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GEOCULTURE AND GEOPOLITICS: WHAT INTERPLAY FOR SOFT POWER INTERCOMMUNICATION(S) IN A GLOBALIZED WORLD?

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Prologue

In today's mediatized public sphere, space and power constitute crucial factors in underpinning the complex relationship between media, geography, politics, and identity. The geopolitical examination of media has been inter/trans-nationalized to deal with mapping cultural reterritorialization and imperialism.

Geopolitics/culture dwell on a wide range of academic and rhetoric traditions. First, both disciplines stem from international public relations, political studies, culture studies, among others. On the other hand, media studies constitute a real turn in mapping the geo-political/cultural world.

Lamjahdi in her *Media and politics: Which is controlling which?* assumes that the impact of media on politics is so decisive that political discourses get influenced in their mainstream. Bataoui scrutinizes the issue empirically and critically. He deconstructs how the American geopolitical hegemony operates through film industry in a globalized context in order to produce specific modes of geopolitical knowledge. Karrouh, in turn, argues that our identities, culturally and politically, are threatened by clichés and fanatic socialized media.

Media and Politics: Which is Controlling Which?

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Abstract

The communication of political information is an important process in the political system, and media play a decisive role in this activity. There is extensive debate in academia about the impact of media on politics, and also the influence politicians usually have on different media platforms to guide the masses towards certain directions and actions. Some theorists believe that the mass media facilitate democracy by allowing a wide variety of views to be expressed. Some believe that the media are anti-democratic because of their power to manipulate the way people think about politics at home and abroad, and that the manipulation is usually exercised by people in power assuming that politicians are the hidden "institutions" behind media products. This article provides a review of recent debates in the field from both parties.

Key words: media; politics; control; information; influence; manipulation.

1. Introduction

'Media' is a term which takes a lot upon itself these days. Apparently, the term seems to carry profound meanings and complications which accept a variety of definitions, hypotheses and, indeed, ideologies instead of simply perceiving it as the different communication channels through which news, data, entertainment, education, or promotional messages are disseminated. Media is more complicated than it might seem. In the last few years, the mass media have helped to fundamentally alter the nature of politics in the majority of the Arab countries. Among the most important political events since 2011 is the so-called 'Arab Spring'. Media have played a remarkable role in the various unprecedented occurrences in the Arab world since 2011 to date. Media are affected by the constraints of legal and informal political pressures, as well as by the economic forces that shape the media industry. However, the media's impact on the political world is real and undeniable. It is strange how media can convince people to adopt a certain set of political beliefs. Thus, it can be said that the media are talented actors who, within the traditional structural constraints, influence the political world in a variety of ways. This influence reaches not only political elites but also ordinary citizens. What is happening in the Arab world nowadays can be taken as a vivid example of how ordinary citizens, illiterate ones maybe, are becoming 'politicians' or 'journalists' who excessively discuss the different political events presented by media. The media industry, most directly, is a powerful lobbyist for its interests. If we take voting as an example here, we can state with much confidence that media corporations are major contributors to political campaigns. They have also organized themselves into specialized lobbying groups that represent the interests of different

segments of the media industry. However, politics is more than just voting, and the political impact emanates from more than just the news media. Therefore, considering the media's impact on the political implications of movies, entertainment television, music and the new media seems necessary to fully understand the control mechanism between the two.

The question of whether the news media affect voting behavior is a researchers' favorite question. Yet, the most profound and direct influence of media on the political world probably takes place at the level of political elites and not ordinary citizens. The media's influence on a hundred politicians has much more significant and pronounced implications than their influence on a hundred regular voters.

Social media are also playing an enormous role in shaping the political scene. The advent of the Internet has generated huge interest about whether Social Media have any impact on the political sphere. There seems an agreement on the fact that the Internet has created new channels of communication that have dramatically changed the flow of information compared with the known traditional media. Social Media play a key role in spreading news among the masses. This paper tries to explore how media, social media in particular, help in increasing political knowledge and engagement. In this context, we address first, the relation between media and politics in an attempt to answer one of the most complicated and debatable questions in the field: Which is controlling which? Do media, with all their forms, shape the political scene? Or, does politics, politicians and people in power to be more precise, control media institutions? Finally, we provide evidence for the influence of Media on politics, by looking at how the spreading of information usually mobilizes the masses.

2. Media's Influence on Politics

Apparently, researchers have had great difficulty clearly measuring media effects because media stimuli routinely interact with other social stimuli, and the reaction of people to media stimuli differs from one person to another. As a result, clear evidence of direct media influence on people's political beliefs and attitudes is difficult to obtain. Still, the influence is there; some recent researches seem to point toward a dual concern with the power of audiences to interpret media and with the subtler influences of media. Media influences remain subtler, stronger, deeper, and clearer.Media influence is strong especially in the early political socialization of adolescents, who are apparently old enough to seriously consider political issues but have not yet fully developed a political orientation.[1] This does not necessarily mean that media influence is exclusive to this category of people, but it simply means that adolescents are more likely to be influenced by the different media messages due to their age. According to Garber (2008), the majority of high school students rely on the mass media more than on families, teachers, or friends in developing their political attitudes about current or past events. And this runs counter to the "two step flow" model of influence, which sees personal interaction as influential as media exposure (29). [2] Research on the media's impact on citizens highlights the tension between media influence and reader agency. Media messages are negotiated by readers, but these messages have an impact on them, whether they know it or not. Media influence what people think about and, to a lesser extent, how they understand the world in general and the political world in particular. When we say that media influence what people think about , we cannot, for sure, measure the extent to which media can influence people; still, the impact media may leave on educated people is assuredly not the same when we tackle illiterate, uneducated people.

However, we should state that the influence of media is neither blatant nor unqualified. Perhaps the most significant and powerful effects of media exposure come about after long-term heavy use. It is very onerous to deny the fact that readers of media messages usually come with a preexisting set of beliefs and experiences through which they filter media messages, and that is why media influence differs from one person to another, because their preexisting beliefs and experiences differ as well.

Readers of media messages also occupy specific social positions that affect how they interpret the media. To understand the impact of media on the political beliefs of an individual, therefore, we must always remember that media consumption is often an active process. Media readers are not passive viewers who easily absorb the various media words and images, but they are active interpreters who strive to be convinced. However, Media are too powerful to be resisted (Garbner et al., 80-94).

Till now, media effects on political elites and individual citizens have been discussed without paying much attention to media in their complex relationship with social movements. Social movements, groups of citizens who have banded together to promote a social or political cause, are an especially important part of the political landscape because they can mediate between individual citizens and political elites.

It should be noted here that, social movements, too, have tried to use some of the new media forms or technologies. Since social movements have often been shut out of mainstream media, they have used the internet and the new media extensively to post information, promote their causes, and solicit new members. The political and the social Moroccan movement "20 February", for example, has used the internet and the different new media forms, especially Facebook, to post the necessary information, objectives, and details about the movement.

Thus, it can be said that new media are playing an unquestionable role in the political world. it is true that it is very difficult to measure the extent to which

new media can influence the political beliefs of a citizen, and it is also true that, as Barnett puts it, " there is no evidence that increasing exploitation of new media by campaigning and pressure groups has actually brought more people into the political fold" (211). But, the writer seems to fully grasp the importance of new media in the political world or in the political culture as he prefers to label it. Barnett states that "leaving the political culture to new communicative devices is a dangerous challenge" (213). It is apparently a dangerous challenge due to new media's ability to change the whole dominant political culture from one of alienation, and detachment to one of concerned involvement.

If we take Egypt as an example, we can clearly see the political significance in the Egyptian media. Politics, shaping or even distorting citizens' political beliefs, is potently present on the developing, mostly non-democratic, countries' media. The Egyptian media after Abdelfatah Sisi has become a president of the country is certainly not the same as it was before. Media are striving to convince all the Egyptians to become pro-Sisi citizens. The Egyptian media have lost its credibility due to their biased attitudes in the political battles during Abdelfatah Sisi's campaign. All the programs, especially the so-called entertainment media, have clearly tackled politics, and have strongly tried to shape the Egyptians' political beliefs.

Television programs are just as political when they avoid serious political issues such as corporate corruption. In Morocco, for instance, issues of corruption are seldom discussed by the Moroccan media. Still, according to Gitlin (2000) a word of caution is in order when we are discussing the political role of entertainment media. There is no clear conspiracy to "distort" viewers' political beliefs. But, programming decisions are usually made on the basis of trying to satisfy the "tastes" of the public, while meeting the needs of advertisers indeed (13- 24). Obviously, we should always remember that commercial media are "a for-profit" enterprise and creating entertainment that does not contradict this

capitalist agenda is television's major form of political proselytizing. For sure, ratings and profits are the bottom line.

The political impact of media, especially television, is highly complicated. The content of media does matter; however, we should never forget that audiences play an important role in interpreting what they see. They are active and not passive viewers as Croteau and Hoynes (2003) strongly argue. While the political messages in the entertainment media may be ambiguous, some argue that they generally have conservative implications.[3]

Movies, a great source of entertainment, often send political messages in a hidden way. Stephan Prince (1992) seriously tried to study the different political messages existing in movies. He argues that films are more likely to reinforce dominant political views than promote alternatives for change. Even popular science fiction films, romantic films, horror films, etc. do not, accordingly, offer any political alternatives, but they simply send certain planned political messages to reinforce the dominant political views. For Prince, "films can be viewed as reinforcing existing trends toward political passivity and feelings of social helplessness in the face of economic crisis" (193).

Entertainment media are vast and powerful in their impacts due to their variety. The world of music for instance has also its own set of political implications. Like television and movies, music is generally a commercial product which is sold for profit. Some may strongly argue that music, all music according to them, is about love. Still, we can state that music may not contain overt political messages, but some forms of music attract a precise audience because they promote politically charged, alternative, or controversial views. Such music is especially politically significant because it tends to be much more meaningful and valuable to people who often listen to it as it is the case with Nass Elghiwan's music for instance.

Gottediener (1980) states that an ongoing interactive process is involved in the production and consumption of media products. The producers of music, usually

the corporate owners and not necessarily the bands, are often interested in the creation of profit. In more theoretical terms, what is important to producers is the "exchange value" (23) of the product; what it can be sold for. People who buy music have a totally different motivation; they want music to simply enjoy the music. What is important for them is, obviously, the "use value" (24) of the product, the function it apparently serves.

In addition to the two previous values, the exchange value and the use value, discussed by Gottdiener, the writer sees that music has a third value which is "the sign value" (26). The sign value is, accordingly, the symbolic meaning people who buy music usually infuse the product with. This value seems to be more significant. Saying that you regularly listen to Nancy Ajram's music, for instance, is not the same as Nass Elghiwan's music, and Elissa's music is certainly not the same as Sami Yussef's or Maher Zain's Music. The music, we usually listen to, often suggests something significant that goes beyond a difference in musical tastes. Music listeners or fans usually infuse the music they like with meaning by associating music they prefer with an outlook on life. Musical taste can also signal a political orientation or a set of values. That is why for example you hear people saying "I will no longer listen to Assala's music because she is against Bashar Al Asad" or you hear the opposite.

Gottdiener strongly argues that often the meaning that is attached to music has political significance. But, accordingly, even in this case, the industry music is subtle enough to adeptly manipulate articulations of dissent into valuable product. The music industry has accurately learned how to make of any music product a profitable commercial one. Let us take Elhussein Eljasmi's successful song "Bouchrit Khir". The song is fully political since it encourages Egyptians to go and vote, to choose a new president and to guarantee a better future for Egypt. Pro-Mourssi's have insulted Eljasmi for the song claiming that Egypt already had a president who was Mahmoud Mourssi, while pro-Sisi's accepted the song with much pride and happiness. The political significance touched on

in Eljasmi's song is very revealing. The fact that the United Arab Emirates have clearly supported Sisi's campaign seems to be related with the fact that Sisi's chosen song for his campaign has been sung by an Emirati singer. Music, here, seems to be at the core of politics, and politics seems to be using every possible and influential type of the so-called entertainment media.

The media's influence on the political process has, obviously, transformed the way politics is conducted in many countries. It reaches beyond the content of political coverage in the news entertainment media. Politics are no more exclusive for politicians or politics elites but due to media all people are speaking politics nowadays. The media have facilitated the development of mass audience for political spectacles. This audience has usually no serious and clear affiliation with political parties or simply politics. Media's influence, as we have noted above, extends into the social process of political deliberation, and transforms the physical, social act of conducting politics; it goes beyond media coverage of news and entertainment.

3. The Influence of Politics on Media

We have discussed the influence of media on politics and politicians, but what about the influence of politics on media? Can media ownership be translated into undue political influence? In other words, how might media ownership translate into political power? Well, it is possible that the different builders of media empires can use "their" media to promote a very specific political agenda; when media owners and sponsors become candidates, media messages and media language generally change to serve the owners. In Italy, for instance, the fact that Silvio Berlusconi owns several television networks was of great help to make of him the most visible political figure.

The situation in the Arab world is even more complex. The vast size of media industry in the different Arabic nations does not tell any stories of freedom or

independence but of manipulation and interests. The owners of media, usually politicians, in the region often have direct control over media products and thus are able to exert political influence by promoting ideas that enhance their interests and serve their power. The situation seems to be scaring and ridiculous at the same time; each party has a newspaper, each politician has a network, and each king or president has a TV channel. These media systems are used as tools to speak their thoughts out and to influence the viewers. The influence is always guaranteed due to repetition and media over consumption.

This concept of media objectivity in the Arab world remains debatable. The so-called independent media may give hope; still, to what extent can we really perceive independent media in the Arab world as being really and fully independent? It might not seem really appropriate to deny that some media rely on a perception of objectivity to maintain their legitimacy. However, in non-democratic countries, even legitimacy has other meanings than the ones we usually think of or believe in.

The process of using media to promote a political agenda is more complex than simply feeding people ideas and images that they passively accept. Using media contains various subtle processes that lead to serious political consequences; the use of media may lead to total change in one's political beliefs, and may lead to a construction of new political identities. The changes in the political beliefs are not to be taken as something perfunctory; the fact that Arab women, for example, believe in sex as a way of resistance in Syria is shockingly unprecedented, or that Arab women believe in nudity, the "Femen" movement, as an influential tool to get their rights remains also debatable. These deeds, according to many, stem from media.

Ownership by major corporations of vast portfolios of mass media gives us reason to believe that a whole range of images and ideas will rarely be visible. To put it in clearer terms, some ideas and images will be widely available, while others will be largely excluded.[4] In the mainstream media in the Arab world, for

example, images of naked women are often connected with richness, modernity, and high education, while veiled women are often represented as uneducated, traditional, and awfully poor. These images with time influence the audience in general, and women in particular.

It would be wise to state that government regulations play a very significant role in shaping the environment within which media organizations operate. Still, the constraints of government regulation do not determine what media organization will do. Instead, the media sometimes challenge, interpret or simply ignore regulations. For example, according to the government regulation, Morocco is an Islamic country, and the different Islamic teachings should be both respected and reflected on media! Is it really the case? The well-distributed images of nudity may take care of answering this question.

Apparently, passing laws is one thing, and enforcing them is totally another, especially in countries like Morocco. Besides, government regulations are usually subject to interpretation, giving media organizations the power to read regulations in ways that match their broader agendas. Still, a fact should be powerfully stressed here, government regulations are ignored in totalitarian nations because ignoring those regulations serve the government somehow; scenes or images of nudity, sexuality and even heterosexuality do not harm the dominating forces in any possible way. However, ignoring the regulations that might threaten the interests of the powerful groups is not even an option in totalitarian societies.

Media and politics remain two vast issues to be fully grasped and discussed. The relationship between media and politics seems to be doomed to complexity. Media are powerful enough to change people's political opinions about a candidate; they are strong systems that might shape a citizen's political stance, belief, and orientation. By so-doing, a political identity emerges. It goes without saying that media have made of politics an issue available to all, media readers, even in non-democratic countries, are discussing politics. However, as it has

been widely discussed and stated, politics and politicians may subtly influence media to achieve their objectives either by media ownership or by financial support. In the two cases, the objective is united: the citizen. Influencing the citizen, convincing him/her to adopt certain political beliefs, to vote, or to act in a planned dictated way is usually achieved due to media's subtle ways.

4. Social Media Mobilizing The Street

The Internet is considered a useful instrument for connecting transnational social movements and protest events. According to Tarrow (2005), the Internet facilitates coordination between political groups, shifts political aims from a local to a transnational dimension, and links struggles worldwide. Scholars have paid attention to how the Internet supports social movements in creating independent and powerful channels of communication. The Internet then may also facilitate the coordination in political communities. Blumler and Coleman (2009) include the bottom-up flow of communication generated by social movements in their category of 'E-Democracy from below'. With this, the authors refer to various forms of grassroots collective action for which the Internet offers autonomous communication channels 'to interact beyond, around and across institutionally controlled communication channels' (117).

A good example of the efficiency of the internet in social movements has been the role that Social Media played in supporting and coordinating protests during the Arab Spring.[5] In a context where freedom of expression and access to neutral and accountable media channels is considered limited, Social Media became the main source of information, and a factor behind social mobilization in various communities. This is because information spread via Social Media is usually quickly absorbed by the masses who become themselves "opinion leaders"; they deliver and interpret media messages to the offline population. Tunisia and

Egypt are not the only existing countries in the scene, the Iranian government seems to exercise an excessive control over the Internet as well in a desperate attempt to control the masses. Strategies like intimidation, the arrest of critics of the regime, and the constant filtering of online information are often used to keep things under control. Still, one cannot deny that such strategies hinder the possibility of creating a real democratic space where free debate is an option thanks to social media forms (Goldstein & Rotich 2008).

However, social networking sites which expand opportunities of different forms of communications may enable people to bypass the control system, and may lead the masses to overcome the authoritarian regime censorship.[6] Yet, this should not be taken as a general rule; some regimes remain too powerful. Social Media did allow a more open political discussion, though, a discussion that would otherwise not have been possible under the conditions of a restrictive media environment.

The recent mobilizations which happened in Tunisia and Egypt, for instance, have provided strong evidence of how Social Media can be a crucial element in the hands of ordinary citizens. The Arab Spring, for example, has provided academia with much empirical evidence about the role that Social Media had in helping citizens to contribute to news-making. Countries like Tunisia, Egypt, Syria and the like has always found it mandatory to control social media forms in the darkest times of these regimes. (Howard & Hussain 2013). This made it challenging, indeed, to get true, real, and unbiased information on what was happening in reality through mainstream national media. People usually resort to social media since controlling mainstream media was never an option.

Worldwide mainstream media, including all the traditional media forms such as television, newspapers and the like ironically used the information uploaded on Social Media by ordinary citizens as their main sources of news. Citizens, ordinary ones, whether they were aware of it or not, became journalists by

simply reporting to the world through Social Media what was really happening in the street.

5. Conclusion

Media is often considered a world or an engine with the potential of influencing and shaping human actions, regardless of the context. Media's influence on society is undeniable. Yet, it remains always wise to stat that the influence usually develops according to the characteristics of the cultural, political, economic, and historical conditions in which they thrive (Barber 2003). We have in this paper questioned whether a relationship between media, Social Media included, and politics exists at all. In order to answer this question, we have first framed the rich body of research addressing the nature of the relationship existing between these two powerful concepts: Media and Politics. We have then shed light on how the advent of Social Media has further increased the capacity of networked facilities to influence politics. We have discussed how 'information' spread via Social Media is a key element in the development of political knowledge, and political engagement. In addition to this, rather than treating media as a unique dimension of politics, we explored how Media has the ability to influence politics depending on the framework and conditions that shape its use. We, then, tried to unravel how different political actors use Media mobilizing the masses.

With this paper we stated that despite the multiple contrasting arguments addressing the influence of media on the political sphere, and addressing the complicated relation existing between the two realms in an attempt to answer the traditional question: Which is controlling which? Media have made politics more accessible. We have also stressed the importance of social media by revealing that the aim of its use is to circulate information coming from multiple sources.

In this context, when we address the relation between Media and politics, we are interested in understanding how information spread through media impacts politics, and how people in power in return control the type and nature of information delivered. Thus, the two seem to influence the various practices of ordinary citizens in an unprecedented way.

Endnotes

[1] For further discussion of Media's Influence on adolescents' political orientation, see *Media and Civic Socialization* by Jack Mcleod, 2000.

[2] 'Two step flow' model is a part of a theory that suggests that audiences are passive. They believe whatever they get from the Media through 'Opinion leaders'; people they usually trust.

[3] David Croteau and William Hoynes (2003), strongly argue in *Media and Society* that audiences come from different backgrounds and they usually have an attitude that is fostered by media through "Uses and Gratification" model suggesting that the masses get influenced by repetitive exposure to things they choose.

[4] This is exactly what we mean by 'Absence and Significance' and 'presence and significance' in   Media Studies.

[5] For further discussion on Media and the Arab spring, read *The role of Social Media in the Arab Spring* by Zeynep Meral, 2017.

[6] For more information on SNSs and Politics, read "Social Network Sites and Political Engagement: Exploring the Impact of Facebook Connections and Uses on Political Protest and Participation" by Micheal Chan, 2016.

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Cinema, Geopolitics, and Power Surveillance:
Screening Middle East in Post-9/11 Hollywood Films

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Abstract

This paper tries to investigate the ways in which American geopolitical hegemony operates through popular culture produced in the wake of 9/11. Specifically, it examines how American geopolitical anxieties and sensibilities are aesthetically, culturally and politically mediated and maintained via the cultural and politicized medium of film. It chooses The Kingdom (2007), a geographically informed and geopolitically framed film, as its primary source of analysis to interrogate the ways in which geopolitical anxieties and sensibilities manifest in the film's narrative through the use of geopoliticized rhetoric of screened landscapes and the specific narration of "Self"/"Other" identities. Drawing on literature from popular geopolitics, geocriticism, visual politics, and postmodernism, this research analyzes how the various interdependent registers of mapping intersect to geopolitically produce and imagine the Middle East. It maintains that the rhetoric discourse of "war on terrorism" is cinematically appropriated and geopolitically manipulated in order to diffuse and reproduce American global hegemony on the global stage. In so doing, it moves beyond the mere analysis of popular culture as only an object for analysis in world politics to how cinematic texts are sites wherein specific modes of geopolitical knowledge, geo-power and world politics are communicated and understood globally.

Keywords: Hollywood cinema; popular culture; "war on terrorism"; Middle East; international politics; global hegemony, critical geopolitics

1. Introduction: Cinema, Politics, and Representation

"As a technology of seeing and a form of porjectionism, film can be regarded as eminently geo-graph-ical and geo-political."[1]

Throughout the history of cinema, the landscape and culture of Middle East have been important to the discourse of Hollywood cinematic perceptions, reproductions and codifications of mythical, political and ideological discursive narratives. In particular, movies, as popular cultural artifacts, have played an extremely important, if frequently controversial, role in the mobilization of political culture, geography and propaganda. World nations and governments have tremendously relied on the power of the moving images to spread their soft power in the global sphere, and thus help create particular sentiments and discourses that ultimately work for the fulfillment of specific ends, nationally and internationally[2]. Given its pervasive influence and potency as a strategic communication on the global stage, soft power is considered to be instrumental for the United States as it consistently seeks to maintain global hegemony and nation-branding. The medium of cinema, in other words, has been deployed to sustain prevailing political sensibilities by dramatizing stories of nationalism, heroism, villainy and geo-power as a narrative strategy to refashion a new sense of American power round the globe. Films like Syriana (Stephen Gaghan, 2005), Munich (Steven Spielberg, 2005), Home of the Brave (Irwin Winkler, 2006), Redacted (De Palma, 2007), Body of Lies (Ridley Scott, 2008), or Zero Dark Thirty (Kathryn Bigelow, 2012) are cases in point which exhibit these tendencies and sensibilities in more subtle ways.

Hence, given the power influence of popular culture in producing and authorizing knowledge about distant cultures, peoples and lands, cinema, as a powerful popular signifying system, is therefore able to vehicle, institute and normalize the established socio-political constructions and mythologies it consistently purports and perpetuates. As Mark Lacy has noted, "cinema

becomes a space where "common" sense ideas about global politics and history are (re)produced and where stories about what is acceptable behaviour from states and individuals are naturalized and legitimated"[3]. Cinema, as an art, then, is never neutral, but is always shaped by the political, social and economic sensibilities, anxieties, and forces that in turn shape and reshape representations of reality. Mao Zedong postulates that, "there is in fact no such thing as art for art's sake, art that stands above classes or art that is detached or independent of politics"[4]. What is more, "popular culture", to borrow Weldes and Rowely's words, "not only reflects but also constitutes world politics"[5]. Films, as popular cultural texts, discursively construct the world politics, the subjects and the objects they visually introduce to the audience, therefore illustrating the centrality of strategic cinema in shaping identities, geographies and perceptions of surveillance and international politics.

Keeping with the scope of this intervention, the complex connections between cinema, geopolitics, power and representation matter a great deal in contemporary Hollywood geopolitically-inclined films featuring the Middle East after the vents of 9/11. Following the attacks on the Pentagon in Washington and the World Trade center in New York, Pentagon officials conducted a series of meetings with Hollywood directors, screenwriters, scenarists and specialists in disaster movies to "solicit the help of Hollywood in the war against terrorism"[6] and put forward possible scenarios to dramatize and respond to the attacks threatening American identity as an international hegemon. In a similar vein, White House advisors met with Hollywood executives to discuss the role of Hollywood in "getting the right ideological message across not only to Americans, but also to the Hollywood public around the globe"[7]. As a consequence, Hollywood mainstream cinematic responses have immensely contributed into fashioning movies that capitalize on pro-American sentiment to extol the virtues of the American vision of the world, display American socio-political values and reposition American perceptions of

geo-power on the global stage. It is to this respect that the events of 9/11 are aesthetically and politically mobilized and manipulated in numerous cinematic texts in order to staunch American patriotic values in the face of seemingly undefeatable odds, implying, in the process, the point that securing American national identity is an essential step towards redefining American identity on the global scale.

Indeed, the rhetoric discourse of the "war on terrorism" has provided fertile grounds for Hollywood movie-makers and entertainers to reconfigure the role of the US in world geo-politics. By moulding plots, settings and landscapes to tell geopolitical tales, Hollywood geopolitical movies, in other words, subscribe to American foreign policies, using "war on terrorism" as a starting point for dramatizing American geopolitical anxieties and sensibilities in the Middle East. In so doing, Hollywood popular culture and cinematographic representations of distant geographies and cultures have shifted, or have been made to shift, from producing films preoccupied with Western cultural supremacy to producing films framed by geopolitics and American foreign policies.

Themes of violence, melodrama, heroism and the role of American position in world politics underpin most of post-9/11 cinematic texts. One can consider here, for instance, movies like Fahrenheit 9/11 (2004), Rendition (Gavin Hood, 2007), Charlie Wilson's War (2007), In the Valley of Elah (2007), Redacted (2008), The Hurt Locker (2008), and Zero Dark Thirty (2012). On their surface, films of this period seem to reiterate the Orientalizing discourse that basically justifies American intervention and involvement in the Middle East. Images of American heroes who epitomize American values and who heroically face and conquer the forces of "evil" in the "exotic" and "dangerous" lands are repeatedly highlighted to display America as the "benevolent" hegemon. Deep down, however, the production and codification of Hollywood cinematic texts after 9/11 are more than simply portraying Middle East through Orientalizing lenses

of danger and exoticism that denigrate and essentialize the lived reality of the region. Indeed, the use of the locations such as Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Afghanistan serves to emphasize the geopolitical importance of the "Other" landscape for American quest for geo-power. Thus, the very specific geographic contexts in which American heroism versus the Other's villainy happens tell more about what America stands for than simply what the Other must discursively represent. As Peter Van Ham states, "the events of 9/11not only triggered renewed efforts to market 'Brand USA' and US policies, but also generated a process of reflection on what 'America' actually stands for (or, perhaps better, should stand for)"[8].

In fact, at the heart of Hollywood cinematic texts in contemporary time is the branding of USA nation as a modern empire intent to dominate the world politics. The construction of Middle Eastern spaces as "wild zones" in need of military ethos and American violence can only be understood in the context of how American policy-makers use the apparatus of Hollywood cinema to present America as a unilateral force which alone takes the burden of bringing peace to the world[9]. Read in this context, the Hollywood codifications of American adventures, surveillance technologies and disciplinary power structures inform the way American empire and Hollywood industry harness their efforts to redefine and remap American perceptions of global power. Indeed, the presence of American military power policing and disciplining the Middle East has many of the characteristics of imperial power. Using force and violence to impose order and meaning upon the space, interfering into Middle Eastern states' affairs coupled with America's entire war on terror in the region could all be interpreted as an exercise in imperialism seeking to protect American imperial geo-strategic and military interests in areas beyond its territorial boundaries. George Kieh concurs that the United States' military intervention in the Middle East was not propelled by "the lofty ideals of democracy", but was indeed prompted by "exigencies of imperialism". He puts it clearly that "the [US]

military intervention was ostensibly designed to maintain and expand the United States' politico-security and economic stranglehold on the Middle East"[10].

Accordingly, what intensifies much the drama of the American intervention in the Middle East is the settings in which these dramas are played out. In particular, given its extreme geo-circumstances, the Middle East landscape offers dramatic possibilities for branding American nation-state and dramatizing its geopolitical sensibilities. In other words, the territoriality of Middle East serves as a projection zone for U.S power; a geographical space which enables them to see themselves as a superpower while they displace their own nationalism, geopolitics and violence upon the region. Therefore, rather than reducing American/Middle East conflict to merely cultural and civilizational factors, the delineation of Middle East is in fact geopolitically driven. Gearoid Ó Tuathail notes that "to designate a conflict a civilizational one is to determine its character in a definitive and totalizing manner. It is to impose a closure upon events, situations, and peoples. The geographical specificity and place-based particularity of conflicts are reduced to terms of a civilizational script"[11].

This paper is an extension of recent work in "critical geopolitics"[12] on film as a genre that is worth investigation. By drawing on literature from popular geopolitics, geocriticism, visual politics and postmodernism, this study interrogates the ways in which the movie, The Kingdom (2007), appropriates and manipulates the discourse of "war on terror" within the broader framework of American foreign-policy and international relations more particularly. The geopolitical codes, the visual geopoliticized rhetoric of screened landscapes and the discursive constructions of otherness, violence, heroism, melodrama and trauma all provide illuminating examples of how these various interdependent registers of mapping and reproducing the Middle East circulate and resonate across the continuum formed by popular culture and world politics in the film under study, The Kingdom. To do so, the research is divided into three sections. The first section begins by examining the complex interconnections between

cinema, politics and representation in order to scrutinize how "popular culture", "world politics" and "representation" are complex and contested concepts, as the relations between and among them are complex and dynamic. In so doing, the research reads popular culture not only as an object for analysis, but also as a form of political communication wherein global politics are encoded and disseminated. The other two sections are devoted to the analysis of the geopoliticized narratives related specifically to the ways in which The Kingdom narrativizes a variety of anxieties associated with America's current position in world affairs. Moving beyond the artistic merits of landscapes and characterization, the research examines how tropes that inform Orientalist discourse are activated and accommodated in post-9/11 Hollywood cinema to serve specific geopolitical agendas. Power, knowledge, surveillance and disciplining are also examined to investigate the ways in which the film naturalizes its violent approach to Middle East in a broadly inflicted geopolitical narrative.

2. American Popular Orientalism and the Reproduction of "Self"/"Other" Identities: A Geopolitical Dimension

Because "identities are constructed… in relation to what they are not"[13], producing and reproducing the "Other" which is anti-thesis of the "Self" has been a prerequisite condition to the well-definition and formation of the "Self" for ages. Most often, the relationship between the "Self" and the "Other" is characterized by alterity: the "Other" is what the "Self" is not. Accordingly, the "Other" becomes associated with negative traits, whereas the "Self" implicitly holds positive attributes. This relational sense of identity, however, necessitates demonization, dehumanization, and vilification of the "Other". Furthermore, this dialectic relationship to the "Other" is enmeshed in a relationship of power wherein the dominant "Self" constructs and defines the "Other" in ways that

accord to specific cultural, political and ideologically-laden discourses and interests. In his analysis of asymmetrical power relations between the "Self" and the "Other", the East and the West, Edward Said posits that, "the relationship between Occident and Orient is a relationship of power, domination, of varying degrees of a complex hegemony."[14]

Since America, therefore, is a cultural, economic and military superpower, its enduring constructions of the "Other" as "villainous", "threatening" and "violent ideological zealots", while the American "Self" assumes the contrasting virtues, becoming "civilized", "moral" and "humanitarian", promote sharp distinctions between the Middle East and the United States. Because of such asymmetrical power relationships, therefore, the dominant "Self" is able to theorize about and define the "Other". For this sort of binary constructions and anxieties to be culturally and politically validated and legitimized, they need to be disseminated to the audiences in order to be widely accepted as true demarcations between the "Self" and the "Other", between the Oriental "villainy" and the American "heroism", thus justifying America's intervention and involvement in the Middle East.

The movie under study speaks volume to this sense of relationality, ambivalence, power-knowledge asymmetrical relationships, and the desire to project America as an international hegemon. Staring Jamie Foxx as Ronald Fleury, Chris Cooper as Grant Sykes, Jennifer Garner as Janet Mayes, and Jason Bateman as Adam Leavitt, The Kingdom, directed by Peter Berg, was released on September 28, 2007 in the genre of drama, politics, and war. The movie's plot centers on a wave of terrorist attacks committed by Abu Hamza, a "fundamentalist" Islamic "terrorist", and his followers against "innocent" American civilians during a softball game at an American oil company housing compound in Ryyad, Saudi Arabia. In response, four American FBI special agents are dispatched to the scene to investigate the terrorist attack and bombing of an American facility by "evil" ideologues. Upon landing on the desert of the

kingdom, the FBI team is met by Colonel Faris al-Ghazi, the commander of the Saudi State Police Force, who advises them of how to act in a hostile environment. Later, they are invited to the palace of Saudi Prince Ahmed bin Khaled for dinner (Mayes is excluded because of her gender, which implies the "backwardness" and "rigidity" ascribed to the East) in order to imply a kind of collaboration between the two states against terrorism. From now on it will be a showdown between the FBI heroes and the villains; the more powerful the villains are, the greater are the heroes. Lead by Ronald Fleury and assisted by Faris al-Ghazi, the FBI team brings down the insurmountably "evil" forces that America must face in order to bring about peace and security to a land that is presented as barbarian and hostile to the progressive ethos and values of the American nation-state. Displaying the confrontation with the "evil" in this way, the moral message of The Kingdom conferred to the audience is that anything, and everything that can be done to murder the "villains", must be done, not only to exterminate the threatening "Other", but more importantly to reconfigure the role of American as "the legitimate gendarme of the world."[15]

Indeed, the release of The Kingdom can be interpreted as indicative of American geopolitical anxieties regarding its military position in the world and the search for a new threat of terrorist attack to justify this anxiety. In other words, the need to create a new Enemy after the fall of the Soviet empire has been a prerequisite need for American policy makers and Hollywood film entertainers in order to rationalize the US exterritorial military intervention in the Middle East. The explicit terrorist attacks, military invasions and emerging enemies in this film, therefore, demonstrate how far are geopolitical interests and anxieties are manifest in the consciousness of American policy makers, film producers and their audience in the post-9/11 world. To attain its geopolitical goals, as a consequence, the movie's characterization of the "Other" developed into worst manifestations: the constructions of the Arabs/Muslims as the Enemy. This intensified construction which demonstrates the transition from

the "Other" to the Enemy has been, however, a condition for the well-projection of the American "Self", for it has become "more and more difficult to imagine who we are without reference to our enemy […] Without him who would we blame for the slings and arrows, the failures, the wounds, the inchoate anger, the gnawing frustration, the injustice."[16]

The Kingdom begins on battlefield, in a lull in combat operations between the forces of "good" and the "evil". Prior to this, the camera shows American families playing baseball and enjoying barbecue, but constantly cuts to zoom in Abu Hamza from a faraway distance on a top building controlling the terrorist operation that his followers are tasked to destroy lives of dozens of American residents in a nameless city in Saudi Arabia. The bombing operation is successfully implemented; dead corpses of American civilians fill the screen, and then the camera cuts to Abu Hamza murmuring words in Arabic thanking God for the success of his "evil" plans. To further aggravate the feelings of the audience, the camera depicts one of Abu Hamza's followers citing the testimony then blows himself up and tragically kills the rest of survived people around him while pretending to save them. The figure of Abu Hamza then is presented as representative of everything that America stands against. He is the leader of the terrorist group and the representative of God to his followers. He is shot three times indoctrinating "fundamentalist" thinking into the minds of a group of little kids. The scene implies how the terrorist network in the Middle East is in a constant conspiracy to destroy the "ideals" of American culture. Little kids are portrayed in the Muslim costume devoting their attention wholeheartedly to the Abou Hamza's "extremist" discourse, and express their willing to bomb Americans as a response to the "call" of their faith. The shooting of the Saudi Abou Hamza and his faithful group in this way invokes Berg's political ends to personalize Abou Hamza and his 'extremist' preaches to Bin Laden, implying that just like Abou Hamza Bin Laden's "extremism" had started in the same way before "his" attacks of September 11 took place. The prolonged scenes of

the "Other" preparing bombs, intercut with significant scenes depicting mosques, followed by extreme attacks, are not only demeaning depictions of the "Other", but can also be defined as a threat to America's position as a global power.

Furthermore, the enemies encountered in this film are but faces viewed through the close-ups of the camera. They are dehumanized to the point that they are not recognized as people with their own full agency and motivation. They act only in response to fanatical dictations communicated to them by their leader, Abu Hamza. Their crudeness is also manifested in their use of weaponry as the brutality of its effects does not discriminate between its targets, implying that the enemy are backwards, technologically and morally, as their bombs against American civilians are incapable of discerning between friend and foe, innocent and guilty, therefore constructing the "enemy" as entirely uncompromising in the pursuit of their sinister goals. This suggests, however, that although the villains are incompetent and backward, they still appear as powerful and dangerous. This is consistent with the paradoxical view of the Orient, which is inferior to the West, yet "it has always been endowed with greater potential to power (usually destructive) than the West"[17]. This is not to say, however, as Edward Said highlights, that the Orient possesses more power than the West but it is because as it is "backward" and "precipitous", the little power it produces becomes threatening and dangerous.

The discursive construction of the "Other" as enemy in this film and others after the appalling events of 9/11, threatens, in fact, the geopolitical and geo-economic stability of the United States in the Middle East and in the international world by extension. Nonetheless, the conflict with the "evil" "Other" is necessary in order to bring about codes of morality, heroism, humanity and nationalism that the film confers to the four American FBI agents who are tasked to redefine American domestic and foreign policies in overseas. As previously noted, post-9/11 Hollywood movies tell more about what defines

American identity than simply how the "Other" must discursively and cinematically be introduced. Nonetheless, the "violent" "Other" is inevitably demanded for this relational meaning to take place. The film introduces FBI agents possessing all the heroic, humanitarian and distinguishing traits that separate them from the forces of "evil". Throughout the most of the film, the camera follows the movements of Ronald Fleury and his team sacrificing their lives to bring peace and stability to Saudi Arabia, and the Middle East by large. The latter, as helpless as it is, could not save itself from the power destruction of its terrorists, which is symptomatic of Orientalist discourse that the Middle East cannot save itself, therefore it needs to be rescued. The heroic American characters are then called upon to save the day. It is, therefore, this construction of Manichean antagonism between "extremist" enemy and American "heroes" that discursively structures the narrative and establishes the grounds for the projection of American nationalist sensibilities and geopolitical anxieties.

By constructing the protection of freedom and democratic values as definitely an American duty, the depiction of FBI heroes in The Kingdom as "freedom fighters" draws clear parallels with American military action around the globe. Endowed with all "positive", "humanitarian" and "heroic morals", the FBI agents are portrayed struggling heroically in exotic landscapes "specified as in need of pacification and administration due to the absence of such social attributes in such places not blessed with the benefits of civilization"[18]. In the process, FBI agents, displayed as bearers of civilization and order, live out the codes of virtuous warriors who stand in for American honour, values and power. Throughout the film, the camera follows their movements keeping them in center frame as they fight against the forces of evil in order to establish peace in extreme and exotic circumstances. In so doing, they physically reassert American identity, restore its dignity and secure it as the repository virtue against barbaric threats to the values it stands for. Responding with alacrity, therefore, FBI agents determine to exterminate scores of terrorists and

heroically kill Abu Hamza and his followers. United and victorious, Fleury, Mayes, Sykes and Leavitt celebrate their victory and return to America. The victory of American agents and the defeat of the "Other" is essential to the structure of the narrative. Seen from a relational perspective, the defeat of the enemy resolves tensions and divisions within the "Self". The "Self" achieves its beingness and becomes whole again only upon eliminating the "Other". Pierre Biskind posits that in order to understand the ideology upon which films derive their significance, "it is essential to ask who lives happily even after one dies … and why?"[19]. The victorious ending of The Kingdom is explicitly associated with the eradication of Arab characters. To this context, the prevalent concept of heroism and villainy as encapsulated by Porteaus's statement: "one murder made a villain, millions made a hero"[20] speaks volume to the workings of the war narrative in this film.

Indeed, the cinemagraphic portrayals of FBI warriors confronting perils in strange lands for "freedom" and "security" provide the central moral message for the "right" conduct through which their violence can morally be justifiable. In contradistinction to the discursive dehumanization of the "Other" enemy as immoral, violent, and having no sense of restraint, the American heroes retain positive and humanitarian traits; although willing to sacrifice their own life to fight villainy, they certainly will never deliberately sacrifice the life of the innocent. In conferring this sense of moral superiority to FBI agents, the film shows their struggle as "noble" and "humane". In this regard, the moral message of The Kingdom conferred to the audience is that American violence ought to be understood nonetheless as noble, whereas the violence depicted against the "enemy" is sanctioned and justified. The Kingdom doesn't show Arabs as victims, actually it undermines this idea. The Kingdom follows an established tradition in Hollywood films whereon Arabs are presented "only as perpetrators of terror, never as victims."[21]

Moreover, the normative workings of melodrama depicted in The Kingdom coupled with sensibilities of American nationalism they serve equally underpin the narrative, shape the American audience's consciousness and reconfirm a sense of national belonging. In fact, The Kingdom relies on a number of strategies to mobilize a particular conception of identity, one that triggers feelings of American national harmony and togetherness. First, the plot narrative creates an emotional connection between audience and nation: a sense of safety and contentment with the nation was then juxtaposed with feeling of fear from the "Other". In the process, narratives of national cohesion and togetherness are visualized through the victimization of American civilians in order to mobilize national consciousness in the minds of American audiences. Simultaneously, the campaign theme developed in the narrative serves the aim of reaching unity and harmony through diversity, reflecting and emphasizing therefore the unified perceptions of American identity and nationhood. The diverse representations of FBI characters in terms of race and gender, all sacrificing their lives for the sake of their nation branding, engender a patriotic response to who "we are" and reinforces the narrative of national togetherness. This is indeed reminiscent to George W. Bush's speech to the nation after 9/11, in which he stated that: "these acts of mass murder were intended to frighten our nation into chaos and retreat. But they have failed. Our country is strong [...] A great people has been moved to defend a great nation"[22]. Following this line of narrative, the film introduces American FBI characters who exhibit staunch patriotic values in their long confrontation with the villains in faraway places. Moreover, they are all driven by a belief in what America represents, and are ready to do whatever necessary to protect their nation. In the process, they show resolve, strength and loyalty towards American national values they stand for. Their ability to achieve victory through adversity, to struggle with a fighting spirit to the end against the violent and ideological zeal of their enemies is

playful in the construction of a national identity that evokes a sense of pride and admiration for Americans.[23]

Furthermore, the mobilization of trauma discourse, victimhood and redemption are explicitly advanced in the narrative of The Kingdom for the purposes of prioritizing, excusing, and ultimately redeeming the American body. Painful and horrific scenes of brutal actions of terrorists are intensified by the affective strategies the film employs to arouse feelings of patriotism and national unity. The horrific scenes of American dead corpses, the tears of Janet Mayes, and the crashing of the planes into the towers play an important role in triggering emotions of fear, anxiety, and insecurity, which generate a sense of trauma and victimization in the eyes of the audience. In addition, the graphic torture of Adam Leavitt, while fighting against "terrorists", is melodramatically displayed to emphasize the suffering inflicted upon the American male body in order to generate a sense of sympathy for his victimized body. Linda Williams posits that "the basic vernacular of American moving pictures consists of a story that generates sympathy for a hero who is also a victim and that leads to a climax that permits the audience, and usually other characters, to recognize the character's moral value"[24]. The American body, in other terms, is thoroughly privileged throughout the film. The suffering of FBI agents is visually emphasized to reassert the mythology of the American body as "benevolent", "vulnerable" and "victimized". In other words, melodrama, as a representational device, is deployed repetitively in this film for the sake of augmenting emotional intensification and sensational identification. Thus, to further maintain a sense of the melodramatic, The Kingdom, as an action-thriller film, makes use of fundamental conventions of melodrama: moral polarization of "good" versus "evil", "noble" heroic characters, heightened emotion, and sensationalism (emphasis on action and violence), are all effectively deployed to advance the over-dramatic plot-line of the narrative, which is designed to particularly play on the spectators' emotions. Accordingly, by exploiting the

trauma discourse, the film makes a clear-cut difference and distinction between the American body and the Arab/Muslim body. While the pain of the American body is prioritized and exceptionalized, the body of the "Other" is evacuated, dehumanized and denigrated. In a nutshell, the popular rhetoric that manipulated the events of 9/11, upon which the movie draws its plot, is in fact mobilized as a strategy to legitimize the presence of America in the Middle East. In so doing, the narrative assumes a geopolitical form to maintain a sense of American exceptionalism.

