



# Journal of Social and Political Sciences

---

**Satriawan, I., & Mustofa, M. (2023). A Genealogical Study of the History of Philippine Terrorism. *Journal of Social and Political Sciences*, 6(2), 162-171.**

ISSN 2615-3718

DOI: 10.31014/aior.1991.06.02.417

The online version of this article can be found at:  
**<https://www.asianinstituteofresearch.org/>**

---

Published by:  
The Asian Institute of Research

The *Journal of Social and Political Sciences* is an Open Access publication. It may be read, copied, and distributed free of charge according to the conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International license.

The Asian Institute of Research *Social and Political Sciences* is a peer-reviewed International Journal. The journal covers scholarly articles in the fields of Social and Political Sciences, which include, but are not limited to, Anthropology, Government Studies, Political Sciences, Sociology, International Relations, Public Administration, History, Philosophy, Arts, Education, Linguistics, and Cultural Studies. As the journal is Open Access, it ensures high visibility and the increase of citations for all research articles published. The *Journal of Social and Political Sciences* aims to facilitate scholarly work on recent theoretical and practical aspects of Social and Political Sciences.



ASIAN INSTITUTE OF RESEARCH  
Connecting Scholars Worldwide

# A Genealogical Study of the History of Philippine Terrorism

Iwan Satriawan<sup>1</sup>, Muhammad Mustofa<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Doctoral Candidate, Department of Criminology, University of Indonesia

<sup>2</sup> Professor of Criminology, Department of Criminology, University of Indonesia

Correspondence: Iwan Satriawan. Tel: +62 81317150235. E-mail: iwansatriawan.krim18@gmail.com

## Abstract

The history of terrorist acts in the Philippines is the focus of this paper. Each act of terrorism has a unique goal, but the most common goal is to undermine the power of a state's government. Terrorism is not an act committed by individuals, but by groups that have made decisions based on shared beliefs and commitments, even if these individuals have different commitments and beliefs toward the group. The researcher used observation through the experience of researchers when they were involved in various activities related to Philippine terrorists, such as the release of Indonesian citizens held hostage by the Abu Sayyaf Group and the evacuation of 17 Indonesian citizens who were members of the Jemaah Tabligh who were trapped in two locations in Marawi City for five months at the hands of terrorists. MNLF, MILF, ASG, National Intelligence Coordination Agency, Philippine National Police (PNP), and Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) researchers collaborate on these activities. Observation becomes the foundation for researchers interested in answering research questions through the experience of researchers who have been directly involved in missions to rescue the phenomenon of terrorism in the Philippines. During the observation, the researcher maintained contact with Philippines terrorists and security forces. The identification results in this paper include at least three aspects that underpin terrorist acts in the Philippines, namely conflict history, economic conditions, and religious disparities. These three factors have all played a role in the history of terrorism in the Philippines.

**Keywords:** Genealogy, Philippine, Religion, Terrorism

## 1. Introduction

Terrorist acts in Southeast Asia show that perpetrators came from various countries such as Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Singapore which shared ideological similarities. Despite the fact that terrorist acts only reflect the local interests of the terrorists' home countries, Philippine terrorists have never participated in terrorist acts in Indonesia, indicating that there are factors that influence Philippines terrorists.

According to the data, the Philippine Terrorist Group did not carry out any actions in Indonesia following the bombing of the Philippine Embassy in Jakarta, except for hijacking ships and tugboats with Indonesian crew members in Philippine and Malaysian waters. Terrorist acts in Indonesia from 2000 to 2018 began with the bombing of the Philippine Embassy by an Indonesian terrorist group affiliated with Philippine terrorists. According to Karnavian (2009) and Singh (2009), there has been contact and cooperation between Indonesian and Filipino terrorists; Saad stated at the trial of the Philippine Embassy bombing case that he carried out his actions in

retaliation for the burning of the Abu Bakar Bashir camp in Mindanao. However, Filipino terrorists have never been proven to have participated in carrying out their actions in Indonesia, which differ from those carried out in Malaysia, Singapore, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and other countries.

