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**India-Usa: Post Cold War Era New Beginning**

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**Abstract:**

Since the outset, researchers have taken a keen interest in the Indo-US ties. International Ties specialists began to closely monitor the real character of relations between the two countries. Foreign policies of several countries were shaped by the cold war and the subsequent politics between the super powers. Given that India embraced the non-alignment and Panchsheela policies at first, the ties were not quite friendly. During the cold war, the region's power dynamics changed. The post-cold war era turned out to be a turning point in the two countries' ties. Therefore, the researcher has made an effort to investigate how India and the United States' relationship have changed in the post-Cold War period and to explore the elements that have contributed to this paradigm shift.

**Keywords:** Democratic Principles, Structurally. Several Countries, Quite Friendly, Foreign Policies

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**Introduction:**

India and the USA are said to have similar political and cultural ideals historically. Both are democracies that place a strong emphasis on judicial scrutiny and basic rights. The approved federal democracy is typical structurally. Democratic principles are ingrained philosophically in both countries. The two countries are regarded as the world's two biggest democracies. All large nations with sizable populations are thought to work together for the benefit of the global community. We both live in democracies that uphold human ideals. Both countries' legal systems respect and protect civil freedoms. The foundation of our democracy is the free and independent press, which we both enjoy. Both support the right to free speech, association, and ideas.

However, the NAM caused a rift between India and the US. The US thought that India was undecided. India declined to join the military alliance formed during the Cold War. America and Pakistan formally established diplomatic ties in 1956. Pakistan joined SEATO and became closer to the American coalition. Pakistan received weapons and assistance, and efforts were

made to portray Pakistan favourably in respect to India. The newly formed Islamabad-Washington-Beijing Axis posed a significant strategic challenge to India. India and the US disagreed on important international issues. In the beginning, India saw China as a sovereign state and campaigned to ensure China's UN membership. It also ratified the 1954 Tibet-related accord. At first, Americans had their doubts about the Chinese and their strong ties to Russia. There were several low points in both India and the US. Conflicts arose during the Korean War, including India's objection to American military activity in Vietnam, US military assistance to Pakistan with respect to Kashmir, and others. The two also have a number of challenges with collaboration. The Russians did not aid India in the Sino-Indian War of 1962. The Americans were the ones who stepped in to support India against China. It offered military support to India. Pakistan, however, utilised Patton tanks and American-supplied fighter jets in 1971. In the Bay of Bengal, the American Seventh Fleet pursued the Indian troops. Following the atomic explosion in 1974, Americans refused to provide India

atomic fuel. India was under pressure to ratify the NPT. The bilateral ties between the US and India were founded by Nehru's non-alignment strategy and the US position on Kashmir, which experts have referred to as a "missed partnership. Background of the Study: During the Cold War, the spread of nuclear weapons was a point of contention between India and the U.S. for many decades. The United States made South Asia a focal point of its non-proliferation efforts after India's "peaceful nuclear explosion" in 1974, in part by drafting laws like the 1978 Nuclear Nonproliferation Act, the Pressler Amendment, and the Symington Amendment, intended to prevent India and Pakistan from acquiring nuclear weapons. Indians had a strong dislike for this policy, which they saw as prejudiced and inconsistent. Indians argued that nuclear deterrence shouldn't be any less effective in South Asia if it was successful for the West. Former foreign minister Jaswant Singh publicly referred to the American non-proliferation strategy as "nuclear apartheid" in 1998.

As a result, the United States and India have had chilly ties throughout the majority of the last six decades. So why has their relationship evolved so drastically over the last several years? We contend that this transition is the result of a synthesis of structural, domestic, and individual leadership variables. The end of the Cold War radically changed India's strategic thinking and widened U.S. foreign policy choices on a structural level. India's economic reforms improved its internal economy and made it a desirable trade and corporate partner. Political leaders at the individual level deviated from prior practises in ways that changed the course of Indo-U.S. ties. Each of these difficulties is covered in further detail below.

**Significance of the Study:** This study attempts to comprehend the nature of Indo-American ties during the post-cold war era, when the globe was shifting from a bipolar to a unipolar to a multipolar system. In these changing times, the nature of Indo-US ties has undergone a fundamental change. Strategic cooperation distinguishes Indo-American ties. India regarded the United States' engagement in South Asia during the cold war with rising alarm. The strategic and

defensive requirements of both countries repeatedly brought them together. India is now seen as a potential global power and is thus viewed as a natural ally of the United States. Thus, the research is sufficiently noteworthy.

**Objective:** The present study has been carried out with the following objectives-  
To study the evolution of the relationship between India and USA in the post cold war era.

