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# Listening to the Citizens on the State of Social Rights in Europe

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# Summary

This paper examines subjective measurements of social rights outcomes by listening to what the citizens in Europe has to say about social rights issues. The listening entails investigating subjective opinions revealed in public-opinion data on Europe's welfare state and social rights. Our analytical objective is to investigate the roots of such views in social-rights power-resource measures. Our focus on such data is on attitudes towards subjective outcomes, such as views about the adequacy of social benefit take-up and attitudes about the quality of social benefits and the level of life for disadvantaged groups in a respondent's home nation. The main findings are that living in environments with more normative and instrumental resources, as well as patterns of significant actual take-up and welfare spending effort, can increase subjective judgements of social-rights outcomes - particularly among vulnerable groups who tend to be less positive in such judgements. Our findings, on the other hand, suggest that a lack of individual-level resources that assist in navigating the complicated welfare state bureaucracy might worsen inequality in terms of outcomes (or, at the very least, perceptions of these outcomes).

# Listening to the Citizen on the State of Social Rights in Europe

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| **Work package** | EuSocialCit is an interdisciplinary research project aiming to support the EU in strengthening social rights and European social citizenship. It evaluates the current state of social rights in Europe and their relationship to social inequalities, gender inequalities, poverty and precariousness, and diagnoses the shortcomings of current policies and institutions at the level of individual countries and the EU.<br><br>The EuSocialCit project focusses on three domains in which social rights are important: the empowerment of citizens (e.g. education and activation), fair working conditions and social inclusion. Each of these domains are respectively studied as part of WP3, WP4 and WP5.<br><br>This report is produced as part of WP6 which is entitled "Listening to the citizens: public opinion on European social citizenship". This WP combines an in-depth examination of the subjective dimension of social rights with an EU-wide quantitative analysis of policy outputs and outcomes, linked to the domains of social rights as analysed in WP2-5. |
| **Web address** | For more information about the EuSocialCit project, please visit www.eusocialcit.eu. EuSocialCit's output can also be found in its community on Zenodo: https://zenodo.org/communities/eusocialcit. |

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# 1.   Introduction

Within the resource-based framework of the EUSOCIALCIT project, social rights realization involves how social-rights resources (normative, instrumental, and enforcement) shape social-rights outputs (e.g. take-up of policies, policy spending) that together give rise to social-rights outcomes (e.g. employment, poverty, active life).  The state or quality of such social rights realization resides fundamentally in material measures of these conditions – such as legislated regulations that manifest (normative) *resources*; measures of social-benefit take-up rates or of spending that manifest *outputs*; and conditions of human flourishing or suffering that manifest social-rights *outcomes*. However, the quality of social rights resides also in the subjective opinions of individuals about such social rights conditions.  This includes public opinion about what is fair or "ought to be," opinions that manifest (not just causally underlie) normative resources relevant to social rights.  It also includes, however, subjective opinions about actual social-rights outcomes – such as about the accessibility or quality of social services, or about the standard of living of vulnerable groups.

In this paper we focus on such subjective measures of social rights outcomes by listening to what citizens in Europe themselves say about social rights matters.  The listening we do, here, involves exploring subjective attitudes found in public-opinion data on welfare state and social rights in Europe. Our analytical mission is to explore the roots of such attitudes in measures of social-rights power-resources – applying the power-resources framework developed in other EUSOCIALCIT papers (e.g. Vandenbroucke et.al. 2021; Eick et al. 2021; Burgoon 2022).  Specifically, this involves combining high-quality individual-level survey data on social rights to new, quality country-year measures of normative and instrumental resources, and estimates of actual take-up and spending efforts. Our focus on such data is not on more commonly explored support for (future) government social policies or conditions that *ought* to exist, but instead on attitudes towards subjective outcomes: attitudes about the adequacy of the take-up of social benefits; and attitudes about the quality of social benefits and standard of living for vulnerable groups in a respondent's own country.  Our analysis starts by exploring descriptive patterns of such subjective outcomes, across European populations, alongside descriptive patterns of new measures of normative and instrumental resources and of actual take-up and spending-based social-rights outputs.  The bulk of our analysis, however, explores how individual-level attitudes about social-rights outcomes are shaped by (or at least associated with) measures of normative and instrumental resources at both the individual and the national levels, and by measures of actual take-up and spending-effort at the national level.

The principal findings are that social-rights resources and policy output measures affect attitudes or subjective judgments that take-up is high, that the living standards of the unemployed and pensioners are adequate, and that childcare and health services are good.  Preliminary to the explicit focus on attitudes, our analysis of the individual-level survey data shows that quality measures of normative resources, instrumental resources, and welfare efforts tend to affect measures of actual take-up of unemployment insurance programs. These patterns help anticipate the study's main findings about how individual- and macro-level resources and welfare effort shape attitudes relevant to the provision of social rights.

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We find that respondents are more positive about social-rights outcomes – are more likely to say that the poor get the benefits to which they are entitled, that the standard of living for the unemployed and pensioners and quality of childcare services are good—when respondents have individual-level resources to navigate welfare state bureaucracies – such as being more educated, having more income, being a member of a labor union, and being aware of political news. Respondents also tend to be more positive in their subjective judgments of social rights outcomes when they live and work in settings characterized by higher actual social-benefit take-up rates, and also by more generous social policy benefits (e.g. higher unemployment-insurance replacement rates) and more extensive welfare spending effort (e.g higher unemployment spending per unemployed person). More surprising, perhaps, is that these macro-level measures of normative resources and take-up and spending outputs also tend to dampen or remedy the tendency of some vulnerable groups (e.g. the unemployed or less educated) to be more negative about social-rights outcomes (e.g. to see a lot of underuse of social benefits by the poor). And most important for the power-resources framework, we find that an important measure of macro-level instrumental resources – a count of a country's social-benefit awareness campaigns and online social-benefit portals – positively improves vulnerable groups' (low) judgments of take-up of social benefit entitlement and of the quality of childcare services. In short, living in settings with more normative and instrumental resources, and with patterns of substantial actual take-up and welfare spending effort, can increase subjective judgments of social-rights outcomes – particularly of those vulnerable groups tending generally to be less positive in such judgments. Vice versa, our findings, however, also indicate that a lack of individual-level resources that help to navigate the complex welfare state bureaucracies can exacerbate inequalities in terms of outcomes (or at least perceptions of these outcomes).

The paper develops these findings in four sections. Section 2 briefly lays out our expectations about how normative, instrumental and enforcement resources at both the individual micro and macro levels are related to the individuals' realization of social rights in terms of take-up and their subjective judgments about the quality of take-up, social-provision quality and the standard-of-living of key target groups. Section 3 sets up our empirical analysis of European social survey data to explore these expectations, providing an overview of country-level variation in subjective social-rights outcomes, and explaining our analytical strategy to explore the roots of subjective outcomes as lying partly in outputs and resources. Section 4 then presents the results of this analysis, presenting the findings in two steps: first, the findings about individual-level measures of actual take-up and about subjective take-up; and second, the findings about subjective quality of provision and standard-of-living for the unemployed and pensioners. A final Section 5 concludes by summarizing the findings and considering how they play into attitudes towards developing European level social provision.

# 2. Attitudes as Social Rights Outcomes, Rooted in Social-rights Resources and Outputs

Understanding the state of social rights in Europe involves understanding a complex of political, legal, social, and economic facets of human experience. In our conception, social rights realization resides in power resources individuals in a society possess (knowingly or not). These include the legal resources, broadly held ideational standards, and *de jure* policies that legitimate and mandate rights in principle (what we call normative resources). They reside also in the resources that facilitate the ability and willingness of individuals to actual claim or take-up those *de jure* rights (what we call instrumental resources). And they reside in resources that provide oversight and enforcement of *de jure* standards and their take-up (enforcement resources, cf. Vandenbroucke et al. 2021). The state of social rights, hence, depends on the quality of this complex of normative, instrumental, and enforcement resources. Of course, the state of social rights depends also – more obviously, perhaps – on the extent to which such resources lead to or are accompanied by policy measures and practices that are outputs of social rights realization – such as patterns of participation and take-up of policies or actual measures of spending as shares of GDP or of target groups.

When all is said and done with such resources and outputs, however, the proof of the pudding of social rights is in the eating – in the actual outcomes of human flourishing or suffering that make social rights meaningful. Such social-rights outcomes are usually conceptualized and empirically explored with respect to material measures of such flourishing or suffering. Commentators, citizens, and politicians judge outcomes in terms of poverty rates or individual experience of poverty; in terms of having meaningful and fairly paid work or access to work; in terms of actual or possible movement up the class or income hierarchies, i.e. the professional ladders of the good life. However, crucial (if less obvious) manifestations of social-rights outcomes involve citizens' subjective attitudes and judgments about their own and their society's socio-economic circumstances and about the provisions they understand to be available to better those circumstances. Studies of social policy implementation and effectiveness have long recognized the importance of studying opinions as subjective outcomes (Knox 1979; Calzada & Del Pino 2008; Van Oorschot & Meuleman 2012). Within our own resource-based perspective on social-rights realization, opinions can matter also in giving form to normative resources by defining the lines of legitimate claim-making. But also for such a resource perspective, opinions matter perhaps most at the level of subjective judgments of social-rights outcomes.

We are particularly interested in subjective judgments of the accessibility or take-up of social rights or social benefits; in subjective judgments of the quality of particular policies or social services; and in subjective judgments of the quality of life for members of society, particularly vulnerable groups ostensibly served by social assistance and activation policies. This is distinct from the work of some scholars who have focused on subjective judgments of what the broader effects of social policy might be in fighting poverty or promoting equality (Van Oorschot et al., 2012); our focus is to look at

judgments of outcomes without explicitly asking respondents to evaluate causal implications of policies. Our exploration, instead, focuses on judgments of how welfare provisions are working for themselves and their compatriots or their vulnerable groups.

While our tracing of subjective social-rights outcomes is partly about describing the state of affairs in a descriptive sense, our main interest is in exploring the roots of individual-level variation in such subjective judgments of outcomes. This mission has plenty of antecedents in recent study of social policy development (Wendt et al. 2011; Ebbinghaus & Naumann, 2020). Here, however, we want to direct our attention to testing a possibility central to our broader resource-based conceptualization of social-rights realization: that individual-level attitudes on outcomes shall be associated with, have their roots in, social-rights resources (normative, instrumental and enforcement) and social-rights outputs (e.g. take-up/participation patterns, or actual policy spending effort).

Figure 2.1 captures the causal sequence that we hypothesize should underlie subjective social-rights outcomes. The broadest expectation is simple: all normative, instrumental, and enforcement resources, as well as higher take-up rates, and higher spending outputs, should be associated with, and maybe even cause, higher subjective valuations of social-rights outcomes. We can expect the causal steps undergirding such connection, however, to follow through the chain of causation shown. First, we argue that resources are likely to matter in shaping the way individuals behave in the presence of policies and socio-economic positions – including a decision or process of participating in social benefits that might be available *de jure* (as a normative resource, that can be more or less generous). For instance, one can imagine that individual-level instrumental resources influence whether a person has the capacity to navigate the bureaucratic steps necessary to take advantage of a given social policy service. And one can imagine that meso- or macro-level provisions or actions by actors, including governments, can confer instrumental resources – as with more or less extensive outreach or awareness campaigns to ready a populace for existing social provisions or standards.

**Figure 2.1. Social-rights Resources, Outputs, and (Subjective) Outcomes**

Second, we argue that estimated take-up patterns are likely to matter, at least in the aggregate, by giving rise to more policy outputs manifested in spending on transfers and services, and interventions to promote social justice more generally. In the social policy realm, this link is almost automatic in nature, in that actual implementation of many policies and the spending effort accompanying them requires that citizens sign up for and use these policies – whether we are talking about unemployment benefits, healthcare or leave subsidies, or childcare services.

Third and finally, we argue that the actual spending and other macro-level outputs are most proximate to subjective judgments of social-rights outcomes. Such spending measures in fact should reflect the accretion of normative resources and take-up, and thereby carry their potential causal impact – this in addition to the visibility of actual macro-level spending measures of welfare outputs. From the point of view of gauging the roots of subjective valuations of social-rights outcomes, it is likely more appropriate to focus on spending per member of the targeted/eligible group rather than as a share of GDP – as the former is closer to the felt weight of policy interventions.

