

The Nigerian State and Crisis of Development: A Study of Bayelsa State, 2010-2020

Orusaibogha Ebikedoumene Nelson

Registry Department, Federal University Otuoke, Yenagoa, Bayelsa State, Nigeria

ABSTRACT: Since the creation of Bayelsa State, several administrations have come and gone with various policy frameworks that are intended to drive development. However, the situation in the state reveals the opposite. Despite the numerous resources the state is blessed with in the Niger Delta region, she still suffers from the problem of lack of development. Thus, this study examined the Nigerian State and the crisis of development with a particular focus on Bayelsa State between 2010-2020. The study was led by three research questions and three research objectives. The investigation was guided by the Marxian political economy approach to provide a theoretical underpinning to the study. A descriptive research design was used for this study. The sample size of 400 respondents was chosen using a simple random. Structured questionnaires were employed to collect information for this investigation. 385 questionnaire copies were retrieved. The outcomes of the research revealed that the State battles with certain observed inhibitive factors to development which have over the years thrown the State into a misery of some sort. The survey also found that despite the numerous natural and human resources the country (Nigeria) significantly found in Bayelsa State, the crisis of development is still significantly felt as the leadership has been over the years incapable of driving the needed development the country as well as Bayelsa State needs within the period under review. Thus, the study recommended among others, that the Bayelsa State government should focus more on Human Capital Development (HCD) through people-centric developmental programmes.

KEYWORD: Development, State, Crisis.

1. INTRODUCTION

The concept of development is a highly contested one with different interpretations and meanings (Igbuzor, 2006). In accordance with Kambhampati (2004), development requires some level of growth and structural change, political transformation, improved health and education, modernization and some measure of distributive equity. Rist (2008, p.3) defines development as “a process of growth, a movement essentially springing from within the society that it is developing”. However, for some scholars (Kothari & Minogue, 2002, p.1), “while development undoubtedly takes place in some places, as measured by shifts in economic growth, relative poverty and inequality have also increased”. Nonetheless, though fraught with some limitations, the Human Development Report (HDR) has come to be one of the most respected and authoritative sources of knowledge as regards development issues and serves as a more successful alternative to the GDP measure of development which is based on economic indices (HDR, 2006; Igbuzor, 2006). This is because it is more people-centred, thereby making development more democratic and participatory (Rist, 2008).

Though endowed with an abundance of natural resources such as diamonds and oil, which have over the years translated into vast government revenue, Nigeria has failed to reach any substantial level of development (Yates, 1996; Ross, 1999). According to Akude (2007), economic and political development have been grossly neglected in some of these African countries endowed with natural resources such as Nigeria, Congo, Libya, Cameroon, Angola, and Ivory Coast including Sudan, thereby resulting in high levels of socio-economic underdevelopment and political instability, a description best qualified as a crisis of development (Ibeanu & Luckman, 2007). This crisis of development is often accompanied by corrupt and authoritarian leadership, ineffective government, poor policies, unproductive patterns of accumulation and political violence (Forrest, 1995, p.1). For the purpose of this dissertation, a crisis of development will be treated as the inability of the state to transform government revenue into the economic, political and social advancement of its population and society as a whole, a situation that will be illustrated here in the Nigerian context.

Research shows that despite an estimated USD 600 billion in oil income since independence, Nigeria continues to be plagued by a crisis of development (Amundsen, 2010; Watts, 2008). This has translated into high levels of poverty, slow economic growth, unemployment, corruption and political violence (Alumona, 2009). It is argued that Nigeria lost about one-quarter of USD 600 billion to corruption between independence in 1960 and the end of military rule in 1999' (Watts, 2007). According to Amundsen (2010, p.7), these illegal outflows have surpassed any other country in the world. Further, 'located mostly in the Niger Delta region, petroleum became Nigeria's chief export which single-handedly made Nigeria the wealthiest country in Africa during the 1970s (Falola & Heaton, 2008, p.181). Nonetheless, rather than contribute to the overall development of Nigeria and improve the welfare of citizens, the discovery of oil and the annual oil revenues of USD600 billion, has ushered in a corrupt political system which has favoured a few and rendered the majority of Nigerians poor and hopeless (Watts, 2007). As such it is believed that real economic growth is a major casualty of the politics of oil in Nigeria (United Nations Development Reports, 2006).

Using state power for wealth accumulation and with enormous gains from the sale of crude oil, a 'rentier state' emerged. This has made politics in Nigeria a game of winners and losers, whereby the winner uses state power and resources as he or she pleases (Lewis, 2009). It is argued that this nature of politics has since independence, sown seeds of discord amongst the parts of the state by politicising ethnicity and religion, thus increasing divisions within the society and fuelling political violence, especially in the southern part of Nigeria (Akude, 2007; Ibeanu & Luckman, 2007). Records show that more than 2000 deaths have been associated with oil production in Southern Nigeria since the 1990s (Watts, 2007, 2008).

In 1999, Nigeria officially became a democratic state having adopted a multi-party system of government (Obi, 2011). With Olusegun Obasanjo installed as the democratically elected president, promises of reduced violence and corruption, greater government accountability and transparency, a more inclusive and effective government, better fiscal policies and regulation of the oil industry have been at the fore of government programmes and visions (Eneh, 2009). However, four political transitions have occurred since 1999, a trend some scholars (Beetham, 1994; Guichaoua, 2009) have argued indicates the strengthening of a democratic culture, and yet, questions and prospects of democratic consolidation in Nigeria have been made distant by increased levels of political violence, high levels of poverty and underdevelopment (Mustapha, 2009). These background issues constitute the context in which this study is located as it examines the Nigerian state and crisis of development with particular focus on Bayelsa State between 2010 and 2020.

Statement of the Problem

Over the years, there has been a recurrent and sustained argument that the Nigerian state, like its African counterparts and other countries of the developing world, underperforms due to a lack of state capacity to

33	ISSN 2690-9626 (online), Published by "Global Research Network LLC" under Volume: 4 Issue: 9 in Sep-2023 https://globalresearchnetwork.us/index.php/ajshr
	Copyright (c) 2023 Author (s). This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). To view a copy of this license, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

deal with the contemporary complexities of governance to bring about the needed development. The character of the state, the public institutions through which legitimate power is exercised and enforced is crucial to the study of understanding the development trajectory of any state (smith, 2003, p.108). The petro-rich Nigerian state, confronted by socio-political instability, high degree of corruption, mass hostility, unemployment and pervasive poverty has continued to wallow in the troubled waters of underdevelopment despite the numerous natural resources she is blessed with (Akmola, 2008). The Nigerian State through purposive courses of action lacks the political will to drive meaningful development. The scenario is manifested in the Nigerian State, where the state’s policies do not reflect the will and aspirations of the people. Most policies enunciated by the ruling class are a reflection of elitism and a relegation of popular interests (Nwadike, 2019). Commenting on the character and nature of the Nigerian state that has thrown her into the current development impasse, Bolaji (2020. p.5) submits thus:

Despite the preponderous natural endowment Nigeria is blessed with, the story remains that there is a high prevalence of key threats to development such as poverty, unemployment, nauseating government policies, state’s institutional incapacity, corruption, electoral violence, low-value orientation etc.

According to him, these indices of state retrogression among others have plunged the Nigerian state into the deplorable state it is in terms of development. The problem of leadership is left out in understanding the development crisis of the lived-up to full popular expectation as stipulated in the contract establishing leadership and followership in the country. No wonder, Achebe (1983) contends that; the trouble with Nigeria is the issue of clueless and emasculated leadership that has not been supportive of a reasonable quantum leap in the existential conditions of the Nigerian citizens.

Consequently, the issue of state failure to guarantee the security of lives and properties in the Nigerian state reveals another impasse of development in the country. The news of insecurity as demonstrated in cases of incessant killings, kidnapping, militancy, and conflicts among other activities that threaten peace abound with their devastating blows on the development of the country. Bassey (2020) lending voice to the insinuation in Nigeria, argues that the Nigerian state of nature is characterized by incessant conflicts, wars and violence among men where man’s security is unsure and uncertain given the evil and unpredictable nature of man. This currently plays out or manifests in the spate of insecurity across the country.