To study the factors leading to the paradigm shift of the relation between India and USA in the post cold war era.

### **The Post Cold War World: A Paradigm Shift In Indo-Us Relatins**

In the post-cold war era, however, new interests between the United States and India emerged as the old ones were consolidated. With the fragmentation of the United States and the growth of democratic processes, cordial ties have evolved between India and the United States.

India is the most powerful nation in the Indian Ocean. China's threat in the Indian Ocean area is neutralised by India's rising. A powerful and prominent India would result in a multipolar world, which poses a threat to Chinese interests. India is become China's primary Asian adversary. India, having cemented its strength in its own territory, would be tempted to extend its influence to West Asia, East Asia, and the South China Sea. Since the conclusion of the cold war, India and the United States have had to deal with China's strategic containment. At the regional and international levels, India is seen as a responsible actor. India has broadened both its strategic perspective and its security objectives.

**Evolution of India- USA Relationship:** India and the United States have grown closer over the last two decades, partly due to shared worries about China's ascent and rising aggressiveness in Asia. Simultaneously, India's grand strategy has shifted from a nonaligned stance and reliance on Russia for its weapons purchases to that of an emerging great power that seeks to counter encirclement and territorial infringement by China and Pakistan and has strengthened its alliance with the United States. To control China and its allies, the United States has abandoned its engagement with Beijing and "major non-NATO alliance" with Pakistan in

favour of quadrilateral collaboration with India, Japan, and Australia. In this emerging partnership, the United States views India as its most significant long-term partner.

The Asian strategic landscape is best explained by structural realist theory, with a largely anarchic system and a looming power transition between China, which is overtaking the United States and its allies and partners and is becoming more assertive in challenging the region's decades-old status quo. The expanding US-India strategic cooperation coincides with Asia's transition from unipolarity to multipolarity during the previous two decades. China and India have gained strength and influence in Asia, whereas the US has lost relative dominance in the region, particularly following the 2008 financial crisis. US attempts to preserve unipolarity in the area are increasingly hampered by China and other nations' pursuit of national interests on their own continents. <sup>6</sup> In contrast to the United States' rebalancing to Asia, Russia has been pushing towards a tighter partnership with China. Japan is adopting a more robust military and security position in response to China's growing threat, which has led to conflict. <sup>8</sup> In contrast, the United States must continue to play "away" in Asia and rely on partners such as India and its allies in Japan, Australia, and South Korea to retain a presence and influence on the continent.

**Factors Contributing to a New Indo-U.S. Relationship**

**Structural Factors:** As the Cold War came to an end, few American interests in South Asia were immediately damaged. The U.S. had entered the area in the 1980s to oppose the Soviet Union's encroachment into Afghanistan. However, after the Soviet defeat, Washington neglected Afghanistan and essentially turned its back on Pakistan, a former ally. In truth, the George H. W. Bush administration enacted Pressler Amendment penalties on Pakistan in 1990 because it was unable to vouch for Pakistan's lack of nuclear explosive device possession. Despite sporadic hints of progress, disagreements over India's nuclear weapons development and the Indo-Pakistani conflict over Kashmir continue to stymie relations with India. India, on the other hand, saw the United States as a quasi-colonial force that was trying to deny it both its legitimate

dominance in South Asia and its standing as a significant participant on the broader world arena.

**Domestic Factors:** Domestic considerations had a role in the post-Cold War reconciliation between the United States and India. The catastrophic financial crisis that hit India in 1991 after the first Gulf War was the most significant factor. This crisis was brought on by the combination of three separate elements. First, before to the start of the conflict, India had severely drained its foreign currency reserves by buying oil on the international spot market. Second, the conflicts compelled India to return more over 100,000 foreign labourers from the Persian Gulf area on short notice. An vital source of foreign cash was shut off by their departure. Third, many loan payments to multilateral institutions were due soon after the conflict. The Indian exchequer went into meltdown as a result of the convergence of these three variables.

**Individual Leadership Factors:** Along with these domestic and structural issues, individual leadership has been a crucial enabler of improved Indo-U.S. relations. In this sense, a number of American and Indian leaders have made substantial contributions. For instance, the expansion that made India such a significant economic partner for the U.S. was made possible by Narasimha Rao and Manmohan Singh's choice to depart from India's autarkic development plan and start moving toward market reforms. Even if the Gulf War's economic crisis served as the impetus for these market changes, Rao and Singh's decision to implement a strategy that marked such a significant break from the status quo required a great deal of political vision and bravery. This is especially true given the strong internal interests in India that resisted any departure from the past course of action. For instance, the government's attempts to lift limitations on investment and growth that hampered the integration of Indian industry into the global economy were fiercely resisted by both labour and management in the industrial sector.