Terrorism resurfaced in Indonesia in 2000, with the bombing of the Philippine Embassy on August 1, 2000, followed by bombings at the Jakarta Stock Exchange on September 13, 2000, throwing grenades at the Malaysian Embassy on August 27, 2000, and a series of bombings on Christmas Eve, December 24, 2000. Terrorist acts continued in Indonesia in the years that followed, namely 1) 2001: the bombings of the Santa Anna Church and HKBP Jatiwaringi, Plaza Atrium Senen, KFC Makassar, and the Australian School in Jakarta; and 2) 2002: the bombings of the Santa Anna Church and HKBP Jatiwaringi, Plaza Atrium Senen, KFC Mak 2) 2002: New Year's Eve bombings at the Bulungan Chicken Restaurant in Jakarta and several churches in Palu, Bali bombing, Philippine Consulate General in Manado, and Mc Donald's Makassar Restaurant; 3) 2003: Lobby of Wisma Bhayangkari Police Headquarters, Terminal F of Soekarno Hatta Airport, and Hotel JW Marriott Jakarta; 4) 2004: Palopo City, Australian Embassy, Immanuel Church in Palu; 5) 2005: Bombings in Ambon City, Tentena, Pamulang Tangerang, Bali 2, and Pasar in Palu; 6) 2009: JW Marriott and Ritz-Carlton Jakarta Hotel Bombings on 17 July 12) 2017: a pot bomb in Kampung Melayu and a pot bomb in Cicendo Pandawa Park in Bandung; 13) 2018: convicts kidnapped several Brimob and Densus 88 members at the Mobile Brigade Headquarters, suicide bombings at GKI Surabaya, the Central Pentecostal Church, and the Immaculate Santa Maria Church in Surabaya, and an attack on the Riau Police Headquarters. Kompas (2005); Okezone (2016); Indopos (2016); Pontianak Tribune (2016); TribunNews 2017 & 2018, Britatagar.id (2018).

The aforementioned terrorist acts occurred following the fall of the Suharto regime (Zakiah, 2016), and there are indications of a close relationship between Indonesian and Filipino terrorists (Tito Karnavian, 2009: 117; Daljit Singh, 2009: 84); in the form of an emotional relationship motivated by ideology (Larasati, 2015). This is evidenced by the close relationship that had existed between Indonesian and Filipino militant Islamic groups since 1985, when Darul Islam (DI) leaders Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Bashir met for the first time with Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) leader Salamat Hashim in Lahore, Pakistan. Indonesian militant Islamic groups DI/NII, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), Kompak, and Wahdah Islamiyah/Laskar Jundullah allied with the MILF, the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), and the Rajah Solaiman Movement (RSM) in the Philippines.

Several Indonesian terrorists were killed in part and apprehended by Philippine security forces (Tito Karnavian, 2009: 117; Daljit Singh, 2009: 84). The MILF and JI then established several camps in Mindanao, including Camp Abu Bakar for Indonesian and Filipino terrorists who had met in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and Camp Hudaibiyah for Indonesian, Filipino, and Arab terrorists. Furthermore, the MILF facilitated the establishment of two additional camps in Mindanao: the Sulawesi Camp for Sulawesi terrorists who were not JI members and had operated in Afghanistan, and the Banten Camp for West Java terrorists who were not JI members and had operated in Afghanistan (As'at Said Ali, 2014: 180-181).

## 2. Method

The purpose of this research is to find out why Filipino foreign terrorist fighters (FTF) do not carry out attacks in Indonesian territory. As a result, researchers must delve deeper into how Philippine terrorists select targets for attacks. The researchers used a qualitative approach to investigate this. A qualitative approach in criminology refers to the collection and interpretation of textual, verbal, or real-world observational data to learn about the causes, nature, consequences, and responses to crime (Miller & Yang, 2008).

Qualitative research can assist researchers in overcoming research problems with no variables and a need to explore. Because previous research literature is a weakness for researchers, qualitative research can be used for research studies that produce little information about specific phenomena (Creswell, 2009). Then, according to Sugiyono (2015), qualitative research refers to single or partial symptoms of an object. Thus, when researchers use this approach, they will examine the social situation under investigation, which may include places, actors, and activities that interact in a synergistic manner.

This study also emphasizes the importance of looking at ideological relationships and interests with various terrorist groups in Southeast Asia and jihadists in general in order to achieve research objectives. This approach can benefit researchers because qualitative researchers can investigate interpretations or observations with greater fluidity, mutuality, and depth of interaction with informants or informants. Qualitative research, which is epistemologically compatible with the fluidity and progressive nature of social phenomena, typically does not narrowly restrict study boundaries and adapts research protocols (e.g., modified interview guides) (Miller & Yang, 2008).