As a corollary from the argument, the Bayelsa state created in 1996 during the military regime of Late General Sani Abacha constitutes the focal point of the study. The development crisis the state faces manifested in the absence of appreciable measures of development indicators forms the key concern of this study. Since the creation of the state, several administrations have come and gone with various policy frameworks that are intended to drive development. However, the situation in the state reveals the opposite. Despite the numerous resources the state is blessed with the Niger Delta region still suffers from the problem of lack of development. The burgeoning question therefore remains whether or not the state’s leadership has over the years driven development through conscious and goal-oriented policies of government. It is against this background that the study intends to examine the Nigerian state and crisis of development with particular focus on Bayelsa state in the Niger Delta region of the country between 2010 and 2020. To this end, the following research questions were stated to guide the study:

1. What is the character of development in Bayelsa State of Nigeria?
2. What are the factors responsible for the crisis of development in Bayelsa State of Nigeria?
3. What are the possible solutions/strategies to the crisis of development in Bayelsa State of Nigeria?

34	ISSN 2690-9626 (online), Published by "Global Research Network LLC" under Volume: 4 Issue: 9 in Sep-2023 https://globalresearchnetwork.us/index.php/ajshr
	Copyright (c) 2023 Author (s). This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY).To view a copy of this license, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

Objectives of the Study

Generally, the main objective of the study is to examine the character of the Nigerian State and the crisis of development. Specifically, it aims to:

1. Examine the character of development in Bayelsa State of Nigeria.
2. Explore the factors responsible for the crisis of development in Bayelsa State of Nigeria.
3. Proffer possible solutions to the crisis of development in Bayelsa State of Nigeria.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

The concept of the state has assumed a polymorphous dimension in conceptualizing it in that, it has suffered a victim of definitional pluralism. In an attempt to circumvent these conceptual ambiguities and fluidities, it is quite revolutionary to attempt a concise conceptualization of the concept. There are several views on the concept of state, namely: the liberal view, Marxist view, philosophical, legal, traditional, instrumentalist, and interactionist view, amongst others. The legal conception of the state dates back to the 1648 treaty of Westphalia that heralded the emergence of states within the international system.

The treaty of Westphalia concluded on January 30, 1648, in Munster (Germany), ended the thirty years’ war, which started with an anti-Habsburg revolt in Bohemia in 1618 but became an entanglement of different conflicts concerning the constitution of the Holy Roman Empire, religion, and the state system of Europe. This contest was a civil “German war,” but foreign powers played a crucial role. The Peace of Westphalia ended with the signing of two treaties between the empire and the new great powers, Sweden and France, and settled the conflicts inside the empire with their guarantees. The Peace of Westphalia signed in 1648, was remarkable throughout history as it ended the Thirty Years' War and created the framework for the emergence of a state system in the international system. The active participants of the treaty were Austria, Brandenburg, the Dutch Republic, France, the Holy Roman Empire, the Papacy, Spain, and Sweden.

In like manner, in 1884 fourteen European countries, Austria-Hungary, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Russia, Spain, Sweden-Norway (unified from 1814-1905), Turkey, and the United States of America, gathered in Berlin (Germany) to end political rivalries among European states in the international system. However, The Berlin Conference of 1884, which regulated European colonization and trade in Africa, is usually accepted as the beginning of African colonial rule. In the last quarter of the 19th century, there were considerable political rivalries between the European empires, which provided the impetus for the Scramble. Thus, the Berlin Conference of 1884, sought to discuss the partitioning of Africa, establishing rules to amicably divide resources as the scramble for Africa intensified among the Western countries at the expense of the African people. The Scramble for Africa, also known as the Partition of Africa, or the Conquest of Africa, is a term widely used by historians to describe the invasion, annexation, division, and colonization of most of Africa by Western European powers during an era known as "New Imperialism" (between 1833 and 1914). The 10 per cent of Africa that was under formal European control in 1870 increased to almost 90 per cent by 1914, with only Liberia and Ethiopia remaining independent.

Traditionally, its conceptualization is rooted in the platonic conception of the state as an instrument for harmonizing the various parts of the society in his ideal society where he opines that the state existed in guaranteeing three major functions, viz: the satisfaction of the underlying physical needs, the protection of the society and the governing of the society. The philosophical conceptualization of the state is an incorporation of both platonic and Aristotelian notions of the state as well as the notions of social contractarianism. Aristotle views the state as natural. According to him, the state is a necessary condition for

35	ISSN 2690-9626 (online), Published by “Global Research Network LLC” under Volume: 4 Issue: 9 in Sep-2023 https://globalresearchnetwork.us/index.php/ajshr
	Copyright (c) 2023 Author (s). This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY).To view a copy of this license, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

all humans. Like Plato, he doesn't differentiate between state and society and, in a similar fashion, considers it to be essential for a good life. Thus, in his view, the State is a necessary condition of a good life.

Marxist view of the state has a political undertone viewing it as an instrument of oppression of the masses by the elites. For Marx, the state has not always existed some societies did without it, and had no idea of it and state power. Quite historically, the state emerged at a certain stage in human history when society was divided into two antagonistic classes with irreconcilable differences to reconcile them (Epelle, 2006, p.95). Continuing further, Nnoli (1986) noted that, the state is a historical product and a manifestation of the irreconcilability of classes. It arises where, when and in so far as class antagonism cannot be reconciled.

However, it is an incontrovertible fact that the state is seen as “the organized aggregate of relatively permanent institutions of government” (Alapiki, 2010, p.29). Further, Ekekwe (1986) would not agree that the state is the executive of the bourgeoisie because to do so will amount to “a simplistic and vulgarized conception of the state”. Moreover, the bourgeoisie itself is a fractionalized state.

In liberal terms, the state can be construed as an association or aggregation of men and women working together to advance their well-being and welfare. The liberal state is one with a limited government, sensitive to popular interests, under normal conditions, it does not act dictatorially by imposing things on the citizens, guarantees the rights of citizens and chiefly is characterized by a vaunting conflict or class struggles between the “power elites” as well as a proliferation of interests and interest groups.

In a related view, in liberal terms, the state is hinged on the logic of individualism and capitalistic mode of social and productive relations. The concept of the state has been figured as the central theme of traditional political theory. Gettel (1949) defined political science as 'the science of the state'. Gamer (1928) claimed that 'political science begins and ends with the state'. In modern political theory, the significance of the concept of the state has been fluctuating. Some exponents of the behavioural approach in political science have even suggested abandoning the concept of the state altogether. Their main objection is that this concept does not help in understanding political reality or the political process, because (a) the term 'state' refers to a formal concept while real politics transcends the formal organization of the state; (b) the 'state' is usually conceived in terms of the 'ends' of the state which drags us to the realm of moral philosophy, far removed from the real world of politics; and (c) the concept of the state postulates a particular type of organization which excludes top organizations of certain societies, real or imaginary, and thus introduces the idea of 'pre-state' societies and 'stateless' societies. This leads to the assumption that political organization is not a universal phenomenon. David Easton, in his *Political System - An Inquiry into the State of Political Science* (1953), observed: “One person sees the state as the embodiment of the moral spirit, its concrete expression; another, as the instrument of exploitation used by one class against others. One author defines it as simply an aspect of society, distinguishable from it only analytically; another, as simply a synonym for government; and still another, as a separate and unique association among a large number of other associations such as the church, trade unions, and similar voluntary groups.” After dwelling on these ambiguities in some detail Easton concluded that the word 'state' 'ought to be abandoned entirely’.

It is important to note that distaste for the term 'state' was confined to some exponents of liberal political theory, especially to some American political scientists. Marxist political theory continued to use the term 'state' to denote a specific form of political organization: the terms 'slave-owning state', 'feudal state', 'capitalist state', 'socialist/communist state', as well as 'pre-state society' and 'stateless society' are the current coins of Marxist political theory interest in the concept of the 'state' as an institutional and constitutional mechanism. However, in contrast to the earlier concept of the state as an institutional structure, it was redefined as an active agent of shaping and reshaping society. It is thus evident that, despite some initial suspicions and objections, the concept of the state never became entirely redundant for the study of politics.

