



THE IMPORTANCE AND ROLE OF NATO IN THE US FOREIGN POLICY AND ITS ALLIED SYSTEM

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ABSTRACT

This article discusses the role of NATO in the American allied system, the early years of the alliance's existence and shows the reasons why there was a need to be united and form an international organization like NATO. Moreover, the article discusses the answers to One of the questions that experts in the field of international relations ask: How wide will the geographical area of activity of the North Atlantic Alliance be?

Introduction

Throughout history, unions have been a central and permanent phenomenon of international relations. In the era of Antiquity and in the Middle Ages, during world wars and at the present stage, states have always formed coalitions to fight a common enemy, or to solve other foreign policy tasks. As the American professor J. Liska rightly notes, "it is impossible to talk about international relations without referring to alliances."¹ The Second World War gave the Transoceanic power a chance to rise to the top of the world "political Olympus". The United States emerged from the war as the leading state in economic, military and political relations. This success, combined with the economic recovery in the post-war years, weakened the isolationist nature of American politics and led to the involvement of the United States in international relations.²

The Truman administration, which came to power in the United States in 1945, sought to prevent the USSR from dominating the Eurasian space. However, the post-war situation did not meet Washington's expectations, which required the American leadership to change its strategy.

¹ Small States and Alliances / Erich Reiter; Heinz Gartner (ed.). – Heidelberg; New York: Physica Verl, 2001. P. 25.

² The rise of American ambitions was also facilitated by the appearance of the atomic bomb in the United States on July 16, 1945. In his Potsdam diary, Mr. Truman wrote: "We have developed the most terrible weapon in the history of mankind." Byrd K., Sherwin M. J. American Prometheus: The triumph and tragedy of J. Robert Oppenheimer. – New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2005. p. 210. – 736 p.; American President: Reference resource [Electronic resource] // Miller Center [Official website]. URL : <http://millercenter.org/president/truman/essays/biography/5> (accessed 12.08.2019).

The Soviet Union, whose international positions were significantly strengthened after the war, became the main obstacle for the United States, seeking to take a leading position in the international community. The American leadership understood that it was impossible to cope with such a strong opponent alone, the United States needed to strengthen cooperation with its former partners and its positions in the Western Hemisphere, as well as direct diplomatic efforts to gain new allies. "In practice, we can no longer be content with the defense of the hemisphere as the basis of our security," said General of the American Army, J. P. Blavatsky, after the end of the war. Marshall. According to this view, the United States had to consolidate its military presence in strategically important regions of the world.

The instruments of rooting the economic and technological leadership of the United States in the international arena after the Second World War were: the monopoly on nuclear weapons, the policy of "containing communism" and the formation of a system of allied relations. The Fulton speech of W. Churchill in 1946 became the starting point in its development. The British Prime Minister called on the United States to continue military cooperation, including joint strategic planning: "It is impossible to prevent war without an alliance of English-speaking peoples."³

In the conditions of instability of the international situation after the Second World War, the formation of a new concept of international relations was required. With the collapse of the anti-Hitler coalition, the former allies had more and more disagreements. The position of the Soviet Union was getting stronger, it demanded more rights in making decisions in the post-war settlement. Churchill understood that since Great Britain was no longer the leading European power, only the USA, which at that time had a monopoly on atomic weapons, could compete with the USSR. The American leadership, striving to take the place of a leader in the international arena, took Churchill's speech positively. In the shortest possible time, a new foreign policy doctrine was formulated, which was outlined by President G. Truman in a speech to Congress on March 12, 1947. Its basis was the policy of "containment" of the USSR throughout the world, expressed in economic, financial and military assistance to non-communist regimes. A long period of the "cold war" was beginning.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States developed the directive "U.S. assistance to other countries for national security purposes" (April 1947). The main priority from the point of view of the US allied policy has become the Western European direction. According to the American political scientist Z. Brzezinski, Europe has become a "springboard of American power" and "the central arena of the world."

