’oe’s heroes, Jesus and Luther, respectively—appears as a functional equivalent of the state here, the object of an absolute, unqualified devotion. This relationship is represented partly by the terms borrowed from the standard Confucian rhetoric (“virtuous, patriotic gentlemen,” or *ch’unggyölsa*) and partly by Meiji Japanese discursive appropriations from European languages (“self-sacrificial spirit,” “sacred national flag,” “Independence Army”).

Then, the ideal male is represented as an embodiment of “strength,” both psychological (“preparedness to die in battle”) and directly physical (“iron bones and muscles,” “nimble legs and arms”). Manly strength, which is shown simultaneously with the patriotic spirit and is obviously supposed to match it,

contains an evident potential for outwardly directed violence: Neither Bismarck nor Peter the Great were particularly well known for eschewing offensive moves against their neighbors, and “flying the sacred Korean flag above the eight regions of the world, . . . the people of all the states on five continents kneeling down before its majestic power” is apparently praise for attack and conquest, if only on a rhetorical level. This violence, however, is subjected to a thorough disciplinarian control: “competitiveness” is “nurtured” and demonstrated in “well-aired, spacious stadiums,” commonly understood in sports to substitute for and/or prepare a practitioner for “later battles.”

Finally, the rhetoric of self-sacrifice and strength is matched by the admiration of success and achievement. “Hero,” the term of choice for Ch’oe and his fellow students, connotes not only prowess in battle but also the fame earned in this way, even if, as was the case with Jeanne d’Arc and Jesus, the sacrifice either costs life or is acknowledged only posthumously. And hero-worshipping baseball practitioners were far from doing their exercises out of a sense of duty only—the song describes “interesting contests,” with “better blood circulation” being only one of many possible positive effects. The male ideal, in a word, is a patriot who is strong in body and spirit—but who also aspires to the shining heights of the Bismarckian or Petrine fame and enjoys the process of developing and displaying the potential of his body.

The questions this paper aims to answer are as follows: In what relationships was this ideal of manhood, with its visions of masculinity, formulated and practiced in traditional Korea, that is, before the onslaught of Western and Japanese capitalist modernity in the late nineteenth century? How did the new ideal of manhood get articulated, what sort of social reality was decisively important for formulating and articulating it, and what sort of imported conceptual and linguistic codes were instrumental in this process of articulation? What were the differences between the ideal as described and prescribed in a variety of literary or journalistic texts and the practice of masculinity in daily life? The paper will attempt to answer these questions primarily on the basis of contemporary texts, in many cases generated by the proponents of the new ideal of manhood themselves, but with the use of observations by strangers—Western missionaries, Japanese officials, and journalists—as well.

As early modern constructions of masculinity in Korea are the main subject matter of this article, I consider it important to define the concept of “masculinity” first. Masculinity—that is, social ideals of manhood—refers here to the social constructions surrounding biological maleness, constructions that are underpinned by power relationships and articulated through prevailing cultural and ideological forms. Inasmuch as the complex web of power relationships is always a site of contest and conflict between the different factions of the ruling classes and between the rulers and the ruled, the masculinity paradigms produced and sustained by these relationships often embrace multiple and mutually contradictory meanings and are always in constant flux, being contested,

subverted, and redefined (Scott 1988). For example, in the Korean case, the series on the “New Nation of the 20th Century” (*20 segi sinkungmin*), published between February 22 and March 3, 1910, in the radically nationalist *Taehan maeil sinbo* (1904–10), termed religion “the great institution, which morally reforms the nation, and from which national justice and morals flow,” rebuked the Korean religions of the day for their “slavish lack of state consciousness,” and proposed, among other things, that Christianity, “a growing force in Korean society, which has already taken the commanding positions in all societal spheres,” be further promoted to become “the religion of the new nation of the 20th century.” Although the “foreign intrusions” (under the disguise of religion) were to be “fended off,” it is quite visible that the new, nationalist male was imagined as a religious, preferably Christian personality—Christian civil ethics were understood to be an important component of the “national strength” of the great powers (An Pyŏngjik 1979, 152–53). In such a context, Ch’oe Namsŏn’s glorification of Jesus Christ and Luther, mentioned earlier, comes as no surprise.

But when the annexation of Korea by Japan came in August 1910, foreign Christian missionaries, whose states either approved of or chose to ignore Japan’s action, were forced to acknowledge the colonial reality and to avoid any contact with the nationalist radicals—and many of them welcomed the “Japanese civilizing efforts” from the beginning anyway (Yu 2004, 413–41). The native Christians were placed under strict control, their leaders being “preventively” terrorized by show trials, such as the infamous “Case of the One Hundred Five” in 1911–12, so as to thwart any will to active anticolonial resistance (Chang 2001, 102–15). Facing disinterested foreigners and either tamely “gradualist” or co-opted native Christian leaders, the exiled nationalist radicals visibly changed their attitudes toward the relationship between Christianity and manliness.

In the 1915 fantastic novel *Heaven Seen in a Dream* (*Kkumhanŭl*) by the putative author of the “New Nation of the 20th Century” series, prominent nationalist Sin Ch’aeho (1880–1936), the eternal “other world” is just an extension of the social Darwinist “this-worldly” reality: The best fighters who are most loyal to their states go directly to paradise, whereas, for example, “those who looked after going to paradise by believing in Jesus, while their parents, wives and children were becoming the others’ slaves,” were to be “fried in excrements in hell” instead (Sin Ch’aeho 1995, 3:174–224). Whereas Sin Ch’aeho, who became an anarchist in the mid-1920s and ended his literary career in 1928 by writing the revolutionary novel *The Great Battle of Two Dragons* (*Yong kwa yong ŭi taegyŏkchŏn*), in which Jesus is hoed to his death by “revolutionary peasants” (his body “made into such a sludge of flesh that he would never get resurrected” [An Pyŏngjik 1979, 213]), definitely came to consider a ferocious, self-sacrificial fighter without any “other-worldly” concerns the only desirable masculine type, the attitude toward Christianity differed vastly in the cases of other radical exiles, some of them retaining the notion of “Christian character-building”

and some considering loving one's enemies a bad start for a "manly" struggle against them (Sin Pongnyong 1999, 187–88).

In any case, views on the place of "civilized" religion in a "civilized" male's life were constantly shifting, influenced by differing positions vis-à-vis foreign missionaries, Korea's own Christian bourgeoisie, and the ideologies of "thrift and industry" associated with Protestant Christianity. Ch'oe Namsŏn himself became strongly influenced by the Protestant-derived vision of a "trustworthy, frugal and industrious" modern man after meeting An Ch'angho (1878–1938), Korea's best-known proponent of the "cultivation" (*suyang*) of modern bourgeois virtues, in Tokyo in February 1907. He subsequently became one of An's followers and protégés, and he was deeply involved in the Protestant convert-dominated organizations led by An, such as the Society of the Young Friends of Learning (*Ch'ŏngnyŏn Haguhoe*), established in August 1908. But notwithstanding the fact that the Protestant-inspired notion of "industriousness" (*kŭnmyŏn*) was a keyword in Ch'oe's writings throughout the later 1900s and 1910s, he continued to shun institutionalized Christianity, an "alien missionary religion," almost until his death, and he converted (to Catholicism) only in November 1955 (Yi Yŏnghwa 2003, 14–56; Yŏksa munje yŏn'guso 1993, 124).

Being produced by a complicated, constantly fluctuating web of power relationships, masculinity is articulated in the languages of cultural and ideological formation. Culture, a network of signifying practices through which social agents generate ways of giving meaning to their experiences (Williams 1982), concretizes the ways in which masculinity is perceived and demonstrated, often either strengthening or absorbing and weakening the influences exerted by the changing power structures on the ideal of manliness. The same role is played by ideology—the cultural domain that legitimizes power relations in their totality (Larrain 1979). Because it is concerned with power relations in their entirety, including tenaciously conservative microsocial settings (e.g., the patriarchal family structure), and because of the unrivaled legitimizing power of tradition, the ideological field is often remarkably resistant to making innovation too visible, clinging to time-honored signifiers despite all the changes in what they signify. For example, Admiral Yi Sunsin (1545–98), who was worshipped as a paragon of loyalty to the king in late Chosŏn society (seventeenth to the nineteenth century), was remade into a symbol of a fearless, successful, intelligent, and patriotic fighter—"Korea's Nelson," by the modern nationalist culture (Roh 2004). Despite crucial changes in the content of the cult, the outward trappings of Yi Sunsin's worship also demonstrate noteworthy continuity, the very traditional nature of the reverence toward Korea's "greatest warrior" playing an important part in the legitimizing of Yi's exaltation today.

Similar patterns of the modernist utilization of "tradition" were characteristic of Japan's dominant ideologies in the time Ch'oe Namsŏn and his co-students were articulating their ideas about what it could mean to live and die "as a man." The 1904–5 Russo-Japanese War presented Japan's ruling oligarchy and

conservative (or moderately liberal) opinion leaders with an excellent occasion to stir up patriotic fervor: The heavily censored and generally enthusiastically pro-war press represented the conflict as “rightful defense” against the racially different enemy’s “aggression against Asians” and fed the public with an array of moving stories about battlefield heroism—often written at the desks of men in the home country—while keeping silent on the true scale of Japan’s losses. The enthusiasm was further boosted by the nationwide lantern-march celebrations on the occasions of main victories (Okamoto 1970, 126–31).

While stories of “fallen heroes” filled the media, opinion leaders were busy employing time-honored concepts to deify the essentially modern patriotic sentiment. A pro-government nationalist with strong popular appeal and a convinced social Darwinist nationalist who firmly believed that “the crucial factor determining national survival is how the people love their country, esteem their country and believe in their country,” Tokutomi Sohō (1863–1957) began in the wake of the war to rewrite his best-selling 1893 biographical account of the Meiji Restoration hero Yoshida Shōin (1830–59) and eventually published the rewritten version in 1908. Instead of Yoshida’s individual brilliance, the new account emphasized his unsurpassed loyalty to his imperial sovereign and depicted him as a self-sacrificial retainer strongly resembling the “model samurais” of the past. For Tokutomi, that was “the quintessentially Japanese self-sacrificial spirit” that possessed the power “to make the nations great and rich” (Pierson 1980, 292–95). This strategy of nationalist “remodeling of the traditional virtues” established a pattern that greatly influenced the ways in which “tradition” was employed in the writings of Korea’s young modernizers, Ch’oe Namsŏn and many of his contemporaries included.

These examples show very well how changes in the content of what is represented by a particular cultural or ideological form are masked by the superficial “continuation of the tradition”—in fact, skillful appropriation of the older forms by the new hegemonic forces. But the older signifying systems should not be seen as simply decorations employed by the modern “inventors of traditions”—following the title of the seminal collection by Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (1983)—in their quest for legitimacy. When the traditional is being appropriated by the “modernizers,” the time-honored cultural and ideological forms also influence the content of the newly built sociocultural constructions, for example, by indigenizing “imported” cultural codes in a variety of ways (Otto and Pedersen 2005).

As the present paper will attempt to show, that was the case with Europe’s nationalized, militarized masculinity, which was imported to early modern Korea. Articulated in a language tinged with Confucian rhetoric, it was often legitimized as an extension of the Confucian values of self-discipline and sacrifice but also was accepted and practiced accordingly, with perhaps stronger emphasis on the simultaneous cultivation of the patriotic body and the vigorous, moral, and self-sacrificing patriotic spirit—which was to combine the basics of Confucian

ethics and attitudes with an all-absorbing nationalist enthusiasm—than was the case in the countries of their origin. Indigenization of such a sort, which also played on the strong acceptance of tough manliness in the popular, nonaristocratic culture, produced as a result the specific patterns of Korean nationalist masculinity, which later became the basis for conceptualizing, standardizing, and demonstrating the “authentic man” in both South and North Korea.

