



From Polarization to Unification, Turkish Politics and the Left View Accused of Hanging the Menderes

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To cite this article: Derya BERRAK, PhD, Science, Volume 4, No. 12-1, 2022, p. 01 – 25. - 0099-0001-2212-0101.

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ISSN: 2667-9515

Barcode: 977266795001

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Abstract

Throughout Turkey's history, there has been a hostile environment for leftists. A 2021 study found that two-thirds of people describe themselves as conservative, nationalist or Islamist, while only 13% describe themselves as social democrats or socialists. In general, masses of people supported populist conservatives who, while in power, served the economic interests of the elite, while during the election campaign they appealed to their own religious sentiments and resentment towards the elite. This happened despite populist conservatives serving the economic interests of the elite. Conservatives in Turkey have succeeded in branding the CHP as the party of an authoritarian state, despite having held control of the country's government for most of the country's history for the past century. Above all, the legacy of secularism embraced by the CHP has contributed to widening the gap between the party's middle class, progressive base and the ordinary masses. Meanwhile, some rightists have functioned as staunch defenders of traditional values. Erdogan pulled Turkey out of the Istanbul Convention a year ago, citing concerns that the convention undermines the concept of 'family values' and promotes the rights of individuals. As one might guess from a progressive, Kılıçdaroğlu swore that he would re-sign Turkey to the contract if he became Turkey's president the following year. However, the head of the CHP is not in isolation. The support of

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Meral Akşener, the leader of the right-wing nationalist IYI Party, the second largest party in the coalition being the moderate opposition, shows that the traditionalist attitude has developed in Turkey. From Atatürk to the creation of innovative ideas The Republican People's Party (CHP) was founded in 1923, the year the Republic of Turkey was founded. Kemal Ataturk, who founded the Republic of Turkey and served as the country's first president, was the driving force behind sweeping cultural reforms that significantly reduced the public appearance and influence of Islam. Initially, the CHP was a private partnership of modernization officials and wealthy landowners.

Keywords: *Polarized Turkey, Unified Turkey, Turkish Politics, Roots in Turkey, Right and Left, Left Accused of Hanging Menderes, Six Table*

1. Introduction

Autocratic single-party control lasted until 1950, when he was ousted by the populist-conservative Democratic Party (DP) in the country's first democratic elections. After that, the CHP transformed itself into a democratic party and later a social democratic party.

Kılıçdaroğlu, who has been the head of the CHP since 2010, has made it a priority to increase the popularity of the party by courting religious conservative voters. Since 1950, the CHP has been victorious in only three elections (1961, 1973 and 1977) as the first party and has never managed to get a majority of the votes. Kılıçdaroğlu resurrected a longstanding legacy of left-wing populism, and this, combined with access to religious traditionalists, profited in the CHP's heyday of the 1970s. He succeeded in bridging the gap between the secular and the religious and winning the support of the working class and small peasants when he went left. The Communist Party of Turkey (CHP) openly declared that it belonged to the democratic left in 1976. The following year, its dynamic leader Bülent Ecevit, influenced by the Swedish social democrats, led the CHP to its biggest election. Score that points which is 41%. Ecevit was of the view that modernity and popular religion are incompatible, and that religious people are reactionary. He disagreed with progressives who shared these views. He described it as a "historical blunder" by Turkish leftists and set out with the mission of bringing the left and the masses, religious conservatives and secularists

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together . When Ecevit formed a coalition with the Islamist National Salvation Party in 1974, he did something that was considered unacceptable at the time (MSP). Ecevit is the only person on the political left to hold the position of head of government in Turkey.

2. Like Ecevit Before Him, Kılıçdaroğlu

Kılıçdaroğlu, like his predecessor Ecevit, aims to change the widespread feeling that the CHP has a problem with Islamic beliefs and promised to 'reconcile people from all occupations and repair the damaged sense of unity in society'. Kılıçdaroğlu is the current leader of the Republican People's Party (CHP). However, Turkey's history is not very encouraging for the future of social democracy in the country. After his victory in the 1977 elections, Ecevit formed a new coalition, but his administration was eventually overthrown by the mass violence campaign of the far right against the left. Ecevit was overthrown in 1979 and since then the CHP has had no place in the government . Kılıçdaroğlu, unlike Ecevit, took care to show the right-left distinction as unimportant. "There is no right-left politics at the point reached in Turkey, there are those who are in favor of democracy, there are those who are in favor of an authoritarian regime," he said. Kılıçdaroğlu did this to support his claim that there is no right and left politics in Turkey. As a result, Kılıçdaroğlu chose a centre-right politician to be the CHP in the next municipal elections in Istanbul, while he chose a right-wing nationalist politician to be the CHP in the municipal elections to be held in Ankara, the capital of the country. However, Kılıçdaroğlu defies the established capitalist order, although he avoids the leftist label and prefers the term social democrat; this is something that has historically proven to be risky in Turkey.