Whatever the particular causal chain at work, our main expectation is that any of the micro- or macro-level measures of instrumental, normative or enforcement resources, should be positively associated with higher social-rights outcomes valuations[1]. And any measure of either take-up outputs or spending-effort outputs should, likewise, be associated with high subjective social-rights valuations. These are the direct-effect expectations informing our analysis. We can also expect, however, that measures of resources and outputs can influence the extent to which particular characteristics spur or undermine subjective social-rights outcomes. For instance, the extent to which unemployed persons rate the standard of living of the unemployed to be lower than others in society could depend on the unemployed person having access to micro-level instrumental resources (e.g. a familiarity with government bureaucracy) or living in a setting with country or city-level programs to directly gain access to programs. And that same unemployed person is more obviously likely to express higher subjective valuations of standard of living for the unemployed to the extent that he or she is in a setting with more generous benefits (normative resources), or high social-benefit take-up rates, or more substantial spending-effort as social-rights outputs.

While our general expectations are simple but expansive, it is important to know that existing research – including our own – have provided little traction to test them. The rest of this study is focused on that mission, where our focus is on finding sources of data to measure social-rights resources, outputs, and subjective outcomes that can allow us to venture some inferences about the real state of social-rights outcomes in Europe.

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[1] The aim of our analysis is not to judge which particular resources are more important than others, But this may be an important question for future research.

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# 3. Empirical Design: Public Opinion on Social Rights in European Public Opinion Data

We empirically explore these expectations by matching individual-level data on social rights attitudes to a range of national-level measures of social-rights-related resources (normative, instrumental, and enforcement), of social-benefit take-up, and of actual social-benefit spending effort. The individual data allows us to gauge actual individual-level take-up, but also, mainly, measures of subjective judgments of the extent of social-benefit take-up, equality in provision of the policies, and standard of living of groups meant to be helped by social benefits. And the aggregate data allow us to gauge the quality or extent of normative resources of social-rights policies; instrumental resources in facilitating access to such policies; and actual policy spending effort of such policies. These all allow us to assess the state of social rights in the attitudes and judgments of citizens, and to consider how measures of social-rights resources and policy outputs shape such attitudes and judgments.

The individual-level data on which we focus are from the European Social Survey (ESS), providing multi-country, multi-year data with excellent sampling properties and well-framed questions on individual characteristics and attitudes related to the welfare state (ESS 2008; ESS 2016; ESS 2020). We focus particularly on the two ESS waves that have batteries of questions on social rights attitudes in Europe – ESS round 4 (2008) and 8 (2016) – but where possible, we consider results also from other years for a few questions, including the most recent round 10 (2020). The key dataset combining 2008 and 2016 provides information from nearly 100,000 respondents in 32 European countries, including 26 EU member states.[2] Appendix Table One summarizes all the variables used in our analysis.

## 3.1 (Subjective) Outcome Measures

The key social-rights outcomes for our analysis are several individual-level measures. The first set of variables is relevant to our exploration of subjective take-up. A first, preliminary, measure is *social-benefit dependency,* an individual's social benefit dependency (particularly on unemployment income transfers) that, when combined with information on a respondent's unemployment status, provides a basis for judging a respondent's actual take-up of social benefits. A second key measure is *Subjective take-up,* based on how much a respondent agrees or disagrees with "*the following statement about people in [your country]: Many people with very low incomes get less benefit than they are legally entitled to.*" Answers range on a (Likert) scale from 1=strongly agree; 2=somewhat agree; 3=neither agree nor disagree; 4=disagree; 5=strongly disagree. Agreeing or disagreeing with the statement may partly capture judgments of deservingness and generosity of benefits, but they also and mainly

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[2] Countries include Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Switzerland, Croatia, Czech Republic, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Iceland, Italy, Lithuania, Latvia, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Sweden, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, and Ukraine. Coverage is smaller for some aspects of our analysis; we report results for the fullest sample for which data is available for each aspect of the story.

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capture beliefs about whether there is considerable "under-use" of social benefits by the poor (see discussion in Roosma et al. 2015). Hence, we interpret higher scores on the full 1-5 categorical scale as a respondent's judgment of the extent of social-benefit take-up by the poor. The full-sample mean for this categorical version of the measure (*Subjective take-up (categorical))* is 2.59 (standard deviation, s.d., is 0.971), and the mean for the binary measure of *Subjective take-up (binary)* is .2 (s.d. .4) – suggesting that the Europeans, in general, tend to agree that there is less social-benefit take-up by the poor than the poor are legally entitled to. Figure 3.1 below shows, however, substantial variation in the (sample-design-weighted) mean *Subjective take-up (binary)* – with the lowest in Turkey, and the highest in the Netherlands. The general pattern reveals lower subjective take up to be concentrated in Southern and Eastern European settings, and significantly higher subjective take-up in the traditionally most generous European settings. There are important exceptions to this pattern, however, with Italy and Finland being below-average in their mean assessments (that is, judging the underuse of legally entitled social benefits), but with the Czech Republic respondents averaging the second highest in *subjective take-up*.

**Figure 3.1. Subjective take-up of social benefits by the poor**



Subjective Social-benefit Take-up for the Poor

A second set of outcome measures concern subjective judgments of the actual achievements of social rights provision – whatever the take-up or participation patterns may be. We focus on four such social-benefit achievement measures. The first two measure the subjective standard of living of the unemployed and of pensioners, two targeted beneficiaries of social benefit programs: *Subjective unemployed living standard* gauges what respondents "think overall about the standard of living of people who are unemployed" on a 0-10 scale (0=extremely bad…10=extremely good). *Subjective pensioner living standard* gauges the same question but with respect to "pensioners" (instead of "people who are unemployed"). A final pair of subjective social-benefit outcomes involve judgments of the quality of childcare services and of healthcare services. *Subjective childcare quality,* what respondents "think overall about the provision of affordable childcare services for working parents?",

again on a 0-10 scale (0=extremely bad...10=extremely good).  And *subjective healthcare quality* gauges what respondents "think overall about the state of health services in [one's country] nowadays?," with answers ranging on a 0-10 scale (0=extremely bad...10=extremely good).  The full-sample averages suggest that overall, European citizens have a rather negative view on the quality of these measures (scoring below 5 on the 0-10 scaling): *Subjective unemployed living standard* having a mean of 3.6; *subjective pensioner living standard* of 4.3; and *subjective childcare quality* of 4.8. It is only healthcare quality that is above the neutral threshold, at 5.3.  Figure 3.2 shows the national means for these measures, suggesting plenty of national variation, with the answers also quite clearly positively correlated, visible in the country averages but also in the Pearson's coefficients of correlation ranging between .3 and .56.

**Figure 3.2. Subjective judgments of social-benefit quality and standards of living of the unemployed and pensioners**



## 3.2 Key Explanatory Factors:  Social-rights Resources and Outputs in Europe

The key explanatory factors on which our empirical inquiry focuses are individual-level and, mainly, national-level measures of social-rights resources and outputs. The measures of normative resources and policy output match frequently studied themes of social benefit provision: unemployment insurance provisions; ECEC provisions; parental leave provisions; old-age provisions; and healthcare

provisions. The instrumental and enforcement resources measures are more generic to social benefit provision generally.

*Normative resources.* Our key measures of normative/deontic resources are metrics of social policy generosity in several social benefit realms: unemployment insurance; old-age assistance; sickness and healthcare services; maternal/paternal/parental leave; early childhood education and care (ECEC). The first three – *UI generosity; Sickness/health generosity;* and *Pension generosity* – are all based on the sub-metrics of benefit generosity (e.g. replacement rates, waiting periods, duration, coverage, etc.) developed as part of the Social Citizenship Indicators Project (SCIP) and the overarching Social Policy Indicators Project (SPIN) (Nelson et al. 2020; SPIN 2023F). We take simple standardized sums to scale each of these measures (taking positive values that manifest more generosity and negative values for provisions manifesting less generosity). And we also consider a composite of these, that we deem *Social benefit generosity scale.* The measure of ECEC generosity is based on OECD gauging "net childcare costs" that measure the extent to which childcare benefits/rebates and tax deductions contributions offset childcare costs per country year (OECD 2023). And finally, the measure of *Mother/Father/Parental leave generosity* is based on OECD social indicators of weeks of public or mandatory paid leave (OECD 2020).

*Take-up Outputs.* Causally downstream from social benefit generosity or other social-rights normative resources are measures of the actual participation in social benefit programs – or what is often termed social-benefit take-up. Such take-up measures, of course, enter into what gets measured downstream with respect to actual spending on programs (more on that momentarily). But measuring these directly is crucial to understanding social-policy outputs – particularly to clarify social rights realization that involves citizens who may or may not have the resources to take advantage of the normative resources captured by *de jure* generosity measures. Our empirical analysis considers three direct, if rough, estimates of such social-benefit take-up – for the policy realms, respectively, of unemployment insurance, parental leave, and ECEC. First, *UI take-up (OECD)* is based on the "pseudo" coverage rates, focused on people receiving unemployment insurance and assistance benefits (mostly categorized as UI and a few as ALMP) as a share of "unemployed" (based on ILO definitions) (OECD 2021).[3] Second, *Mother/Father/Parent leave take-up,* measures the standardized average number of parents making use of maternal or paternal leave benefits in a country, per 100 live births (OECD 2023b). Third, *ECEC take-up* is based on the average of the standardized percentages of children enrolled in early childhood education and care services: the percentage for 0-2-year-olds (ISCED 0 and other registered ECEC services), and the percentage for 3-5-year-olds (ISCED 2011 level 0) or primary education (ISCED 2011 level 1) (OECD 2023c). These measures are "pseudo" take-up measures particularly in that they do not fully distinguish those fully eligible from those not eligible for the social provision in question. Despite their roughness, however, the estimates allow cross national and over time comparison for our study of subjective social-rights outcomes. The UI take-up and ECEC take-up correlate positively

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[3] As noted in Burgoon 2022, this *UI take-up* is a "pseudo" take up measure, where reported shares can exceed 100% because some measured recipients may not be registered as unemployed (and of course some "unemployed" may be ineligible for benefits). The EU LFS data-discussion reported that about 23% of recipients of 2012 unemployment benefits were working, while 40% were jobless but not officially unemployed by ILO standards. Counts of UI recipients, it appears, include people not actively looking for work (OECD 2021).

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with one another, as do the ECEC and leave take-up measures; but UI take-up and leave take-up are negatively correlated. Figure 3.3 shows how each of these take-up measure correlates with its counterpart normative-resource measure of generosity. Consistent with expectations, these normative resources and take-up measures are modestly positively correlated.

**Figure 3.3. Take-up/participation rates and generosity measures associated per social-benefit theme**

*a. Unemployment insurance*                    *b. ECEC*



*c. Maternal/Paternal leave*



*Spending effort.* As our last social-rights output measures, we also consider actual spending effort – what is causally downstream from both social-benefit generosity (normative resource) and from the take-up measures. We are interested in the consequences of social-benefit spending in public opinion, focused on individuals also in particular target groups (e.g. unemployed persons in settings characterized by the extent of unemployment insurance spending). We therefore focus on spending *effort,* where the spending is per head of the target group. The baseline measures of this sort are drawn from Ronchi (2020) (the SIWE dataset). *UI spending effort* is the spending on unemployment insurance and redundancy programs, normalized by total unemployed persons. *ECEC spending effort* is spending on in-kind child benefits, mainly early childcare services and education, normalized by the

number of children (0-5). And *Mat./Pat. Leave effort* shown is based on maternal and paternal leave spending, normalized by birthrate (logged) (OECD, own calculations). Finally, *Total social spending effort*, is a standardized scale of all the SIWE categories (child, old-age, work, and sickness/health effort). To get a sense of the national variation of these measures, Figure 3.4 shows the distribution of each theme-specific measure of spending effort (vertical axis) set against its counterpart measure of take-up (horizontal axis), which is causally upstream from actual spending effort. We can observe the familiar pattern of social spending effort, particularly for UI and ECEC, where the Southern European and CEEC countries manifest substantially less spending effort than their Northern European counterparts.