TAEJANGBU IN TRANSITION: CHANGING VISIONS OF MANHOOD

Traditions of Describing/Prescribing and Demonstrating Manhood in Korea

It hardly needs to be said—especially in light of what has already been said about the shifting, fluctuating, and contested nature of the ideal of manliness—that any attempt to construct an image of unchanging, singular “traditional Korean masculinity” will likely be an exercise in essentialist overgeneralizing. Van Gulik, in his groundbreaking study on China’s endlessly shifting sexual mores, reminds us that although a handsome male in Tang, Song, or Ming China might be a bearded, muscular practitioner of boxing and fencing, the privileges that the Qing granted to the Manchus in the competition for military posts—in combination with other sociopolitical developments—led to the ubiquitous portrayal of handsome young scholars as delicate, hypersensitive bookworms in eighteenth and nineteenth century China (Van Gulik 1974, 188). It is also known that a tough amusement for courtiers, the game of polo, borrowed from the equestrian nomads of Central Asia and played on horseback, continued to thrive in successive Chinese courts until early Song times, then fell into disfavor at the height of the Song dynasty because of the opposition of the activist scholar-officials. However, even later, polo and kickball, together with wrestling, retained their place in the lives of the privileged class, to be fully peripherized only by the time of the Qing dynasty (Brownell 1995, 34–38, 222–25). But the popularity of the *haohan* (good fellow) or *yingxiong* (hero), images of tough manhood, did not wane, especially among the nonprivileged, and does not show any signs of ebbing up to this day, as the high esteem and classic status of such novels as *Three Kingdoms* and *All Men Are Brothers*, with their (often graphic to a horrific degree) imagery of “heroic” masculine violence, as well as the worldwide success of Chinese martial arts films, amply attest (Louie 2002, 1–42, 140–60).

In a very similar way, Korea presents an exceedingly rich spectrum of canonical male images, always in complex interaction among themselves and always in the process of change and reevaluation. To take one example, the Korean answer to the *Three Kingdoms*’ Guan Yu–like type of Chinese masculine war hero—minimizing his sexual ties, always prepared to sacrifice himself and all of his family members to *yi* (ritual, propriety, etiquette) duty, fully concentrated

on his battlefield endeavors (Hodge and Louie 1998, 119–42)—would be a gallery of warriors from the proto-Korean states of Silla, Koguryō, and Paekche in *Samguk sagi* (*Historical Records of the Three Kingdoms*, 1145), biographies (*yōlchōn*) section (fascicles 41–50), in which the masculine ferocity of a warrior is matched only by the strength of loyalty or friendship ties of a Confucian paragon. It begins with a three-fascicle-long biography of Silla’s general Kim Yusin (595–673), which, despite all the aversion that *Samguk sagi*’s chief compiler, Kim Pusik (1075–1151), felt toward any mention of Taoist or Buddhist mystique in the context of state affairs, opens with a fascinating story of seventeen-year-old Kim Yusin’s initiatory trips to the mountains, during which he was granted instruction in magic by a mystical old man and during which the numinous light of the stars made his phallic symbol, the “precious sword” (*pogōm*), move. Then it is followed by the story of the sixth-century Silla *hwarang* warrior Sadaham, whose bonding with his male friend Mugwan was so strong that he died seven days after his friend’s death; the story of the fifth-century legendary Silla warrior Pak Chesang, who valiantly rescued a prince from the Japanese, only to be burned alive himself; the story of the seventh-century Paekche warrior Kyebaek, who killed his wife and children before the decisive battle against Kim Yusin in 660, in which he was killed but his soldiers gained fame by their desperate fight, “in which everyone of them was worth a thousand of their enemies”; and many other epics of male bonding, fearless fights, intrepid revenges, and ferocious loyalty (Kim Pusik 1993, 653–801).

Militarist machismo quite close to the type defined as classic in modern masculinity research or antisexist movements (Gilmore 1990; Kokopeli and Lakey 1983, 1–8), but disciplined and tempered also by the Confucian moralizing, was also in abundant display in the late Chosōn genre of the “heroic,” or “military” novels (*yōngung sosōl*, or *kundam sosōl*), which is thought by modern researchers to have provided a cultural space for the impoverished *yangban* gentry or *chungin* (“middle people,” or hereditary status groups of interpreters, medics, and other specialists) middle-class families to vent their—and their readers’—frustrations and narrate dreams of miraculously improving their status through valor on the battlefield (Sō Taesōk 1985b, 176–98). A typical example of such narratives is *Im Kyōnggōp chōn*, an anonymous fictionalized account of the heroic life and tragic death of Im Kyōnggōp (1594–1646; Korean general known for his fight against Qing armies on the Ming side) that is peppered with descriptions of the hero slaughtering countless enemies but also demonstrating praiseworthy leniency to his prisoners and, above all, absolute loyalty to his sovereign (Yi Pokkyu 1993).

While *Im Kyōnggōp chōn* may be considered a fiction grounded in historical facts, a sort of premodern historical novel, many of the most popular eighteenth- and nineteenth-century heroic novels were richly loaded with supernatural elements of folklore with Taoist or shamanist origins. For example, the enormously popular *So Taesōng chōn*, known today in no less than fifty-one versions

(the earliest go back to the mid-eighteenth century), narrates the story of an exiled immortal who was born a minister of war's son on earth but then had to undergo a series of misfortunes: the death of his parents, life as a street beggar, severe maltreatment by his mother-in-law, and so on. He is returned to a successful career and a happy life by his mystical teacher, an old monk from Ch'ongnyongsa monastery, who tutors him in the military arts and magic and thus enables him to defeat the "barbarian armies," save the emperor, and receive an aristocratic title (Im 1997). In a similar way, Cho Ung—the hero of another popular story, *Cho Ung chŏn*, from the same epoch—defeats the enemies of the Song imperial house and restores "great peace under Heaven" with the help of magic teachings, the sword, and a divine horse bestowed on him by his mentors, the monastic magicians (An Kisu 1995). In such cases, manly toughness in battle definitely was not the decisive element that allowed the hero to realize his dream of improving the family fortune in the world of the mortals or transcending it and returning to the lost paradise of the world of immortals. Sacred knowledge in the form of folklore Taoist magic, which often resembled Korea's own shamanist methods, played a central role in the making of a heroic personality and heroic exploits. It suggests certain parallels with the knowledge-centered masculine ideals of the ruling class's core, to be described later.

Popular consumption of the images of romanticized courage and carnage notwithstanding, the valiant fighter did not seem to represent the dominant paradigm of ideal manhood in late Chosŏn society, nor was violence required as proof of manhood in the real-time daily life of the dominant classes. Seasonal violent games, such as stone fights or fights with torches between youths of neighboring villages, were commonly practiced in Korea until the first decade of Japanese colonial rule, but these pursuits almost never involved youngsters from the *yangban* clans (Kim Sŏngwŏn 1987, 193–94). Kim Ku (1876–1949), a scion of an impoverished peasant family that traced its origins to a branch of the famed Andong Kim clan but had been demoted to commoners by the political upheavals of the early seventeenth-century Manchu invasions, documents in his well-known autobiography a scene of a Chŏlla *yangban* cruelly beating up his farmhand simply because the latter "had the audacity to ask for higher pay" and explaining that "better conditions of life make the commoners disrespectful to the *yangbans*."

However violent and cruel the *yangban* could behave toward their non-*yangban* dependants, violence between social peers inside the provincial *yangban* circles, as depicted by Kim Ku, was highly uncommon. By contrast, Kim Ku's own family, being unconstrained by strict *yangban* behavioral codes, could allow itself much more street chivalry: Kim Ku's father, in Kim Ku's description, behaved in the way of the heroes of *All Men are Brothers*, punching some of his "unjust and arrogant" neighbors, often petty *yangban*, half to death almost every month, and becoming in this way a hero of the local commoners and

a permanent guest in the Haeju county prison. In Kim Ku's native Hwanghae Province, where the local *yangban* wielded considerably less power than in the parts of Korea to the south of Seoul, Kim Ku's father could not only get away with this sort of behavior, but he even overawed some of his *yangban* neighbors to the degree that he was sometimes addressed by them in the more polite forms of speech normally reserved for the members of *yangban* clans only.

But at the same time, in addition to his toughness, Kim Ku's father was reputed to be a judicious connection builder, wise enough to regularly "smooth" the petty local functionaries with timely gifts, thus informally acquiring the privileged status of *kyebang* (a client household patronized by local power holders in exchange for gifts) and providing himself with virtual immunity from prosecution in connection with most of his violent acts: Even if he were sentenced to corporal punishment, the executioners would simply pretend that they were beating him while he simulated "suffering." Apart from his ability to get along with the petty local clerks, Kim Ku's father was also famed for straightforwardly following the path of Confucian virtue in the most crucial matters—namely, for being filial (to the extent of cutting his finger and extracting blood in order to help his ailing mother) and righteous (paying the taxes of the poorest of his neighbors). He shows very well the complexities of the idealized masculinity model among the Chosŏn dynasty (1392–1910) commoners: Physical prowess and toughness were *de rigueur*, but they also had to be balanced with social skills and conspicuous demonstration of loyalty to certain central Confucian values. That violent toughness alone, unchecked by the circumspection and morality considerations, could lead to serious trouble is shown by the example of Kim Ku's uncle. He ended by having his heels cut off by the decision of the family council, which was outraged by the uncle's habit of regularly beating up and humiliating his relatives in all possible ways and even disrupting his elder brother's funeral ceremony (Kim Ku 1997, 21–29, 139–65; 2000, 18–20).

Undoubtedly, demonstrations of masculine toughness of the sort nostalgically depicted by Kim Ku—who himself was greatly proud of having killed on March 7, 1896, a certain Tsuchida Jōgō, whom he suspected of being a Japanese military spy and by whose killing he wanted to avenge the murder of Queen Min by the Japanese (Kim Ku 1997, 90–100)²—would have been seen by many a *yangban* literati as evidence of the commoners' grave lack of refinement. They probably would have considered even more distasteful Kim Ku's demonstration of indomitable ego in the all-important marital issue—Kim Ku stubbornly refused to take the girl engaged to him by his father without being consulted himself (Kim Ku 2000, 70–73). Such a rebellion against parental authority was not unthinkable among the commoners, but it would hardly have been tolerated in a *yangban* environment.

²See also the related diplomatic correspondence and reports of local officials to Seoul in *HKA* documents for April–June 1896.

Of course, ways of demonstrating masculinity differed greatly in the *yangban* milieu, often depending on family, scholarly, and regional background. The local *yangban* (commonly know as *hyangban* in later Chosŏn), who could wield considerable influence in their local communities but possessed little, if any, chance of a decent appointment in the central bureaucracy, sometimes found it possible, especially in the less Confucianized northern provinces of Korea, to share to a certain degree of the commoners' ideal of a tough, brave male, keen to demonstrate both fighting and drinking skills. A good example might be the upbringing of An Chunggŭn (1879–1910), a scion of a wealthy Hwanghae Province *hyangban* family—whose father, interestingly, came to know Kim Ku when he had to suppress local Tonghak³ rebels in 1894–95, as one of the Tonghak bands was led by Kim Ku—who later acquired outstanding nationalist credentials by assassinating on October 26, 1909, Itō Hirobumi (1841–1909), Japan's elder statesman and the first resident-general in Korea in 1906–9, whom An had all reasons to consider one of the key architects of Korea's colonization by Japan.