Although Kılıçdaroğlu prefers the term social democrat, he challenges the established capitalist order like Ecevit in the 1970s. The CHP leader has pledged to nationalize the assets of five companies he thinks are "exploiting" the economy. These businesses are said to receive help from having strong relations with the Erdogan government. Kılıçdaroğlu, on the other hand, challenges not only the 'theft system' associated with crony capitalism, but also neoliberal capitalism itself. He recently declared that "brutal capitalism" and neoliberalism are taking the planet by storm and

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said he would join forces with activists and politicians around the world who are committed to a fairer distribution of wealth and income, such as the US socialist senator. Bernie Sanders. Also, the chair of the CHP is not a Sunni, but an Alevi of Kurdish origin, who is Turkey's heterodox Muslim minority. As a result, the dogmas of right-wing Turkish nationalism cannot coexist with it. In fact, the nationalists and conservatives on the right who make up the opposition coalition are uneasy about the possibility of him being a candidate.

3. Factors Causing Polarization

2002–2006, 2007–2008, 2008–2013 and 2014–present are divided into sub-periods to analyze the factors causing toxic polarization and their effects. In the end, a potentially reformist policy of polarization-transformation turned into an autocratic-revolutionary one. This change took place throughout the course of the political movement. In this process, polarization and AKP policies, the politicization of formation cracks that have created a deep separatism since the establishment of the nation-state, structural transformations and the opposition's organizational, programmatic and personal deficiencies fed and reinforced each other. In this process, the opposition's organizational, programmatic and personal deficiencies fed each other. According to many studies such as political party polarization, voter preferences and social insecurity, Turkey is considered one of the most socially and politically divided countries in the world (Erdoğan 2016; Aydın-Düzgit and Balta 2018; Aytaç, Çarkoğlu and Yıldırım 2017; KONDA 2017; Yılmaz 2017). ; Erdoğan and Uyan Semerci 2018; McCoy, Rahman and Somer 2018). (“Turkey: The Slippery Slope from Reformist to Revolutionary Polarization ...”) As a result, most of the political debate and critical elections and referendums in recent years, most of the voter behavior seems to be split into two incompatible and inflexible blocs.

High turnout percentages in recent elections showed a more divided and politically awakened public. Participation rates were 74.13 percent in 2014, 85.43 percent in 2017 and 86.24 percent in 2018 (2015; Esen and Gümüşçü 2016; Somer 2016; Liberty 2018; Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018). This is surprising because Turkey has long been celebrated around the world for supplying a rare,

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longstanding, thriving and exemplary example of secular democracy in a predominantly Muslim country, despite its many important shortcomings (Rustow 1970; Özbudun 1996; Hale and Özbudun). 2010; Turan 2015).

In addition, some academics praised Turkey for its progress towards setting up a liberal democracy and praised the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and its leader Erdogan for building a "Muslim (or conservative)" (Özbudun 2006; Kuru and Stepan 2012; Yavuz 2009). Considering this, a seasoned observer noted in 2008 (also underlining the warning signs) that the Turks were finally starting to win the civil revolution they had been fighting for decades. This revolution was able to go ahead peacefully and within the law, thanks to Turkey's democratic institutions that showed it was strong enough to control and direct it. This event is a transcendent confirmation of the system set up by the revolutionaries of the 1920s and the Republic of Turkey they set up (Kinzer 2008, xiii–xiv).