**Figure 3.4. Spending effort and Take-up/participation rates by social-benefit theme**

*a. Unemployment insurance*                                   *b. ECEC*



*c. Mat./Pat. leave*



*Instrumental resources.* Finally, the explanatory factors on which we focus are not only theme-specific normative resources and outputs (take-up and generosity), but also instrumental resources that can empower citizens to navigate and take-up *de jure* benefits. Measuring these can be difficult, particularly since we conceptualize these as attributes of individual citizens and the most relevant macro-level instrumental resources are specific to social-benefit administration and program design

in different countries.  With our available data, however, we focus on a range of individual features and one key macro-level indicator that can be seen as conferring instrumental resources relevant to social benefit take-up.  The individual features include more generally relevant individual demographic and socio-economic status conditions that not only capture socio-economic risk but also affect the capacities of individuals to understand, look into and figure out how to access the social-benefit bureaucracy: *High educated,* having completed at least some tertiary education; *Non-low income,* having a household income above the third decile; and *Native-born,* being born in the reporting country, that selects for familiarity with legal/bureaucratic and social traditions/practices relevant to social-benefit navigation. Being a *Union member* has been shown relevant to providing members with informational and logistical social-benefit resources, not just in Ghent-system countries (Van Rie et al. 2011; Kim & Margalit 2017).  Also at the individual level, the ESS data includes a couple of other measures that constitute instrumental resources: *Interested in politics,* the subjective degree of following and caring about public, and political issues; and *Daily internet use,* that captures familiarity with and exposure to internet-based material that can be essential to navigating social-benefit provisions.

Finally, we also have constructed a macro-level national measure of instrumental resources, based on reporting by the European Social Policy Network (ESPN) on existing and planned initiatives in European countries (including all EU member states) to improve social-benefit transparency and accessibility (Spasova et al. 2022).  We focus on two features (and their combination): *Social-benefit campaigns (ESPN)* counts of whether a country has existing social benefit awareness campaigns on general social benefits, unemployment provisions, ECEC provisions, pension provisions, and sickness/disability provisions; *Social-benefit portals (ESPN)* a count of whether a country has existing internet portals to help citizens navigate general social policy, or a given program of social policy; and *Campaigns and Portals (ESPN),* a standardized scale of these two counts.  These measures are simple counts, saying nothing about the (presumably-varying) quality of the campaigns and portals.  And the measures are purely cross-sectional, and have unknown specific dates since the reporting shows that they include programs created many years earlier than 2020. But the measures directly capture or proxy for the concept of instrumental resources relevant to our study. Figure 3.5 provides a snapshot of the measures.  With respect to these, admittedly rough, measures of instrumental resources, we can see that the usual distribution of social-benefit generosity and effort does not clearly apply – with some social-transfer stalwarts like Belgium and Germany being on the low end of such social-benefit *Campaigns and Portals,* while Latvia, Poland and Slovenia are at the high end of such resources.

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**Figure 3.5. Social-benefit Awareness Campaigns and Digital Portals**



Social-beneft Portals and Campaigns

## 3.3 Analytical approach

Our inferential analysis explores how the aforementioned measures of normative resources, instrumental resources, and outputs shape subjective social rights outcomes. In all cases, our analysis can only clarify associations, but these support causal *inferences* about whether normative and instrumental resources and their downstream outputs spur more favorable social-rights outcomes with respect to subjective take up and subjective quality of social-services and living standards. Because most of our explanatory conditions of interest are country-year level while our outcomes are individual-country-year level, our baseline analyses are multi-level random intercept models (country-waves as the level 2 variables). The estimators include either (ordinal) logistic or OLS coefficients depending on the outcome of interest, and robust country-clustered standard errors. All our estimations include controls that help isolate the effects of social-rights resources and outputs: *Female*; *Age*; *Native-born*; *Unemployed; High-educated*; *High-income*; *Live-with-partner*; *Children-living-at-home; Union member*; *Left-Right scale*; and *Support government redistribution.*

With this basic set up, we consider direct effects of measures of resources or outputs on individual-level outcomes, as well as of how such resource and output measures moderate the influence of key individual-level covariates. The latter interactions are important to understand roots of individual-level take-up, by showing how measures of resources or outputs moderate whether a person's unemployment status translates into actual unemployment-insurance benefit dependency. The interactions are also important to our exploration of subjective outcomes like valuation of the quality of childcare services or of the standard-of-living of the unemployed. There we want to understand not only whether subjective judgment of such quality might be improved by instrumental and normative resources and outputs directly, but also whether such resources and outputs might render more positive the way working parents judge childcare services in their country, or the way unemployed respondents see the standard-living of the unemployed in their country.

# 4. Results

We present the results in two steps, focused on distinct sets of outcome variables: (1) *Social-rights Take-up,* starting with actual take-up of unemployment benefits (*UI dependency*) in our individual-level data, and subjective judgments of the adequacy of take-up (*Subjective take-up*) in that same data; (2) *Social-rights quality,* involving both subjective judgment of standards of living of the unemployed and pensioners (*Subjective unemployed living standard* and *Subjective pensioner living standard*), and subjective judgments of the quality of ECEC and healthcare services (*Subj. childcare quality* and *Subj. healthcare quality*, respectively). To help clarify and shorten the presentation of the results, we present the key findings with graphic representation of the quantities of interest, relegating the full regression results to Appendix tables.

## 4.1 Social rights take-up

### 4.1.1 Actual take-up patterns

Before turning to the subjective judgments of social-rights outcomes, we first present the results of how instrumental resources (both individual-level and country-level), normative resources (UI generosity), and outputs (actual national-level UI-take-up) affect an individual respondent's likelihood of making use of or accepting unemployment or redundancy benefits. We model these possibilities by considering whether a respondent's unemployment status is moderated by – rendered more positive by – the presence of social-benefit resources and outputs. The full results can be seen in Appendix Table 2, focused on how individual-level instrumental resources moderate the effect of unemployment on UI dependency, and Appendix Table 3, which centers on how macro-level instrumental and normative resources and macro-level take-up measures moderate the effect of unemployment on UI dependency. The results are broadly in line with our expectations.

Figure 4.1 shows the key statistically significant results suggesting that micro-level instrumental resources spur the likelihood that being unemployed translates into receiving unemployment or redundancy benefits as key sources of household income. In particular, the figure shows on the vertical axis the chance that unemployment status significantly translates into UI-benefit dependency. This chance is always high and statistically significant (see Appendix Table 2), but the Figure shows what this chance is when the individual-level indicator is low versus high, or non-existent versus present. We can see that the chance that unemployed status translates into social-benefit dependency is markedly higher when a respondent is a union member (yes) versus not a union member (no); when education is high rather than low; when income is not very low (rather than very low); when a respondent is native-born rather than foreign-born; and when a respondent is interested in politics rather than is disinterested in politics. The only micro-level instrumental resource measure that does not significantly increase the likelihood of take up is daily internet use (see last column of Appendix Table 2).

**Figure 4.1. How micro-level instrumental resources spur UI-benefit take-up**



The results for how macro-level conditions moderate the effect of unemployment on UI-benefit dependency are less consistent – but the only significant effects for the role of our macro measures of instrumental resources are in line with expectation. The expected moderating role by actual normative resources (more generous UI benefits) and by actual UI take-up outputs turn out to be insignificant (see first two columns of Appendix Table 3). Figure 4.2 shows the results that *are* significant and in line with expectations, namely those for our macro-level measure of instrumental resources. The Figure captures again what the predicted effect of unemployment status is on UI-benefit dependency if respondents are in settings with low versus high values of *Social-benefit campaigns* to raise awareness of programs, of internet-based *Social-benefit portals*, and of their standardized combination. The non-positive difference in the upper confidence interval for low versus high *Social-benefit campaigns* shows that the instrumental-resource measure is insignificant (though positive). However, the *Social-benefit portals* score, and the fuller picture of instrumental resources captured by the combined *Campaigns & portals,* are significant. We take this as evidence supporting the inference that higher instrumental resources in the form of *Social-benefit Campaigns & portals* tend to spur the likelihood that unemployed respondents take up UI social benefits.[4]

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[4] Since the actual dates of having awareness campaigns and internet portals in place are unclear, we also checked and can affirm that the reported results reported in this Figure hold also for the most recent ESS wave in 2020 (with survey questions that are suitable for exploring UI dependency but not for our exploration of subjective outcomes, alas). The coefficient for that one wave is a bit smaller, but so too are the standard errors – yielding a level of significance that is slightly higher than the reported results for 2004 and 2008.

We can now move to the first of our measures of subjective social-rights quality: *Subjective take-up,* respondent judgments of whether the poor get the social benefits to which they are legally entitled. Figure 4.3 summarizes the most important results of the analysis of the micro-level conditions significantly affecting such judgments (Appendix Table 4 shows the full results). The Figure reports the marginal effects on our categorical measure of *Subjective take-up,* where negative numbers indicate that the named characteristic is associated with less support for the view that the poor get the benefits to which they are legally entitled. The resulting findings amount to news that is not good, but also not surprising: individuals with features constituting lower socio-economic status tend to have more negative judgments about the poor's access to social benefits. After controlling for a range of individual characteristics (e.g household composition, left-right attitudes, support for redistribution, union membership, age, gender, left-right ideology), the status of being dependent on social benefits, of being poor, of being less educated, of being unemployed, and of being foreign-born are all associated with belief that the poor underuse the social benefits to which they are entitled legally.

**Figure 4.3. Individual-level sources of socio-economic insecurity/risk are associated with more negative subjective judgment of adequacy of social-benefit take-up by the poor**



Figure 4.4 shows how adding some of the macro-level measures of normative resources and outputs reveals a broadly expected pattern that those respondents in more generous and high-welfare-effort social-policy settings tend to hold more positive judgments of take-up of social-benefit entitlements. As can be seen from the full results reported in Appendix Table 5, two of our three macro-level measures of take-up and our macro-level measure of instrumental resources do not have a significant direct effect on *Subjective take-up.* However, our encompassing measure of normative resources – social-policy generosity for unemployment, pension and sickness/health provisions – is associated with a higher likelihood of saying that the poor get the benefits to which they are legally entitled. The

same is true for one of our measures of take-up – participation in maternity/paternity leave programs – and our encompassing measure of *Total social spending effort.* The predicted effects are for the outcomes of somewhat or strongly disagreeing with the statement that the poor do not get the benefits to which they are legally entitled, and the three panels are on the same scale of such predicted probability. And for all three panels, we consider the predicted probabilities across the full sample of the macro-variable in question. Hence, we can compare the direct 'effects' of these macro conditions, suggesting that the normative resource has the strongest positive effect on *Subjective take-up.*

**Figure 4.4. Macro-level resources and outputs significantly associated with more positive judgment of adequacy of social-benefit take-up by the poor**



More important than these direct effects of macro-level measures are the results for how the same macro-level conditions moderate the micro-level characteristics associated with low *Subjective take-up.* We saw in Figure 4.3 that socio-economic risks are associated with less likelihood of saying that the poor get the social benefits to which they are entitled legally. Further analysis, shown in Appendix Table 5, explores how these micro-level conditions might be moderated by the key macro-level conditions. The results suggest that living in settings with higher values of macro-level resources and outputs can mitigate the tendency of those facing more micro-level socio-economic risks to say that the poor get less than they are legally entitled to.

Figure 4.5 graphically summarizes the most important of the statistically significant results, focused on the moderating role of our macro measure of instrumental resources: *Social-benefit campaigns & portals,* a country's initiatives to increase awareness of social benefits and its setting-up of internet portals on social benefit access. The Figure graphically captures how the status of having a given manifestation of individual socio-economic risk – being dependent on social benefits, unemployed, low-educated, and/or low-income – is associated with a given level of *Subjective take-up* that varies depending on whether the high-risk respondent lives in a setting with low versus high levels of *Social-*

*benefit campaigns & portals.*  As can be seen by the values on the vertical axis, those with any of these higher-risk characteristics are not very likely to say that the poor get the social-benefits to which they are legally entitled; the predicted values are never higher than about a .30 probability of believing as much.  However, that probability goes up statistically significantly, if substantively marginally, when the instrumental resources are better by our macro measure.  For instance, being unemployed predicts a 17.8-percent chance of judging the poor to get their entitled social benefits when instrumental resources are at the lowest 10th percentile of the sample distribution (e.g. Portugal), and almost 24-percent chance if they are in a setting with the highest 90th percentile (e.g. Netherlands).