On June 5, 1947, U.S. Secretary of State J. Marshall announced the general concept of the new aid program, called the "European Reconstruction Program". The proposed scheme, unlike individual lending programs, assumed multilateral interaction of participants to solve common economic problems and was designed for a maximum of four years. With the help of the implementation of the Marshall plan, he intended to limit communism in Europe, protect the economic interests of the United States, taking into account the isolationist movements within the state. In the period from 1948 to 1952, the Marshall Program was the basis of American foreign policy in Europe. The program of financial support for European states has

³ Churchill's speech about the "Iron Curtain" [Electronic resource] // Welcome to Winston Churchill.org [Official website]. URL:

http://www.winstonchurchill.org/images/pdfs/for_educators/MilliganChurchillsIronCurtainSpeechLessonPlanFinal2.docx-1.pdf (accessed 07.09.2019).

become the first stage of Atlantic integration, in which the United States has firmly taken a dominant position.

With increasing tensions in Europe, Western European democracies asked the United States for security guarantees, to which the Truman administration promised to give a positive response in the event of the unification of European states. Introducing J. To Marshall his concept of the Western Union, British Foreign Minister E. Bevin placed special emphasis on the need for the United States to participate in ensuring the security of Western Europe. The essence of Bevin's plan was to create a solid core by combining the forces of Great Britain, France, Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg and the formation of a system of Western democracies represented by Scandinavia, small European countries, Italy, Greece and Portugal. From the point of view of the US State Department, the best embodiment of Bevin's idea was the signing of a multilateral agreement modeled on the 1947 mutual assistance treaty between the United States and Latin American states.

It is known that the main purpose of uniting the countries of Western Europe into a bloc was to counter the aggression of the Soviet Union. In order to avoid accusations of the new union of anti-Soviet orientation, it was proposed to expand the economic article of the treaty, focusing on the reconstruction of the European economy. Later, this definition was used in contrast to the Soviet characterization of NATO as an aggressive bloc.

On March 17, 1948, the United Kingdom, France and the Benelux countries signed the Collective Defense Treaty, which opened the way for the practical implementation of the Marshall Plan. On June 11, 1948, the US Congress approved a resolution by Senator A. Vandenberg, which allowed participation in military-political alliances in peacetime. Thus, the period of the American policy of isolationism has completely ended and the possibility of creating a multilateral North Atlantic bloc has appeared. During the negotiation process, the military aspects were the most difficult to agree on. In particular, the United States tried to limit its material participation in the activities of the bloc to arms supplies (like lend-lease).

On April 4, 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was formed, which was the most significant achievement in the entire history of allied relations of the United States. The agreement was signed by 12 states – the United States, Great Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Italy and Portugal.⁴

The charter of the Organization noted that the participants will ensure the stability and well-being of the region, strive to create collective defense to preserve peace and security. Particular attention should be paid to Article 5 of the NATO Charter, which states that "an armed attack on one or more of them in Europe or North America will be considered an attack on them as a whole."

The entry of the United States into a military-political alliance with European states for the first time after the signing of a bilateral treaty with France in 1778, caused contradictory responses in Congress. Senator R. Taft from the Republican Party saw in the formation of NATO the threat of drawing the United States into unnecessary conflicts, while Republican Senator A. Vandenberg called the establishment of the alliance "the most important step in American foreign policy since the proclamation of the Monroe doctrine."

⁴ The North Atlantic Treaty [Electronic resource] // NATO [Official website]. URL: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm (accessed 05.09.2019)

The formation of the bloc led to the creation of an American military support project for the alliance members, called the Mutual Defense Assistance Program. The practical sense was not only to raise the level of the military-industrial complex (MIC) of European states, but first of all, to form a trustworthy image of the United States. The implementation of the program was effective – the military infrastructure and organs of the bloc were quickly built, American bases and military facilities grew on the territories of the participating countries. In order to get closer to the borders of the USSR, two new members were admitted to the alliance – Turkey and Greece.

Despite the progressive development of the bloc, difficulties often appeared in the functioning of the North Atlantic Alliance caused by disagreements between its members. The first "crisis of confidence" in the interaction between the United States and the member countries of the bloc occurred as a result of President G. Truman's statement in November 1950 about the possibility of using atomic weapons. This decision was made without consultation with the rest of the allies, which led to the unwillingness of European states to be involved in the US war in Korea, and the Suez crisis of 1956⁵ called into question the further development of the organization.