3. Geography, Geopolitics and Power Surveillance: Staging the Middle East

"Geopolitics produced international politics as theater: geography was the stage, politics the drama, and geopolitics the detached observation of this representational spectacle."[25]

The opening sequences of The Kingdom with a gripping montage that briefly documents the history of the kingdom of Saudi Arabia since its foundation in 1932 are playful in the construction of a geopolitically narrative that underpins the plot structure of the movie. Indeed, the opening scenes together with the geopolitical, geo-economic, cultural and historical information they convey are carefully chosen and displayed to guide and structure the understanding of the audience towards an acceptance of the difficult circumstances faced by American FBI government agents in their war against the "Other" enemy, thereby justifying America's territorial invasion of the Middle East. As we watch these introductory scenes, a voice-over narrates that Wahabis (Saudian Islamic warriors) are fiercely anti-Western presence in the kingdom and wanted to go back in time to a pure Islam that was not threatened by the West. Saudi Arabia at that time was the number one country that produced oil in the world, whereas America was the number one oil consumer in the world. The voice-over continues to tell that America claimed that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

needed a security from USA. With the regulation of commercialization, the king of Saudi Arabia accepted it. As a consequence, a partnership was produced between Saudi Arabia and America in 1938, which was named as Arabian American Oil Company (ARAMCO). The voiceover goes on to inform the audience that in 1945 President Roosvelt and Ibnu Saud had a meeting which resulted in signing a unity agreement between East and West, but the Wahhabi movement rejected this unity on the grounds that America supported Israel in the Arab war versus Israel in 1970. Also worth attention in these introductory scenes is the display of the figures of Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden. The voice-over recounts that during the Gulf war, bin Laden offered help to the kingdom of Saudi Arabia to destroy Iraq with his Afghan Mujahdidin (warriors) and defeat Saddam Hussein in Kuwait, but Saudi Arabia got a good offer from the United States army. Because of that rejection, Osama bin Laden did not like the cooperation between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the USA. Then, the movie cuts to a plane crushing into a big building to imply that bin Laden's reaction against America was the motif behind the tragedy of 9 September 2011.

This short, but very geopoliticized introductory documentation, is, however, implicitly overloaded with ideologically imbued assemblages of information, geopolitical implications and imperial intents that the film is dedicated to propagandizing the increasingly enfranchised masses into believing American imperial expansionism has been in everyone's interest in Saudi Arabia and the Middle East region as a whole. The emphasis on the Middle East landscape in these documentary sequences, therefore, merits further investigation as it is the battlefield stage upon which world geopolitics are dramatically played out. The visual rhetoric of screened landscape displayed in the movie informs the motivations of the characters, creates the mood, and frames the film's narrative around a valorization of the U.S military involvement in Middle East. In other words, the landscape–in its screened depictions - moulds the place to the needs

of namely geopolitical production. Through specific unnerving camera angles, low lighting, anguish and despair atmosphere, which produce the affect of extreme fear in an enclose space similar to the regular view of Cold War cinema, the opening of the film presents the Middle East as hostile to human beings; it is a dark and foreboding space, one that borrows from the Orientalist stock images and tropes prevalent in the literary sources outlined by Edward Said in his Orientalism. Then, the background screen turns black, and the featured landscape is a deserted, horrific place. The implied purpose is to present a geopoliticized landscape of extreme otherness, thus legitimizing American military interventionism in the region.

Filled with intense violence, The Kingdom produces an imaginative geography that seeks to orientate audiences, as well as emotional attachments and enmities that shape what is considered to be politically possible and desirable. Moreover, interruptions of the voice-over with landscape depictions isolate and restrict the gaze of the viewer before they are transported to the battlefield, which is a vast, desolate, and harsh world. Indeed, the film's construction of the locale for the drama is instrumental to its geopolitically influenced narrative. It is through such visual politics of essentializing the "Other" landscape that the movie can provide the moral vocabulary into which narratives of "right" conduct and the American imperial violence could be morally justifiable.

In its discursive mapping of the Middle East, the film relies on a number of established coherent strategies to draw up, spatialize and dominate the Middle East geography. That the Middle East is configured as an ideologically rigid and unchanging place in The Kingdom is not, however, perpetuated as being only culturally different, but its geostrategic geography is what counts in the American imperial perpetual struggle over space in global politics. However, still the visualized fetishistic constructions of the Middle East as culturally different and threatening is essential to the film's plot narrative as it seeks to naturalize and legitimize American territorial invasion of the Middle East

region. This brings to mind Samuel Huntington's thesis of "cultural civilization" in which he reduces East-West conflict to merely culture and civilization[26]. In other words, Huntington's "clash of civilization" rhetoric propagates the idea that the conflict between Western world and the non-Western world are over clashes that are ideological, cultural and religious rather than political and economic, which is indeed the same rhetoric used by the American administration to legitimize its geopolitical efforts to remap the Middle East. Huntington's civilizational discourse, however, is remarkably simplistic and comprehensively flawed as it deliberately overlooks the geographical and geopolitical specificities of conflicts which overwhelmingly structure most of the knowledge produced about the Middle East. Richard Rubenstein and Jarle Crocker, for instance, note that "Huntington has replaced the nation-state, the primary playing piece in the old game of realist politics, with a larger counter: the civilization. But in crucial respects, the game itself goes on as always"[27]. Corroborating a similar view, Tuathail posits that "Huntington's thesis is not about the clash of civilizations. It is about making global politics a clash of civilizations."[28]

Informed by geopolitical and geo-economic orientations, The Kingdom, as a geopolitically-inclined text, displays geo-graphing politics and geo-power anxieties as central to its dramatic narrative. That is, the imaginative geography propagated in this film together with the desire to produce international politics geographically is specifically driven by political and economic interests. The "imaginative geography"[29] elaborated by Edward Said in his Orientalism illuminates the manner in which such Western Orientalist imagination shapes the geopolitical and geo-economic discursive mapping of the Middle East. With American Orientalism, more particularly, the imaginative geography of the Middle East landscape is primarily motivated by economic and corporate interests centered mainly on access to oil supply and the domination over the region. Indeed, the Middle East is perceived as "a subsystem of acute strategic

importance to the rest of the world. For local and external powers there are many immutable interests over which to compete and such competition is a major contributory factor to the reputation of the Middle East as the world most volatile and violent region"[30]. That the opening scenes of the film bring to view the fact that Saudi Arabia has been one of the most rich-oil states in the world and that America was the first oil consumer state in the world is one main imperial motif structuring America's geo-economic struggle over the Middle East. The display of the signed agreement between the two states in this film was meant not only to secure American economic interests in the region, but also to maintain the primacy of the United States over the region, thereby countering the emergence of other external political-economic powers seeking to project their presence in the region, namely China as an emergent threat to U.S primacy in world affairs.

Another constitutive and fundamental element lying bare America's geopolitical sensibilities and anxieties in The Kingdom might be the dramatization of the United States' hegemonic and unilateral sense of power, which assigns itself the role of disciplining the "Other" landscape, and subjugating it to the regulatory power structures of its unilateral military action, knowledge and surveillance technology. John Ikenberry observes that "spurred by its war on terrorism, the Bush Administration has advanced new, provocative ideas about the American unilateral and preemptive use of force –and under this go-it-alone if necessary banner"[31]. He adds that "unilateralism seeks to strengthen American power and unashamedly deploy it on behalf of self-defined global ends"[32]. To this vein, the mention of the Wahhabi Islamic warriors, Iraq, Afghanistan and Israel intercut with images of Saddam Hussein and bin Laden exhibit American unilateral military actions in the Middle East along with specific geopolitical anxieties that the film narrativizes through practices of power, surveillance and disciplining. That is, by narrating how these figures and countries are anti-American democratic values, the movie legitimizes the violent and disciplinary

structures used to root out anti-voices of American presence and its interests in the region. The audience therefore is encouraged to naturalize American military invasion of Iraq, which ultimately resulted in the downthrown of Saddam's regime and his eventual death four years after the release of The Kingdom. Saddam and his political regime had to be removed from the Middle East region not because of Iraq's involvement in the Gulf war, nor for the nuclear weapons his country was supposed to possess as the voiceover emphasizes in the movie, but for his threat to the interests of America and the stability of Israel in the region. Simultaneously, the depiction of bin Laden in the film, the "mastermind" behind the September 11, and who was dramatically shot by American army four years later before the release of The Kingdom, is brought to the fore to implicitly reaffirm America's role as a key geopolitical player in the Middle East. Given that bin Laden and Saddam's voices are anti-American geopolitical interests, they therefore must be exterminated in order to establish peace and security in the world.

Moreover, power, surveillance and punishment serve specific geopolitical agendas in The Kingdom. While on the surface they are deployed in the context of "war on terror", their disciplining effect, however, works to reterritorialize the identity of the United States, rewrite the meaning of geo-power, and secure U.S geopolitics on the global scene, thereby bringing to the fore the complexities of power, knowledge, geography, and geopolitics. In exploring the intricacy of these concepts, Tuathail posits that "geography is about power. Although often assumed to be innocent, the geography of the world is not a product of nature but a product of histories of struggle between competing authorities over the power to organize, occupy, and administer space"[33]. Thus, the very identity of the subject position, be they "geographer", "cartographer", or "geopolitician", coupled with the specific techniques by which geographical and geopolitical objects are projected and presented are all effects of power-knowledge relations. Michael Foucault postulates that power and knowledge

directly imply one another: "there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations"[34]. His insights on power, knowledge and surveillance are indeed instrumental for decoding the power structures involved in the cinematization of space. For him, power, knowledge and surveillance are three entities which support an integrated system, for he argues that the success of disciplinary power, thus the objectification of the individual, is carried out through three inter-related instruments: "hierarchal observation, normalizing judgment and their combination in a procedure that is specific to it, the examination"[35]. Indeed, as Foucault highlights, discipline "presupposes a mechanism that coerces by means of observation; an apparatus in which the techniques that make it possible to see induce effect of power on whom they are applied clearly visible"[36]. In other words, "hierarchal surveillance"[37], or the technique of making subjects visible or observable, allows extension of knowledge to sustain its hegemonic mechanism. Following this argument, observing and surveilling can be equated with knowing, thus being dominant, and in the context of the film under study the FBI characters are introduced as possessing the power/knowledge mechanisms, something which allows them to surveil and control the "Other".

Indeed, the issue of surveillance, power and cinema has been important to media scholars. Drawing on Sebastian Lefait's study on the mutual implication of cinema and surveillance, Xiaoning Lu writes that in his study of contemporary film and television programs "[Lefait] suggests that cinema engages surveillance structurally through its fictional creation of surveillance microcosms. In the meantime, by being a reality-capturing device, the cinematic apparatus "translates the problem of the ambiguity of the visible into terms of mediated watching", which is also a matter at the heart of surveillance"[38]. In a similar vein, Catherine Zimmer concurs that ""surveillance cinema" is not simply the recurring tropes or iconographies of surveillance […] Rather […]

"the multiple mediations that occur through the cinematic narration of surveillance, through which practices of surveillance become representational and representational practices become surveillant"[39]. The Kingdom's violent, disciplinary and surveillance narrative embodies and displays all such practices of power and surveillance exerted upon the Middle East geography. In its screened geopoliticized landscape, the film involves, exhibits, and relies on specific disciplinary and surveillance techniques to counter the Other's severe "threat" to American's national security and geopolitical interests in the region. The opening sequences of the film with aerial top-down views, the evocative display of geopolitically charged panoramas of the landscape, the use of satellite technologies, and the reliance on the FBI's expertise and knowledge to track the Other enemy, all promoted by surveillance technologies, indicate how the movie is structured around power and hierarchized surveillance. As a consequence, through the literal and figurative lens of surveillance, the "Other" becomes objectified, surveilled, recorded and controlled. It is equally through these mechanisms of surveillance that a "scientific", "neutral", "objective", and specialized language (knowledge/truth) about the "Other" is produced and sustained. The film depicts the FBI agents as intelligence experts using satellite reconnaissance technology to navigate and investigate the Middle East. In fact, the camera centers much on the battle against the "Other" enemy in order to emphasize the expertise of the FBI investigators mapping out the movements of terrorists, which ultimately leads to the murder of Abou Hamza. Hence, by engaging surveillance mechanisms in its cinematic narrative, the film attributes the tropes of scientific authority, neutrality to FBI agents, thereby justifying their military intervention in the Middle East. The consistency with which this expertise and power are imagined point to the rationalization and disciplining qualities of American imperialism regarding its intervention and involvement in the Middle East. In other words, surveillance, as a mode of power, has been crucial to the United States' geopolitical discourse and its military presence in

the Middle East. The landscape of Saudi Arabia depicted in this film as a geostrategic location is in fact an extension of American military base on the real grounds. The actual presence of American military camp in the region unfolds the American real practices of surveillance, disciplining and punishing the Middle East. In a nutshell, surveilling, disciplining and punishing the Middle East either in fiction or in reality serve the very geopolitical sensibilities of the United Stated in the region embodied in its global hegemony and imperial expansionism. The link between the aforementioned modalities of power and their effect on the imaginative geography can also be clearly found in the links postulated by Edward Said between imperialism and geography, for he states that imperialism is after all "an act of geographical violence through which virtually every space in the world is explored, charted, and finally brought under control"[40].

4. Conclusion

Attempting to interrogate the intersections of geopolitics, power, global hegemony and politics of signification manifest in post-9/11 Hollywood cinema, the conclusions reached herein have revealed the ways in which The Kingdom, as a geopolitical film, has mediated, reproduced and geopoliticized the Middle East landscape and culture along with the ethos of American militarism, geo-policy-making and economic pursuits in the region. While the research demonstrates how the movie has borrowed from Orientalist stock images and strategies that have long been used to signify the Middle East, it emphasized that 9/11 has manipulated and altered these strategies in substantive ways. In the process, it has demonstrated that the construction and the designation of the spaces of "Middle East" as "wild zones" in need of American intervention was mobilized as an argument for American geopolitical interests and interventionism in the region. Likewise, the analysis has illustrated the

ways in which the film deployed the rhetoric of "war on terrorism" as a narrative strategy to display American geopolitical anxieties, America's fear of losing its way in the world, and its geopolitical efforts to recuperate American perception of geo-power. It has maintained that the discursive constructions of the "Other" as enemy and the delineation of the "Other" landscape as dangerous and volatile in post-9/11 Hollywood cinematic texts are enframed within geopolitics, petro-politics and the desire to project America as a world hegemon intending to dominate international politics. More precisely, the construction of the "Other" as enemy threatening American political and economic interests in the region provided the background against which new forms of geo-power and geopolitical narratives are reinstated and situated. In other words, with the demise of the Cold War and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union as the "evil empire", the search for a new threat of terrorist attack, a new geo-political justification for American hegemonic identity and world position, was a prerequisite condition for the reproduction of American hegemony on the global stage. In addition, the study has examined the manner in which such geopolitical sensibilities are mobilized through narratives of melodrama, trauma, victimization, and the burden that American "benevolent" characters must bear to bring peace to the world, therefore emphasizing American exceptionalism and supporting American global hegemony as legitimate. It has interrogated how the film's accommodation and manipulation of history through a brief historical documentary of archival footage of the Middle East is deployed and filtered through the events of 9/11 in order to rewrite and rescue the long and contested history of American foreign policy, economic investment and involvement in the Middle East. In so doing, it shows how the movie's plotline narrative authorizes and validates American knowledge and expertise about the Middle East, which, in other words, might explain American policies of surveillance, discipline and punishment. Ultimately, what is at stake here is a

geopolitical struggle over the space and the desire to reconfigure the role of America as a world hegemony.

Endnotes

[1] Quoted in Andrew Crampton and Marcus Power (2007). *Cinema and Popular Geo-Politics*. London: Routledge. p.4.

[2] For further discussion, see Floribert Patrick C Endong. (2018). "Cinema Globalization and Nation Branding: An Exploration of the Impact of the Nollywood of the Nigerian Image Crisis". *Journal of Globalization Studies*, Volume 9, Issue 1.

[3] Quoted in Klaus Dodds (2008). "Hollywood the Popular Geopolitics of the War on Terror", *Third World Quarterly*, Vol.29: 8. 1621-1637.

[4] Quoted in Jiong, Zhang (2017). *Literature and Literary Theory in Contemporary China*. Trans. Yang Limeng and Wu Yischeng. London and New York: Routledge, p.109.

[5] Jutta Weldes and Christina Rowely (2015). "So, How Does Popular Culture Relates to World Politics?" In Federica Caso And Caitlin Hamilton (Eds.). *Popular Culture and World Politics: Theories, Methods, Pedagogies*. Bristol: E-International Relations Publishing, p.19.

[6] Andrew Crampton and Marcus Power, *Cinema and Popular Geo-Politics*, p.1.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Peter Van Ham (2008). "War, Lies, and Videotape: Public Diplomacy and USA's War on Terrorism."*Sage Publications*, Volume34, Issue 4, p.434.

[9] See Thomas J. Cobb (2020). *American Cinema and Cultural Diplomacy: The Fragmented Kaleidoscope.*UK: Palgrave Macmillan.

[10] Georeg Klay Kieh (1992). "Western Imperialism in the Middle East: The Case of the United States' Military Intervention in the Persian Gulf". *Arab Studies Quarterly*, Volume 14, Issue 1, p.1.

[11] Gearoid Ó Tuathail (1996). *Critical Geopolitics: The Politics of Writing Global Space*. London: Routledge, p.192.

[12] According to Gearoid Ó Tuathail, "Critical geopolitics is distinguished by its problematization of the logocentric infrastructures that make "geopolitics" or any spatialization of the global political scene possible. It problematizes the "is" of "geography" and "geopolitics," their status as self-evident, natural, foundational, and eminently knowable realities … Rather

than innocent sites of declarative facts and constative statements about the world, these signs ["geography" and "geopolitics"] mark the site of space/power/knowledge production systems, operations that script the actors, settings, and dramas of global politics in deeply geo-politicized ways." (Ó Tuathail, Gearoid, *Critical Geopolitics: The Politics of Writing Global Space,* p.52.)

[13] Katherin Woodward (1997), (Ed). *Identity and Difference.* London: Sage Publications, p.35.

[14] Edward Said (1978). *Orientalism.* London and Henley: Routledge and Kegan Paul, p.5.

[15] Floribert Patrick C. Endong (2018). "Cinema Globalization and Nation Branding: An Exploration of the Impact of the Nollywood of the Nigerian Image Crisis", *Journal of Globalization Studies*, Volume 9, Issue 1, p.79.

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[22] De Richard Jackson (2005). *Writing the War on Terrorism: Language, Politics and Counter-terrorism.* Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, p.191.

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[24] Nestingen, Andrew. (2008). *Cinema and Fantasy in Scandinavia: Fiction, Film, and Social Change.* Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press, p.115.

[25] Gearoid Ó Tuathail, *Critical Geopolitics: The Politics of Writing Global Space*, p.178.

[26] In his article, *The Clash of Civilizations?,* published in *Foreign Affairs* in Summer 1993 (later expanded in his book (1996) *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*), Samuel Huntington posits that "it is my hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation States will remain the

most powerful actors in world affairs but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be battle lines of the future" (Samuel Huntigton P, (Summer 1993) 'The Clash of Civilizations?' *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 72, No. 3, p.22.

[27] Richard Rubenstein and Jarle Crocker (Fall 1994), "Challenging Huntington." *Foreign Policy.* No. 96. As cited in Gearoid Ó Tuathail, *Critical Geopolitics: The Politics of Writing Global Space*, p. 194.

[28] Gearoid Ó Tuathail, *Critical Geopolitics: The Politics of Writing Global Space*, p.195.

[29] In his discussion of how "imaginative geography" functions in Orientalist discourse, Edward Said writes that "It [Orientalism] is rather a distribution of geopolitical awareness into aesthetic, scholarly, economic, sociological, historical, and philological texts; it is an elaboration not only of a basic geographical distinction but also of a whole series of "interests" (Edward Said. *Orientalism*, p.12).

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[32] Ibid.

[33] Gearoid Ó Tuathail, *Critical Geopolitics: The Politics of Writing Global Space*, p.1.

[34] Michael Foucault (1995). *Discipline and Punishment: The Birth of the Prison*. Trans. Alan Sheridan. New York: Vintage Books, p.33.

[35] Ibid., p.170.

[36] Ibid., pp.170-171.

[37] For an in-depth study, see Foucault's analysis of "Hierarchal surveillance", "normalizing judgment", and the "examination", as three fundamental processes involved in discipline. Michael Foucault, *Discipline and Punishment: The Birth of the Prison*, pp.170-76, 177-83, 184.

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L'impact des réseaux sociaux sur les représentations culturelles : de la déconstruction à la construction

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Résumé

Les réseaux sociaux contribuent à la déformation et à la déconstruction des traits identitaires de chaque communauté sociale, car ils permettent de briser l'intimité de sa propre culture. Ils deviennent un champ d'investigation assez vaste et non contrôlé pour diffuser et consolider des stéréotypes. L'anarchie des diffusions, nourrie d'un mensonge culturel résultant des images figées et des clichés défaillants reflétant les représentations erronées des internautes, aboutit à une insécurité culturelle susceptible d'entraver la réalisation d'un dialogue interculturel. Pour éviter l'émanation du fanatisme numérique culturel, il faut comprendre que la différence de l'Autre ne constitue plus une menace et que la communication facilite aussi bien la coexistence que la reconnaissance.

Mots clés : réseaux sociaux ; déformation ; (dé)construction ; (re)présentation ; culture(l)

Abstract

Permitting to break the intimacy of one's own culture, social media highly contributes to the deformation and deconstruction of identities traits of all social categories. By and large, it has become a broad field of investigation; however, its uncontrolled spread contributes further in promoting stereotypes. The anarchy broadcasted which is fed by cultural falsification, so to speak, results in fixed wrong cliché images and gives a false representation to the web users. Thus, it potentially leads social insecurity, which consequently hinders the realization of an intercultural dialogue. To avoid the emanation of social digital fanaticism, it is necessary to take into consideration that the cultural differences of the other one do not constitute any sort of threat. Also, communication facilitates both coexistence and recognition.

Keywords: social networks; deformation; (of construction ; (representation ; cultural)

1. Introduction

Culture et moyens de communication modernes, quel apport ? Peut-on concilier entre ces deux thématiques qui entretiennent un rapport paradoxal sans nuire à la cohésion de la société contemporaine, ou même sans creuser un fossé entre les valeurs de l'ère de certitude d'hier et celles de l'ère des soupçons d'aujourd'hui ? Si la première est symbolique, enracinée dans la mémoire collective de tout groupe social et transmise d'une génération à l'autre, il n'en demeure pas moins pour la seconde qui envahit les mécanismes de conduite d'une génération dite moderne dans un monde virtuel.

Qu'il s'agisse d'anthropologues (Max Weber, Georges Dumézil, Lüda Schneider,…), d'ethnologues (Lévi Strauss, Edward Tylor, Pierre Bourdieu …), de sociologues (Lucien Goldman, Emile Durkheim, Michel Foucault…) ou de linguistes (Emile Benveniste, Henri Meschonnic, Georges Mounin, Kadi Keddour…), la culture (ou les cultures) et son impact sur le développement humaindemeurent au sein de leurs préoccupations. Ainsi, malgré la multiplicité de leur angle de vision et la diversité de leurs champs d'études, ils convergent sur la nécessité d'un dialogue culturel favorisant autant une communication où le respect, l'estime et l'acceptation de l'Autre règnent que l'épanouissement de soi : « *je ne vois pas comment le genre humain pourrait réellement vivre sans quelque diversité interne (...) Les différences sont extrêmement fécondes. C'est seulement à travers la différence que le progrès s'est accompli* »[1], écrit Lévi Strauss dans *Myth and Meaning.*

De nos jours, il semble très facile de diffuser sa culture grâce à l'hégémonie des réseaux sociaux si séduisants (Facebook, WhatsApp, Twiter, Instegram, Imo, Messenger, …), lesquels peuvent-être utilisés mécaniquement même par des analphabètes, et avec les coûts les plus moins chers encourageant et facilitant leur consommation. Certes, ils contribuent à un échange culturel permettant

l'ouverture sur les cultures du monde, mais, que peut-on dire de la crédibilité et de l'authenticité de la culture circulée via ces réseaux ? Doit-on croire tout ce qui se diffuse, même dans l'anonymat ? N'est-il pas le moment adéquat pour s'interroger, face à quelques actes irresponsables et irraisonnables visant la déconstruction de tout héritage culturel, sous prétexte d'un progrès numérique, sur le devenir de la culture ?

C'est dans cette perspective que nous allons mettre en exergue, au prime abord, le changement du statut de la culture dans notre société, dû à l'émergence de nouvelles manières qui s'instaurent, consciemment ou inconsciemment, et qui s'insèrent progressivement à la 'culture d'origine', dépourvu qu'elles soient justes ou fausses, et discuter, au second abord, le cheminement de la reconstruction due à la déformation des dimensions culturelles et à la déconstruction de l'intimité des cultures, traçant ainsi le parcours qui marque le changement du statut de la culture, allant de la sacralisation à la désacralisation. Autrement dit, Pourquoi la culture a-t-elle perdu son auréole ?

2. La déconstruction des représentations

Comment les gens conçoivent-ils la culture ? Comment assimilent-ils la diversité des cultures ? Des questions qui s'avèrent pertinentes dans la mesure où la réponse nécessite une réflexion sur l'ascendance de quelques pratiques et postures culturelles qui se répandent sans censure au sein des communautés sociales. Les questions que nous avons posées visent en fait à innocenter la culture de ce que quelques-uns lui collent chaque fois qu'ils se trouvent dans des impasses communicationnelles ou actionnelles, sociales ou religieuses.

Du point de vue linguistique[2], Émile Benveniste attribue à la culture un aspect symbolique. Il la définit comme :

> Un ensemble très complexe de représentations, organisées par un
> code de relations et de valeurs : traditions, religion, lois, politique,
> éthique, arts, tout cela dont l'homme, où qu'il naisse, sera imprégné
> dans sa conscience la plus profonde et qui dirigera son
> comportement dans toutes les formes de son activité[3]

Nous retenons l'expression « *ensemble très complexe de représentations* », car, la culture, réduite de nos jours à des actes coutumiers et pratiques quotidiennes, pourrait-elle remplir ses fonctions et continuer à persister au sein d'une communauté où les analogies de la vie moderne s'émergent à perpétuité ? Comment l'élément culturel s'intègre-t-il dans les images, les anecdotes et les mots diffusés sur les réseaux sociaux ? Comment le récepteur les reçoit-il ?

Il est vrai que ces réseaux participent à un échange culturel où toutes les frontières s'abolissent, apparemment, grâce à la réinvention des deux notions de l'altérité et de l'identité, à la prise de conscience de sa culture et la mise en considération de celle de l'autrui. Or, ne peut-on pas dire que cet échange ne se fait que dans un sens dérisoire visant la déconstruction de sa propre culture ? Vu l'absence totale d'une loi qui régit et règlemente les diffusions d'ordre culturel, les réseaux sociaux deviennent un champ assez vaste pour diffuser et consolider des stéréotypes. D'une part, ils installent chez le récepteur des manières basées sur des représentations et interprétations individuelles erronées, d'autre part, ils influencent leur vision du monde dont nous citons la définition du sociologue Gérard Namer :

> La vision du monde est une totalité historique de représentations
> esthétiques, philosophiques, religieuses et autres, par lesquelles une
> classe sociale se représente sa volonté de transformer le monde en
> prenant conscience de l'historicité de ses représentations contre le
> simplisme de l'idéologie et de la psychologie de l'intérêt.[4]

En effet, toute production humaine, quel qu'en soit le mode de sa diffusion, s'enracine dans un contexte culturel au sein duquel elle se définit et englobe les

aspirations d'un groupe social. Elle renferme ainsi une vision du monde collective, non individuelle. Le producteur a donc cette capacité de concilier entre la structure textuelle, ou picturale, et la conscience collective. C'est à lui de mettre en totalité les fragments de la société, ou par contre, fragmenter la société et déconstruire ses valeurs, grâce à son génie d'exposer cette vision du monde et de changer les mentalités des peuples. À cet égard, Robert Escarpit et Max Weber se mettent d'accord sur le fait que les structures culturelles ne sont pas seulement autonomes mais elles peuvent agir sur les structures sociales et économiques. C'est pourquoi « *il faut séparer les jugements de valeurs des jugements de fait* » (Max Weber, 2002 : 198)

Étant donné que, comme l'affirme Lucien Goldman, « *toute création culturelle est à la fois un phénomène individuel et social, et s'insère dans les structures constituées par la personnalité du créateur et le groupe social dans lequel étaient élaborées les catégories mentales qui le structurent* », comment les réseaux sociaux nourrissent-ils ces structures ? (*Marxisme et sciences humaines*, 1970)

Les exemples se multiplient et s'amplifient dans ce contexte, suite à un flux numérique en cas de mouvance perpétuelle. Mais l'exemple qui a attiré notre attention est une anecdote diffusée et rediffusée via WhatsApp. Elle avait pour objet les qualités, plutôt les défauts de l'homme amazigh, voire son avarice, sa passivité et laideur. L'anecdote était écrite en langue arabe. Nous proposons la traduction suivante[5] :

Il était une fois un Amazigh qui avait dormi jour et nuit dans une petite épicerie à Casa Blanca. On raconte qu'Amazighia était avare, craignant sa femme et ressemblant au singe ou à la chèvre puisqu'il grimpait les montagnes. On raconte également que les amazighs sont le peuple ancestral du Maroc comme le raconte l'Histoire universelle.	يحكى ان أمازيغيا نام بالنهار والليل في متجر صغير بالدار البيضاء، ويحكى أن أمازيغيا كان بخيلا يخاف من زوجته ويشبه القرد أو الماعز لتسلقه الجبال. ويحكى أن الأمازيغ هم سكان المغرب الأقدمون كما يحكي التاريخ العالمي.

Nous remarquons, d'après ce qui est écrit, que le contenu connait des glissements sémantiques. Les unités lexicales qui le constituent se déplacent et changent de signification. :

- Le mode de l'énonciation : la forme impersonnelle 'on' se déplace vers 'l'Histoire universelle'. Est-il vrai que l'anonymat fait du texte, dans ce cas, un produit objectif comme le disait Benveniste ? En fait, l'insistance et la redondance du verbe 'on raconte', et dans un temps indéterminé, inscrit le texte dans le cadre de l'oralité et le rapproche du conte dans la mesure où il incarne un ensemble de représentations sociales et où on remarque l'absence de l'énonciation. Ne peut-on pas dire que, en attribuant à l'anecdote les traits du conte, l'émetteur vise, d'une part, à lui octroyer le pouvoir du conte et d'investir les structures culturelles qui l'abritent, et d'autre part, à profiter de « *la transformation que fait la culture de leurs structures narratives tout en maintenant une permanence sur les imaginaires[6] individuels et collectifs.* »? (Georges Jean, 1990)

- Le nom propre : 'Amazighia' se déplace de son statut de personnage individuel pour désigner les amazighs dans leur collectivité. Le nom propre n'assume pas ici uniquement la fonction vocative ou dénominative d'une personne, comme le note R. Jakobson «*Le nom désigne quiconque porte ce nom* » (1963 : 177). Il n'est non plus « *privé de sens* » comme l'affirme Hamon (1973 : 145). Il dépasse par contre la fonction référentielle pour investir dans un cadre culturel incarnant des valeurs et des connotations à la fois culturelles et sociales. À cet égard, le nom propre, selon Lévi Strauss, a une fonction signifiante liée au contexte culturel car chaque société conçoit et perçoit ce nom selon sa culture où il a été né et actualisé. 'Amazighia' donc est chargé et condensé sémantiquement.

Par conséquent, l'anecdote n'aurait pas la même signification si l'auteur avait choisi par exemple Hemmou, Ahmed ou Jacques. Elle serait sans doute évacuée de sa charge symbolique puisque, d'après Benveniste, c'est « *le symbole qui noue le lien vivant entre l'homme, la langue et la culture.* »[7]

L'onomastique choisie trouve sa signification donc dans un univers symbolique. L'actualisation linguistique du nom propre 'Amazighia' fait de ce personnage ayant les caractères cités le symbole de tous les amazighs. Le nom propre revêt ainsi une fonction économique de la langue basée, comme l'affirme Roland Barthes, sur un rapport de condensation-dénomination versus expansion-définition dans la mesure où il est conçu comme « *un instrument d'échange : il permet de substituer une unité nominale à une collection de traits en posant un rapport d'équivalence entre le signe et la somme.* »[8]

- L'espace : Casa Blanca se déplace pour désigner tout le royaume marocain et assure le passage de la partie au tout.
- La morphologie du verbe : le verbe se déplace de son aspect inaccompli à son aspect accompli (système linguistique arabe).
- Le temps : indéterminé, rappelant la conjoncture des contes.

Bref, en utilisant un champ lexical péjoratif, Amazighia est représenté d'une manière dévalorisante, animalesque même. Pour ce qui est de ses pratiques sociales, il est totalement passif puisqu'il s'endort jour et nuit. Il est réduit tantôt à un singe (pour marquer son caractère burlesque), tantôt à une chèvre (pour tracer peut-être sa féminité, soumission). La description qu'a faite l'auteur d'Amazighia nous fait rappeler les archétypes créés par les romanciers des récits du voyage du XIXème siècle qui, d'après Denise Brahimi, ont établi un Orient comme cet Autre à la fois sauvage, menaçant, exotique, barbare, primitif et soumis, et que seule l'intervention de l'Occident, conçu comme supérieur, pourrait le civiliser et le domestiquer : « *L'Orient est bon à*

reconnaitre et à visiter pour mieux se persuader de l'écart avec l'occident et de la supériorité de l'occident, qui seul, par son intervention pourrait y remédier. Voilà la seule tentation que l'orient soit capable de ressusciter. »[9]. Par extension : la communauté amazighe est l'orient, l'arabe est l'occident. S'agit-il vraiment d'une culture qui traduit innocemment la mentalité d'un peuple ? S'agit-il d'une vision qui développe vraiment l'image de l'homme Amazigh qui a résisté contre les romains ?

Ainsi, l'anecdote proposée, et d'autres bien évidemment, ont déclenché une série d'anecdotes, non exhaustives, tournant en dérision le citoyen amazigh et brisant sa vraie identité[10]. Ils ont développé également un discours de représentations défaillantes sur les amazighs en général, d'où l'émanation de nombreux mouvements s'opposant à toute personne appartenant à leur système linguistique, langagier et culturel. De leur part, et par défense, ils vont répondre d'une manière aussi dérisoire et plus fanatique que celle des autres. Chaque clan essaie d'expliquer et de prouver que sa culture est meilleure que celle d'autrui, oubliant que toute population bornée et refermée sur elle-même sous prétexte de son autosuffisance culturelle risque la mort. Le problème qui s'impose ici c'est que l'on est soit fanatique, soit altéré. La coexistence dans un univers multiculturel, en gardant les mêmes regards vis-à-vis du Moi et de l'Autre, s'avère appartenir à un monde utopique. Car, c'est cette oscillation entre deux rives culturelles sans jamais pouvoir distinguer entre le Propre, comme signe d'identité, et l'Etrange, comme signe de diversité et de richesse humaine, qui mène à l'émergence des rapports conflictuels.

3. La reconstruction des représentations

En réalité, les réseaux sociaux permettent l'identification de soi, même d'une manière virtuelle. Toute personne se croit missionnaire et porte-parole de sa

communauté sociale, toute personne consommatrice aime et partage, selon son gré, sans censure ni même vérification de la justesse ou de la fausseté de ce qui est diffusé, car elle pense que sa popularité se mesure par le nombre de ses publications et fans : le Cogito cartésien se substitue de la sorte que 'Je partage, j'existe'. La conséquence c'est que la personnalité du consommateur se déconstruit, se construit et se reconstruit selon les métamorphoses permanentes des contraintes de la vie économique, politique et idéologique, d'où l'apparition des personnes à identité floue, fragile, à facettes multiples. L'identité cède place ainsi à l'altérité et la culture à la non-culture. Le Propre et l'Etrange s'entrecroisent et se confondent, le Moi et l'Autre perdent de repères et errent, chacun dans ses fantasmes et représentations.

Du fait, la culture numérique s'acquiert un aspect subjectif puisqu'elle répond aux besoins individuels de la personne qui valorise ou dévalorise à son gré les fragments qu'elle diffuse. Celle-ci fait de la culture un matériau travaillé et retravaillé à perpétuité jusqu'à ce qu'il soit comptable à ses inclinations et intérêts dans une conjoncture temporelle et spatiale bien déterminée. C'est pourquoi *« la culture, comme la langue, est bien un lieu de mise en scène de soi et des autres. »* (Abdellah-Pretceille, 1999 : 17)[11]

Le problème persiste de plus en plus chez les personnes en cours de construction de personnalité, voire les enfants et les adolescents. Tiraillées entre les exigences des pratiques culturelles et sociales que leurs parents leur imposent continûment et la fascination, pour ne pas dire l'addiction, du monde virtuel, elles se présentent aptes à embrasser toute culture, ou un seul élément culturel, favorisant leur émancipation de la tutelle de toute contrainte parentale, sociale ou religieuse. Ainsi elles empruntent aux français leur mode de vie, aux anglais leurs tics, aux turcs leur conception de l'amour, aux japonais leurs esprit sportif, aux arabes leur penchant à l'oisiveté, aux africains leurs coiffures….Ils témoignent ainsi de l'absence d'une maturité culturelle.

Par conséquent, il devient difficile de déterminer sa propre culture et de délimiter ses pratiques. Certes, l'entrecroisement des cultures favorise la connaissance de l'Autre et son acceptation dans sa différence, mais il crée un dysfonctionnement au niveau de la détermination identitaire. Car de nouvelles visions du monde se créent sur un ensemble de motifs et de faits qui ne constituent plus l'héritage culturel collectif mais qui collaborent par contre à la déconstruction de cet héritage tant sauvegardé par nos ancêtres.

Ainsi, au lieu d'aboutir à un métissage culturel fructueux se basant essentiellement sur le dialogue permanent des cultures, on déclenche un choc culturel, civilisationnel même. Les mouvements inhumains auxquels on assiste, voire l'extrémisme, le racisme, le fanatisme…expliquent en fait que notre dialogue prétendu est basé sur un mensonge culturel résultant d'une image défaillante et des clichés qui reflètent des représentations, individuelles ou même collectives, que se fait une minorité de sa propre culture. Le retour à la querelle des Anciens et des Modernes, sous des aspects plus modernes encore, semble inévitable.

À vrai dire, il s'avère que des forces invisibles s'intéressent à évoquer de manière déformée cette formidable entreprise du progrès numérique. On fait valoir quelques cultures en les versant dans le bain universel, comme on déconstruit d'autres en gommant leur intimité, de surcroît quand il s'agit d'une culture qui s'associe à un système linguistique et langagier minoré, ou d'une culture dont la langue n'a pas encore accompli son passage de l'état oral à l'état scriptural. Ne peut-on pas dire à cet égard que cette entreprise, qui se développe très vite et qui met chaque jour au marché de nouvelles techniques susceptibles de fasciner et de capter d'avantage l'attention de chaque utilisateur, a contribué à la naissance d'une nouvelle forme de fanatisme que l'on peut appeler 'le fanatisme numérique' ?

Il est temps donc de prendre conscience de la nécessité de sauvegarder l'intimité de chaque culture qui cherche à se positionner au milieu d'une multitude de conceptions culturelles différentes mais égales quant à leur existence. Les jugements qui émanent des représentations erronées doivent être remplacés par des tentatives consistant à comprendre l'Autre et à assimiler ses diverses manières de faire, de penser, d'agir et d'exister.

Le projet de la construction d'une culture qui opte pour un dialogue interculturel, ou transculturel, n'échouera plus face à l'esprit de l'ethnocentrisme régnant chaque écran de diffusion. Il est important donc - pour sortir de cette caverne dans laquelle l'internaute s'emprisonne volontiers - d'interroger l'étrangeté afin d'en déduire les mécanismes du fonctionnement culturel de chaque ethnie, au lieu de la rejeter ou de la juger.

Bref, si l'on veut schématiser le processus de l'évolution de ce circuit fanatique, on obtiendra le schéma suivant : tant qu'il y a une anarchie non contrôlée dans la diffusion incessante des clichés déplacés de la culture, il y aura une confusion flagrante dans la réception de la sorte que le récepteur accueille et consomme abusivement tout ce qu'il reçoit de l'autre. Par conséquent, la réaction du jeune affamé, et à la réception, et à la diffusion, serait violente envers tout acte qui contredit ce qu'il a inconsciemment absorbé. Les insultes et châtiments que les deux clans partagent et publient en témoignent.

Anarchie de diffusion

Confusion dans la réception

Violence dans la réaction

58

Il s'agit d'un processus évolutif qui va de la perception à la conception. Car, pour construire sa vision du monde, il faut varier et élargir ses angles de vision et projeter le regard même sur soi. Et, pour échapper à l'opacité et à la restriction de la vision, il faut déconstruire ses représentations et reconstruire à nouveau ses connaissances de soi, de sa propre culture et du monde extérieur. Déconstruire ses représentations tant admises, conditionnées par les croyances, comportements et habitudes que la personne a vécus et mémorisés dès son enfance, n'est plus une tâche facile à faire, car elle se croit incapable d'envisager une autre manière de percevoir l'Autre et le monde qui l'abrite et de renoncer à ce qu'elle croyait être la réalité : l'internaute s'emprisonne dans sa caverne et mêle ainsi le simulacre à la réalité sensible.