4. Turkey Is Going Through a Transformation Through Polarization

Turkey is going through a transformation through polarization. The AKP primarily represented "new" (ie, from mainstream slums) political actors who had previously been marginalized because of their political Islamist backgrounds. This phenomenon reflected the pattern of causal polarization that led to democratic decline under new groups (McCoy, Rahman, and Somer 2018; Somer and McCoy 2018). The secular laws that make up the "centre" of the country were viewed with suspicion and to some extent scorned by pro-secular institutions and Turkey's elite. Although allowed to take part in the political process, they were regularly disciplined with legal and political consequences (Somer 2007 and 2014; Hale and Özbudun 2010). How did these political "foreigners" dominate Turkish society and, increasingly, its economy, compared to Turkey's political establishment? They succeeded in achieving this goal by forming and organizing a victorious coalition supported by diverse, inter-class and inter-ideological elites and voters (Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu 2009; Ocaklı 2015). The global fiscal crisis in 2001 offered



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possibilities, among other reasons, and the party was able to implement varying degrees of divisive policies at various times, as I will explain in more detail below.

he succeeded in bringing together a wide range of factions , using a simplistic and divisive framework of Turkish society and promising sweeping reforms to Turkey's political and economic institutions . Over time and in connection with the expansion of partisanship, this alliance turned into a partisan bloc that became more concrete in Erdogan. In other words, it has gained such significant weight that it poses a threat to the deep-rooted institutions of the "strong state" in Turkey (Heper 1992; Migdal 2001; Somer 2016). When the AKP came to power, Turkey's legacy of a strong state that successfully oversaw modernization and the transition to multi-party, partial democracy, but also hindered the establishment of full democracy in the twentieth century, has long needed reform. (“Turkey: The Slippery Slope from Reformist to Revolutionary Polarization ...”) This strong legacy of state also prevented the establishment of full democracy in the twentieth century (Heper 2002; Kinzer 2008; Somer 2016).

Democratization can be hindered by strong governments (Slater 2012). Democratic changes were necessary in Turkey for a variety of reasons, including but not limited to:

- *Creating a transparent and responsible state; to rebuild the relationship between the state and religion based on social consensus.*

Earlier elected governments have been unable to push through reforms for a variety of reasons, including being too fragile in their base of support and too vulnerable to their political rivals, activist and rowdy media, and protective state institutions.

In addition, they could not pass the reforms because they could not pass the reforms because they could not pass the reforms. The AKP, however, was able to muster enough authority and stability to conduct sweeping reforms, as I will explain in more detail below, partly because of its polarizing but transformative policy. Many of the earlier reforms helped promote economic development, introduced measures that had democratizing effects, and brought the intervening military to its knees. The latter was conducted with a combination of legal democratic means and "new

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authoritarian", insidious and sometimes even outright illegal methods (Cizre and Walker 2010; Somer 2016; Yavuz and Balcı 2018).

The party has often been able to get away with it, as its (over time, dangerously) divided and imprisoned components in civil society and politics were prepared to ignore or even actively support these practices. In this process, both the AKP and its opponents defended their stances, often referring to democratic principles and values. Pro-Erdogan Turks saw democracy and potential in the same tendencies that anti-Erdogan Turks saw authoritarianism and corruption. This is like other situations discussed in this section. As a result of all this, the price paid by Turkish democracy and society is quite heavy at the end of the day. In 2018 Freedom House downgraded Turkish democracy from "mostly free" to "not free" for the first time since military rule from 1980-1983; this was in addition to the significant division existing in the country (Erdoğan and Semerci 2018, 37–38; Freedom 2018).

So, three elections and a referendum won by the AKP since November 2015 were not free and fair (Esen and Gümüşçü 2017; Freedom 2018). This is because, among other reasons, the bottoming out media freedoms and the building of a party-state have not leveled the playing field against the opposition. In general, new elites and dominant groups managed the collapse of democracy (Özbudun 2014; Esen and Gümüşçü 2015; Taş 2015; Somer 2016; Öktem and Akkoyunlu, ed. 2017; McCoy, Rahman and Somer 2018). When we explore what causes this, we can better understand the factors that play a role in the corrosive effects of polarization on democratic institutions.

The AKP's first term in power has resulted in only mild and what I would call "micro-textual" polarization. This is because the polarization in this time can be characterized as trimodal or bisected. Alongside those who endorsed the party were various elites and community groups who stood in the middle of those who disapproved, mostly because of the party's Islamist identities. These organizations gave them conditional support as they saw the new elites as agents of change, EU membership and the end of military tutelage. Therefore, these organizations and many outside observers were prepared to ignore AKP's nuanced but highly divisive rhetoric and behavior due to its use of microtext (Tepe 2005; Somer 2007, 2010; Kinzer 2008). Contrary to the above text,