In the early years of the alliance's existence, it developed a special authoritarian system of interaction, where the United States took the place of a leader, and the United Kingdom was a privileged ally. In this regard, in 1958, the leadership of the parties developed and adopted the "Mutual Defense Agreement", which concerned the expansion and deepening of cooperation between the two countries, including in the field of nuclear weapons.

The privileged position of Great Britain in the alliance did not correspond to the interests of France. In a secret message to US President Eisenhower on September 17, 1958, French Prime Minister Sh. de Gaulle took the initiative to reorganize NATO, namely its transformation into a leading "triumvirate". The American leadership refused, which led to even greater tension between the allies. The Vietnam War and the American concept of multilateral nuclear forces led to another crisis in NATO, as a result of which France left the alliance in 1966.

At the turn of the 1970s - 1980s, the US course, hostile to the process of detente, contributed to the growth of contradictions within NATO. The American leadership accelerated the arms race, which affected the decisions taken in 1977 - 1979 by the NATO Council.

Under pressure from the United States, in 1977, at a session of the NATO Council, an increase in military spending to 3% of GDP was approved. Washington demanded that the alliance members not limit themselves to developing short-term military programs, but to carry out long-term planning. In 1979-1980, only three NATO states increased their military budgets – the United States itself, Portugal and Luxembourg. The increase in US military spending increased from 4.9% in 1978 to 9% in 1983, while Europeans had only 1.2% and 1.7%, respectively.⁶

⁵ The military actions of Great Britain, France and Israel against Egypt, prepared and launched without the consent of the United States.

⁶ Crisis of Will in NATO Alliance. Hearing Before the Subcommittee on European Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations. U.S. Senate, 99th Congress, 1st Session. September 19, 1985. Washington. US GPO. 1982. P.51

In 1982, Senator from the Democratic Party S. Nunn made a report "NATO: is it possible to preserve the union?". It contained criticism of the actions of US allies who refused to increase military spending, shifting the entire burden of responsibility to the United States.

The Nunn report led to a debate in Congress regarding non-compliance by European states with the 3% level of defense spending. In response to a significant disparity in the level of spending between the United States and allies, the senator proposed to reduce the American contingent in Europe to 90 thousand (by 2/3) by 1990, in case of further non-compliance with military spending. The proposal was rejected by the Reagan administration, and it received 41 votes in favor and 55 against in the Senate. The desire of the Allies to save on their own armed forces did not cause serious concern among the leadership of the United States. Fears were aroused by the intentions of the participating countries to form an autonomous nuclear deterrent potential, the appearance of which would deprive the United States of a dominant role in the alliance.

The calls of the US President to strengthen NATO⁷ and the statements of Secretary of State Alexander Hague about the possibility of the alliance using nuclear weapons as a warning to Moscow worried the leaders of European countries. Public opinion polls in the leading European states have demonstrated that the threat of nuclear war is a constant concern of the population of these countries. Despite the listed disagreements of the member countries of the NATO bloc, there have been no significant changes in the alliance that negatively affected its activities. Western European states, according to American analysts of the Chicago Tribune newspaper, perceived the alliance as a guarantor of their security, thanks to which their democracies could freely develop and flourish. This vision of NATO in European society is still relevant today. The attitude of the authorities and the public of the United States has changed over time. At the initial stage of the bloc's existence, the United States perceived it as a concrete response to a specific threat. With its disappearance, according to most American political scientists, NATO had to "resell itself" in order not to lose political support among the American people and Congress.

On March 31, 1991, with the termination of the Warsaw Pact Organization, Western countries began to search for justification for the need to strengthen NATO as the sole guarantor of peace and stability in Europe. At the same time, the idea of preserving one of the two opposing military blocs contradicted the principles proclaimed in the 1990 Charter of Paris on the inadmissibility of the use of force against participants in the Organization of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).

However, the NATO leadership called for the preservation of the military grouping with its gradual adaptation to the changed conditions. The main arguments in defense of the North Atlantic Bloc were: the function of the alliance as a guarantor of security, NATO's ability to legitimize US participation in ensuring European security on the basis of collective defense obligations, as well as CSCE support in conflict resolution.

