On detail* and its conceptualizations[1]

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Abstract

The 'detail' of social action was a founding preoccupation for ethnomethodology and conversational analysis [EMCA]. EMCA proceeded to write a critique of and alternate to the conceptual habits of normative social science, and each [EM and CA] addressed the play of 'constitutive detail' in the organizations of social action, structure, and common understanding.[2] At the same time, 'detail' is among the perfectly ordinary words that social science relies upon for the familiarity and fluency of its professional discourse. Garfinkel assigned to it and other familiar natural–language borrowings an asterisk [detail*, order*, structure*, methods* reason*, etc.], to alert the reader that he intends a 'tendentious' usage

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2   The phrase, 'the organization of social action, structure, and common understanding' doesn't fully account for Garfinkel's interests in detail*, a central one of which is with the 'things' of ordinary society:

> How in the unavoidable midst of ordinary, immortal society, and therein just in any actual case is the congregationally witnessable coherence of the most ordinary things in the world made in the details in and as of their empirical generality. (2002:139)

The surrounding text is taken up with such things as traffic waves, queues and the orderliness of the plenum. But his studies also clearly take up members' methods for leveraging account-able worlds of common understanding, the practical actions that achieve them and, thereby, structure's recurrences. (1967: 30–31).

(Garfinkel, 2002: 197; see especially 146n). As a covering account, he was pointing to the occasioned detail* of the temporal–material productions of ordinary actions and objects, an order of detail* that, while in plain view, had escaped the notice of social science. In the bargain, diverse grammars and laic methods of common understanding, and thus action, order and recurrence, were lost as well. EMCA studies began—and begin—with single settings and occasions, and yielded, for conversational analysis, collections of an array of sequential organizations. The alternate renderings of 'detail' that we find in this paper's exhibits, and the relationships of those cases to the collections they join, are its central topics.

INTRODUCTION

In his 1983 comparative assessment of CA and Discourse Analysis, Stephen Levinson notes how CA's findings

> … are not in themselves, perhaps, of a very surprising sort, but… these apparently disparate little facts about conversation all fit together in a systematic way, and it is only then that one can begin to see that conversation is in fact an elaborate and detailed architecture. (1983: 296)

We can use the turn-taking paper's "14 observables" as a stand–in for those 'little and systematic' facts–in–detail [and they get 'little-er' still]. None of them is arcane or theoretically imagined; they were matters that simply hadn't been noticed or treated with interest, and have now sustained continuous and revealing study of conversation's sequential productions of social action and order, in detail*. Detail*, for EMCA, is thus detail of a kind, and there are other, more familiar kinds, as in the detail of forensic study, computer code, or archeological excavations, detail as closely rendered inventories.

These more familiar notions of 'detail' tend to stand on behalf of an additive or pointillist conceptualization of an image progressively revealed. They are emblematic of the sense of 'detail' in common parlance, and also in social science, whereby if 'all the detail' were recovered and accounted for, each in its place, 'the whole' would come into view. There is no doubting the serviceability or discipline of this order of detail in many domains of practical and professional inquiry.

But detail* in EMCA is not in pursuit of additive or reconstructed assemblages. EMCA isn't awaiting the materialization of an image from puzzle parts. Rather, it works from detail conceptually, and we can say that for EMCA detail* and its conceptualization own a reflexive, documentary relationship. Detail* opens conceptualization, and conceptualization shapes how we take interest in this detail* for the 'what more' it may be showing us.[3]

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3   Examples in the literature abound, as in the order of the repair space, preference organization, person and place reference, or the order of four–way traffic signs, occasioned maps, and the work of suspending normal turn–taking that enables the telling of stories, as seen in the first exhibit. (See also Schegloff [1992, v. 1: xvii] on Sacks' early work at the LA Suicide Prevention Center, and how he came to see the organizations, or grammars, whereby a caller, on hearing the called offer her name, would offer, or not, her own in return. Schegloff finds in this work the beginning of 'what would come to be called conversation analysis' [sic].)

Rather than pursuing these alternates in a programmatic fashion, I want to turn to a well–known exemplar in Sacks' treatment of the telling of a 'dirty joke' in a group therapy session of adolescent boys (Sacks, 1974, and Sacks, 1992, v. 2, part VII: lectures 9–12). It is a *tour de force* of single case analyses, as he explicates the character of tellings, their contingent sequential and distributional organizations, and the account–ability of the 'told' in the de-tail* of these productions, among many other topics.

THE SEQUENCE

The fragment presented below shows the first work of securing the agreement of the group to Ken's telling of a story told to him by his younger sister. It reminds us that not only tellings, but proposals—and agreements—to 'tell' may take more than a single turn to achieve. It begins with Ken's repaired first turn (repaired from an 'ask' to an announcement), followed by pre-emptive proposals as to what it could be about, and a general heckling about its newsworthiness. Ken proceeds to fend them off while laying out the narrative premise of the story, before the suspension of the normal turn taking that permits the telling is achieved.[4]

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 1  Ken:    You wanna hear muh- Eh my sister told me a story last night.
 2  Roger:  I don'wanna hear it. But if you must.
 3          (0.7 )
 4  Al:     What's purple en 'n island. Grape, Britain. That's what 'iz
 5          si//ster-
 6  Ken:    No: . To stun me she says uh (0 . 8) There wz these three girls
 7          'n they jis got married?
 8  Roger:  ehhh// hehh hhh hhh
 9  Ken:            A::nd uh
10  Roger:  Hey waita seco(h)nd.
11  Al:     [heh!
12  Roger:  Drag that by again… hehh I I hehh
13  Ken:    There-
14  Ken:    There wz these three g!:rls. En they were all sisters. En
15          they'd jis got married tuh three brothers.
16  Roger:  You better have a long talk with yer sister…[5]
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4   My discussion relies on the readers' familiarity with these materials. What is presented here shows how Ken's proposal to tell his sister's story/joke proceeds through refusals, counter–proposals, a first installment, false starts, repeats, asides and a second beginning [see lines 2, 4, 6, 9, 10 and 14], and then re-begins in line 32, or perhaps 30 [see footnote 6]. The treatment, as so much of Sacks' work, shows us his alternations between the technical and the conceptual, and the tie between the order–productive material detail* of social action and the grammars of action this detail* may bring into view.