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which was not divisive because it was inclusive, reformist and conciliatory, this polarizing latent current was “passive-revolutionary” (Tugal 2009). It was showed by actions and statements at the local level and by indirect statements at the national level (Somer 2007) and stood for a trend to gradually conquer the state and reshape society based on Islamic core narratives (Somer 2010, 2017). These reasons have caused pro-secular organizations to experience an increase in their ontological unease (Somer 2007; Öktem and Akkoyunlu 2017). These clandestine currents were supported by "state conquest" government initiatives, including the gradual filling of state institutions with loyalists, some of whom were members of the Gülen Islamist movement (Gülen Movement [GH]), and subtle signals of Islamization (Somer 2007; Toprak et al. 2008). ; Öktem and Akkoyunlu, eds 2017; Yavuz and Balcı 2018). Reformism, democracy and European Union membership had a significant impact on the language and policies of the administration at the macro level (Özbudun 2007; Hale and Özbudun 2010). Inter-party cooperation resulted in the adoption of a considerable number of legislative and political changes. While pro-Islamic and pro-secular elite views differed in the press on issues such as secularism, the role of religion in society and the state, and social pluralism, including gender rights, they were united on issues such as political democracy. This reflects trimodal polarization (Somer 2010b; Somer 2011, 514). 2007: Year of political conflict in the USA and the beginning of the "macro-textual" split.

It was done by acting as a polarizing political entrepreneur and displaying the "competitor image" of the conflicting parties in this conflict (Somer 2001; McCoy, Rahman, and Somer 2018). Somer defines "competitor image" as the image of a competitor. While inviting people to support his side, which he believed would prevail in the conflict, he also discouraged anyone from seeking middle ground and warned that they would be targeted and eventually found themselves.

While inviting people to support his side, he also strongly discouraged anyone from seeking middle ground. As a result, his rhetoric took on a frightening and Machiavellian tone of politics, interpreted as pure power, as defined by Carl, "where the ability and capacity to choose a friend and an enemy coincide with legal authority to build a new legal system." Schmitt (Kutay 2018, 1). Considering these circumstances, many moderates and others trying to build bridges broke up into groups. Some people believed that these aggressive and confrontational strategies were necessary

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to reorganize rigid institutions and overthrow long-standing political and economic power structures. Others believed the government's methods were harmful and inefficient, regardless of the results they hoped to achieve. The AKP framed its second major constitutional referendum vote, started in 2010, as a struggle between those defending their privileges in "old Turkey" and those defending "new Turkey", and similarly tripartite polarized society. This was done to gather support for the AKP's constitutional referendum initiative. The revisions presented resembled a comprehensive law. It included mostly indisputable changes that expanded many rights and freedoms such as collective bargaining for public employees (Kalaycıoğlu 2012).

While the controversial changes seem to democratize supreme court election, they also paved the way for accelerating the transition of the judiciary and military to pro-government institutions (Kalaycıoğlu 2012, 6; Arato 2010; Cizre and Walker 2010). ; Jenkins 2011). All this led to a split among the opposition; some people welcomed the reforms and described them as "incomplete but excellent", while others warned that secular democracy and judicial independence were ending (Kalaycıoğlu 2012). The referendum, which the AKP administration won with a 58 percent majority, shifted the balance of power in the state from pro-secular AKP and GH actors to pro-religious AKP and GH actors. This result was achieved by winning the elections held in 2011. The year 2013 is the closure of a period in which two polarizations took place and at the same time the triple polarization ended. The first event was the demonstrations against the government in Gezi Park. These demonstrations flared up with police violence against young environmentalists in Istanbul. They quickly gained support from millions of people across the country as they expanded across the country. Although pro-secular sensitivities were the main factor that brought people together, the participants stood for a wide spectrum of generations and ideologies; They were united by their opposition to AKP's authoritarianism and their desire for real democracy (Özbudun 2014; Yörük and Yuksel 2014).

This grassroots movement offered opposition parties a fantastic opportunity to reconcile their fragmented constituents based on an anti-AKP, pro-change and pro-democracy policy of separation. However, the main opposition parties, except for the possible pro-Kurdish minority party, did not seize this opportunity. This failure can be attributed, at least in part, to the ideological

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differences and rigidity of the main opposition parties, as well as their organizational shortcomings, mainly as "cartel parties" (Sayari, Musil and Demirkol 2018).

