The Clash between Creativity and Tradition in the Financial Governance of Family Businesses

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ABSTRACT: This paper aims at the theoretical modeling of the clash between innovation and tradition based on the culture of the manager in the family firm. Our analysis of theoretical and empirical work confirms that, contrary to what is commonly believed, managerial innovation and family traditions are by no means contradictory but rather complementary. Thus, despite their attachment to cultural values, family firms can successfully implement change without threatening the stability and durability of the family heritage. This theoretical result gives rise to a model to be tested in the framework of our research program, which allows us to determine the key factors of the reconciliation of the traditional with the innovative for a better response to the requirements of the market dynamics in a context of crisis.

KEYWORDS: family businesses, financial goals, family goals, culture, innovation, family tradition

1. Introduction

Family businesses are characterized by the duality of interests and the confrontation between the socio-emotional objectives of the family and the economic objectives of the business. This duality of interests gives family businesses a specific character. In fact, this type of capitalism is characterized by its informal governance (Almaleh & Francois 2016) motivated by the values and non-economic objectives of the families in business (reputation, family image, family cohesion, power protection...) (McCracken 2020). Indeed, the strategic orientations of family businesses are in turn influenced by this specific mode of governance motivated by long-term goals that go beyond financial profitability objectives (Gomez-Mejia et al. 2007).

That said, family businesses are at the center of research in response to their complex nature. This complexity is proven by the multiplicity of theories that have been interested in family capitalism. In this context, we can cite the agency theory to analyze the relationship between the owner and the manager (Jensen & Meckling 1976), the stewardship theory centered on the motivations of the managers (Donaldson & Davis 1989), the theory of planned behavior which stipulates that the behavior of the individual is guided by his beliefs (Ajzen 1991), the theory of hierarchical financing based on the asymmetry of information between the external actors and the internal actors (Myers & Majluf 1984)

To illustrate and explain the different theoretical facets of our problem (the impact of the manager's culture (internal/external) on the dilemma of family businesses between managerial innovation and family tradition), we will first study the state of the art of family businesses through the explanation of recent trends in research on the management of family businesses and the study of specific managerial trends in family businesses. Then, in a second step, we will analyze the role of the leader's culture in the reconciliation of tradition and innovation within companies through the explanation of the origins of the tradition/innovation dilemma. To conclude, we will present the consequences of the specific character of family firms on the relationship between respect for tradition and innovation through a theoretical research model.

2. Mosaic of contributions discussing a specific management of a specific structure

Family businesses dominate the economic world since they represent a high percentage in the majority of economies (La porta & Lope-de-Silanes 1999). This type of entrepreneurship is currently the core of research given their uniqueness and specificity in comparison with the

classical managerial entrepreneurship. These specificities are mainly explained by the informal and unstructured mode of governance (Almaleh & Francois 2016). In this same context, Ken McCracken (2020) states in his article "The natural advantage of family businesses" that the family business is characterized by its so-called natural governance since it is based on family values and culture that are far from being studied financially.

2.1. The role of family characteristics in the typicality of the family business

Family businesses are characterized by the duality of interests as a result of the coexistence between the family driven by its socio-emotional objectives and the business driven by its economic objectives. In fact, this type of capitalism is characterized by its informal governance (Almaleh & Francois 2016) driven by the non-economic values and objectives of families in business (reputation, family image, family cohesion, power protection...) (McCracken 2020). Indeed, the strategic orientations of family businesses are in turn influenced by this specific mode of governance motivated by long-term objectives that go beyond the objectives of financial profitability (Gomez-Mejia et al. 2007). Faced with this heterogeneity, family leaders tend to favor non-economic objectives in order to defend the socio-emotional wealth of the family in business (Gomez-Mejia et al. 2007).

Indeed, the ultimate goal of family businesses is the protection of the business considered as a family heritage that must be preserved and passed on to future generations (Strike et al. 2015). That said, the specificity of family entrepreneurship lies in the favoring of long-term strategies and decisions that guarantee the preservation of family control and the maintenance of power. In fact, family leaders believe that the survival of the business is vigorously linked to the continuity of the founding family's control (Westhead 1997). In other words, family businesses avoid any decision, action or direction that may result in the loss, in whole or in part, of family power.