**Figure 4.5. Macro-level instrumental resources renders more positive how high-risk individuals judge the adequacy of social-benefit take-up by the poor**



...if in setting with LOW vs. HIgh social benefit campaigns and portals

## 4.2 Social-rights Quality: Subjective judgments of Standard-of-living and Policy Quality

These results about subjective take-up foreshadow results regarding the more obvious manifestations of subjective social-rights outcomes for which we have data: subjective judgments of policy quality with respect to childcare services and healthcare services (*Subjective childcare quality* and *Subjective healthcare quality*); and of standard-of-living of key social-benefit target groups, the unemployed and pensioners (*Subjective unemployed standard-of-living* and *Subjective pensioner standard-of-living*). Our analysis of these four subjective outcomes follows the steps discussed with respect to subjective take-up.  First we report which micro-level conditions predict positive or negative positions on each outcome. Second we report the extent to which macro-level resource or output measures relevant to each outcome actually predict more positive subjective outcomes.  And third, we report whether macro-level resources or outputs render more positive the predicted subjective outcomes of each

outcome's target group; the unemployed in the case of *Subjective unemployed standard-of-living*; older respondents (60+) in the case of *Subjective pensioner standard-of-living*; working parents in the case of *Subjective childcare quality*; and respondents with bad health in the case of *Subjective healthcare quality*.

### 4.2.1 Individual-level correlates of Subjective Social-rights Quality

If we focus only on how the individual correlates, particularly of socio-economic risk, are associated with each of these four subjective outcomes – full results summarized in the first column of each of Appendix Tables 6-9 – we can see that being faced with risk does tend to predict lower assessments of subjective social-rights quality. Figure 4.6 summarizes these patterns, focusing on the predicted effects of each of the key individual correlates (a row for each on the vertical axis) for each of the subjective outcome variables in the four policy realms (a column of findings on the horizontal axis). The results show in general that conditions associated with socio-economic risk or low status tend to be associated with lower subjective judgments of social-rights quality among those facing more risk. This is the case for social-benefit dependency (significantly so for three of the four subjective quality measures); unemployment (significantly for two of the four); for foreign-born (significantly for one); for lower educated (significantly for two of the four); and for low income (significantly for two of the four). Another pattern that is important to note is that those individuals most directly affected by a particular social policy are also the most critical of its quality: the unemployed are significantly negative about unemployed standard of living; working parents are significantly negative about childcare quality for working parents; and respondents in poor health are negative about the quality of healthcare services. In fact, unemployed respondents are particularly negative about the standard of living of the unemployed (more so than their negativity about the standard-of-living of pensioners or about childcare quality). Only older (60+) respondents' judgments of standard living of pensioners is not statistically significant is spared this pattern.

**Figure 4.6. Micro-level correlates of social-rights quality, per policy realm**

To explore the potential effects of macro-level social-rights resources and outputs, we add to the models with all these individual-level predictors a key relevant macro-level measure specific to the benefit realm about which subjective quality is asked: (1) policy-realm-specific normative resources (UI generosity for *Subj.unemployed standard of living,* ECEC generosity for *Subjective childcare quality,* etc.); (2) policy-specific actual take-up outputs (UI take-up for *Subjective unemployed standard of living,* and ECEC take-up for *Subjective childcare quality,* with no macro take-up measures available for *Subj.pensioner standard of living* or *Subjective healthcare quality*); (3) policy-specific spending effort (UI spending per unemployed for *Subjective unemployed standard of living, Old-age spending per eligible population, etc.*); and (4) our general macro-level measure of social-rights instrumental resources (*Social-benefit Campaigns&Portals*). The full results are visible in columns 2-5 in Appendix Tables 6 and 7 and 2-4 in Appendix Tables 8 and 9, but Figure 4.7 graphically summarizes the main results. Each row corresponds to a given subjective outcome – from *Subjective unemployed standard of living* (first row) through to *Subjective healthcare quality* (fourth row). And each column corresponds to a given resource or outcome measure (policy generosity, policy take-up, policy spending effort, and instrumental resources). Each of the fourteen panels for which we have data summarizes the predicted effect on the respective subjective quality measure across the full distribution of the respective macro-level resource or output measure.

**Figure 4.7. Macro-level resources and outputs, associated with social-rights quality outcomes, per policy realm**

As can be eyed across these panels, the macro-level measures tend to be associated with more positive subjective quality in the opinions of our respondents. And this tendency of macro-level resources and outputs to be associated with more positive judgments of social-rights quality is statistically significant in most: three of the four for *Subjective unemployment standard-of-living* and for *Subjective childcare quality*; two of the three for *Subjective pensioner standard-of-living;* but only one of the three for *Subjective healthcare quality.* Figure 4.7 also makes it easy to see how the results reveal the output measure of spending effort to be the most consistent – in terms of substantive and statistical significance – macro-condition associated with more positive subjective quality among European citizens. This makes sense in that this measure ostensibly takes account of – and is causally downstream of – the generosity (normative resource) and take-up (output) measure, and more tied to material experiences than the general instrumental resources measure for which we have data.

### 4.2.3. Macro-level Social-rights Resources and Outputs Positively Shifting Target-groups' Predicted Assessments of Subjective Social-rights Quality

Finally, we can see the extent to which these macro-level measures of social-rights resources and outputs render more positive the judgments of subjective quality among each policy realm's respective target group. The full results are reported in columns 6-9 in Appendix Tables 6 and 7, and in columns 5-7 in Appendix Tables 8 and 9. The general pattern is in line with our expectation in terms of the positive direction of the relevant interactions, where the target group's tendency to judge subjective social-rights quality to be lower than the rest of the population indeed becomes mitigated – rendered more positive – when the respondent lives in a setting with more positive macro-level social rights resources and outputs. The most consistently significant pattern in this direction concerns the results for *Subjective childcare quality* – where all four macro-resource or output measure significantly improves the target group's judgment of subjective quality of childcare services for working parents. Figure 4.8 graphically summarizes this pattern. Each panel correspondents to the moderating role of a given macro-level resource or output measure, from left to right: (1) the normative resource of ECEC generosity; (2) the take-up output measure of ECEC take-up; (3) the ECEC/Childcare services spending effort as the downstream output measure; and (4) the Social-benefits awareness campaigns and portals scale as the instrumental resources measure. In that panel, we see two predicted valuations of "the quality of childcare services for working parents" by respondents who are working parents (compared to all other respondents): when the score for the macro-level variable is "low" (i.e. 10th percentile) and when it is "high (i.e. 90th percentile). The predicted valuation scores are on the scale ranging from 0-10 (0=extremely bad...10=extremely good). As can be seen by the predicted mean valuations for working parents in settings with low versus high resources and outputs, that difference in setting is the difference between the target group judging the quality of the policy to be below passing (roughly, a 5 out of 10).

**Figure 4.8. How macro-level social-benefit resources and outputs increase working parents' valuation of childcare services**



Predicted effect of being a working parent
on subjective judgment of childcare services, moderated by...

This pattern turns out to be more unanimously statistically significant and in support of expectation compared to the three other quality measures. For *Subjective unemployed standard-of-living* all the interactions are positive, but only the spending effort measure is statistically significant, and for *Subjective pensioner standard-of-living* the interactions are all positive but significant "only" for the generosity (normative resource) and the spending-effort output measure (the instrumental resource measure being insignificant) (see results in the Appendix Tables and also Appendix Figure 1). The results are least supportive of expectation for *Subjective healthcare quality,* where the normative resource measure (sickness/health policy generosity) tends to exacerbate the tendency of respondents reporting bad health to judge healthcare benefits lower than do unhealthy respondents in generous policy settings. Despite this mixed pattern, the balance of evidence supports our inference that macro-level normative and instrumental resources, take-up outputs, and particularly spending-effort output measures tend to increase not only general-population valuations of social-rights quality but also the valuations by the key target group for whom such quality is more biting.

# 5. Conclusions and Implications for European Union-level "Social Europe"

Taken together, our empirical exploration paints a mixed portrait on the state of social-rights outcomes based on European individuals' opinions about national-level social rights. On the one hand, the picture is concerning to anyone hoping for high levels of subjective judgments of social-rights outcomes. Only about 20 percent of individuals in European polities believe that low-income citizens are getting the social benefits to which they are legally entitled in their countries. And European citizens tend to rate the standard of living of unemployed persons in their country to be closer to extremely bad than to extremely good (3.6 on a scale of 10). Europeans' judgments are somewhat less harsh towards the living standard of pensioners (4.3 on a 10-point scale between extremely bad and extremely good) and the quality of childcare services for working parents (4.8 out of 10), but such valuations of outcomes are still below "passing." More important, perhaps, our analysis reveals that key target groups of social protection – such as the less-educated, the poor, and foreign-born, the unemployed, the old-age population, and working parents – tend to be more negative than their counterparts about such subjective judgments of social-rights quality. Listening to the citizen clarifies that subjective judgments of social-rights outcomes are anything but rosy.

On the other hand, the study's exploration of how social-rights resources and outcomes influence subjective outcomes provides a lot of evidence that social-benefit interventions can and do make a big difference in improving such subjective outcomes. This has manifested itself in the ways that both individual-level measures of instrumental resources (e.g. union membership or political engagement) can make a difference in one's own take-up of services and also one's valuation of the adequacy of take-up. It has also manifested itself in how macro-level instrumental resources, particularly social-benefit awareness campaigns and internet portals, can improve subjective judgments of social-rights outcomes – and somewhat remedy the particularly low valuations held by vulnerable groups. The patterns are similar for more familiar conditions like the measures of generosity that constitute key normative resources in social-rights realization, or macro-level measures of social-rights outputs like social-benefit take-up or more downstream social-spending effort. If listening to the citizen reveals real problems, then the evidence for how power-resources are important to improving those problems is a source of hope and a directive for action.

The exploration supporting this mixed portrait is of course based on limited data and analysis. Given data limitations, the focus has been on pre-pandemic social-rights attitudes and dynamics. And the aspects of social rights on which we have been able to focus in that data has also been limited – necessarily focused on still-rough categories of social programs and target groups. More importantly, our measures of social-rights resources are limited and rough, as is our ability to hear the ways citizens make use of such resources – given again limits in questions asked and answered in survey instruments. Most importantly, perhaps, our exploration has been limited to study of Europeans' judgments of social-rights outcomes at the national level, even though of course social-rights in Europe reflect and involve fundamentally the role of the European Union.

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With that last issue in mind, we want to conclude by briefly thinking-through what our findings mean for Social Europe as a multi-level enterprise involving interconnected national-level social provisions/rights/capacities and EU-level provisions/rights/capacities. A key issue for us is how the national-level patterns of how social-rights resources and outputs spur subjective outcomes means for the EU level. This issue rides into an ongoing controversy about synergies and tensions between national level and European-level social provisions and capacities. There's plenty of research suggesting some tension, particularly in public opinion on issues of social protection: vulnerable groups have been found to be generally supportive of EU-level social policy development and insurance, but particularly as such EU-level initiatives become concrete we see concerns that whatever happens on the EU-level can displace, politically hollow out or otherwise threaten national-level provisions that were long fought for at the center of the last 100 years of political development in Europe (Burgoon 2009). These issues deserve and receive careful study, including developing arguments and expectations about how the dynamics clarified in the present study should play out for attitudes towards European-level social benefits.

Even without fully identified exploration, we can easily consider how the key factors in our analysis above – the key measures of subjective social-rights outcomes, the key target groups, and the key macro-level measures of social-rights resources and outputs – are associated with support for developing European-level social benefits. The 2016 ESS interviews included a question about the latter – particularly, whether respondents were (strongly or somewhat) "against or in favor of a European-Union-wide social benefit scheme." We can see whether answers to this question are associated with respondents' judgments about their own national-level social benefit settings, and with the conditions we found important to such judgments. Our final Figure 5.1 summarizes the key results (full regression results are in Appendix Table 10).

**Figure 5.1. How subjective judgments about national-level social-benefit outcomes are associated with support for European-Union-wide social benefits**

Here we can see that more positive judgments of subjective outcomes such as *Subjective take-up,* and *Subjective unemployed standard of living,* are associated with less support for European-Union wide social benefit schemes.  And we see that key macro-level measures of social-rights resources and outputs – particularly the instrumental resources measure, the most encompassing take-up measure we have, and the most encompassing measure of actual total welfare spending effort – are also all negatively associated with support for EU-level benefit schemes.  This pattern is in line with plenty of other studies suggesting that citizens envision trade-offs and tension between national- and EU-level social-rights initiatives (see, for example, Mau 2005; Gerhards et al 2016; Vandenbroucke et al. 2018; Eick et al 2022).  On the other hand, the patterns also show that the more vulnerable respondents in terms of unemployment status, social-benefit dependency, low income and low-education status, are all tending to be more supportive of such EU-level provisions.  These suggest a support for EU-level development towards Social Europe that relies fundamentally on the political support from more socio-economically marginalized groups – and those more critical of and frustrated with their own national-level social-rights systems.