5   The sequence continues:

Hopefully this much of the transcript is enough to remind us of the play of detail* and conceptualizations that yield his treatment. That, for example, it's a story from Ken's sister that he's proposing to tell to others, that it is immediately heard as a joke's telling, as evidenced by counter proposals for what the joke might be, fitted to what a younger sister might tell her older brother, and how the premise of 'three sister who got married' is available for demonic membership readings, and so too for the three brothers, and how the parties are doing this work as the work of assembling the suspended turn–taking space for Ken to tell it [which they do, and he does]. Sacks presents the transcript as the un–folding constitutive detail* of these grammars in play. His "Notes on methodology" speak of conversation's order as "… another grammar. And grammar, of course, is the model of routinely observable closely ordered activities." (1984:225). The formulation is at the intersection of sociology and natural language.[6]

This detail in Sacks' treatment is neither deconstructive nor pointillist. It is conceptual and grammatical, and in the presence of the transcript and his account of it, we begin to see

```
17  Ken:    Waita waita // minute
18  Roger:  Oh: // three brothers.
19  Al:     eheh
20  Al:     eh // heh!
21  Ken:    A::nd uh, so
22  Al:     The brothers of these sisters.
23  Ken:    No they're different- mhh // hh
24  Al:     heh
25  Ken:    Y'know different families. // (No link-up.)
26  Roger:  Th's clo:ser th'n before, // hhh
27  Ken:    [So-
28  Al:     heh! hh hh
29          (0.7)
30  Ken:    Quiet.
31  Al:     hh hh // hhhh
32  Ken:    So:, first'v all, that night, they're on their::: honeymoon the- uh
33          mother in law says- (to 'em) well why don'tcha all
34          spen'th'night here en then you c'n go on yer honeymoon in th'morning…
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6   A thoughtful reviewer asked how Sacks' analyses and descriptions of the group therapy sequence are 'grammatical'. My discussion is tied to his 1984 remarks cited above, and there are certainly other, and perhaps more familiar treatments of natural–language grammars through Ryle (1954), Winch (1958) and Wittgenstein (1968, *passim*). (There are two brief references to Wittgenstein in Sacks' published lectures, both in volume one (see v. 1, p. 26 [Fall 1964)] and p. 518 [Winter 1967].) Sacks' notion of 'grammars of action' shows an alignment of social action and natural language that marks a leading edge of EM studies post *Studies* (cf., Coulter, 1991; Jayyusi, 1984; Lynch, 1993, *passim*). (Examples of such grammars are addressed in the paragraph to which this footnote is attached and in the footnote that follows.) The proximate answer to the reviewer's question may be that grammars of social action through natural language are at play in assembling account–able worlds (Garfinkel, 1967), including things like telling–and–hearing jokes and stories in their occasioned productions.

it too. The play of this detail* is inseparable from EMCA's conceptual register, and I want to consider it further in the next two exhibits.[7]

LOTTIE AND EMMA, AGAIN

'Detail' has also been a central topic in the exchanges between the 'epistemic analytic framework' (Raymond, G., 2018) and its critics in these last few years, and I want to pursue its play through two sequences, the first of which was discussed in the 2016 special issue of *Discourse Studies* (see Macbeth and Wong, 2016).[8, 9] In different ways, issues of detail are alive in each, and each ties to questions of how the conceptualization of detail unavoidably leads the analysis, and how there may well be very different conceptualizations, and thus very different accounts of, interests in, and use for the detail of a sequence.

The first sequence has to do with two turns between two sisters, one of whom has just returned from a visit to Palm Springs and is rhapsodizing about the house she stayed in. In taking it up, my aim is not simply to re–visit the 2016 discussion, but to leverage some issues of 'detail' that follow from a rather stringent rebuttal by Professors Clift and C. Raymond in their contribution to the 2018 rebuttal issue of *Discourse Studies*.

The sequence is lifted from a 55 minute phone call transcribed by Gail Jefferson, whose transcript runs in excess of 1450 lines. Two of its turns are presented and briefly discussed by Heritage (2011) and Heritage and Raymond (2005) as follows:

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7   In his continuing treatment of the joke sequence he notes, among other things, how 'there's a puzzle–solution form which is fitted to the joke form such that the solution to the puzzle matches the arrival at the joke's punch-line' (Lecture 9, v. 2: p. 473), and his Lecture 11 concludes with a stunning treatment of how a 'dirty joke' for a group of 12 yr. old girls may possess a storied coherence that adolescent boys [and professional readers] simply cannot hear. In places, how his remarks tie to transcript is not always easy to say [see lecture 10, beginning bottom of 481 on this joke's punchline as a 'squelching']. Yet each is leveraged from the detail* of a keen member's hearing. As Schegloff remarks of CA's development, "We'll never know what discipline it would have turned into had he still been alive" (Raymond, Lerner & Heritage, 2017: 27).

8   In the 2018 rebuttal to the 2016 special issue of *Discourse Studies*, Heritage strenuously objected to the critics' characterization of an 'Epistemic program'. (See also Steensig and Heinemann's 2016 commentary). In his rebuttal remarks, G. Raymond (2018) speaks of an 'analytic framework' instead. Accordingly, this text will speak of the epistemic analytic framework, or EAF.

9   Lynch [personal communication] identifies in Sacks' "Notes on methodology" (1984) a first formulation of EMCA, or "ethnomethodology/conversation analysis". The 'Notes' were assembled and edited by Gail Jefferson, and the expression may have been hers. Through the early 1980s, the phrase 'conversational analysis' was in use. Today of course it is 'conversation analysis' (Lynch also notes that neither phrase will be found in Sacks's *Lectures*, nor in Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson, 1974). Watson (1994) takes up a telling difference between them: the earlier phrase designates a topic, 'namely interlocutors' own conjoint and culturally methodic analyses of their conversational actions.' The contemporary phrase can be seen as 'an analytically privileged 'special technique' cut loose from these commonsense conversational operations' (1994: 178). The difference he points to is alive throughout this paper; it is especially visible in the alternate analyses of its exhibits.

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1  LOT:  h h Jeeziz Chris' you sh'd see that house E(h)mma yih'av
2        ↓no idea.h[hmhh
3  EMM:         [I bet it's a drea:m.
```

The accompanying text tells us:

> Patently lacking the resources to enter into a direct appreciation of the house by the very terms of Lottie's assessment, Emma aligns with Lottie's evaluation by means of a subjunctive expression of her likely evaluation, thereby achieving a simulacrum of agreement. (Heritage, 2011:160; see also Heritage and Raymond, 2005:17).

