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The Right to International Protection

The trade-off between admitting and paying. An experimental analysis of people's attitudes toward responsibility-sharing in refugee issues

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An experimental analysis of people's attitudes

toward responsibility-sharing in refugee issues

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Abstract

The concentration of the world's refugees in developing countries calls for international collaboration on the matter. In the face of concerns voiced amongst politicians but also the public, we investigate how people trade off the two most prominent responsibility-sharing mechanism. We conduct a survey experiment in 26 countries asking whether people would rather: a) admit more asylum-seekers, or b) provide financial assistance to host countries. We find that most respondents prefer admitting asylum-seekers overpaying. We also establish significant individual level heterogeneity that shed new light on people's attitudes toward asylum-seekers. Importantly, we report that sociotropic concerns about broad economic and cultural implications for the nation strongly affect the willingness to admit rather than to pay.

1. Introduction

Despite the COVID-19 pandemic, the number of people fleeing wars, violence, persecution, and human rights violations in 2020 rose to nearly 82.4 million people (UNHCR 2021). A substantial number of these ended up as refugees in developing countries that often lack the means to accommodate and help them. Because of this unequal burden and responsibility-sharing, concerns are increasingly being voiced that the first border crossed cannot be the exclusive principle of responsibility. The international community needs to act based on a more cosmopolitan set of commitments, and it should be an ambition to achieve a more equitable sharing of international responsibility in refugee issues (Doyle 2018).

Fundamentally, there are two broad mechanisms for international responsibility-sharing in refugee issues, namely the provision of financial and other assistance to host countries and the admission of refugees, most commonly through resettlement (Dowd and McAdam 2017). In other words, a nation can either provide financial help to ensure that host countries can guarantee basic rights and decent living conditions for refugees or else expand admission channels so that a proportion of refugees currently in overloaded countries can seek protection elsewhere. The objective of this article is to examine how people trade off these two mechanisms. In the pursuit of burden and responsibility-sharing, do people prefer one mechanism over the other, and exactly how much financial assistance are people willing to provide to a host country in exchange for not admitting a reallocated asylum seeker?

Our findings are based on a large-scale experimental study of how people trade off the two responsibility-sharing mechanisms using financial solidarity contributions as the treatment. The respondents were randomly assigned to one of three treatment groups and provided a hypothetical choice – either accept that their country is reallocated 100 new asylum applicants because it handles fewer cases compared to many other countries, or else pay a financial solidarity contribution to another country that accepts them. The size of the contribution varied between the treatments. The main objective is to explore to what extent the size of the solidarity contribution affects people's willingness to pay rather than to accept reallocation. Further, we also explore how other factors, like people's cultural and distributional concerns, and the contextual features of their country, affect people's economic calculations. The experiment was conducted in 26 countries on general population samples, most of them EU countries, but also non-EU countries such as Canada, Mexico, Norway, South Africa, Turkey, the US, and the UK.

In these introductory remarks, we want to highlight four important results from our study. First, a clear majority of all the respondents agree that countries should collaborate and strive by all means to protect the world's refugees. Second, we find that when people must choose between the two responsibility-sharing mechanisms, a sizable majority choose accepting rather than paying, and we observe little cross-country heterogeneity. Third, the treatment effects are large, implying that the price of paying affects people's decisions, and the more costly it is to pay, the more likely people are to choose admission. Fourth, we observe that, at the individual level, characteristics such as adherence to an inclusive versus discriminatory notion of citizenship, nativist sentiments, redistribution concerns, political orientation, and salience of the immigration issue strongly affect the likelihood of choosing one responsibility-sharing mechanism over the other. While individual economic characteristics like income do not affect

the outcome, countries' macro-level economic features, such as economic growth rate, are associated with people's choice to admit or to pay.

Our results provide novel evidence for an important dimension of people's immigration attitudes that has not yet been systematically explored in the literature. Previous research has typically focused on people's immigration sentiments in general, often focusing on what can explain exclusionary attitudes (e.g., Burns and Gimpel 2000; Citrin et al. 1997; Scheve and Slaughter 2001; Hopkins, 2010; Dancygier and Donnelly, 2013; Esses et al., 2017) and, equally crucial, how anti-immigrant sentiments can affect important policies such as welfare state legislation (e.g., Luttmer, 2001; Crepaz and Damron, 2008; Mewes and Mau, 2013; Reeskens and Van Oorschot, 2012; Ensser-Jedenastik, 2018). The extent to which people have different attitudes toward distinct groups of immigrants, e.g., which type of immigrants should be admitted, has also been an important topic of exploration (e.g., Sniderman, et al., 2004; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2010; Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2015; van der Meer and Reeskens, 2021).

However, due to the increased focus on burden-sharing in refugee issues, it is imperative to gain a better understanding of how people trade off the two main responsibility-sharing mechanisms and what can explain heterogeneous attitudes both at the individual and the contextual level. States that now only to a lesser degree are engaged in helping refugees may soon find themselves in a situation where they must choose between admitting more asylum seekers or paying a solidarity contribution and opting out of responsibility-sharing may become legally or politically impossible.

We proceed as follows: Section 2 provides the theoretical framework guiding our analysis and Section 3 presents our empirical strategy, data, and variables. The penultimate Section 4 presents and analyses the results from the empirical investigation, while Section 5 concludes.

2. Theoretical framework[2]

The question of how people trade off financial assistance against admission of asylum-seekers has not previously been studied but is of vital interest. Importantly, responsibility-sharing has received an exponential increase in attention the last decade, due particularly to the imbalance in state responsibility. The obligations that states have toward refugees in their own territory is

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[2] Our survey experiment involves references to asylum-seekers and refugees and not immigrants. However, there is a broad theoretical as well as empirical overlap between the two concepts (Canetti et al., 2016), and in the design of our theoretical framework we draw upon the more general literature that examines attitudes toward immigration/immigrants.

well defined, while their obligations to support refugees in territories outside their own borders is much weaker and thus very political, and we consequently have a situation where geography and proximity to crisis *de facto* define responsibility (Betts 2018). Because this could be argued to be ethically unsustainable, burden-sharing today enjoys a prominent place in the public as well as political discourses.

To illustrate this, in 2018 the United Nations General Assembly affirmed the Global Compact on Refugees (the Global Compact), and distant donor countries' commitments to provide money or resettlement are no longer wholly discretionary (Doyle 2018). A main ambition of the Global Compact is to achieve a more equitable sharing of international responsibility in refugee protection. States that until now only to a lesser degree have engaged in helping refugees are asked to shoulder more responsibility, thereby easing the load on countries doing more than their fair share. Even though no concrete mechanisms for implementing such sharing is yet agreed upon, infrastructures – such as the Global Refugee Forum and Asylum Support Platforms – have been established for states to consider ways in which burden and responsibility-sharing can be enhanced.

Furthermore, the relocation of asylum-seekers has been at the heart of fierce controversies within the European Union (EU). The uneven distribution of large influxes of asylum seekers has created tensions between Member States and exposed the need to reform the Common European Asylum System in general and the Dublin Regulations in particular. Importantly, the Commission previously proposed a "corrective allocation" mechanism to be triggered when a Member State is faced with disproportionate numbers of asylum-seekers. According to this proposal, a Member State could decide not to accept the allocation of asylum-seekers from another State under pressure and instead pay a 'solidarity contribution' of €250,000 per applicant[3]. Thus, it would be possible, under the current proposal, for Member States to pay a financial contribution rather than to accept a reallocated asylum-seeker.

Ultimately, whether States will pursue burden and responsibility-sharing and thereby make a difference to the lives of refugees and migrants depends to a large extent on the political will of governments to develop and implement their pledges and commitments. This willingness aligns with public support. That public opinion affects policies is well established, especially for public opinion on salient issues (Page and Shapiro, 1983; Wlezien, 1995; Burstein, 2003). Therefore, it is highly relevant how people make a trade-off between these two fundamental responsibility-sharing mechanisms, namely the provision of financial assistance

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[3] See COM(2016)270 final.

to host countries and the admission of asylum seekers. This can impact what pledges and commitments will be made by ratifying states of the Global Compact, as well as whether the "corrective allocation" mechanism within the framework of the Dublin Regulations will be implemented or more specifically designed. The ultimate political success of any responsibility-sharing mechanism will depend on its public acceptance.

It is not straightforward how people trade off paying a financial solidarity contribution against admitting reallocated asylum-seekers. However, we expect three main calculations to be involved in the decision process, namely a *pecuniary* calculation, a *redistributive* calculation, and a *cultural* calculation.

2.1. Pecuniary calculations

Previous literature in the *political economy* tradition theorizes that public attitudes toward immigration are likely to be shaped by native-born citizens' economic self-interests (Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014). Immigration has distributional consequences, and there is assumed to be competition over resources between immigrants and natives. A particular focus has been the fiscal impacts of immigration, i.e., how (especially low-skill) immigration negatively affects the post-tax income of natives through its impact on tax rates and transfers (Dustmann and Preston 2007; Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014). If people believe that immigrants represent a net burden for public finances, such as raised taxes or reduced per capita transfers for public spending, this can increase exclusionary immigrant attitudes – particularly for high-income individuals who are more affected by raised taxes than low-income individuals (Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2010; Dancygier and Donnelly 2013; Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014). This proposition sometimes finds support in the empirical literature (e.g., Hanson et al., 2007; Facchini and Mayda, 2009).

It is important to emphasize that when people make economic calculations, they do not necessarily consider uniquely their own economic situation and how they themselves will be affected by immigration; they can alternatively or additionally focus on the nations' collective welfare (Citrin et al., 1997; Sides and Citrin, 2007). Thus, it is not only economic self-interest that motivates individuals to form their preference, but also country-level economic factors (Schaffer and Spilker, 2019). In other words, immigration can be seen as a threat to individual as well as to collective economic well-being.

The economic calculations that the respondents must make when responding to our survey experiment are less straightforward than in the standard economic modelling above because there is a cost to not admitting asylum seekers. This cost has a precise monetary value

that represents a net burden for public finances, so respondents must compare what they perceive to be the monetary costs (or benefits) of admitting an asylum-seeker to the cost of paying instead. Even though a respondent perceives immigration to be an economic burden, which could otherwise cause him or her to develop exclusionary attitudes, the respondents could be swayed to accept asylum seekers instead of paying because the latter alternative is, on balance, economically more detrimental than the former.

We nevertheless expect treatment effects, which would indicate that economic calculations affect people's decisions. The more costly it is to pay rather than to admit, the less likely it is that people will choose to pay the financial solidarity contribution. However, as we explain below, economic calculations may be compromised by cultural and redistributive calculations.

2.2. Redistributive calculations

Whereas pecuniary calculations involve the financial cost of admission and non-admission, the distributive calculation, as we define it here, concerns the respondent's readiness to share their social welfare rights with the newcomers. Previous research strongly indicates that "welfare chauvinism" – the idea that native citizens are unwilling to grant social rights to foreigners (Andersen and Bjørklund 1990) – is widespread across Europe (e.g., Van Der Waal et al., 2013; Cappelen and Peters, 2018).