Certes, la différence dérange parfois. Mais il ne faut pas en faire un écueil empêchant l'ouverture sur l'autre ou un prétexte pour tourner en dérision sa propre culture. Par contre, il faut dépoussiérer les éléments culturels perturbateurs nuisant à la communication et à la cohabitation paisible. Pour ce faire, développer son écoute, sa prestation à ne pas sacraliser ses modèles de références culturelles sous prétexte de leur unicité ou de leur dominance, et sa croyance à la diversité, demeure la meilleure solution.

4. Conclusion

Pour conclure, il importe à dire que les réseaux sociaux forment un champ d'investigation assez vaste et assez approprié pour la diffusion de la culture, mais un champ taxé de l'insécurité culturelle tant qu'il consolide les stéréotypes

et les images représentatives fausses. Étant donné que le patrimoine culturel ne se limite pas à un groupe restreint, mais il le dépasse pour embrasser celui de l'homme dans son universalité, la culture doit être nourrie par ses origines. Raison pour laquelle il faut repenser ses actes et attitudes, à maintes reprises, avant de cliquer sur la touche 'publier' puis sur la touche 'partager' auxquelles les internautes de tout âge sont addictés. Le problème de l'insécurité culturelle doit être envisagé dans une optique plus sérieuse, en abri de tout rapport de force ou de tout projet rendant service à la mondialisation au détriment de la dimension humaine de la culture.

La culture numérique non conditionnée masque la réalité en ne représentant l'Autre que dans des clichés, parfois déplacés complètement de leur contexte, et crée une réalité illusoire basée sur des images conceptuelles figées. Le regard que l'on porte sur l'autre se construit à partir d'un ange de vision très serré et rend par conséquent la vision plus opaque encore. Cette opacité de vision contribue à générer des sentiments de peur, de détestation et de mépris. Ainsi, comprendre que la différence ne constitue plus une menace et que le cadre culturel référentiel diffère d'une personne à l'autre, d'une communauté sociale à l'autre, brise les obstacles de la communication et facilite autant la coexistence que la reconnaissance.

Finalement, du moment où il n'existe pas encore une démarche sécuritaire préservant l'authenticité des éléments culturels contre la déconstruction, la dénaturation et désacralisation face à la menace réelle exercée par les moyens de communication, utilisés d'une manière abusive, sur sa floraison, la question que nous avons soulevée sur le devenir de la culture en général, en l'occurrence celle qui se tiraille encore entre intimité et étrangeté, et les valeurs culturelles ancestrales en particulier, demeure malheureusement toujours ouverte. Désarticuler l'univers culturel exige la prise en considération du double discours qui s'énonce à propos de la culture en question, car chaque réalité dans l'espace

culturel d'origine renvoie à une autre réalité dans l'espace culturel qui la reçoit et qui l'interprète selon ses dispositifs. N'est-il pas temps donc de construire une conscience collective apte aussi bien à embrasser sa culture que d'accepter l'Autre ?

Notes

[1] Claude Lévi Strauss (1978), *Myth and Meaning,* Toronto, University of Toronto press, p. 16

[2] Notons aussi que TYLOR, prof d'anthropologie à Oxford, définit la culture comme suit : *« la culture ou la civilisation prise dans son acception au sens large est cet ensemble complexe composé par la connaissance la croyance l'art la morale la loi les coutumes et toutes les autres compétences et habitudes acquises par l'homme en tant que membre d'une société ».* Cité *in* Denis Laborde, « Éditorial », *Socio-anthropologie* [En ligne], 8 | 2000, mis en ligne le 15 janvier 2003, consulté le 30 octobre 2021 à 21.30.

[3] Émile Benveniste (1966), *Problèmes de linguistique générale,* Paris, Gallimard, p. 30.

[4] Gérard Namer (2009), *La personnalité de l'œuvre de Lucien Goldman* (Acte de colloque *qui s'est déroulé à l'IMEC du 14 au 16 septembre,* enregistré le : 16/09/2009/ URL : Structuralisme et vision du monde chez Lucien Goldmann | Maison de la Recherche en Sciences Humaines (unicaen.fr), consulté le : 30 Octobre 2021 à 20h00)

[5] Nous pouvons aussi remplacer 'On raconte que' par 'il était une fois', mais là on rapproche l'énoncé au conte plus qu'à l'anecdote.

[6] L'imaginaire s'ancre dans les références culturelles du public que la création vise. Selon l'anthropologue Durant, l'imaginaire existe grâce à un contact entre deux pôles : un pôle biologique et un pôle incarné dans une culture, une langue, et une civilisation. Il existe partout. Dans les rêves, les visions, les hallucinations.

[7] Émile Benveniste, *op.cit.*, p. 30.

[8] Roland Barthes (1976), *S/Z*, Paris, Seuil/Points, p. 101.

[9] Denise Brahimi (1982), *Arabes des lumières et bédouins romantiques*, Paris, le Sycomore, p. 20.

[10] Il est à noter que toute culture pourrait-être l'objet d'une dérision numérique. Le choix de la culture amazighe ne relève plus ici d'un fanatisme culturel, mais il est en rapport avec notre propre culture en tant qu'auteure de cet article.

[11] Abdellah-Pretceille assigne à la culture deux fonctions : « *une fonction ontologique qui permet à l'être humain de se signifier à lui-même et aux autres et une fonction instrumentale qui facilite l'adaptation aux environnements nouveaux en produisant des comportements, des attitudes, c'est-à-dire de la culture* » (Abdellah-Pretceille, 1999 : 9).

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II. The Discourse of Geo-politics/culture across Places and Spaces

Prologue

Territories are today not only a sign of demarcating Orders and Borders; geopolitical/cultural factors have made these territories be spaces and places characterized by a hub of histories, cross-cultural legacies, contentions, among others. The dynamic geopolitical/cultural powers in the Mediterranean have brought up rhetorical forms of statecraft actions. To this effect, the construction of geo-political/cultural determinants influences the meaning of and reasoning on territorial identities, spaces, cultures, and geographies.

Caddeo perceives of the Mediterranean as a border zone between the North-South, geographically and the West-East, geoculturally, designating historical and civilizational connotations. Still, for Caddeo, the Mediterranean can be a productive hub thanks to its anthropological, cultural and linguistic dimensions.

Qaissi scrutinizes the construction of othering in the international order framework. Qaissi resorts to constructivist and postcolonial theories to deal with the issues of cultural alterity, diversity, and authority, all of which do trace todays' international relations.

Oilad Ali negotiates the discourse of place and space between Morocco and Spain through the Ceuta lens. To such effect, the respective geopolitical relations have been up and down at various levels.

La Méditerranée au-delà de la géopolitique

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Résumé

En acceptant la vision *mainstream* de la Méditerranée, on serait encouragé à penser que cette mer incarne une frontière séparant des mondes alternatifs. Cette perspective des « deux rives » reproduirait donc les schémas binaires hérités d'une longue histoire de confrontations (croisades, luttes impériales, colonialisme). En d'autres termes, la Méditerranée serait ainsi une ligne de fracture entre le Nord et le Sud du monde, l'Orient et l'Occident, le monde présumé « civilisé » et le monde considéré comme « arriéré ».

Notre intervention vise à ouvrir des voies de réflexion afin de sortir de cette vision dualiste et asymétrique, tout en évitant des fausses solutions facilement conciliatoires. En quittant à la fois les nostalgies d'un passé cosmopolite révolu, les échecs de la géopolitique, le retour d'un orientalisme jamais définitivement abandonné, la réduction de la Méditerranée à un espace principalement touristique, notre intervention vise à remettre un peu d'ordre dans la pensée. Notre but consistera plutôt dans la prise en compte des dimensions anthropologiques, culturelles, linguistiques, qui font de la Méditerranée une circulation productive.

Mots clés : Méditerranée ; fracture ; civilisation ; culture ; circulation

1. Introduction : La Méditerranée saisie par le tourisme

Comme les flux de capitaux, de marchandises, de revenus et d'images le montrent, l'imaginaire globale semble s'investir loin de rivages méditerranéens, devenus plutôt un élément marginal, ou tout au plus complémentaire, du récit de la mondialisation. L'avenir désirable se focalise sur d'autres terres et d'autres cibles, laissant à la Méditerranée le rôle d'agréable lieu de séjour estival.

Tout d'abord, la Méditerranée souffre des stéréotypes et d'un imaginaire qui s'est superposés à ses multiples réalités. Cet imaginaire se présente parfois comme positif et valorisant, ce qui rend encore plus difficile de se débarrasser de ces raccourcis culturels. En d'autres termes, nourrie par une iconographie figée par les catalogues touristiques, la Méditerranée devient un lieu de vacances et d'évasion, ce que Jean-Paul Gourévitch appelle le « rêve héliothérapique »[1]. Plus précisément, attirée par le soleil, par la nourriture, par un paysage dans lequel histoire, beauté, mer, plages, villes se côtoient, une foule de touristes transite par les littoraux et les îles de la Méditerranée. Commercialisant et banalisant les gestes qu'autrefois avait été ceux de Van Gogh, de Picasso, de Gide, les touristes se reversent dans un monde où ils ne vont pas rester longtemps. Le décor est équivalent à celui d'un catalogue, car « aucune de ces villes ne retient longtemps le touriste. Les séjours de plus d'une semaine sont l'exception. […] [La Méditerranée] est toujours là, comme décor de fond de scène, comme une *veduta* entre deux bâtiments, si présente qu'on ne la remarque plus »[2]. La Méditerranée proposée par l'industrie touristique, dernier avatar de l'exotisme, conforte ainsi une double idée : premièrement, la possibilité de profiter d'un paysage ressourçant le touriste en lui offrant une parenthèse loin de la vie frénétique dans les Métropoles mondialisées ; deuxièmement, celle archéologique, c'est-à-dire l'image d'un lieu custode d'archaïsmes conservés jusqu'à nos jours, en proposant un simulacre de contact avec les civilisations passées pouvant être activé et réactivé pendant le temps court des vacances.

Auparavant, avant que le tourisme s'impose comme pratique de masse, lorsque les voyages étaient réservés à des catégories bien spécifiques (marchands, hommes de lettres utilisés comme espions et ambassadeurs, jeunes aristocrates en formation), la Méditerranée avait pu attirer ces populations en utilisant aussi les fraîches découverte des trésors archéologiques. Au XVIIIème siècle, la Méditerranée s'affirme comme lieu de l'archéologie : le bassin se présente donc

comme sous-développé mais en pouvant, en même temps, offrir au regard curieux des archéologues venus du nord les trésors d'une antiquité glorieuse et enterrée. Au site de Pompéi en Italie verront s'ajouter des trésors de la Grèce antique, comme Mycènes et Troie, et l'Egypte, à partir de l'expédition militaire de Bonaparte en 1798-1799.

Au cours du XIXème siècle le regard sur la Méditerranée se déplace des ruines archéologiques vers la culture et les sociétés indigènes : à l'œil de l'archéologue se substitue progressivement celui du visiteur (on penserait d'abord à la peinture de Delacroix et à ses thématiques marocaines). Comme résumé par le grand historien Georges Duby, il y a un changement de pas dans la culture sur et autour de la Méditerranée, car « La Méditerranée ne cessa pas, en effet, de captiver. Mais le XIXe siècle choisit de tourner vers une Méditerranée énigmatique et passionnée, qui ne ressemblait pas à celle dont les dépouilles peuplaient ces autres nécropoles qu'étaient les glyptothèques et les cabinets des philologues »[3]. Certes, cette nouvelle attitude s'inscrit toujours dans le cadre d'un Orientalisme considérant la Méditerranée en tant qu'espace arriéré et archaïque ; en effet on devrait parler plutôt de « superposition » entre archéologie et voyages de découverte, plutôt que de substitution[4]. On peut citer le voyage de l'écrivain italien Edmondo de Amicis au Maroc comme manifestation de cet esprit du temps, indiquant une fascination envers un monde considéré comme inconnu et exploré à travers un sens de supériorité clairement affirmé[5]. En d'autres termes, cette confrontation se base sur des présupposés forts et tout à fait discutables : premièrement, on donne pour acquis qu'il s'agit de deux mondes autrefois dissociés et antinomiques qui se joignent pour montrer toutes leurs différences ; ensuite, l'explorateur est censé être européen et l'exploré du côté opposé (arabe, berbère, turc, levantin, oriental ou autre), mais jamais on envisage une inversion des rôles ; de plus, cette rencontre prend l'allure d'une « découverte », comme si ces mondes étaient restés pendant des

siècles dans l'ignorance réciproque ; enfin, que la rencontre révèle de manière univoque la supériorité de la civilisation européenne face à une altérité arriérée et marginale.

Cependant, à travers l'œil du visiteur « l'Orient » et de « le sud » cessent d'être les lieux de la barbarie et de la décadence absolue sans aucun rapport avec le passé glorieux exhumé par l'archéologie : la Méditerranée devient plutôt l'endroit du mystère, de la sensualité, de la tradition fascinante et à portée de main. Le regard passe de la perspective funèbre des ruines dormant à l'ombre des cyprès à un exotisme curieux plutôt centré sur l'humain. Même si l'archéologie continuera à jouer un rôle (par exemple, elle est l'étincelle utilisée par l'Italie pour justifier l'invasion de la Lybie en 1911) dans la construction du patrimoine nationale afin de cimenter les nations naissantes derrières une histoire identitaire et censée être glorieuse[6], elle perdra progressivement de valeur[7]. L'archéologie se rétablit dans les quarante dernières années de notre époque en qualité de patrimoine utilisé en fonction de rente touristique pour les territoires hébergeant les ruines : ce patrimoine évolue ainsi vers une image de promotion du territoire finalisée à l'attraction ludique et la mise à disposition d'un passé accessible. A travers ces usages vacanciers, la Méditerranée devient donc une entité « autre », mais suffisamment proche par rapport à des destinations considérées comme bien plus exotiques. En effet, elle incarne pour l'Europe un « exotisme à porte de main », c'est-à-dire l'occasion de profiter au soleil d'un paysage confortable et d'une histoire consommable sans devoir effectuer une dizaine de milliers de kilomètres.

Dans cette perspective, l'espace du pourtour méditerranéen est donc déconnecté du monde global afin d'être renvoyé à un passé mythique et perdu. Comme le note le sociologue Franco Cassano, la Méditerranée souffre d'un goût passéiste et nostalgique s'accompagnant au désespoir face à l'ampleur des problèmes actuels. Il écrit : « elle [la Méditerranée] signifie sous-développement et

résistance à la modernisation, clanisme amoral et clientélisme, mafia et illégalité systématique, exposition au risque des mauvaises fréquentations, celles des pays incapables de tout développement et d'une occidentalisation réussi. […] Au sein de la rhétorique de la modernité, la Méditerranée n'a pas de salut et ne peut se libérer d'une symbolique négative »[8].

La Méditerranée serait ainsi une aire ayant fait une divagation par rapport aux locomotives de la mondialisation : condamnée à un rôle d'éternelle arriérée, elle ne pourrait que se contenter de regretter des splendeurs d'antan.

2. Contre une géopolitique de la division

L'un des enjeux de notre position concerne une focalisation de la Méditerranée en tant que « problème atavique » : un discours de matrice européenne voit ce bassin comme un trait d'union malvenu reliant une Europe satisfaite d'elle-même et un « outre-Méditerranée » vis-à-vis duquel elle tient à garder ses distances. Face à une telle simplification euro-centriste (et du refoulement de la présence historique européenne sur les autres continents), il est nécessaire mettre en peu d'ordre dans les idées et avancer quelques pistes critiques.

Tout d'abord, l'histoire la Méditerranée ne renvoie jamais à un espace de calme et de détente : comme rappelé par l'historien italien Alessandro Vanoli, la Méditerranée de l'harmonie n'a jamais existé[9]. On ne peut également que reprendre l'un des titres de Georges Corm, qui parle de ce bassin en termes d'« espace de conflits, espace de rêves »[10]. Dans cette anaphore, l'historien libanais Georges Corm exprime efficacement la relation intime entre le conflit (le *polémos* grec) et la tension sociale d'un côté, et les divagations nocturnes de la pensée, de l'autre : dans cette mer où une pluralité d'histoires se croisent, on trouve un « carrefour de confrontations et de ruptures. [Mais] Elle est aussi carrefour d'échanges et d'influences »[11]. D'ailleurs, les carences du livre de Gourévitch cité plus haut se manifestent principalement dans l'association qu'il forge entre imaginaire et domination impériale : en effet, pour cet historien, l'unité méditerranéen existe et prospère dans les conquêtes de « tous ceux qui ont rêve de faire de la Méditerranée un lac intérieur sur lequel ils exerceraient leur domination »[12]. Par conséquent, dans cette perspective, la Méditerranée serait vouée à la marginalité dès que ses aspirations impériales cessent et dès que les destins des populations du bassin ont tendance à se morceler. Gourévitch ignore ainsi en bonne mesure la Méditerranée souterraine et hybride, faite d'échanges, d'apports et d'emprunts réciproques entre les populations riveraines, bien plus que par la soumission à un ordre impériale se voulant comme unique et total. Au contraire, la marginalité relative de la Méditerranée à

l'intérieur d'une mondialisation poussée et accélérée ne doit pas être vécue comme un défaut insurmontable et stigmatisant. Il faut plutôt assumer cette vulnérabilité et l'utiliser afin de réfléchir à une Méditerranée « élargie » : il s'agit donc de considérer cet horizon « vulnérable » du bassin en tant qu'élément incontournable. Autrement dit, la vulnérabilité devra être utilisée comme moteur apte à surmonter les insuffisances d'une vie méditerranéenne encore insatisfaisante, c'est-à-dire comme preuve de l'impossibilité pour le bassin de songer à une quelque autarchie auto-complaisante, comme encouragement à multiplier les efforts en matière d'investissement et de production culturelle.

En outre, la Méditerranée a fonctionné et s'est développée en formant et en renforçant des réseaux, agissant à travers les mailles des contraintes et des conflits, mais ne cessant pas de s'entrelacer avec d'autres réseaux exogènes par rapport à l'aire méditerranéenne. Comme François Gipouloux l'a dit, « la Méditerranée ne désigne jamais un espace homogène »[13], mais un espace mobile où des flux s'entremêlent dans une séries d'obstructions et de contraintes.

Si l'on pense à l'histoire du XX$^{\text{ème}}$ siècle, les réseaux méditerranéens ont subi beaucoup de torsions et d'involutions à cause de la fragmentation des équilibres établis précédemment, surtout lors du XIX$^{\text{ème}}$ siècle. Si la période de relative stabilité en Méditerranée était une « paix européenne » fondée sur la pression coloniale et impériale, cet équilibre asymétrique a permis un certain fleurissement du commerce et des phénomènes d'expansion économique à partir principalement de 1840. Le bassin connaît une forte croissance démographique, accompagnée par une installation des populations autrefois implantées dans les terres sur les littoraux : il s'agit de l'époque des ports cosmopolites, situés surtout en Méditerranée orientale et méridionale (Salonique, Constantinople, Smyrne, Beyrouth, Alexandrie), qui s'ajoutent au port européens (Marseille, Gênes, Livourne, Trieste) et aux villes côtières soumises directement au pouvoir

colonial (Alger, Tunis-Carthage)[14]. Ces ports se développent en faisant côtoyer populations diverses (juifs sépharades, grecs, italiens, français, arméniens, turcs, syro-libanais) fondant une prospérité correspondante autour des avantages commerciaux et d'une politique fiscale favorable. Les puissances européennes de Grande Bretagne et France tiraient les ficelles de ce commerce en expansion, qui profitait en bonne partie aux communautés européennes installées sur place, en s'appuyant également sur la crise d'un empire ottoman tolérant et ouvert à la présence étrangère

La dissolution progressive des empires continentaux (ottoman et autrichien-hongrois) et coloniaux (anglais, italien, espagnol, français) lors du vingtième siècle n'as pas fait disparaître les asymétries de l'ancien Monde, mais il lui a plutôt ajouté toute une série de frictions provoquées par les nouveaux états-nations (nationalismes rivaux, problèmes avec les minorités linguistiques, question palestinienne, disputes sur les tracés des frontières terrestres et maritimes, militarismes, autoritarismes, coups d'état, conflits entre factions autour de la prise du pouvoir). Un imaginaire de la « catastrophe »[15] s'est imposé dans le bassin, provoqué par les énormes dégâts des colonisations, par les nationalismes naissants et intolérants, par un discours de quêtes des racines excluant les autres groupes rivaux. Le pourtour s'est ainsi transformé dans une nébuleuse de revendications, de blessures, d'accusations réciproques. À ce propos, Jacques Huntzinger constate avec amertume que « la Méditerranée est passée du cosmopolitisme à l'ethnicité et à l'identité »[16].

Cependant, faire porter la responsabilité de tous les intriquées conflictualités actuelles aux anticolonialismes contemporains sonnerait également comme un prétexte. D'ailleurs, comme le titre l'indique, le texte d'Huntzinger cède aux sirènes de la nostalgie pour nous offrir l'image d'une Méditerranée échouée et sans retour, dont on ne peut que regretter le cosmopolitisme égaré à jamais. D'ailleurs, pareillement indiqué par Maryline Crivello[17], ce regard rétrospectif articule les deux images complémentaires de « d'un paradis perdu et d'un

événement catastrophique » imminente. À ce propos, l'attribution à l'émergence de l'anticolonialisme et du panarabisme de la fin du cosmopolitisme des villes du Levant demeure une opération intellectuelle très partielle. Sur ce point, Jacques Huntzinger[18] n'est pas le seul à propos cette interprétation rapide, car, d'une manière plus discrète, elle avait été aussi exprimée par Jean-François Daguzan : ce dernier parle à ce propos d'un accès à l'indépendance qui « a ouvert une période de déséquilibres et accru le processus de dislocation de la Méditerranée »[19].

Au contraire de cette simplification si facilement divulguée, nous ne pouvons pas accuser les nouvelles nations d'avoir rompu l'ordre méditerranéen, car cet « ordre » était en réalité fondé sur les prévarications coloniales et sur des asymétries de fond. Le réveil de ces nations rend plutôt justice d'un déséquilibre historique qui demandait réparations et dignité. Cette pensée euro-centrée, rêvant une Méditerranée immobile face aux demandes de justice, semble préférer une unité fondée sur un déséquilibre, plutôt que composer avec les similitudes et les résonnances d'un espace hétéroclite. En d'autres termes, la vision européenne sur la Méditerranée ne voit pas une alternative entre l'unité impériale d'un côté et la division irréversible et déchirante de l'autre. En outre, si on pense à l'exemple libanais (pour ne citer qu'une situation parmi d'autres) les choses se compliquent encore. En effet, La fin du cosmopolitisme local, dont Beyrouth était la splendide vitrine jusqu'à la déchirante guerre civile éclatée en 1975, comporte également la prise en compte des responsabilités du colonialisme français qui, dans l'entre-deux-guerres, opère dans le cadre de la Société des Nations (SDN). Plus précisément, la pensée euro-centrée oublie que le colonialisme a joué un rôle non négligeable dans le renforcement des divisions au sein de la société arabe colonisée, en figeant la société civile derrière des hiérarchies religieuses et en appliquant une politique « communautariste » dans la gestion de la représentativité institutionnelle. Ces

choix coloniaux, bien plus que les aspirations libanaises à l'indépendance, ont été la véritable bombe à retardement dirigée contre un cosmopolitisme effectif et serein projeté dans le futur.

Pour résumer, la coexistence méditerranéenne doit sa fin aux nationalismes de tout bord, dont l'anticolonialisme a été parfois l'une des expressions, mais loin d'être la seule. Si le cas égyptien, avec l'arrivée de Nasser au pouvoir en 1953, et la fin concomitante du cosmopolitisme dans la ville d'Alexandrie, réelle perle de mixité linguistique et religieuse, semble donner raison à l'équation entre anticolonialisme et anti-cosmopolitisme, c'est parce que la voie anticoloniale nassérienne est de type nationaliste. De plus, dans toutes les ports ottomans comme Smyrne et Salonique (sans oublier le cas de Chypre, où les nationalismes locaux se développent sous le regard complice de l'empire britannique), la fin de la coexistence est due au recul de l'empire ottoman et à l'avancée des nationalismes (grec et turc, sans oublier celui bulgare) : autrement dit, dans le contexte de la dissolution de l'empire ottoman et de son esprit tolérant, l'anticolonialisme n'est pas opérant, car il ne s'agit pas d'un contexte directement colonial. La même lecture peut être appliquée aux épisodes meurtriers de conflit en mer Adriatique, suite à la dissolution de l'empire autrichien, conséquente également à la Première Guerre mondiale, où des nationalismes exaspérés se disputent des territoires multiethniques jusqu'aux années cinquante.

Ensuite, la Méditerranée turbulente que les conflits mondiaux nous laissent en héritage est déjà transfigurée pendant les décennies de Guerre Froide par une géopolitique dualiste que ce partage du monde imposait. En effet, l'OTAN voit dans le bassin Méditerranéen un rempart pour arrêter l'influence géopolitique et militaire de l'ex-URSS[20]. Par conséquent, entre le Seconde Guerre Mondiale et les années quatre-vingt-dix, les deux blocs « bipolarisent » l'espace méditerranéen en tissant des jeux d'alliances et en faisant rentrer les Etats,

souvent fraîchement indépendants, dans la confrontation entre Occident capitaliste et Est soviétique. Par exemple, un Etat comme la Turquie peut ainsi adhérer à l'OTAN (bien qu'elle se situe très loin des côtes atlantiques), en profitant de son statut d'état limitrophe à l'ex-URSS dont elle doit incarner un tampon militaire et géopolitique. Avec la fin de la Guerre Froide et l'affirmation économique de l'Union Européenne, on remet à jour l'orientalisme de la fin du XIXème siècle, la dichotomie capitalisme-socialisme est remplacée par l'idée d'une fracture culturelle entre continents.

En effet, on retrouve à ces moments une idée des « deux rives », pensant à la Méditerranée comme une cour commune d'un immeuble où des voisins de cultures, éducations, classes sociales opposées sont obligés à se croiser dans des rencontres désagréables. A partir des années quatre-vingt-dix, la théorie de Samuel Huntington sur un clash des civilisations confère à cette vision des « deux rives » un cadre géopolitique et géoculturel. Autrement dit, dans la perspective de ce politologue, la Méditerranée serait une sorte de *no man's land* entre civilisations rivales et antithétiques, entre populations destinées à rester ennemis. Il s'agirait donc d'un « front » armé, au sens militaire du terme, bien plus que d'une « frontière », voulant avec cette dernière expression indiquer à la fois une limite établie et une entité encourageant son propre franchissement. En tout cas, l'opération idéologique prônée par Huntington est double : d'un côté, ce bassin ne serait qu'une dimension géographique n'ayant aucune consistance politique ou anthropologique propre; de l'autre, ses rivages présenteraient des caractéristiques géographiques similaires, mais l'espace demeurerait culturellement archaïque et secondaire, économiquement sous-développé et militairement risqué et tendu. Dans les pages du politologue américain, les échanges qui ont fait la richesse de l'histoire de la Méditerranée sont ainsi résumés à une histoire de confrontations âpres et d'antagonismes perpétuels entre une Europe « chrétienne » et un monde proche-oriental « musulman ». Si

l'on écoutait Huntington, la Méditerranée n'assiste pas à une conflictualité latente ou un risque de basculement dans la violence, mais souffre d'une véritable crise civilisationnelle s'exprimant à travers des affrontements sanglants et irréversibles[21]. Par conséquent, dès ce point de vue, la lecture des sociétés se fait à travers un prisme identitaire et sous la crainte de phénomènes meurtriers inévitables lorsque les civilisations catégorisée par l'historien entrent en contact.

Une autre signification à l'idée de « guerre civilisationnelle » est repérable dans le travail de Mahdi Elmandjra[22]. Le professeur marocain soutient une corrélation entre la fin de la Guerre Froide et un glissement généralisé vers des conflits postcoloniaux à caractère principalement culturel, dont la Guerre du Golfe n'est que le premier exemple. À la différence de Huntington, Elmandjra pense que la conflictualité culturelle contemporaine ne soit pas provoquée par une hétérogénéité inguérissable entre l'Occident et le reste du monde. Selon l'intellectuel marocain, la variété des cultures et des civilisations est une valeur positive appréciable qui n'empêche pas les parcours de développement économique et technologique : en d'autres termes, modernité et occidentalisme ne sont guère des synonymes et chaque civilisation affirme sa propre voie dans un monde multiple. Dans cette interprétation, la conflictualité est engendrée par un Occident névrosé vivant la fin de la Guerre Froide avec une angoisse agressive vis-à-vis d'un monde multipolaire : cet Occident récupérerait ainsi ses anciens démons du « péril jaune », c'est-à-dire le danger d'une Asie concurrente, du danger démographique, dans laquelle sa domination économique serait menacée par une minorisation accrue de ses habitants à l'échelle planétaire, et du danger islamique, associée hâtivement à une barbarie antimoderne par les Occidentaux. Il y a donc un Occident vivant sa position de primat avec une crainte constante de se voir dépossédé de ses axes de domination mondiale et cherchant à poursuivre une politique internationale asymétrique. De notre côté, on peut sans doute apprécier l'acuité de l'analyse

d'Elmandjra à propos d'une politique occidentale marquée par des spectres refoulés du passé et provoquant un expansionnisme belliqueux. De plus, le professeur marocain tourne la notion « de choc des civilisations » en rejetant tout repli dans une vision tribaliste des civilisations et prône une reconnaissance mutuelle entre les cultures. Cependant, son analyse reste fondamentalement imprégnée d'un axiome culturaliste. Même si la notion « d'Occident » fonctionne de manière suffisamment claire dans son récit relativement à la guerre du Golfe, ses contours effectifs demeurent bien plus flous. Autrement dit, dès qu'on cherche à saisir l'Occident comme notion démographique et historique dans les pages de cet auteur, on risque de céder aux approximations, car c'est une vision monolithique d'un bloc occidental qui émerge. En outre, sa vision de la diversité culturelle reste inscrite dans une séparation préalable des cultures. Au lieu de souligner les apports, les emprunts, les circulations, Elmandjra réclame un respect légitime entre cultures, mais ces dernières sont conçues en tant que traditions compartimentées.

En outre, une réponse incontournable aux positions du politologue américain Samuel Huntington se matérialise grâce à la plume d'Edward Saïd. L'intellectuel palestinien rappelle comment le discours d'Huntington se base sur une série d'innombrables abstractions, et même sur des simplifications grossières indiquant un soi-disant caractère exclusif et unique de chaque culture. Pour Saïd, la thèse du choc révèle un usage approximatif de la notion de « civilisation » traitée en tant qu'objet figée et réifiée plutôt que comme un élément dynamique et en mouvement[23]. L'écrivain palestinien souligne également que « le point le plus faible de la thèse du choc des civilisations est la présomption d'une séparation rigide entre les civilisations, alors qu'aujourd'hui le monde est de toute évidence un monde de métissage, de migrations, de traversées »[24] .La conflictualité des civilisations n'est donc pas produite par une impossibilité essentielle de partage culturel. La géopolitique facile de

Huntington, fondée donc sur une lecture civilisationnelle et sur un culturalisme outrancier, marquant également le journalisme du sensationnalisme et de la peur, manque également de mémoire : en effet, encore pendant les années soixante-dix, des états comme la Grèce, l'Espagne, le Portugal, étaient encore des dictatures militaristes et fascistes ; la Méditerranée européenne était donc le centre des politiques obscurantistes et réactionnaires produisant des sociétés ossifiées et sclérosées bien plus que des pays situés dans la Méditerranée orientale. Il ne faut pas non plus oublier la guerre civile provoquée par l'effondrement de la Yougoslavie pendant les années quatre-vingt-dix. Le tragique est donc de tous les côtés, de tous les rivages.

Plus récemment encore, nous avons un témoignage de cet esprit dualiste au cœur aussi des sciences historiques et humaines. En effet, l'historiographie anglo-saxonne a donné une certaine résonnance à un texte se présentant comme une critique directe et sévère envers Fernand Braudel et sa thèse sur la *Méditerranée à l'époque de Philippe II*. Le livre, *The Corrupting Sea*, écrit par le duo Horden et Purcell[25] et marqué par une idée de fond autour des séparations et des disjonctions entre les différentes aires géoculturelles composant le bassin, retient que la mer Méditerranée a constitutivement rendu difficiles toute idée d'unification et d'échange non-violent. Le livre nous suggère l'idée d'une nature méditerranéenne et d'une configuration géographique ayant rendu le pourtour inadapté à l'interaction constructive et apaisée[26]. Dans cette perspective, le commerce aurait été engendré plus par la variété des littoraux que par leur proximité : la mer Méditerranée serait la mer de la « décadence » et de la corruption et non pas celle de la fécondité et de la circulation de biens, populations, outils, idées. Loin de se développer dans la circulation, la Méditerranée se serait construite dans la désunion structurelle.

Il est intéressant d'interroger sur la question de la désunion méditerranéenne la science géopolitique. Selon Yves Lacoste, il y a une schématisation diffuse,

selon laquelle « on oppose le nord et le sud de la Méditerranée. […] Cette façon assez manichéenne de voir les choses est reprise aujourd'hui par ceux qui affirment […] que le monde est désormais le théâtre d'un grand 'choc des civilisations' ou entre de grandes religions »[27]. Selon le géographe français, la Méditerranée n'a rien du *no man's land* empêchant aux valeurs et aux communications de traverser la mer. Le géographe s'efforce de relativiser ce schéma dualiste, opposant deux blocs marqués par un développement inégal : selon Lacoste, cette manière de partager l'espace méditerranéen en deux n'est pas absurde, mais elle ne peut pas être le seule prisme de lecture. En prenant en compte, par exemple, les zonez de sous-développement dans la rive Nord, les états faisant exceptions (la Turquie et Israël notamment), la présence de forces extra-méditerranéens dans l'échiquier géopolitiques du bassin (telles que les présences navales russes et américaines) et les raisons historiques d'une grande diversité, Yves Lacoste nous exhorte plutôt à appréhender cet espace en tant que carrefour d'exigences et d'intérêts mondiaux. En effet, pour comprendre politiquement la géopolitique de la Méditerranée, il faut, selon Lacoste, « tenir compte de la localisation d'une très grande diversité d'héritages historiques et à combiner des rapports de force d'envergure très différente, depuis des conflits locaux jusqu'aux rivalités planétaires »[28]. L'intriqué travail qui se présente au chercheur consiste dans l'immersion dans un large éventail de cas nationaux et régionaux, terrains fertiles pour tout type de rivalités et de tensions, dans lesquelles toute analyse synthétique risque de se perdre. Le géographe prône ainsi un élargissement des questions méditerranéennes bien au-delà des composantes littorales, car, dans son discours, chaque états ou peuples dispose d'intersections directes ou périphériques avec des zone géographiques « autres », ne faisant que multiplier à l'échelle intercontinentale les problématiques méditerranéennes. Dans cette « mondialisation » du bassin méditerranéen, nous pouvons aussi évaluer les limites de la perspective du géographe français. En d'autres termes, Lacoste se focalise sur une constellation

d'histoires singulières de la Méditerranée, chacune avec ses intérêts et ses priorités, en perdant de vue toute continuité relative entre les peuples riverains. De plus, il se limite à tempérer la division en deux rives opposées en Méditerranée, sans penser à une véritable alternative à cette simplification intellectuelle. Enfin, en immergeant les déjà articulées relations méditerranéennes dans l'ensemble encore plus vaste des relations mondiales, il ne fait que relativiser la condition de la Méditerranée à zone de contacts des tensions globales.

Contre ces raccourcis mêlant nostalgies orientalistes et géopolitique de la désagrégation, on doit éviter d'appréhender les rivages de la Méditerranée en « blocs » étanches et d'utiliser l'histoire pour attiser des soifs de grandeur ou pour fabriquer des altérités à craindre. Il faudrait plutôt reconnaître toute expérience « mineure », déplacée, irreprésentable, rendant la division en blocs (monde européen vs monde arabe, civilisation chrétienne vs civilisation musulmane, monde occidental vs monde oriental, Etats démocratiques vs dictatures) une description intellectuelle rapide, insuffisante et insatisfaisante. La réalité de la population méditerranéenne n'est pas la division en deux rives, mais un espace hybride, dans lequel des mots comme « origine » et « destin » perdent une bonne partie de leurs significations, pour être remplacé par ceux de « contribution », d' « emprunts », de « propagation », de « mobilité ». Certes, l'abandon de la perspective des « deux rives » ne signifie pas récréer une unité fictive de type universaliste, généralement construite à partir de l'universalisation arbitraire de certains caractères partiels.

Selon Edward Saïd, l'attitude à adopter considère la valorisation de la multiformité de chaque culture. A l'intérieur d'une société, en effet, la coexistence d'éléments « orthodoxes » (c'est-à-dire « officiels » et « reconnus ») se fait à côté d'éléments hétérodoxes et marginaux, tout en montrant une dialectique faisant évoluer parfois les derniers vers les premiers. Selon Saïd, il

est dangereux et chauviniste essayer d'encadrer une culture dans une définition rapide, telle que la géopolitique d'Huntington et de ses collègues (il ne faut pas oublier l'orientaliste islamophobe Bernard Lewis) n'ont cessé de faire. En effet, dans chaque expérience culturelle il y a un espace de non-dit, de non-connu et de non-identique qui ouvre à la possibilité d'une évolution et d'une communication avec d'autres expériences. La notion de « choc de l'ignorance » forgé par cet auteur[29] vise à montrer l'exploitation de la non-connaissance de la richesse culturelle du monde et les tentatives intellectuelles finalisée à réduire cette même richesse dans des cases préétablie et figée. C'est donc à la fois une mauvaise connaissance des cultures et la prétention de pouvoir les définir facilement qui provoque la conflictualité et non pas une raison identitaire opérationnelle au sein de la culture elle-même.

Pour résumer, l'immersion dans la Méditerranée comporte effectivement une prise en compte de la dimension tragique incarnée par l'Histoire. Le savant français Thierry Fabre reprend correctement l'expression braudelienne de « continent liquide » et donc instable, car, loin d'annuler les différends, le pourtour méditerranéen incarne leur lieu d'expression. Il écrit : « La Méditerranée n'est pas l'ensemble étanche qui sépare, c'est un continent liquide qui relie. […] [Il ne s'agit pas] de fabriquer une 'mythologie commune', fruit d'une légende sur l'harmonie en Méditerranée. Le 'différend méditerranéen' est un fait dont il convient de prendre acte »[30]. Dans ce sens, c'est-à-dire en prenant en compte les contrastes existants et existés, on peut parler d'une aspiration à la « symbiose »[31] entre les rivages, comme nous le suggère Giuseppe Galasso, c'est-à-dire d'une communication féconde, en partie élaborée à partir des échanges du passé et en partie encore à réaliser, dans laquelle les aspects de jonctions ont tendance à prévaloir par rapport aux divergences et aux frictions. La notion de symbiose évoque l'idée d'une rencontre réussi, d'une fusion provisoire laissant entrevoir les composantes qui se sont rapprochées. Il s'agit

donc d'une dynamique passant à travers des jonctions à envisager plutôt que à partir d'une unité statique et totalisée. Les réseaux à tisser ne se réfèrent donc pas à une unité préalable et déjà acquise, mais à un travail de connexion à partir de différences existantes et mobiles. Autrement dit, la question à présenter aujourd'hui n'est pas l'unification de la Méditerranée sous un nouveau drapeau nationale ou impériale et à travers un récit d'hégémonie. Au contraire, en suivant le théoricien du postcolonial Homi Bhabha[32], il faut se focaliser sur les existences contemporaines « interstitielles », sans repères linéaires et sans drapeau d'appartenance ; autrement dit, la Méditerranée pourra se matérialiser non pas à travers un nouveau grand récit enveloppant à tort toute expérience, mais à travers la recherche des continuités mêlées, silencieuses, souterraines, traversant différents histoires et produisant des récits inclassables.

3. Notes pour une Méditerranée au XXIème siècle

Les frustrations d'aspirations méditerranéennes ne sont pas causées par les différends religieux comme une vulgate médiatique et médiatisée approximative essaie de soutenir, en pointant du doigt l'appartenance religieuse comme cause principale du manque d'entente et de rassemblement entre les populations. Les raisons à la racine d'une sensation partagée de déclassement au sein de populations méditerranéennes sont plutôt à rechercher du côté de l'inefficience de la politique face une société civile active et exigeante. Autrement dit, alors qu'au niveau associatif, intellectuel, coopératif, les sociétés méditerranéennes présentent des dynamiques absolument remarquables, les politiques d'état bloquent ses dynamiques dans les mailles de la rente et de la bureaucratie, à travers la protection des clans au pouvoir et le manque du soutien aux politiques scientifiques et technologiques (le bassin est extrêmement déficitaire au niveau de la recherche scientifique et de la production des brevets industriels). Ces considérations signalent également l'insuffisance de la pensée méditerranéenne

prônée par Albert Camus. En effet, Camus caractérise la Méditerranée en tant que domaine de la mesure et de l'esprit rationnel, en recherchant dans la raison grecque le sens d'un équilibre matérialisé par les images littéraires du soleil puissant, de la mer commune, de l'exposition des corps. Loin d'être la gardienne de la lumière et d'une rationalité harmonieuse, la Méditerranée est la manifestation de la dimension tragique contemporaine avec ses déchirures et ses blessures. Les appels au dialogue et aux réconciliations ils ont l'effet inverse de souligner l'ampleur des défis et des situations dramatiques en cours.

On trouve une vision bien plus consciente à la fois des problèmes incontournables et des éléments pouvant rapprocher les populations du bassin chez Pedrag Matvejevic. Dans son texte le plus important, le *Bréviaire Méditerranéen*[33], l'écrivain slave nous met en garde contre les tentations « passéistes » et contre les mythisation de la particularité culturelle : selon Matvejevic, il faut se libérer des obsessions de l'homogénéité culturelle et du besoin de rassemblement autour des mythes de la patrie, afin de se tourner vers un véritable réseau d'échanges et de pratiques reparties. Rejetant à la fois l'image d'une Méditerranée mosaïque de peuples séparés et juxtaposés et d'une unité vide sur des bases universalistes, Matjevevic se concentre sur les trajectoires favorisées par des similitudes climatiques, géographiques et anthropologiques. Cependant, ces similitudes n'implique pas une « essence méditerranéenne » distincte : il s'agit plutôt d'une forme à modeler, d'un ensemble de contributions suffisamment similaires pour être considérées ensemble (et être subsumés sous l'étiquette « méditerranéennes »), mais étant en constante transformation, en réélaboration vis-à-vis des défis énormes qui attendent ces rivages. Comme il dirait en 1998 dans une préface, « Percevoir la Méditerranée à partir de son seul passé reste une habitude tenace, tant sur le littoral que dans l'arrière-pays. […] La tendance à confondre la représentation de la réalité avec cette réalité même peut devenir pénalisante : l'image de la Méditerranée et la Méditerranée elle-même s'identifient avec peine. Une identité

de l'être, *en s'amplifiant, éclipse ou repousse une* identité du faire, *mal affirmée. La rétrospective continue à l'emporter sur la prospective* »[34]. La compréhension de la Méditerranée devrait plutôt être confiée à l'analyse d'une *praxis* projetée dans un horizon constructif, plutôt que dans les recherches de substrats identiques et d'essences monolithiques.

Pour reprendre aussi les mots d'Iain Chambers, la Méditerranée devient « composition en cours, en dissonance avec les représentations héritées »[35]. Dans le discours de l'intellectuel britannique installé au sud de l'Italie, la Méditerranée contemporaine rejette l'image bucolique la cantonnant à statut de décor d'architectures débridées d'une histoire révolue, pour devenir un espace de fluctuations actives et de productions sociales et culturelles. Ces dernières ne peuvent que s'opposer à la politique sécuritaire qui fait devenir la mer le cimetière de tous ceux qui n'ont pas réussi à la traverser. De plus, Chambers présente une Méditerranée instable et comme le dirait Pédrag Matvéjévic, où les caractéristiques ne sont « n'y sont absolues ou constantes, ni les similitudes ni les différences »[36].