The AKP's increasing control over civil society and the media, the Gezi Park Protests, did not mature as a long-term social movement with a well-defined set of goals. As a result, it increased the division and strengthened the bloc supporting the AKP, but not necessarily the bloc against the AKP. In the second episode of the series, the Islamist internal strife between the AKP and the GH led to an escalation of violence. According to Gümüſçü (2016), anti-government forces in the judiciary and police produced massive corruption allegations against the government. At the head of these components were those with ties to GH. Both audio and video recordings of party members, including Erdoğan and his family, were uploaded online and used to spread accusations against them. This conflict has forced increased people to choose between two evils: corruption in government on the one hand, and anti-government and illegal formations within the state on the other. In addition to accelerating Erdogan's ramp-up of authoritarianism and purging AKP moderates, this conflict has forced more people to choose between the two evils. The opposition was thwarted not only by its own shortcomings, but also by the difficulties it faced on an unequal playing field. As a result, they were unable to create a democratically supportive third path.

5. 2014-Present

While the harmful polarization and collapse of democracy lead the reader to other contributions to the many and important socio-political developments that took place in this period (see President 2015; Taş 2015; Esen and Gümüſçü 2016; Gümüſçü) 2016; Somer 2016; Esen and Gumuscu 2017; Öktem and Akkoyunlu 2017; Yavuz and Balcı 2018), suffice it to say that this period witnessed the gradual decline (Bermeo 2016) and the collapse of democracy as the early rise of AKP . The dominant party eventually followed Erdogan's personalized control, accompanied by a presidential system and a primarily instrumental AKP. Erdogan's election as president in 2014 and his declaration of a "de facto presidential system" that challenges the constitutional order based on parliamentarism and an impartial (supra-party) presidency; Repeated parliamentary elections in

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2015, when the AKP first lost the majority and then recaptured it with unjust and partially free early elections; Erdogan's de facto efforts to renew and dominate state institutions; The resistance to Erdogan's rule and the resurgence of the Kurdish minority in Turkey All these transitions took place within the framework of a polarizing and transformative politics, in which the resulting socio-political divide was increasingly self-feeding, individualized and focused on negative partisanship and fear. For example, in the 2017 presidential election, voters' preferences for the presidency were very polarized (Aytaç, Çarkoğlu, and Yıldırım 2017). Most voters took their cues from their party preferences, but people with more knowledge about the presidency were more likely to vote "No". Relatively few people understand the difference between presidential and parliamentary systems, so most voters took their cues from party preferences. As the level of education increased, no votes increased, while yes votes decreased as religiosity and Kurdish ethno-linguistic heritage increased. Both factors were significantly and positively correlated with the "Yes" vote.

6. Elector of the Democratic Party

He almost never stopped claiming that the Democratic Party lost the election due to its ability to deceive the electorate (Erer, t, p. 52). After that, the ruling party had to create its own public information and press department, which was first represented by the Zafer newspaper. CHP supporters referred to this broadcast as partisan media at that time. For example, it was said that Mükerrerem Sarol's newspaper Türk Sesi could survive with government support and official marketing support. In addition, it has been argued that even public schools should buy subscriptions to this newspaper (Toker, 1991b, p.106). The fact that survival in the media sector at that time depended on public announcements and acquisitions may not justify the support of the DP's supporters, but it is logical to some extent that this was the case (Erer, nd. , p.135). In this sense, the enactment of the law regulating the transfer of the CHP's unlawfully confiscated assets in 1953 was a turning point. This is particularly important since the law was passed in 1953. (Arsebük, 1953, pp. 426–432). The closure of Ulus, which was seen as the media organ of the CHP and then reopened as Yeni Ulus, seemed as if it was described as an attack on the opposition

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and increased the hatred between the government and the opposition. However, Ulus was reopened later (Arcayürek, 1985, p. 109). In the second phase of the DP government, which took place between 1954-1957, the relations between the ruling party and the press entered a period when the press was put under pressure rather than a period when the ruling party was put under pressure by the press. . This occurred in the second phase of the DP's rule. The ruling party was able to persuade several influential figures in the media to support its position by effectively using its public advertising and buying power (Öymen, 2009, p.457). Besides the power of public procurement, the paper supply tool used by the government is a crucial step in breaking the resistance of the mainstream press. However, the most influential publications in the media, such as newspapers and magazines, continue to support the leading opposition party (Birgit, 2005, p.299). In addition, the ruling party, trying to strike a balance between the support and criticism it received in the media, began to restrict the opposition's access to the radio (Aksoy, 1960, p.113). Again, because of an event that took place in this period, the first conflict arose within the ruling party.