Researchers see benefits to this approach, such as focusing on the attitudes and opinions of sources or informants, emphasizing ordinal responses, and focusing on bold explanations and descriptions, because voices and answers in the field are sought (Miller & Yang, 2008). Furthermore, qualitative research can estimate the size and characteristics of the population of interest, facilitating research on the phenomenon of terrorism.

The genealogy method is used by the author as a research method to study historical and familial relationships between individuals or groups. Tracing family trees, identifying ancestors and descendants, and analyzing patterns of inheritance and migration over time are all part of this method. Genealogy is used in social science research to investigate social and cultural dynamics in families, communities, and society. Genealogy can be used to investigate how gender, race, class, and other social factors are passed down through generations, as well as how family structures and relationships evolve over time (Rivers, 1900).

Genealogy can be used to trace the various analyses, developments, and claims that surround the spread of a crime phenomenon, which can have an impact on the development of new areas of competence and their legitimacy in relation to crime ideas. This can be accomplished by following the analysis chain and investigating the conceptualizations of the phenomena it supports. The data collected as a result of the analysis will be divided into phases in order to identify common threads in the evolution of the crime phenomenon and the factors that influence it (Morales, Gendron, & Guénin-Paracini, 2014).

The genealogy method popularized by Foucault, which he developed from Nietzsche's genealogy method, is widely used in the social sciences, particularly criminology. The genealogy method of Nietzsche has been described as "utilitarian" and "materialist" (Prinz, 2016). The genealogical method, which is widely used in social science, particularly criminology, was popularized by Foucault and developed from Nietzsche's genealogy method. The genealogy method of Nietzsche has been described as "utilitarian" and "materialist" (Prinz, 2016). In writings about the evolutionary process of aviation terrorism or aviation terrorism (Szymankiewicz, 2022), the genealogical method is used in terrorism cases. Szymankiewicz (2022) employs the genealogical method to investigate how the phenomenon of aviation terrorism has evolved over time.

### 3. Results

The Moro Muslim movement, which seeks independence, is to blame for the Southern Philippines' security problems. This insurgency movement was led by the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) in 1972, and by the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in mid-1977. The Abu Sayyaf Group emerged in 1991 as a fragment of the two previous movements (Eusaquito, 2004), and is regarded as a major terrorist and criminal organization by the Philippine government (International Crisis Group, 2008). Terrorist attacks in the Philippines range from plane hijackings to attacks on military installations and cities, bombing soft targets, and kidnappings. The MNLF was responsible for the majority of terror attacks in the Philippines, though the MILF and ASG were responsible for the most extreme and dangerous attacks (Eusaquito, 2004). MNLF's international network then provided opportunities for JI to enter (Abuza, 2003). According to Eusaquito (2004), the Philippines was then used by JI as a place to increase operational capabilities or as a training ground, as well as a place of refuge, which affected the rampant acts of terror attacks resulting from the protracted conflict between Moro and the Philippines, including efforts to close camps in the South Philippines.

After Basilan's Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) pledged allegiance to ISIS and its leader, Isnilon Hapilon, declared himself Amir of ISIS in Southeast Asia, Philippine security forces increased their attacks on terrorist groups in the Philippines, resulting in many casualties among the ASG, BIFF, AKP, and Maute. On December 31, 2016, Isnilon Hapilon decided to relocate to Butiq, Lanao Del Sur, Mindanao Island, to join the Maute Group, BIFF, AKP, and control Marawi City on Mindanao Island, Philippines, between May 23 and October 23, 2017, in order to establish an ISIS "wilayat" in Southeast Asia.

The Philippine government is increasingly aware of the gravity of the threat posed by foreign terrorist organizations operating in the country. The main threat posed by transnational terrorists, according to the Philippine government, is the transfer of knowledge and skills to local terrorist groups, which can facilitate and nourish local terrorist acts through the supply of funds and other operational logistics. Local and transnational terrorism pose a real threat to the Philippine government (Armed Forces of the Philippines, 2010). To address the aforementioned insurgency and terrorism issues, the Philippine government has developed a counterinsurgency or counterterrorism policy that, in general, overlaps. According to Eusaquito (2004), the existence of a coherent policy is a very valuable resource in combating terrorism that is completely resource dependent. The Philippines' response to terrorism has so far been ad hoc and reactive, rather than strategic and decisive, as Eusaquito (2004) revealed. Plans, institutional architecture, equipment procurement, training, and regulations or laws, including international agreements, can all be part of counter-terrorism policies.