Ces réflexions nous offrent une conceptualisation de la mer en tant que « désencrage », en tant que univers métastable sans enracinent et sans solidité tellurique, détaché de tout esprit d'appartenance continentale. La mer devient ainsi une invitation à quitter tout clocher « localiste » visant à défendre notre particularité contre les autres. Comme indiqué par l'écrivain marseillais Jean-Claude Izzo, la Méditerranée est un « appel à la réconciliation »[37], car l'abandon du particularisme comporte un effort visant à dépasser notre zone de confort, une poussée vers la valorisation de consonances dans la diversité. Pour résumer, la Méditerranée ne se situe ni dans un passé perdu, ni dans un avenir utopique. Elle n'est pas non plus une unité se parcellisant progressivement à travers une histoire de décadence sans fin. De plus, elle ne peut être réduite à un lieu fortuit de la géopolitique où deux mondes s'installent sur deux rives opposées. Dans ce

sens, les idéologues moralisateurs du « dialogue entre les civilisations » commettent l'erreur de classifier les sociétés méditerranéennes en *deux* entités stéréotypées.

La Méditerranée souhaitable n'a pas de centre et pas de hiérarchies, elle se situe plutôt entre le « non-être-fixé » et le « pas encore » : elle demeure ainsi allergique à toute détermination univoque et à toute connotation définitive. Cette Méditerranée rejette les héritages assumés de manière acritique et passive : la filiation avec le passé ne peut qu'être bâtarde (en réalité on doit parler de « *passés* » au pluriel) et consciente de la relativité de tout héritage. Ce dernier doit en effet être réélaboré et considéré en tant que pluralité d'effets dans lesquels différents groupes et récits se sont insérés. Sur ce point, le savant Thierry Fabre nous met en garde contre toute tentative de repli, contre toute concession aux particularismes (intégristes, régionalistes ou nationalistes) en affirmant que « Nul ne peut se définir comme un 'pur' méditerranéen, il est forcément dans l'impur, dans l'entrecroisement des sources et dans l'entremêlement des sangs. […] Nulle souche en Méditerranée, mais au contraire des vagues qui se succèdent à travers l'histoire »[38].

Aujourd'hui, une Méditerranée décomplexée peut exister en tant que reconnaissance d'une déterritorialisation déjà effectuée (entre villes et campagnes, entre mer et montagne, entre côté et terres, entre ouest et est, nord et sud), dans laquelle chaque histoire renvoie à un entrelacs d'autres histoires, dans laquelle toute linéarité historique est perdue dans une mer de récits multiples et segmentés. Par exemple, la condition diasporique n'est pas un phénomène récent produit par une mondialisation accélérée, mais l'une des caractéristiques d'un pourtour méditerranéen fondé sur les circulations d'une partie de sa population.

La Méditerranée au XXIème siècle sera hétérogène et connectée avec toutes ses différentes réalités ou elle ne sera pas, étouffée dans une mondialisation accélérée et réduite à un petit lac par une politique planétaire concentrée ailleurs.

Notes

[1] J.-P. Gourévitch, *La Méditerranée. Conquête, puissance, déclin*, Paris, Desclée de Brouwer, 2018, pp. 235-257.

[2] *Ibidem*, p. 247, italique dans le texte.

[3] G. Duby "l'Héritage" dans F. Braudel, G. Duby, *La Méditerranée. Les hommes et l'héritage* (1977), Paris, Flammarion, 1986, p. 215.

[4] On ne peut pas résumer ici la gigantesque production orientaliste dont il faudrait mentionner toutes les spécificités et les contextualisations relatives. On ne peut pas non plus oublier la cartographie, dédiée principalement à la littérature anglaise et française, établie par Edward Saïd dans son texte le plus célèbre, l'Orientalisme (E. Said, Orientalism), NY, Vintage Books, 1979. Comme autre texte d'encadrement du sujet : T. MacKenzie, *Orientalism. History, Theory and the arts*, Manchester, Mancherster University Press, 1995.

[5] E. De Amicis, *Marocco* (1877), Milano, Ledipublishing, 2017.

[6] Pour comprendre l'utilisation de l'archéologie comme processus politique construisant un lien identitaire avec le passé, voir à ce propos : P. Jockey, « L'anastylose et la ruine » dans M. Crivello, K.-L. Basset, D. Nicolaidis, O. Polycandrioti, *Les échelles de la mémoire en Méditerranée*, Arles, Actes Sud, 2010, pp. 73-90, dédié surtout au cas grec.

[7] Si l'on cherche une date-zéro qui semble décréter la fin de l'utilisation politique de l'archéologie, on devrait penser à 1959 et la construction du barrage d'Assouan qui met en danger des sites de l'Egypte antique. Cette opération incarne la preuve d'une archéologie désormais désuète en tant qu'outil de cohésion nationale, car le sentiment national est alors suffisamment sédimenté. Ce qu'il faut adopter à cette époque pour mobiliser les masses derrière les idéologies (étatistes et souvent marque par un socialisme à caractère nationaliste) c'est le développement économique utilisée surtout idéologiquement comme rêve d'inclusion.

[8] F. Cassano, « Contre tous les fondamentalismes : la nouvelle Méditerranée », trad. fr de J. David, dans V. Consolo, F. Cassano, *La Méditerranée italienne*, Paris, Maisonneuve & Larose, 2000, pp. 32-33.

[9] A. Vanoli, *Quando guidavano le stelle*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2015, p. 206.

[10] G. Corm, *La Méditerranée, espace de conflit, espace de rêve*, Paris, L'Harmattan, 2003.

[11] P. Balta, T. Fabre, « Cultures et représentations », dans (textes rassemblées par) X. Gizard, *La Méditerranée inquiète*, Marseille, Editions de l'Aube, 1993, p. 55.

[12] J.-P. Gourévitch, *La Méditerranée. Conquête, puissance, déclin, op. cit.*, p. 7.

[13] F. Gipouloux, *La Méditerranée asiatique*, CRNS éditions, 2009, Paris, p. 17.

[14] Sur le cosmopolitisme méditerranéen on renvoie au chef d'œuvre de Philip Mansel, *Levant*, London, John Murray, 2010.

[15] T. Fabre, *Traversées*, Paris, Actes Sud, 2001, p. 144.

[16] J. Hunztinger, *Il était une fois la Méditerranée*, Paris, CNRS éditions, 2014, p. 169.

[17] M. Crivello, « Introduction générale » dans M. Crivello, K.-L. Basset, D. Nicolaidis, O. Polycandrioti, *Les échelles de la mémoire en Méditerranée*, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

[18] J. Hutzinger, *Il était une fois la Méditerranée*, *op. cit.*, p. 22 et pp.124-125.

[19] J.-F. Daguzan, « Un demi-siècle de fractures et de recompositions », dans (textes rassemblés par) X. Gizard, *La Méditerranée inquiète*, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

[20] Voir sur ce point, D. Abulafia, *The Great Sea*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011, p. 620.

[21] S. Huntington, *Le Choc des civilisations*, trad. fr. J.-F. Fidel et G. Joublain, Paris, Odile Jacob, 2000, pp. 377-379

[22] M. Elmandjra, *Première guerre civilisationnelle*, Casablanca, Sindbad, 1991.

[23] Cf. E. Saïd, « Le Choc des définitions », 1997, dans E. W. Saïd, Réflexions sur l'exil, (2001) trad. fr. d. C. Woillez, Paris, Actes Sud, 2008, p. 719.

[24] *Ibidem*, p. 725.

[25] P. Horden, N. Purcell, *The corrupting sea. A study pf Mediterranean History*, Oxford, Blackwell, 2000).

[26] Pour l'encadrement de la position de Horden et Purcell dans l'historiographie de la Méditerranée nous avons fait recours à F. Cardini, *Incontri (e scontri) mediterranei*, Salerno Editrice, Roma, 2014, pp. 15-20.

[27] Y. Lacoste, *Géopolitique de la Méditerranée*, Paris, Armand Colin, 2006, p. 6

[28] *Ibidem*, p. 9.

[29] Le choc de l'ignorance, par Edward W. Said (lemonde.fr)

[30] T. Fabre, « la pensée de deux rives » dans T. Fabre (textes rassemblés par) *L'héritage andalou*, Saint-Etienne, Editions de l'Aube, 1995, pp. 5-6, guillemets dans le texte. Cette théorisation reprend le concept de « différend méditerranéen » dans Sami Naïr, *Le Différend méditerranéen*, Paris, Kimé 1992.

[31] G. Galasso, « La dimensione culturale del Mediterraneo, in P. Barcellona, F. Ciaramelli (a cura di), *La Frontiera mediterranea*, Dedalo, Bari 2006, pp. 27-28.

[32] H. Bhabha, *The Location of Culture*, London, Routledge, 2004.

[33] P. Matvejevitch, *Bréviaire méditerranéen*, trad. fr. de E. Le Calvé-Ivicevic, Paris, Fayard, 1992.

[34] P. Matvéjevic, « Préface. Le défi Cassano », dans F. Cassano, *La Pensée méridienne*, trad. fr. de J. Nicolas, Paris, Editions de l'Aube, 1998, p. III, italique dans le texte.

[35] I. Chambers, *Mediterraneo blues*, Torino, Bollati Boringhieri, 2012, p. 57.

[36] P. P. Matvéjevic, « Préface. Le défi Cassano », dans F. Cassano, *La pensée méridienne*, *op. cit.,* p. III.

[37] J.-C. Izzo, *Aglio, Menta e basilico*, Roma, Edizioni e/o, 2006, p. 25.

[38] T. Fabre, *Traversée*, *op.cit.*, pp. 246-247, guillemets dans le texte.

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Extra-political Contacts across the B/Orders: Otherness, Culture and Order

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Abstract

The aim of this article is to explore the implications of the Order/Culture nexus in world politics as related to processes of othering and alterity formation. The contemporary international order brings together states, communities, and individuals with different ways of approaching the world. Meanwhile, it is inevitably hard to ignore the often sharply divisive shifts that penetrate the fabric of the global liberal order. This contestation surrounding the concepts of an international liberal order shows to what extent this contestation is not just about power transitions but reflects the conflicting narratives of the global—cultural, nationalist, ethnic, racial, historical, colonial, and religious. While stability in international politics is a defining element of how order-builders seek the constitution of political legitimacy, these contesting narratives present the global order with a legitimation crisis. This requires not only maximising material capabilities but also an aspiration to choreograph and organise cultural diversity into authorised forms of expressions, or diversity regimes. This article is particularly interested in how these diversity regimes are integral to the ways in which postcolonial orders prioritise and organise cultural differences in alignment with the established distribution of political authority. Analytic insights from the Constructivist and Post-colonial theory will help account for the discursive formations and representations of alterity and otherness, which I argue are another manifestation of diversity regimes. These formations rest upon a particular view of contemporary world order: the characteristic distinctiveness that drives interaction among actors, and which, in turn, constitutes different alterities: "ally," "rival," "friend," and "exotic."

Keywords: culture; order; Alterity-Otherness formation; postcolonial theory; International Relations theory

1. Introduction

The contemporary international order brings together states, communities, and individuals with different ways of approaching the world. Meanwhile, it is inevitably hard to ignore the often sharply fracturing power shifts that penetrate the fabric of the global liberal order: the rise of non-Western great powers, the return of ethno-nationalism and populism spearheaded by far-right leaders, and the resurgence of anti-globalisation sentiments (whether understood as Americanisation, Westernisation, cultural imperialism, or modernisation).[1] These transformations present the international liberal order with a new intense reality: although the contemporary pluralist order is presented as a culturally homogeneous context capable of accommodating all forms of cultural diversity and power transitions, it is also an order in which the organisation of these different articulations of cultural diversity is deeply intertwined with the configuration and legitimisation of political authority. This intense contestation surrounding the concepts of an international liberal order shows just to what extent this contestation is not just about power transitions but reflects the conflicting narratives of the global—cultural, nationalist, ethnic, racial, historical, colonial, and religious. This reality shows the complex nature of cultural diversity by probing a conventional conception of international order anchored in a longer tradition of thinking in mainstream International Relations (IR) scholarship[2]— one in which order is established, in addition to sovereignty, by cultural homogeneity. This means international orders develop in common, unified cultural contexts. These assumptions about the nature of world order and culture show to what extent the view of cultural diversity as a challenge to the current international order depends on a particular view of culture.[3]

The governance of cultural diversity is a key imperative in building and sustaining political legitimacy in world politics.[4] If these global shifts were once

considered purely geopolitical turnabouts, their entanglement with deeper structures of culture and hegemony shows they are not just geopolitical but also cultural in nature. Disciplinary debates in mainstream IR, however, attribute these global changes, and with them the new expressions of cultural difference, to transitions in material capabilities. Often backed by positivist and materialist epistemologies to make sense of these new conjunctions of material power, mainstream IR theory conceives culture as an epiphenomenal event—only loosely constitutive of the international order, and only relates to world politics in ways that are (preferably) empirically causal. It presents the modern polity as a culturally integral, unitary and inclusive order.

This default conception of culture, commonly shared by realists and neo-liberals, is not without problems. The cultural homogeneity thesis suggests that a culturally homogeneous context is a prerequisite condition to sustain order, preserving the "more" important binding role that align the different articulations of cultural diversity to open, "rules-based" institutions such as foreign policy establishment, diplomacy and international law. According to this conception, thus, institutions have but only a "neutralising effect" through which culture is strategically instrumentalised in order to create opportunities for cooperation and coordination. Yet, as Reus-Smit notes, this thesis conceals the very organisational role of these institutions in, not necessarily neutralising cultural differences, but in organising diversity itself into authorised forms of cultural diversity.[5]

Stability in international orders is a defining element of how order-builders seek the constitution of political legitimacy. This requires not only maximising material capabilities and assets but also an aspiration to choreograph and organise cultural diversity into authorised forms of expressions. These defining moments take the form of "diversity regimes": "systems of norms and practices that simultaneously configure authority and construct diversity. Codified in formal institutions, such as treaties and conventions, and embedded in informal

understandings and social practices"[6]. Post-colonial orders are a relevant context where these cultural entanglements are enmeshed with global flows (political, economic and cultural). This article is particularly interested in the extent to which these diversity regimes are integral to the ways in which postcolonial orders prioritise and organise cultural differences in alignment with the established distribution of political authority.

2. Cultural "Diversity Regimes" and the Systemic Configuration of Political Authority

What is at stake for the future of the modern international order is not whether these new articulations of cultural diversity are threatening the very fabric of the neoliberal order, but how these cultural conjunctions are assimilated into the workings of the international order. Such conjunctions present the neoliberal order with various legitimation challenges and crises to sustain order, with which new "diversity regimes" are mobilised to contain diversity. There are three incentives which drive policy-makers to organise and contain diversity: control, coordination and satisfactions of ecumenical sensibilities.[7] In such contexts, international orders are best conceived as systemic configurations of political authority. Order requires a sense of legitimacy which rests on an aspiration for hegemony and the conversion of material power into political might, as well as an aspiration to domesticate diversity into authorised and hierarchical forms of difference.

There are many ways in which we can approach these diversity regimes. What is important to note here is that institutions and social structures provide the fundamental framework to channel these regimes and their subsequent norms and narratives. These diversity regimes do three things: "First, they legitimize certain units of political authority—states, empires, cities, etc.—and define the scope of legitimate political action. Second, they define recognized categories of cultural difference (religion but not civilization or nation, for example), and order these

normatively (Catholics, Lutherans, or Calvinists, but not Anabaptists, Muslims, or Jews). And, third, they relate legitimate units of political authority to authorized categories of cultural difference (sovereign state and religion, empire and civilization, etc.)."[8]

Insights from new histories of the Ottoman Empire's code of *Millet* and the Lifan Yuan system of Qing China, for instance, suggest that international orders have always emerged within heterogeneous, loosely integrated cultural contexts.[9] The Westphalia Peace Treaty of 1648 which brought to an end the Eighty Years' War is often taken as a case to illustrate how shared norms of a cooperative culture are capable to accommodate diversity and perpetual peace and take over the Hobbesian logic of "war of all against all". Yet it also shows how European leaders were keen to resort to a rather institutional solution, through which diversity regimes permeate different units of authority to create cultural hierarchies and patterns of inclusion and exclusion.

3. Into the Definitional Fray: the Constructivist View of Culture

Exploring the nexus between culture and order is rudimentary in today's mainstream IR and outside the field. Exploratory insights of this kind helps understand not only the global cultural flows that are already taking place among states and foreign peoples (whether those that grow organically between nations or those that are established by states' official practices and institutions), but also how the very idea of culture itself is politically configured to exert power and authority. One conceptual challenge that arises here, however, is the elusive nature and semantically loaded meanings of the term culture itself. Raymond Williams famously noted that culture is "one of the two or three most complicated words in the English language."[10] The difficulty of defining culture is due to the fact that it is so inclusive that it is hard to know what to exclude.

Despite these definitional constellations, IR scholars always make assumptions about culture and its workings within international politics. The literature concerned with the study of culture within the scope of mainstream IR theory offers different explanations and conceptualisations of the role of culture in the construction of world politics and international orders—clash of civilisation (Samuel Huntington, 1996),[11] culture of national security (Peter Katzenstein 1996),[12] Social Constructivism (Alexander Wendt, 1999),[13] Soft Power (Joseph Nye, 2004),[14] and Cultural Diplomacy[15]. It is at this point where we come to grips with the central home turf issue that flies in the face of mainstream IR scholarship: how policy-makers and scholars make sense of new cultural conjunctions and power transitions depends on a particular view of culture.

IR scholarship loomed large during the aftermath of the two world wars of the last century. As bodies kept piling up, scholars became very concerned about the causes of war and the possible conditions for peace. This 'problem-solving' commitment of IR theory was soon to be expanded into questions such as the legitimacy of foreign policies, military intervention, causes of conflict and conditions for cooperation. As the field kept growing, so did its theoretical scope. Diversity in theory and its root metaphors caused splits within the field and presented academia with competing frameworks of viewing and approaching world polity. This 'problem-solving' commitment is often paired with positivist and materialist ontologies to make sense of these new conjunctions of material power, driving mainstream IR debates to conceive narrowly of culture as an epiphenomenal event—only loosely constitutive of the international order, and only relates to world politics in ways that are (preferably) empirically causal.[16]

While this default conception of culture sticks to a more positivist[17] and strategic understanding of how culture can be better used to humanise what politics demonises, it appears that it fails to capture the organisational dimension of culture or corporate culture which refers to "typical ways societies structure

power relations in institutions, organise groups to achieve goals, and promote economic activities" (Ferguson, 2001).[18]

The theory of social constructivism, in particular, brings us to a much closer understanding of the fabric of cultural formations and how these inform international orders. The body of constructivist literature has contributed to the debates of IR in many significant ways. The theory emerged in the 1980s with the writings of Nicholas Onuf whose constructivist assumptions take a more critical perspective on how we come to gather knowledge about the world,[19] Martha Finnemore's study of the life cycle of norms and their implications on human rights,[20] and Alexander Wendt's mainstream constructivism,[21] the assumptions of which are of interest to the present study.

The social theory of constructivism suggests that the way states and institutions interact has no reality outside the intersubjective understandings of one another, suggesting "difference across context rather than a single objective reality".[22] This opens the door to exploring and understanding the dramatic—and, sometimes, uncalculated—changes in the international system, and raises questions about transition—and, sometimes, meteoric shift—from conflict to cooperation, or the opposite for that matter. Constructivists focus their analysis on the social dimensions of international relations and argue that these relations are constituted, not fundamentally through the distribution of material forces, but through shared ideas and collective knowledge—hence the distribution of knowledge instead of the distribution of material capabilities. Suggestive as it is, mutual constitution is a central assumption of constructivism.[23] The argument here is that the international system as a social structure "leaves more space for agency, that is for the individual or state to influence their environment, as well as to be influenced by it".[24] The ideational standpoint from which constructivists depart suggests that international relations are not given *a priori* in the same way we speak of rocks, trees, and the solar system. Constructivists use the term "social

facts" or "social realities" to argue that in an anarchic international system, relations between states are constituted on the basis of "intersubjective agreement" (or collective knowledge) among the actors, be they states or individuals.[25] That is, they exist in virtue of some procedural, common beliefs about one another. This is well captured by Wendt's ground-breaking article, now an inscription of constructivism, "Anarchy Is What the States Make of It".[26]

Identity-Alterity formation is apparently one of the staple issues in constructivist critique. The significant "breakthrough" of constructivists is their endorsement of the social sciences in an attempt to arrive at a middle ground theory, or *via media*, that mediates between the grand principles and the complexity of the social world. Indeed, the constructivist debate with realism and neoliberalism takes place,[27] first and foremost, at a meta-theoretical level. In other words, positions taken on the philosophy of social science that inform "the way people theorize and, indeed, 'see' the world".[28]

The intellectual and theoretical development of constructivism originates partly in Immanuel Kant's philosophical accounts on subjective knowledge and the sociological accounts of Max Weber's call for an interpretive understanding of actors' actions as well as those of Anthony Giddens on the agent-structure problematic. Wendt draws on Kant's ideas on obtaining knowledge about the world, which posit that our knowledge of the world is always subjective as long as its perception is filtered through human consciousness.[29] Pure objective knowledge about the world (or what Kant terms "*ding an sich*" in reference to the 'thing-in-itself') can only be reached through an "intersubjective understanding" among individuals.

In sociology, Weber's informative propositions on understanding human interaction is significant in the constructivist analysis. In order to explore and understand human interaction, Weber suggests, we need '*verstehen*', that is, a new interpretive understanding. Wendt uses Weber's ideas to argue that since

international relations are basically interactions among individual actors, understanding their relations means to explore the meanings assigned to these relations which are socially constructed. International relations is not a physical phenomenon that we can merely describe in the same way we describe the physical world; it is rather an intellectual and social phenomenon to which specific meanings are assigned.[30]

Equally significant are the sociological accounts of Anthony Giddens' theory of structuration (1984).[31] His theory discusses the agent-structure problem (what influences what in a social structure). The structurationist proposition gives equal weight to both structure and its agents. Primary effects are reduced to none of the two elements because "[s]tructures do constrain actors, but actors can also transform structures by thinking about them and acting on them in new ways".[32] Wendt uses the premises of the structuration theory in a twofold way. First, he emphasises constitutive rather than causal relations in a social structure. Structure has neither a top-down effect nor a bottom-up one. Second, by incorporating the insights of the structurationist proposition, constructivists suggest that the relationships between structure and agents are less rigid and more dynamic,[33] hence the possibility of change.

While the dynamism of the international structure is suggestive of congruity and unity as well as the inherent heterogeneity of cultural formations across the polity, the constructivist account reduces culture to a set of disaggregate norms that can be communicated and substantiated through common knowledge and "collective mentalities", which are necessary to establish cooperation and coexistence. Yet we learn from anthropologists and sociologists that "any claims to underlying cultural unity on the scale of international orders must necessarily obscure the differences, contradictions, and contestations that characterize any cultural landscape, while at the same time neglecting the institutional construction of aspects of unity".[34] Moreover, while constructivists assume agency and

difference across the context, it does not tell us exactly how the inherent heterogeneity of cultural formations affect the development of international orders. Culture, Reus-Smit notes, "is not just a mess of meanings, symbols, and practices—a grab bag of atomized resources for strategic use—it is patterned and structured: even its contradictions bind as much they divide."[35]

4. Alterity Formation Regimes

Another way to look at the effects of these diversity regimes is post-colonialism. This article is particularly interested in the extent to which these diversity regimes are integral to the ways in which postcolonial orders prioritise and organise cultural differences in alignment with the established distribution of political authority. Indeed, decolonising histories and narratives, in particular, bare the very moment where these diversity regimes are iteratively mobilised to address grievances about existing or past forms of recognition.[36]

Postcolonial theory allows for a critical take on the Eurocentric character of contemporary international order. The mainstream narrative puts forward that the foundations of the modern international order started with the Westphalian settlement, to then spread to other continents. The Industrial Revolution empowered Westerners with technological and economic superiority compared to non-Westerners, and so made it plausible to propagandise the capitalist system elsewhere.[37] Ultimately, the narrative goes on, this brought modernity and progress to foreign peoples.[38] This grand narrative which manifests European paternalism is not without problems. This narrative also comes embedded with hierarchical formations of alterity and otherness that have characterised the order of the international system.[39] Meanwhile, countries with colonial legacies and vulnerable national economies are forced to carry out the burden of recovery, but also adapt to the new world order. Such adaptation leaves a lot more confusion on the side of culture. Within all these intense shifts, postcolonial orders exist somewhere between the burden of cultural recovery in an increasingly intensified

internationalisation of cultures worldwide and an accelerated but dependent economic growth that is often challenged by structural stumbling blocks and the dominance of a global market.[40]

Although much of the early postcolonial critique was concerned with resistance, the emphasis on recognition and recovery is a particular range that could be seen across the postcolonial body of writing (Edward Said, Gayatri Spivak, and Homi Bhabha). While part of this body of writing takes a remarkably redemptive stand with regard to the experience of colonialism and the effects of orientalism (Said), the works of Bhabha and Spivak, in particular, understand the colonial encounter as an "ambivalent" experience for both the postcolonial subject and the coloniser: "the place of difference and otherness or the space of the adversarial … is never entirely on the outside or implacably oppositional."[41] Given the "hybrid" and "syncretic" nature of postcolonial orders, the substrata of otherness and difference are imbued with an inherently "inevitable ambivalence". In such colonial contexts, subjects are involved in a process of hybridisation and mimicry. For Spivak, the inherent heterogeneity of narratives as well as a peculiar focus on the periphery and the marginal should be the foci of interest. She notes: "I am critical of the binary opposition coloniser/colonised. I try to examine the heterogeneity of 'colonial power' and to disclose the complicity of the two poles of that opposition as it constitutes the disciplinary enclave of the critique of imperialism."[42]

Reinterpreting colonial histories is relevant to the understanding of the effects of contemporary cultural and identarian formations on the development of international order. The ways in which these formations occur are the exact manifestations of cultural diversity regimes discussed previously, which re-define order and power relations between the ex-colonial subjects and the former colonisers—aspects of which can be directly found in the "reconciliation" and "rapprochement" policies, but also in modern practices of public diplomacy,

international law and institutions. Nevertheless, the ambivalence of the colonial encounter does also manifest itself through new claims for recognition against past atrocities, genocides (ethnic cleansing) or even misconceptions about entire societies. Such new reinterpretations of the colonial and postcolonial experience draws along less essentialist understandings of culture and power; these are entangled in rather culturally syncretic and heterogeneous contexts. Power can materialise through material capabilities but also through political authority. Master narratives of European paternalism, universalism, and cultural homogeneity are, then, challenged by the discourses of the peripheral and the subaltern. These discourses declare rather an interest in the constructions of Self and Other.

Modern diplomacies are a vital channel for such constructions. Cultural diplomacy and soft power, in particular, accommodate these constructions in the form of discursive formations and representations. Cultural diplomacy is a by-product of the bi-polarity that characterised world order during the Cold War, a period of resurgent liberation movements and independence, as well. It was only until the second half of the twentieth-century that cultural diplomacy had gained currency as an official state activity. An essential component of public diplomacy, cultural diplomacy carries a "quest for tourist dollar as well as the battle for the hearts and minds".[43] It is best defined as "the exchange of ideas, information, art, and other aspects of culture among nations and their peoples in order to foster mutual understanding".[44] The directionality of cultural diplomacy practices, then, suggest a rather pluralist context of exchange and mutual understanding. But along these lines also fall the expectation of where and how exactly this exchange takes place. Indeed, what Smit-Reus calls diversity regimes also fall into the category of these diplomatic representations of Self and Other. The constructivist interpretation of the international structure provides us with a practical taxonomy,

or "cultures of anarchy",[45] that captures the formation of alterity and otherness in the making of world order: Hobbesian, Lockean and Kantian cultures.

Interestingly enough, a key premise in the constructivist interpretation of anarchy and order is the distinction between private knowledge and shared knowledge. The former refers to the set of beliefs someone holds and others do not. States' private knowledge, then, is reduced to domestic ideological considerations and these can affect their external behaviour towards other states. Shared knowledge, or "culture", refers to socially and intersubjectively shared ideas and beliefs which are embedded in many cultural forms such as norms, international laws, international institutions and organisations. In the constructivist critique of order and power, culture takes a specific meaning: "culture is not a sector or sphere of society distinct from economy or polity, but present wherever shared knowledge is found. If economy and polity are institutionally distinct spheres in a society, as in capitalism, therefore, that is because culture constitutes them as such".[46]

Other scholars who addressed the issue of alterity formation in reference to diplomacy include Costas Constantinou (2004),[47] Paul Sharp (1999),[48] James Der Derian and Michael Shapiro (1989),[49] Raymond Cohen (1991),[50] and Edward Said (1978 and 1993).[51] Of interest to the present study, Said's orientalism stands out as a peculiar framework that captures the deeper effects of culture and cultural representations on the development of postcolonial order.

The discursive formations and representations of alterity and otherness, which I argue are another manifestation of Smit-Reus' diversity regimes, rest upon a particular view of order. That is, order is based on a characteristic distinctiveness that drives interaction among actors (or states), and which, in turn, constitutes different alterities: "ally," "rival," "friend," and "exotic." These alterities should be seen, respectively, as corresponding to Wendt's three cultures of anarchy (Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian) and Said's orientalism.

4.1. The Other as enemy/Barbarian: Hobbesian Culture

In a Hobbesian culture of anarchy, states construct a dichotomous process of interaction and view other states as enemies or rivals. Wendt draws upon Thomas Hobbes' idea of "*bellum omnium contra omnes*" (war of all against all). Hobbesian anarchy induces enmity as a position of the Other along with its implications on the Self. Therefore, states seek survival as their ultimate priority. "Enemies", Wendt asserts, "are constituted by representations of the Other as an actor who (1) does not recognize the right of the Self to exist as an autonomous being, and therefore (2) will not willingly limit its violence toward the Self."[52] The act of not being fully recognised as a free and legitimate entity by the Other implies a "deep revisionism",[53] which involves the Other's attempt to "revise" the entity's life and liberty as two properties of a given state. Linked to this is the proposition that in a Hobbesian culture of anarchy, distribution of knowledge might be missing since states interact on a private basis and call each other for constant revisionism that may lead to conflict and war. The implication of the Hobbesian anarchy, for analytical purposes, seems to reflect the hardcore of realism: balance of power and distributions of material might. By extension, the realist discourse about world politics seems to focus only on one logic of anarchy, namely the Hobbesian one.[54]

Three degrees of internalisation are involved in the Hobbesian anarchy. First is *force*; states are forced to comply with the cultural norms of enmity generated by the private/collective knowledge by means of threatening or coercing. Second is *price*. At this degree of internalisation, states comply with the cultural norms induced by enmity not because they are forced to, but because they decide that compliance serves their self-interest. Third is *legitimacy*; states comply with the cultural norms generated by the Hobbesian culture because they think the norms are legitimate.

4.2. The Other as ally/rival: Lockean Culture

In a Lockean culture, states view each other as rivals. That is, they recognise each other's right to liberty, life, and sovereignty. The "war of all against all" is substituted for "live and let live". Recognising each other's sovereignty has implications on the posture of the Self; states do not necessarily tend to eliminate each other, but violence is not preluded either. Wendt argues that "rivals are constituted by representations about Self and Other with respect to violence, but these representations are less threatening. ... [R]ivals expect each other to act as if they recognize their sovereignty.[55] Rivalry, therefore, is constituted as an intersubjective belief that orients states' interactions with one another.

Three degrees of cultural internalisation of the Lockean anarchy are discussed in this regard. As with the Hobbesian anarchy, Lockean anarchy starts with a weak degree of commitment to shared ideas and norms about sovereignty. States are coerced to comply with the norms of sovereignty. A second degree of commitment implies the idea that states' compliance with the sovereignty norms generate more exogenous interests such us territorial security and trade. A third and strong degree of commitment to the norms of sovereignty is reached when states view them as legitimate. They act in ways which make it possible for them to instrumentalise these norms and define their national and transnational interests with the interests of international law.

4.3. The Other as friend: Kantian Culture

In a Kantian anarchic culture, states exhibit friendship roles in conducting their relations. Thus, states have no intention to violate each other. Rather, "non-violence" and "team play" emerge as the cultural norms of Kantian anarchy. Wendt draws on Emmanuel Kant's ideas of Perpetual Peace to argue that states settle their disputes without conflict or war. He notes that substantial literature of IR discusses more enduring conflicts and rivalries but less attention was ever addressed to "enduring friendships"; he goes as far as to suggest that the concept

of "friend", unlike "enemies", is "unauthorised in social theory, especially in IR".[56]

The Kantian culture is so hard a case for materialists to come to grips with. The relatively weak degree of commitment to shared ideas within the Hobbesian and Lockean anarchies make it possible for the materialist ontology assumptions explain the use of coercion and violence in making states comply with the norms of the status quo; but problematic to this case is the Kantian anarchy. What makes it too "hard" to explain is that the shift from the first degree to the second degree of cultural internalisation – in which case friendship is deployed as a strategy to gain sympathy for one's own interests – does not involve coercion. This is largely because in Kantian anarchy, states have no desire to violate each other. Wendt asserts that "[c]ollective security poses a more serious challenge for a coercion theory. Here coercion has to explain not only non-violence but cooperation, and, moreover, do so in a way that distinguishes it from alliance behavior."[57]

By virtue of its nature, the friendship structure of Kantian anarchy allows the deep internalisation of the shared ideas of "perpetual peace". Thus, in a third strong degree of commitment to the shared Kantian norms, the implications of friendship on states dictate that the security of the Other is conceived of as the security of the Self, creating what is known as a "pluralistic security community"; states "live in peace but go their separate ways."[58] The Westphalian Peace Treaty of 1648 which brought to an end the Eighty Years' War is taken as an example to illustrate the point where the shared norms of a cooperative culture between European states took over the Hobbesian logic of "war of all against all". Centuries later, the end of the Cold War marked yet another demarcation line that led to a structural change in the international system and gave European states their identity of cooperation and friendship by forming the European Community and later (since 1995) the European Union.

These three cultures of anarchy, with different degrees of internalisation, provide states with a social structure constituted mainly by the ideas and norms advanced by each anarchic culture. In this respect, states' identities, interests, and hence power are constituted by the ideas implied by which anarchic culture dominates the status quo. Change is dependent on the beliefs and ideas believed to be true, and any change with regard to these beliefs result in a change of the social structure and relations between states. State actors *decide* to be enemies, rivals, or friends.

4.4.   The Other as Exotic: the Orientalist Effect

It is worth noting that Wendt's conceptualisation of these three cultures becomes problematic when discussing the case of postcolonial societies. First, these three cultures concern the historical formation of international relations in Western societies. Second, postcolonial societies present a theoretical limitation to Wendt's classification because *how* these societies relate to each other and to Western societies cannot be merely captured in terms of enmity, rivalry, or friendship. This is largely because the shared knowledge with former colonial powers is determined by a colonial heritage that informs the perception of postcolonial order.

Edward Said's works, *Orientalism: Western Conceptions of the Orient* (1978) and *Culture and Imperialism* (1993) emphasise that Orientalism is an underpinning foundation of the imperialist movement of Western societies, and has three applications: (i) Orientalism as an area of studies dominated more precisely by the nineteenth century specialists and teachers in Oriental languages and culture, and which is based on the ontological and epistemological distinction between the Occident and the Orient; (ii) Orientalism as a discourse and a corporate institution whose "Western style" dominates and takes over the Orient, sustaining the dialects of centre/periphery and superiority/inferiority, and (iii) Orientalism as a set of representations, images and words – myths and lies – that

confine the Orient and Orientals between the fantasies of exoticism and cultural denigration. The production of the "exotic" in culture is a dialectic process in which the Other is framed in an aesthetically rendered entity, or as Graham Huggan notes: "the exotic is not, as is often supposed, an inherent *quality* to be found 'in' certain people, distinctive objects, or specific places; exoticism describes, rather, a particular mode of aesthetic *perception*—one which renders people, objects and places strange even as it domesticates them, and which effectively manufactures otherness even as it claims to surrender to its immanent mystery."[59]

Following Said's analysis, colonialism falls into two main stages: first as a coercive and violent conquest, and later as an ideological appropriation through culture. Equally important, colonialism is not simply an encounter of imperialism that ended once and for all at some historical trajectories. What is characterised as colonialism goes beyond the end of the colonial period to include a set of practices—and, indeed, a set of diversity regimes—that re-dictate forms of power relations between newly independent states and former colonial powers. Order has to determine who can speak, and that is why this alternate space of postcolonial theory that focuses on marginality and identity[60] construction is relevant to the discussion of culture and order in the modern world.

5. Conclusion

The governance and organisation of cultural diversity is a fundamental premise of maintaining and reinforcing political legitimacy in world politics. Although the neoliberal perspective defines the contemporary international order as a multicultural, homogeneous, and inclusive polity, it is also an order whereby culture is politically configured to maintain authoritative legitimacy. Diversity, in fact, as Reus-Smit and Philips show in their account for culture and order, has historically challenged order-builders.[61] Such legitimising challenges requires the

mobilisation of cultural diversity regimes: "systems of norms and practices that simultaneously configure authority and construct diversity."[62]

Disciplinary debates in mainstream IR draw along essentialist views of culture—an epiphenomenal event, only loosely constitutive of the international order, and only relates to world politics in ways that are (preferably) empirically causal. This essentialist view of culture suggests that a culturally homogeneous context is a prerequisite condition to maintain order. Meanwhile, open, rules-based institutions such as foreign policy establishment, diplomacy, and international law are argued to be capable of accommodating diversity under the "unity-triumphs-over-diversity" thesis. According to this conception, thus, institutions have but only a "neutralising effect" through which culture is strategically instrumentalised in order to create opportunities for cooperation and coordination.

The constructivist critique (Wendt's taxonomy of cultures binding the international scene) and postcolonial theory (presented here by Said's writings) bring us much closer to the understanding of these diversity regimes. The discursive formations and representations of alterity and otherness, which I argue are another manifestation of diversity regimes, rest upon a particular view of contemporary world order: the characteristic distinctiveness that drives interaction among actors, and which, in turn, constitutes different alterities: "ally," "rival," "friend," and "exotic."

Endnotes

[1] In recent years, there has been an increasing amount of literature on the implications of new conjunctions of power and cultural difference for the future of the modern international order. See Ikenberry 2011; Philips 2011; Goh 2013; Kissinger 2014; and Reus-Smit 2018.

[2] The term IR is the shorthand name for the academic subject and scholarship of international relations. The term "international relations" with lower cases refers generally to the phenomenon of relationships and interactions between states.

[3] See Hurrell 2020.

[4] See Philips and Reus-Smit 2020, especially chapter 2.

[5] See Reus-Smit 2017, Reus-Smit 2018; and Philips and Reus-Smit 2020.

[6] Reus-Smit 2017, 26.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Ibid., 26.

[9] See Philips and Reus-Smit 2020, especially chapters 1 and 2.

[10] Williams 1976, 76.

[11] See Huntington 1996.

[12] See Ketzenstein 1996.

[13] See Wendt 1999.

[14] See Nye 2004.

[15] See Ninkovich 1981; Cummings 2003; Arndt 2005; Schneider 2010; and Jurková 2015.

[16] For more views on the philosophy of social science in IR, see Kurki and Wight 2013.

[17] Classical realism, social constructivism and neoliberalism (represented by English School scholars) are three competing traditions in mainstream IR that have invoked the question of culture and international politics in one way or another, but nowhere is the nature of culture itself probed. These traditions of thinking take particular theoretical assumptions about culture and international order-building because each theory asks different questions about ontology, methodology, and epistemology. They direct in a fundamental way the way we theorise the international system. Realism and neoliberalism draw upon a materialist and positivist ontology. The materialist stance accounts for the distribution of material capabilities, and these are measured by means of military and economic assets. According to mainstream IR theory, the structure of the international system is formed "solely by differences in polarity (number of major powers), and structural change is measured solely by transitions from one polarity distribution to another"; see Wendt 1999, 16.

[18] Ferguson 2001.

[19] See Onuf 1989.

[20] See Finnemore 1996.

[21] See Wendt 1999 and Hopf 1998.

[22] Fierke 2013, 189.

[23] Constructivists emphasise constitutive relations rather than causal relations within structure. The agent-structure problematic takes a huge chapter in the constructivist analysis. Building mainly on Anthony Giddens' concept of structuration, constructivists assume that the relationship between agents and structure is reducible to none of these elements – structure has neither a top-down effect nor a bottom-up effect. Both the agents and the structure are reducible to the process of structuration. Agents shape structure, and structure shape agents in return.

[24] Fierke 2013, 191.

[25] See Kubalkova 2001.

[26] See Wendt 1992.

[27] These disagreements initiated a whole debate known in IR scholarship as the Third Debate. See Kurki and Wight 2013.

[28] See Kurki and Wight 2013, 15.

[29] See Jackson and Sørensen 2013.

[30] Ibid.

[31] See Giddens 1984.

[32] Jackson and Sørensen 2013, 210.

[33] Ibid., 213.

[34] Reus-Smit 2017, 15.

[35] Ibid., 6.

[36] In international relations, some states deny the legal status of others, stigmatising their practices or even their culture. Such occurrences are common in modern diplomacy. French political scientist Bertrand Badie draws on a social psychology approach to explain the effects of such acts of humiliation on international relations. According to Badie, these actions appear to be the outcome of a colonial past, a failed decolonisation, a mistaken vision of globalisation and a very dangerous post-bipolar reconstruction. See Badie 2014.

[37] See Bull and Watson 1984.

[38] For a more detailed discussion on the postcolonial critique of IR theory, see Seth 2011.

[39] For a more detailed discussion of the Eurocentric character of IR theory, see Hobson 2012.

[40] See Acharya 2018.

[41] Bhabha 1985, 152.

[42] Spivak 1989, 5.

[43] See Bound, Briggs, Holden and Jones 2007.

[44] See Cummings 2003.

[45] See Wendt 1992.

[46] Wendt 1999, 142.

[47] See Constantinou 2004.

[48] See Sharp 1999.

[49] See Derian and Shapiro 1989.

[50] See Cohen 1991.

[51] See Said 1978 and 1993.

[52] Wendt 1999, 260.

[53] Ibid., 261.

[54] Ibid.

[55] Ibid., 279.

[56] Ibid., 298.

[57] Ibid., 303.

[58] Ibid., 299.

[59] Huggan 2001, 13.

[60] For strong points of view on different aspects of identity formation and culture, see Hall 1992, 1993 and 1996.

[61] See Philips and Reus-Smit 2020.

[62] Reus-Smit 2017, 26.

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The Geopolitical Construction of Space: Ceuta and Melilla

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Abstract

The Moroccan-Spanish geopolitical relations have witnessed several ebbs and flows. They have gone through different stages that have conditioned and limited their cooperation and outweighed their competition. These stages include the Andalusian period, the post-Andalusian era, Spanish colonization, and the post-colonial preservation of Moroccan occupied enclaves and islands. Each of these periods contributed their share to the deterioration in interstate relations between these two strategic neighboring countries that are full of qualifications and competences in almost every aspect of life. Benevolent governance on both shores could surely do wonders to the common good of the two peoples as they both reside strategic locations on the world map.

Keywords: Morocco; Spain; geopolitical contention; Ceuta; Melilla.