According to Kim Ku's autobiography, as well as An Chunggŭn's own autobiography (finished in a Japanese prison ten days before his death sentence was carried out on March 26, 1910), An Chunggŭn did receive the training in classical Chinese that was obligatory for members of his social stratum, but his true passion as a young man, to which he gladly sacrificed academic success, was hunting and hiking in the mountains, where he sometimes narrowly escaped death on account of his adventurous disposition. An active participant in Tonghak suppression (under his father's command) at the youthful age of sixteen, to the very last moments An Chunggŭn remained proud of his propensity for building friendships with "chivalrous males" (*ũhyŏp hohan*), drinking and dancing, hunting with guns, and galloping on horseback. He nostalgically recalled his habit of beating up *kisaeng* (professional female entertainers) who were not respectful enough to him, when, while enjoying their society, he maintained his Confucian "face" by admonishing them to marry some worthy men and follow the path of virtue (An Chunggŭn 1979, 11–38, 183–90; Kim Ku 2000, 49–52).

³Tonghak was a native Korean religious group whose teachings, based on a messianic, Korea-centered re-reading of the Confucian tradition and supplemented by elements of popular magic, had become vastly popular throughout the country among the peasantry and some impoverished local *yangban* by the early 1890s, a result of the general sociopolitical crisis faced by the country at that time. The first uprising by Tonghak peasants in Chŏlla Province in March–May 1894 led to a Chinese intervention and ultimately triggered the Sino-Japanese War. The second uprising in the southwestern provinces in October–November 1894 was brutally suppressed by Japanese and Korean government troops, but scattered skirmishes between local Tonghak groups and the forces of the government and local *yangban* militias continued in various provinces of Korea in the beginning of 1895 (Kang 1982, 179–216).

For most scholarly *yangban*, however, especially those hailing from the lineages of some academic and bureaucratic distinction in the southern or central provinces, to be a *taejangbu* (manly person) meant conforming to the ideal of an impassionate learner, often a precocious prodigy able to astonish one's elders with unusual study skills, and a man of balance and restraint whose sense of duty and righteousness could find its expression in behavior that could be praised as lofty and principled without being violent—for example, one's refusal to serve in officialdom in corrupt times and to deal with the dishonest and greedy. An Chunggŭn's reputation of being the unparalleled crack shot of his locality would have been a liability rather than an asset in this society, and his father's policy of allowing his son to discard classical learning in favor of guns, horses, and chivalrous friends would have been considered the gravest possible dereliction of paternal duties.

A good description of behavior widely perceived as approximating the orthodox, mainstream *yangban* male ideal is the stele inscription by the famous patriot and independence movement activist Kim Ch'angsuk (1879–1962) dedicated to one of his teachers, the eminent neo-Confucian scholar Kwak Chongsök (1864–1919), whose academic lineage goes, through the agency of his mentor, the renowned Söngju (Northern Kyöngsang Province) neo-Confucian Yi Chinsang (1818–86), to one of the greatest neo-Confucian authorities in Chosön history, Yi Hwang (1501–70). The stele inscription, *Myönu Kwak sönsaeng sindobi myöng*, describes Kwak Chongsök as a child prodigy who learned to read as soon as he learned to speak and mastered all the four Confucian classics (*sasö*) at the tender age of nine. But he is also described as a strict practitioner of ritual norms who adamantly refused, for example, to live in rooms with a heated floor during the period of mourning for his mother; a man of restraint who eschewed any direct confrontation with the rivals of Yi Chinsang's school, even as the latter were defaming the memory of Kwak's beloved teacher; a man of modesty and integrity who refused all the posts offered to him and stayed away from the corrupt officialdom of his times before being directly summoned by King Kojong (r. 1863–1907) in July 1903; and a man of bravery, able to reproach Kojong both orally and in writing for overburdening the people with taxes, allowing corruption to engulf the administration, and placing Napoleon and Peter the Great above the sage kings of ancient China (Simsan sasang yön'guhoe 1981, 135–50).

Reproving the king at the risk of banishment or worse was not, of course, the only way of expressing *taejangbu* bravery, as the manifold armed risings of literatiled “righteous armies” in 1895–1910 amply showed. But in the cases of conservative *yangban* leaders of those risings, resisting the Japanese was often viewed as more a way of “following the cause of righteousness” and ultimately dying honorably for it instead of living dishonorably “under barbarian rule,” not as an occasion for proudly practicing manly toughness and prowess in fighting (Yi Sangik 1997, 173–78). Brave withdrawal from the world, which could mean

abandoning official life under a usurper king or, in times when officialdom was perceived as too corrupt in some cases, willing death in a hopeless attack against the incomparably stronger foreign invader, or in other cases suicide, were certainly important features of the *yangban* class masculinity paradigm, with the romanticized, poeticized state of “righteous anger” (*ūibun*, or *pibunkanggae*) as its main emotional backdrop.

Countless literati were immortalized in prose and poetry for their brave, manly resolve in severing their connections with the corrupt world of officialdom. For example, Nam Hyoon (1454–92), a scion of an aristocratic family who refused to serve the usurper king Sejo (r. 1455–68) and his successors and withdrew to a wandering life of poetizing and literary and scholarly friendships, once writing that “those dressed in silks and eating meat, would they ever know the taste of ferns [eaten by the poor hermits] on the Western Mountains” (cited in An Taehoe 2000, 161), was characterized in the *Pyŏngjin chŏngsarok* (unofficial historical records compiled by Im Posin in 1556–57) as “a man unable to put up with his righteous anger . . . , always feeling a righteous resentment about the affairs of the world, in a habit of climbing Muak Mountain [in the capital] and weeping bitterly there [over the state of things in the world], never afraid of speaking the truth in violent language or mentioning the things normally unmentioned in the world” (cited in An Taehoe 2000, 147). To generate, preserve, and display one’s righteous anger did certainly require considerable bravery, but it was more usual to sublimate this emotion to poetry or other forms of creative, literary life than to translate it into a spectacle of violent manliness. The ability to sever attachments to life and to leave the world “inundated by barbarity” for higher pursuits was, in a word, prioritized over the masculine shows of fighting dexterity so popular in Kim Ku’s milieu.

The neo-Confucian emphasis on the manliness of emotional self-restraint and passion for learned self-cultivation was, however, gradually problematized even among the ranks of the core ruling elite as the Chosŏn dynasty found itself more deeply and deeply gripped by a multifaceted crisis in economy, politics, and society in the nineteenth century. The rulers, faced with the daunting task of crisis management in a centralized state where power and resources were being rapidly privatized by influential clans and cliques at both the local and central levels (Kim Unt’ae 1971; Han’guk yŏksa yŏn’guhoe 19 segi chŏngch’isa yŏn’guban 1990), were searching for less formalized modes of acceptable bureaucratic behavior in their quest for more efficient control. For example, the great memoirist of the time, Hwang Hyŏn (1855–1910), describes the preferences in personnel policies in the period of Taewŏn’gun (father of the then-adolescent king Kojong, who practically ruled the country in 1862–73) regency in the following way:

Unhyŏn (Taewŏn’gun), while recognizing the usefulness of the valiant, spirited and jolly fellows quick in sorting out affairs, emitting a gallant

air and talking loudly to others, used to discard those with a literati-like style of behaviour, refined and mature. On this account, the ruffians skilled in drinking and gambling were able to use their connections for rapidly advancing in the service of the state, and those with nice beards, skilled in drumming and well-humoured were mostly given good postings. (Hwang 2005, 1:50–51)

There may be an element of exaggeration in Hwang Hyŏn's description, as he was generally inclined to lament over what he perceived as the disintegration of societal morals. Still, it looks as if he astutely grasped one of the directions of the evolution of the dominant norms of manly behavior among the traditional power holders of Korea.

One interesting feature of Korea's premodern views on physical violence is that, inasmuch as violent behavior was most eagerly valorized in cases in which it was subordinated to Confucian ethical norms and values and the cosmic and societal order, the expulsion of women from the domain of violence was never as complete as the rigid neo-Confucian separation of the gender roles might seem to have demanded. To be sure, female participation in the ritualized violence of stone fights or in street fistfights would have been unthinkable in most contexts; but the use of violence, sometimes lethal, to defend one's reputation as a "chaste" woman often went unpunished and even praised. For example, in 1790 a married woman named Kim Ŭnae from Kangjin County (Southern Chŏlla Province) stabbed to death a certain widow (*sosa*) An, an older local woman who had been plaguing Kim Ŭnae and her family for a long time by spreading false rumors about the latter's "illicit liaisons." The enquiry soon established that An's behavior had been caused exclusively by personal mal-evilence (Kim Ŭnae refused to marry An's relative and thus stirred up An's anger), and in the end, king Chŏngjo (r. 1776–1880) personally ordered that Kim Ŭnae be cleared of all accusation and released, and that a documentary story, *Ŭnae chŏn*, be written in commemoration of Kim Ŭnae's exemplary defense of her virtuous name (Chŏng Yagyong 1999, 3:109). Such "defense" with knife in hand was hardly something the dominant morals actively promoted among Chosŏn women, but the knife taken by a female hand in the name of justice was by no means unconceivable.

The sword wielded by female hands in the defense of Confucian Korea against "barbarians" was equally conceivable, at least, in works of fiction. A well-known anonymous late Chosŏn novel of military exploits, *Pakssi chŏn* (or *Pakssi puin chŏn*), for example, has as its main heroine the wife of a Chosŏn minister, an immortal's daughter with the surname Pak, who employs her magic abilities and martial skills to thwart the plans of "Manchurian barbarians" to assassinate Chosŏn statesmen and to slaughter the invading Manchurian troops (Sŏ Taesŏk 1985a, 71, 151, 170–71). The novel, richly peppered with fantastical details, was hardly supposed to reflect the current realities realistically, but

it shows that an image of a female heroine skilled in martial arts was not necessarily anathema to the middle- and low-ranking *yangban*—the main consumers of such novels.

Similar to the “male–female” paradigm in traditional China, as analyzed by Tani Barlow (1994, 253–91), the manhood and womanhood of Chosŏn society were essentially relational rather than transcendent constructions. Thus, no such thing as an (engendered) universal protocol of female behavior for all situations of life built on an assumption of female fragility could emerge: Different sets of cosmological and moral imperatives in different situations could demand varying ways of behaving, and in some cases, the prescribed patterns of male and female reactions could coincide as well. Violent toughness certainly belonged predominantly to the male realm in Chosŏn culture, but it was hardly fully monopolized by males. Insofar as legitimate violence was the last resort for Confucian virtue, it was to a certain degree “sexless” and open to women, albeit under exceptional circumstances. The stereotypical image of a disciplined masculine fighter, which made legitimate violence into what may be called a male preserve—something biological males had to aspire to and train for if they were to receive the recognition as authentic males socially and culturally—was created later in the process of the “nationalization” of Korean gender consciousness.

To summarize, by the end of the nineteenth century, five centuries of neo-Confucian rule had left Korea with a complex range of diverse but sometimes overlapping visions of masculinity: the refined, ascetic restraint of a neo-Confucian *kunja* (lofty gentleman) at one end of the spectrum, contrasting sharply with the cheerful and unrestrained celebration of sexuality, itinerant life, and contempt for established social norms embodied in the somewhat comic and somewhat tragic figure of Pyŏn Kangsoe, the hero of the popular *p'ansori* opera of the same name, the “world’s boor,” who refuses to work and proclaims that he would happily starve for ten years, if only he be given an opportunity to regularly enjoy viewing the beauties (Sŏ Chungmun 1984). Restrained and confined to only a limited assortment of performative and discursive contexts among the *yangban* literati, sex and violence could be a touchstone for manliness and a source of pride and enjoyment among the less Confucianized elements of society.