This protectionist vision can be explained by the socio-emotional attachment and identification of members with the company (Micelotta & Raynard 2011). In fact, the company represents for family members a set of family memories whose protection must be prioritized. That said, emotions are central to the governance of the family business.

Based on the above, the management of family businesses is informal and far from being based on financial logics that aims at the short-term profitability of the company. More precisely, the governance of family businesses favors the achievement of objectives that maximize the value and socio-emotional wealth of the family in business without focusing on the creation of financial wealth. However, despite their awareness and confirmation of the benefits of adopting structured management, family leaders are reluctant to change and favor the preservation of their own modes of governance (Bloom et al. 2013). Therefore, no one can deny the effect of the existence of the family on the management and performance of the family business.

From there, a legitimate question arises: will the force that the family character exerts on the management of the company not in turn affect its basic strategic orientations, specifically its investment policy, its financial policy as well as its transmission policy?

To better answer the above question, we will analyze in the following section the specific managerial trends of family businesses.

2.2. Managing two interfaces - family and managerial -: What constraints and challenges?

The performance and survival of family businesses are linked to the non-economic objectives of family managers (Kotey 1999). In other words, the management practices of family managers impact the strategic orientations of the firm and then influence its growth. From the above, family capitalism is characterized by a specific decision-making process influenced by the family character generated by the presence of the family entity.

2.2.1. The impact of family governance on investment decisions

Investment is an orientation that ensures the proper functioning of the organization in order to survive as much as possible. However, the investment decision is not a quick action, in fact, according to the classical financial theory, it is based on interpretable quantitative studies and analysis in order to choose the optimal option (Rigar & Majhed 2020).

In other words, managers should opt for the investment project that maximizes the value of the company and the wealth of the family shareholders. Indeed, the ultimate goal of family managers, which is to keep the family business as long as possible (Lumpkin et al. 2010), is totally in line with the performance and development objectives of the company, and since investment is one of the pillars on which these organizations rely to achieve their objective, the motives and determinants behind it should in principle be imperatively rational. Nevertheless, within the family business, the family character curbs the rationality of the investment decision in favor of the non-economic objectives of the family in business.

Indeed, emotions and relationships are always favored over any other objective in family businesses. Thus, according to Yeung (2000), informality is a decision-making tool given the difficulty of properly formalizing the hierarchical links between family members. In fact, the business is an illustration of all the values and considerations of the family, and these values and principles are undoubtedly included in the decision-making process. In fact, the decisions taken within family firms, especially their investment decisions, are not motivated by prior studies, nor are they the result of a choice made between several possibilities, but rather if they are taken out of conviction, it would certainly be because they satisfy first the aspirations and non-economic objectives of the founding family and then the financial objectives of the company.

At this level, family members who are also shareholders of the firm are very much influenced by their past experiences through previous projects in their investment decisions, so they will favor a loss of return to the detriment of a loss of control of their entity, i.e., they are more averse to loss than to gain (Tversky et al. 1988).

Indeed, family managers prioritize the independence of their company (Zellweger 2006), and this preference is a parameter of the investment, as long as the choice is made on this basis. In other words, if an investment project will cause the firm to lose its control and autonomy, family managers will not hesitate to reject it. Once the independence criterion is met, the family actors involved in the decision-making process will seek to control the risk of the project, which comes down to the family's risk aversion and their concern about putting their family assets at risk by resorting to excessive debt, for example, to finance the investment.

In fact, investment decisions are strongly influenced by the behavior and attitudes of family members (Leary & Roberts 2010). Their preferences, which generally tend towards: maintaining power, controlling risk, respecting family values, and satisfying long-term objectives such as succession and value creation, are the determinants of their investment choices, and it is at this level that the particularity of family business investment decisions lies. In other words, the socioemotional objectives of the family in business, mainly the preservation of control and transmission, conform the investment policy of the family business and its openness to the possibilities of the external environment.

In this same context, the investment policy of family businesses is conditioned by their financial constraints. Indeed, the desire to maintain power pushes family managers to limit themselves to their internal resources in order to avoid the control of creditors, so the company may miss very profitable investment opportunities in case of a lack of self-financing. In fact, the financial risk is accompanied by a risk of devaluing the human capital of family managers. Again, banks are reluctant to grant credit to family businesses since family shareholders are keen to keep the family secret. This finding aggravates the asymmetry of information and therefore increases the risk perceived by banks and financial institutions.