According to Marshall (1949), social rights (e.g., various forms of positive assistance like publicly funded health care, education, and social assistance) represent one class of citizenship rights bestowed on those who are full members of a community. The other rights are civil and political rights. The idea that there is a right to welfare is controversial and represents a fundamental challenge to the idea that citizenship is only a civil and a political status and to the *laissez-faire* capitalist idea that a person's economic status should be determined by the market alone (Plant, 1998; Mead, 2008). However, liberal democracies today include it as an important citizenship right, which more than ever before spurs a moral controversy. According to Marshall, the gradual increase in citizenship rights has been associated with a gradual expansion of the class of citizens, i.e., the inclusion of women, the working class, and other previously excluded groups. But to what extent and when, if ever, should immigrants, and more specifically refugees, be granted full citizenship rights?

On the one hand, some may be convinced that the freedom of (cross-border) movement is a fundamental human right, rooted in the idea that all people are of equal moral value and that individuals have moral primacy over communities (e.g., Carens 1987). For them, it is

therefore unfair to reject immigrants' claim to welfare rights. On the other hand, some would agree with Walzer (1983) that we should recognize the political community's right to regulate admission and citizenship with a view to securing its cultural, economic, and political integrity. Unconditional admission to the welfare states can pose challenges because "distributive justice presupposes a bounded world within which distribution takes place" (ibid, 31). Thus, how much of their welfare entitlements citizens are prepared to share with refugees is another important factor in their trade-off between admitting asylum seekers and paying. We expect that the more a person adheres to the idea of sharing welfare with refugees, the more they will be inclined to admit refugees rather than to pay.

2.3. Cultural calculations

It is not only economic matters that motivate individuals to form attitudes about immigration; cultural calculations, such as whether immigrants are seen as posing a threat to the cultural homogeneity and the national identity of the host society, are also found to be crucial (e.g., Sniderman et al., 2004). Studies indicate that perceived cultural threats strongly correlate with support for restrictive immigration attitudes (e.g., Esses et al., 2017).

The central hypothesis of social identity theory is that people have a natural tendency to develop group identities and to differentiate between "us" and "them" and that in-group members often develop negative feelings toward out-group members (Tajfel and Turner, 1979). Out-group members can be seen as a threat to central in-group values and identities, which again can trigger anti-immigrant sentiments (Stephan and Stephan, 2000).

Perceiving immigrants as a cultural threat strongly associates with nativist sentiments, which we here define as *a preference for a policy promoting the interests of the natives rather than the immigrants*. An extreme form of nativism, often associated with radical right-wing parties, is a conviction that the state should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group (Mudde, 2007). However, the more basic philosophy contained in nativism is that non-native elements, be they people or ideas, represent a threat to the native communities, and the native majority group therefore needs protection against foreign influence (Higham, 2002; Knoll, 2013). Not unsurprisingly, nativism has been shown to be associated with certain immigration-related policy preferences such as stricter immigration laws (Citrin, 1990; Knoll, 2013). We therefore expect that respondents in our experiment who exhibit nativist sentiments will be more inclined to want to pay a financial solidarity contribution rather than accept asylum-seekers compared to non-nativists.

Citizenship may be another way of determining who is a cultural threat to "us". While nativists allow full inclusion only for natives, the citizenship perspective prescribes a treatment of persons based on the degree of their insider-ness. That is, the more a person is a part of the community of citizens, the less of a threat they pose. This allows rights to immigrants on "a sliding scale of rights" (Bader, 1995), varying from denying any rights to granting equal citizen rights, based on how much in or out an immigrant is within the community of citizens. The criteria for determining the degree of insider-ness varies between the liberal, republican, communitarian, and multicultural forms of citizenship (e.g., ideological orientation, class, cultural belonging, ethnic/religious identity, economic and cultural integration, or assimilation). Such criteria usually translate into inclusive and exclusive notions of citizenship, which is our primary theoretical interest here. In this regard, earlier research indicates that the more inclusive a person's notion of citizenship the more positive an attitude they have towards immigration (Sicakkan 2005). Thus, we expect respondents who exhibit a restrictive stance on who is entitled to full citizen rights to be more in favour of paying a financial solidarity contribution than accepting asylum-seekers compared to respondents who have a more inclusive view of citizenship.

2.4. Other factors

Precisely how people calculate the various cultural and economic costs/benefits of immigration is likely to be affected by political affiliation. Previous research indicates that people on the political right, more than people on the political left, have restrictive immigrant views and perceive of immigrants as culturally and economically threatening (Semyonov et al., 2006; Canetti et al., 2016). Immigrants can cause change in a country, culturally or otherwise, and conservatives exhibit a *status quo* bias (Wilson 2013). People who identify with a left-wing ideology, on the other hand, have been found to have comparatively greater tolerance for outgroups such as immigrants and therefore to be in favour of more lenient immigration policies (Semyonov et al., 2008; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013). It is therefore reasonable to expect that respondents belonging to the political right will be more likely to choose to pay rather than to admit compared to respondents belonging to the political left.

At the contextual level, earlier research reliably finds that the sense of threat posed by immigrants, whether economic and/or cultural, is heightened when people believe that the immigrant population is large (Sides and Citrin, 2007; Czymara, 2021). Here, we expect that the actual size and cultural features of the immigrant population also enhances the sense of threat. Previous research emphasizes that situations where the size of the out-group is rapidly

increasing and where the out-group is culturally very different from the native majority group are particularly prone to triggering threat perceptions and negative sentiments regarding immigration (Schneider, 2008; Hopkins, 2010). Therefore, we expect that the relative share of the immigrant population, the growth rate of immigrant population, and the relative share of the Muslim population (the non-Muslim population for Turkey) are positively associated with the willingness to pay.

Through a similar logic, one could reason that the state of the economy in a country also affects the willingness to admit because immigrants can be conceived of as economically more threatening in times of economic hardship (Lapinski et al., 1997; Wilkes et al., 2008; Czymara, 2021). However, this expectation is far from obvious because of the cost in our experiment of not admitting. In times when the economic conditions are hard, this cost can be unappealing to many who in better times would have chosen to pay. As a reasonable short cut, we expect shrinkages in GDP to be negatively associated with the willingness to admit asylum seekers.

3.   Design, data, and methods

Before presenting our methodological approach and data, we want to emphasize that all of the respondents in our survey were asked about the extent to which they agree that all countries should "collaborate and strive by all means to protect the world's refugees".[4] A total of 66.6% of the respondents agree to various extent with this statement (figure 1). Thus, a clear majority of all the respondents agree – at least to some extent – that it is important to collaborate to protect the world's refugees.

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[4] The exact question and answer options are presented in section 5.2 of the Appendix.

Fig. 1. Percentage of respondents agreeing or disagreeing with the statement: "All countries should collaborate and strive by all means to protect the world's refugees".

Note: post-stratification weights applied; no population weights applied.

Studies reporting on public preferences regarding asylum/refugee policies are sparse compared to studies on attitudes toward immigration policies (Jeannet et al., 2021), and they indicate ambivalence in preferences. Because of humanitarian concerns, many are willing to help refugees; however, because of national interest concerns (e.g., bogus asylum claims), some are concerned about admitting asylum seekers (Jeannet et al., 2021). More precisely, the rather limited amount of research on refugee and asylum policy preferences finds that a heightened sense of humanitarianism (Fraser and Murakami, 2021), low fear of terrorism (De Coninck, 2020), identification with left- and green-leaning parties (Gravelle, 2009), and being a citizen of an extensive welfare state and a historically immigration-oriented country (Koos and Seibel, 2019) are positively associated with a preference for liberal refugee and asylum policies.

While our finding that most people agree to responsibility-sharing is arguably good news for those who strive for more collaboration and responsibility-sharing in refugee issues, such as the EU and the UN, it is silent on which responsibility-sharing mechanism that people prefer and on how they would like responsibility-sharing to be implemented. The central objective with the present research is to explore this issue by asking people to choose between the two main responsibility mechanisms proposed in scholarship and policy circles, namely accepting more asylum seekers or paying a financial solidarity contribution (Dowd and McAdam, 2017).

Dataset

Our expectations were tested on an original dataset from a web survey conducted in June–July 2021 in 26 countries.[5] These countries were selected to represent the cross-country diversity in (i) citizenship models, (ii) migration regimes, (iii) government responses to the recently adopted Global Migration Compact, (iv) status as host or transit country, and (v) proximity to migrant-sending countries.[6] Each national sample includes a minimum of 1,000 respondents (2,000 for the US) amounting to a total of 27,429 respondents. The questionnaires were administered by a consortium of three survey firms. Respondents were recruited to constitute nationally representative samples of the adult population (18+ years old) on a set of observable characteristics (age, gender, and area of residence). The Appendix provides more information on the data collected and the survey firms.

Dependent variable

We employ a factorial survey experiment (Auspurg and Hinz, 2015), which explores the effect that the size of a social solidarity contribution has on the willingness to accept new asylum seekers. All the respondents were provided with the following vignette:

> *Many countries are handling a disproportionate number of asylum applications by comparison to the overall number of asylum claims. It could therefore be considered fair that some of the applicants in these countries are reallocated to other countries with fewer applicants. Assume that [your country] is reallocated 100 new applicants because it handles fewer cases compared to many other countries. However; [your country] is given the option of paying a financial solidarity contribution rather than accepting the new applicants.*
>
> *If you could decide, which of the following two options would you choose?*

Respondents were randomly assigned to one of three groups in which the amount of the solidarity contribution varied. Answer options:

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[5] The countries involved are Austria, Belgium, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, the UK, and the US.

[6] See the online appendix for the classification of countries along these three dimensions.

Accept the applicants; or

Pay a financial solidarity contribution of €xxx ────────→ *Group 1: €5,000*

for each applicant to the state that accepts them[7] ────────→ *Group 2: €50,000*

────────→ *Group 3: €250,000*

Our dependent variable is binary; either a respondent is willing to accept the allocation of 100 reallocated applicants to his or her country or else pay a financial solidarity contribution for each applicant to the state that accepts them. We investigate people's response in two steps. We first compare the three groups' means through standard analysis of variance tests to provide a first estimate of the effect of the vignettes. Because distribution in the three groups is randomized at the national level, comparing means for each group provides reliable results. However, the treatment effects may be confounded by other factors that are unevenly distributed across groups. We thus test a more complex set of hypotheses by running multivariate logistic regressions. The effect of the treatments is tested while holding potential confounders constant. Similarly, multivariate regression allows the investigation of factors determining the outcome, thus helping explain why some people would rather accept asylum seekers in their country or else pay another one to accept them. In our analysis we have a particular focus on the respondents' nativist sentiments and their attitudes toward redistribution, immigration, and citizenship rights.

Because the respondents were located within specific countries, the observations are not independently distributed. We model heterogeneity through country random intercepts. This allows us to test country-level variable effects (Fairbrother, 2014) such as the effect of migration or asylum pressure, GDP per capita, and unemployment. We also run models with country fixed effects to test the robustness of our findings. Note, though, that the Hausmann specification test supports the use of random effects models (Hausman, 1978; the online Appendix provides more information and robustness tests).