One overlapping moment among these often contrasting visions may be seen in the common patriarchal belief in men’s birthright to the commanding position in the family—even the loutish Pyŏn Kangsoe is sure about his right to rule over his wife Ongnyŏ, whose labor he unceremoniously lives off, drinking, gambling, womanizing, and fighting. Another is the common affirmation of the Confucian sociopolitical ethos, centered on filial piety, which upheld the complex hierarchy of family and clan institutions, as well as the legitimacy of the neo-Confucian state as one big “moral community” ruled by “sagely” kings. Subsequent nationalist reconstructions of the masculinity ideals in the 1890s and 1900s were, in fact, largely achieved by appropriating those values and “modernizing” them

by redefining the dynastic state as a “nation” and placing it at the paramount position previously occupied by the filial piety concept, while the structure of male dominance over women remained basically intact. The *kunja* virtue of self-control and near-ascetic restraint was continuously upheld and simultaneously extended to spheres of experience that were not previously common for Korea’s privileged classes, that is, regular physical training envisioned as “cultivation of military virtue.” And the militant, tough masculinity of the “rediscovered” warrior heroes of Koguryō or Silla, or the prominent warriors of Chosŏn, such as the illustrious admiral Yi Sunsin, identified now as Korea’s own brand of Nelson or Napoleon, came to dominate the imagination of modernist upper- and middle-class males.

New Models of Manhood in the 1890s: Ideals and Practices

In the case of the nineteenth- and early twentieth-century European nation-states, idealized middle-class masculinity displayed a set of decisively important central features that were closely interconnected with each other. The respectable bourgeois male was expected to practice strict sexual restraint, avoiding “corrupting, sinful, and unhealthy” practices (homosexuality, masturbation, sexual “perversions,” and so on) and generally confining himself to the limits of the “normal” heterosexual family, which was built on piety and centered around childrearing rather than “sensuality.” He was instead to employ his energy and vigor for the “noble causes,” the range of which in mainstream society, especially in Protestant countries such as Britain or Germany, was usually crowned by professional work and “glorious sacrifice” on the battlefield, which the nation-states were quick to dress in quasi-cultic clothes. Directing the whole of an individual’s aspiration toward the causes of nation, civilization, or profession was viewed as requiring not only inner, “moral” rigor but also a good measure of bodily strength and discipline. Thus, English public schools, with their range of “character-building” competitive field sports, which had become so popular by the 1850 and 1860s, or the *Bünde* (voluntary sporting associations) such as Friedrich Ludwig Jahn’s (1778–1852) *Gymnasts* (1810) in Germany, were to produce upper- and middle-class men with their bodies hard and lithe, ready for sports and prepared to fight. The requirements of disciplining one’s character and body meant that the male collectiveness that was thought to impose and internalize the virtues of self-control, obedience, and command, like that of public schools dormitory life, was considered almost indispensable for the right upbringing of “Christian gentlemen.” Being moral meant being athletic in the first place, following the *mens sana in corpore sano* thesis, which had become widely accepted by the mid-nineteenth century. So, it came very naturally that males in positions of influence and power socialized in this way and lived in a state of “permanent adolescence,” continuing to place male bonding and the virtue of “old boy” camaraderie above anything else throughout their lives (Connolly 1988, 271; Hargreaves 1986, 41; Mangan 1981, 1992; Mosse 1985).

Of course, the norms of ideal manhood just sketched applied differently to the strata of the nation-states' populaces: Character building on the public school playfield was largely the preserve of the upper and upper-middle classes, whereas the more typical middle-class male persona of the Victorian age was organized "around a man's determination and skill in manipulating the economic environment" (Davidoff and Hall 1987, 229). The ideals looked lofty, in part, precisely because they were never fully put into practice: homosexuality, which was criminalized and looked upon in the dominant discourse as a pathology leading to a personal and national degeneration, was, however, a not-uncommon extension of "manly love" in the British public schools, for one example (Sedgwick 1985, 1–2). And the hegemonic ideas of manhood were often contested both in theory and in practice, Nietzschean or Expressionist rebellions against the societal suppression of passions or pacifist visions of nonviolent manly virility being among the better known avenues of dissent (Mosse 1987, 21–51). However, that was primarily the mainstream vision of nationalized, constrained, well-controlled, and sublimated masculinity of training, diligence, and patriotic fervor that descended on Korea's modernist intelligentsia, primarily through the agency of Japanese translations or adaptations of European ideologues and moralists (Spencer, who once stated that "the first requisite of life is to be a good animal," Thomas Carlyle, with his "hero worship" and paeans to Cromwell and Frederick the Great, and Samuel Smiles being particularly revered; see Kim Pyŏngch'ŏl 1980, 11, 17, 30, 135–37, 142, 189–92, 195–96, 215, 719) and Japanese (principally Fukuzawa Yukichi and Katō Hiroyuki) or late Qing (Liang Qichao's influence was paramount) modernity discourses, with their emphasis on civic morals, consciousness of duty, self-sacrifice, and military spirit (Chŏn 1996). The question of how this vision was digested and translated into more understandable and acceptable terms for the majority of the still Confucian literate class, and how it was implemented, is to be debated.

While the conservative Confucians of the late nineteenth century tended to single out Korea as the only place where the authentic Sinic Confucian civilization (*chunghwa*), "defiled by the Manchu barbarians" in Qing China and supplanted by the worst European sort of "barbarity" in Japan, still continued to shine with its ancient glory (Yi Sangik 1997, 101–15), the modernists took pride instead in the supposed advantages of the Koreans' "racial physique." For example, a July 11, 1896, English editorial in *Tongnip sinmun* (*The Independent*), a bilingual newspaper run by American-educated physician Sŏ Chaep'il (Philip Jaisohn, 1864–1951), the first-ever Korean to be naturalized as an American citizen (1888) and a Protestant convert (Liem 1952), contrasted Koreans' supposedly advantageous body type and their deplorable lack of competent military leadership:

So far as physique is concerned the Korean has a decided advantage over all Eastern people—with the exception of the northern Manchu soldiers

who are stalwart, powerful fellows. One of the marked characteristics of the Korean is his ability to walk long distances at a stretch. He has a light, springy step that takes him along at four miles an hour all day long; and a hundred *li*, or thirty miles, is only a common day's walk for a Korean travelling in the interior. If need be, he can raise the figure to forty or fifty miles a day and keep it up for days in succession.

From the earliest days of Korean history till the present time the crying need has been for proper leaders. It is well-known that in China and Korea military rank is not on an equal level with civil rank but is a step below, and so through all the centuries the best places in the army have been filled by men who were not bred to the profession of arms but who had enough influence to secure the best military positions in connection with other offices of a civil nature ... Consequently the best things in the army have fallen into the mouth of civilians who were not at all skilled in the art of war or even in the managing of an army in time of peace so as to make it effective if a war should break out ... The time must come when an army position will be as high an honour as a civil position. Look at Germany, England or France. (*Tongnip sinmun yŏngin kanhaenghoe* 1991, 7:42)

The optimistic conclusion of the *Tongnip sinmun* editors was that the Korean army was disadvantaged by “nurture” rather than by “nature.” Though it had excellent soldierly bodies at its disposal, it did not possess so far an officer corps professional enough to drill and train it. Korea, according to the *Tongnip sinmun* modernizers, also possessed a good cultural soil on to which the seeds of manly spirit could be sowed, namely, the commoners’ violent masculine ways, so despised by the learned class before. *Tongnip sinmun* editorially stated on its English pages that the custom of seasonal fighting between village teams had been introduced by the founder of Chosŏn dynasty “for the purpose of encouraging the war-like spirit among the people” and should not be stopped as long as it did not pose a danger to the lives of the participants or bystanders. The game of fighting by sticks or stones was, just like the field games in the English public schools, understood to be as good for the spirit as it was for the body: “They have elaborate codes in fighting, and if anyone forgets to observe the regulations, he is punished by his captain even if he has achieved some victory over his enemies. The men, who fail to observe the rules of play, and who hurt their enemies by taking a mean advantage of them, are called ‘dirty fellows,’ and are never afterwards engaged by either side” (*TS* 1991 7:198). The age-old tradition of ritualized violence among the commoners was, in this way, being appropriated by the Westernizing modernists in their quest for the “local roots” of the new patterns of manliness.

The positive influence of drilling and other forms of militarized training was not limited to the professional soldiery. In their belief—undoubtedly influenced by contemporary European ideals of manhood, as drill and discipline came to

even higher prominence in late Victorian times, with their militarist and imperialist fervor (Mangan 1986, 1987)—that only rigorous training of the body could lead to proper character building, the Westernizers of *Tongnip sinmun* paid particular attention to the newly introduced Western-style militarized exercises in Seoul's elite schools. For example, a June 26, 1897, English editorial described militarized sport exercises in the royal presence by three of Seoul's government foreign language schools (English, Russian, and French) in the following laudatory way:

The Government schools, in which Koreans are receiving tuition in foreign languages, English, Russian, French and Japanese, are, we believe, all doing excellent work, and the scholars are showing not only that they have no mean capacity for learning languages, but also that they have aptitude for physical exercises, which, in our opinion, though Koreans as a race are well-developed, are necessary to stir up the blood made stagnant by their hitherto indolent and sedentary manner of life. A proof that Koreans also have physical power and endurance was shown a few days ago at the athletic sports of the Royal English School; and on Tuesday last still further proof was given of this when the three first mentioned schools, by royal command, appeared before His Majesty on the new drill ground in Chongdong.

The English School appeared first on the parade ground, looking very smart in their new khaki uniforms with red stripes and lacings. The first company carried rifles ... Sergeant Boxwell of the British Marines, who has been drilling the English School students and to whose efforts the students owe their efficiency, precision and discipline, first put them through various evolutions ... When the Russian School had gone through their exercises, His Majesty expressed his wish to witness a further exhibition by the English scholars, upon which the boys advanced and went through some physical exercises. ... We think it wise of His Majesty to take a personal interest in the training of his young subjects, and to encourage and foster the spirit of loyalty and patriotism shown by young men (*TS* 1991, 7:414).