The account is emblematic of epistemic asymmetry, as the authors argue that one party–Emma–'has no access' to what the other–Lottie–has experienced, and how this differential access sets in play an 'epistemic gradient' as a 'driver' of turn design and sequential order (Heritage, 2012).[10]

In 2016 we re-analyzed the sequence (Macbeth and Wong, 2016) and raised several questions about the transcript and its treatment. The central issues were these:

a)   that Emma's turn was incompletely transcribed;
b)   that in the presence of Emma's full turn, we could find no support for the characterization of her "complete lack of access" to the matters Lottie was assessing, nor for the characterization of Emma's turn as a "simulacrum of agreement", and
c)   that there was ample evidence elsewhere to suggest otherwise.

As for Jefferson's transcript, it can be found in TalkBank ["swimming nude"], with an audio record running 42 minutes. And there you will find Emma's next turn—now lines 76–77—transcribed like this:

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74  Lot:  ⌊h h⌋Jeeziz Chrise shu sh'd see that house
75        E(h)mma yih'ay ↓no idea.h[hmhh
76  Emm:                       [I bet it's a drea:m. <Wih the
77        swimming POO:L ENCLO:SED⌈HU:H↗
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You will also find the full turn in Sacks, 1992, though names have been changed; Emma is now Agnes, and Lottie is Portia, and his interest is in Portia's following turn.

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10   As we noted, the EAF account of an epistemic asymmetry, and thus a 'simulacrum of agreement', seemed to rely on a literal hearing of Lott's phrase "you have no idea". We heard an idiomatic expression instead, and a sequence wherein a first idiomatic expression was met with a next: 'it must be a dream' (see 2b).

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Agnes:   I bet it's a dream, with the swimming pool enclosed huh?
Portia:  Oh God, we hehh! we swam in the nude Sunday night until about two
         o'clock.
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<div align="right">*Transcript 2c (Sacks, 1992: v. 2 lecture 7, Spring 1970, p. 275).*[11]</div>

Pomerantz (1984:97) produces a similar transcript [original names], but with a difference.

```
L:   Jeeziz Chris' shu sh'd see that house E(h)mma yih av
     ↓no idea.h[hmhh
E:              [I bet it's a drea:m …
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<div align="right">*Transcript 2d*</div>

Here we find Emma's turn annotated with an ellipsis, suggesting there is more to it than we see.[12]

We couldn't account for the transcripts showing Emma's lesser turn. But trying to make sense of them led us to note how frequently we, all of us, work from prior materials by cutting and pasting, rather than listening to them. And as an important aside, I want to note that in our work developing the 2016 special issue, we often found it difficult to access tapes and transcript, finding that they were not available for distribution, or were privately held, or held by others on instruction that they not be shared. And in this I want to flag a troubling departure from the precedent of open access established by Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson, and the very idea, through Sacks, that if one wanted to disagree with an analysis, one could

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[11]   Sacks' interests here are with Portia's 'hehh!' and the grammatical work it does in framing the account that is about to be produced.

> Now what I take it that "hehh!" is doing, and what I take it a bunch of "hehh"s are doing is something like this: Something is about to be reported which the teller takes it that the hearer should know what the teller's attitude towards it is. The kind of event being reported could be specifically equivocal as to whether it is something awful, embarrassing, serious, non-serious, etc. And there are ways for the teller to let the recipient know which the teller thinks it is, so as to guide the recipient in figuring out what's happening, and also in figuring out things about the teller's participation. So, for example, in the report about swimming in the nude, by using "hehh! " before reporting it she's saying "I took it lightly." Where it could be read as a kind of obscene event, it is rather to be treated as something light-hearted. It was funny. Where it perhaps could be important for the teller to have the recipient know or believe that the teller thought it was that sort of thing. (1992, v. 2: 275).

> In its production, her 'hehh!' is in this way grammatical, rather than, say, informational or epistemic, and is a matter of what 'anyone' could hear.

[12]   The ellipsis is no less significant for Pomerantz's treatment, as the sequence is part of a collection intended to show how parties "may proffer a qualified assessment of the referent assessed in the prior, marking the assessment as based on other than direct access". 'Direct access' thus figures in both her and the EAF accounts.

do so *through* the materials. But of course one must have access *to* the materials to do so. Schegloff's archive is exemplary of this openness.

However the transcribing came to pass, when we hear the tape and see the full turn, Emma clearly knows something of the house, and she knows on other grounds as well. Earlier in their conversation, she clearly knows the Palm Springs area and its landmarks, and we produced several lines from Jefferson's transcript to show how this is so, with a footnote indicating that "The transcript we present here reduces some of the detail and symbols used by Jefferson in her original transcript" [our footnote 4].

Here's a portion of that reduced sequence:

```
43  Emm:   = Oh: honey I bet the house is beautiful.hu:h?
44  Lot:   °Oh::: God Emma.°
45         (.)
46  Lot:   °Jeeziz.° Ho:w lu:cky.h
47         (.)
48  Emm:   Mm::::.
49  Lot:   Yih'av no idea it's right across the street from the::: El
50         Torrero.
51  Emm:   Oh::::.
52  Lot:   Ye:ah.
53  Emm:   Oh not near the Indian We:lls…
```

Transcript 2e (CABank/Jefferson/NB:IV:10:R/21swimnude.cha)

We noted two things: we first hear Lot's use of the idiomatic expression 'you have no idea' in line 49, which we find again in the two–turn sequence. In our view, the subsequent two-turn sequence shows an *exchange* of such expressions, and neither struck us as literal assessments ['it must be a dream']. We also noted how, in addition to knowing the house has a pool, Emma knows the area and its place names (line 53), and is surprised to hear Lot's place reference (line 51). In brief, this was our critique of the claim that Emma had 'no access' to Lottie's account of her experience there.[13] But it was our 'reduced transcript', and line 51 especially, that bore the brunt of the Clift and Raymond (2018) rebuttal.

A CRITIQUE IN RETURN

Our 2016 discussion of this sequence was critically taken up by Clift and Raymond (2018) where 'detail' is central to both discussions, though in very different keys. Professors Clift and Raymond (2018) raised several issues with our treatment, but the incompleteness of the two–turn transcript was not one of them. One issue had to do with our critique of the formulation of Emma's "simulacrum of agreement". Clift and Raymond vigorously made the

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13   Lynch [personal communication] notes further how 'proposing that Emma has 'no access" runs aground on how Lottie is 'reflexively appealing to and elaborating upon that very 'access' as the conversation unfolds'.

case that there can be many forms of agreement, weak or strong, enthusiastic or diffident, and of course we completely agree.

There are endlessly many forms of agreement, assessment, complaint, compliment, greeting, second greeting, wry remark, etc., each produced in the fine durations of its constitutive detail* [of which a favorite is in Jefferson's (1978) title phrase "What's in a 'Nyem'", as when leaving the theater and a friend asks 'What'd ya' think?']. So there's no doubt or question about those gradations. But that was not our question. It was rather: is the finding of a 'simulacrum of agreement' a *members' measure*, evidenced by the parties in their demonstrable orientations, or the privileged expression of an over–hearing analyst? *That* was our question—it still is—and we thought it was the latter.

But a more insistent issue for Clift and Raymond, stinging really, had to do with how in the above sequence from Jefferson [2e] we said we were using a "reduced" version of her original transcript. And we were. There were transcription notations that were novel to us, and we found an economy of notation suitable to our purposes. The following is Jefferson's transcript, and Clift's and Raymond's central concern pertains to its line 49. [It became line 51 in our reduced version.]:

```
43  Emm:  =↑Oh: honey I bet the house is beautiful.hu:h?
44  Lot:  °Oh::: God Emma.° (.)
45  Lot:  °Jeeziz.°Ho:w lu:cky.h (.)
46  Emm:  Mm::::.
47  Lot:  Yih'av no idea it's right across the street from thë::: El
48        Torrer+o.
49  Emm:  ·t Oh:↑::↓::+::.
50  Lot:  Ye:ah.
51  Emm:  Oh not near the Indian W+e:lls. (1.0)
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Transcript 2f

And here are the two versions of line 49/51—Jefferson's and ours—side by side:

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Jefferson                              Reduced
49  Emm:  ·t Oh:↑::↓::+::.             51  Emm:  Oh:::.
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A stirring case was then made for the deficiency of our treatment, for having elided the 'dental click' in Jefferson's line 49, along with the "non–modal voice quality" and "a very distinctive rising/falling intonation" (Clift and Raymond, 2018: 106). We were sternly held to account for the dereliction:

> Macbeth and Wong's (2016) evident approval of, in their words, 'the disciplined work of writing production accounts that are faithful to the occasion's evident detail' (p. 592, fn. 2) sits oddly, to say the least, with their assertion that 'The transcript we present here... reduces some of the detail and symbols used by Jefferson in her original transcript' (Macbeth and Wong, 2016: 592, fn. 4). (Clift and Raymond, 2018:106)

And further,

> Cavalier disregard for 'detail and symbols' cannot but have analytic implications. (Clift and Raymond, 2018:107)

There is much to think about here, but I want to turn it in a different direction, and begin with the notion of a 'reduced transcript' and how it was used. We used it as a practical account of how our analysis proceeded; though we had the audio record and Jefferson's transcript, there were notations we did not reproduce. As best as we understood them, our purposes did not have need for them. We were pointing to something else, and there is ample precedent in the literature.[14]

I also want to note how the Clift and Raymond critical rejoinder has everything to do with an un-articulated binary pair: the complaint is leveraged on behalf of an absence standing in the shadows of a 'reduced transcript'. The absent part is something like, 'the complete transcript'. And with that phrase we run headlong into something like 'the real and objective transcript', and from there to the formal–analytic dream of 'literal description'. Its impossibilities have long been known (cf., Kaplan, 1964; Taylor, 1970; Wilson, 1970; see Schegloff (1988) for a discussion through Max Weber). The idea of 'literal description' is joined at the hip to the promise of 'induction', meaning that if 'all the facts' were well enough on display the objects and answers of our pursuit would reveal themelves.

But induction, or 'naïve induction', runs aground on the primacy of conceptualization, or how observation—and perception itself—is a conceptual matter (see Coulter and Parsons, 1991; Coulter and Sharrock, 1998). To sum the point with economy, shall we regard our first exhibit—Sacks' treatment of the telling of the joke—as a 'reduced transcript'? Take a look.