7. Events of 6-7 September

The events of September 6-7 were seen as an obvious conspiracy coordinated by the Turkish government at a time when the Turkish government showed great interest in the Cyprus issue as part of its foreign policy. Throughout the Yassıada trials, the Chairman of the Supreme Board of Inspection, Altay Ömer Egesel, often used this claim by referring to the media (Ağaoğlu, 1972, p.190; Dosdogru, 1993, p.147 and Güven, 2005, p. .76-78). DP supported private enterprise as an alternative to a planned economy; nevertheless, its policy of careless importation of foreign products and technology led to the eventual bankruptcy of the nation. While the fortunes of a typical peasant improved, this was achieved at the expense of the economic integrity of the country. Despite Turkey's heavy economic difficulties, Menderes kept its popularity among the villagers. As a result, the Democratic Party (DP) was victorious once again in the elections held in 1954 and Menderes came back to power. Menderes, who has a past that cannot tolerate criticism, then set out to cut his opponents. The press was censored, journalists were imprisoned at the discretion of the government, local elections were stolen. These tactics not only infuriated the

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intelligentsia, but also alienated the military, which saw itself as the champion of Kemalist ideas and believed that Ataturk's revolutions had come under direct attack. Despite the continuation of the contraction in the country's economy, Menderes was able to keep the support of the people and won the 1957 elections. However, the voice of his opponents was louder, and he overthrew his rule with a military coup on 27 May 1960. He has not been in power since. Menderes and several hundred other prominent Democrats were detained. Menderes' trial lasted for eleven months, during which time he was accused of various crimes such as theft of public money, luxury and corruption. He was sentenced to death and executed by hanging after an unsuccessful attempt to take his own life. For the past ten years, Tayyip Erdoğan has dominated Turkey's political scene without opposition; During this time, he took control of Turkey's most powerful generals and steered the country's economic success, which fundamentally changed the country's landscape and expanded Turkey's sphere of influence all over the world.

But unprecedented demonstrations and riots may now be putting limits on the power of a prime minister who is seen as the victim of the same uncompromising and emotional stance that helped him win three elections in a row. These traits helped him succeed in his political endeavors. They are likely to put an end to their dreams of running into a new and stronger presidency next year. "There are lawmakers and officials in the party who are disturbed by recent events," said a source close to the AKP, whom Erdogan brought to power in 2002 by crushing established parties accused of incompetence and corruption. This is something that has never happened before with Erdogan. Although some members of the AKP believe that Erdogan's policies should be softened, these members continue to show their loyalty to party discipline and to Erdogan himself. Reflecting on the emotional drama of the past few days, Erdogan's supporters took to Twitter to declare that they would not abandon Erdogan to the same fate as his two political heroes: a prime minister hanged after a military coup in 1960, and a president some believe poisoned. The police use of tear gas and water cannon against a small demonstration for a construction project in Istanbul on Friday sparked protests across Turkey and attracted members of various social groups such as professionals, trade unionists, and a considerable number of young people who had not known anyone before.

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Erdogan's refusal to view the demonstrators as "looters" and his familiar promise of sincerity only served to increase their numbers when he made the following statements:

- *"If this is to have meetings, if this is a social movement that brings together 20,000 people, I'll go. Gather 200,000 people."*

Proving to be an active leader during the Ukraine conflict, Erdogan today focuses on micro-level initiatives to contain inflation. Under these circumstances, it would be a great failure if the opposition could not put forward a common candidate and program strong enough to win the election and run the country. The six-person table, Republican People's Party (CHP) Chairman Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, who has made many moves recently, is pushing the different components of the "six-person table" step by step to sign his candidacy. The Democrat Party (HDP), Felicity Party (SP) and even the IYI Party (IP) had previously made statements implying that they favored this proposal. We do not think that it will be difficult to convince the Future Party (GP) and Democracy and Progress Party (DEVA). The CHP's own members are restarting their pressure to support Kılıçdaroğlu as the opposition's co-opposition candidate, thinking that electing a politician to sit at the "six-person table" will lessen the pressure that other opposition leaders are feeling right now. Maybe they believe that going with the CHP leader will help create the perception that the opposition has chosen a candidate "under the supervision of six leaders" and will make it easier to approach the public with a real coalition. Although the "six-man table" has postponed the presidential candidates' debate, it is no secret for now that Kılıçdaroğlu is stronger than ever. So, he can run as a joint presidential candidate or hope to win the support of the opposition in the runoff. The political debate around the birth of the "six-man table" centered around the proposal to revive the parliamentary system. Due to the struggle between several opposition presidential candidates, the emphasis shifted to the common candidate, the single program, the transition process and beyond. While mayors and other mayors are constantly lagging, the opposition is left with two options: to approve Kılıçdaroğlu or to black horse. Yet both possibilities grapple with an uninspiring mediocrity. It seems that the opposition group has chosen to delay the promotion of its candidates until three or four months before next year's elections. This decision was taken to protect their candidate from being tainted and to conclude a power-sharing agreement that said