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# Appendix

**Table A1. Summary statistics (European Social Survey, ESS), 2008, 2016, 2020**

| Variable | Obs. | Mean | Std. Dev. | Min | Max |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Subj. take-up (cat) | 89,878 | 2.595 | 0.971 | 1 | 5 |
| Subj. take-up (binary) | 89,878 | 0.200 | 0.400 | 0 | 1 |
| Subj. unemployed living standard | 96,743 | 3.637 | 2.167 | 0 | 10 |
| Subj. childcare quality | 49,868 | 4.752 | 2.362 | 0 | 10 |
| Subj. pensioner living standard | 98,048 | 4.273 | 2.417 | 0 | 10 |
| Sub. Healthcare quality | 98,460 | 5.271 | 2.565 | 0 | 10 |
| Support EU-level social benefits | 32,289 | 2.687 | 0.756 | 1 | 4 |
| UI dependency | 99,325 | 0.018 | 0.133 | 0 | 1 |
| Soc.benefit dependency | 99,325 | 0.046 | 0.209 | 0 | 1 |
| Unemployed | 99,325 | 0.062 | 0.241 | 0 | 1 |
| Female | 99,289 | 0.535 | 0.499 | 0 | 1 |
| Age | 98,984 | 48.216 | 18.473 | 15 | 105 |
| Native-born | 99,198 | 0.905 | 0.294 | 0 | 1 |
| High educated | 99,041 | 0.181 | 0.385 | 0 | 1 |
| Non-low income | 94,237 | 0.739 | 0.439 | 0 | 1 |
| Live with partner | 99,325 | 0.631 | 0.483 | 0 | 1 |
| Child at home | 99,045 | 0.371 | 0.483 | 0 | 1 |
| Union member | 99,325 | 0.164 | 0.371 | 0 | 1 |
| Left-Right scale | 85,267 | 5.177 | 2.259 | 0 | 10 |
| Government redistribution | 99,325 | 3.883 | 1.009 | 1 | 5 |
| Working parent | 99,080 | 0.329 | 0.470 | 0 | 1 |
| Old-age (60-plus) | 99,325 | 0.306 | 0.461 | 0 | 1 |
| Interested in politics | 99,059 | 2.393 | 0.915 | 1 | 4 |
| Daily internet use | 99,325 | 0.445 | 0.497 | 0 | 1 |
| Bad health | 99,208 | 2.240 | 0.934 | 1 | 5 |
| Support deeper EU integration | 89,773 | 5.16 | 2.673 | 0 | 10 |
| UI generosity (SCIP) | 79,419 | 0.053 | 0.509 | -0.878 | 1.438 |
| Sickness/health generosity (SCIP) | 79,419 | 0.024 | 0.540 | -1.649 | 1.322 |
| Pension generosity (SCIP) | 79,419 | -0.293 | 0.510 | -1.316 | 1.072 |
| M/F/Parental leave generosity (OECD) | 77,383 | 3.754 | 0.833 | 1.720 | 5.118 |
| ECEC generosity (OECD) | 83,603 | 92.250 | 5.047 | 72 | 100 |
| Social benefit generosity scale (SCIP) | 79,419 | -0.215 | 1.082 | -2.673 | 2.697 |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| UI take-up (OECD) | 86,701 | 0.659 | 0.489 | 0.028 | 2.034 |
| ECEC take-up (OECD) | 86,084 | 56.067 | 26.613 | 10.850 | 96.767 |
| M/F/Parental leave take-up (OECD) | 37,417 | 99.322 | 75.285 | 23.188 | 335.083 |
| Take-up scale | 30,268 | 0.805 | 1.658 | -1.899 | 4.204 |
| UI/Work spending effort (SIWE) | 74,220 | 25753.63 | 21187.34 | 3790.901 | 100837.2 |
| Child spending effort (SIWE) | 74,220 | 2776.489 | 2545.341 | 111.781 | 10293.8 |
| Health spending effort (SIWE) | 74,220 | 1591.410 | 778.901 | 318.123 | 3395.823 |
| Social transfers effort (SIWE) | 74,220 | -0.066 | 0.617 | -1.222 | 0.952 |
| Old-age spending effort (SIWE) | 74,220 | 13598.94 | 5348.022 | 3786.572 | 24437.73 |
| Total social spending effort (SIWE) | 74,220 | 0.009 | 1.937 | -3.306 | 3.401 |
| Soc.-benefit Campaigns (ESPN) | 99,325 | 2.508 | 2.038 | 0 | 6 |
| Soc.ben. Portals (ESPN) | 99,325 | 1.744 | 0.804 | 1 | 3 |
| Soc.ben. campaigns & portals scale (ESPN) | 99,325 | 0.005 | 0.780 | -1.074 | 1.644 |
| Labor inspections | 58,017 | 0.291 | 1.146 | -0.774 | 3.677 |

**Table A2. Micro-level power resources and take-up of unemployment benefits**

| | (1) uidepB | (2) uidepB | (3) uidepB | (4) uidepB | (5) uidepB | (6) uidepB | (7) uidepB |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Unem.×Union memb. | | .815*** | | | | | |
| | | (.251) | | | | | |
| Unem.×Native | | | .592*** | | | | |
| | | | (.151) | | | | |
| Unem.×High Educ. | | | | .664*** | | | |
| | | | | (.21) | | | |
| Unem.×Non-low inc. | | | | | .5*** | | |
| | | | | | (.144) | | |
| Unem.×Polit.int. | | | | | | .219*** | |
| | | | | | | (.083) | |
| Unem.×Daily internet | | | | | | | -.084 |
| | | | | | | | (.18) |
| Unemployed | 3.686*** | 3.56*** | 3.187*** | 3.618*** | 3.493*** | 3.174*** | 3.723*** |
| | (.129) | (.131) | (.198) | (.129) | (.126) | (.232) | (.172) |
| female | -.259*** | -.268*** | -.26*** | -.265*** | -.279*** | -.273*** | -.257*** |
| | (.074) | (.074) | (.074) | (.073) | (.074) | (.074) | (.076) |
| Age | -.006*** | -.007*** | -.006*** | -.007*** | -.007*** | -.006** | -.008*** |
| | (.002) | (.002) | (.002) | (.002) | (.002) | (.002) | (.003) |
| Native-born | -.223** | -.227** | -.589*** | -.219** | -.218** | -.214** | -.227** |
| | (.09) | (.09) | (.133) | (.09) | (.088) | (.092) | (.089) |
| High educated | -.402*** | -.398*** | -.402*** | -.814*** | -.379*** | -.358*** | -.376*** |
| | (.121) | (.12) | (.121) | (.163) | (.122) | (.123) | (.122) |
| Non-low-income | -1.595*** | -1.592*** | -1.594*** | -1.588*** | -1.903*** | -1.574*** | -1.583*** |
| | (.088) | (.09) | (.088) | (.088) | (.121) | (.089) | (.086) |
| Live-with-partner | -.296*** | -.3*** | -.297*** | -.291*** | -.275*** | -.291*** | -.297*** |
| | (.093) | (.093) | (.093) | (.093) | (.095) | (.093) | (.094) |
| Child at home | .352*** | .362*** | .354*** | .355*** | .362*** | .342*** | .346*** |
| | (.086) | (.086) | (.086) | (.087) | (.084) | (.086) | (.088) |
| Union member | .194 | -.232 | .188 | .197 | .201 | .211 | .197 |
| | (.138) | (.233) | (.139) | (.138) | (.137) | (.138) | (.137) |
| Left-Right scale | -.02 | -.02 | -.019 | -.02 | -.02 | -.019 | -.02 |
| | (.015) | (.015) | (.015) | (.015) | (.015) | (.016) | (.015) |
| Support govt. redist. | .094*** | .093*** | .091*** | .094*** | .09*** | .093*** | .092*** |
| | (.032) | (.031) | (.031) | (.032) | (.031) | (.032) | (.031) |
| Political interest | | | | | | -.223*** | |
| | | | | | | (.068) | |
| Daily internet use | | | | | | | -.082 |
| | | | | | | | (.145) |
| Const. | -4.19*** | -4.082*** | -3.888*** | -4.147*** | -4.043*** | -3.714*** | -4.092*** |
| | (.3) | (.298) | (.314) | (.297) | (.287) | (.32) | (.33) |
| /var(_cons[cntryes~) | .839*** | .818*** | .848*** | .833*** | .83*** | .84*** | .858*** |
| | (.259) | (.255) | (.263) | (.257) | (.255) | (.256) | (.268) |
| Observations | 80468 | 80468 | 80468 | 80468 | 80468 | 80318 | 80468 |
| Log likelihood | -4400.3 | -4390.6 | -4394.7 | -4395.6 | -4393.3 | -4384.8 | -4398.5 |

DV=Main source of household income is unemployment/redundancy benefit (0=other income source; 1=dependent on benefits)

All models are multi-level random intercept models (with country-year as level 2 variable), with logistic regression coefficients, and robust-cluster standard errors (in parentheses).

*Standard errors are in parentheses***: \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1*

**Table A3. Macro-level resources and take-up of unemployment benefits**

| | (1)<br>uidepB | (2)<br>uidepB | (3)<br>uidepB | (4)<br>uidepB | (5)<br>uidepB | (6)<br>uidepB |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Unemployed | 3.755*** | 3.713*** | 3.608*** | 3.167*** | 3.622*** | 3.665*** |
| | (.142) | (.236) | (.315) | (.245) | (.13) | (.165) |
| UI generosity | .614** | | | | | |
| | (.269) | | | | | |
| Unemp.×UI-generos. | -.206 | | | | | |
| | (.174) | | | | | |
| UI take-up rates | | 1.239*** | | | | |
| | | (.332) | | | | |
| Unemp.×UI-take-up | | -.016 | | | | |
| | | (.228) | | | | |
| Soc.benefit Campaigns | | | -.097 | | | |
| | | | (.073) | | | |
| Unemp.×Campaigns | | | .013 | | | |
| | | | (.08) | | | |
| Soc.benefit portals | | | | -.552** | | |
| | | | | (.226) | | |
| Unemp.×Portals | | | | .286** | | |
| | | | | (.145) | | |
| Cmpgns&Portals | | | | | -.664*** | |
| | | | | | (.253) | |
| Unem.×Cmpgns.&Port. | | | | | .271** | |
| | | | | | (.127) | |
| Labour inspections | | | | | | .139 |
| | | | | | | (.163) |
| Unemp.×Lab.insp. | | | | | | .17*** |
| | | | | | | (.06) |
| Female | -.249*** | -.247*** | -.241*** | -.239*** | -.237*** | -.221** |
| | (.08) | (.077) | (.08) | (.079) | (.079) | (.091) |
| Age | -.007*** | -.006*** | -.008*** | -.008*** | -.008*** | -.006* |
| | (.002) | (.002) | (.002) | (.002) | (.002) | (.003) |
| Native-born | -.257*** | -.225** | -.266*** | -.27*** | -.27*** | -.192 |
| | (.098) | (.094) | (.099) | (.099) | (.099) | (.131) |
| High education | -.422*** | -.423*** | -.42*** | -.429*** | -.426*** | -.456*** |
| | (.126) | (.122) | (.131) | (.13) | (.131) | (.148) |
| Non-low-income | -1.583*** | -1.558*** | -1.614*** | -1.615*** | -1.613*** | -1.514*** |
| | (.092) | (.085) | (.094) | (.094) | (.096) | (.095) |
| Live-w.-partner | -.292*** | -.279*** | -.32*** | -.321*** | -.324*** | -.409*** |
| | (.1) | (.095) | (.101) | (.103) | (.102) | (.122) |
| Child at home | .338*** | .348*** | .346*** | .343*** | .343*** | .459*** |
| | (.095) | (.09) | (.095) | (.094) | (.094) | (.092) |
| Union member | .183 | .086 | .257* | .267* | .27* | .042 |
| | (.136) | (.128) | (.149) | (.15) | (.148) | (.208) |
| Left-right scale | -.009 | -.019 | -.013 | -.012 | -.012 | -.029 |
| | (.016) | (.017) | (.015) | (.015) | (.015) | (.021) |
| Support govt. redist. | .116*** | .093*** | .11*** | .106*** | .108*** | .072** |
| | (.031) | (.033) | (.031) | (.032) | (.031) | (.036) |
| Cons. | -4.068*** | -4.897*** | -3.654*** | -2.956*** | -3.812*** | -4.098*** |
| | (.31) | (.386) | (.401) | (.477) | (.295) | (.414) |
| /var(_cons[cntryes~) | .454*** | .41** | .726** | .695*** | .657** | .888** |
| | (.093) | (.179) | (.309) | (.261) | (.267) | (.367) |
| Observations | 66154 | 71507 | 65045 | 65045 | 65045 | 49401 |
| Log likelihood | -3910.3 | -4124.3 | -3953.3 | -3945.6 | -3947.3 | -2853.9 |