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14   Over the years various transcripts in the literature have been marked as 'FN', or field notes. These are heard but un–recorded materials (and are reduced in that way). See, for examples, Heritage, 1984:299 exhibit 1, Pomerantz, 1984: 84, exhibits 56 and 60 and footnote 6 on p. 97. See also multiple usages in Schegloff, Sacks and Jefferson, 1977: p. 368, exhibit 30, p. 369, footnote 15, exhibit (b) and p. 373, exhibit 58. So also Schegloff, 1996: 184 exhibit 9 (EAS:FN) and Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson 1974: 716 exhibit 17. Each is identified with a closing tag of 'FN'. Schegloff (2007:65) has also had occasional use for 'simplified' transcript, as in his footnote 3:

```
1  B:  And uh the- Uh if you'd care to come over and visit a little
2      while this morning, I'll give you a cup of coffee.
3  A:  hehh! Well that's awfully sweet of you, I don't think I can
4      make it this morning, hh uhm I'm running an ad in the paper
5      and-and uh I have to stay near the phone.
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(5.08) SBL T1/S1/C10, simplified

One can well imagine many more transcript notations for this exchange. All to the point that transcripts in various forms sustain various analytic and conceptual interests. (I am indebted to Jean Wong for recovering these and other resources for this paper.)

Are his analyses as deficient as the possibilities for elaborating his transcript notations? Is *this* how revealing work is to be measured? Jefferson suggests otherwise:

> I take it that when we talk about transcription we are talking about one way to pay attention to record-ings of actually occurring events. While those of us who spend a lot of time making transcripts may be doing our best to get it right, what that might mean is utterly obscure and unstable. It depends a great deal on what we are paying attention to. It seems to me, then, that the issue is not transcription per se, but what it is we might want to transcribe, that is, attend to. (1985:25)

The alternate pointillist premise is familiar enough in social science; it underwrites efforts to repair the deficiencies of 'data sets' of every kind—including our 'reduced transcript'—to assure their accuracy and, so the promise goes, their synoptic range. I want to pursue the difference with some preliminary remarks on the topic of collections, and a fourth exhibit. Professors Clift and Raymond (2018) take up collections too, and what we can know of the cases that organize them. By their account, in the absence of the collection, it isn't too much.

COLLECTIONS

Clift and Raymond (2018) argue a genealogy of the tie of cases to the collections they assemble wherein while

> ... conversation–analytic findings are certainly answerable 'to the details of single episodes of action' (Schegloff, 1987: 102)... from a CA perspective, those details are altogether unanalyzable without refer-ence to other instances. This is due to the fact that the examination of a single case unavoidably brings to bear, on that single case, the findings and observations from examinations of collections. And thus, for practitioners of CA, collections are as analytically essential as they are unavoidable. (2018: 97)

Their discussion turns to Schegloff's (1997) remarks on the value of 'boundary cases' and concludes:

> Collections are thus the sine qua non of analysis; without them, all that remains is interpretation. [Clift and Raymond, 2018: 97]

But respectfully, I want to suggest this is an impossible genealogy. It cannot be that collections come first, or *came* first. Actual occasions do. And it cannot be that 'the details of single episodes of action' (Schegloff, 1987: 102) "are altogether unanalyzable without refer-ence to" collections. This simply flies in the face of our intellectual history, including Sche-gloff's counsel about the treatment of single cases as "episodes with their own reality" (2010). EMCA did not *begin* with collections, and to imagine so would render Sacks' lectures—per-haps the most extraordinary corpus in our literature—a raft of 'un-analyzables', idlying as "interpretation". This can't be right.

Sacks was of course working from and building a developing collection of extraordinarily revealing case materials, about members' measures, or doing being ordinary, or membership categorization—single episodes developed conceptually and thematically in directions no one had imagined before. These weren't collections as Clift and Raymond use the term. They were rather collections as in how a single conversation between Emma and Lottie of nearly 1500 lines, or Sacks' corpus of adolescent group therapy sessions, are *collections*. Indeed, Garfinkel's *Studies* (1967) is a collection too, of *studies*.

Our colleagues seem to have taken what 'collections' have commonly become, as in the EAF literature—brief sequences of two to a dozen lines, relieved of their sequential environments beyond the page margins, as the analysis of the Lottie and Emma two–turn sequence is so relieved—as though this is only and exactly what collections could be. And with that move we have an account of the development of sequential analysis that is impossible to recognize. It loses entirely Sacks' formulation of an analytic program that could "deal with the details of actual events, formally and informatively" [1984:26]. This is a conceptual, grammatical task, and there is an enduring focus on singular occasions in Sacks' corpus and pedagogy that seems well beyond Clift's and Raymond's claims for the primacy of collections. But of course, it is not as though Sacks had never seen this world before.

Clift and Raymond seem to be proceeding from a "bucket theory of detail", wherein the analytic task becomes one of 'exhausting the bucket'. (Jefferson may have pressed the promise in some of her studies of laughter [see Jefferson, 1979].) But the larger point is that collection studies do not and did not *begin* with collections. The idea elides Sacks' first work. And while archeologists clearly have use for variable grades of mesh–from fine wire to coarse–to sift the contents of their buckets, as was observed in the panel abstract accompanying this paper:

> The explication of such detail in ethnomethodology and CA is thus not a matter of pursuing smaller and smaller particles and relating them back to the larger aggregates or abstractions they index... Analytically posited detail may or may not be commensurable with details relevant to the endogenous production of [the] laic orders that our materials routinely exhibit. [IIEMCA 2019, panel on 'Detail', Mannheim, GR.]

For EMCA, detail* and its granularity are not objective measures boxed by transcription conventions. Indeed, Schegloff's (2000) discussion of "granularity" is entirely about the 'granularity' of member accounts; it is the granularity of ordinary ways of speaking, rather than professional–analytic parsings. More simply, what's missing in the Emma and Lottie treatment we addressed is a good deal more than transcript notations, in exactly the sense that understanding a turn's production as a turn within a sequence of turns—once we see the full turn—entails detail* of a different order: grammatical details* of meaning, action, sequential implication, reference, allusion and, centrally, the achievements of common understandings as they are demonstrably oriented to by the parties [as in Portia's 'hehh!']. These interests have underwritten the conceptual fabric of EMCA's extraordinary regard for detail* through Garfinkel and Sacks for a very long time. They leverage the separation of EMCA not

only from academic sociology, but from structural linguistics and Goffman too (see Schegloff, 1988b).

AMENDMENTS AND CONTESTATIONS

A last sequence, introduced with a brief prior, is also on topic of the genealogy of collections and how they shape our interests in the singular episodes that assemble them. It is an exhibit from Drew (2018) lifted from a corpus well known in the literature, one of the many exchanges between Virginia—the irrepressible American teenage wannabe adult—and her mother. [Cf. Schegloff (2005, 2007) and Sidnell (2010) for treatments and discussions.]

Drew's analysis is also on behalf of the 2018 EAF rebuttal, and how the 'ubiquity' of knowledge claims and attributions are:

a) embedded in turns and sequences;
b) inform turn design;
c) are amended in the corrections that speakers sometimes make... and;
d) are contested, in the occasional 'struggles' between participants, as to which of them has epistemic primacy.[15] [Drew, 2018: abstract]

There is a striking image here of ubiquitous organizations embedded in conversational social action that are only occasionally evidenced at its surfaces, in the parties' amendments and contestations. Absent those occasions, apparently, the parties do not see them. We can certainly agree that 'epistemic amendments and struggles' [items c and d] are indeed occasional. They sometimes happen, and the critics of the EAF have never suggested otherwise. Rather, it has been our on–going puzzlement as to how conversation's foundations—and the EAF clearly aims to articulate alternate foundations—can be leveraged on 'occasional [and thus occasioned] struggles', as though when not in view, these ubiquitous foundations were still in play, operating where the 'daemon' lives. The premise—well known in catechism and social science—seems to be that we only occasionally witness an enduring presence. EMCA has written a very different account of what the parties routinely witness and orient to, *in vivo*.

EAF studies frequently rely on morpho-syntactic forms, such as declaratives, negative interrogatives, and their alternations (Drew, 2018; Heritage, 2012, *passim)*. These formal structures have been central for parsing epistemic gradients and endowments so as to yield the status assessments that are central to the EAF project. They are presented as formal linguistic structures known in advance, and a turn's contingent production is then accounted for *through* its identification as the one or the other. (Compare to Schegloff (1984) where the identification of a question *as a question* is a sustained, sequential, and revealing course of inquiry, for members and analysts alike. Or, consider the endless forms a greeting may take.

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15   Drew (2018:180) also writes a continuum of 'benign' and less than benign 'struggles'. But perhaps more interesting than the continuum might be how a position within it would be decided in any actual case.

Neither requires a formal syntactic structure for its recognition; each is produced to be found as an apt move within its occasioned, constitutive sequential context.)[16]

The sequence of interest here is in Drew's collection of "epistemic amendments", or how, quoting Heritage (2012b), "unknowing speakers ask questions… and knowing speakers make assertions." This yields the "epistemic gradient" featured at least since 2012, and how turns that begin as K+ declaratives but are repaired to K– negative interrogatives *cede* "the primary epistemic status to the recipient" (Drew, 2018:175), as in this first sequence, where Hal receives a phone call:

```
1  Hal:  Oh 'el[lo Lesl[ie?
2  Les:  [.hhhh [I RANG you up- (.) ah: think it wz la:s' night.
3        But you were- (.) u- were you ↑ou:t?
```

Transcript 3 [#7 Field SO88(II):1:3:1] (Leslie is caller)

The repair can be seen in turn 3, and Drew presents three such sequences wherein the repair to a negative–interrogative is coded as a move from a K+ to a K– position. The fourth is the Virginia sequence and her exchange at the dinner table with her mother. The question is whether Virginia can work in sales at her mother's clothing store. The turn of interest is line 4.

```
1  Mom:  Beh- oh:, Vuhginia, we've been through this. When you're
2        old enough you ca:n work in the store.
3        (0.2)
4  Vir:  ˙hh Well Beth didn' Beth get tih work b'fore she was sixteen?=
5  Mom:  = No::! I'd- (0.2) I would let her wrap presents an' packages et
6        Christmus an:'- ºtimes we needed somebady.º ˙hh >But people
7        just don't want < (0.4) chi:ldren (0.2) waiting on[('um).
8  Vir:                                            [I'm not a chi:::ld!
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16   See Lindwall, Lymer & Ivarsson (2016), Lymer, Lindwall & Ivarsson (2017), Lynch (2018) and Macbeth (2018) for discussions of the EAF reliance on syntactical forms. Schegloff (1984) also takes a critical interest in the reliance on syntactical forms for understanding social action:

> A ready bridge is apparently before us to cross from language to social behavior, in which, it might appear, the syntax will bear the load. Though it might be conceded that no complete or neat linguistic account of questions is yet available, the relevant attributes being variously apportioned among syntax, prosody, and other resources, still it might appear that linguistic resources will allow the construction and recognition of utterances as questions, and thus as actions of a certain type. Now I think such a view is, or would be, as misleading with regard to questions as a way of bridging language and social action as it is in the case of promises. The general point is that it is misleading to start to account for such categories of action as questions, promises, and so on as the analytic objects of interest. They are commonsense, not technical, categories and should be treated accordingly. (1984:30)

The discussion continues:

> The self-correction in excerpt 10 is slightly more complex insofar as the switch to an interrogative from a declarative exploits a pivot on *didn'*; Virginia begins her turn in line 4 by seeming to declare that *Well Beth didn'* but then corrects that to go off in a different direction to ask, in a negative interrogative, *Didn' Beth get tih work ...* (176–177)

The characterization trades on a parsing of line 4, and Drew cites Clayman and Raymond (2015) on "modular pivots" to achieve it.[17] Drew also says we have a 'correction' here, but

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17   Clayman and Raymond (2015) write an "auditory and acoustic" analysis of "modular pivots". They begin from Schegloff's (1979) treatment of 'pivots' in same–turn self repairs—words or phrases that knit together the initiation and repair segments of the turn—and go on to substantially extend its range. Space doesn't permit a review, but an exhibit from Clayman and Raymond may be helpful.

```
1 Jen:  Oh: e-ye- ey list'n I:'m d<I went on the scale
2       yestee I'm ten stone now,
3       (0.5)
4 Ann:  Well now y[ou don't look it]
5 Jen:           [ T e n s t o : ]ne:.
6 Ann:  Y'don't look it Jen ah must be honest.
7 Jen:  Ah well ah mean t' say when you consider that I should be
        what izzit ei:ght' n a hahlf…
```

(Exhibit 2, 2015: 390)

Ann is replying to Jen's report that she was 'ten stone' on the scale yesterday, and Ann's turn in line 6 is treated to show how 'Y'don't look it Jen' could be a complete utterance, just as 'Jen ah must be honest' could be. Thus, 'Jen' is the modular pivot conjoining what could be two complete utterances, serving as "... the next element of the turn–so–far and the first element of the new version" (Schegloff, 1979:276). That may be so, but it's fair to ask how it works as a sequential–production account of these materials (if this is the aim). The sequential context suggests a different understanding of Ann's turn productions, and the sequence.

In line 1 Jen is distressed by her scaled weight. Her report seems to be a self–assessment, a lament, and not a brag. Ann then produces a counter assessment in line 4—'Well now you don't look it'. The reader can play out the delicacies through Pomerantz (1984) on the preference for agreement, along with what anyone knows about body image. As Jen overlaps in line 5, repeating the central phrase of her first turn ['T e n s t o :]ne:.'], Ann then repeats her overlapped mitigating assessment in line 6, and up-grades it with assurances of sincerity: 'Y'don't look it Jen ah must be honest.' Though the turn amply displays a 'pivot', where a first TCU pivots to a next, each is doing same work, as in 'That was a great dinner Jen I loved it'? But the 'pivot' in the *Virginia* sequence claimedly bridges alternate *syntactical* productions, from a declarative to a (negative) interrogative. As Lindwall and Lymer et al. (2016, 2017) and Schegloff (1984) remind us, however, there

moves on to a next sequence, and Virginia's putative pivot to the negative interrogative of *Didn' Beth get tih work...* ends the discussion.

In his prior sequences, however, and throughout the EAF, when 'declaratives' are repaired to 'negative interrogatives', it is said the turn cedes 'epistemic primacy' to the recipient. We don't find this discussion in the Virginia sequence, and I want to offer an alternate reading that may account for the difference, as of its production detail*.

It begins with how it is not clear that the turn–initial phrase of Virginia's line 4 is *Well Beth didn'...* It could be, *Well Beth...,* in which case the continuing turn does indeed show a correction [or repair] to '*Didn Beth...*' Note also the difficulty of hearing 'Well Beth didn't' as a TCU within its sequential context, and thus hearing *didn't* as a 'pivot' from a first TCU to a next.[18] We would need to hear the tape to press the question, yet it's quite clear that Virginia goes on to produce something like a 'negative interrogative'. I say 'something like' because I think we are on more secure grounds to say she asks her mother a question, about Beth, who is her older sister. And in background remarks on these materials Schegloff (2005:458) tells us that the family lives in South Carolina, that the materials were collected in the 1970s, and that sister Beth is videotaping the dinner for a college class under instructions to keep quiet while she does so. So Beth (and perhaps also their brother Wesley) is in the room too. And thus there are perhaps four parties who may know something of what has become a contested history about who's worked in the shop, how old she was, and thus who's old enough now.