36	ISSN 2690-9626 (online), Published by “Global Research Network LLC” under Volume: 4 Issue: 9 in Sep-2023 https://globalresearchnetwork.us/index.php/ajshr
	Copyright (c) 2023 Author (s). This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY).To view a copy of this license, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

Nico's Poulantzas structuralist view of the state is also of the position that the capitalist class maintains a structure through which it controls the state even though it does not administer the state directly (Poulantzas, cited in Ekekwe, (1986). This creates a more precarious situation for a state such as the Nigeria state. Its economy is manipulated from the outside. Unlike the core capitalist states, the Nigerian state lacks autonomy for regulation as a state which emerges as an instrument of accumulation (Alavi, 1979). It is truly not a regulative state. Thus, Alavi (cited in Ekekwe, 1986) maintains that the state is an instrument of the ruling class in the promotion of capitalist accumulation under the guise of national development. In doing so, it projects the accumulative interest of both foreign and domestic capital for its survival even against the health, survival and livelihood of its population.

By the very nature of the state, as described above, it is coercive. It is vested with the legitimate use of force and has a monopoly on the use of physical force (Gaubas, 2003), which force is exercised in this case in the protection of capital in the guise of providing an enabling environment for business to thrive. This kind of state is an organ of exploitation and is not capable of pursuing policies that would promote the interests of all. It is this that makes the state an accomplice in the environmental violence meted out to humanity by the activities of capital.

Nigerian State

The Nigerian state, as presently constituted is a product of colonialism. Extant literature shows it was externally created and imposed by forces of imperialism and colonialism as the socio-economic and political foundation of the development of capitalism in Nigeria as well as other colonized and third-world countries. This clearly shows that the Nigerian State as presently constituted is/was not an indigenous construct designed and developed by Nigerians as a reflection of her historical-cultural heritage and experiences. Because it was forcefully implanted from the outside, the Nigerian State is said to reflect the vision of its implanters, aimed at the continuous plunder of the resources of the Nigerian State as a peripheral state in the system of global capitalism (see, Kieh & Agbese, 2014). For them, it is this external imposition imbued with the vision of its driving force that also defines the character of the Nigerian State.

To execute its mission and to effectively secure the control of the subjugated people and their resources, colonialism developed a repressive political architecture replete with unfriendly institutions and rules. As such, the state uses force to enforce obedience to unfriendly, exploitative and repressive rules (see Ekekwe 1986; Ake, 1996; Kieh & Agbese, 2014; Nwosu, 2006). The conduct of state affairs in Nigeria exacerbates poverty, disease, destitution and economic retrogression. Political leadership is solely motivated by greed. This kind of leadership is incapable of doing for Nigeria what the leaders of the Asian Tigers did for their people.

This is the type of state that was said to have been bequeathed to Nigeria at independence, and its nature and structure have equally remained fundamentally unaltered. It follows that the nationalist leaders who took over the running of the affairs of the state at independence failed to restructure or dismantle the repressive colonial state. This is simply because, the state in the form bequeathed, serves better the interest of managers of the state. As such, they did not see the need to restructure or dismantle it. It is a fact that the culture of misrule that followed flag independence subverted the ideals of the nationalist struggle, to the extent that all attempts at restructuring the form of the state inherited from colonialism, have remained unsuccessful. So rather than restructure, dismantle or reconstruct the state to fit the yearnings of the independent Nigerian state, the leadership inherited the oppressive structure, ostensibly to continue with the exploitation of natural resources for private gains. Ake elucidates it when he says:

The character of the colonial state did not change significantly at independence since with few exceptions; the colonial state was inherited rather than transformed. Like the

37	ISSN 2690-9626 (online), Published by "Global Research Network LLC" under Volume: 4 Issue: 9 in Sep-2023 https://globalresearchnetwork.us/index.php/ajshr
	Copyright (c) 2023 Author (s). This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). To view a copy of this license, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

colonizers before them, most of the nationalist leaders regarded the state as the instrument of their will. They privatized and exploited it for economic gains and used it oppressively and absolutize their power, even after independence, the state in Africa has not become a reassuring presence but remains a formidable threat to everybody except the few who control it (Ake, 1994, p.7).

Ake in the above quote speaks more directly to Nigeria. To be sure, the inherited legacies of devastating colonialism and exploitation have continued unabated with far-reaching implications for Nigeria's national development. This is so because, in Nigeria, political power or control of the state power is the most reliable means to accumulation of wealth. Armed with the “most oppressive instrument, the same state apparatus was bequeathed to the nationalist leadership dominated by majority elements in the same form, content and character and effectively utilize to suppressive...” (Ogali, 2017, p. 50). With its tenuous accumulative base, the Nigerian bourgeois class turned the state as its instrument of accumulation and “rather than building a productive base in industry, the bourgeois class began to extend the power of the state to build up its capital base” (Ihonvbere, 2014, p. 100-101). To this extent, the features of this state show a total disconnect between the state and the society. The Nigerian state has shown from the above premise is said to have developed multi-dimensional characters. Barigbon and Idoniboye-Obu (2022), assert that the character of the Nigerian State is described in the literature as “criminalized”, “exploitative”, “negligent”, “predatory” “rentier”, “dependent” and “prebendal” etc.

From the above understanding, the Nigerian state is said to be rather more exploitative, negligent, predatory, rentier and dependent. These are general features or “characters” of the post-colonial African state. The Nigerian state “wearing a negligent garb” therefore shows no interest in fettering the basic needs of the people. It is not interested in development. The Nigerian state has been malevolent and exhibits a predatory character. As predatory, it is like “the dead sea which does not give, but only takes”. It is a collection of self-interested persons solely concerned with the extraction of rent in the form of economic resources (Jomo, 1997). Thus, the Nigerian ruling class uses the state and state power as a vehicle for the accumulation of capital. Again, the Nigerian state shows the characteristics of a rentier state. Its operators are only interested in extracting rent in the form of economic resources. As a rentier state, it operates peripheral capitalism, dependent on externally generated revenue or rent derived from extractive industries such as oil rather than a productive domestic economy (Kuru, 2000). It is more interested in the redistribution of wealth than the creation of wealth. Rent-seeking is an overbearing feature of a predatory state. The predatory state would negate all attempts of meaningful and purposeful involvement of the state in economic development and social transformation.

Concept of Development

Before human development and participation are discussed, it is imperative to have insight into the definition and the main objectives of development in general. Development is both a physical reality and a state of mind in which society has secured the means for obtaining a better life” (Todaro & Smith, 2006, p.22). Through this process, the society ensures growth in wealth acquisition and mental enrichment and the betterment of the quality living conditions of all the people. The society uses a combination of social, economic and institutional processes as the means to acquire better living conditions. This definition of development generated the following development objectives:

- A. To increase the availability and distribution of basic goods needed for human life sustenance. Such basic goods include food, shelter, health and security.

38	<p>ISSN 2690-9626 (online), Published by “Global Research Network LLC” under Volume: 4 Issue: 9 in Sep-2023 https://globalresearchnetwork.us/index.php/ajshr</p>
	<p>Copyright (c) 2023 Author (s). This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY).To view a copy of this license, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/</p>

- B. To improve the level of living in respect of social aspects such as household and national income, education, and human cultural values, for the enhancement of individual and national material well-being and self-esteem.
- C. To expand the range of the available individual and national economic and social choices by freeing them from servitude by forces of ignorance and human misery on one hand, and dependence on other people and national states on the other (Theron & Banard, 1997).

Development is, therefore, less concerned about human wealth than well-being as its ultimate end, the basics of which are livelihood, security, and sustainability (Coetzee, 2001). This is also dependent on what people are capable of doing. The emphasis is that wealth is not the same as well-being. Swanepoel and De-Beer (2006) agree that poverty is suffering from ill-being and development is well-being which encompasses material, bodily, and social well-being on the one hand, and security and freedom of choice and action on the other. This means that development is about people.

The study found that development is a broader concept that entails personal, social, political and economic development. The first three development contexts are based on human development as a foundation, in that development in its meaningful sense begins with and within the individual (Burkey, 1993). However, the study dwells mostly on personal and social perspectives.