From there, and in order to ensure the achievement of their social objectives, family shareholders tend to sacrifice their own interests related to the distribution of dividends to allow

the financing of the company's activity. In fact, family firms are characterized by low dividend distribution. Thus, the empirical study carried out by Hirigoyen (1985) shows that the distribution of dividends within medium-sized family firms is exceptional, even abnormal. This fact is confirmed by Bruno Grandjean, Chairman of the Board of Directors of the family firm Redex: "If Redex had not been a family firm, it would not have survived the crisis because it would have been tempted to pay dividends at the very moment when it was necessary to continue investing and modernizing the production apparatus" (Michiels & Molly 2017). That said, to better detail the financial policy of family businesses, the following paragraph will analyze the influence of family character on the financial decisions of the company.

2.2.2. The impact of family objectives on the financial thinking of family businesses

The intertwining of the family's social goals and the firm's financial goals gives family firms a different specific character than non-family firms. Thus, the set of specific characteristics influences the totality of behaviors related to firm governance.

Similar to all strategic orientations of family capitalism, financial policy is also affected by the presence of the family entity (Molly 2019). In fact, the attachment of family members and the importance placed on the transmission of family wealth pushes managers to further entrench the desire to maintain control as well as prioritize decision independence within the firm.

That said, family businesses tend to favor financing arrangements that ensure the protection of family power and enable the achievement of the family's social-emotional goals in business (Zhang et al. 2002).

In fact, in order to guarantee the defense of the family legacy, managers opt for conservative financial strategies (Allio 2004). Based on this, it can be seen that internal financing comes first among the financing choices within family capitalism since it allows the protection of the dynasty (Li 2006).

Family businesses are characterized by adherence to the hierarchical financing theory (Myers & Majluf 1984), which states that internal resources are the priority choice for financing growth, followed by debt, the issuance of hybrid securities, and finally, as a last solution, the opening of the capital to new investors (Chen & Ye 2007).

However, although debt is the second solution, family businesses are characterized by a low debt ratio (Gallo et al. 2004). Indeed, the use of debt threatens the independence of the decision-making process within the company. Thus, decisions will be impacted by the requirements of the financial institution. Moreover, the conditions of financing can lead to conflicts of interest between the firm and the creditor (Jensen & Mecking 1976). Moreover, indebtedness negatively influences the financial autonomy of the enterprise and can lead to the loss of family control in the event of a fall in the ability to repay. Thus, the use of debt requires the company to declare its financial situation and its performance visions. Thus, the firm must have a clear and accurate information system, nevertheless this requirement may impact the non-economic objectives of family capitalism characterized by informational enclosure and professional secrecy.

Thus, based on the same explanations cited above, the managers of family businesses radically refuse to open up their capital to non-family investors, even if they represent an interesting opportunity for the development of the business (Gallo et al. 2004). In fact, it is considered that the company is a family affair where the outsider cannot find his place or give his opinion (Hamilton & Cheng 1990).

Based on the above, it is concluded that the financial policy of family firms is motivated mainly by the objective of maintaining the financial independence of the firm in order to guarantee the protection of the family fortune through the elimination of any option that may, probably, lead to the loss, total or partial, of the family power. Thus, the impact of the presence of the family entity depends mainly on the nature of the family, the concentration of power as well as the importance given to socio-emotional objectives (Romano et al. 2000). In fact, the financial risk is accompanied by a risk of devaluation of the human capital of family leaders.

In conclusion, we believe that the financial policy of family firms is strongly influenced by the specific character generated by the presence of the family entity. In fact, the interest allocated to the protection of family control curbs the recourse to external financing since it can threaten the concentration of power in the hands of the family. Thus, shareholders tend to favour the interests of the firm over their own interests by sacrificing the distribution of dividends. This sacrifice is motivated mainly by the desire to protect the family legacy to be passed on to future generations. From this point of view, it is legitimate to wonder about the effect of the new challenges of succession on the performance of family businesses.