1. Introduction

The geopolitical and diplomatic relations between Spain and Morocco have always been of paramount importance. The Andalus, as a contact zone between two cultures, two religions, two ideologies, and two rival powers, was the most significant pinnacle of the competitive geopolitical construction of how the two sovereign states perceive themselves in the 21st century. "Moorish Spain" or the Islamic presence in the Iberian Peninsula, for almost eight centuries (711-1492), was an era that formulated the matrix of Islamic-Christian sociopolitical and economic relationships in general, and the Moroccan-Spanish geopolitical rivalry in particular. The unfolding of the Islamic religion to the peninsula was of great importance as it was the first hegemonic form of power relations between the Islamic and the Christian world. After several ebbs and flows of Hispanic resistance, political, economic, and military changes took place. Thus, the Umayyad Hispania was to inaugurate a new chapter in world history that constituted a very crucial stage in the geopolitical fusion between "East" and "West".

The geopolitical construction of space in the Moroccan-Spanish power relations mostly revolves around the matrix of the Andalusian Islamic "enlightened-era" as paralleled with the West European "dark ages", medieval period (from the 5th until the 15th centuries). During this period of European impairment, the European blown candles were to be rekindled, first from the Muslim presence on the Christian land, and second, from the willingness to take revenge of the "Moors", and to expel them beyond the Mediterranean. What enhances such contention here is, first, the occupation of the Moroccan coastal enclaves and islands like Ceuta and Melillia, Chafarinas Islands, Perejil Island (Laila Island), and Badis and Nekkor, right after the expulsion of Muslims from Al-Andalus and the destruction of The Nasrid Kingdom of Granada (the last Islamic state in the Iberian peninsula (1232-1492))[1].

Second, setting these enclaves, especially Ceuta and Melilla, as watch islands/watchtowers, serving both as a preemptive strategy to deter any kind of possible Moroccan expansion to the west and as a reminder of the expulsion or revenge of the "Moorish" presence in the Andalus. The conquest of Melilla took place in the the 15th century (1497) by Spain and the conquest of Ceuta in the 15th century by Portugal (1415) then it "was transferred to Spain under the Treaty of Lisbon in 1668".[2]

Another important episode in the Moroccan-Spanish geopolitical relations was the Spanish colonial period (1912-1956), or what the French and Spanish regimes like to call "the French protectorate" and "the Spanish protectorate" over Morocco. Spanish colonialism over Northern Morocco, especially in the Rif region, was very brutal; it was one of the first powers to use internationally banned chemical weapons against civilians (after World War I) and many other humanitarian crimes. In addition to the occupation of Northern Morocco, the enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, and other Moroccan islands, Spain also occupied the Moroccan Sahara. However, despite its compelled withdrawal from Morocco,   Spain continued to preserve the two main enclaves, Ceuta and Melilla after Morocco's independence in 1956. What is evident in the present status quo is that both countries are trying to preserve their cooperative relations as neighboring sovereign states, and at the same time, to exert their influences in the geopolitical construction of space. This is evident on the part of Spain whose foreign policy has been trying hard to set hurdles for the Moroccan diplomatic success in gaining the international community's support in what concerns the Moroccan Western Sahara.

2. Historical background

Thanks to their distinct geostrategic positions, Morocco and Spain have always played special roles in connecting the African and European continents. The shortest

distance between Morocco and Spain along the Strait of Gibraltar, which is around 12 miles, is very suggestive of the kind of relations that could render them either cooperative or competitive. Historically, the strait served well in bridging the space between cultures, economies, religions, and interests of these neighboring geographical entities. The constructed ideological stigmas of the polarities of "Europe" and "Africa", "East" and "West", "North" and "South", the "Occident" and the "Orient", have always been present in such a continental proximity. By all the odds, spacial proximity can be either a grace or a curse. For Spain, and Europe as well, the "curse" started when "The Arabs came to the Peninsula as fanatical worshippers of Allah and of Mohammed his prophet, at whose bidding and under whose spell they found themselves embarked on a career of conquest aimed at winning all mankind for Islam: peacefully if possible, the prophet had taught, by the sword if necessary".[3] For Morocco, the curse started first with the annexation of the two Moroccan cities Ceuta and Melilla as parts of the Spanish – and later European – territories, and second, with the Spanish colonization of northern and southern Morocco.

Undoubtedly, the Muslim conquest of the Iberian Peninsula was one of the most tragic "predicaments" for the Spaniards and Europeans alike. It was very bad for them because, as Christians, they refused the presence of another religion that would certainly "threaten" their Christendom. As a faith, Islam was very strong in the hearts of its followers. After the death of the Prophet (PBUH) and "During the life time of the first caliph or successor, Palestine, Egypt, and Persia had already been overrun and added to the faith. Less than a century would suffice to carry it east to the borders of India and west over the extent of north Africa until it confronted Christian Europe across a narrow twelve miles of sea".[4] The fast spread of the new religion from India to Europe in less than a century, and before the discovery of the Americas by

Columbus, was like conquering the entire world. This constituted both a real predicament, and a challenge at the same time, for Christians all over the globe.

In his *Moorish Spain*, the English historian Richard Fletcher described the Muslim arrival to the peninsula at the beginning of the 8th century AD. Thus, he wrote, in 711 a Berber army led by Arabs reached the Straits of Gibraltar from Morocco, continuing a series of raids that had been underway for some time. The army was led by a general named Tariq, who is claimed to have named his landfall on the northern side of the Straits for himself: Jebel Tariq, or "the Rock of Tariq," Gibraltar. The subsequent year, a fight took place between the conquerors and the Spanish army led by King Roderic or Rodrigo, and Tariq's forces were victorious. King Roderic was assassinated, and the invaders went on to conquer Toledo, the capital city. The entire peninsula was at their feet within a few years.[5]

In the same vein, the American writer Louis L'Amour wrote describing the Islamic golden age and the expansion of the Muslim rule after the death of the Prophet (PBUH). He noted that within a hundred years, following Mohammed's death in 632, the Arabs had managed to carry the sword of Islam from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean, controlling at one time most of Spain, part of southern France, the island of Sicily, all of North Africa and Egypt, all of Arabia, the Holy Land, Armenia, Persia, Afghanistan, and nearly a third of India. The Arab empire was broader than that of Alexander the Great of Rome.[6]

The Islamic golden age, which was undoubtedly a period of cultural, scientific, and economic flourishing, was paralleled by European decadence. This period contributed a lot to the formation of the "Moorish" character and helped in the formation and in the ideological construction of "the dangerous other". It generated countless negative reactions towards Muslims and their "potential danger". Unquestionably, the construction of the geopolitical spaces, the construction of

binaries were formulated during this period along with a set of stereotypes about Muslims. Most of these stereotypes and ideological constructions have been energized during the amalgamation of the events in Al-Andalus; the fact that pushed Spanish Catholicism[7] to commit different brutal actions to cause problems especially between Muslims and Jews so as to demonize the "Moors" and help in their dissociation and expulsion.

However, unlike what has been imaginatively projected about the Muslim conquest of Spain and the fanatical destruction and fundamentalism that was hovering over the Christian land, Muslims proved very tolerant towards both Christians and Jews. In her book, *The Ornament of the World: How Muslims, Jews, and Christians Created a Culture of Tolerance in Medieval Spain,* the Cuban writer, María Rosa Menocal, tells the story of how Muslims, Jews, and Christians could forge a common tolerant cultural identity regardless of their sociocultural and religious differences. She refers to the tragic "massacre of Jews in Granada in 1066, while ascribing it entirely to fundamentalist Berbers, which is not wholly convincing".[8] More than that, "The Jews and Christians of Muslim Andalucía flourished economically and culturally under the Umayyads, whose dynasty had been transplanted from Damascus to Cordoba by the audacious Abd al-Rahman."[9] Seemingly, Christians, whose land had been conquered by Muslims, were deaf to whatever tolerance, scientific, cultural, and economic flourishing Muslims had achieved. What mattered most for them was the banishment of everyone and everything that is Arab/Arabic and Moorish; because as Harold Bloom clarified, "For the Jews and Moors it meant permanent exile from what had been 'a first-rate place'; for the Old Christians it meant their triumph and their Golden Age."[10] And, that is exactly what clarifies their destruction of many libraries and thousands of books in Spain.

Undoubtedly, the tragic massacre of Jews in Granada in 1066 and the countless atrocities that were committed by the Spanish Catholics were among the preparations and the strategies of *the reconquest.* In her last chapter, epilogue: "Andalusian shards", Menocal asks some pertinent questions about the expulsion of Muslims and Jews from Al-Andalus, she tries to understand,

> "What happened? How and why does a culture of tolerance fall apart? How did a people come to abandon a culture rooted in an ethic of yes and no, so readily able to love and embrace the architecture or the poetry of political enemies or religious rivals, so willing to read good books regardless of the library they come from?"[11]

As a logical answer for her questions, she writes, "All the answers are themselves bundles of contradictions".[12]

Another very important period in the Morocco-Spain diplomatic and geopolitical relations is the post-Andalusian era. Islam as a tolerant religion and a hosting culture has so many things to contribute to the international community and to humanity. The tolerance and coexistence Muslims, Christians, and Jews cherished in Al-Andalus proves the relevance of the Islamic paradigm in the Iberian Peninsula and, of course, in the current polycentric world. However, after the fall of the Islamic empire in Spain and the rise of the Spanish empire that set off towards the New World, determined to explore what is beyond the vast ocean, a new era had already started. The new era or the post-Andalusian era molded the onset of Western colonialism that afflicted the world with woes and tragedies form the 15th to the 20th centuries.

Unlike the Islamic paradigm that cultivated tolerance and coexistence among the different ethnic groups and religions in the peninsula, the western paradigm alluded to "the clash of civilization" that was supposed to reign the post-cold war era in

Huntington's analysis in *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. As a kind of response, in *Freedom and Orthodoxy: Islam and Difference in the Post-Andalusian Age*, Anouar Majid argues that the "clash of civilizations" is caused not essentially by world religion belief systems or cultural incongruities, but by the unyielding and hegemonic universalisms that have characterized world history since 1492. That is, the comprehensive worldviews of Euro-American ideologies have resulted in the marginalization of Islam and other non-European traditions, as well as an increase in suspicion, fear, and terror.[13]

In fact, Majid's theory of the "inflexible and hegemonic universalisms that have characterized world history since 1492" does apply hugely to the Moroccan-Spanish geopolitical relations. Moroccan people, especially in the Rif Region, have suffered uncountable atrocities due to the Spanish use of internationally banned chemical and biological weapons. Thus, despite the signing of the Geneva Protocol in 1925 prohibiting the use of biological and chemical weapons during international conflicts, the Spanish army used chloropicrin, mustard gas, diphosgene, and phosgene, and this was the first time chemical warfare was used after World War I.[14] The collective memory in Al-Hoceima and the suburbs is still recounting these tragedies from generation to generation as people are still dying of cancer and other diseases. The Spanish army committed unforgiven brutalities and crimes towards civilians by "raping Moroccan prisoners of war, castration and mutilation, the bombing of children and women"[15], and the bombing of markets and populated areas. On this basis, we can say that Spanish/European colonialism will always remain a stone in the shoe of any kind of compromise between the two countries.

What confirms the impossibility of any kind of compromise between Spain and Morocco in the future, or the disingenuous/untruthful compromises on the part of Spain, is the frivolity of the Spanish government to preserve the two Moroccan

enclaves and other coastal islands after the independence. In fact, these tails of colonialism will always remain a dark spot on the Moroccan map and a place of contention between the two neighbouring countries.

3. A geopolitical context

> Geography is about power. Although often assumed to be innocent, the geography of the world is not a product of nature but a product of histories of struggle between competing authorities over the power to organize, occupy, and administer space. Imperial systems throughout history, from classical Greece and Rome to China and the Arab world, exercised their power through their ability to impose order and meaning upon space.

−Ó Tuathail, 1996

Gearóid Ó Tuathail inaugurated his work, *Critical Geopolitics: the politics of writing Global Space,* in these ideologically significant words. Undoubtedly, geography has always been a point of contention and competition between the peoples of the world. People have always been engaged in wars and conflicts that may last for years, if not centuries, to preserve a geographical entity that is considered as national, and which is always thought of in socio-political, religious and ideological terms. In this sense, a geographical entity must remain socio-politically and religiously intact and sovereign. The fact that geography, as a physical space, represents different forms and modes of power, a "product of histories", of competition, of "imperial systems", and of imposing "order and meaning" is very revealing. It is revealing in the sense that geography represents both space and time. Every spatial element is meaningful in terms of both physicality and temporality. There is always a complementarity between physicality and historicity in constituting visions and versions about a certain space. Thus, the interference of politics in geography makes the latter dynamic and in perpetual motion, usually, in accordance with the matrix of global

powers that never cease crafting their political presence over the national and international systems, alike.

In this context, Ceuta and Melilla should serve as good examples of how colonial and imperial systems "exercised their power through their ability to impose order and meaning upon space" as argued by Ó Tuathail. Obviously, the two Moroccan occupied enclaves have been geopolitically constructed to serve Spain's geopolitical and geostrategic considerations. Geographically, both towns are undeniably located on the African continent. Yet, Melilla has been in Spanish possession since 1497, when it was captured by Pedro de Estopián, an envoy of the Duke of Medina Sidonia, and is one of multiple fortresses or presidios which were founded along the coast to thwart further invasions of the Spanish peninsula by the 'Moors' (the general term used to refer to the Arabs and Berbers from the south), who had subsequently been exiled five years earlier after spending around eight centuries there. Following the end of the union between Spain and Portugal in 1640, Ceuta, which had been under the Portuguese control since 1415, was formally transferred to Spain under the Treaty of Lisbon in 1668.[16]

In fact, the geopolitical imperative of organizing, occupying, and administering space has gone even further with the occupied towns. Spain has always sought to guarantee Europe's backup to impose order and meaning on the colonially annexed territories, which lay beyond the sea, beyond its territory. These regions have well-established links with Europe as part of Spain, with their own elected representatives in the national Parliament, but following Spain's entry into the European Community in 1986, they became European by treaty: the majority of their citizens are Spanish, and thus now citizens of the European Union. They elect MPs to the European Parliament, and there are enormous signboards proclaiming each to be a 'Municipality of Europe' on the outskirts of both cities.[17]

Historically, Europe owes a lot to Spain; the Spanish Empire was the first to inaugurate the European age of exploration, especially during the early modern period. For John Julius Norwich, Spain was an exceptional case in this regard. Ferdinand and Isabella were significant for a number of reasons, including their destruction of the Kingdom of Granada, their mass expulsions of Muslims and Jews, which had a significant impact on western Europe's demography, and their sponsorship of Columbus, the first step in the Mediterranean's depreciation to the relative backwater it would become in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.[18] Of course, the Spaniards did not accomplish all of this on their own, as William S. Multby argues. Capital was provided by Genoese and German bankers. The Spanish fleet was augmented by ships and crews from various countries, and Spain's European armies were multinational in every sense of the word. Many aspects of war and administration were dominated by Castilians, but they were too few and their country was too poor to create such a global enterprise without help.[19]

Thus, for the sake of understanding the geopolitical construction of these physical spaces, it is necessary to put it in a global context. As an approach, geopolitics brackets the study and interaction of geography and politics. Such interaction may take the form of geographical factors that influence certain spaces and political imaginations that may orient state decisions and, thus, statecraft in general. In this vein, introducing a definition of geopolitics is worth considering here. For Agnew, "the term is now used freely to refer to such phenomena as international boundary disputes, the structure of global finance, and geographical patterns of election results".[20] A more specific meaning of geopolitics refers to the "examination of the geographical assumptions, designations and understandings that enter into the making of world politics."[21] Geopolitics, as a field of study, was first introduced by the Swedish political scientist Rudolf Kjellén in 1899. But in terms of use, it was till

the 1930s that a group of German political geographers, particularly the retired Major General Dr Karl Haushofer in association with Adolf Hitler through Rudolf Hess that the concept was brought to the world's attention. Hitler who represented the Nazi party (1930s and 1940s) fortified his lines and consolidated his power with all obsession to expand Germany's living area.[22] Undoubtedly, Hitler's conception of geopolitics was different from its being a serious field of inquiry, a method of explaining world politics; it was in fact a strategy to dominate and conquer.

However, after World War II, geopolitics started to take its shape as a serious field of inquiry. It had been a considerable ideological field for Hitler to promote his propaganda and Nazi ideology on a wider scale. Yet, things took another path, especially with "the shifting economic and geopolitical foundations of the world economy since the Second World War."[23] After the war, geopolitics was conceived of as a field of investigation necessary for every state to study its potential as a sovereign state and the potential of other states, on the one hand, and to prepare for preventive and preemptive self-defence, on the other. This stance dominated the world's political arena, especially with the emergence of USA as a world power.

The American geopoliticians, mainly Alfred Thayer Mahan, Sir Halford Mackinder, Henry Kissinger, and Zbigniew Brzezinski, wrote in excess about the American domestic and foreign policy. Mahan wrote his famous book *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783,* in which he focuses on the role of the sea in terms of "use and control"[24] as a source of power. Mackinder's Heartland Theory constitutes a response to Mahan's *Sea Power*. While Mahan focuses on sea power, Mackinder focuses on 'the geography of the earth as being divided into the "World Island" which comprises Eurasia and Africa; and the "Peripheral Islands" which include the Americas, Australia, Japan, the British isles, and Oceania.[25]

In his turn Kissinger, a security adviser, wrote his book about *Diplomacy* (1994) after the Cold War. His argument is that despite the fact that we are living a post-Soviet era, Russia, along with Germany, still constitutes a threat for the USA. He maintains that "unless America was organically involved in Europe, it would be obliged to involve itself later under circumstances far less favourable to both sides of the Atlantic."[26] Seemingly, "it is in no country's interest that Germany and Russia should fixate on each other as either principal partner or principal adversary. If they become too close, they raise fears of condominium; if they quarrel, they involve Europe in escalating crises."[27] What is evident for Kissinger is that, "without Europe, America could turn, psychologically as well as geographically and geopolitically, into on island off the shores of Eurasia."[28]

Brzezinski argues for the same point. For him the "American foreign policy must remain concerned with the geopolitical dimension and must employ its influence in Eurasia in a manner that creates a stable continental equilibrium, with the United States as the political arbiter."[29] The role of USA as an external arbiter, a global watch-dog, is very telling, especially for Eurasia that constitutes the "World Island" in Mackinder's words. Thus, Eurasia (mainly Asia), the cradle of civilizations, of religions, of histories, of sciences, and the continent where the orient and the occident merge, is reduced to a mere American chessboard. Consequently, Eurasia is considered as a "chessboard on which the struggle for global primacy continues to be played, and the struggle involves geostrategy—the strategic management of geopolitical interests".[30]

Giving examples from an American geopolitical context is just for the sake of limiting a little bit the scope of the geopolitical analysis. A brief analysis then would suffice, because USA is today's superpower; so, it is useful to contextualize the geopolitical contention between Morocco and Spain. This would surely help us grasp

how the geopolitical machine functions. The American recognition of the Moroccan sovereignty over Moroccan Western Sahara is very vexing to Spain, and some other countries, because the Spanish government became aware of the loaded messages the US is sending. Morocco has fully understood that these times are very tough; one single state cannot survive in a world of alliances and coalitions. One cannot do without firmly positioning his feet in a solid ground for mutual interests.

Undoubtedly, geopolitics is criticised for not being able to deal with all the factors that furnish the scene of international relations.[31] Yet, as a method of analysis, an approach to the struggles over power and space, it should be furnished by different discourses that cover and touch upon a wide range of socio-political, economic, religious and ideological factors. Geopolitics has always been accompanied by different discourses. Accordingly, "geopolitics is defined as a discursive practice by which intellectuals of statecraft 'spatialize' international politics and represent it as a 'world' characterized by particular types of places, peoples and dramas".[32] In *Critical Geopolitics,* Agnew refers to three discourses or modes of representation (the three ages of geopolitics): civilizational geopolitics (1815-75), naturalized geopolitics (1875-1945), and ideological geopolitics (1945-90), respectively.[33] In every stage, he highlights the periodization of geopolitical discourse.

Nobody can deny the fact that there is a close relationship between the political discourse and the geopolitical reorganization of world politics and space. The geopolitical reorganization of world politics is based on crafting the political presence, especially of superpower(s), over the international system, past and present. Discourse takes different forms and modes. In this case, geopolitical discourse has the tendency to set as many varied 'assumptions', 'designations', and 'understandings' as is possible for its survival and maintenance. For example, the current geopolitical assumptions and designations all revolve around the slogans of

'security', 'terrorism', 'climate change', 'weapons of mass destruction', 'resources scarcity', 'hegemonic annexations of different geographical entities against people's free will', etc. This leads to geopolitical tension and competition. In fact, this race to gain power, to gain access to vital natural resources on the regional or global scales, under different pretexts, hinders every attempt to promote dialogue and peace in various parts of the world.

Spain is very cautious in retaining good relationships with Morocco, especially on the level of political discourse; however, in what concerns the geopolitical reorganization of space they have built 6 meters high fences around the occupied enclaves, a land that Morocco has never ceased claiming as part of our nation. Obviously, there is a huge gap between abstract political discourse, and the geopolitical manipulation of space as praxis. In this context, Peter Gold notices that the fences that surround the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla are an effort to manipulate the upsurge of Africans into Europe, even if they only divert a portion of the flow elsewhere. They are, however, a blatant and true reminder of the cultural, political, and economic barriers that Europe and its Mediterranean neighbours still have to overcome. As long as these intangible barriers exist, the enclaves will continue to serve as a conduit for migrants fleeing North Africa and elsewhere to reach Europe.[34] The cultural, political, and economic barriers (fences) that Spain has set is a unique ideological construction of space the 21st century has witnessed; a true reminder/remnant of the European colonialist legacy.

Geopolitics is a key element in understanding international relations. The concept sets a fertile ground for the question of international relation. It offers both a lucid and an ambiguous context in dealing with this issue. On the one hand, its lucidity resides in how the combination of politics and geography renders it possible for us to understand and deal with perceptible components in the process of international

relations such as the zones of political and economic power that are enrooted and controlled in certain geographical spaces. For example, when we talk about the USA or Europe we understand their political influence in the global decision-making, as main factors. We can also speak of rising powers such as India, China, Russia and Brazil, and how they are increasing and maintaining their economic, military and political statuses on the world's political arena. Another example is that of states that might be considered as failed or rogue states but still influence regional and global geopolitical decisions and are exploited by economically and militarily powerful states to secure their interests and privileges. The phrase "rogue state", as Noam Chomsky clarifies in his *Rogue States: The Rule of Force in World Affairs*, has two meanings: a propagandistic one that refers to various enemies, and a literal one that refers to states that refuse to abide by international conventions. Logic says that unless they are internally restrained, the most powerful regimes should fall into the latter category, which history confirms.[35]

On the other hand, its ambiguity springs from the endless and recurring factors that never stop manipulating and influencing international relations, mainly ideological factors. The geopolitical considerations, in this sense, are always conditioned by certain interests and hidden agendas. For example, a powerful state or a confederation of states may pretend to be aiming at liberating a certain society from the shackles of tyranny, as was the case with Iraq and many other countries, while in fact they are aiming at things ranging from natural resources to their political fantasies. Therefore, if we take the concept of geopolitics as "the study of the influence of geographical factors on state behavior- how location, climate, natural resources, population, and physical terrain determine a state's foreign policy options and its position in the hierarchy of states"[36] we realize how fertile and crucial this

concept for a deep and founded understanding of the issue of interstate contentions, regional integrity, and global communication is.

It is crucial and fertile in the sense that it conjures very controversial issues such as human rights, global justice, sovereignty, communicative ethics, international law, environment, natural resources, etc. All these factors contribute to the geopolitical competitions between individual nations or groups of nations in the form of alliances of different states and groups on the ground of sharing common ideological interests.

The geopolitical contention over space between Morocco and Spain, as I mentioned above in this section, dates back to the Andalusian era. Many historians, sociologists, and politicians agree that this period constituted and molded irreconcilable attitudes and prejudices among Muslims and Christians. For instance, the former Spanish Prime Minister José Maria Aznar sees that the conflict between the two countries began in the eighth century. In a lecture given at Georgetown University on September 21, 2004, Aznar stated that Spain's long battle against terrorism began in 711, when Muslims led by Tariq Ibn Ziyad invaded the country. He went on to say that the terrorist attacks in Madrid on March 11, 2004, had nothing to do with the Iraqi crisis and had everything to do with the fall of Al-Andalus.[37] Thus, overlooking the fact that Morocco had been exposed to the same brutal terrorist attacks on May 16, 2003, in Casablanca, and in which about 45 people were killed. Others, like Anouar Majid, believe that the true predicament of the geopolitical contention between these two nations started during the post-Andalusian era.

Generally speaking, and for the sake of comparing the Muslim rule in Al-Andalus to the Spanish one in some parts of Morocco, we can say that, Spain, enjoyed all sorts of economic, cultural, and scientific flourishing during the Muslim presence on the Iberian Peninsula. Christians and Jews lived in harmony and tolerance under the

Muslim presence; while Moroccans suffered woes and tragedies under the Spanish colonialism and they are still suffering the remnants of the chemical and biological weapons in Northern Morocco along with the preservation of parts of the Moroccan land.

4. Future Prospects

> "If Africans want to stand up and walk, sooner or later they must look elsewhere than to Europe. Europe is undoubtedly not a dying world. But, weary, it now represents the world of declining life and crimson sunsets. Here, the spirit has faded, eaten away by extreme forms of pessimism, nihilism, and frivolity."

Achille Mbembe, *Out of the Dark Night*, p. 230.

Drawing on the same line of thought expressed by Frantz Fanon in *The Wretched of the Earth*, Mbembe's *Out of the Dark Night*, calls for "decolonization as a praxis of self-defense and as an experience of emergence and uprising."[38] Postcolonial writers have always called for a certain detachment from the shackles of the ex-colonizer. Subordination and subjugation are soundless weapons that kill cool-bloodedly every human being who is willing to live freely, all the Africans who are willing to "stand up and walk". The preservation of the two Moroccan cities Ceuta and Melilla (and other islands) under the Spanish occupation, is an extreme form of "pessimism", "nihilism", and "frivolity" to subdue and subjugate the non-subjugated. Otherwise, what does it mean to encircle a dozen square kilometers piece of land, in the African continent, hundreds of kilometers away from the European continent, on the Moroccan land, and call it "Spanish"?

In his turn, Frantz Fanon stresses the fact that as African nations, "we must shake off the heavy darkness in which we were plunged, and leave it behind. The new day which is already at hand must find us firm, prudent, and resolute".[39] Subordination

and subjugation to the "West" weakens Africa. These sorts of crippled international relations should be substituted with cooperative and interdependent relations of power that guarantee the African nations a true resurrection and set them free from the tails of colonialism. In this context, Spain seems to be still clinging to this crippled logic of subordination and 'racial supremacy'.

Last year, Ceuta received a surge of migrant crossings from the Moroccan borders, in which case the Spanish government blamed Morocco for loosening border control on purpose. In the same way, Nasser Bourita, Moroccan Foreign minister, blamed Spain for the diplomatic spat between the two countries and reminded them that "today's Morocco is not that of the past, and Spain needs to understand this".[40] Spain and Europe have to accept the fact that the world is changing relentlessly, and today's geopolitical conditions are not yesterday's. Every nation is willing to embrace the nations and allies that support its national integrity and foreign policy. One day Africa will find itself obliged to "turn its gaze toward the new. It will have to stage itself and, for the first time, accomplish what has never before been possible. It will have to do this with awareness that it is opening new ages for itself and for the planet."[41]

Recently, the once deaf and stubborn Spanish government has apparently succumbed and opened both ears to the Moroccan diplomatic calls in what concerns his national unity and integrity; thus, following the U.S.A, Germany, France, and the majority of world countries that support the Moroccan right to exert his sovereignty over his historically legitimate land, the southern regions. After a fifteen-month crisis with Madrid, Premier Pedro Sanchez wrote to King Mohamed VI on 14 March 2022 that "'Spain considers the autonomy initiative undertaken by Morocco to be the most serious, realistic and credible basis for resolving the conflict' over Western Sahara."[42] This declaration was welcomed by the Moroccan government and hailed

as a very significant diplomatic gain due to the fact that the whole southern region, which is the same size as the United Kingdom, was formerly ruled by the nation (Spain) as its colonial authority. And because Spain's stance on the subject is widely esteemed, Morocco hopes that other European and Latin American nations would follow Spain's lead.[43]

What is really interesting and thoughtful in Sanchez's declaration is that he "goes a bit further than France and Germany. The French Foreign Ministry has described the Moroccan plan as "a basis" and not as "the most serious basis" on which to hold "serious and credible talks"".[44]

Spain, also, knows well that the contention over the two Moroccan occupied cities will have to be resolved. And, Morocco will never tolerate the occupation of a single spot of its land. Jaime De Pinies once said that "On the day we can restore the sovereignty of Gibraltar to Spain, it would be hard to imagine that the international community will accept that we control the two shores of the Straits."[45] In the same way, King Hassan II argued that "the day Spain comes into possession of Gibraltar, Morocco will, of necessity, get Ceuta and Melilla. No power can permit Spain to possess both keys to the same straits".[46] Thus, as a matter of fact, both Morocco and Spain are aware of these conclusions, of these futuristic trajectories that are still conditioned by the factor of time only. Time in this context is, of course, one of the main elements that give meaning to geography as a process of the geopolitical construction of space.

5. Conclusion

The geopolitical construction of space constitutes the main framework for contentious politics and interstate contentions. There is always a certain ideology

behind space construction because when you construct a space, you "intend" to classify, fragment, include, exclude, marginalize, unify, weaken, strengthen … etc, the different 'Other'. And since such classifications, fragmentations, inclusions, and exclusions cannot happen unless through the mantle of power, there remains a little room for dialogue and communication simply because power and politics pay no heed for ethics and justice. Undoubtedly, interstate relations are conditioned by the element of power to the highest levels, and no process of the ideological construction of space can happen without power interference. So, this directly affects and impedes interstate collaboration, especially on the geopolitical level.

The Moroccan-Spanish geopolitical relations have witnessed several ebbs and flows. They have gone through different stages that have conditioned and limited their cooperation and outweighed their competition. These stages include the Andalusian period, the post-Andalusian era, Spanish colonialism, and the post-colonial preservation of Moroccan occupied enclaves and islands. Each of these periods contributes its share to the deterioration in interstate relations between these two strategic neighboring countries that are full of qualifications and competences in almost every aspect of life. Benevolent governance on both shores could do wonders to the two peoples as they both reside strategic locations on the world map.

Endnotes

[1] See the preface of the edition by Adela Fábregas (2020), *The Nasrid kingdom of Granada between East and West*, which was translated by Consuelo López-Morillas. It was published within the series of Handbook of Oriental Studies. Section 1 The Near and Middle East, Volume, 148. Leiden: Brill. p. ix.
[2]Said Saddiki (2017). *World of Walls: The Structure, Roles and Effectiveness of Separation Barriers*. London: Cambridge. p. 58.

[3] William C, Atkinson (1960). *A History of Spain and Portugal*. London: Whitefriars press. p.45.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Richard Fletcher (1992). *Moorish Spain*. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson. p.1.

[6] Louis L'Amour (1985). *The Walking Drum*. New York: Bantam. p.171.

[7] Harold Bloom describes the year (1492) of the expulsion of the Moors and the Jews from Spain as a brutal disaster that was committed by Spanish Catholicism. In forward for *The Ornament of the World: How Muslims, Jews, and Christians Created a Culture of Tolerance in Medieval Spain* by María Rosa Menocal p. xi

[8] Harold Bloom, forward for *The Ornament of the World.* p. xii.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Harold Bloom, forward for *The Ornament of the World: How Muslims, Jews, and Christians Created a Culture of Tolerance in Medieval Spain* by María Rosa Menocal. p. xii

[11] Menocal. *The Ornament of the World.* p.266

[12] Ibid.

[13] Anouar Majid (2004). Book review. *Freedom and Orthodoxy: Islam and Difference in the Post-Andalusian Age*

[14] Morocco Telegraph (June, 21, 2021). "War Crimes: Moroccans Are Still Suffering The Consequences Of Spain's Use Of Chemical Weapons In The Rif". At
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[15] Ibid.

[16] Peter Gold (2000). *Europe or Africa: A Contemporary Study of the Spanish North African Enclaves of Ceuta and Melillia*. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press. p. xi

[17] Peter Gold, Ibid.

[18] John Julius Norwich (1998). *The Middle Sea: A History of the Mediterranean*. p. xiv.

[19] William S. Maltby (2009). *The Rise and Fall of the Spanish Empire*. London: Palgrave Macmillan. p.3.

[20] John Agnew (1998, 2003). *Geopolitics: Re-visioning World Politics* (2nd ed.). London: Routledge. p.5.

[21] Ibid.

[22] Griffiths, O'Callaghan, and Roach (2002, 2008). *International Relations: The Key Concepts* (2nd ed.). London: Routledge. p.123.

[23] Knox, Agnew and McCarthy (1989, 2014). *The Geography of the World Economy* (6th ed.). London: Routledge. p. 353.

[24] Mahan, A. (1889, 2009). *The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783*. Tucson: Fireship Press. p. I.

[25] Sir Halford Mackinder (1904). "The Geographical Pivot of History*". The Geographical Journal*, Vol. 170, No. 4, December 2004, pp. 298–32.

[26] Henry Kissinger (1994). *Diplomacy*. New York: Simon & Schuster. p. 82.

[27] Ibid. p. 822.

[28] Ibid.

[29] Zbigniew Brzezinski (1997). *The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives*. New York: Basic Books. p. xiv.

[30] Ibid.

[31] Geopolitics is criticised for being unable to bracket all the factors that control and contribute to the production of world politics. However, geopolitics remains of crucial importance for every analysis of international relations. And examples of how geographical factors influence state behaviour and state's foreign policy are plenty. Today, geopolitics has become of much importance as the struggles over space are increasing day after day. It goes without saying that world politics is heavily based on geopolitical assumptions and imaginations. The Middle East, as a rich space and place, has never ceased attracting and creating geopolitical competition, especially between the Orient and the Occident.

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[33] John Agnew (1998, 2003). *Geopolitics: Re-visioning World Politics* (2nd ed.). London: Routledge. p.85.

[34] Peter Gold (2000). *Europe or Africa: A Contemporary Study of the Spanish North African Enclaves of Ceuta and Melillia*. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press. p. 144.

[35] Noam Chomsky (2000). *Rogue States: The Rule of Force in World Affairs*. Cambridge, MA: South End Press. p.1.

[36] Griffiths, Martin, Terry O'Callaghan, and Steven C. Roach (2008). *International Relations: The Key Concepts* (2nd ed.). London: Routledge. p.123.

[37] Mohamed Larbi Messari, "The Vivid Memories of Al-Andalus in the Discourse on Dialogue among Civilisations",
http://www.isesco.org.ma/english/publications/ Human%20Civilizations/p32.php. As cited in Said Saddiki (2017). *World of Walls: The Structure, Roles and Effectiveness of Separation Barriers*. London: Cambridge. p.64.

[38] Achille Mbembe, *Out of the Dark Night*, p. 230.

[39] Frantz Fanon (1963). *The Wretched of the Earth*, Trans. Constance Farrington, New York: Grove. p. 311.

[40] Reuters (May 20, 2021). Morocco blames Spain for spat, says weather caused migrant crisis. At https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/morocco-blames-spain-spat-says-weather-caused-migrant-crisis-2021-05-20/

[41] Achille Mbembe, *Out of the Dark Night*, p. 230.

[42] Cembrero, Ignacio. (2022, April 15). Spain falls into line with Morocco on the Western Sahara conflict. *Orientxxi.info*.
https://orientxxi.info/magazine/spain-falls-into-line-with-morocco-on-the-western-sahara-conflict,5528 Accessed: 04/05/2022 17:28.

[43] Ibid.

[44] Ibid.

[45] Jaime De Pinies, La descolonización del Sáhara: Un Tema sin Concluir. Madrid: Espasa Crónica, 1990, p. 55. Cited in Mohamed Larbi Messari, "The Current Context of a Moroccan Claim to Ceuta and Melilla" (December 2009), as Cited in Said Saddiki (2017). *World of Walls: The Structure, Roles and Effectiveness of Separation Barriers*. London: Cambridge. p. 78.

[46] L'Opinion (26 novembre 1975), cited by Robert Rézette, *The Spanish Enclaves in Morocco*. Paris: Nouvelles Editions Latines, 1976, p. 146, as cited in Said Saddiki (2017). *World of Walls: The Structure, Roles and Effectiveness of Separation Barriers*. London: Cambridge. p. 78.

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III. The Geocultural/Political Fiction

Prologue

There has been a spatial turn in fiction as more recent authors remain committed to geoculturally and ethno-historically incontrovertible localizations of character and plot, whether these writers hail from formerly colonial locations, or from former imperial metropolises. In this sense, the world literature has become a literary-cultural reality. Indeed, many anarchist and imperialist geographers affected the fiction scholarship, which has delineated the affinities between geography and culture. Accordingly, various narratological techniques are reckoned to move beyond the boundaries of space and time, and could carry new epistemologies of international relations.

Karmim and Rbouj analyze postcolonial concepts pertaining to resistance, identity, memory, absence, and space. More specifically, *The Book of Disappearance* by Ibtissam Azem is studied through the lens of dynamics power relations, incarnated in the colonized's living experiences. The co-authors conclude that the book study should redefine the historical mainstream.

Lahbouchi studies Mahmood Mamdani's *Neither Settler nor Native: the Making and Unmaking of Permanent Minorities* geoculturally in order to explore the relations between settlers and natives within different postcolonial contexts. As a remedial action, inter-/trans-cultural dialogues is badly needed to avoid signs of genocide and violence.

Postcolonial Arab Science-Fiction Resistance through (Dis)-Appearance: Reclaiming Space and Memory in *The Book of Disappearance* by Ibtissam Azem

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Abstract

This research paper presents a thorough textual analysis of the postcolonial concepts of resistance, identity, memory, absence, and space in the novel The Book of Disappearance written by Azem Ibtissam. The purpose of this research is to scrutinize and analyze the binaries appearance and disappearance set in a dystopian geopolitical space where dynamics of power relations distort etymologies and falsify the politics of mention. It will also focus on the pertinent use of science fiction and magical realism through the absence of chronology and the presence of flashbacks as narratological vehicles that facilitate the movement beyond the limits of the concepts of time, reality, and truth, as well as third and first-person narration in an omnipresent fashion. This textual analysis will shed further light on depersonalization and detachment associated with the lived experiences of the colonized, what makes their subjective realities different from those of the colonizer, and impacts their identities providing them with an inchoate fluidity and ambivalence. The ongoing conflict between Palestine and Israel and the occurring clash of civilization that has been present and persistent since the Nakba provides fertile grounds for postcolonial perusal and interpretation. The results of this analysis pertain to the fact that the concepts of space, memory, truth, belonging, identity, shape and redefine mainstream history. This latter has always been written by a biased hegemony and subjectively alter the collective unconscious of differing peoples.

Key words: post-colonial; resistance; (dis)appearance; space; memory; history

1. Introduction

Being known as the bride of Palestine and one of its oldest cities, Jaffa has always been at the center of many Palestinian literary works[1]. *The Book of Disappearance* is nothing but another novel about and for Jaffa. Yet, although it shares many aspects with the previously written Palestinian novels about this city, it still offers an exceptional fictional perspective that the literary genre adopted allows. The space of Jaffa in this novel is not only disturbed by the Israeli settlement but also by a dystopian disappearance of Palestinians from the city. For the first time, Jaffa is present in a Palestinian novel without the Jaffans and their absence from this space, which must be historically considered a victory for the settlers, is not but a source of their anguish.

This paper openly argues that this novel is about the story of Jaffa; not that of Alaa or his Tata, and not that of Ariel and his colonial culture. Yet, Jaffa is not a single city in this literary work but rather multiple cities. From the very beginning of the novel, this idea is explicitly revealed through Alaa's statement to his dead grandmother:

> Your Jaffa resembles mine. But it is not the same. Two cities impersonating each other. You carved your names in my city, so I feel like I am a returnee from history. Always tired, roaming my own life like a ghost. Yes, I am a ghost who lives in your city. You, too, are a ghost, living in my city. And we call both cities Jaffa.[2]

Alaa's claim of the plurality of the city and the interconnected complex ties between these different Jaffas encapsulate the significance of this space and its centrality to the novel and to this paper. Before the compulsory exodus of thousands of Palestinians in 1948, Jaffa was the commercial, industrial, and cultural capital of Palestine[3]. It symbolized Arab affluence that was disastrously aborted by the settlement. This pivotal position is indeed what makes it an unhealed wound in the hearts and collective memory of Palestinians[4]. Consequently, comparing and contrasting the Jaffa before and after 1948 is

inscribed not only in literature but also in the Palestinian popular culture. By overly praising the old Jaffa and mourning the present one, Palestinians display excessive feelings of nostalgia that make them crave going back to the past and live in the old Jaffa. This longing is also experienced by younger generations who had never physically lived through that prosperous era, but who are able to relive it through the older generations.

Indeed, this explains the over-attachment of Alaa to his *Tata* and her persisting presence through his diaries and the text. It is not a bond with the person as much as it is a tenacious tie with her representation of the socio-political space of Jaffa, as he states; "I told you once that, with you, I felt that I was living the world of your Jaffa before 'that year'"[5]. However, this attitude adopted by Alaa is refused by his grandmother who believes that "Jaffa will always be Jaffa"[6]. She thinks that considering the fact that Jaffa has changed into another Jaffa is itself an act of surrender. This pluralism that is both suggested by Alaa and this paper degrades Jaffa according to the grandmother.

The question that emerges here is would a city really remain the same even after colonization? Or would it rather be its paralleled version that will be able to survive in the collective memory and imaginary? An early answer that we provide to these two questions is: no. Neither will the city be the same in reality nor will it remain authentic even in imagination and memory. Yet, the strong emotional bond that Jaffians have with their city forces them to keep reliving its glorious memories and never allow the settler to erase the truthful memory of the place. Actually, along with space, the concepts of truth and collective memory reign strongly as one of the most important themes of the novel. Azem makes sure to highlight the fact that despite the continuous dire efforts of the colonizer to expunge and erase the colonized memory and truthful sense of identity, this latter persists and continues to forcefully and painfully remember through detailed routines within the Jaffan spatial constructs.

2. A Tale of Two Cities: Jaffa and Jafa

Dispute over preserving and destroying the memory of the city is present all throughout the novel as it is projected through the crisis of naming. Public spaces' naming is actually an issue that attracts the attention of many postmodern debates with political ends; including feminism, blackism, and postcolonialism. Names of streets all around the world are being revisited in an attempt to promote political correctness. The case in Palestine was reversed because, in the second half of the twentieth century, the original Arab names of streets were replaced by Hebrew-Jewish names as Alaa states "I used to repeat whenever I went through Rayzal Street, the name that had occupied Iskandar Awad Street"[7]. Renaming the streets of Jaffa is part of the settler's agenda to erase the Palestinian identity; as it is considered an outspoken form of symbolic violence against its culture. In fact, according to Ernesto Laclau, names are considered "performative catalysts for popular identities"[8], and by replacing them either with Hebrew names or numbers they perform a kind of soft power that makes original Palestinian streets unrecognizable.

For this reason, remembering is a very important theme in Palestinian literature in general and in this novel specifically. The second enemy after the Zionists is forgetfulness. To fight this enemy, not only Palestinians are pushed to remember, but Jaffa is also forced to remember its citizens, history, and legacy. The personification of the city is a result of the strong emotional involvement of its citizens, as it is the catalyzer of a soft form of resistance. Furthermore, there is an established metaphor of Jaffa as a woman/mother who has a heart that is overwhelmed by melancholy, a body agonized by weapons, and a memory that, although forced into dissociative amnesia, still remembers[9]. However, remembrance is not always an act of resistance when it includes endless insights into one's own vulnerability.