Independent individual-level variables

To investigate the effects that *nativism*, *inclusive citizenship*, and *redistribution* (discussed in the theory section) have on the willingness to pay (rather than to admit), we create three scales

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[7] Amounts were presented in euros for European countries and Turkey and in local currency for other countries. Amounts were adjusted to differences in purchasing power across non-European countries. More information is found in the online appendix.

ranging from –3 (most nativist, least inclusive, and least in favour of redistribution) to 3 (least nativist, most inclusive, and most in favour of redistribution). We employed the following questions to measure nativist sentiments and inclusive citizenship:

How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements?[8]

    a. People whose ancestors and family have lived in [Country] for generations should always come first

    b. Minorities whose ancestors and family have lived in the [Country] for generations should have the same citizen rights as the majority

    c. People of foreign ancestry who are born and raised in the [Country] should have the same citizen rights as the majority

    d. Immigrants not born here but who have been granted the [Country]'s citizenship should have the same citizen rights as the majority

    e. All citizens of [Country] should be able to enjoy the same citizen rights without discrimination

We observe a clear distinction between item *a* and the four other items. Item *a*, by stating that the country's native people always should come first, alludes to the nativist rhetoric that considers the members of the dominant ethnic group to be the only full members of the nation (Mudde, 2007; Golder, 2016). Items *b* to *e* concern the rights attached to different levels of membership to the citizenry (Kabeer, 2005), namely ethnic minorities (*b*), second or third-generation migrants (*c*), first-generation migrants who acquired citizenship (*d*), and the all-encompassing category of every citizen in the country (*e*). The two scales are conceptually separate and empirically distinct (as demonstrated in the Appendix). To extract our two scales, we consider item *a* to be supportive of nativism while we consider the arithmetic mean of the other four items to be supportive of inclusive citizenship. Our choice is guided by comparing the two aforementioned scales with the results of a Principal Component Analysis (PCA; detailed in the Appendix).

    Finally, the degree of welfare chauvinism was measured by asking the respondents:[9]

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[8] Answer options: Strongly agree, Agree, Partly agree, Neutral, Partly disagree, Disagree, Strongly disagree, Don't know.

[9] Answer options same as above.

When it comes to the refugees already admitted and living legally in [country], your country should…

a. *Give them access to education, competence-building, and job-seeking on equal terms as citizens*

b. *Give them access to existing social benefits and services on equal terms as citizens*

c. *Give them privileges beyond citizens' entitlements to enable them to earn a decent living (e.g., free vocational training, cost-free investment credits, public-funded traineeships, etc.)*

We follow a similar process as that for our two previous scales, i.e., we calculate the arithmetic mean of items *a* to *c* and compare it to the predicted component obtained through PCA. The results (presented in detail in the Appendix) suggest that we should use the arithmetic mean as its values are more easily interpretable.

Political affiliation has been shown to be associated with attitudes toward migration (Semyonov et al., 2006; Canetti et al., 2016). We study this association with a variable ranging from 0 (left) to 10 (right). To study the effect of self-interest, we include as independent variables the respondents' income and their employment status.

We include several controls. Previous studies indicate that issue salience affects policy preferences (Dennison and Geddes, 2019), and salience of migration is controlled for with a variable ranging from 0 to 10.[10] Other individual-level controls include interest in politics (a scale variable ranging from 0 (no interest) to 10 (very interested)), gender, age, and country of birth (0 for native, 1 for foreign-born). Whether the respondent is born abroad can be relevant because foreigners might hold different opinions on migration issues than natives. While the topic has been little explored, there exists some evidence on migrants being potentially more open to other cultures (Berlinschi and Harutyunyan, 2019)[11].

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[10] To measure salience, the respondents were asked which three issues among a list of issues (including immigration) that they think are the most important challenges currently facing their country. Subsequently, the respondents were asked to indicate more precisely how important these issues are to them personally. For details, see the Appendix.

[11] Note that the cited authors focus on the values of migrants from Eastern European countries. We explore the issue at greater length in the Appendix by looking at the potential effect of various areas of origin.

Country-level independent variables

We test the effect of a set of macro-economic features, including GDP per capita (in purchasing power parity), growth in GDP, unemployment, and old-age dependency ratio (World Bank data). We moreover control for educational attainment through the percentage of the population with tertiary education (OECD and Eurostat). Whether a territory borders origin countries or migration routes (as opposed to bordering another destination country to which migrants may be headed) likely matters because said country may be more concerned with the migration issue altogether.[12] We also include variables aimed to capture migration pressure, which has proven to affect people's opinion on migration and refugees (Schneider, 2008; Hopkins, 2010; Hatton, 2016; Koos and Seibel, 2019). We thus account for the percentage of foreigners residing in the country, the change in said percentage between 2015 and 2020 (UNDP data), the number of asylum claims lodged in the country over the last three years (per thousand residents), and the growth in asylum applications over the last two years (our elaboration on UNHCR data). As explained above, we also account for the percentage of Muslims in the country (several sources; see Appendix). Finally, we add a dummy variable for EU membership and a variable for the percentage of the vote for the far-right in the last national election. Descriptive statistics and data references are available in the Appendix.

4. Results

Overall, most of the respondents would accept the asylum seekers rather than pay the solidarity contribution. We observe strong treatment effects: The willingness to admit increases with the size of the contribution. Across countries, 45.3% of the respondents would want their country to pay if the amount is €5,000, 38% if the amount is €50,000, and 32.2% if the amount increases to €250,000 (Figure 2).

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[12] Countries considered to be near the borders: Croatia, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Mexico, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Turkey, and the US. Conversely, countries farther away from the borders: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Slovenia, Sweden, and the UK.

Fig. 2. Percentage of respondents willing to pay another country.

The pattern of response is similar across countries but with notable differences in terms of magnitude. Figure 3 shows the difference between the share of respondents choosing to pay in Group 1 and in Group 3. The difference as we move from a financial contribution of €5,000 to €250,000 is considerable in some countries (Slovenia, Slovakia, and the Netherlands) but relatively small in others (Mexico, Belgium, and Sweden).

Fig. 3. Differences between the percentage of respondents willing to pay in Group 1 and in Group 3 (in percentage points).

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
We first explore the treatment effects through an analysis of variance in the data and pairwise comparisons of group means. Table 1 shows the means for the three groups and indicates that at least one group has a mean significantly different from another group (left side of the table). Pair-wise comparisons of the means show that all three means differ significantly (right side of the table).

Tab. 1. Analysis of variance and pair-wise comparison of the three treatment groups.

ANOVA	Means	Prob > F	**Pair-wise comp.**	Difference	Sig.[*]
Group 1	0.446	0.000	Group 2 vs 1	-0.071	0.000
Group 2	0.375		Group 3 vs 1	-0.127	0.000
Group 3	0.319		Group 3 vs 2	-0.055	0.000

[*]: significance level obtained through Bonferroni test.

To robustly establish causality, we run more complex models that account for the effect of confounders as well as for country differences[13]. Results are obtained through logistic regressions, with coefficients reflecting average marginal effects. Table 2 shows the results of three models that all account for country heterogeneity, either through random intercept (M1 and M3) or through country fixed effects (M2). M1 contains the treatment variables and the variables that test our expectations at the individual and country level. M2 replicates M1 but substitutes country-level controls with country fixed effects to control for both observed and unobserved heterogeneity. M3 presents the standardized coefficients of M1 with the view to help make comparisons between them[14].

The differences in means obtained through simple pair-wise comparisons (Table 1) are confirmed, both in terms of statistical significance and magnitude, across the models shown in Table 2 (M1 and M2). Namely, the probability of respondents' willingness to pay to relocate asylum seekers to other countries decreases as the amount presented increases, by about 7 percentage points from Group 2 to Group 1 and by about 13 percentage points from Group 3 to Group 1. These findings support our expectation that respondents' propensity to accept or pay is affected by economic calculations – the more costly the financial contribution, the higher their disposition to accept asylum seekers. More generally, the results obtained for all individual-level covariates are consistent across models irrespective of how country-level heterogeneity is modelled (M1 and M2).

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[13] Additional models and robustness tests are available in the Appendix.
[14] M1 was fitted to standardized explanatory variables so that each variable x is replaced by $(x-\bar{x})/\sigma_x$. Coefficients in M3 represent the effect of a standard deviation change in x.

Furthermore, our findings suggest that nativist sentiments, attitudes to citizenship rights, and attitudes to redistribution are associated with the decision of whether to accept or to pay. The least nativist respondents (high values on the nativist scale) are significantly more in favour of accepting asylum seekers than the most nativist ones, a finding in line with our expectation and with the literature on nativism and immigration perceived as a cultural threat (Mudde, 2007; see also Esses et al., 2017). Such effect appears to be quite sizable (M3) and constant across the nativist spectrum.

Tab. 2. Results of logistic regressions with random effects (RE) or fixed effects (FE), average marginal effects (M1–M2), and standardized logistic coefficients (M3).

DV: accept (0) or pay (1)	M1 - RE			M2 - FE			M3 - RE, std. coef.		
	AME	Std. err.	Sig.	AME	Std. err.	Sig.	Std. coeff.	Std. err.	Sig.
Group 2 w/ gp.1	-0.0743	(0.009)	***	-0.0741	(0.008)	***	-0.1638	(0.021)	***
Group 3 w/ gp.1	-0.1302	(0.009)	***	-0.1299	(0.008)	***	-0.2951	(0.020)	***
Nativism	-0.0170	(0.002)	***	-0.0169	(0.002)	***	-0.1550	(0.023)	***
Inclus. Citiz.	-0.0116	(0.004)	***	-0.0117	(0.003)	***	-0.0709	(0.027)	***
Redistribution	-0.0619	(0.004)	***	-0.0616	(0.003)	***	-0.4297	(0.028)	***
Importance immig.	0.0118	(0.001)	***	0.0118	(0.001)	***	0.2076	(0.021)	***
Left-right placement	0.0096	(0.002)	***	0.0096	(0.001)	***	0.1084	(0.023)	***
Interest in politics	0.0042	(0.002)	**	0.0042	(0.001)	***	0.0540	(0.023)	**
Income categ. 2 w/ cat.1	0.0112	(0.009)		0.0113	(0.008)		0.0270	(0.022)	
Income categ. 3 w/ cat.1	0.0010	(0.014)		0.0026	(0.011)		0.0018	(0.026)	
Age	0.0026	(0.000)	***	0.0026	(0.000)	***	0.1675	(0.022)	***
Gender female	0.0107	(0.006)	*	0.0110	(0.006)	*	0.0259	(0.016)	*
Gender other	-0.0280	(0.087)		-0.0293	(0.074)		-0.0074	(0.023)	
Country of birth	0.0499	(0.014)	***	0.0502	(0.014)	***	0.0558	(0.016)	***
Occup.-employee perm. parttime	0.0018	(0.011)		0.0021	(0.012)		0.0026	(0.015)	
Occup.-employee fixed term	0.0060	(0.019)		0.0055	(0.019)		0.0049	(0.016)	
Occup.-freelance	0.0043	(0.016)		0.0047	(0.014)		0.0051	(0.019)	
Occup.-student	0.0147	(0.016)		0.0145	(0.015)		0.0202	(0.022)	
Occup.-job seeker	0.0067	(0.014)		0.0072	(0.013)		0.0091	(0.019)	
Occup.-pensioner	0.0050	(0.011)		0.0049	(0.014)		0.0061	(0.014)	
Occup.-on social benefits	0.0076	(0.023)		0.0071	(0.018)		0.0070	(0.021)	
Old-age dependency ratio	0.0030	(0.003)					0.0498	(0.045)	
Asylum claims last 3 yrs	0.0056	(0.002)	***				0.1166	(0.032)	***
Unemployement	0.0010	(0.002)					0.0250	(0.047)	
GDP change	0.0080	(0.004)	**				0.1123	(0.053)	**
GDP per cap. PPP	0.0000	(0.000)					0.0216	(0.060)	
Percentage foreigner	-0.0052	(0.003)	**				-0.1461	(0.070)	**
Change in perc. foreigner	-0.0007	(0.000)	***				-0.1027	(0.030)	***
Percentage of Muslims	-0.0093	(0.005)	*				-0.1315	(0.073)	*
Growth in asylum applications	-0.0004	(0.000)	**				-0.0994	(0.046)	**
Vote far-right last election	0.0007	(0.001)					0.0478	(0.040)	
Percent with tertiary education	-0.0015	(0.001)					-0.0779	(0.078)	
Near the border state	-0.0793	(0.017)	***				-0.1901	(0.041)	***
EU member state	0.0218	(0.024)					0.0484	(0.053)	
N	**22812**			**22812**			**22812**		