The connection between the “precision and discipline” of the militarized drill or games, the “multi-faceted character” it supposedly developed, and the “spirit of loyalty and patriotism”—so evident for many schoolmasters in the public schools of late Victorian England or for Robert Baden-Powell (1857–1941), the founder of the Scout movement (Warren 1987, 199–219)—was elaborated in an April 29, 1897, Korean editorial in *Tongnip sinmun* citing Sŏ Chaep'il's speech delivered on the occasion of an April 27, 1897, gymnastics demonstration by government primary school students:

Judging from the fact that the place for the gymnastics demonstration here is decorated with Korean flags, we can assume that the Koreans

gradually began to understand what the national flag is and appreciate its importance. The hoisting of the national flag represents the King above and the people below, and it means that it represents the country [as a whole]. That the students at their sports demonstration have hoisted the national flag means that the Korean people have gradually come to wish Korea to be as sovereign and independent in the world as the other countries. Then, to train their bodies and enhance their health through sports is no less important for the students than diligent learning. For a weakling . . . the learning is of no avail, but strength without learning is useless as well. (TS 1991, 2:201)

In the same way that the gendered bodies of the new, “valorous” (*wehrhafter*) German men were understood by the “patriotic” opinion of the learned and propertied classes in Prussia during the wars against Napoleonic France in 1813–15 to prop up and represent the whole German *Volk* as a masculine entity (Frevort 1996, 69–87), the healthy, strong bodies of the young Korean students engaged in gymnastics seemingly came, in Sŏ Chaep’il’s nationalist imagination, to be symbolically associated with the Korean flag as the embodiment of the whole Korean nation. The vision of a nation as an entity, represented, first and foremost, by a well-disciplined, regimented group of well-bodied men able and willing to exercise or playfully simulate violence at the first command was a sort of universalistic discourse for the publishers of *Tongnip sinmun*. Nations other than Korea were represented in a similar way on its pages. A brief article from the English “Local Items” column dated April 16, 1898, dealing with a party organized by the Japanese officers in the barracks of the Japanese troops stationed in the Myŏngdong quarter of Seoul for the Korean officers and some resident foreigners, introduced “Japanese wrestling” (evidently, sumo was meant), for example, as Japan’s national sport, which “almost every son of the Oriental Yankee is more or less expert in.” Soldiers were obviously the quintessential “Japanese” in this respect, as the sight of their wrestling bodies gave rise to much admiration on the part of *Tongnip sinmun*’s anonymous correspondent: “the well-proportioned bodies and limbs of the brawny soldiers displayed a fine play of muscles during the struggle.” In the same vein, “agility of movement and sturdiness of arms and legs” demonstrated by the Japanese soldiers during the gymnastic exercises was greatly admired as well. All in all, wrestling, gymnastics, and fencing, in addition to “patriotic” amateur theater and military songs, were understood by *Tongnip sinmun* as displaying the “true Japanese spirit, that is, everyone is willing and ready to die for his Fatherland” (TS 1991, 8:434). Disciplined movements and the self-sacrificial patriotic spirit were tied together by the nationalized masculinity discourse. And, as one of *Tongnip sinmun*’s English editorials (January 8, 1898) put it, the drilling of the Korean troops by the foreign officers so that “their demeanours would be brought up to the modern methods” was the only hope for Korea—just as “native troops”

were made “effective” in India by virtue of “civilized,” that is, British, “leadership and training,” why could not Korean males in uniform undergo the same process of regeneration? (*TS* 1991, 8:266). In fact, the training of a thirty-three-strong group of chosen Korean troops by a Russian military advisor earlier in the autumn of 1896 was considered a success by *Tongnip sinmun*, as the “intelligent-looking lads” learned the “most needed points of being systematic in daily duties, obedient to superiors and clean in person and belongings.” And the fact that the commands the “lads” learned so successfully were, quite naturally, in the instructor’s native Russian, did not discourage at all the newspaper’s English editorial writer (*TS* 1991, 7:84).

The optimism brought to *Tongnip sinmun*’s Westernizing nationalists by the successes of the Japanese or Indians in British uniforms at gaining proper masculine qualities, was, however, cautioned by an important fact: The new standards of masculinity obviously were not quickly spreading over the walls of the mostly Seoul-located “new style” schools and military units further into the masses of the population. True, as *Tongnip sinmun*’s English “Editorial Notes” gladly informed its readership on July 8, 1897, “the military fervour” was “on the increase” among Seoul boys on the streets, who sometimes imitated the military drills “relatively well,” even picking up Russian and Japanese commands and bugle calls. The newspaper forcefully stated that “this form of play among children should be encouraged and fostered by grown people, as it will impress upon young minds the beauty of regularity and uniformity” (*TS* 1991, 7:434). This phenomenon was laconically described by the American minister to Korea, Dr. Horace N. Allen (1858–1932), in the following way: “the little urchins have taken to imitating the soldiers drilled in foreign style and give the commands quite credibly, even to sounding the bugle calls on little toy horns” (1975, 128). The “military craze” of 1897 was witnessed by the British lady traveler Isabella Bishop (1831–1904) as well, as she obviously was impressed by the sight of Paejae Missionary school students drilling in European military uniform on her last visit to Seoul in 1897 (Bishop 1970, 389).

Despite all these “signs of progress,” the traditional forms of Chosŏn lower-class masculinity were more than visible, even on Seoul’s streets. The traditional seasonal stone fights, which Allen described in some length, reporting that they often led to “a few fatalities and many serious wounds” (1975, 129), were continuing unabated in the capital and provinces. *Tongnip sinmun* itself was once obliged to report in its English “Local Items” pages (February 12, 1898) that in one case, the stone fighters had seriously intended to kill the policemen who tried to stop them from conducting this time-honored masculinity affirmation ritual (*TS* 1991, 8:326). The policemen, who were supposed to be paragons of disciplinarian spirit and symbols of state power, were reported by *Tongnip sinmun* to drink and engage in brawls with strangers (*TS* 1991, 8:46); to be beaten up and thrown unconscious into a drainage ditch by the belligerent servants of a prominent member of the influential Min clan, Min Pyŏngsŏk (1858–1940) (*TS* 1991,

8:170) and also once thrashed almost to death by a band of unruly soldiers irritated by their failure to open a city gate at night (*TS* 1991, 7:111); to be completely ignored by a gang of fifty-odd armed robbers, who stormed, pistols in hand, the house of a rich merchant in Söbinggo, just near the Seoul gates (*TS* 1991, 8:174); to fail to apprehend the robbers even after having witnessed a robbery (*TS* 1991, 4:16); to be engaging in vicious fights with each other while playing traditional chess (*TS* 1991, 8:178); and to engage in a lively fistfight with the soldiers of the royal guard (*ch'inwidae*), who dared to smoke traditional long pipes in front of a police station (*TS* 1991, 8:294).

The soldiers, in their turn, were customarily engaged in earning extra money by taking by force the horses and oxen of the powerless passersby going to the butchers and plundered the countryside in a variety of traditional ways (*TS* 1991, 8:54, 130) while being unable to impose the essentials of modern military discipline on those who stood above them in the social pecking order. An attempt by soldiers on sentry duty guarding their barracks in a provincial town to stop a passing Secret Royal Inspector and check his name led to the latter having the former tied up and flogged! (*TS* 1991, 8:143).

The officers, in their turn, felt themselves confident enough refusing an order to travel to Japan only because it could imply the shaving of their traditional topknot, the symbol of adult manhood in Chosŏn society (*TS* 1991, 8:135), and were openly pronounced untrustworthy by the *Tongnip sinmun* modernizers because of their frequent participation in various conspiracy cases and perceived lack of full loyalty toward the government (*TS* 1991, 7:102).

As Western norms of soldierly masculinity—the only legitimate ones, from the vantage point of the *Tongnip sinmun* publishers—were visibly lacking, even in the supposedly reformed military and police apparatus of the Korean state, *Tongnip sinmun* was often editorializing to the effect that the lack of discipline was to eventually ruin the state as a whole. One of its Korean editorials (August 22, 1898), entitled “The Ways of Expediency, Which Ruin the State” (“Nara rül manghanün kwöndo”), treated the question of military discipline in the context of what was supposed to be the “Korean disease” in a broader meaning of the word:

Looking at the soldiers currently on sentry duty here and there, one cannot help noticing that they often leave their rifles and go away from their sentry posts to do sightseeing or enjoy mischief. If some bad people suddenly take these guns, what measures will be at [the soldiers'] disposal? ... According to the regulations, policemen should make the rounds of inspection by turns, and there is nothing in the regulations about them smoking, taking a nap or talking in their tents. But they started to follow the way of expediency and pleasure themselves in violation of the regulations on hotter days and colder nights, and then it became a habit, so they turned into policemen, who spent most of

their time in their tents ... The reason why Korea became so weak today is because of the preference given to the expedient ways, and the propensity towards violating regulations in the name of comfort ... If the regulations and laws are not kept, the country will naturally enough fall into danger. (*TS* 1991, 4:73–74)

In this quite eloquent editorial, a disorderly policeman or soldier becomes a metaphor for Korea's lethal "weakness," which, in the social Darwinist worldview of the *Tongnip sinmun* publishers (Chŏn 1996, 114–35), could only result in the eventual ruin of the country and nation. This campaign by *Tongnip sinmun* does not seem to have influenced to any serious degree a pitiful state of discipline in the Korean army, which continued to be a source of trouble for the police and especially for civilians in the beginning of the 1900s (Hyŏn 2002, 266); however, it did influence the understanding of masculinity by the wider layers of Western-oriented upper- and middle-class Koreans, who then continued to introduce and systemize new models of masculine behavior in the 1900s.

The 1900s and Further Indigenization of the New Masculinity Discourses

After the suppression of the Independence Club—which *Tongnip sinmun* was meant to represent—in 1898–99, the nongovernmental reformist movements in Korea entered into their "hibernation" period until 1904–5, as Kojong's government was launching its bid to rebuild Korea into an absolute monarchy that would not tolerate any sort of political activism from below. The situation decisively changed only after the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War in February 1904, as the Japanese occupation of the peninsula worked to weaken Kojong's position and forced him to tolerate more of his subjects' participation in debating clubs and political societies, and even clandestinely support some of them, in order to offset the onslaught of openly pro-Japanese elements (Ch'oe Kiyŏng 2003, 35–55, 224–94). Though *Tongnip sinmun* was discontinued by the government on December 4, 1899, a plethora of new modernist newspapers and journals published by highly politicized educational and academic societies came into being after February 1904. Of special notice was the radically nationalist *Taehan maeil sinbo* (*Korea Daily News*), launched on July 18, 1904, and secretly financed by Kojong's court (Chŏng Chinsŏk 1990, 230). That newspaper's vernacular Korean, mixed Sino-Korean, and English editions had 13,256 subscribers by May 1907 (Kye 1979, 128), and together with the combined readership of 5,357 of the two pre-existing moderately nationalist papers, *Hwangŏng sinmun* and *Cheguk sinmun*, it gave the nationalist press 18,613 subscribers—mostly bureaucrats, modernist *yangban* landlords, richer traders, and peasants. But the real outreach of the masculinity discourses carried on by this modernist media was much broader, as it was customary to recite newspapers collectively in schools, city residential quarters, and villages (Kim Minhwan 2002, 138–40). The journals, which carried on what

amounted to a public intellectual discourse in late 1900s Korea, were meant largely for a highbrow readership, with a circulation mostly of 500–1,000, and were published either by national and provincial academic or debating societies (e.g., the Korean Self-Strengthening Society launched its monthly *Taehan chaganghoe wŏlbo* in 1906, and the Pyongyang region-based Western Friends Academic Society started its monthly *Sŏu* in 1907) or by private individuals (Ch'oe Namsŏn, mentioned in the prologue, started his journal for would-be intellectuals, *Sonyŏn*, in November 1908). *T'aekŭk hakpo*, cited in the prologue, belonged to the first group of association-affiliated intellectual monthly publications (Kim Minhwan 2002, 173–74). Insofar as the reading of such journals was *de rigueur* for teachers of the mushrooming private and state schools—there were about 2,250 private schools by 1910 (Eckert et al. 1990, 247–53), in addition to around 150 governmental and semigovernmental educational establishments of various kinds (132 four-year primary schools, various specialized schools, and so on)—the pictures of ideal masculinity by the journal contributors could indirectly reach audiences of tens of thousands of students.