The following definitions of development help us in setting our focus on the core of our literature review. The definitions also help us to contextualise development as a concept about participation as a means, and empowerment as an end. From Gran's (1983, p.2) work, we find human development basically as a process of giving the people power to control their future, while people's participation constitutes the basis for the whole phenomenon. He defines development as a social and practical process which aims at the liberation of human potential so that people acquire the maximum socially, feasible and practical control over all the available resources needed for the realization of basic human needs and security. In this context, the poor in particular, is free to effectively and meaningfully participate in social, political and economic interactions for economic advancement and popular empowerment. In other words, development is about liberation of human potential towards people's absolute control of their resources to meet their basic needs.

From a people-centred development perspective, development means: a process by which the members of a society increase their personal and institutional capacities to mobilize and manage resources to produce sustainable and justly distributed improvements in their quality of life consistent with their aspirations (Korten, 1990). According to him, people-centred development means the processes by which people as individuals and structures make efforts themselves to improve their quality of life according to their aspirations, and through the sustainable mobilization and management of available resources for legitimate and equitable distribution of the benefits among the society. Seers (1969) conceived development by posing certain questions such as; what has been happening to poverty, what has been happening to unemployment, and what has been happening to inequality. According to him, if these three indices are at a relatively high rate, there is an absence of development. This definition explains that these key parameters and indices must be considered before a country is considered developed or not.

Development is viewed "as a many-sided concept and processes implying increased skill and capacity, greater freedom, creativity, self-discipline, responsibility and material wellbeing at the individual level of understanding" (Rodney, 1972, p.1). According to Burkey (1993, p. 35), "development is also a process by which an individual develops self-respect, and becomes more self-confident, self-reliant, cooperative and tolerant to others through becoming aware of his/her shortcomings as well as his/her potential for positive change".

39	ISSN 2690-9626 (online), Published by "Global Research Network LLC" under Volume: 4 Issue: 9 in Sep-2023 https://globalresearchnetwork.us/index.php/ajshr
	Copyright (c) 2023 Author (s). This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY).To view a copy of this license, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

This takes place through working with others, acquiring new knowledge, and active participation in the economic, social and political development of their communities. This means that development is “a process through which people become aware of their capabilities, acquire knowledge and work in a collective to meet their abstract needs” (Swanepoel and De Beer, 2006, p. 26). In other words, people work to develop themselves.

Crisis of Development

The crisis of development has become a reoccurring issue in Nigeria coupled with the series of contradictions inherent in every epoch of Nigerian society; the country has passed through different stages ranging from primitive to slave society, colonialism, decolonization and neocolonialism. Presently, the crisis of development is the most serious problem facing Nigeria. This is because the continent remained largely underdeveloped despite the huge mineral and human resources, several decades after the end of colonialism, most parts of Africa are still fighting with problems such as basic infrastructural facilities, and insecurity of lives and properties. (Alumona, 2009, p.1) For example, Nigeria is the most populous African country and the country reflects most of the activities in Africa.

Nigeria earned over US\$600 billion in Oil revenue since the 1970s yet remains mired in poverty, unemployment, burgeoning domestic debt, infrastructural squalor, abysmal health and educational services and attendant social frustration and unrest (Suberu, 2007). Nigeria reflects most parts of Africa in that it inherited arbitrary state boundaries from its colonial age and was under military authoritarianism for the most part of its existence as a nation. Nigeria earned over US\$600 billion in oil revenues since the 1970s, yet remains mired in poverty barely some years after independence when hope and expectations were high on the new emerging state that has been under the stranglehold of colonialism for many decades given its huge resource endowment both in human and material resources (Alumona, 2009). In buttressing the above analysis, Omotola (2001) asserts that these are not heady days for Nigeria, heralded at independence in 1960 as a missing giant at both regional and global levels, given its huge resource endowment- human and material, the country has not only failed to actualize its potentials but also appears to have effectively squandered its opportunities for greatness, ignominiously seated at the very nadir of development. The quest for stability and development is, without doubt, the Holy Grail for many third-world countries, a never-ending, tedious, yet elusive, search for that condition under which these countries would be able to develop institutions and structures with the capacity to ensure economic growth, equitable distribution of national wealth, political stability and accountability.

As daunting as these may appear, still it is possible to argue that there is a certain level which all countries, developing and even those that are de-developing, aspire to reach. Each country aspires to a high quality of life for its citizenry, a strong and diversified economic base, internal cohesion and political stability. How and to what level these aspirations are attained depends on a number of factors, mostly internal. For one, resources, both natural and human are critical but the ability to harness these and to utilize them for the common good is principally the domain of technological expertise, administrative capacity as well as political leadership.

Consequently, strong accountable leadership is necessary. Nigeria is a practical example of a country with abundant human and natural resources yet her citizens wallow in abject poverty, the problem is multidimensional, encompassing a variety of issues that have been generally codenamed the national question. There is a growing increase in a population explosion and a corresponding decrease in economic productivity and the country has turned into a veritable incubation centre for the emergence of violent anti-state groups and their ideology, to a greater part, is fuelled by years of the state’s neglect and failure to transfer the aspiration of its people for a meaningful, purposeful and qualitative life. (Alkanda, 2002, p. 3)

40	ISSN 2690-9626 (online), Published by “Global Research Network LLC” under Volume: 4 Issue: 9 in Sep-2023 https://globalresearchnetwork.us/index.php/ajshr
	Copyright (c) 2023 Author (s). This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY).To view a copy of this license, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

Basically, Nigeria cannot be explained outside the impact of colonialism, neocolonialism and dependency. The present condition of the third world countries are not in least analogous to the condition of the industrialized countries in the earlier stages of their economic development. These present condition of the third world countries is the effect of the slave trade, pillage, colonialism and unequal exchange (Ake, 1981). African development is possible only on the bases of radical break with the international capitalist system, which has been the principal agency of the underdevelopment of Africa. (Rodney, 1982, p. 298)

Nigeria development crisis can be explained from three perspective, colonial legacy, corrupt leadership and democracy leads to economic growth, the colonial legacy perspective argues that the problem of underdevelopment is traceable to the origin of colonial authority and the exploitative nature of Nigerian colonial and post-colonial experience. Similarly, the concept of leadership believes that corruption and mismanagement on the part of leadership have been the bane of development in Nigeria. Analysis of the leadership problem in Nigeria is located within this framework, lack of effective management of human and material resources as a result of leadership problem in the country.

Theoretical Framework

Political Economy

The theoretical framework provides a foundational basis and premise upon which the explanation of given and observed phenomena and studies are situated for better understanding. The theoretical framework adopted for this study is a Marxist political economy theory by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. The theory was first expressed literally in the Communist Manifesto of 1848. Marx in Ugumanin and Maurice (2014) avers that theory is concerned about the relationship between the economy and state and about the various ways individuals try to use the state to improve their economic welfare. The ruling class used the state machinery as an instrument to seize economic power to suppress the poor masses. The ruling class controls the society's means of production, the superstructure of society is determined by the ruling class. By this, it's a generation of people in the class category and incessant struggle to maximize the state as an instrument of the economic well-being of the few. The central premise of this perspective is that the mode of production in material life determines the general character of the social, political and spiritual process of life in the society. In support of this view, Ake (1981, p.13), notes that "the mode of production is the material foundation of social life. It largely determines another aspect of social life, particularly the legal system, the political system, the belief system and the morality".

On the other hand, Akani (2011) opined that Marxist political economy is a human science which explains the remote causes of exploitation and contradictions in society and provides, the exploited theoretical and spiritual weapon to liberate himself or herself from years of thralldom and shackles of marginalization. This is through constant struggle and revolutionary revulsion. This constant struggle reflects the history of people in the mode of production. They are formed by concrete historical conditions. They evolve over a long period in the course of man's interaction with his human and physical environment (Ake, 1981). Ogali (2017) opined that Marxist political economy is rather a dynamic science with an emphasis on human relations in the production process, a relationship that is fundamentally advantageous to a segment of society, exploitative and therefore conflict-oriented.