Significance levels: *** p < 0.01. ** p < 0.05. * p < 0.1. Robust standard errors reported.

Figure 4 shows the predicted probabilities of respondents' willingness to pay rather than to admit in the three treatment groups. From the top-left corner figure we observe that the probability of choosing to pay decreases as we move along the values of nativism, from most nativist (left of the graph) to least nativist (right). The difference between the three groups is also similar in magnitude for all values of the variable.

Fig. 4. Predicted probabilities of willingness to pay according to values of nativism, inclusive citizenship and attitudes to redistribution for each treatment group.

A similar trend is observed for the inclusive citizenship scale (Figure 4; top-right corner), but with a flatter slope, mirroring the size of the average marginal effect shown in Table 2. However, the effect is not robust across the three treatment groups, as the results of separate regressions demonstrate (M6–M8, Table A8 in the Appendix). While the coefficient is sizable and statistically significant for Group 3, it is not for the first two groups. This is illustrative of how people trade off cultural and pecuniary calculations. The position on inclusiveness matters little as long as the costs of reallocating asylum seekers are contained, but it does matter when the amount to be paid is high. Our expectation is thus partly verified: more restrictive

conceptions of belonging to the citizenry are associated with a lower probability of accepting more asylum seekers, but only when the cost of relocating asylum seekers is deemed too high.

The degree of welfare chauvinistic sentiments is also significantly associated with the likelihood of wanting to pay (Figure 4, right-hand side). The effect of the variable is sizable and is of greater magnitude than that of nativism and inclusive citizenship (M3). In fact, it appears to be the strongest determinant of the probability to choose to pay. Respondents who would rather limit redistribution in favour of non-natives show a higher probability of answering "pay" than those who would include non-natives in redistributive policies.

How important the migration issue is for the respondents as well as their self-placement on the left-right political spectrum are both significantly correlated with their willingness to accept or pay. As already emphasized, previous studies indicate that there is an association between issue salience and policy preferences (Dennison and Geddes, 2019)[15]. Our study adds to these previous findings and shows that salience is among the strongest predictors in our model (M3). The more salient the issue is for the respondents, the more likely they will want to pay rather than to admit. Furthermore, respondents who place themselves on the right side of the political spectrum are more likely to want to pay too, thus supporting previous findings that associate right-wing leaning to more restrictive migration preferences (Semyonov et al., 2006; Canetti et al., 2016).

Turning to the effect of economic calculations, previous studies distinguish, as already emphasized, between material self-interest on the one hand and sociotropic effects on the receiving country on the other (Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014). In their review article, Hainmueller and Hopkins claim that most previous studies on the association between material self-interest and attitudes toward immigration indicate no such associations at all (*ibid*.: 240). Our analysis confirms these previous findings. Neither unemployment nor wages are associated with the willingness to pay.

At the aggregate level, we observe no effect of unemployment rate (in line with previous findings, notably Hatton (2016)) or GDP per capita. However, we do find an effect of economic change. Higher levels of growth in GDP are associated with increased willingness to pay. This finding contrasts with a study by Hatton (2016), who, analysing economic changes over a 10-year span, does not find any effect of economic downturns on attitudes towards migration. Our finding may, however, be situational. We need to stress that in 2020 most countries in our sample experienced negative growth due to the COVID-19 emergency, a type of disaster that

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[15] The hypothesis is further tested in the online Appendix where we test the effect of salience on attitudes towards international protection.

they had not experienced since the international financial crisis of 2008–2010. Our data, which is cross-sectional, does not allow for the assessment of contextual explanations over time.

The variables that aimed to capture migration pressure are statistically significant. Contrary to expectations, the percentage of foreigners in the residing population and its rate of change over the last five years are both negatively associated with the willingness to pay. Put differently, the total number of asylum claims per thousand inhabitants is positively associated with the willingness to pay.

Furthermore, the willingness to accept asylum seekers is decreasing with age. This finding is consistent with the negative association between ageing and attitudes towards migration documented in most studies exploring this association (see, among others, Heath and Richards, 2016; and Hatton, 2016). Finally, states located near countries of origin or on the route towards destination countries (the near-the-border variable) display, on average, lower probabilities of paying by 7.5 percentage points.

5. Conclusion

Given the increased focus of burden-sharing in refugee issues, the objective of this article has been to gain a better understanding of how people trade off the two main responsibility-sharing mechanisms, namely admitting more asylum-seekers or else paying other countries to host them. The article provides novel large-scale evidence on the nature of people's preferences regarding this trade-off from 26 countries. We find that, overall, most people prefer to accept rather than to pay, but we also establish significant individual-level heterogeneity that sheds new light on people's attitudes toward asylum-seekers/refugees. Moving beyond simply asking people about their attitudes toward responsibility-sharing, we have introduced a new research avenue that focuses on the concrete responsibility-sharing mechanisms.

Importantly, we have provided the very first depiction of people's preferences on the available mechanisms of responsibility-sharing in international protection. We found that the cost of non-admission is the most important factor affecting people's willingness to accept asylum seekers into their country. However, the effect of the financial cost of non-admission is constrained by the extent to which people adhere to exclusivist notions of citizenship, as well as the degree to which they are welfare chauvinists and nativists.

The explanatory frame portrayed above is a modest theoretical contribution. We find that economic calculations affect people's willingness to pay: the lower the cost of paying rather than admitting, the more likely people are to admit. This observation arguably relates to people's sociotropic concerns; if the price of non-admittance is very high, paying can be

detrimental for (national) economic performance. We also find a positive association between the willingness to pay and levels of growth in GDP, which could indicate once again that sociotropic assessments of the impact of asylum-seekers on the economy are important for understanding people's attitudes toward responsibility-sharing. However, we do not find evidence for the expectation that self-interest arguments affect people's willingness to pay. What we do find, though, is that welfare chauvinism is positively associated with the willingness to pay. This result can relate to sociotropic concerns (sharing welfare benefits with refugees is detrimental to economic performance) as well as to cultural concerns (it is unfair that refugees should have the same access to welfare provision as natives).

We find that cultural calculations affect people's willingness to pay. Beyond welfare chauvinism, we can report that people with nativist sentiments, who believe that immigrants pose a threat to the cultural homogeneity and the national identity of the host society, are more inclined to pay (rather than to admit) compared to non-nativists. Furthermore, we find that people who exhibit a restrictive stance on who is entitled to full citizen rights are more in favour of paying rather than accepting compared to people who endorse a more lenient notion of citizenship. Both of these observations align with our theoretical expectations.

In these concluding remarks we want to stress that how people trade off economic calculations against cultural calculations can be affected by something that, due to a lack of relevant data, we were unable to measure, that some people may be put off by the very idea of putting a market value on asylum seekers and the more general idea that everything is for sale. Some people will arguably be appalled by the very idea of a world in which everything can be bought and that market values have reached into a sphere where they, according to some, do not belong. Some might think that there is a limit to markets, and that we are drifting into a market society rather than just having a market economy (Sandel, 2000). Independent of the price of not having to admit asylum-seekers, some respondents may simply be put off by the very idea of allowing markets to influence immigration issues, and these people might be inclined to admit asylum-seekers rather than to pay, independent how they make economic and cultural calculations. This could be one factor explaining why a majority of people prefer to admit rather than to pay.

Finally, we want to introduce a possible caveat related to our findings. We conducted our survey at a time marked by the COVID-19 pandemic. It has been argued that this pandemic has led to increased feelings of threats and competition and of heightened uncertainty (Esses and Hamilton 2021), and some early research indicates that anxiety about the COVID-19 pandemic has had had a negative effect on immigration attitudes (Hartman et al., 2021). However, even

if this is true, we still find that most people prefer to admit rather than to pay, and we observe that a clear majority agree that all countries should collaborate and strive to protect the world's refugees.

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<div align="center">

Appendix for the article:

The tradeoff between admitting and paying. An experimental analysis of people's attitudes toward responsibility sharing in refugee issues.

</div>

1. Data

Most of the data used in the article was collected *ad hoc* by a consortium of survey firms that gather [Faktum Markedsanalyse](), [CINT](), and [Syno International]() (consortium referred to hereinafter as the survey firm). The survey aims to measure the attitudes of citizens to different aspects and components of international refugee protection. The data was collected in 26 countries, on national representative samples of 1,000 respondents (2,000 for the USA). The questionnaires were administered online through the survey firm's platform, in the national majority language, in mid-June-mid July 2021. National samples are representative on the basis of their respective universe population distribution according to gender, age groups[16] and area of residence[17]. Post-stratification weights were calculated to correct for unbalanced samples and applied for all statistics that imply inferences on larger populations (i.e., only descriptive statistics described in table A1 are not weighted). Note though that the application of the weights calculated affects very little the results obtained as they range from 0.328 to 3.862, have a mean of 1, and standard deviation of 0.2; meaning that most respondents have a probability of selection of 1. The data collected through survey was supplemented with other sources for country level variables (see next section and table A1 for more).

Regarding the survey's scope condition, the countries were selected to have varying citizenship models, migration regimes (Sicakkan, 2008), responses to the Global Compact on Migration (GCM), statuses as receiving or transit countries and proximity to migrant-sending

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[16] Age groups are as follows: 18-22; 23-35; 36-55; 56-65.
[17] NUTS 1 for DEU, TUR, GBR. NUTS 2 for AUT, BEL, DNK, FRA, GRC, HUN, ITA, NLD, POL, ROU, SVK, ESP, SWE. NUTS 3 for HRV, CZE, EST, LTU, NOR, and SVN. Provinces and Territories for CAN, macro-regions for MEX, Provinces for ZAF, Regions for the USA.

countries (Zaun, 2017). Table A2 summarizes information on citizenship models, migration regime and response to the GCM.