An important feature of the late 1900s modernization movement, which also helped make the new modernization discourses more persuasive for the majority of the educated classes, was broader participation of the reformist Confucian element—most typically, minor or middle-ranked bureaucrats with a good Confucian education who often became interested in the problems of modernization under *Tongnip sinmun* influence but, unlike Sŏ Chaep'il and his colleagues, could not read English and learned what they could about the “New World” from Liang Qichao (1873–1929) treatises, missionary translations of Western works into literary Chinese, or Japanese books. As the reformist Confucians tended to represent modernist ideas in the flowery language of classical Sinic idioms, their writings looked much more authoritative for the classically educated *yangban* than the more down-to-earth vernacular editorials of *Tongnip Sinmun*, which mostly referred to much lesser known Western models. A typical example of such a reformer was Pak Ŭnsik (1859–1925), known as an editorial writer of *Taehan maeil sinbo* and a frequent contributor to such journals as *Taehan chaganghoe wŏlbo* and *Sŏu*. An heir to the orthodox *noron* school of Chosŏn neo-Confucianism, closely connected to such eminent figures from the mighty Min clan, such as the above-mentioned Min Pyŏngsŏk, who learned much of his understanding of modernity from Timothy Richard's (1845–1919) hugely popular Chinese translation of Mackenzie's *History of the Nineteenth Century* (1895), entitled *Taixi xinshi* (*Taesŏ sinsa*), as well as Japanese literature (No 2000), Pak Ŭnsik explained in his *New Discourse on Academic Regulations* (*Hakkyu sinron*, 1904) that the models of man should be figures from the Chinese pre-Zhou and Zhou time antiquity:

In the old days, new-born males were given bows made of mulberry wood and arrows with flights made of mugwort, which they would shoot in all

four directions of the compass, signifying that everywhere under the Heaven is the scene for males activity. That is why the schools of the three ancient epochs of Xia, Yin and Zhou nurtured pupils' bodies through dance, and taught them to elaborate their [noble] aims in song. The concurrent study of both literature and military affairs started from there. ... The term "six arts"—etiquette, music, shooting, riding, writing and arithmetic—meant the study of the essentials and their practice from primary school age. And its methods were really active, not dull and depressed. ... But in our country today ... pupils are just to sit and stare at the walls as if they fear and avoid something, not daring to make any movements at will. How is it possible to nurture their bodies in this way? That is why they are always depressed and passive, with all kinds of bad consequences resulting from it. (Yi Manyŏl 1980, 63–65).

This modernist ideal of the nurturing of body and spirit legitimized by some idiosyncratically interpreted references to Chinese antiquity—pretty much in the same way that Ch'oe Namsŏn provided additional legitimacy to his cult of Bismarck and Peter the Great by comparing their self-sacrificial spirit with that of China's old heroes—was also on the micro level of the state-related discourse, partly divorced by Pak Ŭnsik from traditional morals, substituted now by the modernist "patriotism" and rather instrumentalist understanding of ethics. In his 1911 biography of Yŏn Kaesomun (?–666), the Koguryŏ aristocrat notorious among traditional historiographers for his 642 regicidal coup d'état but also well famed for the successful struggle against the invading Tang dynasty armies, Pak Ŭnsik laments that Chosŏn dynasty Koreans "deified and feared the corrupt, unwise and cowardly" aristocracy and, "in an atmosphere of flattery, blind obedience and self-preserving opportunism," were not inclined to "worship and study the heroes." He then contradicts the negative portrayal of Yŏn Kaesomun in the following way:

Britain's Cromwell and Japan's Toyotomi Hideyoshi⁴ were guilty in greatly over-stepping the norms of morality, but do not the British worship Cromwell as a deity and do not the Japanese worship Toyotomi Hideyoshi as a progenitor of their state? One may say that it means only that those [two] countries respect achievements while not worshipping ethics, but even in the ethic-worshipping land of China did not the first historian Sima Qian⁵ put Xiang Yu's⁶ history into the Imperial Annals section?" (Yi Manyŏl 1980, 170–71)

⁴Toyotomi Hideyoshi (1536–98) was the politician who succeeded in unifying Japan's feudal domains under his personal leadership.

⁵The Chinese historian Sima Qian (ca. 145–90 BCE) is traditionally regarded as the father of China's historiography. "Imperial Annals" refers to a section in his magnum opus, *Shiji* (Records of the Grand Historian).

⁶Xiang Yu (232–202 BCE), a prominent warlord during the fall of the Qin dynasty (221–207 BCE), was notorious for his impetuous character and brutality.

The reason that the regicidal Yŏn Kaesomun was to be “worshipped” alongside another hero of regicide drama, Cromwell, and Japan’s aspiring unifier, Toyotomi, was Yŏn Kaesomun’s “patriotic independence spirit,” which enabled him to withstand the attacks of the Tang armies. That the modern “hero” was no longer tied to the traditional moralizing was shown also by Ch’oe Namsŏn’s placement of Jesus alongside Bismarck and Peter the Great. That the latter’s “national revivals,” “restorations,” and conquests were all executed with all possible violations of the former’s precepts did not matter: What mattered were the achievements and the degree of hero’s attachment to the “heroic endeavor.” However, the possibility of breaking with ethics for the sake of the nation-state as the highest ethical aim in the nationalist code did not mean that the nationals were to behave cynically in their relations with the state and each other. On the contrary, they were to behave as old good *kunja*, but with loyalty toward the nation-state placed solidly above allegiance to one’s family and the “cultivation of the adventurous spirit” considered as important as the bookish education of the former days. The ways in which the old *kunja* pattern of masculinity was being appropriated for the new aims are visible, for example, in the advice on the “Science of [running one’s] Family” (*Kajŏnghak*), serialized in *Honam hakpo*, the organ of the Honam (Chŏlla Province) Academic Society (*Honam hakhoe*). The portion, published in issue six of this journal (November 1908), recommended treating children with respect, as “they already became nationals (*kungmin*)” and also “may one day, who knows, grow into the bulwarks of the state and wise officials of the court.” To help children to reach this desirable aim, one had to “make their ethics progress” from the earliest age and cultivate their “patriotic feelings, bravery and bodily strength,” but without neglecting their “habit of filial piety,” also an important part of the manly “indomitable spirit” (*HKH* 1976, 17:347–53). While counting children as both actual and potential “nationals” and emphasizing their “patriotic feelings and bodily strength” combined with “bravery” was certainly an innovation, an accent on “filial piety” and the prospect of state service as the most desirable way of contributing to society also show the influence of the Confucian *kunja* paradigm, appropriated by the reformers, on the essential content of the new masculinity ideals.

Patriotic, self-sacrificial “vigor” (*wŏn’gi*) was to be nurtured through sports. A member of Pak Ŭnsik’s Western Friends Academic Society (*Sŏu hakhoe*), a certain Kim Hŭisŏn, made clear in his article “The Necessity of Physical Education” (*Ch’eyuk ŭi p’iryŏ*) in the fourth issue of the monthly *Sŏu* (March 1907) that the vigor of the “nation” (*kungmin*) was dependent on the state of the nation’s physical fitness. Physical weakness of the nation led to a weakened “spiritual/mental strength” (*simnyŏk*), and that, in turn, threatened the nation’s academic progress, as well as its ability to get along in the age of “armed peace,” when a nation’s existence depends only on its muscular and intellectual strength. Korea was precisely in a such position when, despite the existence

of the “spirit of loyalty to the King and love of the state,” both bravery and the “spirit of strenuous exertion” (*punbaljisim*) were “completely absent” on account of the lack of physical preparedness. Kim Hŭisŏn’s practical recommendations mostly emphasized the introduction and practice of light gymnastics, which “made the bones more flexible and helped to better use the arms,” and heavy gymnastics, which was instrumental in “obliterating cowardice and nurturing both muscular strength and the spirit of perseverance” (*HKH* 1976, 5:202–3).

What might be the consequences of the negligent attitude toward the nation’s physique was discussed in detail in another *Sŏu* text (June 1907), penned by another Western Friends Academic Society member, a certain Kim Ponggwān. Noting that in the worldwide struggle for survival, knowledge and its prerequisite, physical strength, are both main determinants of success, and that teaching and training children (the text implies that predominantly male children are meant) is the prime responsibility of their parents and teachers, he then deplored Korea’s realities, where focus on teaching was “impairing the development of the bodies,” and warned that “this evil” would affect not only individuals but also the nation as well: With “diminishing physical strength,” “the race (*injong*) will gradually become weakened and degraded, unable to withstand external enemies.” The only way out of such a predicament, according to Kim Ponggwān, was to institute obligatory schooling and to ensure that pupils got enough regimented, regular sports, as well as strolls, gymnastics, and swimming, and were forbidden to drink, smoke, and sleep until late hours (*HKH* 1976, 5:378–80).

Inasmuch as the lack of sportive training in a masculine individual could endanger both the nation/race and the state, physical health built on regular exercise was taken by *Sŏu* writers as very much a prerequisite for authentic citizenship. For example, the last of the “10 precepts of hygienic theory” (translated, obviously from either Japanese or English, by a certain Pak Sangmok), published in *Sŏu*’s August 1907 issue, stated that “Everybody who wishes to succeed in necessary things, have joyful thoughts, awaken to the real taste of life, discharge all the obligations toward the state and become a faithful citizen, can achieve this only if healthy—and that is why hygiene is so indispensable” (*HKH* 1976, 5:497). The same topic—physical exercise and sports as the crucial prerequisite for “healthy” nationhood and authentic citizenship—was developed in a much longer text by Yi Chongman titled “Effects of Physical Training upon the State” (*Ch’eyuk i kukka e taehan hyoryŏk—Sŏbuk hakhoe wŏlbo*, November 1909). Yi Chongman maintained that sports and physical training on the national level were as crucial for the business of nurturing conscious nationals, as a healthy body was crucial for the development of the individual—only institutionalized sports could produce “brave males” (*yongjanghan namja*), able to “achieve their results in any affair by strenuous efforts” Then, field sports nurtured the team spirit—the ability to follow orders and nimbly move the body from left to right together with other bodies, thus achieving the “unity of consciousness”

with the collective. And last but not least, sports fostered the “bravery and spirit of adventure” needed, together with bodily strength, by (male) nationals to strengthen their state in these times of “competition for survival and survival of the fittest.” The disciplined, regimented, vigorous masculinity of a patriotic sportsman was thus defined as the only way to survival in the social Darwinist jungles of the “New World” (Yi Hangnae 1989, 44–45).

The “theoretical” texts of this kind show very well the details of the logical connection between the spread of sports, the nurturing of national vigor, and the paramount task of national survival, which was romantically narrated in the song of baseball players cited in the prologue. The “heroic” masculine spirit, in which “patriotism and loyalty” were upheld by bravery, self-sacrificial attitudes, and bodily and spiritual “vigor,” needed the playing fields as much as it needed the battlefields, imaginary or real, past and present. Sport was entrusted with the task of nurturing the masculine “national vigor” (*kungmin ūi wŏn’gi*)—and from this vantage point, even a plain baseball match was a sort of nation-building ritual, affirming and strengthening the participants’ belonging to the imagined masculine community.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

He expected to die: he was willing to die for the dear England whose beauty and majesty he knew: and he advanced toward the brink in perfect serenity, with absolute conviction of the rightness of his country’s cause ... Joyous, fearless, versatile, deeply instructed, with classic symmetry of mind and body, ruled by high undoubting purpose, he was all that one would wish England’s noblest sons to be in the days when no sacrifice but the most precious is acceptable, and the most precious is that which is most freely proffered.