DV=Main source of household income is unemployment/redundancy benefit (0=other income source; 1=dependent on benefits)

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All models are multi-level random intercept models (with country-year as level 2 variable), with logistic regression coefficients, and robust-cluster standard errors (in parentheses).
*Standard errors are in parentheses*: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

## Table A4. Macro-level power resources and subjective judgment of adequate take-up of social benefits by poor citizens

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | subjtake upcat | subjtake upcat | subjtake upcat | subjtake upcat | subjtake upcat | subjtake upcat | subjtake upcat | subjtake upcat | subjtake upcat |
| Soc.-benefit depend. | -.202*** | -.192*** | -.182** | -.221*** | -.219*** | -.204*** | -.19*** | -.194*** | -.264*** |
| | (.047) | (.049) | (.093) | (.05) | (.084) | (.051) | (.05) | (.049) | (.058) |
| Unemployed | -.224*** | -.256*** | -.278*** | -.241*** | -.298*** | -.235*** | -.229*** | -.221*** | -.244*** |
| | (.039) | (.041) | (.053) | (.045) | (.06) | (.034) | (.035) | (.031) | (.053) |
| Female | -.001 | -.002 | .01 | -.009 | -.011 | -.004 | -.009 | -.007 | -.009 |
| | (.017) | (.018) | (.02) | (.018) | (.021) | (.019) | (.02) | (.019) | (.023) |
| Age | -.002 | -.002* | -.003 | -.002* | -.003* | -.002 | -.002* | -.002* | -.001 |
| | (.001) | (.001) | (.002) | (.001) | (.002) | (.001) | (.001) | (.001) | (.001) |
| Native-born | .108*** | .12*** | .141*** | .094*** | .128*** | .111*** | .085** | .098*** | .142*** |
| | (.031) | (.033) | (.046) | (.032) | (.047) | (.034) | (.037) | (.036) | (.037) |
| High education | .35*** | .369*** | .438*** | .342*** | .432*** | .375*** | .36*** | .37*** | .367*** |
| | (.033) | (.03) | (.037) | (.035) | (.041) | (.03) | (.032) | (.032) | (.037) |
| Non-low-income | .166*** | .176*** | .163*** | .159*** | .161*** | .197*** | .194*** | .193*** | .169*** |
| | (.032) | (.035) | (.046) | (.036) | (.054) | (.033) | (.035) | (.032) | (.045) |
| Live-w.-partner | -.014 | .004 | -.013 | -.017 | -.016 | -.008 | -.011 | -.014 | -.021 |
| | (.022) | (.023) | (.038) | (.024) | (.038) | (.025) | (.027) | (.025) | (.025) |
| Child at home | .01 | .01 | .036 | .017 | .039 | .014 | .022 | .019 | .02 |
| | (.019) | (.02) | (.03) | (.021) | (.038) | (.022) | (.023) | (.022) | (.027) |
| Union member | .017 | .015 | .008 | .006 | -.022 | .02 | .009 | .011 | .014 |
| | (.024) | (.026) | (.035) | (.027) | (.043) | (.025) | (.026) | (.025) | (.037) |
| Left-Right scale | .021*** | .023*** | .037*** | .023*** | .032*** | .031*** | .031*** | .025*** | .019** |
| | (.008) | (.009) | (.008) | (.008) | (.009) | (.007) | (.008) | (.008) | (.01) |
| Support govt.redist. | -.294*** | -.287*** | -.255*** | -.295*** | -.254*** | -.29*** | -.293*** | -.302*** | -.285*** |
| | (.015) | (.016) | (.015) | (.016) | (.017) | (.016) | (.017) | (.017) | (.019) |
| UI take-up | | .204 | | | | | | | |
| | | (.152) | | | | | | | |
| M/P leave take-up | | | .004*** | | | | | | |
| | | | (.001) | | | | | | |
| ECEC take-up | | | | .002 | | | | | |
| | | | | (.003) | | | | | |
| Take-up scale | | | | | .065 | | | | |
| | | | | | (.069) | | | | |
| Soc.ben.gener.scale | | | | | | .185*** | | | |
| | | | | | | (.053) | | | |
| Soc. prot.welf. effort | | | | | | | .439*** | | |
| | | | | | | | (.097) | | |
| Cmpgns.&Portals | | | | | | | | .029 | |
| | | | | | | | | (.127) | |
| Labor inspections | | | | | | | | | -.022 |
| | | | | | | | | | (.072) |
| Cut 1 | -3.286*** | -3.196*** | -2.935*** | -3.2*** | -3.262*** | -3.392*** | -3.35*** | -3.321*** | -3.235*** |
| | (.11) | (.175) | (.137) | (.201) | (.178) | (.112) | (.124) | (.125) | (.138) |
| Cut 2 | -.8*** | -.686*** | -.405*** | -.728*** | -.783*** | -.875*** | -.841*** | -.79*** | -.767*** |
| | (.102) | (.167) | (.129) | (.201) | (.175) | (.103) | (.128) | (.12) | (.127) |
| Cut 3 | .642*** | .762*** | 1.188*** | .702*** | .771*** | .572*** | .575*** | .621*** | .684*** |
| | (.105) | (.164) | (.17) | (.227) | (.216) | (.103) | (.124) | (.121) | (.132) |
| Cut 4 | 3.139*** | 3.268*** | 3.465*** | 3.134*** | 2.952*** | 3.087*** | 3.034*** | 3.088*** | 3.097*** |
| | (.169) | (.221) | (.293) | (.291) | (.345) | (.188) | (.208) | (.193) | (.219) |
| /var(_cons[cntryes~) | .318*** | .289*** | .13*** | .202*** | .181*** | .194*** | .154*** | .299*** | .284*** |
| | (.063) | (.061) | (.034) | (.034) | (.053) | (.037) | (.035) | (.074) | (.084) |
| Observations | 73918 | 65623 | 30842 | 63942 | 24733 | 60759 | 55339 | 59986 | 45308 |
| Log likelihood | -3970.3 | -3962.7 | -3964.4 | -3953.2 | -3966.3 | -3949.1 | -3948.3 | -3991.8 | -4010.1 |

DV=Do not believe that 'many with very low incomes get less benefit than they are legally entitled to' (1=strongly agree…5=strongly disagree)

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All models are multi-level random intercept models (with country-year as level 2 variable), with ordinal logistic regression coefficients, and robust-cluster standard errors (in parentheses).

*Standard errors are in parentheses*: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

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**Table A5. Moderating Role of Macro-level instrumental resources and subjective adequacy of take-up of social benefit entitlements**

| | (1)<br>subtakeupcat | (2)<br>subtakeupcat | (3)<br>subtakeupcat | (4)<br>subtakeupcat | (5)<br>subtakeupcat | (6)<br>subtakeupcat |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Female | -.007 | -.006 | -.007 | -.006 | -.007 | -.029 |
| | (.019) | (.019) | (.019) | (.019) | (.019) | (.02) |
| Age | -.002* | -.002* | -.002* | -.002* | -.002* | 0 |
| | (.001) | (.001) | (.001) | (.001) | (.001) | (.001) |
| Live with partner | -.014 | -.014 | -.014 | -.013 | -.011 | -.014 |
| | (.026) | (.025) | (.025) | (.025) | (.026) | (.026) |
| Child at home | .02 | .019 | .019 | .019 | .019 | .02 |
| | (.022) | (.022) | (.022) | (.022) | (.022) | (.025) |
| Union member | .013 | .011 | .011 | .012 | .014 | -.023 |
| | (.025) | (.025) | (.025) | (.025) | (.025) | (.027) |
| Left-Right scale | .025*** | .025*** | .025*** | .025*** | .025*** | .025*** |
| | (.008) | (.008) | (.008) | (.008) | (.008) | (.008) |
| Support govt. redist. | -.302*** | -.302*** | -.302*** | -.302*** | -.303*** | -.305*** |
| | (.017) | (.017) | (.017) | (.017) | (.017) | (.017) |
| Campaigns&Portals | .015 | .022 | .034 | .039 | .129 | .084 |
| | (.128) | (.127) | (.132) | (.128) | (.134) | (.127) |
| Soc. benefit depend. | -.278*** | -.188*** | -.194*** | -.193*** | -.196*** | -.201*** |
| | (.04) | (.049) | (.049) | (.049) | (.046) | (.051) |
| Unemployed | -.21*** | -.257*** | -.221*** | -.221*** | -.219*** | -.237*** |
| | (.031) | (.039) | (.031) | (.031) | (.031) | (.035) |
| Native-born | .095*** | .097*** | .099*** | .098*** | .099*** | .094** |
| | (.036) | (.036) | (.037) | (.036) | (.036) | (.04) |
| Non-low-income | .197*** | .193*** | .193*** | .193*** | .232*** | .178*** |
| | (.032) | (.032) | (.032) | (.032) | (.036) | (.035) |
| High education | .368*** | .369*** | .37*** | .379*** | .367*** | |
| | (.032) | (.032) | (.032) | (.033) | (.032) | |
| Soc.b.dep×Cmpgns&Portals | **.303***** | | | | | |
| | **(.059)** | | | | | |
| Unemp×Cmpgns&Portals | | **.121***** | | | | |
| | | **(.043)** | | | | |
| Native×Cmpgns&Portals | | | **-.006** | | | |
| | | | **(.06)** | | | |
| High ed.×Cmpgns&Portals | | | | **-.049** | | |
| | | | | **(.044)** | | |
| Non-low.inc.×Cmpgns&Portals | | | | | **-.129***** | |
| | | | | | **(.041)** | |
| Low education | | | | | | -.34*** |
| | | | | | | (.032) |
| Low-ed.×Cmpgns&Portals | | | | | | **.097*** |
| | | | | | | **(.051)** |
| Cut 1 | -3.322*** | -3.323*** | -3.32*** | -3.319*** | -3.29*** | -3.516*** |
| | (.124) | (.125) | (.123) | (.125) | (.123) | (.134) |
| Cut 2 | -.789*** | -.791*** | -.789*** | -.787*** | -.758*** | -1.005*** |
| | (.119) | (.12) | (.117) | (.119) | (.117) | (.126) |
| Cut 3 | .622*** | .619*** | .622*** | .624*** | .653*** | .408*** |
| | (.12) | (.121) | (.118) | (.121) | (.119) | (.128) |
| Cut 4 | 3.09*** | 3.087*** | 3.089*** | 3.091*** | 3.12*** | 2.813*** |
| | (.192) | (.193) | (.19) | (.192) | (.191) | (.199) |
| /var(_cons[cntryes~) | .3*** | .3*** | .299*** | .299*** | .301*** | .231*** |
| | (.073) | (.074) | (.074) | (.074) | (.075) | (.054) |
| Observations | 59986 | 59986 | 59986 | 59986 | 59986 | 49368 |
| Log likelihood | -3974.1 | -3954.2 | -3967.3 | -3945.1 | -3938.3 | -3901.1 |

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DV=Do not believe that 'many with very low incomes get less benefit than they are legally entitled to' (1=strongly agree…5=strongly disagree)

All models are multi-level random intercept models (with country-year as level 2 variable), with ordinal logistic regression coefficients, and robust-cluster standard errors (in parentheses).