Tab. A1. Descriptive statistics

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. dev.	Min	Max	Source
DV - Accept or pay	27,366	0.380	0.485	0	1	Survey data
Experiment Group 1	27,366	0.333	0.471	0	1	Survey data
Experiment Group 2	27,366	0.333	0.471	0	1	Survey data
Experiment Group 3	27,366	0.333	0.471	0	1	Survey data
Nativism	26,445	-0.344	1.886	-3	3	Survey data
Incl. citizenship	26,118	1.464	1.265	-3	3	Survey data
Redistribution	25,913	0.282	1.432	-3	3	Survey data
Importance of migration	27,429	2.086	3.638	0	10	Survey data
Left-right self-placement	27,366	5.153	2.338	0	10	Survey data
Interest in politics	27,366	5.611	2.678	0	10	Survey data
Income						
Low income	24,316	0.371	0.483	0	1	Survey data
Middle income	24,316	0.453	0.498	0	1	Survey data
High income	24,316	0.176	0.380	0	1	Survey data
Age	27,429	41.147	13.185	18	66	Survey data
Gender						
Gender male	27,429	0.488	0.500	0	1	Survey data
Gender female	27,429	0.509	0.500	0	1	Survey data
Gender other	27,429	0.003	0.053	0	1	Survey data
Country of birth	27,366	0.059	0.235	0	1	Survey data
Occupation						
Employee perm. full-time	26,631	0.532	0.499	0	1	Survey data
Employee perm. Part-time	26,631	0.093	0.291	0	1	Survey data
Employee fixed term	26,631	0.030	0.171	0	1	Survey data
Freelance	26,631	0.062	0.242	0	1	Survey data
Student	26,631	0.088	0.284	0	1	Survey data
Job seeker	26,631	0.087	0.281	0	1	Survey data
Pensioner	26,631	0.070	0.255	0	1	Survey data
On social benefits	26,631	0.038	0.190	0	1	Survey data
Old-age dependency ratio	27,429	54.574	3.379	47.607	62.356	World Bank
Asylum claims last 3 yrs	27,429	3.496	4.322	0.125	21.305	UNHCR
Unemployment (ILO definition)	27,429	8.038	5.339	2.94	28.74	World Bank
Growth in GDP	27,429	-5.483	2.892	-11.250	0.659	World Bank
GDP per cap. PPP	27,429	40,053	12,939	11,466	63,586	World Bank
Perc. of foreigners	27,429	11.631	5.763	0.9	21.3	UN DESA
Change in perc. of foreigners	27,429	18.846	30.482	-17.3	159.9	UN DESA
Perc. of Muslims	27,429	3.354	2.924	0.1	11.1	See §2
Growth asylum claims last 2 yrs	27,429	-0.970	53.818	-85.421	152.501	UNHCR
Perc. vote for far-right	27,429	12.665	14.976	0	65.21	CMP/PopuList
Perc. with tertiary education	27,429	34.433	10.936	15.798	59.375	OECD/Eurostat
Country near border	27,429	0.556	0.497	0	1	See §2
EU-member	27,429	0.703	0.457	0	1	EU27

Tab. A2. Selection of countries and contextual variation

Country	Citizenship Model	Migration Regime	GCM Response*
Austria	Communitarian	Regionalist	-
Belgium	Communitarian	Regionalist	+
Canada	Libertarian	Market-globalist	+
Croatia	Republican	Regionalist	+/-
Czech Republic	Ethno-national	Nativist	-
Denmark	Ethno-national	Nativist	+/-
Estonia	Ethno-national	Nativist	+/-
France	Republican	Nation-statist	+
Germany	Communitarian	Regionalist	+
Greece	Ethno-national	Nation-statist	+
Hungary	Ethno-national	Nativist	-
Italy	Liberal	Regionalist	+
Lithuania	Ethno-national	Nation-statist	+/-
Netherlands	Communitarian	Nation-statist	+/-
Norway	Communitarian	Nation-statist	+/-
Poland	Ethno-national	Nativist	-
Romania	Ethno-national	Nativist	+/-
Slovakia	Ethno-national	Nativist	-
Slovenia	Republican	Regionalist	+
South Africa	Liberal	Human rights-globalist	+
Spain	Liberal	Human-rights globalist	+
Sweden	Communitarian	Regionalist	+
Mexico	Republican	Human-rights-globalist	+
Turkey	Republican	Market-globalist	+
UK	Liberal	Market-globalist	+
USA	Liberal	Market-globalist	-

* "+": full support to GCM; "-": rejected GCM; "+/-": not full or conditional support to GCM.

2. Variables and descriptive statistics

Table A1 above displays the descriptive statistics of all the variables introduced in the main text, as well as detailed references to sources and details on the modifications made. Most of the data was collected in an *ad hoc* survey. This section aims to describe our variables at greater length.

2.1. Nativism and Inclusive citizenship scales

Nativism, inclusive citizenship and attitudes to redistribution are scale variables ranging from -3 (most nativist, least inclusive and least in favor of redistribution) to 3 (least nativist, most inclusive and most in favor of redistribution). Their construction follows a process that is both deductive and inductive.

Nativism and inclusive citizenship

For nativism and inclusive citizenship, we use the following questions:

How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements?

(Answers on a 7-point Likert scale: Strongly agree, Agree, Partly agree, Neutral, Partly disagree, Disagree, Strongly disagree, Don't know)

a. *People whose ancestors and family have lived in [Country] for generations should always come first*

b. *Minorities whose ancestors and family have lived in the [Country] for generations should have the same citizen rights as the majority*

c. *People of foreign ancestry who are born and raised in the [Country] should have the same citizen rights as the majority*

d. *Immigrants not born here but who have been granted the [Country]'s citizenship should have the same citizen rights as the majority*

e. *All citizens of [Country] should be able to enjoy the same citizen rights without discrimination*

Each item was recoded to range from -3 to 3 so fit with the range of values described above. Theoretically, there is a clear distinction between item *a*. and the four other items. Item *a*., by stating that the country's native people always should come first, alludes to the nativist rhetoric that considers the members of the dominant ethnic group as the only full members of the nation (Mudde, 2007; Golder, 2016). Items *b*. to *e*. concern the rights attached to different levels of membership to the citizenry (Kabeer, 2005): ethnic minorities (*b*.), second or third generation migrants (*c*.), first generation migrants who acquired citizenship (*d*.), and the all-encompassing category of every citizen in the country (*e*.). The two scales are conceptually separate and only partially overlap. Empirically, the two scales are distinct, as the Principal Component Analysis (PCA) run on the five items demonstrate. More precisely, the PCA reveals the presence of two main components, together explaining 78% of the variance (table A3). Items *b*.-to-*e*. load significantly on component 1 whilst item *a*. loads overwhelmingly on component 2 (table A4). We then predict the values of component 1 (inclusive citizenship) and 2 (nativism) to compare them to, respectively, the mean of the raw distribution of items *b*.-to-*e.* and the raw distribution of item *a*.. Given the high correlation coefficients between component 1 and the mean of items *b*.-to-*e.* (0.999) and between component 2 and item *a*. (0.973), we decide to use the variables relying on raw values so as to retain easily interpretable variables (ranging from -3 to 3).

Tab. A3. Results of the PCA – proportion of variance explained

Component	Eigenvalue	Proportion explained	Cumulative proportion explained
Comp. 1	2.939	0.589	0.588
Comp. 2	0.979	0.196	0.784
Comp. 3	0.490	0.098	0.882
Comp. 4	0.321	0.064	0.946
Comp. 5	0.271	0.054	1.000

Tab. A4. Loadings of single variables on the components

Variables	Component 1	Component 2	Unexplained var.
Item a.	0.198	0.922	0.053
Item b.	0.448	-0.354	0.288
Item c.	0.512	-0.141	0.212
Item d.	0.511	0.063	0.230
Item e.	0.488	0.033	0.300

Taking a closer look at the resulting variables and their distribution (figure A1), there appears to be partial overlap between the two scales in the upper part of the graph[18]. Namely, the least nativists tend to hold more inclusive positions in terms of rights. Interestingly, the most nativists also support inclusive citizenship, with however more dispersion on the -3 to 3 scale, with more frequent exclusivist positions.

Fig. A1. Plotting nativism scale against inclusive citizenship scale

Note: noise added artificially to enhance clarity.

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
[18] We added some artificial noise in the data to see the distribution more clearly; hence the dots displayed in circles.

Note that, in order to test the effect of the two scales on our dependent variable, and the sensitivity of our results to the specification of the inclusive citizenship scale, the two variables were tested the one after the other and the various components of the inclusive citizenship scale were tested separately. The results (not reported) are similar in terms of direction (negative), statistical significance (at the 99% level) and in terms of magnitude (with moderate changes at the odds ratio's second decimal place).

Attitudes towards redistribution

Attitudes towards redistribution focuses on whether respondents would favor inclusion of refugees into welfare policy targets. We use the following question:

> *When it comes to the refugees already admitted and living legally in [country], your country should… (answers on a 7-point Likert scale: Strongly agree, Agree, Partly agree, Neutral, Partly disagree, Disagree, Strongly disagree, Don't know)*
> *a. Give them access to education, competence-building, and job-seeking on equal terms as citizens*
> *b. Give them access to existing social benefits and services on equal terms as citizens*
> *c. Give them privileges beyond citizens' entitlements to enable them to earn a decent living (e.g. free vocational training, cost-free investment credits, public-funded traineeships etc.)*
> *d. Increase refugees' safe and voluntary return to their countries of origin*
> *e. Increase refugees' return, by force if necessary, to their countries of origin*

We rely on items *a.*-to-*c.* to define the contours of attitudes to redistribution. We follow a similar approach as that for nativism and inclusive citizenship. Namely, we run a PCA of the three items. They overwhelmingly result in one component explaining a great deal of the variance (68%; table A5), whilst the other ones present low eigenvalues. We predict component 1 and compare it to the average of the three items under consideration. Here too, the correlation coefficient is high (0.997) thus suggesting that the arithmetic average conveys the same information, with the benefit of clinging to the original values for interpretation. The variable thus ranges from -3 (least redistributive attitude) to 3 (most redistributive attitude).

Tab. A5. Results of the PCA – proportion of variance explained

Component	Eigenvalue	Proportion explained	Cumulative proportion explained
Comp. 1	2.046	0.682	0.682
Comp. 2	0.670	0.224	0.906
Comp. 3	0.283	0.094	1.000

Tab. A6. Loadings of single variables on the component

Variables	Component 1	Unexplained var.
Item a.	0.594	0.278
Item b.	0.630	0.187
Item c.	0.500	0.489

Interestingly, the redistribution scale is only weekly correlated to nativism (with correlation coefficient 0.192) and inclusive citizenship (0.454), confirming their empirical distinction.