Chart 1: Terrorism Network in the Philippines

Source: processed from various sources

#### 4. Discussion

Because it combines economic and cultural explanations, the Bourdieus framework has proven useful for research on political and religious radicalization (Bourdieu, 1990). As a result, it can provide a more nuanced, diverse, and dynamic understanding than one that is solely focused on ideology, geopolitics, or aggression. Cultural ideas like

violent jihad (Sandberg, 2008a) will always be linked to and embedded in concrete material contexts, but their nature is not entirely determined by this socioeconomic foundation.

When applied to terrorism in the Philippines, habitus theory can help explain how people become involved in terrorist movements and why those movements continue to exist. In this context, habitus can be defined as a proclivity to resolve conflicts through violence, with terrorism serving as a manifestation of this proclivity. As a result, this chapter will examine the origins of the terrorism phenomenon in the Philippines. The concept of habitus developed by Bourdieu is used to explain the evolution and nature of terrorism in the Philippines.

Spain attempted to subdue the Muslims in Mindanao for more than three centuries, beginning in 1521. Spain conquered large areas of the Christian population, but it was never able to establish extensive rule over areas of the southern Philippines inhabited by a small proportion of Muslims (at the time, Muslims made up 4-5 percent of the population). Under the Treaty of Paris in 1898, Spain included Mindanao in the transfer of sovereignty to the United States. When the United States ruled the Philippines, the Moro in Mindanao staged some of the most violent rebellions at the turn of the twentieth century (Dalpino, 2003).

In 1946, the United States granted independence to the Philippines, but there were strong objections from Muslims in Mindanao to the inclusion of Mindanao in the Republic of the Philippines. Muslims in Mindanao continued their separatist struggle, this time against Manila. Despite this long history of separatist sentiment, Filipino Christians and Muslims alike trace internal friction and conflict over Muslim separatism not because of religious differences, but because of economic inequality. Since then, Muslim groups to secede from the Philippines and rebellion against the Philippine government has continued (Dalpino, 2003).

The traditional indigenous territories of thirteen Muslim ethnic groups have been Mindanao, the Sulu Archipelago, and Palawan, with the Maguindanaoans, Maranaws, and Tausugs being the most numerous and currently more influential in both local and national politics. These groups had their own distinct cultural, social, and political institutions prior to the arrival of the Spaniards in the sixteenth century. Particularly, they are free to live their own lives (Luga, 2002).

Mindanao and the rest of the Philippines were essentially separate countries for centuries. Following the introduction of Islam in 1460, various communities in Mindanao developed into sultanates and kingdoms, while other Filipino tribes on Luzon and Visaya were scattered and unconsolidated. These sultanates and kingdoms were active participants in extensive maritime trade networks with Southeast Asia, India, Japan, and China. Furthermore, Jolo and Maguindanao served as international trading ports, with Arab, Chinese, and other Asian traders visiting. During the pre-Spanish period, sultanates and kingdoms maintained diplomatic relations with Spain, France, the Netherlands, and England (Luga, 2002).

When the Spanish conquistadors expanded their military and missionary conquests into Mindanao and Sulu, the Muslims retaliated, resulting in what historians refer to as the "Moro Wars." For more than three hundred years, Spanish expeditions against Muslim countries to conquer them failed. Mindanao and Sulu lands were not covered by the Spanish agrarian system or other Spanish land tenure arrangements in the Visayas and Mindanao during the long years of Spanish colonization (Luga, 2002).

The Treaty of Paris in 1898 granted the United States government authority to control and own all land in the Philippine archipelago, and thus the United States inherited the Moro issue from Spain. The US policy, like its predecessor, is to turn Mindanao and Sulu into political entities. The Philippine colonial government enacted legislation that solidified US control of the country, particularly in terms of land ownership. These laws were the Land Registration Act of 1902, the General Land Act of 1903, and a policy enacting a program of resettlement of Filipinos of Christian faith to areas in Mindanao formerly dominated by indigenous peoples of Muslim faith, which went into effect in 1913 (Luga, 2002).