Death is an unconditional element in Jaffa's memory. The book opens with the grandmother's death. This might be interpreted in two ways. First, we can assume

that the death of the grandmother symbolizes the end of the old Jaffa. Second, death might refer to the eternal stay of the grandmother in Jaffa's soil. Yet, natural death is not the weakest point in Jaffa's memory but is rather death caused by annihilation and homicides. As Alaa states; "Should I tread lightly? Was I walking over the corpses of those who had passed through, and who were decimated in the nakba? ... When I walk in Palestine I feel that I am walking on corpses"[10]. After the arrival of the settlers, death has dominated the space of Jaffa which made the city unbearable to live in.

Jaffa is at the same time the long-loved and the hated, the desired and unsought. These ambivalent feelings torment Alaa as they push him to interrogate his faithful commitment to the city. The fact that he lives in Tel Aviv also aggravates his identity crisis as he lives in Rothschild Boulevard just because he refuses to live in Ghettos in his own country[11]. The noticeable socioeconomic differences between Tel Aviv and Jaffa, where so many Arabs are still living, also enrage Alaa.

Becoming a stranger in one's homeland is what made leaving less difficult for a vast category of Palestinians who could have stayed. Alaa's grandfather preferred real exile rather than exile in Palestine. This partial massive departure of Palestinians has allowed the settler to destruct the authenticity of the space under the pretext of modernization. But, what if not even one Palestinian stays in Palestine? Would this finally make the dream of the settlers come true?

The political dispute over owning space was settled by Azem in favor of the Israelis. However, the dominance of the space in the shades of an unexplained, illogical, and even abnormal disappearance of Palestinians cannot be celebrated. Yet, a large number of Israelis still celebrated it. The conflicting opinions over the reason behind this disappearance raised tension in the already strained colonized space. Being nowhere is a hollow inference that is beyond the bounds of logic as Ariel states that "one still has to be somewhere"[12]. Reclaiming space through this

abnormal out-of-placeness is only reached through the narrative structure that magical realism provides.

As a matter of fact, magical realism allows postcolonial authors a margin of freedom to subvert the diverse discourses of power that cannot be found in any other genre. According to Bakhtin, magical realism "provides a means to fill in the gaps of cultural representation in a postcolonial context by recuperating the fragments and voices of forgotten or subsumed histories from the point of view of the colonized"[13]. This gap is used by the author to subordinate the settlers to noticing, thinking, and even worrying about the Palestinians' absence. Both the grandmother's and Alaa's Jaffas are deconstructed and a new Jaffa, where Palestinians are completely dismissed, is reconstructed. This imaginative alternative reconstruction of Jaffa as a Palestinians-free space where Israelis become more anxious also delineates the fact that the absence of the victim can also cause trauma to the subjugator.

It is certain that the mysteriousness involved in this disappearance is the aspect that intensified the feeling of angst, but it is also the dialectic of the master and slave that subconsciously increased worries. Reactions to the disappearance varied from one person to another and from one political view to another. Yet, the colonial ambitions that pushed Palestinians into physical and metaphorical homelessness resurfaced. In less than two days, the "abandoned" Palestinian houses became the subject of a good deal of real estate. Among the people who cherished this opportunity was Ariel's mother who expressed her excitement towards moving to Jaffa as she has been "eyeing a house on Abbas Street"[14] for a long time. This fast will to own the deserted houses puts into question the resisting aspect of absence and shows that houses are as central to this work as are the two different, yet similar, cities of Jaffa and Jafa.

3. The Haunting of Alaa's House: The house as a Metaphor

A house is not only a place that provides people with shelter and helps them develop their own sense of home, it is a space that represents the boundary between the private-public and the public-public. In this section, we will follow the Bergsonian tradition of "reading the house". Nevertheless, the ideologically loaded context in which we will be reading the house coerces us to focus on the political rather than the poetic. In his pivotal work "Poetics of Space", Bergson suggests that houses are more than just the limits that divide the public and domestic spheres. They can be considered the world itself as he believes that houses are "our first universe, a real cosmos in every sense of the word"[15]. Consequently, transgressing the borders of someone's house, especially without their permission, can automatically be considered a brutal invasion of someone's intimate world.

Historically, the Israeli settlement did not only invade Palestinian houses and took them by force, but they also bombarded and demolished them[16]. In the novel, the grandmother's family house collapsed because of a bombing, and took away all its inhabitants, as she describes it; "the building died, and they (her family) died with it"[17]. Replacing collapsing with dying, which equally refers to both the family and the house, shows that her house was not just a set of soulless bricks, but actually part of her family.

This physical pulverization was added to the allegorical one when all Palestinian houses were disowned and were given to the Jewish people who were arriving from the four quarters of the world. On one hand, and in the fictive tense of this novel, the government's spontaneous response to the disappearance of Palestinians by taking away their houses is a historically and politically anticipated action. On the other, the way Ariel allowed himself into Alaa's house with no permission might be considered the shocking element in the novel. At the beginning of chapter fifteen, it is made clear that Alaa and Ariel "exchanged spare keys (just) in case one of them lost his"[18]. That is, Ariel does not have the right to

enter Alaa's house, let alone go through his personal belongings and make himself at home. However, abusing intimacy and transgressing confidence is actually not unfamiliar to the character of Ariel whose occupation was to read and translate letters that circulate between Palestinians. Thus, entering into a house that is not his own revived the intrusiveness that he tried to hide with the pretext of being steered only by his attempt to understand what happened.

The fact that Ariel could invade Alaa's intimate geopolitical space without any difficulties or problems pushes us to question the efficiency of the aspect of absence as a postcolonial answer back to the settlement. However, the author added rather disturbing elements that cut short Ariel's feelings of easiness during the moments of transgression. Right after opening the door, Ariel was faced with "the (strong) aroma of the cardamom (that) Alaa used to put in his coffee"[19]. Actually, it is possible to find cardamom mentioned in every Palestinian literary work at least once. In his prose poem "Memory for Forgetfulness", Darwīsh refers to this herb as a geographical direction towards a Palestinian house. He says,

> Walk out the door and go left, then turn right. Go twenty meters, then turn left for thirty and take another right. There you'll find a huge chinaberry, a lone tree that will lead you to a small courtyard. Cross it **and follow the aroma of cardamom** to this building's entrance, like a shark chasing the smell of blood.[20]

The intersection between geographical space and smells is also manifested through this novel. Coffee with cardamom is one of the national labels of Palestine. It capsulizes the fragments of the Palestinian identity that the settler tries to eradicate. The fact that Ariel was hit by this smell once he entered proposes that Alaa's display of out-of-placeness does not imply his out-of-spaceness. Despite Alaa's virtual absence, Ariel finds himself still unable to fully occupy his house.

This disturbance becomes even more interesting when a painting hanging on the wall becomes the source of an apparent psychological agitation for Ariel. By adding to the setting of the living room a painting that displays a Palestinian,

Azem aims to intensify the character's distress. In fact, it is not the painting of a Palestinian per se that causes Ariel a sudden perturbation, but it is rather one single part of this genderless person's body; their eyes. Taking this point into consideration, we can assume that this painting is not there only to occupy space but also to watch it, as the unknown omniscient narrator explains; "the veiled person's eyes in the painting on the wall across from him glistened as they gazed at him. It was strange, he thought, that a painting could unsettle him"[21].

In the shades of the magical absence of Alaa from his own apartment and the actual absence of his grandmother, this painting still performs existence and occupancy of the space. This small artistic visual addition to the house's furniture successfully subverts the relations of power between the absent and the present. This hung gaze can also be compared to the most famous gaze in the history of modern literature in Orwell's 1948;

> …the poster with the enormous face gazed from the wall. It was one of those pictures which are so contrived that the eyes follow you about when you move. BIG BROTHER IS WATCHING YOU, the caption beneath it ran.[22]

Without the need for any caption, Azem's painting openly claims that PALESTINIANS ARE WATCHING YOU. This overly present absence calls into question the truthfulness of the Palestinians' disappearance. Hence, to what extent did Palestinians disappear? And did they appear through disappearing? This appearance/(dis)-appearance paradox eludes the reader's enumeration of the magical elements in the novel.

Apart from the unexplained absence from both the city (public) and the houses (private), the novel gives the delusion that it also engages with haunting and ghosts. Previously deserted houses are represented through Alaa's perspective as haunted. He says: "I pass by the old city houses overlooking the sea… Are they haunted? I want to believe that the spirits of those who used to live in them are still there seeking comfort"[23]. A haunted space is by force an occupied space.

Thus, the Palestinian houses, including Alaa's, are not as free as Israelis perceive them. Indeed, the materialistic elements of the Palestinian identity that are highlighted while describing Alaa's apartment are nothing but a few examples among the thousands of things that will be found in other houses. Ghosts of the Palestinian culture will haunt these houses not only through removable furniture, but also through the cement and bricks, and simply through the land on which they are built. In this novel, Alaa's house stands as a metaphor for Palestine. The closure of the text with a passage in which Ariel changed the door lock defines the point where the magical dimension of the novel stops and the realist one begins.

4. The Psychopathology of Everyday Truth

"I didn't shed any tears. Perhaps I had yet to comprehend what had happened. Or maybe I didn't want to believe that she had died"[24].

These were the thoughts running through Alaa's mind after the sudden passing of his grandmother. What first started as the probability of an old demented lady's disappearance culminated in her death in her favorite spot near the Jaffan beach. This pertains to the elusiveness of truth and the fact that matters are never as clear-cut as they seem. The frantic distraught and overwrought behavior of Alaa's mother at the beginning of the novel in reaction to the disappearance of her mother foreshadows the agitation in the Israeli behavioral framework on the social and the political fronts once the sudden realization that all Palestinians have disappeared sets. Nevertheless, what represents an act of worry from the former is actually an act of triumph to the latter.

Truth is also symbolized when it comes to the politics of mention. As previously stated, space is one of the most important pawns when it comes to dominion and the establishment of specific power relations. This means that abolishing names provides space with a new fake identity through the pathological act of renaming. Thus, the way space is altered in the novel, where Palestinian street names become

numerals and Hebrew, showcases the distortion of truth within a colonial setting where representations are made to be biased towards the subjugators. In other words, etymology always favors the ever-changing power structures that make appearance grow into becoming disappearance and eventually changes the truth around mainstream history by making it adhere to pure dogmatism and mere subjective interpretations that feed into Grand Narratives.

When Alaa addresses his grandmother while talking about his manic hysterical great-grandfather he relates: "When you told him he was at home, he accused you of lying"[25]. Lying and equivocating seem to be some of the main themes that Azem focused on in this novel. To put it differently, Alaa's demented great-grandfather can be a metaphor for a shifting and a fleeting discourse that started to squander its authenticity and that eventually and forcefully succumbed to the bias of power relations which results in psychological confusion and physical disorientation when it comes to the concept of home.

In the same vein of etymological lies and dialectal disillusionment that were adopted in order to cover the truth, crimes against humanity committed by the Israeli occupation against the Palestinian colonized are seldom honestly mentioned or scrutinized through the eyes of the media and the press as mentioned in Human Rights Watch's article "A Threshold Crossed - Israeli Authorities and the Crimes of Apartheid and Persecution". The atrocities of murder, genocide, ethnic cleansing, bombings, physical and metaphorical rape, and the expunging of culture, history, and customs are disregarded truths that are only present and persistent within the lived experiences of the sufferers. This out of sight out of mind representation overlooks the colonized people who get their own identities tortured and brainwashed out of them as the excerpt clearly demonstrates: "They threw him out on the street after keeping him in prison for six months. No one knew where he was. He came back a mad man. I don't know what they did to him"[26]. This highlights the fact that for the colonizer, the surest way to achieve complete forgetfulness is to go through mania and madness.

Consequently, the fragmentation and displacement of truth are depicted throughout the novel in the facts that the politics of mention are governed by hegemony which stresses the multiplicity in naming Tel Aviv based on personal and subjective lived experiences, and that, once it was sure that the Palestinians have actually disappeared, there is a battle of dogmatic, heroic, ecstatic, elevated supremacy, and false hope discourses from the part of the Israeli government that claims victory without even being sure of what is really going on. This pertains to what Alaa mentioned in regard to the institutionalized discourses learned in schools in contrast to the subaltern discourses that stem from lived experiences what recalls Ngugi Wa Thiong'o's notion of the cultural bomb in his essay "Decolonizing the Mind".

Through a discourse of Israel's disillusionment of righteousness of it being the "only democracy in the middle east", there is a nod to the White Man's Burden concept that was used as a historical rationalization and justification of imperialism throughout various empires. Through the unfolding of her novel, Azem attests that these discourses of heroism, valor, and prowess are what veils and disregards the truth surrounding the lived experiences of the colonized and how their small narratives are needed in order to fashion an alternative history.

5. Thus Spoke Collective Memory

It is a known fact that individual long-term memory becomes unreliable with passing time. The same can be said for the collective memories of various peoples throughout the ages. As a consequence, when these memories falter, clash, and become subjective, conflicts arise. Therefore, even if shared memory is able to transcend the temporal and spatial circumstances of colonization as seen through Alaa's grandmother, there is an undeniable trickiness and difficulty when it comes to memory and remembrance. In his foreword "Remembering Fanon: Self, Psyche and the Colonial Condition" of Frantz Fanon's book *Black Skin, White Masks*, Homi Bhabha defines this remembrance as being a painful re-membering that

helps the colonized make sense and work through the traumas of the past and the present.

In addition, since the politics of mention and the concealment of etymologies work only through creating deep holes, prolonged gaps, and persistent breaks in the psyche as well as the collective memory of the colonized people, changes in names entirely refashion and alter their identity, belonging, and history. In other words, this memorabilia and nostalgic feelings associated with remembrance have a crucial effect on the collective unconscious of the subjugated. For this, Alaa writes "The images of multitudes of people escaping in terror are always on my mind"[27]. This means that the wars crimes and the past horrors of the Nakba are persistent within the minds and the psyches of the Palestinians no matter how young they are. They are all vividly aware of what has befallen them making the reality of that memory always creeping upon them around every corner.

Regardless of the strong and powerful effect of collective memory despite the abundance of forced altering and misrepresenting discourses, this act of remembering is always associated with pain, suffering, nostalgia, and sadness. In this way, memory becomes synonymous with loss, anguish, and heartache, making it a burden too heavy to carry. This is why Azem shows that dementia is the optimal solution for this arduous and harrowing collective memory.

On another flow of thought, Palestinians started experiencing a clash of civilization as a cause of imperialism, capitalism, and globalization. As a result, collectivist communities became more and more individualistic what created a conflict of generations when it came to the questions of identity and belonging. Consequently, and in order to circumvent this generational gap, music and language were used so as to evoke fond memories of belonging, kinship, and remembrance. This makes writing and memory interconnected and intertwined as practices of resistance by representing the last hope of appearing and being remembered.

Another thing worth mentioning is the presence of Michel Foucault's concept of the strategy of containment, from his book *History of Madness*, in the novel. To elaborate, since memory is forced to become part of the prevailing hegemony and ideological discursive practices of the colonizer forming a lie of whiteness, colonized victims of imprisonment and torture are kept alive in order for them to be able to tell their stories and spread fear, terror, and panic to the other prospect victims who might consider retaliation and resistance. These dreadful war tactics have a lasting impact on the hybrid and ambivalent gray collective memory of the colonized.

6. Conclusion

This novel is a fictional staging of the geopolitical chaos that overbears the Palestinian context. The dispute over who owns space and who holds truth continues even if the narrative time stops. This study has investigated the geopolitical dimension of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict without marginalizing the historical part of it that summons the debate of memory. In fact, this novel does not take remembering only as a theme but it is rather a postcolonial mechanism to answer back to western discourses. It is itself an alternative memory that is refreshed through the use of magical realism. The interplay between disappearance (magical) and appearance (realism) put into question the truthfulness of the space's memory. All throughout the novel, we find an interconnection between absence and presence as there is appearance within the word (dis)-appearance. At a certain level, absence becomes a phenomenal possibility that is challenged by the incorporeal presence. In this way, this novel has successfully recuperated space and memory through the violence of absence.

Endnotes

[1] Either with Anouar Ahmad's *Yafa Makes the Morning Coffee*, Kheiri Aboujenin's *Stories about Jaffa* or Moujahid Mourdawi's *Jaffa's Oranges and Damacus' Jasmine*, Jaffa as a socio-

political space has been always the source of a historical agony for Palestinians. Even with the slight changes in perspectives that separate these texts, as some of the authors prefer to remember the happy side of Jaffa while others choose to focus on how horrendous it has become, these texts like Azem's are all characterized by excessive feelings of nostalgia.

[2] Ibtisām ʿĀzim. *The Book of Disappearance: A Novel*. Translated by Sinān Anṭūn, Syracuse University Press, 2019. p. 17.

[3] Itamar Radai. *Palestinians in Jerusalem and Jaffa, 1948: A Tale of Two Cities*. Routledge, 2017. p. 182.

[4] Ibid. p. 126.

[5] Ibtisām ʿĀzim. *The Book of Disappearance: A Novel*. Translated by Sinān Anṭūn, Syracuse University Press, 2019. p. 66.

[6] Ibid. p. 67.

[7] Ibid. p. 66.

[8] Lawrence D. Berg, Jani Vuolteenaho. *Critical Toponymies: The Contested Politics of Place Naming*. Routledge, 2017.

[9] Ibtisām ʿĀzim. *The Book of Disappearance: A Novel*. Translated by Sinān Anṭūn, Syracuse University Press, 2019. pp. 61-97.

[10] Ibid. p. 59.

[11] Ibid. p. 86.

[12] Ibid. p. 73.

[13] Maggie Ann Bowers. *Magical Realism*. Routledge, 2018. p. 96.

[14] Ibtisām ʿĀzim. *The Book of Disappearance: A Novel*. Translated by Sinān Anṭūn, Syracuse University Press, 2019. p. 143.

[15] Gaston Bachelard. *The Poetics of Space*. Penguin Books, 2014. p. 4.

[16] Itamar Radai. *Palestinians in Jerusalem and Jaffa, 1948: A Tale of Two Cities*. Routledge, 2017. p. 66.

[17] Ibtisām ʿĀzim. *The Book of Disappearance: A Novel*. Translated by Sinān Anṭūn, Syracuse University Press, 2019. p. 14.

[18] Ibid. p. 56.

[19] Ibid. p. 64.

[20] Ibid. p. 72.

[21] Ibid. p. 70.

[22] George Orwell. *1984*. Signet Classic, 1950. p. 3.

[23] Ibtisām ʿĀzim. *The Book of Disappearance: A Novel*. Translated by Sinān Anṭūn, Syracuse University Press, 2019. p. 82.

[24] Ibid. p. 10.

[25] Ibid. p. 19.

[26] Ibid. p. 25.

[27] Ibid. p. 59.

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Towards a Geocultural Vision of Postcolonialism: A Critical Analysis of Mahmood Mamdani's *Neither Settler nor Native: the Making and Unmaking of Permanent Minorities*

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Abstract

The paper relies on the insights of Mahmood Mamdani in his book: Neither Settler nor Native the Making and Unmaking of Permanent Minorities, to explore the geocultural vision on the relations between settlers and natives within different postcolonial states, to name a few, Israel, Sudan, and South Africa. The paper relies on the sources of the Anthropologist Mamdani regarding the postcolonial states and the two culturally different groups within it, to highlight the need for a geocultural vision of postcolonialism. This paper analyses the intercultural relations between settlers and natives. After examining the aforementioned relations, the paper suggests that intercultural dialogues and transcultural awareness and consciousness are needed in order to avoid genocide and violence episodes as described in Mamdani's work.

Key-Concepts: geoculture; postcolonialism; settler/native; intercultural dialogue

1. Introduction

Concepts such as globality, geoculture and transcultural discourse are overshadowed in postcolonial studies. Thus, the main focus of the latter is politics and historical events. Studying the aforementioned concepts is commonly perceived as transcending postcolonial-state-focused analyses. The present chapter aims to examine and analyse Mahmood Mamdani's (2020)[1] work entitled as: Neither Settler nor Native: The Making and Unmaking of Permanent Minorities through Geocultural lenses. According to Guamguami (2021)[2], geoculture refers to a combination of what is cultural and what is geographic via intercultural communication as well as international relations. Here, it highlights how cultural aspects (ideas, rituals, norms and objects) get distributed across geographical spaces. Wallerstein (2011: xvi)[3] defined it as " a set of ideas, values, and norms that were widely accepted throughout the system and that constrained social action therafter." Thus, this concept is essential in Wallerstein's world-system analysis.

This paper uses the concept of geoculture to analyse the socio-cultural relations between settlers and natives within different postcolonial states. Unlike Wallerstein, the paper does not focus on the world-system but on postcolonial state as a geographical space in which cultural aspects get distributed and reconstructed.

Geoculture is comparable to geopolitics and geoeconomics as each term focused on a topic within a global framework (Guamguami, 2021). Little to no published studies was devoted to study post-colonial conflicts and national relations between natives and settlers within postcolonial states using geoculture. The aforementioned concept was widely used by public international and foreign policy makers in transnational discourses and reports, ethnic conflict resolution stakeholders to solve identity, ethnicity, religion and extremism related problems

and conflicts, and by Tink Tank theoreticians and practitioners to manage cross cultural issues between nations and people (Guamguami,2021).

It is of paramount importance to fill in the gap existing in postcolonial studies. Thus, the current study aims to highlight the idea that geoculture fits well with postcolonialism, the study is based on the work of Mamdani (2020) to shed the light on the unescapable connections between members of postcolonial states: majority and minority. This connection requires intercultural dialogue as well as transcultural consciousness that is based on appreciation of difference and a sense of responsibility towards **the Other**. Here, each group (settlers or natives) should deal with their other in the postcolonial binary opposition.

Mahmood Mamdani inaugurates his book by an interesting idea, which is, both modern colonialism and modern state were conceived of the creation of nation state. That is both nationalism and colonialism were co-constructed. Here, Mamdani highlights the process of creating a nation state and to what extent that process was similar to the one of the modern state or post-colonial state.

 Mamdani (2020)[1] seeks to decipher the link between nation-states and the so-called post-colonial modernity. In doing so, he discusses two phases of the nation-state: the non-liberal and the liberal. Historically speaking, the non-liberal nation-sate was born in Liberia in 1492, it was a state project that spotlights on the relations between minorities and majorities within its boundaries. These relations came to the surface thanks to the agenda of non-liberal nation-states that summed up in oneness, which obviously leads to ethnic cleansing and genocide processes specifically of Muslims and Jews. This phase of nation-sates was known of its bloody religious wars (Mamdani,2020).

The liberal side of nation states occurred as a response to aforementioned religious wars. It was originated in the treaty of Westphalia in 1648. According to Mamdani, two key elements were emphasised on, with the born of the liberal nation state, which are: religious tolerance at home and reciprocal guarantee of

sovereignty outside its boundaries. To put it simply, tolerance was considered as the key to put an end to religious wars and terror and to guarantee civil peace within the nation state. Minorities within the nation states were tolerated to the extent that they were viewed as politically loyal and non-threating to the national majority. Here, the liberal notion of the nation state succeeded to formulate permanent political identities for both majority and minority. However, unlike political modernity in Europe, colonial modernity tackled things differently. In colonies oversees, only people, who are seen as civilized, have the right to be tolerated (Mamdani,2020)[1] (see Obregón,2012)[4]. Others, the ones who are culturally different from Christian Europeans, had to be made civilized first before having the right to be tolerated. Thus, only the majority- the civilized- has sovereignty.

The mission of colonizers overseas was creating an avatar of modernity, a nation state, like the one existed in Europe, but ended up with an anamorphosis of it. This mission was entitled as "civilizing mission". Unfortunately, this mission failed, the colonial modernity did not follow the footsteps of the modern states. Instead of liberal tolerance, colonies created a liberal conquest (Mamdani, 2020).

The new colonial method moved from adopting the civilizing mission as direct rule to indirect one. The colonizer imposed its laws, customs, educational practices, language and lifestyle which leads to natives' resistance. The resistance opened the door for a new colonial method which is the indirect rule. The colonizer created different minorities instead of one, "each preserved under the leadership of a native elite. The native elite's power was said to derive from custom, but it was the backing of the colonizer that was their true source of authority" (Mamdani,2020:03).

The differences that took place between religious groups were further expanded into civilizational differences between races and tribes. The previous distinction reminds us of the world of Samuel Huntington that categorized in terms of

religions. Separated into several tribes and races, natives faced and became conscious of new notions of otherness and difference among them. Despite the fact that the focus of Mamdani is political and historical in nature, but the presence of culture and economic motives embodied the colonial as well as post-colonial frameworks. In the same line, Mamdani states that:

> Embracing political modernity means embracing the epistemic condition that Europeans created to distinguish the nation as civilized and thereby justify aggrandizing the nation at the expense of the uncivilized. The substance of this epistemic condition lies in the political subjectivities it affords. How does the subject understand herself? If she understands herself as a member of the nation, she is participating in political modernity. Colonized peoples lacked this subjectivity until Europeans foisted it on them, much as this subjectivity was foisted on Europeans themselves, at least in the early days of the nation-state. p.3

In his book, Mamdani explored the export and the distribution of the notion of different kinds of citizens and people in a given territory, sovereign and non-sovereign, from the United States to South Africa, Nazi Germany and finally to Israel. Mamdani argues that the United States was the initial blueprint in modern colonialism, and its political project was followed by South Africa, Nazi Hitler and Israel.

The present article explores the Geocultural face of postcolonial states and the Geocultural relation among the permanent settlers and natives resulted from it. The present chapter seeks to decode and highlight the cultural relations that existed between the two groups: settlers and natives, as mentioned in the book of Mahmood Mamdani, and to highlight the link between these cultural relations and the need for a Geocultural vision of postcolonialism.

2. American Indians and European Settlers: Geocultural Perspective

2.1. America as the role model in modern colonialism

In the first chapter of his book, Mamdani (2020)[1] tackles the Indian reservation in the US and considers it as a system by which modern colonialism was originated. Mamdani started with comparing two different historical narratives or discourses: one that considers the United States as far from being a colonial power or colony, and another one that considers it guilty of its indigenous people's genocide. He claims that US should rethink its history and start with considering itself as a colonial project at first, and a role model to the other colonial modernity's projects around the globe. The way the US dealt with Indians was copied by Nazis and South Africa later.

2.2.   Otherness: Indians versus African American

Indians are different from African Americans in many ways. Pre-Colombian residents were called and viewed as Indians and not as natives. Here, the Indians were always regarded as aliens. The 1964 civil rights act excluded Indians in reservation, and it was until 1968 act that the Indians were included. However, the two acts are not similar as the 1964 act is constitutionally binding, whereas the 1968 act is only advisory. The idea of two different civil rights acts shows us the born of second-class citizens and third-class citizens (Mamdani, 2020)[1].Here, we can examine the difference and otherness in citizenship.

As mentioned above, the Indians were depicted as aliens, the uncivilised other. We cannot deny that the African Americans at that time were also aliens and others according to the perspective of European settlers. Significantly, Indians were colonized, Africans were dominated racially in terms of labour and slavery. Thus, racial and colonial domination are two different faces. The Indians were dominated colonially to take their lands, which go hand in hand with colonialism that means the conquest of territory and natural resources.

2.3.   Indians and Two-State Solution

The two-state model was embraced not only when dealing with Indians in US, but it was also implemented by Israel when dealing with Palestinians. This two-state model solidified the idea of Mamdani (2020)[1] that America was the source of colonial modernity as the American model was embraced in different colonial projects later. That model leads to the emergence of Indian reservation system and the idea of separating Indians in a state without sovereignty. This is the territorial form of indirect rule. Thus, the European settlers stripped Indians from their lands in order to dominate them as colonized subjects and to minimise the political threats using a customary law. As Mamdani states:

> the formation of the US political community comprised two broad developments. One was the coming together of settlers, both voluntary and forced, from Europe and Africa. The other was the legal designation of Indians as aliens without rights, in spite of their residence in US territory. As Chief Justice John Marshall put it in 1831, Indians belonged not to the American nation but to "domestic dependent nations." This was a recipe for the creation of a permanent internal colony in the homelands. (p. 24).

In the aforementioned quote, Mamdani (2020)[1] indicates that settler is a political identity of both Europeans and Africans who came to US either voluntarily to start a new life and explore a new land and exploit natural resources, or forced as in the case of African Americans. The other permanent political identity was natives or minorities, they are Indians that were excluded from participating in sovereignty.

Nichols (1975)[5] states that the former US president "Lincoln's vision for the West carried with it the implicit doom of the Indians", this vision leads to violence and genocide as well as bloody wars after his death. Quoting from Mamdani's book: "The pale-faced people are numerous and prosperous because they cultivate the earth, produce bread, and . . . depend upon the products of the earth rather than wild game for a subsistence," Lincoln explained. "This is the chief reason of the difference; but there is another. Although we are now engaged in a great war

between one another, we are not, as a race, so much disposed to fight and kill one another as our red brethren." (Nichols (1975 :14-15)[5] in Mamdani (2020)[1]). The difference between settlers and Indians was omnipresent in terms of language, culture, lifestyle and race; however, the difference was a good excuse for settlers to treat the Indians in an inhumane way. But as mentioned in the quote above, Lincoln and Marshal believed that the coexistence between European settlers and Indians was impossible, which paved the way to another excuse for the two states model to take place. A non-sovereign state which belongs to Indians in reservations inside a sovereign state that belongs to the European settlers.

2.4.   Geocultural Aspect of Settlers and Indians 'Relationship

we cannot deny that European settlers and Indians are culturally and socially different, despite the definition of civilization that we have in mind. Mamdani (2020)[1] sheds the light on the cultural assimilation of Indians by European settlers. Here the goal of the settlers was to divest the natives from their cultural practices as well as their tribal identities. They believed that the assimilation was the only reasonable act through which they could help Indians to be more civilized as Europeans.

The history of customary law was full of misguided endeavours to culturally assimilate Native Americans, through policies ranging from the liquidation of communal Indian lands to direct prohibition of traditional languages and religions (Cornell,1988[6]; Pommersheim,1995[7]). The Indians were treated like wards, and were defined as subjects that couldn't govern themselves. In the same connection, Justice Stanley Matthews's majority opinion claimed that Indians were:

"to be subject to the laws of the United States, *not in the sense of citizens,* but as they had always been, *as wards*, subject to a guardian; not as individuals, constituted members of the political community of the United States, with a voice in the selection of representatives, and in the framing of the laws, but *as dependent community who were in a state pf pupillage*, advancing from the condition of a

savage tribe to that of the people who, through the discipline of labor, and by education, it was hoped might become a self-supporting and self-governing society".(Ex parte Crow Dog 1883[8], in Mamdani, 2020:52[1]) (emphasis added by the author)

The aforementioned quote shows the portrayal of American Indians as savage and wards. the portrayal was an excuse to belittle the Indians and legitimise the claim that they need help to be more civilized and become a self-supporting and self-governing society. Unfortunately, the American settlers reneged on their promise as in the case of the five civilized tribes. These tribes were more civilised, according to the Eurocentric criteria, they inhabited permanent communities and they practised agriculture, they adopted many settlers' practices that they found beneficial. These tribes were: *Chicksaw, Choktaw, Creek, Cherokee,* and *Seminole* (Mamdani, 2020).

The promises of self-governing and tribal sovereignty were not kept, no matter how the American Indians embraced the white culture and the ways of civilization, since both Indians and settlers had incompatible goals. Thus, there is no happy ending for all as the catalyst of this civilization mission was the Indians. The civilizing mission was a countersign for legitimizing the ethnic cleansing and genocides of Indians.

As I mentioned earlier, cultural assimilation took place to wash away the Indian culture and the practices of religious practices of Indians, and manifest itself in the prohibition of long hair on men. Bureaucratically, the BIA which is the Bureau of Indian Affairs proclaimed that:

> Any Indian who shall engage in the sun dance, scalp dance, or any other dance, or any other similar feast, so called, shall be deemed guilty of an offense.

> Any Indian who shall engage in the practices of so-called medicine men, or who shall resort to any artifice or device to keep the Indians of the

reservations from adopting and following civilized habits and pursuits, or shall adopt any means to prevent Indians from abandoning their barbarous rites and customs, shall be deemed guilty of an offence.[9]

As mentioned in the aforementioned announcements, the Indians were forced to abandon their spiritual and cultural practices because European settlers considered them as barbarous. Furthermore, Indians' names, the most elementary of cultural signifiers, were prohibited and replaced by English names. The roles such as farmers and ranchers were imposed on Indians in the style of European settlers. These cultural and spiritual practices as well as Indian names are significant in the lives of Indians, they provide them with a sense of belonging and emotional stability.

The Indian children were no exception, they brought together at reservation schools run by settlers or compliant Indians, or they were shipped away from reservations in order to separate them from their families and ingroups. These reservation schools' vision statement was, as Richard Pratt (1892)[10] revealed, the founder of the Carlisle Indian Industrial School, "kill the Indian and save the man"(in Prucha 1973:261[10]). Unfortunately, this vision led to disastrous consequences that can be summarised using Huhndorf's (2001:201)[11] words, "heart-breaking experiences that drove Native children to commit suicide and to run away repeatedly."

These forced cultural appropriation and assimilation practices caused crisis instead of civilization. Because of both subjugation and isolation, Indians lost their sense of life and the rituals as well as the customs that were the building blocks to make sense of who they are and which community they belong to. Their sense of the self and the other became confusing. Taking the conception of Erikson (1968)[12] as a reference, there are two forms of identity: identity and difference. Firstly, identity takes the form of self-differentiation, or self-awareness, and a self of personal continuity. Secondly, difference derives from a

primary relationship between the self and the other which leads to an awareness of one's distinctiveness.

Accordingly, the American Indians lost their "indigenous self" since the settlers' attempt was to kill the Indians on them, and transform them into a so called civilised people. Here, there is no self-continuity, the pre-Colombian self, before the European settlement, was not associated with the self in question. The set of meanings, norms, rituals and cultural as well as religious practices has been replaced by other practices and rituals, that are disconnected from the material circumstances of the tribe.

Mamdani (2020)[1] states that there were substitutes, such as agricultural practices and Christianity, albeit, they were unfamiliar and irrelevant to the emotional and communal needs of Indians. As a response to this spiritual and cultural gap, Indians endeavoured to create some new practices that hearkened back to their old self, such as the Ghost Dance religion that emerged in the 1920s among Indian tribes in reservations. Thus, Ghost Dance brought Indians under single ritual which manifested a sense of unity and collective identity among them (Mamdani, 2020)[1].

Historically speaking, Indians 'conceptualisation of identity had taken a different approach, that is to say, they define identity as a cultural constraint. For them, the identity is not biological or racial but it is cultural. Significantly, cultural identity refers to those social identities that are based on cultural membership, cultural identity means identifying oneself with and accepting a larger cultural group, into which we socialise and share a system of symbols, traditions and values (Liu et al. ,2015)[13]. In the same vein, Ting-Toomey (2005)[14] points out that cultural identity involves the emotional significance that is related to the sense of belonging to a given culture or a cultural group.

The conception of cultural identity adopted by Indians seems broader, and unlike the settlers, it is not subject to visible racial traits. Therefore, there were examples

of Indian tribes adopted "captured whites" and members of other Indian tribes. The outsiders were considered as members of the in-group and they share the same cultural identity.

The idea of cultural identity did not please the settlers. For this reason, they enacted laws that withdraw from the Indians the right to establish memberships, in accordance to their conception of cultural identity. The law defined membership according to blood quantum and replaced matrilineal descent by a patrilineal descent. The law aimed to minimise the groups of Indians and make the blood as a legal marker of Indian identity. These attempts minoritize the Indians and stick to them a permanent minority identity that become their future sense of self. Hence, the colonial settlement transformed the Indian self from an Indian cultural identity to a minority racial identity.

3. Understanding Native and Settlers: Apartheid South Africa

Mamdani (2020)[1] sheds the light on natives and settlers as political identities. He discussed the partial success of South Africa in destroying native and settler identities and creating a new one which is a survivor identity. Mamdani (2020)[1] defines them using a dichotomous discourse, he states that a settler cannot be a native, and the native is the creation of the settler. He added that "the native is the settler's invented other: the settler claimed not only to be defined by history but be its marker, but at the same time stigmatizing the native as an unthinking captive of unchanging custom and a product of geography. My conclusion was that settler and native are joined; neither can exist in isolation. Should you destroy one, the other would cease to exist." (p.144).

According to Mamdani(2020)[1], the South African experience was fruitful at the end, unlike the failed logic of Nuremberg and its Denazification. It did not respond to the extreme violence emerged from the conflicts between settlers and natives, by separating perpetrators from victims. Instead, it highlighted the issues that led

to violence and the needs of survivors. the South African recognised the settlers and natives' identities as political and historical ones, hence, changeable.

The imposed differences of race such as being African, Coloured, Indian, and white were overcome in order to destroy apartheid. Afrikaners also become part of the movement against it. Here, we can observe the building of a collective consciousness that accept all the differences that put them against each other and decolonize laws so that they can be treated as equals.

The decolonizing process took place through breaking down the colonial distinctions between settlers and natives, and opening the doors for everyone to participate in the same political community, with settlers reconfigured as immigrants. Mamdani claims that what defined the settler was not their race, language and culture, but the law to which he was subject. This law, according to Mamdani (2020)[1], is named as civil law. Nonetheless, political systems, including laws, are cultural institutions. As Bourdieu (1977)[15] stated that the culture is shaped according to its dominant economic and political system. Thus, each economic as well as political system imposes its culture. On the other hand, Dodd (1998)[16] states that the outer layer of culture constitutes of several institutions and systems including religious, economic and political systems. These systems are products of culture. Both Bourdieu and Dodd agreed on the idea that there is a relationship between culture and the aforementioned systems, the question is which one is the product of the other. These cultural institutions played a major role in the transformation and the development of economic and political systems.

In the same token, Sun (2017:2)[17] stated that: "Culture refers to the consciousness about life and social relations in economic and political activities in a society, including values, social consciousness and morality. Economic and political practices are the basis and container of culture, while thoughts about and understanding of economic and political practices are the main content of culture. It is difficult to build a culture in isolation of social reality. Culture has its own

particularity and will evolve with economic and political practices." In the light of this definition of culture, culture shape the economic and political systems, but there is an interplay between them.

I believe that the enactment of laws is related to and part of culture, they are interrelated, so it is extremely hard to claim which one came first. The civil war in South Africa and the customary law in the United States created natives-settlers relationship and bloody ethnic cleansing as well as civil wars. In South Africa, race was considered as a political identity. Africans were put in the lowest position in the racial hierarchy, which is legitimised by a dominant culture of settlers. The political and intercultural conflict over territory and political power led to a discriminatory discourse over race and racial differences.

During the Apartheid period, South Africans were divided in terms of race. Mamdani (2020) found that this racial division is similar to what happened to American settlers and American Indians, and to Jewish and German after the Holocaust. The same process happened with the American settlers and American Indians Jewish and Germans. Racial groups were forced to live in segregated areas (NTULI,2012)[18]. These racial separations remind us of the two-state model: A sovereign state and a non-sovereign state belonged to natives, this model created new cultural differences that were added to the previous ones between natives and settlers. To put it differently, the separation means that each group will create another culture, different from the culture that they had before colonialism, that go hand in hand with their new political identity. Additionally, each group will construct an evil image about the other group.

Due to the segregation prior to 1994, Africans were free to go anywhere they liked and socialise with South African settlers, they had limited level of cultural knowledge about the other group, the same for settlers. The difference in social and economic classes and backgrounds made the gap between the two groups

grew wider. Additionally, Natives had to learn and speak the languages of the settlers, which solidified their superiority. (NTULI,2012)[18].

This social and economic hierarchy "creates a 'power matrix' where different knowledge systems intersect, interact and compete. It is at this point of intersection that political dimension of interaction arises and power imbalances result" (Bradfield,2019:6)[19]. In the same vein, Grosfoguel (2007)[20] acknowledges that these knowledge systems not only reinforced through political and educational systems, but also through everyday interactions. Thus, the day-to-day socialisation and interactions guide and assist the spread and the legitimisation of post-colonial differences between settlers and natives, these differences became part of their reality and their sense-making process of their position in the post-colonial state. Edward Said (1979:12)[21] also accentuated that colonialism is significant in the distribution of 'geopolitical awareness into aesthetic, scholarly, economic, sociological, historical, and philological texts. These texts construct a consciousness of hierarchical differences that become a reference of everyday life practices of citizens.

4. Sudan: Tribal Sovereignty and Post-colonial Others

Mamdani tackles (2020)[1] the problem of Two Sudans in the post-colonial era: the Republic of Sudan, which its capital is Khartoum, and the Republic of South Sudan, which its capital is Juba. This separation is a result of the civil war, the South Sudan obtained its independence in 2011, whereas the new state, the South, has been witnessing conflicts between ethnic groups.

Mamdani (2020)[1] tried in this chapter to historize the intercultural conflicts between tribes in South Africa. The tribes, Dinka and Nuer, were not rivals before colonialism, instead, they were fighting to gain back their own new state. However, things changed with the colonial modernity, the British, in the early twentieth century, politicized ethnic boundaries and reconstructed cultural differences as tribal differences. Mamdani (2020)[1] commented on this issue

stating that the "inheritors of the colonial mentality govern as the British did, not as their ancestors did." (p.196). Here, the Sudanese experienced a cultural and ethnic consciousness split, they adopted the British vision and start connecting to a given homeland with its traditional authority and its customary law.

The territory of what is now inhabited by "two Sudans" witnessed impressive cultural diversity for at least half of a millennium, but lately this diversity has been a source of tribal and intercultural conflict. Here, the British colonists tribalized Sudan, they created legal and physical boundaries between the tribes. These tribes that coexisted prior to colonialism despite their cultural differences. These actions were done so as to prevent the colonized from collaborating and developing solidarities between tribes.

Sudan's several groups were conscious of their cultural differences in terms of religion, languages, agricultural practices, ways of life and political vision. The British took advantage of these differences and turned them into boundaries of authority and sovereignty, and they decided what political power that authority would take control of (Mamdani,2020).

The project, which highlights the lines of indirect rule of the colonialists, separated the Arabs from other groups through underlining the linguistic differences, and it separated the other cultural groups through ethnic differences. The north that was inhabited by the Arabs was more civilized and was the center of power, which left the South with no sovereignty. Thus, the South was further subdivided into several tribes at the level of territory (Mamdani, 2020).

This project put Arabs against Africans and African tribes against each other. Unlike the aforementioned relationships between settlers and natives in America and South Africa, the Sudan's settler "against whom the native was opposed was not the colonizer; the British did not attempt settlement of the territory. Instead, the settler was the Arabic speaker in the North, whom the British understood to be an immigrant presence" (Mamdani, 2020:198). The creation of settlers in this

case required no actual settlers. This project imposed settler identity on Arabs and the native identity on African groups.

The Arabs embraced this settler-native dichotomy and maintained it after independence. They took advantage of the superiority that settler identity possesses. Influential thinkers and politicians position themselves as Arabs sought to define Sudan as an Arab nation, and Africans as inferior and uncivilized. In the same line, Ruay (1994:15)[22] states that:" There is an exceptionally strong urge for Arabism among the Northern Sudanese people; everybody wants to be an Arab." The Arabs highlighted the lines of the false history written by British, and choose to reconstruct their identity by distinguishing themselves as immigrants. This positioning solidifies the migration-centric discourse that assumes that meaningful change came with immigrants.

Identity ambiguity of Sudanese's different ethnic groups was due to changes in the self-recognition, along with the false history and the emerging of settler political identity discussed thoroughly by Mamdani (2020). In the same vein, Prunier (2005:77)[23] tackled the issue of the Arabization process and the self-recognition of Northern Sudanese. He states that: "For the 'Arabs' at least, they are not completely sure of what and who they are. In the Sudan they are 'Arabs', but in the Arab world they are seen as mongrels who hardly deserve that name. They desperately stive for recognition of their 'Arab' status by other Arabs, who tend to look down on them-even using them the dreaded name of *abd* (slave) that they use for those more black than they are."