2.2. Other individual level independent variables

To measure salience, the respondents were asked which three issues among a list of issues (including immigration) they think were the most important challenges currently facing their country. Subsequently, the respondents were asked to indicate more precisely how important these three issues were to them personally. This results in a scale variable ranging from 0 (not mentioned) to 10 (mentioned and considered very important). Left-right self-placement is a scale variable ranging from 0 (left) to 10 (right). Interest in politics follows a similar design with 0 for not interested and 10 for very interested. The variable on income was constructed as categorical and contains three values: low, middle, and high income. Building on research in other scholarly fields[19], the range of incomes relies on the distribution of gross monthly income relative to the median of monthly gross personal income at the country level. Low income is thus considered to fall beneath 60% of the median; high income is above 140% of the median; and middle income is in between. Employment status consists in a series of binary variables that summarizes the respondents' position in the labor market. They include the following categories: employed permanently full-time (the reference category), employed permanently part-time, employed fixed-term, freelance, student, job-seeker, pensioner, people on social benefits.

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[19] Notably, studies on poverty in economics and demography define relative poverty (ILO) or at-risk-of-poverty (Eurostat) as being about 60% of the median income.

2.3. Country level independent variables

Regarding variables that were taken from other data sources, they concern country level independent variables. We shall mention that most demographics variables were extracted from the World Bank's data repository, which covers all the countries in our study. Data relating to asylum more specifically was retrieved from the United Nation High Commissioner for Refugees' data finder (UNHCR). We calculated the total number of asylum claims per country over the years 2018-2020, and standardized the result by the country's population size. The data is presented in asylum claims per thousand inhabitants. We also calculated the percentage of change from 2018 to 2020 as a way to proxy the dynamics of the asylum pressure on the receiving country. Percentage of foreigner in resident population comes from the United Nations' Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA). From the same data source, we calculated the percentage change between the share of foreign residents in 2015 and in 2020 (the data is only available every five years). To account for the cultural differences of the out-group, we use as a proxy the share of Muslims in mostly Christian societies (and the share of non-Muslims in Turkey). The data is gathered from different data sources: PEW research centre offers estimates for EU countries[20] in 2016, for the USA[21] in 2017 and for Mexico[22] in 2010; Statistics Canada[23] for Canada in 2017; and from the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) for South Africa 2015. Given the large population of Muslims in Turkey (estimated between 98 and 99%), we consider as an indicator of outer-ness not being Muslim. The data for Turkey comes from an average of data from the CIA (99.8% but that does not indicate the date it refers to), the PEW research center's estimates from 2010 (98.6%) and the estimates from the World Value Survey of 2018 (98%; see Haerpfer et al., 2022). Data on vote for the far-right considers the last national elections before our own data collection and is taken from the Comparative Manifesto Project (Volkens et al., 2020), while far-right parties are identified through the PopuList database (Rooduijn et al., 2019). The data on percentage of the population with tertiary education considers the share of the population between 25 and 64 years-old with tertiary education (ISCED 5 to 8) out of the total population in this age range. Given lack of coverage in other data sources, we combined OECD and Eurostat data after having ascertained correlation between the two sources for the countries represented in both databases. Finally, the

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[20] See: https://www.pewforum.org/2017/11/29/europes-growing-muslim-population/.
[21] See: https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/01/03/new-estimates-show-u-s-muslim-population-continues-to-grow/.
[22] See: https://www.pewforum.org/2011/01/27/table-muslim-population-by-country/.
[23] See: https://www.statcan.gc.ca/en/dai/smr08/2017/smr08_219_2017#a3.

countries near the border are those countries closer to an origin country than to another destination country. The countries are classified as follows:

- Near the border: POL, SVK, LTU, ROU, HUN, GRC, HRV, ITA, ESP, TUR, USA, ZAF, MEX, EST:
- Away from borders: AUT, BEL, CAN, CZE, DEU, DNK, FRA, GBR, NLD, NOR, SWE, SVN.

3. Factorial survey experiment

The survey experiment is described in the main text. Figure 3 therein provides a depiction of the respondents' answers by subtracting the percentage of people replying "pay" in group 3 to the percentage of these in group 1. Figure A2 provides a comprehensive illustration of country differences by plotting the mean of those answering "pay" for each of the three groups. The figure adds information to figure 3, even though the pattern it displays is similar.

Fig. A2. Percentage of respondents willing to pay another country, by country and treatment group.

Percentage answering 'pay' for each group of respondents

In the context of an international survey with countries featuring different purchase powers, the amounts presented in the vignettes had to be adjusted in some instances. For European countries

and Turkey, the amounts are as presented in the main text. They do not reflect differences in purchase power inasmuch as the amounts are close to that featured in EU policy proposals. Firstly, the €5,000 amount is close to that planned as solidarity contribution (from EU to member state) in the framework of the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF). Secondly, the highest amount; i.e. €250,000, is that planned in defunct Dublin IV regulation as a penalty for unwillingness to cooperate.

For non-European countries, the amounts are presented in table A7:

Tab. A7. Conversion of the amounts for the vignettes in non-European countries

	Group 1	Group 2	Group 3
Canada	CAD 7,500	CAD 75,000	CAD 375,000
Mexico	MXP 15,000	MXP 150,000	MXP 750,000
USA	USD 5,000	USD 50,000	USD 250,000
South Africa	ZAR 20,000	ZAR 200,000	ZAR 1,000,000

4. Robustness tests and model fit

The results presented in the main text are robust to various model specifications. Most notably, there is very little difference between the coefficients yielded by random intercept (M2) and fixed effect (M3) models, thus suggesting that most of the variation comes from individual level factors. This also suggests that heterogeneity is correctly modelled through random intercepts and that there is no confounding of within- and between-cluster effects. The Hausmann test confirms the former and shows that there is no significant difference between coefficients computed through random and fixed effects. Models differentiating within- and between-cluster effects confirm the absence of cluster confounding (table A8; M5, variable with _BTW suffix are country averages): our coefficients of interest and their statistical significance change very little, so that our conclusions remain unchanged.

To provide further evidence of the effect of nativism, inclusive citizenship and redistribution, we run separate models for each treatment group (table A8; M6-8). For matters of legibility, country level variables are not reported but their coefficients are in line with those presented in the main text. We also omit standard errors for the same reason. The effect of nativism and redistribution appear to be constant across groups, thus confirming the results displayed in figures 4 in the main text. However, inclusive citizenship presents different coefficients and statistical significances (M6-8) from that of the model considering all three groups together (M2). Namely, the coefficient is sizably shrunk and non-significant for group 1 and 2 while it is larger and significant at the 99% level for group 3. This indicates that people's

position on inclusive citizenship decreases their likelihood to answer "pay" only when the cost is the highest.

Tab. A8. Results of logistic regressions with random intercept, Average Marginal Effects.

Average Marginal Effects	M2		M5		M6 (Gp 1)		M7 (Gp 2)		M8 (Gp 3)	
Group 2 w/ gp.1	-0.0743	***	-0.0741	***						
Group 3 w/ gp.1	-0.1302	***	-0.1299	***						
Nativism	-0.0170	***	-0.0169	***	-0.0171	***	-0.0188	***	-0.0158	***
Inclus. Citiz.	-0.0116	***	-0.0117	***	-0.0033		-0.0090		-0.0219	***
Redistribution	-0.0619	***	-0.0616	***	-0.0749	***	-0.0618	***	-0.0499	***
Importance immig.	0.0118	***	0.0118	***	0.0142	***	0.0118	***	0.0095	***
Left-right placement	0.0096	***	0.0096	***	0.0111	***	0.0092	***	0.0080	***
Interest in politics	0.0042	**	0.0042	**	0.0033		0.0022		0.0065	**
Income categ. 2 w/ cat.1	0.0112		0.0113		0.0161		0.0265	*	-0.0097	
Income categ. 3 w/ cat.1	0.0010		0.0026		-0.0061		0.0189		-0.0162	
Age	0.0026	***	0.0026	***	0.0048	***	0.0016	***	0.0016	***
Gender female	0.0107	*	0.0110	*	0.0043		0.0126		0.0166	
Gender other	-0.0280		-0.0299		-0.1165		0.1292		-0.0532	
Country of birth	0.0499	***	0.0492	***	0.0534	**	0.0479	**	0.0434	**
Occup.-employee perm. parttime	0.0018		0.0021		0.0111		0.0047		-0.0146	
Occup.-employee fixed term	0.0060		0.0055		0.0055		-0.0044		0.0111	
Occup.-freelance	0.0043		0.0047		0.0120		0.0154		-0.0155	
Occup.-student	0.0147		0.0145		0.0545	**	-0.0411		0.0307	
Occup.-job seeker	0.0067		0.0072		0.0225		0.0081		-0.0157	
Occup.-pensioner	0.0050		0.0049		0.0198		-0.0182		0.0124	
Occup.-on social benefits	0.0076		0.0071		0.0422		-0.0240		0.0030	
Country level variables omitted										
Nativism_BTW			-0.0861	***						
Inclus. Citiz._ BTW			0.0537	***						
Redistribution_BTW			-0.1296	***						
Importance immig._ BTW			0.0964	***						
Left-right placement_ BTW			0.0529	***						
Interest in politics_ BTW			-0.0206	***						
Income categ. 2_ BTW			-0.5128	***						
Income categ. 3_ BTW			-0.3277	***						
Age_ BTW			0.0343	***						
Gender female_ BTW			-2.8152	***						
Gender other_ BTW			6.2793	***						
Country of birth_ BTW			-0.6326	***						
Occup. 2_ BTW			1.1020	***						
Occup. 3_ BTW			0.7931	***						
Occup. 4_ BTW			-2.9522	***						
Occup. 5_ BTW			-0.1901	***						
Occup. 6_ BTW			-0.2566	***						
Occup. 7_ BTW			-0.8955	***						
Occup. 8_ BTW			0.6568	***						
N	22209		22209		7408		7400		7401	

Significance levels: *** $p < 0.01$. ** $p < 0.05$. * $p < 0.1$. Robust standard errors, not reported.

Considering the model's goodness of fit, we test how well it fits the data by partitioning the predicted values in 300 quantiles, thus resulting in little groups of about 70 to 80 observations. We then compare the 300 group means to observed values. Figure A3 provides a summary of

the result. As can be seen, there is a relatively good fit between observed and predicted values, thus suggesting the adequacy of the modelling strategy and the soundness of the results.

Fig. A3. Plotting observed and fitted values for 300 quantiles of predicted values.

Given the remaining noise in the averages (figure A3), we inspect model fit further by plotting the deviance residuals for every single observation (figure A4). This allows us to see if potential influential observations affect the results significantly. The observations are grouped by countries so as to identify potential patterns; one observation by country is singled out and labelled. As figure A4 shows, there is no outlying observation. Mexico and the Czech Republic display values that are overall higher for the former and lower for the latter, but they still remain on similar levels as the other countries.

Fig. A4. Plotting deviance residuals for observations, grouped by countries.