So it is not simply that we have a "negative interrogative" here. That is a syntactical account. A sequential account of social action is a bit more patient. What we may have in Virginia's question is a nicely crafted 'question with a known answer', meaning here a question whose answer could be well known by Virginia, by her mother—whose question it is—*and* by others in the room too. And while most of us know of such questions through classroom

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is a sequential context for a turn's production that may well answer questions about turn and sequential order that syntactical analyses claim for themselves. To treat Virginia's sequence as a 'pivot' from one syntactical form to another is to treat the sequence relieved of its sequential production by the parties, as Ann's line 6 is so relieved. (See again Watson, 1994.) And for Virginia, the 'pivot' itself is a problematic description. A repair seems more likely.

18   There may be other contexts in which 'Well Beth didn't' could be heard as a 'complete utterance', but the sequential context of her mother's prior turn isn't one of them:

```
1  Mom:  Beh- oh:, Vuhginia, we've been through this. When you're
2        old enough you ca:n work in the store.
```

'Well Beth didn't' would be a puzzlingly next TCU in this sequential context. Instead, and in *this* environment, Virginia seems to be doing a repair on 'Well Beth...' Note also how Schegloff (2005:478; footnote 7) opens up this different hearing of Virginia's initial turn production in his stress markings on how 'Beth' is produced each time:

```
4  VIR:  · hh Well Beth didn' Beth get tih work b'fore she was sixteen?=
```

studies and how it is that teachers routinely know the answers to their questions, often enough so do mothers, lawyers, cops, doctors, philosophers, and here, teenage daughters.

Rather than 'declaring' Beth's history of work, Virginia asks about it in the presence of others who may know it quite well, and this may have something to do with her mother's exasperation that follows. So perhaps Virginia's move from 'Well Beth' to '... Didn't Beth' isn't a play on syntax; it is a play on recipient design, both for her Mom *and* Beth, and for her mother *in* Beth's presence (Sacks, et al., 1974: 727). Notwithstanding Beth's participation constraints, this is no longer a dyadic setting. It becomes a question to Mom in the presence of a knowing third party, and this can make answering delicate, as evidenced in her mother's exasperation. Virginia's mother ends up playing definitional checkers [about whether 'wrapping' is 'working'], while Virginia is playing sequential–grammatical chess, and by this reading, we are also relieved of the puzzle of her mother's exasperation: if—by the EAF account—Virginia has just ceded "epistemic primacy" to her mother, that's an odd thing to screech about.

CONCLUSIONS

From its earliest days through Garfinkel and then Sacks, the play of 'knowing' has been central to and identifying of EMCA's analytic program. But rather than a social psychology of 'who knows what', or a landscape of contested 'territories of knowledge',[19] EMCA was taken up from the beginning with what *any* member knows:

> Sociologically speaking, 'common culture' refers to the socially sanctioned grounds of inference and action that people use in their everyday affairs and which they assume that others use in the same way. Socially-sanctioned-facts-of-life-in-society-that-any-bona-fide-member-of-the-society-knows depict such matters as the conduct of family life, market organization, distributions of honor, competence, responsibility, goodwill, income, motives among members, frequency, causes of, and remedies for trouble, and the presence of good and evil purposes behind the apparent workings of things. (Garfinkel, 1967: 76)

Or, in a stunning discussion of "imitations", Sacks spoke of what any member can see of another, having never seen her before, or seen her doing what she's doing now:

> If, for example, you see a rather young girl, three years old, perhaps older, behaving coquettishly, you may find that what you see is, her imitating a woman. And there are, of course, much larger collections of actions which one sees being done as imitations. One thing to notice is that you can see somebody doing an imitation although you've never seen that person before, or even if you've seen that person before, you're

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19   See, for examples, Heritage (2008: 310) on an epistemic order '...indexed and policed in practices of turn design and sequence organization'; Heritage (2011) on 'territories'; Heritage and Raymond (2005: 34) on the 'patrol and defense of information preserves', or Raymond and Heritage (2006: 685) on contests of epistemic 'supremacy', for discourses on possession, contest, and subordination. [See Lynch, 2018 and Macbeth, 2018 for discussions.]

never seen them do that action. You don't see them doing the thing itself, you see them doing an imita-tion. And that raises some rather neat questions. (Sacks, 1992: v. 1, lect. 32, p. 479)[20]

Elsewhere, Garfinkel speaks of what 'anyone knows' as 'vulgar' knowledge, but not to disparage it:

(It) is vulgar in the way in which competence to the streets is a vulgar competence. The competence is nothing special; it is nothing you can be called upon to celebrate or brag about; it's nothing uniquely and singularly of your authorship, and of all things, everyone knows it. You don't have to be a particular person who has gone to the university and now you are able to see that. (2002: 206)

These passages underscore the strangeness of any suggestion that 'what the parties know' has somehow escaped the attention of EMCA. What *any* member knows is quite at the heart of its distinctive inquiries into our grammatical productions of social action, order, structure and recurrence, and the achieved understandings that underwrite them, such that jokes and proposals to tell them can be heard (and what kinds of jokes they are), and queues, conversations and orderly traffic produced among strangers. This is a register of 'knowing' at some conceptual distance from the epistemic analytic framework.

With respect to collections, as the turn–taking paper notes there are assuredly more interests alive in case materials than the interests serving the collections they assemble. Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson (1974) write a very thoughtful post–script on how their variously collected materials are alive in other collections too, and how this should be no surprise:

[A]ll the data in the paper can be examined for points other than those in whose service they are initially cited... Similarly, all the data in all our other papers can be inspected for their bearing on the points made in this one. And any materials of natural conversation (transcribed to an appropriate level of detail and precision) collected by others may be examined as well. All this, of course, is appropriate if, indeed, what is proposed in the paper is so 'for any conversation'. (1974: 734)

Their remarks are on behalf of a densely variegated architecture (and evidently Sacks was working from 'an appropriate level of detail and precision' in his treatment of the joke's telling). The achievements of common understanding show demonstrable orientations to the occasioned particulars of manifold contingencies (Moerman and Sacks, 1971/1988; SS&J, 1974, *passim*). It is this range of grammatical organizations that is so impressive about what EMCA has shown us of practical action and natural conversation, and the EAF has little to say about most of it, save for a few selective 'executive' appropriations, e.g., that recipient design, turn design and turn taking itself are shaped by epistemic status:

Insofar as one of the key principles of turn design is to whom a turn is addressed (recipient design), and the key property of a recipient's identity is the (mutual) knowledge that one attributes to the other (i.e.