*Standard errors are in parentheses*: *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$

**Table A6. Macro-level resources and views standard of living of unemployed**

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | slvuemp | slvuemp | slvuemp | slvuemp | slvuemp | slvuemp | slvuemp | slvuemp | slvuemp |
| Unemployed | -.392*** | -.411*** | -.406*** | -.415*** | -.396*** | -.418*** | -.415*** | -.482*** | -.396*** |
| | (.033) | (.034) | (.036) | (.035) | (.037) | (.034) | (.071) | (.051) | (.036) |
| UI generosity | | .706** | | | | .702** | | | |
| | | (.281) | | | | (.28) | | | |
| UI take-up (macro) | | | .897*** | | | | .897*** | | |
| | | | (.248) | | | | (.249) | | |
| UI spending effort | | | | 0.0003*** | | | | 0.0003*** | |
| | | | | (0.0001) | | | | (0.0001) | |
| Campaigns&Portals | | | | | -.188 | | | | -.188 |
| | | | | | (.231) | | | | (.231) |
| Unemp×UI-generos. | | | | | | .067 | | | |
| | | | | | | (.066) | | | |
| Unemp×UI take-up | | | | | | | .014 | | |
| | | | | | | | (.071) | | |
| Unemp×UI spend. | | | | | | | | 0.0004* | |
| | | | | | | | | (0.0002) | |
| Unemp×Cmpgns&Port. | | | | | | | | | 0.0004 |
| | | | | | | | | | (.056) |
| Soc.benefit depend. | -.342*** | -.412*** | -.363*** | -.399*** | -.384*** | -.413*** | -.364*** | -.405*** | -.384*** |
| | (.066) | (.063) | (.067) | (.066) | (.066) | (.063) | (.068) | (.066) | (.066) |
| Female | -.071*** | -.052** | -.068*** | -.039* | -.056** | -.052** | -.068*** | -.039* | -.056** |
| | (.023) | (.022) | (.023) | (.022) | (.023) | (.022) | (.023) | (.022) | (.023) |
| Age | -.007*** | -.008*** | -.008*** | -.008*** | -.008*** | -.008*** | -.008*** | -.008*** | -.008*** |
| | (.001) | (.001) | (.001) | (.001) | (.001) | (.001) | (.001) | (.001) | (.001) |
| Native-born | -.072* | -.077 | -.077* | -.061 | -.04 | -.077 | -.077* | -.06 | -.04 |
| | (.039) | (.048) | (.041) | (.056) | (.054) | (.048) | (.041) | (.055) | (.054) |
| High educated | -.05* | -.051 | -.048 | -.076** | -.077** | -.051 | -.048 | -.076** | -.077** |
| | (.03) | (.036) | (.034) | (.034) | (.033) | (.035) | (.034) | (.034) | (.033) |
| Non-low-income | .03 | .028 | .008 | .034 | .033 | .028 | .008 | .034 | .033 |
| | (.025) | (.024) | (.025) | (.026) | (.027) | (.024) | (.025) | (.026) | (.027) |
| Live with partner | -.048** | -.044** | -.037* | -.045* | -.051** | -.044** | -.037* | -.045* | -.051** |
| | (.021) | (.022) | (.022) | (.024) | (.023) | (.022) | (.022) | (.024) | (.023) |
| Child at home | -.004 | -.012 | -.011 | -.018 | -.007 | -.012 | -.011 | -.018 | -.007 |
| | (.02) | (.022) | (.021) | (.024) | (.024) | (.022) | (.021) | (.024) | (.024) |
| Union member | -.065*** | -.089*** | -.079*** | -.099*** | -.085*** | -.09*** | -.079*** | -.1*** | -.085*** |
| | (.025) | (.026) | (.026) | (.026) | (.026) | (.026) | (.026) | (.026) | (.026) |
| Left-Right scale | .068*** | .078*** | .067*** | .08*** | .076*** | .078*** | .067*** | .08*** | .076*** |
| | (.008) | (.008) | (.009) | (.009) | (.009) | (.008) | (.009) | (.009) | (.009) |
| Support govt. redist. | -.24*** | -.218*** | -.227*** | -.225*** | -.236*** | -.218*** | -.227*** | -.225*** | -.236*** |
| | (.017) | (.016) | (.016) | (.018) | (.019) | (.016) | (.016) | (.018) | (.019) |
| Constant | 4.832*** | 4.927*** | 4.435*** | 3.989*** | 4.842*** | 4.927*** | 4.435*** | 3.992*** | 4.842*** |
| | (.155) | (.164) | (.254) | (.192) | (.168) | (.164) | (.254) | (.192) | (.168) |
| lns1_1_1:_cons | .048 | -.125 | -.181** | -.465*** | -.03 | -.124 | -.181** | -.466*** | -.03 |
| | (.071) | (.104) | (.075) | (.088) | (.072) | (.104) | (.075) | (.088) | (.072) |
| lnsig_e:_cons | .594*** | .574*** | .593*** | .579*** | .59*** | .574*** | .593*** | .579*** | .59*** |
| | (.016) | (.016) | (.017) | (.017) | (.017) | (.016) | (.017) | (.017) | (.017) |
| Observations | 78868 | 64974 | 70077 | 59013 | 63916 | 64974 | 70077 | 59013 | 63916 |
| Log likelihood | -3970.3 | -3962.7 | -3964.4 | -3953.2 | -3966.3 | -3949.1 | -3948.3 | -3991.8 | -4010.1 |

DV= Judgment of living standards of the unemployed (0=extremely bad…10=extremely good).

All models are multi-level random intercept models (with country-year as level 2 variable), with ordinary least squares (OLS) regression coefficients, and robust-cluster standard errors (in parentheses).

*Standard errors are in parentheses*: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

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**Table A7. Macro-level resources and views on childcare services for working parents**

| | (1) cldcrsv | (2) cldcrsv | (3) cldcrsv | (4) cldcrsv | (5) cldcrsv | (6) cldcrsv | (7) cldcrsv | (8) cldcrsv | (9) cldcrsv |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Working parent | -.134** | -.121* | -.127** | -.147** | -.173** | -2.712*** | -.316** | -.274*** | -.212*** |
| | (.068) | (.067) | (.061) | (.074) | (.082) | (1.012) | (.144) | (.078) | (.082) |
| ECEC generosity | | .024 | | | | .015 | | | |
| | | (.036) | | | | (.034) | | | |
| ECEC take-up | | | .017*** | | | | .016*** | | |
| | | | (.005) | | | | (.005) | | |
| ECEC spending effort | | | | 0.0002** | | | | 0.0001** | |
| | | | | (0.0001) | | | | (0.000) | |
| Campaigns&Portals | | | | | .526** | | | | .484* |
| | | | | | (.262) | | | | (.26) |
| Wrkg.par×generosity | | | | | | .028** | | | |
| | | | | | | (.011) | | | |
| Wrkg.par×take-up | | | | | | | .004* | | |
| | | | | | | | (.003) | | |
| Wrkg.par×spend.effort | | | | | | | | .0004** | |
| | | | | | | | | (.0001) | |
| Wrkg.par×Cmpgns.&Port. | | | | | | | | | .122* |
| | | | | | | | | | (.065) |
| Soc.ben.depend. | -.183*** | -.16** | -.219*** | -.126** | -.13** | -.162** | -.215*** | -.117** | -.134** |
| | (.054) | (.064) | (.058) | (.059) | (.055) | (.064) | (.058) | (.059) | (.055) |
| Unemployed | -.049 | -.077 | -.069 | -.095 | -.097 | -.072 | -.07 | -.106 | -.095 |
| | (.064) | (.077) | (.075) | (.082) | (.069) | (.078) | (.075) | (.081) | (.068) |
| Female | -.049 | -.05 | -.089 | -.003 | .004 | -.049 | -.088 | -.002 | .003 |
| | (.047) | (.056) | (.058) | (.049) | (.043) | (.057) | (.058) | (.049) | (.044) |
| Age | .003* | .003 | .003 | .003** | .003** | .003 | .003 | .003** | .003** |
| | (.002) | (.002) | (.002) | (.001) | (.001) | (.002) | (.002) | (.001) | (.001) |
| Native-born | .042 | .066 | .031 | -.187** | -.168* | .066 | .028 | -.187** | -.169* |
| | (.142) | (.161) | (.178) | (.092) | (.087) | (.163) | (.174) | (.092) | (.087) |
| High educated | -.073 | -.097 | -.092 | -.144* | -.133* | -.1 | -.094 | -.145* | -.131* |
| | (.077) | (.088) | (.092) | (.078) | (.073) | (.086) | (.09) | (.076) | (.072) |
| Non-low-income | -.06 | -.027 | -.046 | .046 | -.003 | -.029 | -.045 | .045 | -.005 |
| | (.078) | (.09) | (.093) | (.048) | (.061) | (.091) | (.091) | (.048) | (.06) |
| Live with partner | -.163*** | -.153*** | -.19*** | -.217*** | -.191*** | -.147*** | -.188*** | -.215*** | -.189*** |
| | (.047) | (.055) | (.055) | (.051) | (.047) | (.054) | (.055) | (.051) | (.047) |
| Child at home | .111 | .102 | .056 | .082 | .113 | .094 | .058 | .077 | .111 |
| | (.076) | (.085) | (.087) | (.087) | (.088) | (.086) | (.087) | (.088) | (.088) |
| Union member | .005 | .01 | .014 | -.016 | -.019 | .006 | .013 | -.031 | -.022 |
| | (.066) | (.075) | (.087) | (.052) | (.05) | (.074) | (.087) | (.049) | (.047) |
| Left-Right scale | .056*** | .056*** | .054*** | .068*** | .066*** | .056*** | .054*** | .068*** | .066*** |
| | (.013) | (.017) | (.018) | (.014) | (.012) | (.017) | (.018) | (.014) | (.012) |
| Support govt.redist. | -.129*** | -.115*** | -.118*** | -.125*** | -.137*** | -.115*** | -.118*** | -.124*** | -.137*** |
| | (.024) | (.025) | (.027) | (.027) | (.027) | (.025) | (.027) | (.026) | (.027) |
| Cons. | 5.058*** | 2.891 | 4.335*** | 4.8*** | 5.05*** | 3.726 | 4.407*** | 4.839*** | 5.064*** |
| | (.147) | (3.276) | (.315) | (.269) | (.224) | (3.084) | (.305) | (.265) | (.218) |
| lns1_1_1:_cons | -.202* | -.248** | -.364** | -.442*** | -.384*** | -.247** | -.363** | -.44*** | -.382*** |
| | (.117) | (.119) | (.17) | (.1) | (.128) | (.119) | (.17) | (.1) | (.129) |
| lnsig_e:_cons | .777*** | .76*** | .78*** | .749*** | .764*** | .76*** | .78*** | .749*** | .764*** |
| | (.02) | (.022) | (.022) | (.023) | (.023) | (.022) | (.022) | (.023) | (.023) |
| Observations | 38915 | 32016 | 29977 | 28077 | 31692 | 32016 | 29977 | 28077 | 31692 |
| Log likelihood | -3865.9 | -3900.2 | -3897.2 | -3898.2 | -3899.1 | -3895.1 | -3900.3 | -3891.6 | -4001.3 |

DV= Judgment of childcare services for working parents (0=extremely bad…10=extremely good).

All models are multi-level random intercept models (with country-year as level 2 variable), with ordinary least squares (OLS) regression coefficients, and robust-cluster standard errors (in parentheses).