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candidate would have to abide by. In other words, the opposition wants to postpone the discussion about its possible candidates until a clear time frame for next year's competition is found. But we hope that when the nominations are made public, the discussion will focus on the proposed presidential system rather than the opposition candidate. It is true that the opposition has a long-term strategy to restore the parliamentary system. They will still give a proposal under the presidential system to decide how the joint candidate and six opposition leaders will form their alliance. Therefore, the real war of words will be waged over two opposing presidential regimes. The first choice will be measured by Erdogan's performance and leadership. The discussion on the alternative will focus on the intricate formula that the "table of six" will impose on the opposition candidate to overcome the problem of keeping six or seven political factions together. Then the pro-government People's Alliance will have enough points to use against the opposition's candidate, platform and transition alliance. Therefore, the real question that the "table of six" must answer is what kind of presidential system it will approve of, rather than choosing a candidate. A new strategy The question is whether Kılıçdaroğlu's idea works. The CHP leader has resorted to a new technique in the past few months, filming online details of the many packages the government expects to launch to support fixed and low-income people in the face of rising inflation. Kılıçdaroğlu, for example, knew of the government's intention to make such public statements by canceling student debts and postponing overdue debt collection. He uses such moves to create the impression that the administration has conducted what the opposition vowed to do.

The CHP leader is likely to think that such moves could reduce the influence of the government's micro-level initiatives on the election campaign. I feel that this technique does not help the opponents in the least. After all, given that Erdogan has been in power for 20 years, people will simply discredit Kılıçdaroğlu when Kılıçdaroğlu is the only one who has resolved serious economic problems.

Still, the opposition will step up the government's attempts to resolve micro-problems before next year's elections, making it difficult to criticize many such actions as "election-related investments".

Indeed, the opposition presidential candidate would have faced criticism at the time for subordinating the power of the majority to the tutelage of six opposition leaders. Likewise, they

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would have to take charge of the power struggle between the six presidents. Rooted in the opposition's "opposition to another Erdogan," this symbolic idea of a president will surely be ruined by the limits of his powers, responsibilities and performances. Third, the power and power sharing of the coalition: The "six-man table" wants to create a concrete transition process and coalition structure before the elections to be held next year. Opposition leaders and their presidential candidates, who have quite different political backgrounds and views, seem unlikely to convince voters of their union before the election. If the opposition bloc wins, the country may have to deal with an unprecedented level of inconsistency, ineffectiveness and chaos under a coalition of six parties (nationalists, liberals and social democrats) and possibly the Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP). The Turkish people still remember the 1990s, when two- or three-party coalition governments failed and led to many crises. Therefore, the kind of power struggle that could arise within a strange coalition of seven political parties is unimaginable.

is extremely difficult for this coalition, which brings together political parties with opposing views, to offer the public a common vision that they can manage. Perhaps they can come to weak and unpretentious agreements on key issues such as counterterrorism, foreign policy and the economy. Even those agreements are nothing but an ambiguous attitude towards the unity of the People's Alliance. However, if the opposition bloc develops an ambitious program to cover the Kurdish issue, it is not possible for these six parties to stay together. At the end of the day, they cannot connect with the electorate by adhering only to abstract principles. To address these four contradictions simultaneously, the "table of six" will certainly have to meet many more times.

According to a senior IYI official, Akşener is more than willing to field a candidate who can easily beat Erdogan in the first round of the presidential contest, rather than risk running for a runoff. There are signs that he supports Imamaoğlu, whom he likens to the Ottoman Sultan Mehmed the Conqueror, who conquered Istanbul in 1453. This comparison was made a year ago. But like his counterparts in the alliance's smaller parties, he must perform a complex calculation to decide which candidate has the highest chance of winning and which candidate best serves his personal political goals. In addition to political maneuvering, one of the main factors to consider is Turkey's need to win over its sizable Kurdish minority. The pro-Kurdish Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP),

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which is expected to receive about 12 percent of the national vote, is not part of the alliance. It is viewed as very toxic, especially by parties on the right, due to what the government calls ties to illegal Kurdish militias. However, HDP is expected to receive about 12 percent of the general vote.