As George Mosse has aptly noticed, these phrases from Winston Churchill’s obituary, written for the contradictory and confused poet of war, manliness, and national devotion, Rupert Brooke (*The Times*, April 26, 1915), encapsulate in a precise, succinct way the nineteenth-century nationalized ideal of masculinity rejuvenated by the trench camaraderie of World War I (Mosse 1985, 118–28). But although the discursive roots of the somatic nationalism in early modern Korea may unmistakably be traced in the very end to the game ethics and character building of nineteenth-century Europe’s middle and higher classes, the Korean case shows the closest typological affinity with the emergent sport nationalisms of the later nineteenth and early twentieth century in Europe’s colonies. Made into a Japanese protectorate (a semicolony in reality) in 1905 and fully annexed by Japan in 1910, Korea felt the full pressure of imperialist encroachment already in 1894, when it was occupied by Japanese troops from the very

beginning of the Sino-Japanese War. And from the time of its inception, Korea's sporting nationalism was built on the all-permeating sense of national emergency and the painful anticipation of the "downfall of the state and extinction of the race" if Korea's manliness should not be "regenerated" (Kim Kwangjung 1992). As urgent and, at the same time, thorough transplantation of the European nationalist masculinity norms ("regeneration of manliness") was best achieved by invoking and co-opting the traditional paradigms of idealized manliness into the new construction of patriotic manhood, Korea's youthful sportsmen of the 1900s were urged, in the spirit of age-old Confucian rhetoric, to be "virtuous gentlemen." In a very similar way, the volunteers of the Hindu nationalist organization, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, founded by Dr. Keshav Baliram Hedgewar (1889–1940) in 1925, who often received training in the martial arts "for self-defense purposes," were enjoined to follow the time-honored ideal of *brahmachari*—the way of life of a selfless, moral, and celibate disciple whose devotion to the common good is in direct proportion to his self-control (Alter 1994). In the same way that the Korean nationalist emphasis on Korean men's inherent virility, to be "regenerated" through sport and drill, implicitly—and, in the case of more radical nationalists, such as Sin Ch'aeho, quite explicitly—contradicted the Japanese colonialist assumptions about effeminate, cowardly, and unpatriotic Koreans (Kim Minsŏn 1999, 563–80), Gaelic football or hurling, made popular by the Gaelic Athletic Association (founded in 1884), was to counteract the Victorian British characterizations of the Irish as either drunken ruffians or effeminate, feckless, child-like inferiors in need of Anglo-Saxon domination (McDevitt 1997). Like many other peripheral sport nationalisms, the Korean one was to produce and proudly display virile, powerful, beautiful manly bodies—a sight that could provide some psychological compensation for what was commonly perceived as the country's rather low position in the international pecking order at present and the hope for the "greatness of the Korean flag" at some point in the future. This gorgeous, encouraging sight was a locus of both inclusion and exclusion. Not unlike the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh or the Gaelic Athletic Association, the Korean student sports teams of the later 1900s, such as the pioneering baseball team whose song was mentioned in the prologue, were keen to emphasize that they strove to transcend the traditional status group boundaries and social divisions in the name of the nation. Indeed, the prominent role that the son of the non-*yangban* trading family, Ch'oe Namsŏn, was allowed to play in the Korean student milieu in Japan was a sign of the changing times and the gradual erosion of the *yangban* societal hegemony. However, just as the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh of the colonial times was in reality led by the members of higher castes, who were decidedly conscious of the caste backgrounds of their volunteers, most of the Korean students in Japan in the later 1900s, who were, then, to return home to promote modern sports and drills in the schools and through the modern media, hailed mostly from *yangban* or, like Ch'oe Namsŏn, wealthy *chungin* lineages (Yi and Song 1980).

The scions of the poorer, unable to enter the modern schools, the main centers of sporting activities, were practically excluded from the nationalist somatic training. In order to enter a governmental middle school, one usually had, for example, to pass entrance exams in classical Chinese and Korean on the basis of previous schooling in some other institution or at home and often pay tuition (Kim Yöngu 1996, 171–73). Likewise, women were, as in the case of the Gaelic Athletic Association, largely sidelined, given only some basic gymnastic training on the assumption that it is necessary in order to produce healthy male offspring for the sacrosanct nation, or they were reduced to supporting roles or the status of admiring spectators—the nation was to encompass both sexes, but combat and sports, conceived as training for the war, were to be male preserves.

In Korea's case, “the classical symmetry” of the patriotic mind and a disciplined, well-trained body—the zest of masculinity's poetics in the age of high imperialism and triumphal nationalism—was a hybrid heir to at least two local masculinity paradigms, that of the noble-minded *kunja* literati, whose loyalty was now gradually shifting from the dynastic state and the “immovable” morality norms to the new paramount values of national independence and sovereignty, and that of the Kim Ku-type commoner whose respect for the figure of a fearless street fighter certainly predated the conversion to the modern national idea. While the *kunja* paradigm, with its traditional emphasis on “lofty aims,” self-discipline, and moral rectitude, has very much shown itself in the paramount importance attributed by Ch'oe Namsön and others to the idea of self-sacrifice—modernist, but deeply rooted in the traditional Confucian discourses—the commoners' respect for fierce, tough manliness, routinely displayed in the seasonal collective fights between neighboring villages' teams was to be channeled into the militaristic aspects of the new masculine ethos. This, however, was not easy—obedience to one's “betters” was certainly expected in premodern Korea's everyday life, but it was fairly different from the modern idea of discipline, and the late 1890s Korean soldiers and policemen probably did not consider leaving their arms to take a drink, failing to make the regular inspection rounds, or forcibly taking the horses and oxen from passersby to be unsoldierly or disobedient behavior. The production of ideally disciplined, docile modern male bodies and souls, which would not simply rejoice in an occasional sportive game or feel vaguely patriotic about their nation and state, but would also measure their manly worth in terms of regular training and precise execution of orders, was the task essentially to be fulfilled by the modern obligatory schooling system and conscript army. Both were among the things the 1900s modernists wished most to get implemented, but Kojong's March 1903 edict on the introduction of the conscription system remained a dead letter (Hyön 2002, 269–75), and the late 1900s campaign by the academic and educational societies for the introduction of compulsory schooling hardly yielded any tangible results. These campaigns, as well as appeals for the “reformation of the [Korean] bodies” (*yukch'e kaejo*) by the “cultural nationalists” of the 1920s and 1930s, were usually

treated in South Korea's nationalistic scholarship as "patriotically anti-Japanese in their essence" (Yi Hangnae 1989, 35–46, 139–46), and only recent postnationalist research has started to pay attention to the degree to which the early modern Korean vision of the "healthy national body" was informed by the models provided exactly by the colonizing power that Koreans wished to outdo in their pursuit of the modern bodily excellence (Ch'ŏn Chŏnghwan 2005). The new model of disciplined, militarized masculinity, admired by the intelligentsia of colonial Korea, was implanted in earnest in the everyday modes of life during the total mobilization of the Pacific War (with willing collaboration on the part of many "cultural nationalists" turned war supporters; see Kim and Sin 2001) and then, after the decolonization in 1945, by the regimental authoritarian states in both North and South Korea.

Acknowledgments

I am grateful to my department for generously funding my trip to the Ninth International Interdisciplinary Congress on Women, "Women's Worlds 2005" (held at Ewha Womans University, Seoul, in June 2005), where the draft version of this paper was first presented. I owe a debt to my co-presenters, Moon Seungsook, Choi Hyaeweol, and Ko Misuk, whose important comments helped me improve this paper. Fruitful discussions with Seoul colleagues who shared my interest in the process of formation of the modernity paradigms in late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Korea—especially with Chŏng Sŏnt'ae, Kwŏn Podŭrae, Chŏng Yŏul, and O Sŏnmin from the Suyu Research Institute—contributed to my understanding of early modern Korea's masculinity discourse. My general understanding of the history of modern Korean sports in the context of the nationalized vision of masculinity was greatly improved by familiarizing myself with Ch'ŏn Chŏnghwan's recent work. Last but not least, I also must acknowledge the very insightful comments and suggestions from Kenneth George and two anonymous readers of the *Journal of Asian Studies*.

List of References

- ALLEN, CHIZUKO T. 2005. "Ch'oe Namson at the Height of Japanese Imperialism." *Sungkyun Journal of East Asian Studies* 5 (1): 27–51.
- ALLEN, HORACE N. 1908. *Things Korean: A Collection of Sketches and Anecdotes, Missionary and Diplomatic*. Seoul: Kyŏngin munhwasa, 1975.
- ALTER, JOSEPH S. 1994. "Somatic Nationalism: Indian Wrestling and Militant Hinduism." *Modern Asian Studies* 28 (3): 557–88.
- AN CHUNGGŪN. 1979. *An Chunggŭn ūisa chasŏjŏn* [Martyr An Chunggŭn's Autobiography]. Seoul: An Chunggŭn ūisa sungmohoe.
- AN KISU. 1995. "Yŏngung sosŏl yŏn'gu" [Research on the Heroic Novels]. PhD diss., Chungang University.
- AN PYŒNGJIK, ed. 1979. *Sin Ch'aeho*. Seoul: Han'gilsa.
- AN TAEHOE. 2000. *Han'guk hansŏ ūi punsŏk kwa sigak* [Analysis of and View on Korean Poetry in Classical Chinese]. Seoul: Yŏnse Taehakkyo Ch'ulp'anbu.

- BARLOW, TANI E. 1994. "Theorizing Woman: Funü, Guojia, Jiating (Chinese Woman, Chinese State, Chinese Family)." In *Body, Subject and Power in China*, ed. Angela Zito and Tani E. Barlow, 253–91. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- BISHOP, ISABELLA BIRD. 1898. *Korea and Her Neighbours*. Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 1970.
- BROWNELL, SUSAN. 1995. *Training the Body for China: Sports in the Moral Order of the People's Republic*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- CHANG KYUSIK. 2001. *Ilche ha Han'guk kidokkyo minjokchuwüi yŏn'gu* [Research on Korean Christian Nationalism under Japanese Imperialism]. Seoul: Hyeon.
- CH'OE KIYŎNG. 2003. *Han'guk kŏndae kyemong sasang yŏn'gu* [Research on Modern Korean Enlightenment Thought]. Seoul: Ilchogak.
- CH'OE NAMSŎN. 1906. "Hönsinjök chöngsin." *T'aekük Hakpo* 1:17–19; 2: 12–14. [HKH, 13:24–27, 82–84]
- CH'ÖN CHÖNGHWAN. 2005. *Kkŏnnaji annün sindŭrom* [The Endless Syndrome]. Seoul: P'urŏn yŏksa.
- CHÖN POKHŪI. 1996. *Sahoe chinhwaron kwa kukka sasang* [Social Darwinism and Ideas on Statehood]. Seoul: Hanul Ak'ademi.
- CHÖNG CHINSÖK. 1990. *Han'guk öllon sa* [History of Korean Media]. Seoul: Nanam.
- CHÖNG YAGYONG. 1999. *Hŏmhŏm sinsö* [New Book on Justice Written with Reverence]. 3 vols. Trans. and annot. Pak Söngmu, and Chöng Haeryöm. Seoul: Hyöndae sirhaksa.
- CONNOLY, CYRIL. 1988. *The Enemies of Promise*. London: Andre Deutsch.
- DAVIDOFF, LEONORE, and CATHERINE HALL. 1987. *Family Fortunes: Men and Women of the English Middle Class, 1780–1850*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- ECKERT, CARTER J, et al. 1990. *Korea Old and New: A History*. Seoul: Ilchogak.
- FREVERT, UTE. 1996. "Soldaten, Staatsbürger: Überlegungen zur historischen Konstruktion von Männlichkeit" [Soldiers, Citizens: Reflections on the Historical Construction of Masculinity]. In *Männergeschichte—Geschlechtergeschichte: Männlichkeit im Wandel der Moderne* [The History of Men—The History of Gender: Modern Masculinity in the Change], ed. ThomasKühne, 69–87. Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag.
- GILMORE, DAVID D. 1990. *Manhood in the Making: Cultural Concepts of Masculinity*. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.
- HAN'GUK YÖKSA YÖN' GUHOE 19 SEGI CHÖNGCH'ISA YÖN'GUBAN [Association for the Study of Korean History, Group for the Study of Nineteenth-Century Political History]. 1990. *Chosön chöngch'isa: 1800–1863* [Chosön Political History: 1800–1863]. 2 vols. Seoul: Ch'öngnyönsa.
- HARGREAVES, JOHN. 1986. *Sport, Power, and Culture: A Social and Historical Analysis of Popular Sports in Britain*. Cambridge, U.K.: Polity Press.
- HKA:OEBU [Foreign Ministry]. 1909. *Hwanghaedo körae an* [Documents Related to Hwanghae Province]. 3 vols. Seoul: Kyujanggak Library, No. 17986.
- HKH: HAN'GUKHAK MUNHÖN YÖN'GUSO [Research Institute for Korean Studies Documents]. 1976. *Han'guk kaehwagi haksulchi* [Korea's Academic Journals of the Modern Reform Period]. 21 vols. Seoul: Asea munhwasa.
- HOBBSAWM, ERIC, and TERENCE RANGER. 1983. *The Invention of Tradition*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- HODGE, BOB, and KAM LOUIE. 1998. *The Politics of Chinese Language and Culture*. London: Routledge.
- HS: KUKSAP'YÖNCH'AN WIWÖNHÖE [National Committee for History Compilation]. 2000. *Han'guk sa* [Korean History]. 60 vols. Seoul: T'amgudang.
- HWANG HYÖN. 2005. *Maech'ön yarak* [Unofficial Records of Maech'ön]. Trans. Im Hyöngt'aek et al. Seoul: Munhak kwa chisöngsa.