The diversity of ethnic and cultural groups that emphasised Sudan in the past became a curse in the post-colonial era. Thus, the categorisation of Sudanese, coupled with the imposition of Arabism and Islam on African or Southern Sudanese, has led to a national identity crisis (Madibbo,2012)[24]. This identity crisis expedited the emergence of armed conflicts, markedly, the civil war between the North and the south as well as the conflict in the Sudan's Western

province of Darfur. Significantly, the Darfur's conflict was described as the first genocide of the 21st century (Madibbo,2012)[24].

This identity crisis can be viewed from two different perspectives. First, the essentialist perspective to identity accentuates the reason why, in some cases, the identity differences were the source of conflict arousal (Madibbo,2012)[24]. Second, the instrumentalist perspective to identity encapsulates the strong association between marginalization and conflicts, which means that, the marginalised groups or minorities, the indigenous people, opted for political violence as genocide to show their discontent with inequality (Nordas, 2008[25] in Madibbo, 2012[24]).

As Mamdani (2020) suggests in his book, Both Sudans should rethink the way they view themselves by washing away the falsified British portrayals of themselves and the others. They, as Sudanese, must appreciate their linguistic, cultural, and ethnic specificities, but they should also appreciate and tolerate the differences. Having a goal-oriented conflict over authority and recognition, they should first embrace a flexible mindset that emphasises new conceptions of Sudanese identities as being multiple, changeable, and fluid. The identity formation and transformation of Sudanese people had undergone several processes starting from colonialism to the emergence of a postcolonial state. These processes paved the way to the creation of settlers-native political identity. By deconstructing the dichotomous discourses that construct Sudanese identities, and unmaking permanent post-colonial settlers and natives, Sudan will adopt easily a multi-cultural model that cherish shared civic identity; no second-class citizens, and put the inclusion of permanent minorities in public sphere and institutions.

5. The Israel Palestine Problem: A Settler-Native Conflict

Mamdani (2020)[1] spots the light on the Isreal/ Palestine Question. He asserts that" Zionism arguably is the most perfected expression of European Political modernity in a colonial context" (p.250). He sheds the light on the differences

between South Africa that challenged the process of translating cultural differences into political ones, and the cultural identity into a political one, and Zionism that embraced this process. Accordingly, Zionism associated being a Jewish with being part of a nation. they linked the Jewish nation to Israel state. To wit, the vision of Zionism goes hand in hand with the doctrine of political modernity originated from Europe.

Zionism is a product of both oppression and enactment of European modernity. The nationalism that excluded Jewish from Europe as unwanted minorities, was a goal for Zionists later as they decided to have a state for their own. Zionist created their own nation-state, and they chose to be the oppressor and the nation, whereas the Palestinian were deemed to be oppressed, minority, and the other. The Jews are considered automatically a citizen of Israel, while the non-Jewish, who inhabited the land before the formation of Israel, cannot obtain the citizenship easily (Mamdani, 2020)[1].

The sweep of otherness does not affect the non-Jewish but also some Jewish groups. To put it differently, the acceptable from of Jewishness is Ashkenazim, who were the founders of the state. They considered themselves as more civilized, and they opted for civilizing the Mizrahim, Arab Jews. The Mizrahim were the second other for Ashkenazim. The former could not swallow the combination of being Jewish and Arab at the same time. Linguistic and cultural differences between the two Jewish groups let the fear washed over the Zionism and Israel state. Zionists were afraid that cultural similarities between Arab jews and non-jews and the possibility of a fruitful intercultural dialogue between the two, will hinder the settlement process (Mamdani, 2020)[1].

As a response to this issue, the jews were subject to a civilizing mission, the same as American Indian one, they were de-Arabized. Here, the vision of Zionist is crystal clear, the cultural assimilation and the suppression of the Arabic language shows the absence of diversity and the focus on making non-Jewish minorities.

The story of Israel and Palestine's intractable political conflict began with the immigration of Jewish to Palestine. The Jewish **immigrants** presupposed that they are the natives of the Palestinian land because it is their home-land. Mamdani (2020)[1] retells the historical process of Israel formation, and he highlights the transformation of Jews from immigrants to settlers, and the conflicts that arose with the increasing number of settlements in the Palestinian lands. The natives have not accepted the Zionist project, and chose to fight for their rights and lands.

Similar to the colonial experience that was tackled throughout the present chapter, the Israeli /Palestinian experience is no exception. The Zionist project, which has been implemented by European Jews and the British Empire, is a colonial project that created permanent settlers and natives. Despite the claim that Jews are also natives, which makes them settlers who considered themselves as natives. In a similar vein, Mamdani (2020:266)[1] stated that "Israeli Jews may be considered returning natives, even if their return comes after two millennia. But if Jews are returning natives, Palestinians are natives who never left, who can trace their link to the land for the same two millennia, if not longer".

The returning natives reconstruct an identity that the land is its core component. They transform the identity they had when they were minorities in other nations into a religious and Israeli national identity. Their desire to have a state and nation for their own made them ignore the present of the natives who never left, which are the Palestinian, they believed that they inhabited their land, "a virgin land". In doing so, they followed the footstep of colonial project and the tenets of the emergence of a modern state.

The conflict between Israel and Palestine is not only a political dispute over territory. It is an intercultural one. The acculturation of Arab Jews solidifies the representation of Arabs in the mind of Zionists. The fact that Arab Jews and Palestinians were bearers of the Arab culture was scary for European Jews. In their mind, having cultural and linguistic similarities between the two may lead to

intercultural dialogue and tolerance. Thus, they have to deal with two others (Mamdani, 2020)[1].

Structurally speaking, the Arab and Jews were perceived as binary according to the Zionist dichotomous discourse. This "strategic essentialism" was highlighted by Shohat's (1999[26], in Shenhav&Hever,2012[27]) essay "Reflections of An Arab Jew". She asserts that her grandmother learnt in Israel to refer to the Jews using "we" and to refer to the Arabs as "they". Consequently, the"Arab Jews" is contradictory, it is an axymore (Shenhav&Hever,2012)[27]. As I mentioned earlier, the de-Arabization of Jews took place as a stage of strategic essentialism. The two others should not be mixed, they should have two different identities despite the cultural and linguistic closeness. In the same line, Behar (2021)[28], following in the footsteps of activist authors as Abraham Serfati, Ilan Halevi, Abbas Shiblak, and Ella Habiba Shohat, he established the collective signifier "Arab Jews" using a three-fold justification, which are as follows:

1. " "Arab" is a linguistic and cultural marker rather than a racial or religious one.
2. Pre-1950s Jews within the Ottoman and Arab Middle East have participated fully in the production and consumption of Arab culture.
3. Distinctions in the Middle East were commonly drawn internally between "Jews," "Muslims," "Christians," etc., rather than between "Jews" and "Arabs." "(Trailblazers section, 7th paragraph).

Yet, this conception of Arab Jews was unconvincing for European Jews. The process of identity transformation and the erasure of Arabic heritage took place through school systems and army, and by separating Arabs from Arab Jews in different towns (Nurieli,2006)[29].

The conceptions of otherness among Israelis sheds the light on the Geocultural aspect of colonial project and postcolonial states. The others for Israelis are Arabs, Palestinians, because they accepted the widely used term "European Jews". Here,

we can say that Israelis, despite the differences of religion and faith with both the Europeans and Arabs, they chose to accept and embrace the European Identity as mixed with" being a Jew". Remarkably, the colonial mentality and Eurocentricity influenced the consciousness of not only the Israelis, but also indigenous and non-indigenous group in postcolonial states, which led to a geocultural consciousness split.

What I mean by a geocultural consciousness split is the non-continuity of the process of awareness of and reflecting on what is cultural, either one's own culture or others' cultures, that get distributed across the postcolonial state. This non-continuity is due to the transformation of cultural consciousness, the construction of new identities (settler-native, minority-majority), and the acculturation processes and the dominance of colonial culture.

6. Conclusion

In the present paper, I analysed and highlighted the intercultural aspects used in Mahmood Mamdani's (2020)[1] book: Neither Settler nor Native: The Making and Unmaking of Permanent Minorities, in order to underline the need of a geocultural vision on postcolonialism studies. The assembly of the three concepts will enable us to decolonise the colonial-oriented discourses and destroy the binary oppositions that based on marginalising the alterity and constructing permanent identities.

Mamdani calls for decolonizing the political which means erasing the majority and minority identities that define the tenets of the nation state. Mamdani succeed to historize these identities, which shows that they are products of power rather than nature. Nonetheless, A geocultural analysis is needed to investigate the distribution of culture, identity and cultural institutions in the postcolonial state, and the possibility of establishing an intercultural or cross-cultural communicative strategy that fit all the cases mentioned in the paper, otherwise

each case will need its own strategy that will go hand in hand with the specificity of the history andthe current events of each post-colonial state.

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IV. The Geo-trio: Crossing Boundaries between Economics, Politics, and Culture

Prologue

Economic, political, and cultural factors have historically shaped a geo-dynamic continuum in the global international relations. The world economic-institutional agreements and cooperation have steadily created transforming ties and trends between countries. The market capitalization has provoked concerns like geo-equity, the global economic fairness between, across, within countries.

Politically, geo-politics focuses on the spatial dynamics between the world's (especially great) State powers. The issue of geo-equity is highly sought; while very few polities dominate the world governance, many others are marginalized. This is why world populism index increased due to such geo-dynamics.

Culturally, the effects of economic and political geo-dynamics are mainly cultural. Geoculture is, hence, an essential part of these world-systems – economics and politics. The three-layer arena acquires a symbolic order to approach the current world cultural hallmarks.

Tahseen and Tugba's paper studies the geo-cultural and political dialogue between Turkey and Pakistan. The co-authors argue that the soft-power diplomacy is an effective pathway to reinforce the Turkey-Pakistani multi-dimensional ties.

Belabdi scrutinizes the global market domination from a linguistic and socio-cultural soft power lens. Belabdi examines qualitatively how ads figures carry geocultural variables whose transcreation techniques touch upon features of geo-economics, geo-poltics, and geo-culture, all of which shape the word order.

Ejjebli analyzes bibliometrically the geo-politics research in the period of 2021-2022. Ejjebli focuses on the international publications to sustain her literature analysis and to deepen the enquiry in the field of geopolitical research and practice.

Geo-cultural and Political Dialogue between Pakistan and Turkey: Resetting the Diplomatic Pace for 'Soft Power' Regional and Global Imagery in a Changing World

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Abstract

This paper focuses on highlighting the discourse of geo- culture and how the discourse is shaped, defined, and structured in the new global age. The discussion rests with the background of culture and diplomacy and the debate surrounding the concept of soft power. The redefinition preeminently entails to explore the dynamics of softer side of diplomatic conduct and how political dialogue, negotiations, parlays, and diplomatic communication reinforces the process of cultural diplomacy? Therefore, the motivation of this paper is to link the notion of soft power to diplomacy in the contemporary case studies of Pakistan and Turkey. It aims to explore the new dimensions and pathways in outlining policies and perspectives taken by Turkey and Pakistan; in view to address some extremely challenging questions vis-à-vis regional and global political and geo-cultural reality.

Keywords: Geo-culture; Pakistan; Turkey; soft power

1. Introduction

Recent years have shown some landmarks developments from South Asia to South-Pacific, from the Mediterranean to Persian Gulf. The nature and extent of the political, social, and economic impact of these events have called for re-thinking policy and diplomatic partakes. In such a situation the way in which states redefine their interests, objectives and priorities will be a key factor in understanding the newly changing Geo-Culture/s of States. To begin our discussion of what constitutes this change, we will have to seek to define, reconfigure and re-interpret the discussion on Geo-Culture/s.

In the background to understand geo-culture; we can associate the concept with the field of Political Science and especially the branch dealing with Political Geography. The combination of Politics and Geography synthesise to form a branch of studies, focussing on the issues of land, boundaries, borders, frontiers and how politics can change the dynamic of these borders and frontiers. It can also connote to politics of power and culture, realised to form blocs, alliances, lobbies, interest groups and even proxies. The understanding of the term geo-culture can have a very wide interpretation so far as cultural, political, economic, and socio-cultural and socio-political imagination is concerned.

If we were to observe it from the point of view in terms of remaking of borders, the independence of the Indian subcontinent from the British Colonial legacy (because of the fall of the British Empire) in the mid twentieth century; followed by the creation of two independent states of India and Pakistan; comes to mind as a case in point. Similarly, the creation of Palestine and Israel in 1948, the independence of East Pakistan (present day Bangladesh) in 1971; the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 are some other examples. The events following the end of the first world war; Emergence of Turkey as modern Republic and the end of the second world war followed by the cold war as well as the successionists

wars in the former Yugoslavia; including the creation of Baltic states because of the breakup of the Soviet Empire serves as best examples of an inexorably connected yet intricate relationship between culminations of conflicts, border making and formations. It is meanwhile important to note that Political borders share an irreversible relationship with consequences of wars, conflicts, and disputes at the regional and international level.

2. Geo-culture crosscurrents of Culture and Politics: Reference to Pakistan

2.1. A brief glance of Culture and Politics- Case of Pakistan in South Asian perspective

The partition of the Indo-Pak sub-continent had been one of the worst episodes of the genocide where about more than 20 to 30 million people were in exodus criss-crossing borders and lands across both India and Pakistan. But it is a fact that people, cultures and civilizations can come under heavy odds of history even though with the background and experience spanning over hundreds of years in fact centuries of mutual co-existence. Chapters from the times of partition have uncovered one of the ghastlier episodes among communities living in South Asia and particularly in India and Pakistan.Many instances of the partition tragedy have been a point of interest for many scholars who have tackled this issue with great length. As if the partition legacy of terrible and horrid episodes of violence, was not enough; there followed a repeated occurrences of riots in India based on the Hindu-Muslim schism.The question of the Muslim minorities in India could not be resolved and to date it has worsened followed by the policies of the ruling BJP or Bharatiya Janata Party in India.

The Muslims were one nation until the end of the Mughal rule in India and it is in fact that theMuslim history after the fall of the Mughal empire reflected their

complete ghettoization andthe loss of the nation status as such, the wounds of which were apparent at the advent of theBritish rule when the East India company was established in the seventeenth century, littlethat the world would know that the British aimed from commerce to the conquest of India.The fall of the Mughal Empire, consecutive with the diminishing power of the Turkish empire and the eventual drawdown and the end of the Turkish Caliphate, relegated the Muslims to lower status in social, economic and political domains. The marks of which were felt later and in fact became a triggering point towards the idea of Pakistan. The last Mughal emperor Bahadur Shah Zafar was banished opening flood gates of the British onslaught, followed by a series of events culminating to the final separation of the two countries in 1947.[1]

In case of Pakistan, the post-independence political and social scenario was full of problems; solutions of which were no easier. But during a long-drawn struggle against the demand of a separate Muslim state and the freedom struggle that spanned over centuries, the expectations of the people of the newly formed republics were high. In this situation, the lack of a suitable political, social, and economic infrastructure, combined with the myriad number of problems in terms of facilitating the refugees coming from India; their housing, employment, food, shelter, and sanitation became a crucial issue. Given the complex nature of the situation, the young state of Pakistan had to deal with enormous pressures and challenges in a wider variety of areas. The role of the leadership also played a great factor, as far as promising the future. The fact that Mohd Ali Jinnah; the founder of Pakistan had died in the immediate after years of the formation of Pakistan, combined with questions of who should take over his mantle became a question mark, answers to which were not easy.

Over successive years, Pakistan emerged on the map of the world as a young Muslim state, although with myriad issues and challenges. It has been a long walk from 1947 to 2021 down the course of history and with all along the years

for a country whose borders with its neighbouring state of India remain conflictual even until today. The British empires hastily decision to merge political boundaries in a disarray with the Boundary Commission under lord Redcliff that divided the princely state of Kashmir without arbitration between the two countries remains a thorn in the neck of South Asian politics.

Apart from Kashmir, India gulped major Muslim majority States like Hyderabad and Junagarh under illegal annexation and against the spirit of the Partition Act of 1947[2]; under which it was decided that Muslim majority States will be part of Pakistan and Hindu majority States be part of India.

In years passed by, for the young state of Pakistan, impediments for the smooth functioning of democracy have been impacted by institutional factors including the factor of institutional balance between the civil and military bureaucracy; the balance between the *civil versus military* is historically in the favour of military and the non-elected institutions have as a result been dominant. Ayesha Siddiqua in her book the 'Military Incorporated: Inside Pakistan's Military Economy'[3] has talked in length about this issue. Similarly, Ayesha Jalal has taken an extensive survey of democratic evolution in Pakistan through her book 'Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia: A Comparative and Historical Perspective'[4]. The book discusses the transition from military to democratic rule in Pakistan which has thus been a painstakingly long journey with jolts and bumps; taking a considerable time and in the course have proved decisive for the social, political, and economic stability of the country. In terms of Pakistan, one could say that the smooth transfer of power from one elected government since 2013 to present electoral process justifies this. The fact that the electoral activity itself is a healthy undertaking on the part of fragile democracies as in the case of Pakistan refers to this claim. Yet only the conclusion of the electoral process is not the yardstick for a democratically sound and stable polity in the long run. There must be a check and balance of institutions guaranteeing

smooth transfer of power, parliamentary democratic traditions to spill over, institutional strengthening, justice and rule of law, transparency, rights, and freedom of speech, guarantee to minorities, marginalized and effective distribution of resources for the general wellbeing of democracy.

Yet, in the vastly changing South Asian region, commensurating with the change of political landscape in Afghanistan following by the takeover by the Taliban, new geographical and strategic thinking requires actors to adopt new pace of strategies forremaking of geopolitical and economic agenda. In such a scenario, Pakistan, like other actors in the region including China, Iran, Russia, and India is recalibrating its role. Pakistan is not only proactive on many fronts; It is also diplomaticallyfound a level playing field in terms of convincing the international community to highlight the issue of Human rights violation in Kashmir perpetrated by India, but it has also addressed domestic terrorism issues with increased sensibility and maturity. On the issue of Afghanistan, Pakistan is fencing the Pak-Afghan border. It remains a credible actor in the Afghan peace process and has tried to mediate the Afghan peace talks with renewed diplomatic efficiency and finesse. It has also tried to extend diplomatic support regionally to small states in South Asia like Bangladesh and Nepal including Maldives, Sri Lanka,and Bhutan. It has also tried to exert its clout on the re- settlement of dispute between Iran and Saudi- Arabiaalong with managing very tactfully the balance between the US and China. In the Organization of Islamic States (OIC), Pakistan's stance of Kashmir has been much successful, In the United Nations Human Rights Commission (UNHRC), Pakistan got much leverage as a state promoting values of rights and democracy in Kashmir and Pakistan's version of India's atrocities in Kashmir was adopted by the UNHRC eventually. Furthermore, Pakistan and Turkey Relations have in the recent years seen an upward trajectory, corresponding to a variety of MOU's

and agreements to enhance cultural, regional, bilateral, and multilateral cooperation.

2.2. New realities of the South Asian region

Post Trumpian world has witnessed a back-on-back approach to address reversal of policies with the US discarding the Trump approach towards isolationism in many domains from climate change to Muslim ban to US troop stationing in Afghanistan. In terms of South Asia, which circles dominantly in the US containment of China, India, Pakistan axis remains at the core. Pakistan also comes as priory state in terms of geo-strategic and geopolitical challenges US faces in context to China, India, as well as Afghanistan. Pakistan's clout in Afghanistan is recognized by the US reliance on Pakistan as an actor which can be relied for facilitating talks for the larger peace and reconciliation in Afghanistan. Seen from this perspective, there is an overall sense that Pakistan's history and its geography and the challenges to its security are much clearer today than in the past. This is particularly relevant when one takes into account the scenario developed in the post Biden Presidency period. Comprehensively, most of the members of the Biden team are composed of Obama Administration's members who have had a thoroughknowledge and background of dealing with Pakistan.[5]

With the rising Chinese influence in the South Asian neighbourhood, Chinese advances into the Indian Aksai Chin zone, China's credibility is rising in the South Asian States like Bangladesh, Nepal and Bhutan who fear Indian influence in their territory, as well as the currentcoup in Burma, Myanmar, it will be very interesting how Biden administration decides to revive its engagement in South Asia. Furthermore, with the farmer's movement in India, the Citizenship Amendment Act as well as the Indian annexation of Kashmir emerging as the two very central points of reference against the democratic credibility of the Indian government, it will be worth- while to observe how the

US Foreign policy tackles the question of Modi's fascist India with its failure to cope both internally and externally remains very tough questions for US to address. India's abrogation of Article 370 and 35 A in Kashmir also manifests a clear breach of its constitution to that end. On 5th August India belligerently took over the disputed and autonomous region of Kashmir stripping off its autonomy by merging with the Union Territory. The legal fraternity in India called it extra constitutional, fraudulent, and illegalbarring the Jammu and Kashmir Assembly rather making it entirely dysfunctional and abrogating it all together. India deployed 900,000 troops, one of the largest deployments of its military contingents ever in Kashmir, blocked and banned all communication links, incarcerated, and detained the political leadership of Kashmir, imposed unlimited curfew, curbed the basic human rights of millions of people in Kashmir by making it one of the largest human prisons of the world. At its worst schools, colleges, universities, and all seats of learning were closed, hospitals recording extreme emergency with severe limitations of medical supplies, maternity wards having almost absent mid nurses. Casualty wards having next to zero rescue staff. The world watched the most hapless scenes of how one of the biggest democracies kept its population hostage. Moreover, the adoption of the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA), which is called "discriminatory citizenship law," and the "aggressive" suppression of the anti-CAA protests that followed called the attention of the rights group vociferously[6]. The Indian intransigence and continued atrocities against the Kashmiri Muslims, depriving its minorities the right to national self-determination is a serious case in point. Something that which India has vociferously denied even in international forums like the United Nations.The fact that India itself went to the UN in the face of its defeat in Kashmir. With the Kashmir issue having internationalised, India continually denied Kashmiris to exercise right of national self -determination and it remains the fact that it deployed thousands of its armed forces in the region and later imposed one of

the most regressive acts, Armed Forces Special Power Act (AFSPA) to curtail the rights and freedom of the people of Kashmir. The Jammu and Kashmir conflict thus occupies a centre stage when it comes to the context of violations of human rights.

Retrospectively, the International community remained quite indifferent to the plight of the Kashmiris even though the United Nations Secretary General Antonio Guterres proclaimed the emergency to resolve the issue and later the Organization of the Islamic Conference, The OIC categorically called for an international response to the Kashmir issue, authenticating Pakistan's position.

In a changing international scenario, it is incumbent to reflect upon Pakistan and its proactive role on many fronts. On the regional level, Pakistan is contributing to peace and stability by promoting dialogue with its neighbours, convincing the international community that it remains dedicated to resolve peacefully all outstanding issues; including the issue of Jammu and Kashmir with India. Pakistan has also remained steadfast in its attempts to highlight the issue of human rights violation in Kashmir perpetrated by India. It has also successfully maintained a proactive role in mediating the peace process in Afghanistan, maintaining its commitment to ensure a multi -level peace agreement between all stake holders in Afghanistan.

Pakistan's clout in Afghanistan is recognized by the US reliance on Pakistan as an actor which can be relied for facilitating talks for the larger peace and reconciliation in Afghanistan. The Biden administration is cognizant of Pakistan's history and its geography and the challenges to its security in a much clearer sense, quite differently from the Trump administration and recognizes Pakistan credibility in the Afghan peace process.

Pakistan also remains committed to peaceful relations with its South Asian neighbours; it has not only reiterated cooperation but also revitalized its

diplomatic support regionally to Bangladesh and Nepal including Maldives, Sri Lanka, and Bhutan. Recently, it has also tried to exert its clout on the pacification of Iran Saudi- Arabia bilateral relationship. Furthermore, the ambit of Turkish- Pakistan bilateral relationship is growing faster than ever before. Turkey's support to Kashmir cause has rendered immense clout to Pakistan's position on the global front towards Kashmir.

In the Organization of Islamic State Ministerial meeting held in February2021, Pakistan's position on Kashmir has been much accepted with a resolution passed advocating Pakistan's stance on Kashmir which believes in the right of national self- determination for Kashmiris. In December 2020, The United Nations General Assembly approved the Pakistan sponsored resolution that reaffirms the right to self-determination for people subjected to colonial occupation, reaffirming Pakistan's legal case in support to the people of Kashmir. The High Commission for Human Rights UNHCHR, had issued a report in 2009 that categorically condemned the abuses of human rights by India in the Indian administered Kashmir, which was a diplomatic win for Pakistan. Under the above given realities, it is highly timely and topical to discuss the dynamics of new trajectories of developments that are shaping the geo-cultural realities impacting Pakistan and the tremendous influence and changes those new developments are unravelling in our times. Therefore, there is an urgent need to uncover the vicissitudes of options, challenges, and opportunities in this vein.

3. Global trends and Pakistan: A Wholistic Paradigm

3.1.   Media and Culture

In a cultural context, the social mainstreaming through electronic and digital media like Facebook, Twitter, Instagram play are very crucial role in generating support and mobilization for issues. In Pakistan for instance, platforms like

YouTube, Facebook and Twitter have become mass-based with millions of followers belonging from 16 to35 years mostly youth. Pakistan's population boom of youth becomes a very interesting point in this debate as the ideas coming from the new generation of millennials[7]are impacting on the patterns of social and economic developments which will have a deep impact on the micro and macro level social patterning.

However, as societies in developing countries like Pakistan become more intricate and complex with the complexity of hybrid political and ethnic identities, issues of cultural tolerance and tackling with groups and multiple identities become challenging. In such scenarios, the role of educational integration in universities, youth platforms in public spaces, activities of art, social mobilization through causes, theatre, and even music can play an instrumental role in capacity building bringing communities and societies together.

In case of Turkey, Turkish soft power diplomacy through art, music, movies, and cinema hasa great impact on the international audience. More and more people in Pakistan are finding agreat interest in exploring Turkish culture, language, music, and art. This impact is not only limited to millennials only rather also range from all age groups. Such a situation makes more effective grounds for cultural collaboration in areas of mass media, art, education, scientific and cultural collaboration. In this context, thus; it is highly imperative to seek projects and research towards understanding the issues and challenges of the youths of the two countries together, making compatibility and generating ideas, opinions and decisions for a new era marked by digitalization, innovation and joint initiatives of support and cooperation.

In many parts of the globe for instance in South Asia, North Africa, East Asia and even in Southern Europe, Turkish drama serials appearing on NETFLIX and AMAZONPRIME has generated a huge interest among the young

generation. In Pakistan, Turkish music through YouTube channels has aroused great attention of the Pakistani audience. Pakistani Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA) and the Government of Pakistan have very recently agreed to produce a serial based on a joint venture between Pakistan and Turkey. In this vein, it will be very interesting to observe how electronic media, through channels, can bridge the gap between cultures and civil societies. Performing arts have a huge potency to cultivate and generate new forms of dialogue that consequently can result in newer means of cross- cultural dynamics. Meanwhile, Turkish Universities are playing an effective role in acting as a gateway to many foreign students. One of the most encouraging encounters of my academic interaction with Turkish Universities has been at Ankara Yildirim Bayezit University, during my visit in 2019 as a guest Lecturer. It was very enlightening experience to share my point of views with a variety of students coming from as far as Afghanistan, India, and Morocco. Such interactions on international level are needed to bolster academic, scientific, and epistemic research and to provide mediums for enhancing soft power diplomacy.

3.2.   Soft power global imagining and the role of diplomatic partake

While Soft power is essentially and inevitably defined as "the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments;"[8] it is plausibly possible through persuading the other party through convincing arguments and rational policies. Here, credibility and the ability to persuade constitute the main elements of soft power. These elements also provide legitimacy to the use of power. The concept of soft power which is at the common point and ground of the public diplomacy and cultural diplomacy was included in the literature by Harvard Professor Joseph Nye in 1990, and it became the essential component of public diplomacy in 2000s. The soft power concept is also described as cultural power. This was because Nye conceptualized the cultural element as the primary source of soft power when defining the soft power concept. Nye based

the concept of soft power on three resources including culture that is found to be attractive by other societies, political values and foreign policy and he defined the concept as shaping the preferences of others without hard power and force and thus ensuring others to want what you want. Based on this, Nye laid the functioning logic of soft power on attraction.

Some scholars are still sceptical about soft power and consider that it would be more effective if more money were allocated to it. Others assert that in today's global information space, soft power is becoming more influential, and it needs less hard power support. Both sets of theorists consider soft power not merely as an influence, and as more than just persuasion or the ability to move people by argument. For them, soft power is based on setting the agenda and attracting others through the deployment of cultural and ideological means of provoking acquiescence.

Soft power is simply defined as the ability to threat others in a desired way. "Desired way" here emphasizes several political goals using power in cultural and diplomatic manners, apart from the militarian one. To achieve soft power in the target geographical zone, several strategies are applied such as business and trade, governance, international relations, culture and heritage, media, communication, education, science, people, and values (see illustration 1). The variety of strategic tools prove that soft power reaches beyond the political arena and affects deeply in all part of a social life including food, sport, tourism, social media, values, human rights and so on.

Image-1: Definition of Soft Power[9]

According to Nye, soft power can be categorized into three sources such as "culture" to attract the others, "political values" at home and abroad, and "foreign policies" as legitimate and having moral authority[10].

Geun Lee in his research also contributes to soft power studies regarding to the policy goals. He identifies it into the following. [11]

- *Soft power to improve external security environment by projecting peaceful and attractive images of a country.*

- *Soft power to mobilize other countries' supports for one's foreign and security policies*

- *Soft power to manipulate other countries' way of thinking and preferences*

- *Soft power to maintain unity of a community or community of countries*

- *Soft power to increase approval ratings of a leader or domestic support of a government.*

Nye's and Lee's categorization shows the diversification of sources and political strategies. These strategies can be found on security policy, imperial

continuity, domestic and international support, and attractive imagination of a country by using the sources to achieve geo-cultural dominance in the region.

When soft power is linked to geo-culture, culture is seen a set of practices creating meaning for a society through literature, art, and education. Thus, culture constitutes a high political priority in soft power strategies. To reach that aim, public diplomacy is used as an instrument to realize the soft power. According to Nye, public diplomacy draws attention to potential resources (such the values an organization or a country expressing in its culture, internal practices, policies, and relations with others) through broadcasting, subsidizing cultural exports and arranging exchanges[12]. The key term for public diplomacy is the attraction, because if the content of a country's culture, values and policies are not attractive, then the soft power cannot be produced[13]. For this reason, public diplomacy tools diversify in two branches: State to Public (StPs) and Public to Public (PtPs). StPs includes official tools and channels to public such as State policies and activities. PtPs are counted as civil elements such as NGOs, research centers, universities, media, and opinion leaders[14]. As mentioned above, soft power reaches beyond the political one and provides varied tools and channels to attract the others using public diplomacy.

3.3.   Culture and Cultural Diplomacy through Soft Power

Cultural diplomacy is essentially accepted as a branch or type of public diplomacy. Cultural diplomacy covers the activities of the public diplomacy in the fields of culture and art. The definition of cultural diplomacy as a separate type of diplomacy is due to the prominence of the fields of culture and art in public diplomacy. Cultural diplomacy, which is a type or a branch of the public diplomacy with regards to the activities of culture and art, is in fact intertwined with public diplomacy.[15]While there are many definitions of cultural diplomacy in the literature, the definition of Milton Cummings is the most referred one, which reads as the exchange of values, ideas and culture-art elements.[16] With

this respect, cultural diplomacy can be considered as the building of civil relations directly between individuals and peoples including culture and art activities based upon individuals and civil society. This provides states with the manoeuvre possibility in a broad area as well as with the opportunity to deepen their influence.[17]This way states carry out cultural communication and interaction activities through cultural diplomacy.In public diplomacy, programs such as public relations, image-reputation-prestige management and perception management, propaganda, lobbying, nation branding, agenda setting and information through communication tools are implemented instead of the official mechanisms of the traditional diplomacy with respect to instruments and methods.

The rise of soft power diplomacy has been the phenomenon of the post -cold war era where the presence of global campaigns for the call of national liberation, democratic movements, along with the mushrooming of power networks, organizations as well as pressure groups has been dominating the focus of international attention. This is because in today's times the State must relinquish its powers in some areas where it traditionally played its dominant role or for that matter areas that became more powerful like public diplomacy through various instruments like persuasion, attraction even propaganda are the norms of the day. The rise of the mass media for instance including the electronic media has fairly augmented the non-conventional domains of diplomacy thus.

This can be called as building soft power through cultural diplomacy. In other words, soft power is implemented through public diplomacy activities including culture, values and foreign policy, exchange programs, cultural and informational activities. Transforming soft power to policy by the public diplomacy program and methods makes soft power directly related and intertwined with public-cultural diplomacy. For Nye, soft power is better seen

as a malleable strategy that a country may use to gain its objectives by attraction founded on culture, political values, and a legitimate and moral foreign policy. [18]To better understand the flexible nature of soft power, Nye distinguished between behaviours, resources, and actors. Resources are tangible or intangible capabilities, goods, and instruments at one's disposal; behaviour is the action itself, the manner or way of acting, and the conduct of an agent. In behavioural terms, soft power is an attractive power. In terms of resources, soft power resources are the assets that produce such attraction. Nye argued that the soft power of a country is primarily the product of three main resources: "its culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values; when values are widely accepted and implemented, and its foreign policies, when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority.[19] (Nye,2008)

4. Turkey's Diplomatic Relations and Soft Power in South Asia

4.1.   The Strategic Importance of South Asia

The Asian continent is a special zone owing to its strategic importance and geographic location. The region stands at the main heart of the world power center and thus, stability and instability in the region go hand in hand. The region includes positive strategic factors such as economic growth, nuclear potential, young and dynamic population, as well as negative factors such as rising nationalism, terrorism, nuclear power status, land, and sea border disputes. Due to instability, dominance in the region proceeds with soft power arguments among regional actors in this area. The future of the region provides a moral source of self-confidence for the countries in the region. Therefore, this competition is called "The Asian Miracle"[20].

Furthermore, South Asia forms the region comprising countries like Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and The Maldives. States in the region such as Pakistan and India are relatively important States that form the strategic balance.

South Asian States remain attractive because of cultural depth, economic potential, human resources; comprising about a quarter of the world's population, which constitute a huge contribution to their influence concerning the evolution of the international system. That's why the region is becoming one of the significant geo-strategic and geo-economic hubs in the current international scenario. Dynamic developments in South Asia make it stand in a notable position among global centers of power and therefore assign it a critical role[21]

4.2. Turkey's Soft Power in The South Asian Region

The Global Soft Power Index, which conducts country' performances analysis, published a report in 2021 about soft power positioning and projection in selected countries.75,000 interviews were conducted over across the 102 countries, as part of the General Public Survey. In this report, it is simply seen that Turkey advanced from 30th to 26th in the list, with a score of 42.3 [22], indicating that Turkey's strengthening its foreign policy on a variety of fronts. One of the main reasons why Turkey has advanced in the list can be explained in Çandar's words. According to Çandar, the emergence of Turkey in the international arena as an autonomous regional power can be found in a-) the decline of American influence in the Middle East and neighboring region, b-) the absence of Europe and/or ineffectiveness of the EU policy in the region, c-) Turkey's growing economic power, and d-) political modernization of Turkey proving that the Turkish democracy has matured enough to accommodate a government allegedly having Islamist roots[23].

According to Kalathil, Turkey offers and extends its soft power and influence as an "emerging regional power".[24] It exerts all the elements such as culture and history, values, domestic and foreign policies followed by states, institutions, economic development, progress in science, art, and literature that are among the important sources of soft power[25].

Turkey believes that the South Asian Region is important in terms of exerting the weight of the Turkish foreign policy. In part, Turkey's relations with the countries in the region and especially with Pakistan have strong historical and cultural ties, which goes beyond to political interests. Turkey strongly believes that the peace, stability, and cooperation can render victory for Turkey's diplomatic priority in the region[26].

Given a closer look at the relations with other the countries of the region, for instance India, Turkey has maintained relative stability in trade, science, and energy at the bilateral level. Relations with other regional countries such as Sri Lanka, Bhutan, The Maldives, Nepal, and Bangladesh are progressing on bilateral, regional, and international platforms and concrete developments are being recorded. For Afghanistan, Turkey is involved with aid programs within the framework of permanent peace and stability. Aid to Afghanistan continues in line with expanding education, especially for girls, increasing the public's access to health services, and supporting the education of Afghan security forces. Afghanistan plays an important role in Turkey's soft power diplomacy, to achieve permanent security and stability in the region[27].

Relations with Pakistan continue deepening at an institutionalized level, as well as bilateral, regional, and international levels. After the establishment of Pakistan in 1947, friendly relations were developed through high-level visits.The relations between the two countries have been institutionalized with the mechanism established as the High-Level Cooperation Council in 2009 and later raised to the level of the High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council (YDSK)[28]. In the meetings held with the YDSK mechanism, decisions are taken in bilateral relations in cooperation against terrorism, security, trade, energy, transportation, and many other areas.[29]

5. Turkey's Geo-cultural and Geo-political Interests in Pakistan

5.1. Historical Background of Strong Cooperation

The emphasis on the imperial past build great importance in Turkey's foreign policy in the region[30].When we look at the history of relations dating back to the Ottoman Empire, the influence of the caliphate come to the forefront. Below, the historical pictures presented by Aziz Fatima Sıddık, the granddaughter of Muhammad Ali Johar, living in Karachi, one of the leaders of the Caliphate Movement, which was established with the aim of political and financial support to the Ottoman caliphate, prove the extent of these relations.

Image-2: Medical officers from Turkey and India[31]

Image-3: Medical team of 25 people who came to Istanbul voluntarily (Red Crescent Society)[32]

As can be seen in both pictures, in addition to the political and financial support provided by the Indian Muslims (including Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslims) in the late Ottoman period, it is also seen that personnel support was provided in the wars on the fronts. In fact, it was stated by Sıddık that Indian Muslims who

fought in the British army was sentenced to four years in prison for opposing the war with Turkey.[33].

The transfer of the caliphate to the Ottoman Empire had provided a basis for spiritual ties and spiritual support elements between the two communities- especially after the British began to rule in the Indian Subcontinent- causing high loyalty to Ottoman Empire. Thus, Indian sub-continent Muslims had never denied fighting for Ottoman Empire's existence, showed their support to maintain its authority, and provided donations to rescue Ottoman in a difficult situation. For example, in an article dated August 17, 1876, published in Urdu Akhbar, one of the influential Urdu newspapers of the time, it was stated that Muslims needed to do everything they could to save Turkey from the difficult situation it was in. It was emphasized that if this empire were destroyed, Muslims would lose their importance and no one would take them into consideration[34]. As of today, the celebrations in Pakistan for The Khilafat Movement of the 1920s can be accepted as a spiritual tie of common history35.

5.2.   Why is Pakistan Important for Turkey?

Turkey and Pakistan are like a body with two heads,

If one has a headache, the other will also have a headache.[36].

As expressed by Abdullah Muradoğlu, this statement most accurately reflects the extent of Turkey's diplomatic relations with Pakistan. So, the answer to "why Pakistan is important for Turkey?" can widely be found in emotional ties, regional stability, and political role models.

- *Emotional Ties*

The political dimension of the relations also remains strong even today. Although the two countries do not have borders by sea or land, Turkey needs to take care of Pakistan's interests and it sees it as a responsibility that needs to be taken care of. Attaining in west camp during the Cold War period, becoming an

alliance within the framework of the Baghdad Pact called CENTO, supporting each other diplomatically in any political conflict such in Cyprus or Kashmir presents the milestone of the political alliance between Turkey and Pakistan. But relations between the two countries go beyond the "just-foreign policy interest". Thank to strong support of subcontinent Muslims, Turkey and Pakistan have maintained their relations on "emotional" level built as brotherhood and friendship. The emotional concepts form emotional intimacy and common values between two societies.

- *Regional Stability*

Turkey gives importance to Pakistan's regional stability. Pakistan is considered with its increasingly significant role in South Asia, as one of the 9 countries in the world having nuclear weapons.Apart, neighboring Afghanistan, where the threat of terrorism is originating, is seen as a threat to Pakistan's stability[37]. Given the regional importance and historical/emotional ties, Turkey feels the responsibility to support in need in the region. With this aim, strong military cooperation also forms a smart power. The Pakistan-Turkey Military Consultative Group, which was established between the two countries in 1988, was renamed the "High-Level Military Dialogue Group" in the early 2000s, with the deepening of relations. Military training programs, increasing cooperation in trade and defense industry, Turkey's domestic military production and support to Pakistan, aerial vehicle development process, the development of military cargo ships, the signing of the MİLGEM (National Ship) corvette agreement, which is the "defense industry agreement with the most value in one item" for Turkey, in July 2018 form the military cooperation to support Pakistan's stability in the region38.

- *Political Role Model*

Political relations are surrounded on seeing each other as a model and maintaining the political discourses about being politically strong. For example,

the former Prime Minister of Pakistan Nawaz Sharif expressed that they admire the Turkish model, and that Pakistan has strong Turkish leadership to follow. On Turkey's side, Pakistan needs to remain strong in the region. Expression of "A strong Pakistan" shows Turkey's strategic perspective and foreign policy in the region[39].

5.3. Turkey's Soft Power and Public Diplomacy Tools for Pakistan

As mentioned above about Lee's category for soft power, the fourth category partly reflects Turkey's soft power to Pakistan. The fourth category explains *maintaining a large size of political-economic entities such as an empire, a nation, or a community demands soft power at the center of the entities ...through an imperial museum, imperial rituals, common languages, the invention of traditions, and common lifestyles*[40]. Accordingly, it is possible to say that the footprints of the Ottoman Empire and the values remaining from the Ottoman Empire were shaped based onbrotherhood in the relations between Pakistan and Turkey. For this reason, ideas, images, education, discourses, culture, traditions, and national symbols can be considered as the sources of Turkish softpower[41].

To reach that aim, Turkey uses StPs and PtPs as a tool to public diplomacy to realize its soft power in the region. Many public institutions such as TIKA, KIZILAY, TRT, Diyanet, Yunus Emre Foundation, AFAD, the Ministry of Tourism and Culture, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and such perform their role directly or indirectly. These StPs provide public diplomacy in diplomatic, economic, and cultural manners[42]. Also, Islam plays a fundamental role for public diplomacy strategies. The Ottoman Dream builds a common identity among Turkish zones of influence in the Balkans, the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Middle East, aiming regional leadership, patronage of the Muslim world, and a strong presence in many of the major conflicts in its neighborhood[43].

The STPs and PTPs as public diplomacy tools to Pakistan are considered as below:

- *The Directorate of Religious Affairs and TürkiyeDiyanet Foundation*

Diyanet is an umbrella institution for many Muslim countries. Those, whose financial capacities, and human resources were limited to serve religious services for theirMuslim populations, build cooperation with Turkey's Diyanet to avoid Salafi and Wahhabi groups grounded in their countries. Here, Turkey's *laik* (secular) position plays an important role to provide internal security towards extremist religious groups and establish security as modeling Turkey's laik frame.[44]

Apart from that, several aid programs organized by Diyanet in Pakistan show the greater extent of public diplomacy in the region. For example, Eid-Al Adha/ Qurbani Programs in Pakistan inAugust 2020 and 16,450 qurban sharing to 60 thousand families in Pakistan[45]aim to provide the further consolidate friendship ties between two societies. Another sample can be found on high-level meetings. For example, the meeting held on the 9th of September 2020 between Head of Religious Affairs Prof. Dr. Ali Erbaş and Pakistani Minister of Religious Affairs and Interfaith Harmony Dr. Pir Nurulhak Kadri shows the continuity of both societies' emotional cooperation. In this meeting, Dr. Kadri underlined Turkey as a permanent and true friend, standing by each other always and getting stronger relationships among the people than ever. Prof. Erbaş's statement the importance of the work carried out to develop cooperation between the religious institutions of the two countries in terms of religious services and religious education[46] proves Islam as a strong public diplomacy tool in the region.