2.2.3. A theoretical look at the impact of succession challenges on the performance of family businesses

According to Bennedsen et al. (2010), a firm is considered family-owned if the family holds a significant share of the capital and voting rights related to control. Again, the family character depends on the preferences of preservation of the business so that it will be transmitted to future generations. Indeed, the family business is seen as an inheritance that the family holds and that must be passed on from one generation to the next. However, the performance of the family business decreases significantly after succession (Bloom & Van Reenen 2010).

In fact, the ratio of growth and investment opportunities is more significant for companies that are not yet inherited. In fact, the 2nd generation is generally more risk averse, in other words, it is less courageous in seizing opportunities that could promote the growth of the company. This comes back to the desire to preserve the heritage founded by the antecedents and therefore the guarantee of the survival of the family firm. In fact, the successor generations are more open to indebtedness since they are less attached to power, but they only go into debt to finance operations or increase cash flow and not to invest. As a result, the company is in a situation of underinvestment.

Indeed, the main impact of the transmission is the stagnation of wealth. Thus, the successors do not seek the growth of the company but rather its preservation and survival. That said, the successor generations tend to structure the management of the enterprise more to guarantee the continuity of the operation.

Indeed, this drop in performance is also due to the lack of preparation of the transmission since, for the most part, the eldest member of the family is automatically the successor without checking whether he or she has the required skills and qualities. This lack of preparation can also amplify family conflicts as a result of the involvement of third generation cousins. In turn, these conflicts threaten the performance of the family business and even its survival. In this same context, studies done by Jing Melanie Xi in 2015 showed that only 30% of businesses successfully pass on to the second generation and only 10% survive to the third generation.

Indeed, the implementation of a process of transmission of the family business requires many regulatory and legal provisions. Thus, many disciplines are intertwined: economics, finance (analyzing the financing decisions of the transmission, strategic management, management (managing change), law, taxation (the choice of a transmission technique is influenced by taxation). This being said, and faced with disciplines that he does not master adequately, the manager often finds himself unable to decide and therefore gives up preparing a succession plan.

The situation is even worse when the founder has several descendants. Indeed, he is obliged to choose the successor among them. Then, for fear that his children will misinterpret this act (favorism) the head of the company will constantly postpone the discussion on the transmission of the company. The postponement of transmission can also be explained by the fact that the manager can feel eternal, so the transmission of the company is often considered as the end of a dynamic era. "Giving up what was the reason for living and entering into the ultimate certainty

(death)" is a very difficult decision to take and can therefore be the subject of reluctance, even unconscious.

3. Analysis of empirical work on the cultural impact on the clash between innovation and tradition in family businesses

Often associated with respect for tradition, and paternalism...family entrepreneurship has long been the victim of a negative image. In fact, the surviving family business, thanks to its specificities (value and culture specific to the family, long term horizon, weight of the family in the management and control...) is reputed to be part of the tradition that privileges the routines responsible for the old victories, while avoiding change and innovation. As a result, social representations of the perennial family business rarely associate it with innovation rather than tradition. Contrary to popular belief, however, innovation is not the prerogative of non-family businesses. Like nonfamily businesses, family businesses innovate, as shown by the many examples of long-lasting family businesses (Bouygues, Toyota, Adidas, Hermès, Michelin, etc.) that have succeeded in establishing themselves in their respective sectors while ensuring their longevity, thanks in particular to their capacity for innovation. In order to better analyze this dilemma, we will begin by studying the effect of the family character on managerial innovation and then analyze the role of the manager's culture in its reconciliation.

3.1. Towards an innovative family business: what constraints?

The specificities of family business management analyzed in the previous paragraph lead us to wonder about the effect of the presence of the family entity on managerial innovation in this type of entrepreneurship. Nevertheless, the behavior of family firms in terms of managerial innovation is an area of research that has not yet been studied. Indeed, the field of entrepreneurship/innovation constitutes less than 5% of the work on family businesses (Temri 2018).

In this context, we distinguish between three different frames of reference in the literature on innovation in family businesses. The main difference between these three logics is related to the impact of the family character on the managerial innovation of family firms.

The first current states that family businesses are characterized by their status quo. In other words, this type of capitalism is characterized by a low rate of innovation because of its immobility, inertia and risk aversion. Thus, for the proponents of this approach, innovation is less sustained in family firms due to these conservative characteristics (Naldi et al. 2007; Schulze et al. 2001, 2003).