5.   Alternative models and hypotheses

To further test the validity of the results presented in the main text, we explore another set of hypotheses here. Firstly, we consider general attitudes to international protection as a dependent variable to assess whether the results compare with those obtained through our experiment. Investigating people's attitudes towards asylum is also more common in the specialized literature (von Hermanni and Neumann, 2018; Koos and Seibel, 2019; Abdelaaty and Steele, 2020). Then, we take a look at overall preferences in migration and asylum matters to see whether unconstrained preferences affect our results. In line with other sets of studies (Hatton, 2016; Crepaz and Damron, 2009), we consider the effect of countries' spending in social policies, which could in turn affect attitudes towards migration and asylum. We also provide some insight into what can be considered the extreme cases: respondents willing to pay however high the cost; and respondents willing to accept however low the cost. Finally, we look at the composition of the foreign-born respondent group and assess its effect on the overall results of our study.

5.1. Attitudes towards asylum as a dependent variable

While almost no study has looked into people's preferred policy when it comes to asylum, several studies have investigated attitudes towards asylum and refugees[24]. In order to test the robustness of our results, we test our variables of interest onto general dispositions towards asylum and compare our results with previous findings. Our survey asks respondents whether they agree or disagree with the statement "All countries should collaborate and strive by all means to protect the world's refugees". Answers are recorded on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from "strongly disagree" to "strongly agree". They also have the possibility to answer "I don't know". The distribution of our respondents' answers is described in figure 1 in the main text. Given that the question is a continuous scale, we run a multilevel linear regression with the same covariates as in the analyses in the main text (results reported in table A9; same regressors as in M2). We confirm our results with the use of an ordered logistic regression, suitable to regress on scale dependent variables. The results (not reported) are in line with those obtained via linear regression.

First of all, the variables linked to the experiment are not significant, which indicates that random assignment to either of the three treatments occurred efficiently. Should the effect of the treatment be significant, random assignment would have not been successful as one group would have views that are significantly different from another. Nativism, Inclusive citizenship and redistribution all have a positive effect on support for international protection, meaning that the least nativist, the most inclusive and the most inclined to redistribution tend to support international collaboration to protect the world's refugees. Similarly, those placing themselves at the right of the political spectrum (thus in line with Koos and Seibel, 2019, and Abdelaaty and Steele, 2020) and those for whom migration is a salient issue are less supportive of international protection. Interestingly, and that differs from (but without contrasting) the analysis in the main text, interest in politics appear to have an effect but not income[25]: those most interested in politics are significantly more in favor of international protection.

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[24] Note though that there are still only a handful of studies that directly investigate attitudes towards refugee and asylum. Most studies are concerned with attitudes towards immigration, some of which also include disposition toward asylum as a predictor of attitudes to immigration (see for instance Mayda, 2006; O'Rourke and Sinnott, 2006).

[25] Evidence on the effect of wealth was also found in Koos and Seibel (2019) who, however, looked at subjective economic situation of the respondents. Abdelaaty and Steele (2020) did not find any effect.

Tab. A9. Results of a linear regression with random effects, linear coefficients.

DV: position on Intl. protection	M9	
Group 2 w/ gp.1	-0.0091	
Group 3 w/ gp.1	-0.0039	
Nativism	0.0268	***
Inclus. Citiz.	0.3378	***
Redistribution	0.4231	***
Importance immig.	-0.0206	***
Left-right placement	-0.0494	***
Interest in politics	0.0217	***
Income categ. 2 w/ cat.1	0.0296	
Income categ. 3 w/ cat.1	0.0569	
Age	0.0030	**
Gender female	0.0224	
Gender other	0.1455	*
Country of birth	-0.1775	***
Occup.-employee perm. parttime	-0.0212	
Occup.-employee fixed term	0.0115	
Occup.-freelance	-0.0356	
Occup.-student	0.0148	
Occup.-job seeker	0.0203	
Occup.-pensioner	-0.0193	
Occup.-on social benefits	0.0238	
Old-age dependency ratio	0.0167	
Asylum claims last 3 yrs	-0.0061	
Unemployement	0.0229	**
GDP growth	0.0378	
GDP per cap. PPP	-0.0000	
Percentage foreigner	0.0160	
Change in perc. of foreigners	0.0031	
Perc. of Muslims	0.1423	***
Growth in asylum applications	0.0016	
Vote far-right last election	0.0042	
Percent with tertiary education	-0.0025	
Near the border state	0.4255	***
EU member state	-0.5588	**
Constant	-0.6845	
N	**22086**	

Significance levels: *** $p < 0.01$. ** $p < 0.05$. * $p < 0.1$. Robust standard errors, not reported.

Age appears to have a small negative, yet significant, effect on support for international protection, an effect found in Koos and Seibel (2019) but not in von Hermanni and Neumann (2018) and Abdelaaty and Steele (2020). Strikingly, being foreign-born has a negative effect on support for international protection while Abdelaaty and Steele (2020) found an effect going the opposite way. This could stem from the fact that most foreign-born respondents in our data were born in the EU (see section 5.5 below) and that membership to the EU seems to translate into less favorable views on international cooperation for protection.

All in all, the individual-level variables of interest seem to confirm the results presented in the main text. Support to the idea that all the countries should collaborate to protect the world refugees is found in the least nativist, most inclusivist, in favor of redistribution, left-leaning respondents for whom the issue of migration is not too salient.

5.2. The effect of attitudes towards asylum

Our experiment (described in the main text) splits the sample in three groups of respondents, each of which is *constrained* to make a choice between accept and pay. It is thus useful to investigate the effect of overall attitudes towards protection by relying on other questions in our survey. This allows us to assess the results presented in the main text in the light of the respondents' position on the issue. With the addition of controls on people's preference, we allow the respondents to formulate *unconstrained* preferences: they may indicate how much they agree or disagree with both options accept or pay. For that matter, we make use of three questions.

The first question concerns overall support for international collaboration on protection (hereinafter Q1). It reads as follows:

> **Q1:** "How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?
> All countries should collaborate and strive by all means to protect the world's refugees."

The second and third questions are based on a same statement, of which two answers were considered (hereinafter Q2 and Q3):

> "[Country] should help people who need protection from persecution outside their own country by:
> - **Q2:** Admitting people whose need for protection has been affirmed by other states hosting large numbers of people in order to share their burden.
> - **Q3:** Giving money to countries hosting large numbers of people who are fleeing persecution."

Respondents were invited to answer on all three items on a 7-point Likert scale with the following values: Strongly agree (value 1), Agree, Partly agree, Neutral, Partly disagree, Disagree, Strongly disagree (value 7; Don't know as an eighth value).

As shown in the main text, a good deal of the survey's respondents is in favour of international protection (Q1; see also figure 1 main text): about 66.6% of them agree to some extent with the fact that all countries should collaborate to protect the world's refugees[26]. Regarding the second and third questions, they are respectively considered and constructed as "accept" (Q2) and "pay" (Q3) scales. Figure A4 plots the one against the other (artificial noise added for better legibility).

Fig. A4. Plot of Q2 and Q3, scale from 1 (strongly agree) to 7 (strongly disagree).

Q2 and Q3 are recoded in order to have three values for each scale: neutral, not-accept (or not-pay), yes-accept (or yes-pay). The combination of these two variables covers a large spectrum of absolute preferences as to how respondents would rather protect (or not) asylum seekers and refugees. Table A10 reports the results of M2 (in the main text) to which the three variables presented in this section are added (M10). Several other models were computed, first by including the two scale variables (Q2 and Q3), and then adding Q1. Two interaction terms were

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[26] The figure here are not weighted by population sizes. It thus regards the survey respondents without inference on the populations of these countries.

also introduced alternatively in the model: i) an interaction term between the variables resulting from Q2 and Q3 so as to have different combinations of the two sets of values; ii) a three-way interaction between Q1, Q2 and Q3. Additionally, we run the same model on the three subsamples constituted by our three treatment groups.

The results of the different models do not add – nor do they alter – those presented in table A8. More precisely, the three variables are significant at the 99 or 95% level and produce coefficients in line with our expectations and results (presented in the main text). One difference ought to be noted though: the coefficient for inclusive citizenship – which we have established as being significant if all groups are considered together (M2, table 2 in main text) but not if they are considered separately (M6-8, table A8) – is not significant in table A10 but is significant at the 95% level when M10 is run on group 3. This further underlines the lack of robustness of the inclusive citizenship variable. Regarding the added variables, Q1, which basically represents people's willingness to see countries collaborate to protect the world refugees, is negatively associated with the outcome. Put in a nutshell, the more people think refugee is a world matter for which countries should collaborate, the more they are inclined to accept refugees in their territory. Similarly, people's agreement with hosting refugees (Q2) is negatively correlated to their willingness to pay financial contribution, whilst their agreement with paying countries struggling to host people in need (Q3) translates with a higher willingness to pay financial contribution. More importantly, controlling for unconstrained preferences do not affect much the results presented in the main text, if not for inclusive citizenship, which is not significant across the groups. Our coefficients of interest are of comparable statistical significance and magnitude.

5.3. The effect of social expenditure

We also investigate the effect of social expenditure on our dependent variable. Social expenditure may have an effect on people's attitudes towards migration, and possibly towards international solidarity when it comes to accepting asylum seekers or paying another country to do it. It could be that exclusionary sentiment develops towards low-skilled immigrant in countries with a developed welfare states where foreigners would be perceived as an economic and fiscal strain (Dustmann and Preston, 2007). It could also be that more generous welfare states foster more tolerant citizens. Crepaz and Damron (2009; but see also Hatton, 2016) have found evidence for the latter: they have shown that the more comprehensive welfare state is, the more tolerant citizens are of immigrants. In their own words: "comprehensive welfare

systems reduce welfare chauvinism and experience fewer conflicts in the area of politics of identity than in liberal regimes" (p.457).

We test the hypothesis using two proxies alternatively (results in table A10). Firstly, we rely on OECD's social spending as a percentage of GDP data. Because it covers a range of social benefits, such as cash benefits (targeted at low-income households, the elderly, disabled, sick, unemployed, or young persons), direct in-kind provision of goods and services, and tax breaks with social purposes, OECD's social spending is a good candidate to measure the generosity of national welfare states. The downside of using OECD's data is that it does not cover some of the countries in our database; namely, Croatia, Romania, and South Africa. We thus use IMF's data on the functions of government (COFOG), which breaks down states' expenses (as a percentage of GDP) in different categories. In order to have a measurement of welfare states' generosity that somewhat matches OECD's indicator, we use the functions of government that are covered by the latter. They are: sickness and disability (COFOG 10.1), old age (COFOG 10.2), survivors (COFOG10.3), family and children (COFOG 10.4), unemployment (COFOG 10.5), housing (COFOG 10.6), and social exclusion (COFOG 10.7). The two indicators remain fairly different across countries but are significantly correlated within them. For IMF's data, only Mexico is missing.