According to Olawole (2013), the capitalist society is divided into two classes: the rich and the poor or the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. Therefore, the rich own the means of production, distribution and exchange, using their wealth/resources to persuade the poor to gain power and this has resulted in constant class struggles between the two classes for the control of material values in the process of production. Marx in Giddens and David (2007) noted that the bourgeoisie is meant to be the class of modern capitalists, owners of the means of social production and employers of wage labour. While the proletariat is the class of modern

41	<p>ISSN 2690-9626 (online), Published by "Global Research Network LLC" under Volume: 4 Issue: 9 in Sep-2023 https://globalresearchnetwork.us/index.php/ajshr</p>
	<p>Copyright (c) 2023 Author (s). This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY).To view a copy of this license, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/</p>

wage labourers who, having no means of production of their own, are reduced to selling their labour power in order to live. This is why the interest of the owners of the means of production (capitalist) is at variance with the interest of the non-owners of the means of production (wage labourer). For instance, the interest of the owners of the factory (capitalist) is to maximize profit but this is opposed to the worker's interest.

The theory is relevant to the study to the extent that it sees the development impasse rife in the country as one occasioned by the activities of the ruling class (bourgeoisie) that have continued to use state resources for their primordial interest leaving the masses (proletariat) in abject deprivation and poverty. The nation's crisis of development is one caused by the tragic failure of leadership in driving development through purposive programmes and policies of government to deal with matters of concern that border on the people. The situation exposes a state in abject poverty, unemployment, policy failure, institutional weakness, corruption, electoral violence etc. The implication is that Nigeria's development crisis is a consequence of leadership failure in delivering development to citizens.

3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The study adopted the descriptive research method. In this method, quantitative data were generated using standardised, well-structured and closed questionnaires from the field to elicit responses from the respondents. Upon this, generalisation or generalised inferences were made about the target population under study. Thus, the population of the study constituted the total population of Bayelsa State estimated at 2,537,400 by the National Population Commission (NPC) of Nigeria as of 2022. This is the general population out of which the sample size shall be taken for this study. The sample size for the study included 400 male and female adult citizens across the eight local government areas that make up Bayelsa State of Nigeria. The sample for this study is the portion of the population that the researcher used for this study. The researcher employed the statistical formula by Taro Yamane of 1967 to calculate the sample size of the Bayelsa State population of 2,537,400 citizens. The formula states thus:

$$n = \frac{N}{1 + N(e)^2}$$

Where: n = Expected sample size

N = Total population

e = Margin of error 5% (0.05)² or (0.0025).

Therefore, the sample size of 400 was taken out of the estimated population figure of Bayelsa state of Nigeria by the National Population Commission (NPC) as of 2022 which is 2,537,400.

Thus;

$$n = \frac{N}{1 + N(e)^2}$$

$$1 + N(e)^2$$

$$n = \frac{2,537,400}{1 + 2,537,400 (0.05)^2}$$

$$1 + 2,537,400 (0.05)^2$$

$$n = \frac{2,537,400}{1 + 2,537,400 (0.0025)^2}$$

$$1 + 2,537,400 (0.0025)^2$$

$$n = \frac{2,537,400}{1 + 2,537,400 \times 0.0025^2}$$

$$1 + 2,537,400 \times 0.0025^2$$

$$n = \frac{2,537,400}{1 + 6,343.5}$$

$$1 + 6,343.5$$

42	ISSN 2690-9626 (online), Published by "Global Research Network LLC" under Volume: 4 Issue: 9 in Sep-2023 https://globalresearchnetwork.us/index.php/ajshr
	Copyright (c) 2023 Author (s). This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). To view a copy of this license, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

n = 2,537,400
6,344.5

n = 399.9 approximately 400

Since there is no fraction of a human being in the population figure, the sample size is approximated to 400. Hence, the sample size used in this study is 400. The study adopted a simple random sampling technique where the population elements of the target population had equal chances of being selected. The work adopted both primary and secondary sources of data. Data were sourced primarily from the respondents using a well-structured, uniform and standardized questionnaire. Secondary data included a review of existing literature, newspapers, magazines, bulletins, journals, and browsing of the internet.

The researcher generated data for the study using standardized and well-structured questionnaire instruments that were administered to the respondents to elicit responses to answer the research questions posed in the study. The questionnaire has two sections (sections A and B). Section A contains demographic information of the respondents, while section B contains the questions. The questionnaire instrument was structured on a 4-point Likert scale with: Strongly Agree (SA) = 4 points, Agree (A) = 3 points, Disagree (D) = 2 points, and Strongly Disagree (SD) = 1 point. Also, the study generates data from secondary sources which involves the use of information from textbooks, journals, government gazettes, magazines, bulletins, newspapers and browsing the internet on issues of the Nigerian State and crisis of development: a study of Bayelsa State within the period of 2010-2020. The researcher went out to the field and administered the research instrument (questionnaire) to the respondents (target population) of Bayelsa State. The questionnaires were responded to adequately by the respondents after which they were handed over to the researcher. The researcher ensured he got or retrieved the total number of questionnaires issued out to avoid a misplacement of any of the questions. The study used two major sources of data collection, primary and secondary data. The primary data collected for this study were presented in a tabular frequency. The frequency distribution of the respondents' responses from each of the questionnaire items were analysed using percentages. The result of the scores were analysed for both their theoretical and practical values and used to validate or invalidate the research question. The secondary data were generated from the documented facts on the subject matter and were interpreted using content analysis as a tool for analysis.

4. DATA PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS

Table 4.1.1: Rate of Distribution of Questionnaire

Designation	Frequency	Percentage (%)
Correctly filled and retrieved	385	96.25
Incorrectly filled and retrieved	10	3.5
Unretrieved	5	1.25
Total	400	100

Source: Fieldwork, 2022.

The table above clearly shows the rate of distribution of the questionnaire items. 385 copies of the questionnaire amounting to 96.25% of the total of 400 copies administered were correctly filled and retrieved, 10 copies amounting to 3.5% were incorrectly filled and retrieved while 5 copies amounting to 1.25% were unretrieved. Based on the above, a total of 385 copies were correctly filled and retrieved which constitute the basis for further presentation and analysis of data.

4.1.2. Respondents' Characteristics and Classification

This section covers the socio-demographic data of the respondents such as sex, age, academic qualification and marital status. These data were analysed and interpreted.

43	ISSN 2690-9626 (online), Published by "Global Research Network LLC" under Volume: 4 Issue: 9 in Sep-2023 https://globalresearchnetwork.us/index.php/ajshr
	Copyright (c) 2023 Author (s). This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). To view a copy of this license, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

Table 4.1.2: Sex of the Respondents

Sex	Frequency	Percentage (%)
Male	230	57.5
Female	155	40.3
Total	385	100

Source: Field Work, 2022

Table 4.1.2 above reveals that 230 men constituting 57.5% were interviewed, whereas 155 female respondents amounted to 40.3% of the total respondents of 400 were interviewed. This meant that male respondents exceeded their counterparts (female) in number.

Table 4.1.3: Age of the Respondents

Age	Frequency	Percentage (%)
20-30yrs	189	49.1
31-40yrs	55	13.75
41-50yrs	91	22.8
51 and above	50	12.5
Total	385	100

Source: Field Work, 2022

Table 4.1.3 above indicates that most of the respondents were between 20-30 years totaling 189 persons which is up to 49.1% of the total number of respondents interviewed. 31-40 years were 55 respondents which is 13.75% of the total respondents. 91 persons fall under the age of 41-50 years amounting to 22.8% of the population while 51 and above 50 persons constitute 12.5% of the population. This meant that the majority of the respondents fell between 20-30 years and 41- 50 years of age.

Table 4.1.4: Marital Status

Status	Frequency	Percentage (%)
Single	250	64.9
Married	90	23.4
Divorced	10	2.6
Widowed	35	9.1
Total	385	100

Source: Field Work, 2022

Table 4.1.4 above reveals that 250 respondents are single, constituting 64.9% of the students interviewed. 90 respondents which are 23.4% are married, 10 which is 2.6% are divorced whereas 35 respondents amounting to 9.1% of the total respondents are widowed.

Table 4.1.5: Academic Level of the Respondents

Academic level	Frequency	Percentage (%)
FSLC	179	46.5
WAEC	132	33.0
B.SC	47	11.8
Postgraduate	27	6.8
Total	385	100

Source: Field Work, 2022

Table 4.1.5 (above) shows that 179 respondents representing 46.5% of the population used in this study are FSLC holders and 132 persons amounting to 33% of the population hold WAEC. BSC are 47 persons representing 11.8% of the respondents while 27 respondents representing 6.8% are postgraduate degree holders.