Resettlement policies in the 1950s, in particular, encouraged Filipino Christians to migrate from the densely populated province of Luzon to Mindanao, where Muslims make up the majority of the population and own

roughly 40% of the land. As Christian Filipinos become the majority in Mindanao and gain more land, the Muslim population and landholdings on the island have shrunk significantly. Furthermore, Mindanao Province, which has a sizable Muslim population, remains one of the poorest in the Philippines (Dalpino, 2003).

Furthermore, several sultans entered into negotiations with the Americans, which were opposed by the Muslim community because they were seen as a prelude to surrender. They launched fierce attacks against American troops and military installations from their mountainous and jungle terrain. Individual Muslims will sometimes carry out "juramentado" attacks against the American government if they believe the sultan and datuk have abandoned the jihad against the infidels of the United States (Luga, 2002).

The strong belief among Muslims that they are a distinct and separate nation from the Filipino nationality, and that the Philippine government is a colonial government, resulted in the organization of resistance movements in the 1960s. Although they initially worked separately, several Muslim political leaders, students from Mindanao and Sulu studying in Cairo, and Muslim students in Manila secretly planned and organized the movement (Luga, 2002).

Although Moro resistance was widespread during and immediately following colonial rule, it was not until the early 1970s that the Moro revolutionary movement became formalized. The Moro National Liberation Front, or MNLF, was the first revolutionary organization (Rhoades & Helmus, 2020). MNLF Nur Misuari, an ethnic Tausug and former University of the Philippines professor, founded the organization, which has an overtly nationalistic ideological agenda. MNLF arose as a result of Filipino Muslims' growing awareness of Islam. The MNLF was at the forefront of the Moros' separatist movement. This condition reflects a widespread Moro perception of national oppression at the hands of the predominantly Christian Philippine government (2009) (Chalk, Rabasa, Rosenau, & Piggott, 2009).

The MNLF leads an armed Muslim separatist campaign against the government. The MNLF had approximately 30,000 members in 1975; by 1996, membership had dropped to approximately 17,700 (Rhoades & Helmus, 2020). After five years of bloody conflict, the famous Tripoli Agreement was signed in December 1976, ushering in a new era of peace. The agreement, among other things, called for the establishment of autonomous regions in thirteen provinces in Mindanao and Sulu. In April 1977, a referendum was held in Mindanao's thirteen provinces, asking voters whether they wanted to be organized into an autonomous government. Three of these provinces in Regions 4 and 11, Davao del Sur, South Cotabato, and Palawan, refused to participate in the referendum, and those voting in the remaining nine provinces in Regions 9 and 11 rejected the proposal, preferring to remain in their respective territories. As a result, two autonomous regions, Regions 9 and 11, were established (Luga, 2002).

While two autonomous regions are gradually being imposed in the cities of Zamboanga and Cotabato, the MNLF leadership is shaken by alleged inter-ethnic conflicts among top officials (Luga, 2002). In 1996, the MNLF and the Philippine government signed a peace treaty. Since then, the MNLF has engaged in sporadic political activities and violent attacks, but its popularity has dwindled, and it has been largely sidelined in subsequent negotiations with the government. On the other hand, the goals of the Moro independence struggle have shifted; several groups have split from the MNLF, spawning new separatist organizations (Rhoades & Helmus, 2020).

In 1979, Ustadz Hashim Salamat, a Maguindanaoan and former vice-chairman of the MNLF, formed The Moro Islamic Liberation Front/Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), which broke away from the MNLF in 1978 to pursue a more Islam-focused agenda with respect to seeking Moro independence, replaced the MNLF as the main organization negotiating with the Philippine government for a Muslim autonomous region. When the MILF began to take a stance more in favor of an autonomous region, rather than total independence, many more radical groups emerged. One of them is the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) (formerly a MILF military unit) which broke away from the MILF in 2010, the Maute Group (Rhoades & Helmus, 2020) and Misuari Breakaway Group (MBG) in 2002. These groups are not on the US Department of State's FTO list (Manalo, 2004).

With its peace efforts with the MILF in the 1990s, the Philippines saw the formation of another Muslim armed group known as the Abu Sayyaf Group or the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) (Luga, 2002). Abdurajak Abubakar Janjalani, a former MNLF member indoctrinated in Islamic extremism, leads the group. When the Soviet-Afghan

war erupted in the early 1980s, Janjalani enlisted in the Third International Islamic Brigade to assist the Afghan mujahideen in driving out the Soviet invaders. Janjalani was educated in an Islamic extremist mindset there, and upon his return to Mindanao, he formed his own group to fight for Islamic causes inspired by Middle Eastern movements (Manalo, 2004).