*Standard errors are in parentheses*: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

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**Table A8. Macro-level resources and views on living standards of pensioners**

| | (1) slvpens | (2) slvpens | (3) slvpens | (4) slvpens | (5) slvpens | (6) slvpens | (7) slvpens |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Old (60+) | -.053 | -.009 | -.048 | -.055 | .104* | -.496*** | -.076 |
| | (.052) | (.059) | (.062) | (.058) | (.057) | (.139) | (.066) |
| Pension generosity | | 1.117*** | | | .996*** | | |
| | | (.164) | | | (.162) | | |
| Old-age spending effort | | | .0005*** | | | .0004*** | |
| | | | (.0001) | | | (.0001) | |
| Campaigns&Portals | | | | -.134 | | | -.157 |
| | | | | (.259) | | | (.252) |
| Old(60+)×generosity | | | | | .391*** | | |
| | | | | | (.078) | | |
| Old(60+)×spend.-effort | | | | | | .0003*** | |
| | | | | | | (.0001) | |
| Old(60+)×Cmpgns.&Port. | | | | | | | .074 |
| | | | | | | | (.077) |
| Soc.ben.depend. | -.238*** | -.239*** | -.222*** | -.229*** | -.247*** | -.228*** | -.228*** |
| | (.054) | (.058) | (.06) | (.06) | (.058) | (.06) | (.061) |
| Unemployed | .007 | -.005 | -.011 | .023 | -.008 | -.018 | .023 |
| | (.045) | (.041) | (.042) | (.043) | (.04) | (.041) | (.043) |
| Female | -.093*** | -.086*** | -.074*** | -.077*** | -.085*** | -.074*** | -.078*** |
| | (.021) | (.022) | (.023) | (.023) | (.022) | (.023) | (.023) |
| Native-born | .024 | -.07 | -.106 | -.09 | -.085 | -.12* | -.087 |
| | (.074) | (.066) | (.068) | (.065) | (.066) | (.067) | (.065) |
| High educated | .246*** | .295*** | .251*** | .252*** | .294*** | .251*** | .251*** |
| | (.054) | (.056) | (.058) | (.056) | (.056) | (.058) | (.056) |
| Non-low-income | .163*** | .195*** | .182*** | .165*** | .186*** | .171*** | .165*** |
| | (.046) | (.033) | (.035) | (.045) | (.033) | (.035) | (.045) |
| Live with partner | -.083*** | -.077** | -.077** | -.086** | -.077** | -.081** | -.086** |
| | (.031) | (.036) | (.039) | (.038) | (.036) | (.038) | (.038) |
| Child at home | -.094*** | -.1*** | -.101*** | -.093*** | -.09*** | -.092*** | -.093*** |
| | (.024) | (.025) | (.027) | (.026) | (.026) | (.028) | (.026) |
| Union member | -.08** | -.087** | -.118*** | -.102*** | -.085** | -.112*** | -.1*** |
| | (.032) | (.034) | (.027) | (.028) | (.033) | (.026) | (.028) |
| Left-Right scale | .042*** | .049*** | .058*** | .062*** | .047*** | .057*** | .062*** |
| | (.011) | (.011) | (.01) | (.01) | (.011) | (.011) | (.01) |
| Support govt.redist. | -.217*** | -.198*** | -.201*** | -.214*** | -.199*** | -.201*** | -.214*** |
| | (.016) | (.017) | (.018) | (.019) | (.017) | (.018) | (.019) |
| Cons. | 4.976*** | 5.498*** | 3.262*** | 5.001*** | 5.492*** | 3.432*** | 5.006*** |
| | (.165) | (.176) | (.328) | (.19) | (.172) | (.333) | (.188) |
| lns1_1_1:_cons | .138* | -.128 | -.324*** | -.002 | -.128 | -.325*** | -.003 |
| | (.073) | (.093) | (.093) | (.083) | (.093) | (.093) | (.083) |
| lnsig_e:_cons | .714*** | .691*** | .696*** | .704*** | .69*** | .695*** | .704*** |
| | (.017) | (.016) | (.017) | (.017) | (.016) | (.017) | (.017) |
| Observations | 79911 | 65742 | 59713 | 64638 | 65742 | 59713 | 64638 |
| Log likelihood | -3900.2 | -3897.2 | -3898.2 | -3899.1 | -3895.1 | -3900.3 | -3891.6 |

DV= Judgment of living standards of pensioners (0=extremely bad…10=extremely good).

All models are multi-level random intercept models (with country-year as level 2 variable), with ordinary least squares (OLS) regression coefficients, and robust-cluster standard errors (in parentheses).

*Standard errors are in parentheses*: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

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### Table A9. Macro-level resources and views on quality of health services

| | (1) stfhlth | (2) stfhlth | (3) stfhlth | (4) stfhlth | (5) stfhlth | (6) stfhlth | (7) stfhlth |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bad health | -.259*** | -.263*** | -.266*** | -.263*** | -.264*** | -.339*** | -.256*** |
| | (.017) | (.019) | (.02) | (.019) | (.018) | (.059) | (.021) |
| Sickness/health generosity | | .37 | | | .54* | | |
| | | (.301) | | | (.289) | | |
| Health spending effort | | | .001*** | | | .001*** | |
| | | | (0) | | | (0) | |
| Campaigns&Portals | | | | .066 | | | .127 |
| | | | | (.331) | | | (.346) |
| Bad health×generosity | | | | | -.084** | | |
| | | | | | (.036) | | |
| Bad health×spending effort | | | | | | .0002 | |
| | | | | | | (.0002) | |
| Bad health×Cmpgns.&Portals | | | | | | | -.027 |
| | | | | | | | (.031) |
| Soc.ben.depend. | .046 | .044 | .054 | .051 | .038 | .047 | .05 |
| | (.049) | (.056) | (.059) | (.057) | (.056) | (.059) | (.057) |
| Unemployed | -.099** | -.121** | -.134*** | -.109** | -.118** | -.133** | -.108** |
| | (.042) | (.05) | (.051) | (.048) | (.05) | (.052) | (.049) |
| Female | -.213*** | -.234*** | -.228*** | -.217*** | -.233*** | -.227*** | -.217*** |
| | (.034) | (.036) | (.039) | (.039) | (.035) | (.039) | (.039) |
| Age | .004*** | .005*** | .006*** | .006*** | .005*** | .006*** | .006*** |
| | (.001) | (.001) | (.002) | (.002) | (.001) | (.002) | (.002) |
| Native-born | -.39*** | -.484*** | -.513*** | -.519*** | -.489*** | -.516*** | -.52*** |
| | (.075) | (.076) | (.086) | (.082) | (.075) | (.085) | (.082) |
| High educated | .066 | .09* | .068 | .059 | .088* | .067 | .059 |
| | (.045) | (.051) | (.051) | (.05) | (.051) | (.052) | (.05) |
| Non-low-income | .001 | .026 | .035 | .018 | .027 | .033 | .018 |
| | (.041) | (.038) | (.041) | (.045) | (.038) | (.041) | (.045) |
| Live with partner | -.155*** | -.168*** | -.169*** | -.162*** | -.167*** | -.169*** | -.162*** |
| | (.03) | (.028) | (.031) | (.034) | (.028) | (.031) | (.034) |
| Child at home | -.068*** | -.089*** | -.089*** | -.088*** | -.089*** | -.087*** | -.088*** |
| | (.021) | (.022) | (.024) | (.023) | (.022) | (.024) | (.023) |
| Union member | -.138*** | -.123*** | -.142*** | -.146*** | -.121*** | -.142*** | -.147*** |
| | (.034) | (.036) | (.038) | (.038) | (.036) | (.038) | (.038) |
| Left-Right scale | .073*** | .07*** | .08*** | .09*** | .07*** | .079*** | .09*** |
| | (.015) | (.015) | (.015) | (.017) | (.015) | (.015) | (.017) |
| Support govt. redist. | -.123*** | -.107*** | -.122*** | -.134*** | -.107*** | -.122*** | -.134*** |
| | (.018) | (.019) | (.019) | (.019) | (.018) | (.019) | (.019) |
| Cons | 6.411*** | 6.553*** | 5.028*** | 6.383*** | 6.557*** | 5.2*** | 6.366*** |
| | (.196) | (.215) | (.295) | (.245) | (.212) | (.315) | (.249) |
| lns1_1_1:_cons | .16** | .121 | -.101 | .08 | .115 | -.101 | .08 |
| | (.079) | (.081) | (.117) | (.093) | (.081) | (.117) | (.093) |
| lnsig_e:_cons | .776*** | .757*** | .767*** | .784*** | .757*** | .767*** | .784*** |
| | (.018) | (.018) | (.019) | (.021) | (.018) | (.019) | (.021) |
| Observations | 79944 | 65831 | 59775 | 64682 | 65831 | 59775 | 64682 |
| Log likelihood | -3994.8 | -3993.2 | -3991.1 | -3995.1 | -3995.3 | -3993.2 | -3997.5 |

DV= Judgment of health services in country nowadays (0=extremely bad…10=extremely good).

All models are multi-level random intercept models (with country-year as level 2 variable), with ordinary least squares (OLS) regression coefficients, and robust-cluster standard errors (in parentheses).

*Standard errors are in parentheses*: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

**Table A10. Macro-level resources and support for European-level social benefit provision**

|  | (1)<br>eusclbf | (2)<br>eusclbf | (3)<br>eusclbf | (4)<br>eusclbf |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Subjective take-up | -.174*** | -.174*** | -.174*** | -.174*** |
|  | (.031) | (.031) | (.031) | (.03) |
| Subj.unempl. stand.-of-living | -.108*** | -.108*** | -.108*** | -.108*** |
|  | (.014) | (.014) | (.014) | (.013) |
| Subj. pensioner stand.-of-living | 0 | .001 | .001 | -.002 |
|  | (.012) | (.012) | (.012) | (.012) |
| Subj. healthcare services quality | .02* | .02* | .02* | .019* |
|  | (.012) | (.012) | (.012) | (.012) |
| Unemployed | .136** | .136** | .136** | .156*** |
|  | (.053) | (.053) | (.053) | (.055) |
| Working parent | -.111 | -.111 | -.112 | -.115* |
|  | (.072) | (.071) | (.072) | (.07) |
| Bad health | .022 | .022 | .022 | .02 |
|  | (.025) | (.025) | (.024) | (.024) |
| Old (60+) | .048 | .048 | .048 | .048 |
|  | (.05) | (.05) | (.05) | (.048) |
| Soc.ben.depend. | .249*** | .249*** | .25*** | .235*** |
|  | (.086) | (.086) | (.086) | (.086) |
| Female | .072** | .072** | .072** | .074** |
|  | (.031) | (.031) | (.031) | (.031) |
| Age | -.003** | -.003** | -.003* | -.003** |
|  | (.002) | (.002) | (.002) | (.002) |
| Native-born | -.095* | -.095* | -.096* | -.086 |
|  | (.058) | (.058) | (.058) | (.056) |
| High educated | -.127** | -.127** | -.128** | -.127** |
|  | (.064) | (.064) | (.064) | (.062) |
| Non-low-income | -.083 | -.083 | -.082 | -.084 |
|  | (.07) | (.07) | (.07) | (.068) |
| Live with partner | -.056* | -.056* | -.056* | -.06* |
|  | (.032) | (.032) | (.032) | (.032) |
| Child at home | .098 | .097 | .099 | .099* |
|  | (.062) | (.062) | (.062) | (.06) |
| Union member | .126*** | .126*** | .128*** | .123*** |
|  | (.045) | (.045) | (.046) | (.044) |
| Support EU integration | .108*** | .108*** | .108*** | .107*** |
|  | (.03) | (.03) | (.03) | (.029) |
| Social benefit generosity | -.026 |  |  |  |
|  | (.116) |  |  |  |
| UI take-up rate (macro) |  | -.653*** |  |  |
|  |  | (.223) |  |  |
| Total welfare spending effort |  |  | -.264*** |  |
|  |  |  | (.046) |  |
| Campaigns&Portals |  |  |  | -.437** |
|  |  |  |  | (.175) |
| Cut 1 | -3.163*** | -3.659*** | -3.277*** | -3.365*** |
|  | (.252) | (.315) | (.199) | (.254) |
| Cut 2 | -1.258*** | -1.754*** | -1.372*** | -1.458*** |
|  | (.239) | (.301) | (.19) | (.243) |
| Cut 3 | 1.943*** | 1.447*** | 1.829*** | 1.777*** |
|  | (.243) | (.303) | (.2) | (.242) |
| /var(_cons[cntryes~) | .34*** | .232*** | .116*** | .27*** |
|  | (.089) | (.05) | (.032) | (.061) |
| Observations | 26888 | 26888 | 26888 | 27918 |
| Log likelihood | -27935.0 | -27931.8 | -27925.9 | -28759.7 |

EuSocialCit
European Social Citizenship

DV= Support creating European-Union-wide social benefit scheme (1=strongly oppose…4=strongly support).
All models are multi-level random intercept models (with country-year as level 2 variable), with ordinal logistic regression coefficients, and robust-cluster standard errors (in parentheses).
*Standard errors are in parentheses*: *** *p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1*

## Figure A1. How macro-level social-benefit resources and outputs increase target-group valuation of social-rights quality