Selahattin Demirtaş, currently imprisoned former leader of HDP, said that his first election for prime minister will be "inclusive" Mamoğlu. The waiting game will be crucial to the opposition's attempts to find its way through the turbulent seas ahead, whether Kılıçdaroğlu is the candidate who will eventually challenge Erdoğan or not. Anthropologist Ayşe Çavdar, who has worked on religious conservatives in Turkey for decades, is reported to have said, "She is what keeps men at the table together." He thinks Kılıçdaroğlu has a chance to win if Mamoğlu shows his support "very strongly" in front of the public. Mamoğlu, a CHP member, has been regularly capping the party leader for the past few weeks. At the same time, he said he believed six opposition leaders would make the "right choice" for the candidate. For now, however, the opposition is working to extend the process. Özer Sencar, CEO of survey company Metropoll, worries that the organization is wasting valuable time. If Erdogan believes that conditions are favorable enough, or that he can alleviate them with a series of populist giveaways, perhaps a new minimum wage hike, he may decide to call early elections in the fall.

If so, he says, it will be too late for the opposition to begin the enormous task of launching and running a campaign. Kılıçdaroğlu's opponents believe that Kılıçdaroğlu deliberately delayed the election in anticipation of closing the poll gap with his rivals. They accuse him of surrounding him with fans who are too cowardly to tell him the fact that his decision to become the spokesperson for the campaign is too dangerous. They warn that Kılıçdaroğlu and his supporters risk making a mistake of historic proportions if they continue to demand his nomination. CHP Executive Board Member Fethi Açıkel does not share this view. Açıkel is confident that the chair of his party is aware of everything that is at risk. "Of course, he's a natural choice for us and he won't hesitate to accept the nomination if he gets his way," he adds. But don't overlook the fact that in previous elections he stepped aside to nominate others to replace him. Besides being quite cunning, he is humble.

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8. Conclusion

there were many in-depth speeches on the need to revise the paradigm on this issue, as well as the important break in Turkish military coup traditions . This is something that is still debated. Modernization is understood in the Turkish context as a secular effort; As a result, the military has long been seen as both the site of the project and the hard power of modernization. Prior to the failed coup try on July 15, it was well known that the military had for a considerable period implemented a booty system in which secular tendencies were favored. In line with this military ideology , coups or memoranda were instinctively conducted on 27 May, 12 March, 12 September and 27 April. These events occurred as a logical consequence of the reorganization of the army as the protector of the government, not the people. Although the events during the July 15 coup attempt were grave, it was noted that this incident paralleled earlier coups or memoranda in terms of instrumentalizing the army for a specific purpose. It is significant that the cadres who conducted the May 27 coup were mostly colonels, majors, commanders and captains belonging to a small clique, and that this fact emerged only a week after the revolution. In total, there were only five generals in action during the coup. Although the putschists insist that the intervention was the result of internal dynamics, external dynamics also played a key role in the incident. Having to deal with the rivalry between the superpowers in the region after the Second World War, the government fell into an untenable position. The government, which survived the May 27 coup attempt, supported the United States and its allies in the Korean War. Later, Turkey joined NATO despite Britain's opposition. It is known that the UK is against this choice. It is well known that the United States and the United Kingdom are engaged in a power struggle in the Middle East, with the former trying to control the latter. However, after the end of the Second World War, a new world order or system appeared based on a bipolar structure in which the United States and the Soviet Union fought a war of supremacy. There is much speculation as to why, after the war, the United States surrendered Eastern Europe to Soviet expansionism, even though the United States used nuclear weapons and seemed to have the power to impose its demands ; however, a satisfactory answer does not appear to have been found yet. There are some conspiracy theories about this issue in the Turkish publishing world (Kaynak, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006a, 2006b, 2006c,

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2009; Kaynak and Gürses 2007; Kaynak and Mete, 2008). According to these theorizations, the USA left Eastern Europe in order that Europe would not regain its former power and that it could be controlled more easily in this way. However, the dominant paradigm seems to ignore these theories.

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