ASG is the first Filipino Islamic extremist organization to be included on the US State Department's list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations. Al Qaeda initially provided ideological inspiration, funding, and training to the group. Osama bin Laden has a personal relationship with the ASG leader. Later, bin Laden's brother-in-law helped fund the ASG, and Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, the mastermind of the 9/11 attacks, assisted in training ASG members (Rhoades and Helmus, 2020).

ASG had a central committee structure with distinct functional committees responsible for planning, formulating programs, controlling and directing the activities of all sub-groups across its operational areas (Basilan, Sulu, General Santos, Zamboanga peninsula, including Palawan) under Janjalani. However, following Janjalani's death in 1998, ASG members became dissatisfied and faced a leadership vacuum. As a result, the organization disintegrated, and the ASG is now made up of various armed groups, each with its own leader. The formal organizations vanished, leaving only bandits and money launderers hiding behind jihad and the struggle for an Islamic state. As a result, the government has no intention of reaching a peaceful agreement with the group (Luga, 2002).

ASG and BIFF pledged allegiance to the Islamic State of Iraq (ISIS) on social media in 2014. Despite its origins as part of the MNLF and its links to al Qaeda and ISIS, the ASG was primarily engaged in violent criminal behavior for the majority of its existence, with no clear political or ideological agenda beyond material gain. The ASG has never been included in peace talks with the Philippine government because of its violent activities and extremist ideology. ASG finances itself through kidnapping, extortion, smuggling, and selling marijuana; however, ASG also provides funds to local communities in order to foster support (Rhoades & Helmus, 2020). The following describes the rise of terrorist organizations in the Philippines:




Figure 1: Development of Terrorist Groups in the Philippines

Source: processed by researchers (2023)

The Philippines, arguably, faces the most diverse mosaic of militant internal security challenges of any Southeast Asian country. Threats today include ethnoreligious separatism and Islamic extremism. The characteristics of terrorist groups emerging in the Philippines are as follows (Chalk, Rabasa, Rosenau, & Piggott, 2009):



Table 1: Characteristics of Terrorist Groups Developing in the Philippines

	<b>Moro Islamic Liberation Front (1977)</b>	<b>Misuari Breakaway Group (2002)</b>	<b>Abu Sayyaf Group</b>
<b>Background and Objectives</b>	The establishment of an independent Islamic state is governed by sharia law and Muslims form the majority	Responses from MNLF developments to the Davao Consensus (1996)	Removing all Christian influence in the southern Philippines and establishing the Islamic state of Mindanao whose nature, meaning, symbols and goals are the basis for peace
<b>Structure and Size</b>	The hierarchical organization has an executive branch of the MILF consisting of a chairman and three deputy chairmen for political, internal and military affairs, a central committee and a secretariat. The military structure falls under the post of deputy chief of military affairs and consists of committees responsible for the northern, southern, eastern, western, and central fronts.	The armed partisans numbering around 660 are under the control of Pangdam Malik who is headquartered in Sulu	The ASG configuration was separated, following the death of its leader. The group lost most of its internal cohesion
<b>Patterns of Recruitment and Radicalization</b>	Based on a sense of injustice in the 1970's. Radicalization is motivated by the Islamic obligation to carry out jihad	No inductees into the group, but have remained loyal to the group since the arrest and disillusionment with the mnlf	Ideology was not an important factor, support was based on family and clan relations reinforced by strong traditions of resistance to outside authority
<b>Attitude of the General Population</b>	Develop a deep-rooted military and political infrastructure in western and central Mindanao	Support and respect in movement strongholds in Sulu, Davao, Lanao, Maguindanao and the Zamboanga peninsula	Support in Sulu, Jolo and Basilian
<b>Evidence of Cross-Border Links.</b>	MILF cooperates with Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)	-	Interact with JI
<b>Links to Other Groups</b>	Maintaining operational and logistical relationships with ASG and MBG	Establish operational and logistical relationships with ASG	Maintain operational and logistical links with ASG, MBG and Al Qaeda

Source: Chalk, Rabasa, Rosenau, & Piggott (2009)

Using Bourdieu's theory of practice and the important concept of habitus as an analytical tool, the history of the development of terrorism in the Philippines can be seen. Habitus refers to a proclivity toward a particular way of behaving, an almost natural worldview that embodies the individual and what is required, ingrained in both the body and the intellect, usually at a subconscious level. It situates the individual as a social being in a specific context that serves as a reference point for evaluating all life experiences (Ali, 2014).