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20   I am indebted to Oskar Lindwall for alerting me to this passage.

epistemic status), and insofar as all turns are unavoidably constructed or designed for a speaker's recipient, then epistemics is engaged in the design of every turn at talk. (Drew, 2018: 174)[21]

Though posed as a logically connective tissue, the argument through recipient design and identity seems more rhetorical, and defeasible. Though others 'knowing things' can certainly be relevant for recipient design, as in our encounters with service providers or neighbors holding our mail, Drew is suggesting that epistemic status underwrites the design of every turn *because* it underwrites the proposed 'key property of identity'. Apparently, to secure a formative place in every turn construction, the EAF must appropriate the contingent work of recipient design, set aside the indefinite and situationally contingent membership categories it calls into play, and designate epistemic status as identity's 'key property'. The reduction of our understandings of identity *and* recipient design should not be missed.

In this light, Drew seems to be re-writing the concept of identity—a concept well–baked into those of agency, membership category, and common usage. And are the identities of our grandmothers, classmates or neighbors accounted for in the particulars of what they ask or tell on this or that occasion, rather than, say, for example, their forms of life? We know of them in many ways, and along with grandmothers there are strangers, cops and casual romantic interests. In what sense must we attribute their epistemic status, or 'know what they know'—beyond what *anyone* knows—to engage them as recipients? Conceptually, perhaps these questions come to rest on just what use the EAF can have for what 'anyone knows'. The answer is uncertain because there is nothing invidious about the question.

Every turn and sequence will of course sustain more than a single interest, if only because single grammars are seldom, if ever, in play. We are not *only* taking turns or doing recipient design, however much we may *always* be doing those things. In this serious sense, collections trade on cases, but cannot fully account for them. This strikes me as a fuller understanding of the relationship between the two. It is a large topic, but for now Schegloff's remarks on the "convincing analysis of single episodes of conversation" (1991: 153) continue to instruct:

> *One of the key tasks of researchers* in developing claims for a phenomenon is not to sacrifice the detailed
> examination of single cases on the altar of broad claims—especially when the cases are meant as evidence

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21   In citing '(mutual) knowledge' as the bridge from recipient design to turn construction Drew could be seen to veer toward an EM reading of 'what anyone knows'. But for EM there is no need for motivated 'attributions', whereby '…a recipient's identity is the (mutual) knowledge that one attributes to the other (i.e. epistemic status)…' Instead, what 'anyone knows' is taken for granted until further notice. And if, as a thought experiment, the EMCA reading of what 'anyone knows' were in play, the EAF would then stumble on how 'epistemic status' could serve as a foundational conversational structure at all; it would be derivative, occasioned and occasional. More likely, however, the 'mutual knowledge' in Drew's discussion refers to a 'ticker' mutually in play, a relentlessly mutual orientation to and interrogation of what the other knows, or not (see Heritage 2012a, 2012b and 2013). But the epistemic 'ticker' is quite unlike the achievements of common understanding. The one is an attribution, "'guided' by syntax" (Heritage, 2012c: 76); the other is a foundational contingency of sequential order and social action (Moerman and Sacks, 1971/1988).

for the broad claim; *one of the key tasks of readers* is to examine the detailed analysis of single cases as episodes with their own reality, deserving of their own rigorous analysis without respect to their bearing on the larger argument for which they are being put forward. (Schegloff, 2010: 42, italics in original)

He is speaking of the work of assembling–and reading–collections. We have in his formulation a place to begin a discussion of the play of cases and collections that is more faithful to the production histories of each, and they are entirely different histories.

For EMCA, detail* was never on behalf of hidden structures or coded forms, notwithstanding the enormous familiarity of the exercise. For EMCA detail* was on behalf of describing the constitutive work of cultural members engaged in assembling account–able worlds in common.

"Shared agreement" refers to various social methods for accomplishing the member's recognition that something–was–said–according–to–a–rule and not the demonstrable matching of substantive matters. The appropriate image of a common understanding is therefore an operation rather than a common intersection of overlapping sets. (Garfinkel, 1967:30; emphasis in original)[22]

The 'rule' here is a grammatical one. Depending on whether we seek an understanding of those operations as grammars of action, or an alignment of stable 'sets', our sense of 'detail'—our reckonings of the endless detail we witness in our materials—will be so shaped. It is this shaping, and what use we may then have for what 'detail' could be, that I am trying to get at in these remarks. It is both a conceptual and a material question. It asks whether and how our interests in detail are in the service of programs of aggregation and/or deconstruction, finding in increasingly smaller and/or hidden units the foundations of the larger orders they claimedly index or assemble, or whether the sense and relevance of a pervasive *constitutive detail*, a signal phrase in EMCA studies, organizes both the ordinary organizational things of everyday life and our inquiries about them. As Mair and Sharrock (2020) observe, "Treating 'meaningful actions', for instance, as amalgams of non–meaningful movements, gestures and other 'more basic' elements of conduct puts the componential cart before the analytical horse." (2020:29).

The corpus of EMCA studies is showing us the constitutive detail* of the laic orders that our materials routinely exhibit, an orderliness that is prior to the professional–analytic constructions that are the coin–of–the–realm of social science (and without which the coins would find no traction). There are very large and consequential differences to be found in how social science sights its detail, how we imagine it, by what conceptualizations we take interest in or may have use for it. Perhaps these differences are enough to lead us to the good sense of Garfinkel's asterisked annotations. They flag the bewitchments of natural language

22   Though programs for coding the play of overlapping sets have been proposed for EMCA studies (see Stivers, 2015 and Heritage and Raymond, 2016), their arguments seem to have ignored EM's penetrating re–specifications of coding's work (see Garfinkel, 1967: 18–24, and Watson, 2008 on 'equivalence classing'). These contemporary proposals and their prior examinations seem never to have met (Macbeth 2020).

in professional discourse (Wittgenstein, 1968, §109), for which 'detail' may be the exemplary case.

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