The second is opposed to the first in that it supports the idea that family businesses are more innovative, creative and proactive than non-family businesses (Ward 1997; Zahra 2005). According to this approach, the specific character of family businesses and the promotion of their non-economic objectives constitute a competitive advantage that enables them to introduce change more fluidly thanks to family cohesion.

Based on the above, the 3rd framework resulting from the work of Bloch et al. (2009, 2010, 2012) supports the adoption of an intermediate approach according to which family firms are characterized by a specific culture that guarantees more measured risk-taking and therefore more rational managerial innovations than non-family firms (Zahra et al. 2004; Carney 2005). These works are based on the resource theory, paying more attention to the family/firm interaction that generates sustainable competitive advantages, some of which represent key factors for the development of a sustainable innovation strategy; mainly the emphasis is put on the long term, the stability of external relations, the low cost of capital, the low debt ratio, the values and the corporate culture, the trust and the stewardship of the leaders (Arrégles et al. 2010).

Based on this, family businesses face a complex dilemma between maintaining traditions and the need for innovation. Indeed, family managers avoid unmeasured risk-taking in order to

balance the process of exploration by favoring family values associated with a pragmatic dynamic of insertion/construction of their environment. Thus, the search for sustainability, which represents a responsibility towards future generations for whom the company is a family legacy, curbs any change considered as risk-taking in order to avoid jeopardizing the survival of the company (Gomez-Meija et al. 2007).

Indeed, the management of innovation within family capitalism is characterized by a strong involvement of managers, little formalism, pragmatism, a long-term horizon, strong values and culture, the importance of learning related to sustainability, low risk-taking ... which give the "prudential" character to managerial innovations of family businesses (Saibi 2012).

In fact, the above allows us to highlight the role of traditions in guaranteeing the sustainability of the company and which is reflected in the accumulated experience, know-how, culture and values specific to this type of company (Bloch et al. 2009, 2012).

As a result, the perennial family business is subject to a tension that can highlight two contradictory and indissociable logics: tradition and managerial innovation. From then on, it is appropriate to ask ourselves the question of how to manage this paradox and how to reconcile these two logics which, at first glance, seem antagonistic.

3.2. The role of the leader's culture in reconciling managerial innovation and traditions within the family business

Family firms are characterized by their high performance and higher average profitability than non-family firms (Charreaux 1991; Allouche & Amann 1997), a low debt ratio (Gallo & Vilaseca 1996; Allouche & Amann 1997; Mahérault 1998) and a better self-financing capacity (Allouche & Amann 1997). This, combined with a policy of low dividend distribution (Hirigoyen 1984; Mahérault 1998; Calvi-Reveyron 2000), is then reinvested in the growth of family assets. Based on this, the existence of the family, mainly the family manager, has a positive influence on the durability of the firm by favoring investments that create long-term value. In this same context, the empirical study carried out by Vigoureux in 1997 states that when the functions of management, control and ownership are separated, the managerial behavior of the family firm becomes more structured, innovative, proactive but more risky. In other words, family businesses perform better when they are led by a family member than when the responsibility lies with an external manager.

Indeed, the involvement of family leaders is characterized by the presence of the emotional factor, since their success, reputation and personal well-being depend to a large extent on the fate of the company (Davis et al. 1996; Miller & Le Breton-Miller 2006; Gomez-Mejia et al. 2007). Thus, family business leaders/priorities would be driven by a sense of altruism favoring the interests of the business and family members over their own interests (Schulze et al. 2003).

In fact, according to Zahra (2005), the altruism, the influence of the culture that characterizes the managers/owners of this type of capitalism and the longevity of the control/management structures have a positive impact on the risk-taking of family entrepreneurship. This also encourages them to allocate the necessary resources to innovation, thus stimulating the exploration of new activities that can promote investments capable of creating new distinctive skills. Thus, several studies (Miller et al. 2006; Anderson et al. 2003) have shown that, in terms of resource allocation, family firms tend to sacrifice their own interests in order to reinvest a larger share of their profits than their non-family counterparts.