The researchers' preliminary findings show that there are several factors that shape the habitus that supports terrorism in the Philippines by looking at historical data on the development of terrorism in the Philippines. First and foremost, political violence and ethnic conflict have become ingrained in history and culture. As previously stated, Spain and the United States have both played a role in the political violence and ethnic conflict in Mindanao involving Muslims. In short, terrorism is viewed as a means of conflict resolution.

Simmel defines religious habitus as a sacrifice that becomes a part of a religious society. This type of religious language is still being reproduced within the inner processes of religious people who commit suicide bombings. Suicidal tendencies can become a habit if they are experienced repeatedly over a long period of time. According to Siregar, habitus is a long-lasting and transposable structured disposition system that generates and organizes practices and representations that can be adjusted objectively with results without requiring conscious efforts to achieve certain goals or mastery (Tamrin, Irwansyah, & Arisnawawi, 2021).

The social environment, life experiences, and individual habits, on the other hand, form habitus, which influences how individuals view the world and act (Ilan & Sandberg, How 'gangsters' became jihadists: Bourdieu, criminology, and the crime-terrorism nexus, 2019). Some of the factors that can shape a habit that supports terrorism in the Philippines include:

1. Conflict history: The Philippines has had centuries of political and ethnic conflict, and violence has always been a part of Filipino history and culture. This conflict gave rise to several terrorist organizations, including the Abu Sayyaf Group, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), and the New People's Army (NPA). Prolonged conflict can reinforce the notion that violence is the only way to achieve political objectives.
2. Economic condition: Terrorist groups in the Philippines often come from disadvantaged groups in society and feel unrepresented in the Philippine political system. Difficult economic conditions can trigger feelings of dissatisfaction and frustration, which can encourage individuals to become involved in terrorist movements.
3. Religion: Several terrorist groups in the Philippines have religious roots, such as the Abu Sayyaf Group and the MILF. Religious beliefs can form a world view that justifies violence as a form of political action. Some terrorist groups even combine violence with jihad, which is considered a religious duty.

## Acknowledgments

Created as a prerequisite for the University of Indonesia's PhD degree in criminology.

## References

- Absari, D. J., & Morados. (2020). Philippine Muslim History: Challenges and Prospects. *Discussion Paper 2020-09 Islamic Studies Program University of the Philippines*.
- Aftergood, S. (2001). *Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF)*. From <https://irp.fas.org/world/para/mnlf.htm>
- Ali, J. (2014). Public Workshop Sociology of Muslim Terrorism: Causes and Consequences. *Bankstown Campus*.
- Alifandi. (2021). *Terrorism in the Philippines: Examining the data and what to expect in the coming years*. From <https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/mi/research-analysis/terrorism-philippines-examining-data.html>
- Azra, A. (1989). *Islam Di Asia Tenggara: Pengantar Pemikiran* [Islam in Southeast Asia: Introduction to the Thoughts]. Yayasan Obor.
- Bara, H. (2001). *The History of the Muslims in the Philippines*. From <https://ncca.gov.ph/about-ncca-3/subcommissions/subcommission-on-cultural-communities-and-traditional-arts-scta/central-cultural-communities/the-history-of-the-muslim-in-the-philippines/>
- Britannica. (2018). Moro National Liberation Front. *The Editors of Encyclopaedia*. From <https://www.britannica.com/topic/guerrilla>
- Chalk, P., Rabasa, Rosenau, & Piggott. (2009). *The Evolving Terrorist Threat to Southeast Asia A Net Assessment*. RAND.
- Conciliation Resources. (2009). *Conflict and Peace in Mindanao (MNLF)*. From c-r.org: <https://www.c-r.org/resource/conflict-and-peace-mindanao-mnlf>
- Costa, C., & Murphy, M. (2015). Bourdieu and the Application of Habitus across the Social Sciences. *Bourdieu, Habitus and Social Research*, 1-15.
- Creswell, J. W. (2012). *Educational Research: Planning, Conducting and Evaluating Quantitative and Qualitative Research*. Pearson.
- Dalpino, C. E. (2003). Separatism and Terrorism in the Philippines: Distinctions and Options for US Polic. *The Brookings Institution*.
- Elgindy, A. (2013). Translation and the Construction of the Religious Others Sociological Approach to English Translations of. *A thesis submitted to the University of Salford for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy*.