4.2. Analysis of Research Questions

Research Question One: What is the Character of Development in Bayelsa State of Nigeria?

Table 4.2:1 Analysis of question one in items 1-5 of the questionnaire.

Respondents’ Perception of the Character of Development in Bayelsa State of Nigeria

Items	SA	A	D	SD	Total %
Low infrastructural development in the State	175	80	70	60	385
Widening the gap between the ruling class and the masses	45.5%	20%	17.5%	15%	100%
Development is skewed in favour of the ruling class against the non-ruling majority (masses)	181	170	20	14	385
Development programmes of government are not distributed evenly to the localities	47.0%	42.5%	5%	3.5%	100%
The human factor of development is not given adequate attention in the state	165	160	40	20	385
Low infrastructural development in the State	42.9%	40%	10%	5%	100%
Widening the gap between the ruling class and the masses	175	80	70	60	385
Development is skewed in favour of the ruling class against the non-ruling majority (masses)	45.5%	20%	17.5%	15%	100%
Development programmes of government are not distributed evenly to the localities	110	105	90	80	385
	28.6%	27.3%	22.5%	20%	100%

Source: Field Work, 2022

According to the data in Table 4.2.1 above, 385 respondents expressed their opinions on the state and development crisis in Nigeria with a particular focus on Bayelsa State in response to question one. In item 1, 175 respondents, or 45.5 per cent of the total respondents, strongly agreed to the statement, 80 respondents or 20 per cent of the population agreed with the statement; 70 respondents or 17.5 per cent of the total respondents, disagreed; and 60 respondents, or 15 per cent of the total respondents, strongly disagreed with the statement. In item 2, 181 respondents or 47.0 percent of the total respondents strongly agreed to the statement, 190 people, or 42.5 percent of the population agreed to the statement; 20 respondents or 5 percent of the total respondents disagreed; and 14 respondents or 3.5 percent of the total population interviewed, strongly disagreed. In item 3, 165 respondents or 42.9 per cent of the population strongly agreed, while 160 respondents or 40% of the population agreed with the notion. Additionally, 40 respondents or 10% of the total respondents disagreed with the statement while 20 respondents or 5% of the entire population polled severely disagreed with it. In item 4, 175 respondents (45.5 percent) strongly agreed with the statement, 80 respondents (20 percent of the population) agreed to the statement; 70 respondents (17.5 percent of the total respondents) disagreed; and 60 respondents (15 percent of the total respondents) strongly disagreed to the statement. 175 respondents (45.5 percent) strongly agreed with the statement. Finally, 110 respondents or 28.6 per cent of the whole population strongly agreed with the statement whereas 95 respondents or 27.3 percent of the total population agreed with this assertion. In addition, 90 respondents or 22.5 percent of the total respondents disagreed with the statement, while 80 respondents or 20 percent of the total respondents strongly disagreed with it.

45	ISSN 2690-9626 (online), Published by “Global Research Network LLC” under Volume: 4 Issue: 9 in Sep-2023 https://globalresearchnetwork.us/index.php/ajshr
	Copyright (c) 2023 Author (s). This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). To view a copy of this license, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

Research Question 2: What are the Factors Responsible for the Crisis of Development in Bayelsa State of Nigeria?

Table 4.2.2: Analysis of question two on items 6-10 of the questionnaires.

Respondents' Perception on the Factors Responsible for the Crisis of Development in Bayelsa State of Nigeria.

Items	SA	A	D	SD	Total%
Prevalent poverty in the state	145	120	80	40	385
	37.7%	30%	20%	10%	100%
The rising spate of youth unemployment and restiveness in the state	181	170	20	14	385
	47.0%	42.5%	5%	3.5%	100%
Non-implementation of government programmes and measures to drive development in the state	165	160	40	20	385
	42.9%	40%	10%	5%	100%
Pervasive corruption in the state	120	110	90	65	385
	30%	27.5%	22.5%	16.9%	100%
Leadership crisis	145	140	60	40	385
	37.7%	35%	15%	10%	100%

Source: Field Work, 2022

According to the data in the preceding table 4.2.2, in item 6, 145 respondents or 37.7 percent of the population strongly agreed with the statement, 120 respondents or 30 percent of the population agreed with the statement; 80 respondents or 20 percent of the total respondents, disagreed; and 20 respondents or 10 percent of the total population interviewed strongly disagreed with the statement. In item 7, 181 respondents, representing a 47 percent majority strongly agreed with the statement, 170 people agreed with the statement, 20 respondents, or 5 percent of the total respondents, disagreed with the statement, while 7 respondents or 3.5 percent of the total respondents, severely disagreed with it. In item 8, 160 people agreed with the statement, accounting for 40% of the population in total. In addition, 40 respondents, or 10% of the total respondents, disagreed, while 20 respondents, or 5% of the population examined, severely disagreed with the statement. In item 9, a total of 120 respondents, or 30 percent of the people questioned, strongly agreed with the statement. A total of 110 respondents, or 27.5 percent of the population, agreed with the statement. In addition, 90 respondents, or 22.5 percent of the total respondents, disagreed with the statement, while 65 respondents, or 16.9 percent of those questioned, strongly disagreed with it. In item 10, a total of 145 respondents, or 37.7 percent, strongly agreed with the statement.

Research Question 3: What are the Possible Solutions/Strategies to the Crisis of Development in Bayelsa State of Nigeria?

Table 4.2.3: Analysis of question three on items 11-15 of the questionnaire.

Respondents' Perception on the Possible Solutions/Strategies to the Crisis of Development in Bayelsa State of Nigeria

Questions	SA	A	D	SD	Total (%)
There is need for democratic governance that will bring development to the people. Equitable distribution of the state resources to where	117	115	86	67	385
	29.25%	28.75%	21.50%	17.4%	100%

they are needed					
Improving institutional capacities in the state to deliver on the programmes of government to achieve development	196	155	20	14	385
Consolidating on anti-corruption agencies and campaigns to stem the tide of corruption in the state	49%	40.2%	5%	3.5%	100%
Provision of employment opportunities to the citizens by the government	145	140	60	40	385
There is a need for democratic governance that will bring development to the people.	37.7%	35%	15%	10%	100%
Equitable distribution of the state resources to where they are needed	145	120	80	40	385
Improving institutional capacities in the state to deliver on the programmes of government to achieve development	37.7%	30%	20%	10%	100%
Consolidating on anti-corruption agencies and campaigns to stem the tide of corruption in the state	181	170	20	14	385
	47.0%	42.5%	5%	3.5%	100%

Source: Field Work, 2022

According to the data in the preceding table 4.2.3, in item 11, 117 respondents (or 29.25 percent) strongly agreed to the statement. 115 respondents or 28.75 percent of the entire population, agreed with the statement; 86 respondents, or 21.50 percent of the whole population, disagreed; and 67 respondents, or 17.4 percent of the total population, strongly disagreed with the statement according to the survey. In item 12, 196 respondents or 49% of the total strongly agreed to the statement, 155 or 40.2 percent of the population, expressed agreement with the statement, twenty respondents, or 5 percent of the total respondents, expressed disagreement, and fourteen respondents, or 3.5 percent of the total population interviewed, expressed strong disagreement with the opinion.

In item 13, 145 respondents, or 37.7 percent of the total respondents, strongly agreed with the statement; 140 respondents, or 35 percent of the population, agreed to the statement; 60 respondents, or 15 percent of the total respondents, disagreed; and 40 respondents, or 10 percent of the total respondents, strongly disagreed with the statement.

Again, in item 14, 145 people, or 37.7 percent of the total, strongly agreed with the statement, 120 respondents representing 30% of the population agreed with the statement, 80 respondents who disagreed with the statement, accounting for 20% of the total respondents, and 20 respondents who strongly disagreed with the statement, accounting for 10% of the overall population polled.

Lastly in item 15, 181 respondents or 47% of the total strongly agreed, and 170 people agreed with the statement representing 42.5 percent of the population. In addition, 20 respondents or 5 percent of the total respondents disagreed with the statement, while 7 respondents, or 3.5 percent of the total respondents, severely disagreed with it according to the results.