Indeed, it would seem that the culture of innovation adapts to that of the firm, motivated mainly by the culture of the family in business. According to Mignon (2009), the invariants composed of values and cultural variables specific to the family in general and to the manager in particular play the role of filters leading to the orientation of innovations in the direction of the durability of firms and the protection of the family heritage. For his part, Zahra et al. (2004), following the comparison between family and non-family firms, demonstrated that a group

culture (characterized by trust and the exchange of ideas) that is open, decentralized and oriented towards the long-term is conducive to the development of entrepreneurial activities. In other words, a family leader with an open culture is conducive to entering new markets and developing new businesses.

This being said, although tradition, which is embodied in the accumulated experience, know-how, culture and identity of the firm, can result in rigidities that inhibit any desire for innovation and learning, particularly when the family firm persists in responding to new problems with these good old practices, this attachment to history and the past influences the innovation process (Teece et al. 1997). In effect, the firm limits itself to its already acquired heritage of competence in order to innovate.

Thus, according to this logic, the innovation process is based on the routines and know-how existing within the family business, and is part of a cumulative phenomenon, the product of a heritage that determines its innovation trajectory (Dosi et al. 1994; Teece 1997; Nelson & Winter 1982). As a result, we no longer speak of a break with the existing and the past but rather of continuity.

Indeed, all of these analyses bring us back to the key concept of "routines" characterizing family firms that are attached to their own ways of doing things in order to guarantee respect for the cultural values of the leader. In fact, family firms acquire over time, thanks to the experience of the management team, managerial customs and habits that influence the way the firm manages its innovation (Teece 1997). Indeed, these routines constitute a unique set that explains the family organization's solutions to innovation problems. However, it should be noted that the specificity of family businesses, characterized by the favoring of traditions, hinders the acquisition of new managerial modes.

Based on the above, the successful implementation of managerial innovation requires the establishment of a learning process based on experience, hence the value of tradition and the past. In other words, tradition and managerial innovation become complementary thanks to the moderation of the culture and values of the leader. Therefore, good innovation management is linked to the creation of new ways of doing things and the improvement of old efficient routines.

In short, the innovation process is oriented and structured by the weight of tradition in the family business, the desire to preserve its brand image, the altruism and culture of the manager/owner, and the concern to influence the long-term horizon. This explains the strategy of prudent innovation that this type of capitalism adopts and which protects it from getting lost in practices that are too risky. Thus, far from being contradictory, it seems that tradition and innovation are rather complementary. As Dumoulin and Simon's (2008a) title so aptly states, innovation and tradition represent "two sides of the same coin." Far from being a nostalgia for the past, tradition motivated by the culture of the leader seems to be a source of dynamics that guarantees not only evolution through innovation but also its orientation to ensure the sustainability of family businesses.

4. Discussion and conclusion

Family businesses are characterized by their uniqueness generated by the divergence of interests between the different stakeholders: Family, Shareholders, Managers... Indeed, family members tend to favor their non-economic objectives related to the socio-affective wealth of the family in business. In this context, our study has shown that the favoring of these family objectives can prevent managerial innovation because of the attachment to cultural traditions. Nevertheless, reconciliation is possible since the two aspects can complement each other.

Thus, the evaluation of family businesses is not only done through the results and economic objectives but also through the socio-affective objectives of the family in business. Social-emotional wealth can be represented in several ways: the satisfaction of belonging needs, emotions, and intimacy (Kepner 1983) and especially the respect of the family's cultural values

and traditions. Often, the failure of the business to meet non-economic goals and expectations can be seen as a failure of the business itself for the family, in this sense family leaders continually ensure that these goals are prioritized over the profitability of the business.

At the strategic level, studies in this regard have shown that family businesses in particular make major strategic decisions based not only on an economic logic but rather on a logic of preserving social-emotional wealth, which makes them unique from other managerial firms.

Indeed, for family businesses, the choice of financing is a rather complicated issue because - in contrast to managerial businesses - the choice of financing is subject to several constraints, among them the refusal of recourse to debt as a means of financing since the latter limits the financial autonomy of the business on the one hand and affects family control on the other hand (Sonnenfeld et al. 1989)

The pecking order theory (Myers 1984) states that there is a certain hierarchy in the choice of financing among firms, since this hierarchy begins with self-financing as the optimal choice, followed by debt and, towards the end, the issue of new shares. The logic of financial management in family businesses is different from that in non-family businesses, since the latter is motivated by several reasons, mainly the maintenance of family control. This implies the refusal of any choice that could influence this control unless the company could not finance itself by any means.

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