- HYŎN KWANGHO. 2002. *Taehan cheguk ūi taeoe chŏngch'aek* [The Foreign Policy of the Taehan Empire]. Seoul: Sinsŏwŏn.
- IM SŎNGNAE. 1997. "Wanp'an So Taesŏng chŏn ūi taejung sosŏljŏk kibŏp" [The Popular Novel Technique of the Full-Text Version of *So Taesŏng chŏn*]. *Yŏlsang kojŏn yŏn'gu* 10: 185–208.
- KANG CHAEŎN. 1982. *Han'guk kŭndaesa yŏn'gu* [Research on Korea's Modern History]. Seoul: Hanbat ch'ulp'ansa.
- KIM CH'ŎL, and SIN HYŎNGGI, eds. 2001. *Munhak sok ūi p'asijŭm* [Fascism in Korean Literature]. Seoul: Samin.
- KIM KIJU. 1993. *Hanmal chaeil han'guk yuhaksaeng ūi minjok undong* [National Movement by Korean Students in Japan in the Last Years of the Taehan Empire]. Seoul: Nŭt'inamu.
- KIM KU. 1997. *Paekpŏm ilchi* [Paekpŏm Diary]. Trans. To Chinsun. Seoul: Tolpegae.
- . 2000. *Paekpŏm ilchi: The Autobiography of Kim Ku*. Trans. Jongsoo Lee. Lanham, Md.: University Press of America.
- KIM KWANGJUNG. 1992. "Hanmal aegukyemong undonggi ūi sinkyoyuk kuguknon." [The "National Salvation through New Education" Ideas in the Period of Patriotic Enlightenment Movement in the Last Years of the Taehan Empire]. *Sahak yŏn'gu* 43–44:193–213.
- KIM MINHWAN. 2002. *Han'guk ŏllon sa* [The History of Korean Media]. Seoul: Nanam.
- KIM MINSŎN. 1999. "Sin Ch'aeho ūi kyoyuk sasang" [Sin Ch'aeho's Ideas on Education]. In *Han'guk kŭnhyŏndae ihaenggi sahoe yŏn'gu* [Research on Korean Society in the Transitional Period to Modernity], ed. KimHoil, 563–80. Seoul: Sinsŏwŏn.
- KIM PUSIK. 1993 [1145]. *Samguk sagi* [Historical Records of the Three Kingdoms]. Trans. Yi Chaeho. Seoul: Kwangsin Ch'ulp'ansa.
- KIM PYŎNGCH'ŎL. 1980. *Han'guk kŭndae sŏyang munhak iipsa yŏn'gu* [Research on the History of the Introduction of Modern Western Literature into Korea]. Seoul: Ŭryu munhaksa.
- KIM SŎNGWŎN. 1987. *Han'guk ūi sesi p'ungsok* [Korea's Seasonal Customs]. Seoul: Myŏngmundang.
- KIM UNT'AE. 1971. "Chosŏn hugi sahoe ūi haech'e kwajŏng kwa chŏngch'i, haengjŏng munhwa ūi pyŏnch'ŏn" [The Process of Dissolution in Late Chosŏn Society and Changes in Its Politics, Administration, and Culture]. *Minjok munhwa yŏn'gu* 5:1–28.
- KIM YŎNGU. 1996. *Han'guk kaehwagi ūi kyoyuk* [Education in the Period of Modern Reforms in Korea]. Seoul: Kyoyuk kwahaksa.
- KOKOPEL, BRUCE, and GEORGE LAKEY. 1983. "More Power Than We Want: Masculine Sexuality and Violence." In *Off Their Backs ... and on Our Own Two Feet*, by Men Against Patriarchy, 17–24. Philadelphia: New Society.
- KYE HUNMO. 1979. *Han'guk ŏllon yŏnp'yo* [Chronological Tables of Korea's Media History]. Seoul: Kwanhun K'ŭllŏp.
- LARRAIN, JORGE. 1979. *The Concept of Ideology*. London: Hutchinson.
- LIEM, CHANNING. 1952. *America's Finest Gift to Korea: The Life of Philip Jaisohn*. New York: William-Frederick Press.
- LOUIE, KAM. 2002. *Theorizing Chinese Masculinity*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- MANGAN, JAMES. 1981. *Athleticism in the Victorian and Edwardian Public Schools*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- . 1986. "The Grit of Our Forefathers: Invented Traditions, Propaganda and Imperialism." In *Imperialism and Popular Culture*, ed. John M. Mackenzie, 113–39. Manchester, U.K.: Manchester University Press.
- . 1987. "Social Darwinism and Upperclass Education in Late Victorian and Edwardian England." In *Manliness and Morality: Middle-Class Masculinity in Britain and America, 1800–1940*, ed. James Mangan and James Walvin, 135–59. Manchester, U.K.: Manchester University Press.
- . 1992. *The Cultural Bond: Sport, Empire, Society*. London: F. Cass.
- MCDEVITT, PATRICK F. 1997. "Muscular Catholicism: Nationalism, Masculinity and Gaelic Team Sports, 1884–1916." *Gender and History* 9 (2): 262–84.
- MOSSE, GEORGE L. 1985. *Nationalism and Sexuality: Middle-Class Morality and Sexual Norms in Modern Europe*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
- . 1987. *Masses and Man: Nationalist and Fascist Perceptions of Reality*. Detroit, Mich.: Wayne State University Press.
- NO KWANBŎM. 2000. "1875–1904 nyŏn Pak Ŭnsik ũi chujahak ihae wa kyoyuk chagangnon" [The Understanding of Zhuxianism and the Ideas of Self-Strengthening through Education of Pak Ŭnsik in 1875–1904]. *Han'guk saron* 43:91–134.
- OKAMOTO SHUMPEI. 1970. *The Japanese Oligarchy and the Russo-Japanese War*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- OTTO, TON, and POUL PEDERSEN. 2005. *Tradition and Agency: Tracing Cultural Continuity and Invention*. Aarhus: Aarhus University Press.
- PANG SŎNJU. 1989. *Chaemi hanin ũi tongnip undong* [Independence Movement by the Koreans in the USA]. Ch'unch'ŏn: Hallim Taehakkyo Asia Munhwa Yŏn'guso.
- PIERSON, JOHN D. 1980. *Tokutomi Sohō, 1863–1957: A Journalist for Modern Japan*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- ROH YOUNG-KOO. 2004. "Yi Sun-shin, an Admiral Who Became a Myth." *Review of Korean Studies* 7 (3): 15–37.
- SCOTT, JOAN WALLACH. 1988. *Gender and the Politics of History*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- SEDGWICK, EVE KOSOFSKY. 1985. *Between Men*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- SIMSANSASANG YŎN'GUHOE [Society for Research on Simsan Ideas]. 1981. *Kim Ch'angsuk*. Seoul: Han'gilsa.
- SIN CH'AEHO. 1995. *Tanjae Sin Ch'aeho chŏnjip* [The Complete Works of Tanjae Sin Ch'aeho], 3 vols. Seoul: Hyŏngsŏl Ch'ulp'ansa.
- SIN, PONGNYONG. 1999. *Hanguk ũi chŏngch'i sasangga* [The History of Political Ideas in Korea]. Seoul: Chimmundang.
- SŎ, CHONGMUN. 1984. *P'ansori sasŏl ũi yŏn'gu* [Research on the Song Texts of the P'ansori]. Seoul: Hyŏngsŏng ch'ulp'ansa.
- SŎ, TAESŎK. 1985a. *Kundam sosŏl ũi kujo wa paegyŏng* [The Structure and Background of the Military Novels]. Seoul: Ihwa taehakkyo ch'ulp'anbu.
- . 1985b. "Yŏngung sosŏllon" [On the Heroic Novels]. In *Han'guk kojŏn sosŏllon* [On the Korean Classical Novel]. Seoul: Saemunsa.
- TONGNIP SINMUN YŎNGIN KANHAENGHOE [TS; Committee for Reprinting and Publishing *Tongnip Sinmun*]. 1991. *Tongnip sinmun*. 9 vols. Seoul: Kabŭl ch'ulp'ansa.
- VAN GULIK, ROBERT. 1974. *Sexual Life in Ancient China*. Leiden: Brill.
- WARREN, ALLEN. 1987. "Popular Manliness: Baden Powell, Scouting and the Development of Manly Character." In *Manliness and Morality: Middle-Class Masculinity in Britain and America, 1800–1940*, ed. James Mangan and James Walvin, 199–219. Manchester, U.K.: Manchester University Press.

- WILLIAMS, RAYMOND. 1982. *The Sociology of Culture*. New York: Schocken Books.
- YI HANGNAE. 1989. *Han'guk kŭndae ch'eyuk sa yŏn'gu* [Research on the History of Physical Culture in Modern Korea]. Seoul: Chisik Sanŏpsa.
- YI INSUK. 2000. "Kŭndae yesul ūi palchŏn: Ch'eyuk" [The Development of the Modern Arts: Physical Culture]. *HS* 45: 365–73.
- YI KANGHO, and SONG CHUNHO. 1980. "1907 nyŏn tangsiŭi Taehan cheguk kwanwŏn chung yuhak kyŏngnyŏk sojijaŭi chosa" [Survey of the Taehan Empire Officials, Who possessed the Experience of Studying Abroad in 1907]. *Chŏnbuk sahak* 4:349–67.
- YI MANYŎL, ed. 1980. *Pak Ŭnsik*. Seoul: Han'gilsa.
- YI POKKYU. 1993. *Im Kyŏngŏp chŏn yŏn'gu* [Study on Im Kyŏngŏp chŏn]. Seoul: Chimmundang.
- YI SANGIK. 1997. *Sŏgu ūi ch'unggyŏk kwa kŭndae han'guk sasang* [The Shock of the the West and Korea's Modern Ideas]. Seoul: Hanul Ak'ademi.
- YI YŎNGHWA. 2003. *Ch'oe Namsŏn ūi yŏksahak* [Historical Research by Ch'oe Namsŏn]. Seoul: Kyŏngin munhwasa.
- YŎKSA AMUNJE, YŎN'GUSO [Society for Research on Historical Problems]. 1993. *Inmul lo po nŭn ch'inilp'a yŏksa* [The History of the Pro-Japanese Group Read through Personalities]. Seoul: Yŏksa pip'yŏngsa.
- YU TAEYŎNG. 2004. *Kaehwagi Chosŏn kwa Miguk sŏn'gyosa* [Korea in the Time of Modern Reforms and the American Missionaries]. Seoul: Han'guk kidokkyo yŏksa yŏn'guso.