4.3. Discussion of Findings

This section of the work offers a critical discussion of the research findings drawing extensively from the opinions and arguments of previous scholars on the subject matter under review.

Responses to research question one (1) of the study on the character of the development crisis in Bayelsa State of Nigeria revealed that the pattern of development crisis in the State is reflected in very skewed

47	ISSN 2690-9626 (online), Published by "Global Research Network LLC" under Volume: 4 Issue: 9 in Sep-2023 https://globalresearchnetwork.us/index.php/ajshr
	Copyright (c) 2023 Author (s). This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). To view a copy of this license, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

development that is not supportive of an improvement in the existential conditions of the people which ordinarily is the primary concern of any development. The character of development in Bayelsa State of Nigeria is one characterized by low spate of infrastructural development, high level of poverty, unemployment, lack of adequate priority attention to the human component of development by the government, inequitable distribution of state resources to the localities where they are needed etc. Buttressing these research findings, Okeke (2019) argued that in most Niger Delta States especially Bayelsa State of Nigeria, despite the abundant resources the state is blessed with, the character and nature of development does not guarantee an improvement in living standard in the State. Again, corroborating these research findings, the National Bureau of Statistics (2022) reported that, Bayelsa State is ranked the second poorest state in Nigeria with 88.5% of the population living in poverty. On the issue of unemployment in the state, the Commission reported that the state has an unemployment rate of 36.68% (NBS, 2022). The implication is that the character of development in the state is such that the human factor (the people) is/are not treated with priority by the government.

Response to research question two (2) on the factors responsible for the development crisis in Bayelsa State of Nigeria revealed that the State battles with certain observed inhibitive factors to development which has over the years thrown the State into a misery of some sort. This crisis of development is manifested in unemployment and youth restiveness, corruption, lack of institutional capacities to drive through the programmes of government and poverty among others. The prevalence of these factors explains that Bayelsa State presently faces the problem of development crisis which is mainly traceable to leadership failure in the State. The leadership of the State lacks the will to drive development and as such, the State wobbles in the troubled waters of the above-identified miserly indices. Corroborating these findings, Daminabo (2020) noted that in Nigeria today particularly in the oil-rich regions, leadership crisis has been one key factor responsible for the crisis of development. The gross inability of the government to tailor development through adequate resource utilisation throws this region into the irony of development even amid plenty.

Lastly, responses to research question three (3) on the possible solutions/strategies to the development crisis in Bayelsa State of Nigeria revealed that there are identified measures that if explored, the pace of development in the State would be enhanced. Some of those solutions, measures or strategies include the prioritization of the human component of development (the people) in the agenda of the government, rejigging or strengthening government institutions that combat corruption, provision of employment opportunities to the youths and distributing equitably the available resources in the state to the localities where they are needed. The implication of these findings is that if the above-identified strategies/solutions are explored, the State’s development will be significantly enhanced.

5. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusion

The crisis of development in the Nigerian State and particularly Bayelsa State which constitutes the research setting of this study explains the irony of development amidst the avalanche of natural resources the State is blessed with. There is no doubt or argument that Bayelsa State is naturally endowed with enormous natural resources especially oil but lacks the needed development. This scenario has been attributed to a host of factors among which are poor leadership, pervasive corruption, poverty etc. These miserly indices have continued to determine negatively the pace of development in the state wherein the people’s living conditions are not improved upon. It becomes regrettable that amidst the avalanche of resources the state is blessed with, the state is still toddling in its development trajectory. This is manifested in the low spate of development in the state as the human component of development has over the years been relegated to the background by the leadership of the state. On the whole, the development crisis in Bayelsa State of Nigeria is chiefly traceable to leadership failure to deliver development which explains the poor State of development in the State.

48	ISSN 2690-9626 (online), Published by "Global Research Network LLC" under Volume: 4 Issue: 9 in Sep-2023 https://globalresearchnetwork.us/index.php/ajshr
	Copyright (c) 2023 Author (s). This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY).To view a copy of this license, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

Recommendations

Based on the study findings, the following recommendations are made:

1. The Bayelsa State government should focus more on the human component of development (the people) through people-oriented programmes of government.
2. The state government should marshal modalities to tackle the pervasive poverty in the state through the provision of employment opportunities.
3. Corruption needs to be combated out rightly through consolidating the institutions responsible for anti-corruption in the state.
4. The revenue generated in the state should be deployed to improve the living standards of the people and should be equitably distributed to the localities where they are needed.
5. There is a need for a change in leadership orientation towards development where the interest of the people will be the key driving force of leadership.

References

1. Achebe, C. (1983). *The trouble with Nigeria*. Fourth Dimension.
2. Akani, C. (2011). *Political economy of secret cult in Nigerian universities (2nd Edition)*.Delta State University Press.
3. Ake, C. (1981). *A political economy of Africa*. Longman.
4. Ake, C. (1995). The democratisation of disempowerment in Africa. In: Hippler, J(ed). *The Democratisation of Disempowerment: The Problem of Democracy in the Third World*. Pluto Press.
5. Ake, C. (1996). *Democracy and development in Nigeria*. The Brookings Institution.
6. Akude, J. E. (2007). *The Failure and Collapse of the African State: on the Example of Nigeria*. Assessed on 15/07/2011. <http://www.fride.org/publication/262/the-failure-and-collapse-of-the-african-state:-on-the-example-of-nigeria>
7. Alapiki, H. (2010). *Politics and governance on Nigeria*. S. P. Shape Publishers.
8. Almond, A. G., & Powell, G. B. (1966). *Comparative politics: A developmental approach*. Little Brown and Co.
9. Alumona, M. I. 2009. *Understanding the crisis of development in Africa: Reflections on Bedford Umez’s analysis*. African Journal of pol. Sci. 3 (1), 354-359.
10. Beetham, D. (1994). *Conditions for democratic consolidation*. Review of African political economy. 60 (4), 157-172.
11. Bienen, H. (1985). *Political conflict and economic change in Nigeria*. Frankcass.
12. Brundtland Commission Report (1987). *Sustainable development-our common future*. Oxford University Press.
13. Bush, R. (2007). *Poverty and neoliberalism: Persistence and reproduction in the global south*. Pluto Press.
14. Cruz, I., Stahel, A., & Max-Neef, M. (2019). *Towards a systemic development approach: Building on the human-scale development paradigm*. *Ecological Economics*, 68 (7), 2021–2030.

49	ISSN 2690-9626 (online), Published by “Global Research Network LLC” under Volume: 4 Issue: 9 in Sep-2023 https://globalresearchnetwork.us/index.php/ajshr
	Copyright (c) 2023 Author (s). This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY).To view a copy of this license, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