- Fabe, A. P. (2013). The Cost of Terrorism: Bombings by the Abu Sayyaf Group in the Philippines. *Philippine Sociological Review*, 61(1), 229-250.
- Global Terrorism Database. (2018). *Kasus terorisme di Filipina* [Terrorism cases in the Philippines]. From <https://lokadata.beritagar.id/chart/preview/kasus-terorisme-di-filipina-1563945583>
- Ilan, J., & Sandberg, S. (2019). How 'gangsters' become jihadists: Bourdieu, criminology and the crime–terrorism nexus. *European Journal of Criminology*, 1–17.
- Institute for Economics & Peace. (2020). *Global Terrorism Index: Measuring the Impact of Terrorism*. From <http://visionofhumanity.org/reports> (accessed Date Month Year).
- LaFree, G., Miller, E., & Yang, S.-M. (2013). Terrorism in Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand, 1970 to 2008. *Sicherheit und Frieden (S+F) / Security and Peace*, 31(2), 77-86.
- Luga, A. R. (2002). Muslim Insurgency in Mindanao, Philippines. *Master of Military Art and Science*.
- Magpantay, A., Buhain, J., Tejuco, H., Contreras, J., Malasaga, E., & Gray Habal, B. (2019). Data Analysis and Visualization of Terrorist Attacks in the Philippines. 28.1-28.7.
- Mahmut, D. (2020). What causes radicalisation? Voices of Uyghur Muslims in Canada. *2020 Conference of the Canadian Society for the Study of Education*, (hal. 1-31).
- Majul, C. A. (1966). The Role of Islam in The History of The Filipino People. *A paper prepared for the Silver Jubilee of the Philippine National Historical Society*.
- Manalo, E. P. (2004). The Philippine Response to Terrorism: The Abu Sayyaf Group. *Master's Thesis*.
- Radics, G. B. (2004). Terrorism in Southeast Asia: Balikatan Exercises in the Philippines and the US 'War against Terrorism'. *Stanford Journal of East Asian Affairs*, 4(2), 150-127.
- Rhoades, A. L., & Helmus. (2020). *Countering Violent Extremism in The Philippines: A Snapshot of Current Challenges and Responses*. RAND Corporation.
- Stokke, K. (1998). Sinhalese and Tamil nationalism as post-colonial political projects from 'above', 1948-1983. *Political Geography*, 17(1), 83-113.
- Szymankiewicz, Ł. (2022). Evolution of Aviation Terrorism – El Al Israeli Airlines, Case Study. *Journal of Strategic Security*, 15(1), 106-125.
- Tamrin, S., Irwansyah, & Arisnawawi. (2021). Terrorism habitus Reproduction in Indonesia (Study of Pierre Bourdieu's Thought in Potraying Terror Behaviour in Indonesia). *Mamangan Social Science Journal*.
- Taya, S. L. (2007). The Political Strategies of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for Self-Determination in the Philippines. *Intellectual Discourse*, 2007 Vol 15 No 1.
- Thohir, A. (2015). Historical Overview and Initiating Historiography of Islam in the Philippines. *International Journal of Nusantara Islam*, Vol.03 No.02 – 2015; (1– 16) .
- US Department of State. (2021). *Country Reports on Terrorism 2020: Philippines*. From [state.gov: https://www.state.gov/reports/country-reports-on-terrorism-2020/philippines\\_trashed/](https://www.state.gov/reports/country-reports-on-terrorism-2020/philippines_trashed/)
- US Department of State. (2022). *Country Reports on Terrorism 2021: Philippines*. From [state.gov: https://www.state.gov/reports/country-reports-on-terrorism-2021/philippines](https://www.state.gov/reports/country-reports-on-terrorism-2021/philippines)
- Vertigans, S. (2011). Habitus: Terrorism and violent dispositions. *The Sociology of Terrorism: Peoples, places and processes*, 75.
- White, G., Porter, M. D., & Mazerolle, L. (2013). Terrorism Risk, Resilience and Volatility: A Comparison of Terrorism Patterns in Three Southeast Asian Countries. *Journal of Quantitative Criminology*, 29, 295–320.