In reality, the NATO leadership could not allow the dissolution of the organization, since the alliance's military system provided orders to the military-industrial complex of the West. Companies such as Northrop Grumman, Lockheed Martin, General Dynamics received most of their income from orders from the US Department of Defense and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The loss of orders could lead to the death of corporations and the consequences

⁷ Weekly compilation. 1982. Vol.18. №22. P.728

in the social sphere – unemployment due to the closure of enterprises producing military products.⁸

To justify the need to preserve NATO, strong arguments were needed in the form of a new threat, which was found in "rogue states", states with unstable regimes and international terrorism. These challenges, which pose a danger to the entire world community, required the expansion of the regional borders of the bloc.

So in 1991 and 1999, concepts were developed, the main provisions of which were aimed at giving the alliance the character of a global military-political organization. "Since NATO carries out operations at a strategic distance, a dialogue with other interested countries is necessary," noted NATO Secretary General Ya. Scheffer. In order to strengthen relations with countries outside the alliance, new structural elements were formed: the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), the Partnership for Peace Program (PFP), the Mediterranean Dialogue and anti-terrorist campaigns.

Conclusion

The NATO bloc was considered by the US leadership as the basis of military force for the implementation of geostrategic plans. Firstly, the United States has not entered into a war with an equivalent enemy (Vietnam, Serbia, Iraq, etc.) in the entire history of the existence of the state. Secondly, with the end of the Cold war, the military potential of the Soviet Union was mainly in the hands of the Russian leadership, which could pose a serious threat to the United States. Thus, the alliance remained an important instrument of American foreign policy, representing a guarantor of security and a platform for solving political and economic problems.

In the 1990s, the NATO bloc did not lose its value for the American foreign policy course, but on the contrary, consolidated its leading positions in the US system of alliances. The alliance helped Washington's leadership to tie almost a third of the UN countries to American politics. As of the beginning of 2021, the North Atlantic Alliance unites thirty States deeply interested in maintaining security and stability in the world. In recent years, the joint forces have conducted six operations with a military component.

However, the quantitative deficit of the US army and the insufficient involvement of participating countries in operations conducted in remote regions reduces the effectiveness of NATO's activities. Thus, the operations of the US Armed Forces in Afghanistan and Iraq have become a burden for most of the countries of the alliance, involved at the request of Washington in the "restoration of peace and stability" in troubled regions. Exorbitant financial costs, growing losses among coalition troops and civilians, and the lack of prospects for stabilizing the situation have led to the desire of NATO member countries to withdraw their contingents from Afghanistan and Iraq. This led to an increase in the composition of the US national armed forces involved in combat missions. Despite the need to conduct operations in remote territories, the circle of potential members of the bloc is still limited by the requirement that European states be participants.

⁸ Annual report [Electronic resource] // Northrop Grumman [Official website]. URL: http://www.northropgrumman.com/AboutUs/AnnualReports/Documents/pdfs/2013_noc_ar.pdf; Annual report [Electronic resource] // Lockheed Martin [Official website]. URL: <http://www.lockheedmartin.com/content/dam/lockheed/data/corporate/documents/2013-Annual-Report.pdf> (accessed 28.01.2019); Annual report [Electronic resource] // General Dynamics [Official website]. URL: <file:///D:/Users/Alex/Downloads/2013-GD-AnnualReport.pdf>.

Given the foreign policy obstacles and internal disagreements, it is worth noting that by now the NATO bloc has not lost its importance. Contradictions between the bloc's allies still persist, and the mechanism of political consultations serves to resolve them.

Russian political scientists Istomin I.A. and Baykov A.A. refer NATO to the category of asymmetric alliances. In their opinion, "such associations act not so much as a mechanism for aggregating potentials, as an instrument of hegemonic management – even if the security of a major power does not depend on small and medium-sized countries, an alliance with them helps to consolidate its international political dominance." From the moment of its creation to this day, the North Atlantic Alliance has been the main and unchanging component of the entire system of alliances of the United States.

An attempt to predict the further evolution of NATO was made by Russian political scientists Istomin I.A., Bolgova I.V., Sushentsov A.A. and Rebro O.I. They connect the future of the organization with the specifics of its future missions and geographical localization of activities. One of the questions that experts in the field of international relations ask is how wide will the geographical area of activity of the North Atlantic Alliance be?

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