**Lessons from the Cold War:** From their protracted and frequently frustrating interaction during and immediately after the Cold War, the United States and India learned very different lessons. Many generations of American policymakers came

to the conclusion that there was little chance of a strategically united South Asia because India and Pakistan couldn't resolve their differences. Washington would have been powerless to bring the region back together after Partition because conflict was being fueled by leaders in India and Pakistan who seemed to lack common sense. In order to help contain the Soviet Union or China, American administrations have occasionally debated between Pakistan and India (or, at times, both). Although Kennedy was prepared to make such a decision at the time of his death, no administration was able to maintain it. When a result, American financial support for India reached its pinnacle in 1961–1962, just as support for Pakistan's military had plateaued. Later, as American military gear started to go to India, Pakistan received military hardware in retaliation. The United States consistently reacted to the zero-sum attitude present in both Islamabad and New Delhi by implementing programmes with the other countries to partly offset movements towards one or the other.

**Contemporary Indo-US Relations:** The United States remained the only super power when the Cold War ended in the 1990s. The Indo-US ties have been reviewed in light of this new reality. New chances for closer cooperation between the US and India have emerged. Military-to-military interactions began, American capital began flooding in, and Indian experts in communication and information technology portrayed India favourably to the US. In 2000, President Clinton visited India, which was a resounding success. Terrorism and non-proliferation have been significant problems on the political front. The American engagement in the Kargil conflict in 1999 was one of the pivotal moments in modern Indo-US ties. India saw President Bill J. Clinton's participation in convincing Pakistan to remove its soldiers from the Indian side of the Line of Control (LOC) in Kashmir during the 1999 Kargil crisis to be a significant turning point. India made an effort to emphasize the significance of combating the terrorist threat by focusing on Pakistan's involvement in Jammu and Kashmir. However, until the US cities (New York and Washington) were seriously attacked on September 11, 2001, the US did

not demonstrate much enthusiasm in taking action against terrorism. India gave the US its full support in its anti-terrorist campaign. However, we were unsuccessful in convincing the US that Pakistan was the "epicentre" of global terrorism because of its backing for the Taliban in Afghanistan and the Jihadists in Kashmir. More than India, the US needs Pakistan to connect with Al-Qaeda militants. Thus, the US made a distinction between "good" and "bad" terrorists. When terrorists attacked the Kashmir Assembly and the Indian Parliament in October and December 2001, respectively, they expressed solidarity. The United States resumed its Cold War collaboration with Pakistan in an effort to mobilize allies in the fight against terrorism. General Pervez Musharraf's military government in Pakistan was formerly sharply criticized by Washington, but Musharraf is now welcomed as a full member of the anti-terrorist alliance. In addition to promising to provide extensive aid and lifting the sanctions on Pakistan, the Bush administration also granted the Musharraf regime a level of legitimacy it had never previously experienced. India has reasonable concerns that Washington might once again lean toward Islamabad.

The possibility of events getting out of hand scared the USA. The George W. Bush administration added the two Pakistan-based organizations that New Delhi believed were responsible for the assaults to the US list of terrorist organizations to demonstrate to New Delhi that it regarded its allegations about Pakistan's involvement in these attacks seriously. Washington's words and deeds made it obvious that Islamabad could and should do more to combat terrorism, even while it did not openly endorse India's assertion that the Pakistani government was directly engaged in terrorist operations.

**Conclusion:**

India wants to increase her own strength in Asia, hence she is pursuing tighter connections with the US. Asia has come to be seen by the US as an area of vital significance to our future ever since the 9/11 attacks. India has historically supported the US, and one of its long-term goals is to join the UNSC permanently. India has declined to ratify the NPT and CTBT and opposes the spread of nuclear weapons. The US must assist India in nuclear non-proliferation, to

be more precise. The signing of the civilian nuclear deal was largely justified by the need to advance global non-proliferation efforts, boost the defence industry, and forge close military connections. Defense industries and the government of India have long complained that uncertainty regarding the US's dependability as a supplier as a result of prior nuclear sanctions has prevented them from purchasing American military equipment. A significant increase in military commerce has been made possible by recent laws passed in the US and IAEA approval of civil nuclear cooperation with India. The future India-US alliance will need close communication about Asian trends and more widespread dissemination of policy, both bilaterally and via multilateral regional agreements. The United States sees India's expanding influence in the globe as largely converging with US interests since it is a democracy and a rising power. The goal these countries are pursuing is democracy. Largely peaceful and better equipped to handle the problems of globalization are stable democracies.

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