15. Development Report. (2006). *Institutions, politics and development: Militancy in the Niger Delta and crisis of development in Nigeria*. http://www.financialnigeria.com/development/developmentreport_category_item_detail.aspx?categoryid=58item=10
16. DI-Ekine; M. O. (2008). Economics of small-scale palm oil processing in Ikwerre and Etche Local Government Areas of Rivers State, Nigeria. *Journal of Agriculture and Social Research*, 8(2), 67-89.
17. Dode R.O. (2011). *The political economy of resource curse and the Niger Delta crisis in Nigeria: Matters Arising*. <http://onlinersearchjournals.com/aaajoss/art/56.pdf>.
18. Easton, D. (1965). *A systems analysis of political life*. Wiley.
19. Ebong, F., Udoh, E. & Obafemi, F. (2014). Globalization and the industrial development of Nigeria: Evidence from time series analysis. *International Review of Social Sciences and Humanities*, 6(2), 54-66.
20. Ekekwe, E. (1986). *Class and state in Nigeria*. Longman Nigeria Limited.
21. Ekekwe, E. (1986). *Class and state in Nigeria*. Longman.
22. Eneh, C.O. (2009) *.Failed Development Vision, Political Leadership and Nigeria’s Underdevelopment – A Critique*. Assessed on 15/07/2011. Available at http://www.iaabd.org/2009_iaabd_proceedings/track10a.pdf
23. Epelle, A. (2006). *Themes in Marxist political theory*. Salami Publishers.
24. Ezirim, G.E. (2011). Resource Governance and Conflict in the Niger Delta: Implications for the Gulf of Guinea Region. *African journal of political Science and International relations*. 2 (2), 61-71.
25. Falola, T. & Heaton, M.M. (2008) *A History of Nigeria*. Cambridge University Press.
26. Forrest, T. (1995). *Politics and economic development in Nigeria*. United States of America. West View Press.
27. Frank, A.G. (1967). *Capitalism and underdevelopment in Latin America London*. Monthly Review Press.
28. Gahia, C. (2012). *Nigerian government and politics: Political processes and political dilemma*. Ano Publications Company.
29. Gauba, O.P. (2003). *An introduction to political theory (4th ed)*. Macmillian.
30. Giddens, A., & David, H. (2007). *Classes, power, and conflict: Classical and contemporary debates, (3rd Ed)*. University of California Press.
31. Guichaoua, Y. (2009). *Oil and political violence in Nigeria*. http://oxford.academia.edu/YvanGuichaoua/papers/311560/oil_and_politicalviolence_in_Nigeria
32. Hulme, D., & Turner, M.M. (1990). *Sociology and development: Theories, policies and practice*. Harvester Weatsheaf.
33. Human Development Report (HDR). (2006). *Niger Delta Human Development Report*.
34. Human Rights Watch (HRW). (1999). *The price of oil: corporate responsibility and human rights violations in Nigeria’s oil producing communities*. Human Rights Watch.
35. Ibeanu, O. & Luckham, R. (2007). 'Nigeria: political violence, governance and corporate responsibility in a petro-state' *.In: Kaldor, M., Karl, T. L. and Said, Y. (eds.) Oil Wars*. Pluto Press.

50	ISSN 2690-9626 (online), Published by “Global Research Network LLC” under Volume: 4 Issue: 9 in Sep-2023 https://globalresearchnetwork.us/index.php/ajshr
	Copyright (c) 2023 Author (s). This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY).To view a copy of this license, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

36. Igbuzor,O. (2006). *A review of Niger Delta human development report*. <http://www.dawodu.com/igbuzor16.htm>
37. Inokoba P,K & Imbua D,L. (2010). *Vexation and militancy in the Niger Delta: The way forward*..Krepublishers.
38. Jomo, K.S. (1997). *Economic consideration for a renewed nationalism*. SEPHIS-CODESRIA.
39. Karl L,T. (1997). *The paradox of plenty: Oil booms and petro-states*. University of California Press.
40. Kothari, U & Minogue, M. (2002). Critical perspectives on development: An introduction. *In: Kothari, U and Minogue, M (eds). Development Theory and Practice*. Palgrave Macmillian.
41. Kuru, A. (2000). The rentier state model and central Asian studies: The Turkmen case. *Alternative: Turkish J. Int'l*. 1 (1) Pp. 51-71.
42. Lasswell, H.D. (1936). *Politics: Who gets what, when and how?* Whittlesey House.
43. Lewis M,P. (1999). Introduction. *In: Diamond L. Plattner F,M (eds). Democratization in Africa*. The John Hopkins University Press.
44. Mark, B. (2007). Classical economics. *The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics*, 5(1), 414–45.
45. Mitter, S. (1986). *Common fate and common Bond: Women in the Global economy*. Pluto Press.
46. Mohan, G., & Stokke, K. (2000). Participatory development and empowerment. *International Journal on Development*, 21(2), 40-63.
47. Monaheng, T. (2000). *Community development and empowerment*, Oxford University Press.
48. Moore, S. (2000). *'A' level sociology letts educational Aldine house*. Jordan Put Ltd.
49. Motteux, N., Binns, T., Nel, E., & Rowntree, K. (1999). Empowerment for development: Taking participatory appraisal further in rural South Africa. *International Journal Development*, 9(3), 12-23.
50. Mouton, J. (1989). *Participatory research: A new paradigm for development studies*. Southern Book Publishers.
51. Nesamvuni, E.A., Dagada, M.C., Raidimi, N.E.,& Mudau, N.J. (2007). *Socio-economic analysis as a determinant for sustainable development of rural land claimants, in Pretoria*. South African Society for Agricultural Extension.
52. Nnoli, O. (1986). *Introduction to politics*. Longman Nigeria Limited.
53. Ogali, M. (2017). The post-colonial state, minority right and peasant revolt in Nigeria's Niger Delta. *Journal of Political Science and Leadership* 3(1), 48-61.
54. Ojefia I,A. (2004). *The Nigerian State and the Niger Delta question*. <http://www.nigerianlawguru.com/articles/constitutionallaw.thenigerianstateandthenigerdeltaquestion.pdf>
55. Peel, M & Chatham House. (2005). *Crisis in the Niger Delta: How failures of transparency and accountability are destroying the region*. Africa programme briefing paper. <http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Africa/bpnigerdelta.pdf>
56. Postali F.A.S. (2009). Petroleum royalties and regional development in Brazil: The economic growth of recipient towns. *Res. Pol.*, (4), 34 205-213.

51	ISSN 2690-9626 (online), Published by "Global Research Network LLC" under Volume: 4 Issue: 9 in Sep-2023 https://globalresearchnetwork.us/index.php/ajshr
	Copyright (c) 2023 Author (s). This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY).To view a copy of this license, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

57. Rist, G. (2008). *The history of development: From western origins to global faith* (3rd Edition). Zed Books.
58. Rodney, W. (1972). *How Europe underdeveloped Africa*, Bogle: L' Outeture Publications and Tanzania Publishing.
59. Ross, M. (1999). *The political economy of the resource curse*. *World Politics*. 51 (2), 297-322.
60. Schreder P.J. (1995). Political elites and the process of democratisation in Africa. *In: Hippler, J(ed). The Democratisation of Disempowerment: The problem of democracy in the Third World*. Pluto Press.
61. Soyinka, W. (1996). *The open sore of a continent*. Oxford University Press.
62. Streeten, P. (2017). Human development: Means and ends. *Human Development*, 84(2), 232–237.
63. Sunkel, O. (1977). *The development of development thinking institute of development IDS.Bulletin* University of Sussex.
64. Swanepoel, H. (2000). *The state and development*. Oxford University Press.
65. Swanepoel, H., & De Beer, F. (2006). *Community development: Breaking the cycle of poverty*. Juta.
66. Theron, F. (2005). *Guidelines for writing scientific documents and using basic social research methodology*. Van Schaik.
67. Theron, F. (2005). *Public participation as a micro-level development strategy*. Van Schaik.
68. Theron, F. (2005). *Trends in micro-level development*. Van Schaik.
69. Theron, F., & Barnard, D. (1997). *Participation and development planning*. Juta.
70. Todaro, M.P. (1981). *Economic development in the third world*. (2nd Ed.). Longman.
71. Todaro, M.P., & Smith, B.C. (2006). *Economic development*. (9th edition). Pearson Addison Wesley.
72. Treurnicht, S. (2000). *Sustainable development*. Oxford University Press.
73. U.S Non- governmental Delegation Trip Report. (1999). *Oil for Nothing: multinational Corporations, Environmental Destruction, Death and Impunity in the Niger Delta*. http://www.essentialaction.org/shell/final_report.pdf.
74. Ugumanin, B. O., & Maurice, A. C. (2014). The Marxist theory of the state: An introductory guide. *Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences*, 5(4), 527-533.
75. Watts, M. (2007). *Oil inferno: Crisis in Nigeria*. http://www.counterpunch.org/watts_01022007.html
76. Watts, M. (2008). Petro-insurgency or criminal syndicate? Conflict, violence and political disorder in the Niger Delta. *Economies of Violence, working Paper*. No. 16.
77. World Bank. (2004). *A better investment climate for everyone*. World Development Report. World Bank and Oxford University Press.
78. Yates D, A. (1996). *The rentier state in Africa: Oil rent dependency and neocolonialism in the Republic of Gabon*. Africa World Press.

52	ISSN 2690-9626 (online), Published by "Global Research Network LLC" under Volume: 4 Issue: 9 in Sep-2023 https://globalresearchnetwork.us/index.php/ajshr
	Copyright (c) 2023 Author (s). This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY).To view a copy of this license, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/