We test the two indicators alternatively. The OECD's indicator of social expenditure is statistically significant at the 99% level but of little magnitude (M11). The IMF's one is not significant (M12). The coefficients for OECD's indicator is positive: increased social expenditure corresponds to lower probability to want to pay, a finding in support of Crepaz and Damron (2009) and Hatton (2016). Most importantly, the inclusion of these variables in the model does not put in question the results presented in the main text: our coefficients of interest remain of similar magnitude and statistical significance; except perhaps for inclusive citizenship that is only significant at the 95% level, which brings further evidence of the lack of robustness of the variable (as highlighted above and in the main text). Some country-level coefficients become significant with the inclusion of one or the other variable. Namely, unemployment and vote for the far-right in M11; percentage of people with tertiary education in M12. Statistical significance is however not robust across models and the addition of the variables to the model do not improve overall goodness of fit.

Tab. A10. Alternative models, random effects, Average Marginal Effects.

DV: accept (0) or pay (1)	M10		M11		M12	
Group 2 w/ gp.1	-0.0751	***	-0.0735	***	-0.0728	***
Group 3 w/ gp.1	-0.1306	***	-0.1285	***	-0.1323	***
Nativism	-0.0162	***	-0.0181	***	-0.0172	***
Inclus. Citiz.	-0.0039		-0.0100	**	-0.0111	**
Redistribution	-0.0516	***	-0.0644	***	-0.0629	***
Importance immig.	0.0112	***	0.0118	***	0.0122	***
Left-right placement	0.0079	***	0.0097	***	0.0102	***
Interest in politics	0.0040	**	0.0047	**	0.0040	**
Income categ. 2 w/ cat.1	0.0119		0.0146		0.0086	
Income categ. 3 w/ cat.1	-0.0009		0.0040		-0.0026	
Age	0.0026	***	0.0027	***	0.0026	***
Gender female	0.0130	**	0.0159	**	0.0112	*
Gender other	-0.0192		-0.0531		-0.0733	
Country of birth	0.0421	***	0.0561	***	0.0514	***
Occup.-empl. perm. partime	0.0003		-0.0000		-0.0010	
Occup.-empl. fixed term	0.0048		0.0012		0.0044	
Occup.-freelance	0.0062		-0.0025		-0.0001	
Occup.-student	0.0148		0.0207		0.0106	
Occup.-job seeker	0.0095		0.0063		0.0040	
Occup.-pensioner	0.0048		0.0113		0.0026	
Occup.-on social benefits	0.0087		0.0041		0.0053	
Q1	-0.0219	***				
Q2	0.0435	***				
Q3	-0.0390	***				
Old-age dependency ratio	0.0033		0.0047	*	0.0034	
Asylum claims last 3 yrs	0.0055	***	0.0048	***	0.0068	***
Unemployement	0.0014		0.0085	***	-0.0029	
GDP growth	0.0084	**	0.0045		0.0096	***
GDP per cap. PPP	0.0000		0.0000	**	-0.0000	
Percentage foreigner	-0.0050	**	-0.0075	***	-0.0056	**
Change in perc. of foreigners	-0.0006	***	-0.0018	**	-0.0009	***
Perc. of Muslims	-0.0056		-0.0097	**	-0.0063	
Growth in asylum app.	-0.0003	**	-0.0005	***	-0.0001	
Vote far-right last election	0.0007		0.0016	***	0.0005	
Percent with tertiary educ.	-0.0015		-0.0023		-0.0025	**
Near the border state	-0.0663	***	-0.1230	***	-0.0658	***
EU member state	0.0067		0.0393	*	-0.0109	
OECD's social exp.			-0.0056	***		
IMF's COFOG					0.0002	
N	21924		19621		21334	

Significance levels: *** $p < 0.01$. ** $p < 0.05$. * $p < 0.1$. Robust standard errors, not reported.

5.4. Insight into "extreme cases"

Extreme cases, so to speak, are respondents willing to answer "pay" whatever the cost or that answer accept even when the cost is minimal.

Firstly, regarding those willing to pay whatever the cost (namely €250,000 per asylum seeker), there are quite some differences among countries. Not surprisingly, many of them are located in the Czech Republic, Denmark, and Hungary (as can be seen in figure A2 above). A more surprising case is Turkey, which has been under significant migratory pressure since the EU-Turkey agreement of 2016. Each of these countries account for more than 5% of the total

number of respondents (i.e. all countries considered) that would pay whatever the cost. In terms of national subsamples, they account for about 14 to 15% of their national sample. In order to investigate this further, we run a logistic regression (not reported) with, as a dependent variable, belonging to this group of extreme cases and, as independent variables, the individual-level covariates present in the original models (cross-country heterogeneity is controlled via country fixed effects). Unsurprisingly, those likely to pay whatever the cost happen to be more nativist, less inclusivist, less redistributionist, less in support of international collaboration for protection, more right-wing, for whom migration is more important an issue and they are also older (43 years old on average).

Now turning to those who would accept, however little the amount they would have to pay to have another country accept asylum seekers, there are some differences across countries but they are less pronounced than for the previous extreme case. Mexico is the country with the highest number of respondents in this category (24.8% of the Mexican sample), and bout 5% of the total number of people in this group of extreme cases. Here too, we run a logistic regression (not reported) with the dependent variable being being part of this extreme cases group. The modeling choices are the same as those for the group above. The determinant of belonging to this group are also less clear than for the previous one, although the strongest (and significant) coefficient determining the probability to be in this group is general support for international collaboration to protect the world's refugees. They also appear to be less nativist as the coefficient is significant at the 99% level, even though of limited magnitude. Levels of inclusiveness do not seem to affect belonging to this group. Migration as an issue is also much less important for this group.

All in all, the results presented in this paragraph are very much in line with the results presented in the main text, so that investigating extreme cases does not yield additional results.

5.5. Respondents' place of birth

Table 2 in the main text displays a statistically significant effect of country of birth, specified as a dummy variable: 0 for local, 1 for abroad. This section looks deeper into this result by further splitting the foreign-born respondents by their area of origin. Table A11 details their distribution in terms of frequencies and percentages.

Tab. A11. Area of origin for foreign-born respondents

Area of birth	Frequency	Percentage
East Asia	160	9.96
Southern central Asia	113	7.04
West Asia	64	3.99
Eastern Africa	59	3.67
North Africa	34	2.12
Southern Africa	48	2.99
Western Africa	16	1
North America	45	2.8
South and central America	123	7.66
European Union	545	33.94
Eastern Europe	211	13.14
Other Europe	73	4.55
Other	178	7.16
Total	**1606**	**100**

Nota: other Europe includes Iceland, Monaco, Norway, Switzerland and the UK.

We run M2 (presented in table 2, main text) while substituting the dummy variable country of birth with a set of dummy variables for the areas of origin listed in table A11. We take native-born respondents as the reference category (which represents 93.9% of the whole sample). In table A12, we report the coefficients and significance levels for each of these categories. The only two statistically significant categories are respondents born in the EU and respondents born in other European countries (see nota table A11 for more on other European countries). Being born in the EU significantly increases people's will to pay while being born in other Western European countries decreases it. For the former, note that M9 in table A9 above shows that respondents in EU countries tend to be less in favor of international collaboration on protection, which likely explains the sign of the coefficient in M13. Regarding the latter, note that there are a limited number of observations to calculate the coefficient. The other coefficients are very much in line with the results presented in the main text and are therefore not altered by controlling for areas of origin. Namely, the effects of all the variables in M2 and M13 are similar in terms of direction and magnitude of the effect as well as in terms of statistical significance. The only variable that somewhat differs is gender for females: it is only significant at the 90% level here while it is at the 95% level in M2.

Tab. A12. Results of logistic regressions with random effects, Average Marginal Effects.

DV: accept (0) or pay (1)	M13	
Group 2 w/ gp.1	-0.0739	***
Group 3 w/ gp.1	-0.1295	***
Nativism	-0.0170	***
Inclus. Citiz.	-0.0118	***
Redistribution	-0.0617	***
Importance immig.	0.0118	***
Left-right placement	0.0095	***
Interest in politics	0.0042	**
Income categ. 2 w/ cat.1	0.0116	
Income categ. 3 w/ cat.1	0.0016	
Age	0.0026	***
Gender female	0.0105	
Gender other	-0.0287	
East Asia	0.0477	*
Eastern Africa	-0.0122	
Eastern Europe	0.0406	
European Union	0.0970	***
North Africa	-0.0026	
North America	-0.0025	
Other	0.0688	
Other Europe	-0.1763	***
South and Central America	0.0572	
Southern Africa	0.0875	
Southern Central Asia	0.0764	
West Asia	-0.0605	
Western Africa	-0.0327	
Occup.-employee perm. parttime	0.0024	
Occup.-employee fixed term	0.0058	
Occup.-freelance	0.0047	
Occup.-student	0.0160	
Occup.-job seeker	0.0074	
Occup.-pensioner	0.0061	
Occup.-on social benefits	0.0076	
Old-age dependency ratio	0.0032	
Asylum claims last 3 yrs	0.0055	***
Unemployement	0.0011	
GDP growth	0.0081	**
GDP per cap. PPP	0.0000	
Percentage foreigner	-0.0053	**
Change in perc. of foreigners	-0.0007	***
Perc. of Muslims	-0.0093	*
Growth in asylum applications	-0.0004	**
Vote far-right last election	0.0007	
Percent with tertiary education	-0.0014	
Near the border state	-0.0796	***
EU member state	0.0214	
N	**22209**	

Significance levels: *** $p < 0.01$. ** $p < 0.05$. * $p < 0.1$. Robust standard errors, not reported.

6. Analysis of country differences and treatment effect

As figure 3 in the main text shows, there are significant differences between countries if we consider the treatment effect as the difference between the share of people answering "pay" in group 1 and its counterpart in group 3. Such differences range from 27 percentage points (p.p.) for Slovenia to 6 p.p. for Mexico. To look into the effect of the treatments across countries, we investigate the effect of macro variables onto our dependent variable aggregated at country level as abovementioned. To shed some light on these differences, we compute the bivariate Pearson correlation coefficients (and statistical significance of the latter). Table A13 summarizes the results and shows the absence of evidence of systematic correlation between the dependent variable and the other country-level covariates featured in our models. Namely, the correlation coefficients are quite low and their statistical significance far from the 95% bar. We also run a series of bivariate linear regressions; it yields similar results (not reported): the coefficients are of limited magnitude and none of them are statistically significant.

Tab. A13. Pearson correlation coefficients and significance levels between difference in percentages of "pay" in groups 1 and group 3, related to other country-level variables.

	DV=%pay in gp.1 - %pay in gp.3	
	Coefficient	Significance level
DV=%pay in gp.1 - %pay in gp.3	1.0000	
Old-age dependency ratio	-0.0492	0.8112
Asylum claims last 3 yrs	-0.1778	0.3847
Unemployment	-0.0064	0.9754
GDP growth	-0.0422	0.8378
GDP per cap. PPP	-0.1997	0.3280
Percentage foreigner	-0.1082	0.5989
Change in perc. of foreigners	-0.2192	0.2821
Perc. of Muslims	-0.1273	0.5355
Growth in asylum app.	0.1532	0.4550
Vote far-right last election	0.1226	0.5507
Percent with tertiary educ.	-0.1470	0.4738

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