- *Television Series, Turkish Higher Board for Radio and Television (RTÜK) and Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (TRT)*

Turkish television series has a regional market and seen the importer of Turkish history, Turkish culture, and ideas as a part of public diplomacy. In Pakistan, the top 10 most viewed "Turkish Dramas" are Ertugrul Ghazi, Ishq E Mamnu, Fatima Gul – Aakhir Mera Qasoor Kya Hai? Intikam, Feriha, Kaala Paisa Pyaar, Pyar Lafzon Main Kahan Drama and Mera Sultan or Hurrem Aur Sultan.[47]

Television series provide social engineering for a "New Turkey"[48]. The widespread production of historical television series on Turkish TV came following the production of Muhteşem Yüzyıl, Diriliş and Payitaht, which aired on the public broadcaster Turkish Radio and Television (TRT), conveying the government's political agenda and discourse,[49] in the region with the mission of keeping the historical imperials ties strong and sharing the extension of Turkish identity[50].

- *TIKA- Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency*

Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA) was established in 1992 for the need an organization to implement and coordinate the activities and foreign policy priorities. Since then, TIKA has become a tool to implement Turkish foreign policy in many countries with which Turkey shares common values. From the Middle East to Latin America, TIKA is expanding its projects and activities in the fields of education, health, restoration, agricultural development, finance, tourism, and industry[51].

Image-4: TIKA Education Activity in Pakistan[52]

Pakistan – Mansoorah

Relationships with Pakistan through TIKA projects and activities have a significant effect on the continuity of a strong partnership. Several examples can be found such as:

-Girls' School Renovation and Refurbishment Activity carried by TIKA with the aim of renovating and equipping two schools, a girls' primary/secondary school and a college, in Mansoorah, one of the poorest areas of Lahore, Pakistan helped increased quality of education by ensuring that students receive education in a better environment[53].

-A 2-week training program held at the Pakistan Tourism and Hotel Management Institute to introduce Turkish Cuisine to Pakistani cooks[54]. Additionally, vocational education project at the Karigar Vocational Education Institute Professional Training Center were carried out to ensure the young population between the ages of 15-30 in Pakistan for qualified education and ease to join their workforce in the service sector.[55]

- 85 water well projects in the cities of Swabi, Dera İsmail Khan and LakkiMarwat in the province of Hayber-Pahtunhva, which were most affected by the great flood disaster in 2010[56]

- Sewing Machines Projects upon the request of the All-Pakistani Women Association aimed to contribute to the family economy as well as to meet the clothing needs of women[57]

-The project "Reducing Poverty and Empowering Women in Rural Areas Through Goat Breeding" carried out in cooperation with the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA) and Faisalabad Agricultural University in Pakistan aiming to support agriculture as an economic activity in Pakistan and to increase women's participation in the workforce.[58]

These activities and projects are significant public diplomacy tools to ensure the stability of emotional ties in the region and make closer of two societies by contributing social and economic growth.

Image-5: Water Wells Project[59]

2019-2023 TIKA targets and strategies shows Turkey's future interest in the region as below:

-implementing Turkey's international development cooperation activities in the most effective way

-increasing the number of the projects carried by TIKA from 78 to 150 by 2023[60] including South Asian region.

- *Yunus Emre Institute*

Yunus Emre Institute aims to increase the number of people all over the world who establish bonds with Turkey and to increase the awareness, reliability, and reputation of Turkey in the international arena.[61] With the relations with Pakistan, Yunus Emre Institute in Lahore serve for this aim. Several activities and projects are carried each year. For example, free Turkish courses for orphans provide Turkish education for adults and children in Lahore, Azad Jammu Kashmir University, and the National University of Modern Languages (NUML). With this project, Turkey aims to introduce its culture and language by giving instructive and instructive information[62]

Image-6: "From Language to Literature, Pakistan and Turkey's Friendship and Brotherhood Journey" Program in Lahore[63]

Another activity titled "Pakistan and Turkey's Journey of Friendship and Brotherhood from Language to Literature in the Context of Urdu and Turkish" serves as Turkey's public diplomacy tool to reinforce the existing feelings of friendship and brotherhood between Turkey and Pakistan[64].

These activities and projects are believed to provide strong cooperation and cultural bridge strengthening historical friendships between two societies.

- *Ministry of Interior, Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency - AFAD*

The duties and powers of AFAD are determined between Articles 30 and 56 of the Presidential Decree No. 4 on the Organizations of Ministries, Related, Associated Institutions and Organizations and Other Institutions and Organizations published on 15/07/2018. In the Decree, AFAD's duties are among the institutions and organizations that carry out the necessary measures for the effective performance of disaster and emergencies and civil defense services at the country level, and as well as coordinating humanitarian aid operations at home and abroad and developing and implementing policy proposals on these issues"[65].

International conventions, to provide the necessary communication and coordination, to carry out international emergency and humanitarian aid activities, and to ensure coordination with all institutions in this field are considered as part of extending Turkey's soft power for the countries, which are in need of emergency[66]. In the concept of international aid, a large scale of countries from Japan and USA, including Pakistan, a total of 29,222 tents, 250 prefabricated houses, 28 general purpose tents, 95,490 blankets, 147 living containers, 1,000 beds, 684 heaters and 40 generators were sent[67].

These humanitarian aid activities contribute to shifting public opinion, changing attitudes towards the public and increasing support for specific policies. But in Pakistan's case, those humanitarian aids are more than a political strategy, including the sense-like of closer relations in crisis times and the necessary help for the brothership.

- *Turkish Red Crescent Society (KIZILAY)*

Within the framework of national and international legislation, the Turkish Red Crescent Society undertakes the task of protecting human dignity in disasters and ordinary periods, assisting to the needy and the vulnerable, and reducing vulnerability as operating in 140 countries, mainly in the Balkans, Central Asia, Middle East, and Africa[68]. As of 2020, Turkish Red Crescent heads in 15 countries, including Afghanistan and Pakistan, carrying out its activities with 2 Institutional Personnel and 3 Local Personnel in the fields of Disaster Response, Humanitarian Aid Material Distribution, Reconstruction, Economic Support and Rehabilitation Programs, National Association Support Projects[69].

As a part of public diplomacy, Kızılay has carried out several projects and activities in Pakistan as below:

-2005 Earthquake and 2010 Flood Disaster Response and Rehabilitation Activities, -Humanitarian Aid Material Distribution in Cooperation with Pakistan Red Crescent,

-Distribution of more than 100,000 Food Packages,

-Post-Disaster Rehabilitation Activities,

-Road and Bridge Construction,

-Pakistan Red Crescent Capacity Building Project,

-Headquarters Building Construction and Blood Services Supply Project,

-First Aid Bag Distribution Project in Schools,

-Social Aid Projects Developed in Cooperation with Pakistan Red Crescent[70]

Today, projects and activities continue for Distribution of Food Packages and Humanitarian Aid Materials in Cooperation with Pakistan Red Crescent, Supporting Pakistan Red Crescent Blood Donation Acquisition Project, The Blessings Project – Providing Livelihoods to the Needy Family, Jamia Jhang Hz. Ibrahim Mosque Construction. For 2021, Scholarship Program for Students in Need, Youth and Volunteer Center Restoration Project are planned as further support activities in the country[71].

6. Conclusions and Observations

The pace of change characterising the modern-day world through forces of globalization has characterized a new international order which has marked a change in conventional diplomatic realm. Numerous instances of diplomatic

tasking in resolution of international conflicts now involve Track 2 diplomatic approaches. This approach is characterized of applying the necessary weight of citizens, networks, academic and epistemic groups, policy, and technical experts in International Relations. In fact, this approach takes its locus back from 1960s developed through the decades of 1970s 80s and 90s. Examples include soft track 2 soft power diplomacy through non-conventional channels like Cricket diplomacy and mango diplomacy between Pakistan and India. In real sense, "Track II" diplomacy believed that private individuals who meet on unofficial platforms, can find their way to reaching a common ground that official negotiators can't.

Given these tough realities of the modern day conflicts, wars, onslaughts by the radical militant groups and armed interventions that need more than just the role of the State actors to come to the rescue, Some International non-state actors like UN, EU, International NGOs, Humanitarian missions like Red Cross, Amnesty International become important to address immediate diplomatic and humanitarian concerns taking active roles in the certain hard core international decision making at times necessarily becoming major political and diplomatic stakeholders.

However, the following questions still remain worth asking:

1. What is the role of the changing nature of International Relations and to what extent diplomacy as a tool of state policy is compromised/non compromised by the state to the non –state actors?
2. Why the role of the nation state as the sole partaker of policy tasking has been side-lined in the diplomatic arena? If yes how?
3. Amidst the changing nature of the nation state, role of the non -state actors are enhanced and so does its diplomatic jurisdiction to act as a role model as an important diplomatic caucus?

4. What comprises the non-state actor today? Whether the non- state actors today comprise of big corporations, multinationals, transnationals, pressure groups, conglomerates, freedom fighters, terrorist organizations and militias provide the much-needed space for diplomatic manoeuvring.

These questions above are still being discussed in international agenda and soft power still remains one of the important tools to affect international relations in different manners. Turkey is one of the countries enhancing its soft power to South Asia using humanitarian aid, film industry and so on. Pakistan, among South Asian states, keeps a significant role for Turkey's soft power diplomacy. Due to long historical ties rooting from Ottoman Empire, strong military, economic, cultural and political bilateral agreements still continues for further cooperation. Turkey's public diplomacy tools in Pakistan aims to strength emotional ties such as friendship between two countries. Thus, Turkey's diplomatic strategy in Pakistan is more than bilateral levels and promises to develop historical ties in many political, economic, social and cultural aspects.

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Towards a Global Market Domination under a Linguistic and a Sociocultural Soft Power Strategy

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Abstract

This research seeks to investigate the domination on the local markets worldwide by highlighting the soft power strategy use, as came in Nye's concept (2008). Furthermore, it studies the impact of localisation and transcreation to provide a baseline understanding of how products and advertisements are introduced to the target audience. This study examines, under a qualitative approach, exclusive advertisement figures that carry geo-cultural conceptions and under a geo-marketing strategy. The findings led to significant demonstrations that offered remarkable variables, because they were strongly related to going global by acting local policy and in each case, the adopted strategy was unique. The current study contributes theoretically in presenting transcreation technique for following linguistic and sociocultural guidelines of the target expression in order to better address the target audience. Moreover, this study contributes practically in demonstrating some implications that identify the target expression and the target audience alike. This study is one of the very few that touches upon the multidisciplinary approaches where geo-political, geo-economical and geo-cultural features are incorporated in shaping identities of the world's order. It also contributes to the understanding of the theorisation and the practicality of powers that are shaping minds and decisions, eventually.

Keywords: geo-approaches; soft power; domination; local markets; transcreation; advertisements.

1. Introduction

Any given geographical area, almost anywhere in this planet, is not an unidentifiable space but a territory that has borderlines, set of rules and norms that are determined by the governors and the locals. This group of people are gathered and unified under their own distinctive identity. Politics, economy, society, culture, language and so on and so forth represent the rules and the norms that this group of people are following and eventually are identified with. These patterns are what create the differences among people across the globe. Rules and norms appear to be distinctive in each country. Moreover, the accumulation of historical events and their evolutions throughout time and the people's flexibility in adopting new ways of managing their living in the contemporary world represent also the identity features of this group of people, composed of citizens and rulers. But despite the dissimilarity among the groups, it is very important to keep the link that connects these different communities with their near and far neighbours worldwide. This relation of connectivity is very important, on so many levels. It is indeed for the growth and the development of these nations. Some countries even moved to the next level with their relations, where many countries formulated a union that added more value and power to their identity such as the European Union, or the so called transnational relations. Others preferred to disjoin the group such as the Brexit. So, whether it is a union or a parting, they both regulate relations.

Geo-approaches (the geo-politics, the geo-economics and the geo-cultures) are basically the geo-strategies that regulate the relations with the locals, the representatives of the country and the foreigners.

Rozov clarifies this situation as follows: "discussions about international relations are conducted in the terms of geopolitics (security, strength, conflicts, coalitions) [...,] geo-economics (growth, development trade, investment,

dependence, and others) [... and] geo-culture [...] (prestige, exchange, cultural influence, similarity or difference in religious faiths). Everyone realizes that these spheres are closely interconnected". [1]

Therefore, knowing and taking these approaches into consideration may determine how relations on the transnational or the transcultural level are managed. In this investigation, more light, in particular, will be shed on the economical relations between global companies and their domination on new local markets worldwide, where their marketing strategy is softly powerful. The reason behind is that they use local linguistic and sociocultural aspects as their means of communication with their new local clients via transcreated advertisements.

So from the economical perspectives and for the marketing strategies, the local aspects impact should be studied and used on the favour of the global market investors, when they aim at widening their commercialisation operation and gain more local markets abroad. Schlegelmilch thinks that the locals' preferences in their purchases are related to their local rules and norms, because it is very hard to manage creating a global segment with global standards. As a matter of fact, there has to be some adjustments in the product, the service or even the way advertisements are presented to the new customers in order to fit more the local standards.

Schlegelmilch explicitly says that: "There are opportunities for marketers to pursue some segments on a global scale. However, the predicted global uniformity finds its limits in language differences, national laws and a large variety of cultural factors. Companies with a wide global reach still encounter a large number of regional and national preferences that limit the scope for truly global segments". [2]

It is then recommended to make some changes on the marketing strategy as on the advertisements conceptions, to reach the targeted audience, efficiently. The geo-approaches are identified with one common element: the geographical

sphere. But it is also what imposes the difference in each territory. For more in depth clarification regarding the three geo-approaches impact on the economical transactions and relations, they are all discussed as follows:

- Geo-politics represent the hard power of the country. It is then a set of rules, applied on a specific territory.

Cowen and Smith says: "Geopolitics embodies a range of assumptions that entwine political power to the territorially demarcated system of national states, and it reads national cultures, societies and economies as more or less aligned to those territorial divisions of the world". [3]

In other words, the major approach that regulates the relations is the geopolitics because it is the determiner of the form of the power the state exercises on different kinds of relations between the other approaches, such as the geo-economical and the geo-cultural ones. Therefore, if new local markets are targeted in order to display global products and services for commercialisation purposes, the marketing strategy should go for a mass commercialisation and under the geopolitics regulations, as for creating flexible strategies that do not break the local rules.

- Geo-marketing represents the undertaken strategy to win or dominate both the domestic and the global markets.

Cowen and Smith see that: "the transition to a globalized geo-economic world is not a matter of some natural evolution in economic affairs, but a case of active assembly, albeit fomented by very real scalar shifts in economic relations". [4]

The situation here is very clear. If settling on new local markets abroad, the marketing strategy goes with a lot of effort to be done in order to make of this new commercial horizon a welcoming one. The shifts in economic relations are very crucial because the facts and the statistics provide different data of the new market. Starting from different languages, different target audience of clients and different policies... etc, they all then require active planning and changes

that adapt the product and service or the advertisement to the new client of the new local market.

The expansion of the marketing strategy is also called the macro-marketing. But the micro-marketing is applied on niche markets. Regarding these strategies, Schlegelmilch sees that:

"Mass marketing [...] Here, a company targets the entire market, disregarding differences among market segments and concentrating on their commonalities. [...] Other approaches are known as niche or concentrated marketing, where a company attempts to capture a large proportion of one or a few smaller market segments of niches. Companies pursuing such strategies usually obtain a high degree of market knowledge through this concentrated strategy". [5]

Selling for the global market requires relatively common standards of commercialisation. But when aiming for selling to a specific type of clients, at this level, more studies and investigations are conducted in order to understand and cover the need of this niche market. As a matter of fact, it is obvious that neither the demand nor the offer should be standardised. It is rather a set of customisations that are applied on the new local market offers to the target clients' demands.

- Geo-culture represents the soft power. It is manifested in the language, local thinking, habits, traditions...etc. It is obvious that cultures vary from region to region. Showing much appreciation and respect to the local culture can only be one of the strongest arsenals that can be used to link the identity of the productive company to the cultural identity of the targeted geo-culture.

Winter sees that:*"Geocultural Power* thus explores the strategy of coaching trade and political relations, energy and political security, in an evocative topography of history". [6]

It is with no doubt, that the soft power is way more powerful than the hard power because it coaches many relations, smoothly. It makes people's resistance

or repulsion very lower in the commercialisation strategy. At this stage, translation intervenes in order to bridge the two different cultures. On this purpose, advertisements for instance are being translated to the local language. But if translation only seems impossible to be done, the transcreation technique, which is a concept beyond the services of the direct translation, takes place in order to transfer not just the linguistic content of the advertisement, but also to incorporate features of the local culture in the conception of the advertisement to be presented to the new target client. On top of that, it is very possible to create a positive impact and influence on the new client because transcreation works on translating and creating the advertising contents under the fitting measurements to the target market, target client and target culture. Therefore, the language, the culture and the impact become all combined in one conception that serves the positive reception of the transcreated advertisement in the new geo-cultural sphere.

For the commercialisation purposes, the connection of the three geo-approaches: geo-politics, geo-marketing and geo-culture serve all the marketing strategy that should be different if evolving from wining the domestic markets at home country to gaining more new markets abroad. It is actually called the globalisation strategy. The foreign language, foreign culture and foreign society rules may be regarded as obstacles in reaching the target audience's minds and hearts via advertisements, but after adopting the localisation marketing strategy, in localising/customising products, services and their advertisements, these latter could fit more the target client's demands. So by applying an advanced translation technique; which is called transcreation technique, as a process for the concentrated marketing strategy, at this stage, both translation and creation collaborate and conceive exclusive advertisements to the new targeted audience because direct translation may sometimes fail in doing the requested job. In other words, excelling the use of the local language, the understanding of the

local cultural traits and going under the consultation of the in-country laws and restrictions can make of the marketing strategy of dominating local markets abroad a soft power. It eventually becomes used on the target audience and on the favour of the foreign investors of local markets abroad.

2. Literature Review

The soft power, as came in Nye's concept, is a strategy that can be used in political, economical or cultural relations between the targeted people and the governor or the marketer....etc. it gently pushes the people to react in a desirable way or take decisions that are on the favour of the beneficiary. To reach this level of control/domination, the used strategy has to be very attractive, influential and persuasive.

Nye, on that, says: "Soft power rests on the ability to shape the preferences of others. [...] In behavioural terms, soft power is attractive power. In terms of resources, soft power resources are the assets that produce such attraction [...] such as an attractive personality, culture, political values, institutions, and policies that are seen as legitimate or having moral authority". [7]

It seems that the soft power concept in Nye's article has more than one single definition. The already cited definition was more on the theoretical/informative level, and the upcoming definition is more on the practical/descriptive level, where he again says that:
"By definition, soft power means getting others to want the same outcomes you want, and that requires an understanding of how they are hearing your messages and adapting them accordingly. It is crucial to understand the target audience [...] The ability to combine hard and soft power effectively is smart power". [8]
Therefore, when a fusion occurs between the soft and the hard power, it produces, according to Nye, a more effective power, because the outcomes of

this combination are more effective on regulating relations, and especially of the economical sector.

The target market, whether it is a domestic or a global market, has to go through a strategy of marketing. Doubtlessly, the strategies vary, due to the variations of patterns. Advertisement is a marketing tool that aims to transmit the message of the productive company to the targeted clients in a persuasive way. Since the patterns (language, demand, target clients, culture, political and economical regimes...etc) are different, exclusive advertisements had to be made in order to deliver the marketing message in a different way for each market.

Moreover, the STP: Segmentation, Targeting and Positioning, the holy trinity of marketing, as named by Schlegelmilch, is very crucial to the success of any business, where any disorganisation is likely to be very disadvantageous. For more in depth clarifications, Schlegelmilch sees that:

"Market segmentation aims to divide the market into smaller units [..., based on] geographic, demographic, psychographic, behavioral and benefit segmentation" [9]

These approaches are determiners. They show more focus on what to offer, who to serve, with what and how putting the product or the service in a position that they should be known as unique and never become confused with the available products or services in the market. In few words, these approaches are the division, the focus and the distinction.

Exclusive advertisement is a special message for commercial purposes. It is conceived particularly to the targeted audience of clients, where the customer feels him/herself being addressed directly. Marieke de Mooij, in her book, *Global Marketing and Advertising: Understanding Cultural Paradoxes*, sees that going global should not rely on standardisation strategies in providing products or conceiving advertisements, it should rather be focused more on the effectiveness of the cultural segmentation for effective marketing

communication strategies. She emphasises so clearly on the cultural aspects, where she says that:

"Advertising is more than words; it is made of culture [...] People process advertising messages in social and cultural contexts and then respond". [10]

The cultural side in advertisements are mainly the conceptions of some daily life practices, or in the way the language is expressed, where the local thinking seems so obvious in such conceptions. So, even if the product, the service or the advertisement become standardised, their interpretations can only go relatively, and that is under their sociocultural perceptions. Values are determined by people, and their nature is just like the identity nature; distinctive and different. Therefore, there has to be careful considerations when introducing values in advertising conceptions because their interpretation should not be misunderstood by the targeted people. A successful advertisement is when values are used carefully.

Localisation, historically, updates to the early 1980's. It was mainly in the soft and hardware IT (Information Technology) industry, where the American companies aimed at having new markets. They first targeted Europe and later other countries. In the 1990's, it was much recommended as well for the gaming industry. Marketing strategies, that time, started acting global but thinking local because it was very important to the success of the global commercial campaign, where it did not opt for standardising products and services or advertisements. It rather made a lot of customisations to fit the new targeted market.

Budin sees that: "global stands for all the cross-cultural activities such as translation, localisation, but also customisation, etc" [11]

To continue, it is especially transcreation. To know more about localisation or transcreation, let us first learn from some scholars, what localisation and transcreation really are. It seems that there is a remarkable confusion between many concepts in some scholar's definitions.

Budin thinks that: "Content localisation may very well involve more than translation in the traditional sense, i.e., we might have to re-create part of that content for another culture, or at least change fundamentally the way this content is presented to a certain culture". [12]

It is obvious that this definition emphasises on the similarities between localisation and transcreation, and the common thing is in making changes in the original content. Schäler succeeded in clarifying the difference between localisation and translation by saying that: "Probably the most difficult distinction to make, however, is that between localisation and *translation*. Not just localisers, translators as well adapt products (text) linguistically and culturally so that they can be understood in different *locales*. However, translation does not necessarily deal with digital material whereas localisation is *always* happening in the digital world. This has a number of implications in a number of different areas".[13]

So localisation is more in dealing with the customisation of products based on the criterions of the target local market, translation, on the other hand, deals more with products of linguistic nature such as texts of advertisements, menus, manuals...etc. But to be exact, direct translation does not offer such results, adaptation at some extent yes, but not direct translation. For this reason, a clarification should be added to Schäler's definition, where the technique of translation that has an access in changing contents could be transcreation, and here we avoid falling again in confusions.

Schäler also says that: "According to the findings of a new market study undertaken by Word bank (2005) into the impact of language on the consumer's purchasing behaviour, more than eight out of ten consumers expect global companies to sell to them in their own language and seven out of ten will not buy a product if they cannot understand the packaging". [14]

So according to this statement, the global market is demanding changes and exclusivity in offers, since the demands are becoming unique. It focuses more on

the targeted client and does not impose the same adopted marketing strategy of the home market on the new local market.

Mangiron and O'Hagan, in their study of game localisation, see that localisation is one of the translation techniques that allow modifications in the original product so it gives the same experience to the gamers of the localised version. They think that:

"The brief of the localiser is to produce a version that will allow the players to experience the game as if it were originally developed in their own language and to provide enjoyment equivalent to that felt by the players of the original version. In order to achieve this it is crucial that the translators are familiar with the game domain". [15]

The modifications are necessary for a version that should be transmitting the same experience sensations of the game. These modifications could be on the level of the language, the characters, the game itself ...etc. In the same context of modifications, they think that:

"Translators are often given *carte blanche* to modify, adapt, and remove any cultural references [...] Localisers are given the liberty of including new cultural references [...] This type of creative licence granted to game localisers would be the exception rather than the rule in any other types of translation. The technique of *compensation*, [...] domestication [...] adaptation [...] re-creation [..,] all this gives a distinctive original flavour to the localised version [...] The traditional concept of fidelity to the original is discarded. In game localisation, transcreation, rather than just translation, takes place".[16]

They also justified the use of all these techniques in order to create a different version that takes fidelity meaning into another path. So modifications are legitimate and the fidelity in translation is becoming advantageous to the target audience, and not to the original expression.

Transcreation is a type of translation. It is actually one of its free techniques that have the access in shaping a new form of the original content, based on the recommendations of the client or for the purpose of producing customised contents for fitting purposes to the target expression system. It is mainly a modeller of the content, when using the local language or the local thinking, with the incorporation of local sociocultural references. It is a sort of a soft power that has a huge impact on the target audience, and can make their response to the transcreated expression and the marketing purpose of the foreign investors of the local markets going hand in hand. Many scholars tried to provide a definition of transcreation technique, where others have just avoided that, because there are still maintainable confusions between transcreation and many other free translation techniques. Bernal-Merino thinks that:

"To some extent, this term shares similarities with other terms such as 'domestication', 'localisation', or 'target-oriented translation', as it implies a target-reader centred philosophy of translation". [17]

So all these techniques share one thing so common between them all, it is in prioritising the reception of the target expression and not the original message. Geo-marketing is also focussing on the target audience, target expression and target culture in its strategy. It is where the soft power use appears.

This confusion did not stop Bernal-Merino from providing a definition where he says that:

"'Transcreation' might be a suitable term in the sense that it acknowledges unashamedly the fact of consciously replacing images, text and references that are deemed too culturally specific to be understandable or appealing for the target country. The end product is a translation that completely tilts the balance towards the target audience but claims to be the same product as the original, despite those differences". [18]

So transcreation definition is saying it out loud in its creational part. It is then so obvious that modifications are taking place in the original expression because translating for the target audience can only transfer expressions that do not make the addresses feel the strangeness in the target content. Bernal-Merino continues with explaining the connection between the geo-marketing strategy in targeting niche markets and in the application of transcreation technique, where he says that:

"From CEOs' point of view, they are maximising their investment in the form of one basic concept with slightly different selling strategies, depending on the local culture. It could be argued that companies translating commercials are in many cases recording new footage, therefore creating new advertisements, but this only seems to change the medium, from mono-channel text to multichannel film, not the translation task itself or the product being sold. It is the same basic principle that many companies have often applied to creating and selling cars, cosmetics, or burgers globally". [19]

The strategy that transcreation follows is sort of a soft power that the local market investors use when they aim at wining more new local markets abroad because it is very effective in capturing the target audience's attention. Transcreation makes changes in the content so that it sounds very original to the new addressee. Jakson sees that: "In addition to being an esthetic and creative procedure, transcreation is a constant project in progress, a voyage among world languages and literatures. Departing from a linguistic approach to expressive language" [20]

The creativity part in transcreation makes of it influential, therefore, its application evolved from poems to advertisements. In addition to that, the unexpected encounters make of the transcreated version looks so original. And the originality is a significance of a creation that is addressed to its target audience.

Pool, J.[21] tries, through his article: *Translators in a global community. The Translator as Mediator of Cultures*, to discuss a topic that turns out, at the end, to be as a wishful thinking of the idea of unifying one language and one culture to all people of the world. But translation, even at this level, still does its tasks and appears to be so valid in interpreting and translating in the same or between languages. Moreover, it is used in adapting contents of cultural references. So the idea of creating the expression of one common language and one common culture can only be formed thanks to the linguistic and the cultural expression rendition, that it is only possible under a translational process.

3. Methodology

This study was designed to follow a qualitative approach of research in order to demonstrate the soft power features that are manifested in the local language and the local sociocultural norms of the target audience. Because excelling the decryption of the target expression code system and using it as a marketing strategy can make the domination of the local market very easy.

The examined advertisement figures demonstrated how one productive company can vary its marketing strategy from one country into another by using the transcreation technique in translating its exclusive advertisements to each target community of clients. In other words, the addresser (the producer/the marketer) is one, but the addressees (clients in domestic and foreign markets) are numerous, therefore, to address them properly, there have to be multiple versions of communicating with them, and each version has to be identified as original on its own in the target expression system, because it is unique and it does not make sacred the source expression.

4. Results and Analysis

It is important to note that the following advertisements are examined for educational purposes only. No marketing or appropriation claiming intentions are held. Toyota, Nivea and L'Oreal were chosen in this research for their global marketing strategy, where transcreation technique is applied to conceive exclusive advertisements for different countries.

Toyota advertisement:


Figure 1: Toyota GR Supra Jarama Race track, Spain

Figure 2:Toyota GR Supra Jarama Racetrack, France

Figure 3: Toyota GR Supra Jarama Race track, UAE

Addresser	Toyota		
Product	Toyota GR Supra Jarama Race track Limited Edition		
Addresses	Spain	France	UAE

| Geo-marketing strategy: soft power use according to the need of the target market (in bold and italic).	Breaking stereotypes in: "*Dicen que no podemos controlar nuestras emociones, nosotros te demostramos que sí. Descubre el nuevo* #GRSupra Jarama Race track Limited Edition y déjate llevar. ✨ """	Solutions finder in : "*Impossible de s'ennuyer sur la route* des vacances *à bord de la #GRSupra* Jarama Race track Edition 😎 "	Adopting contemporary norms (Woman Empowerment): """Go for it, do your best and drive like a girl", says @amnalqubaisi_official *encouraging younger girls to break down barriers and disrupt male dominated sports*. "قدّمي أفضل ما عندك وأظهري قدرتك على القيادة" تنصح آمنة القبيسي الفتيات *بكسر الحواجز والمشاركة في الرياضة التي يهيمن عليها الرجال*"

Nivea advertisement

Figure4:Nivea Luminous 630 Antitaches, France

Figure 5: Nivea Luminous 630 Even Glow, Middle East

Figure6:Nivea Luminous 630 Anti manchas, Spain

Addresser	Nivea		
Product	Nivea Luminous630		
Addressees	France	Middle East	Spain
Geo-marketing strategy: soft power use according to the need of the target market (in bold and italic).	Geographical considerations in : "Découvrez le nouveau duo Cellular Luminous630®, votre allié pour *diminuer les taches brunes* ! Son indice FPS 50 vous permettra *de profiter du soleil printanier* tout en protégeant votre peau.	Geographical considerations in: "NEW NIVEA LUMINOUS630 Even Glow *reduces dark spots* in 4 weeks! مستحضر NIVEA LUMINOUS630 Even Glow الجديد *يخفف البقع الداكنة* خلال 4 أسابيع فقط!	Geographical considerativos in: "¿Conoces la Crema de Día FP50 Luminous630 Fluido Triple Protección? Es *una fórmula anti manchas* de textura ligera que combina el ingrediente anti manchas

	#nivea #niveaestla #l uminous630 #antitach es #bellepeau".		patentado LUMINOUS630 ® con un *alto factor de protección solar* (FP50), un paso fundamental a la hora *de reducir y prevenir las manchas* de tu piel y *conseguir una tez uniforme y luminosa*. *¿A qué estás esperando para probarla?* 💝 #N IVEAContigo"

L'Oreal advertisement

Figure 7: L'Oreal the brand, Australia

Figure 8: L'Oreal the brand, USA

Figure 9: L'Oreal the brand, Middle East

Addresser	L'Oreal		
Product	L'Oreal the brand		
Addressees	Australia	USA	Middle East
Geo-marketing strategy: soft power use according to the need of the target market (in bold and italic).	Identity as a beauty standard: "What is beauty? At L'Oréal, we believe that ***beauty is a universal aspiration that transcends time, borders and cultures*** 😊. #Beauty gives us confidence	Beauty in inclusivity: "We believe that beauty begins when you are ***free to be you***, ***express yourself*** and ***love who you love***. 🌈***L'Oréal supports the UN LGBTI*** Standards of Conduct for Business and stands for self-expression as a	Beauty in diversity: "We asked you, what is beauty? For some beauty is a shape, a color, aesthetics… ***At L'Oréal, we believe that beauty is a universal aspiration that transcends time, borders and cultures***! #Beauty gives us confidence in who we are and in who we want to be! Because we are creating the beauty that

	in who **we are, in who we want to be**! Because we are creating the beauty that moves the world 🌍 #beautythatmoves"	powerful driver for change and a path for inclusivity. #beautythatmoves"	moves　　　　the world #beautythatmoves سألنا ما هو الجمال؟ بالنسبة للبعض　الجمال　هو الشكل..اللون..　الجماليات... *نؤمن في لوريال بأن# الجمال هو الطموح اللامحدود الذي يتجاوز الزمن والحدود والثقافات حول العالم.* فالجمال يمنحنا الثقة بأنفسنا وبما نطمح أن نكون! لأننا نقوم بإبداع جمال يحرّك العالم #جمال_يحرك_العالم"

5. Discussion

The soft power strategy in geo-marketing is definitely an effective one because it takes each local market as a study case on its own and tries to use geo-aspects concepts that have the most effective and influential strategy on the local clients.

In Toyota's strategy, the advertisement was conceived of verbal and non verbal expressions. Despite the same product, the images and the scripts were different for each country. In figure 1, for Spain's advertisement, the image demonstrates the blue car GR SUPRA Jarama Racetrack in a garage. The script was a sort of a stereotype breaker, based on the local thinking, where the Spanish people have been known for their uncontrollable emotional excitement and the advertisement script tried to break this stereotype in "***Dicen que no podemos controlar nuestras emociones, nosotros te demostramos que sí.***". In addition to that, there was also an expression of suspense for motivating the target client in order to try

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the car in: "**Descubre** el nuevo #GRSupra Jarama Racetrack Limited Edition y **déjate llevar**". It is eventually a transcreated advertisement that used different image and script according to the target expression system. In figure 2 for France's advertisement, the image demonstrates the blue car GR Supra Jarama Racetrack on the road. The script was kind of a solution finder, where the focus was more on the speed of the car and the enjoyment of riding it during the long road when going on vacation in "**Impossible de s'ennuyer sur la route des vacances à bord de la #GRSupra Jarama Race track Edition**.". In figure 3 for the UAE advertisement, the conception of the transcreated advertisement took the next level. The idea of adopting the changes and taking the challenges of the contemporary world were the context of the advertisement in **"Go for it, do your best and drive like a girl", says @amnalqubaisi_official encouraging younger girls to break down barriers and disrupt male dominated sports.""**. This phenomenon is very new for the Emirati girls and Toyota accepted and supported the challenge of empowering women.

In Nivea's marketing strategy, the advertisement was also conceived of verbal and non verbal expressions. The images were also different. In figure 4, France illustrated with 5 images to show the process of applying the product. In figure 5 and 6, Middle East and Spain preferred using just one significant image that had all necessary visual demonstrations. Concerning the model, in France and Middle East advertisements, the dark spots were visible on her face then they disappeared after the use of the crème. In the advertisement of Spain, they showed just the final results of the crème; a clear face without dark spots.

Concerning the script, the geographical element was highly taken into consideration at this stage. In France's advertisement, they referred to the sun as an enjoyable experience in "Découvrez le nouveau duo Cellular Luminous630®, votre allié pour diminuer les taches brunes ! Son indice FPS 50 vous permettra de **profiter du soleil printanier** tout en protégeant votre

peau.#nivea #niveaestla #luminous630 #antitaches #bellepeau.".For Spain's advertisement, it was more on the protection from the sun with the use of an incentive expression at the end in "¿Conoces la Crema de Día FP50 Luminous630 Fluido Triple Protección? Es una fórmula anti manchas de textura ligera que combina el ingrediente antimanchas patentado LUMINOUS630® **con un alto factor de protección solar** (FP50), un paso fundamental a la hora de reducir y prevenir las manchas de tu piel y conseguir una tez uniforme y luminosa. *¿A qué estás esperando para probarla?* #NIVEAContigo.".But in the Middle East, the sun element is not even mentioned because it is a blazing sun. They only focused on the protection from dark spots in "NEW NIVEA LUMINOUS630 Even Glow reduces dark spots in 4 weeks!.".

In L'Oreal's marketing strategy, the conception of verbal and non verbal expressions in the advertisements was distinctive. In figure 7 for Australia's advertisements, the images demonstrated the concept of beauty by illustrating with people from different races and with different inclinations, and this is the identity of the Australian people. Regarding the script, it was harmonious with the non verbal content in "What is beauty? *At L'Oréal, we believe that beauty is a universal aspiration that transcends time, borders and cultures* 😊. #Beauty gives us confidence in who we are, in who we want to be! Because we are creating the beauty that moves the world 🌍#beautythatmoves". In figure 8, in both verbal and non verbal expressions, the USA advertisement preferred to be supportive to the LGBT community. In figure 9, for the Middle East advertisement, the part where LGBT was introduced in images or the script in the previous advertisements, was deleted for socio-cultural reasons. They instead selected the other images of the commercial campaign that expressed beauty through the diversity of races only.

To conclude, transcreation and localisation are both techniques that are used in the geo-marketing strategy. They put first every local aspect, from language, to

the way of thinking, to the culture, to the society norms...etc. These are actually the arsenal of the soft power use because when they are introduced in advertisements, they have a direct effect on the target client. As observed in the above studied advertisement figures, modifications or omissions were used to transcreate an exclusive advertisement for the target customers based on their local languages and local cultures.

6. Conclusion

The global market is a group of local markets that are geographically located in different territories. These local markets happen to be under different geo-economical regimes, geo-political rules and geo-cultural norms. To exercise an effective control/domination on these distinctive local markets, very smart and innovative marketing strategies are applied, such as localisation and transcreation in translating and re-creating exclusive advertisements to the target audience of the target market. The relation, of connecting the global market investor to the local market customer, is made under the connection of the identity representations of these two parts: producer and consumer. To reach such level of control, a good command of the local language or the local expression system, a deep knowledge of the local culture and specially its value and impact on the local people and an up-to-date consultation of the laws and restrictions of the target market and the country are all very necessary criterions to the process of commercialising abroad.

Reaching clients abroad goes under the same marketing strategy at home, but with very different procedures and measurements to take. The marketing strategy consists of studying the local language, the local culture, the local identity, the local client, the local market and the flexibility to the contemporary world commercialisation requirements...etc. The transcreator should be qualified to go under all these examinations and work in collaboration with the marketing staff and the advertisement teamwork, where all members have an important

role to play to guarantee the successful management on the target local market and every aspect that is related to it.

The communication skills are a soft power that gets exercised on the target community of clients without running to the use of force or unwillingness. The translator, on his/her turn, is the intermediate that uses the power of communication to reach the marketing goals, therefore, transcreators are hired to be the voice of the productive company. They seem to know how to talk to the addresses and know everything that is related to the way the communication should be held in its multimodal features. Another reason of them being trusted is that, they are aware of the subsequent data talk after transcreating advertisements.

Geo-culture and geopolitics identify the adopted geo-marketing strategy. It is obvious that the main element in common between the three approaches and the one that imposes these changes is the geographical factor. In other words, a place is not just a location, but a factor that gathers a certain group of people in a state, where specific norms, laws and rules are ruled, and they are eventually identified with. In other words, it is the framing of the bigger picture of the target community/market.

Notes

Figure 1:

https://www.instagram.com/p/CM1msrOD3pg/?utm_medium=copy_link&fbclid=IwAR0aSC6m3nbJbHEwqgp7Ag1ckwmra-C3HH0elzkNpY67-l-1OFm7ai6tUm8

Figure 2:

https://www.instagram.com/p/CSKBrnYiq2s/?utm_medium=copy_link&fbclid=IwAR1wNzCCn3exodxXSOUM_1IRCkaR7cMi6ycu0CvsJ7mUD6HP4QFuD7j9oCI

Figure 3:

https://www.instagram.com/p/CJA7hkagJHx/?fbclid=IwAR2NdyDYWYyVa-OIkODE8vubVd_zQT8eB0ucTZS6vpntnVlKwq1d93E5NFc

Figure 4:

https://www.instagram.com/p/CQjyqN6D1yL/?utm_source=ig_web_copy_link&fbclid=IwAR3lCeuBeAZZIhHiZLb7aFNqJaWb4C8yhkfBf5hvHoKeXVl06ps zwqlFBIU

Figure 5:

https://www.instagram.com/p/CQqznelqoe/?utm_source=ig_web_copy_link&fb clid=IwAR1BfkmdgVqa_tFazJXrb6jiWV0mau4m7whpjyDaHjtPVDXG7QCok 9DFqHE

Figure 6:

https://www.instagram.com/p/CRLwMrp1c5/?utm_source=ig_web_copy_link& fbclid=IwAR0Q5i4IBFrImbs7fsaz_fmjkONQeF8gILMDFXt8xpCvbbe0o8Q6Jn ZhiZ0

Figure 7:

https://www.instagram.com/p/CNDMS9AsAMt/?fbclid=IwAR0kUp8PRAELBv LEtCedbQ8IoIONNax91S4knOn0sE33sG1oSs-pEkeUv9U

Figure 8:

https://www.instagram.com/p/CRL_h1yl2ll/?utm_source=ig_web_copy_link&f bclid=IwAR3WsJeTRAAjMVgkInQYSyzQQFpeFgVOa81HNGWIbyKgyMEd peZb4hSHts4

Figure 9:

https://www.instagram.com/p/CMKCM9rqitf/?utm_source=ig_web_copy_link& fbclid=IwAR1IepFRPo4Ia-EMG0zNAL5BiCnyQA6ylOtXwExcjforeWSwbCPrOue6Jzk

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Mapping Trends of Geopolitical Research:
A Bibliometric Analysis 2000-2021

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Abstract

In recent years, geopolitical research has gained momentum. To fully explore its progress and impact, an extensive overview of research was conducted reviewing all journals in Scopus dataset, examining published research between the periods of 2000 and 2021. Principally, a bibliometric analysis was employed documenting a significant increase in publications in the last five years. Specifically, the journal of Sustainability Switzerland has one of the highest numbers of publications on Geopolitical research. The literature is dominated, principally, by authors from Asia, United Kingdom, United States, Russian Federation, and Germany. The study identified the most frequently cited authors, drawing on a list of co-authorship between authors and cooperation between countries in the field. The predominance of Asian, German, Russian and English publications was prevalent in the networks, centered around their international collaborations. The findings of this study highlighted the lack of mapping and systematic review of existing literature which is a necessary applied component of the social, political sciences, economic, and multidisciplinary studies. Furthermore, Geopolitical research is a multidisciplinary field of inquiry, however, the field gravitate more towards the social sciences with the highest number of publications in GPR, compared to other neighboring disciplines. The results of this study contribute to the existing and prospective literature by shedding light on previously untapped avenues which may immensely enrich any potential enquiry in the field of geopolitical research and practice.

Keywords: trends; geopolitics; research; bibliometric; geo-culture

1. Introduction

Geopolitics is originally a branch of geography that strives to map and explain the relationship between geographical realities and its link to international affairs. Such link between geography and international affairs has been documented dating back to the times of ancient Greeks. However, its reach has been limited and was until the discovery of modern geography's methodological and conceptual tools that theoreticians could examine those connections in an attempt to approximate scientific precision. Consequently, the discipline's mission became transparent. Essentially, it strives to provide an identification of the geographical circumstances that best explain the power dynamics at play, in a study of the character and behavior of nations (S. Spencer 42-47). 'Geo-politics' as a term was coined at the end of the nineteenth century by the Swedish political scientist Rudolf Kjellén. Since then, a relatively extensive amount of complex research and theories have been assembled under its label. Its history has undergone a fair number of transformations and transitions. The significant phases that marked its history were discussed in depth accounting for the different points in the history of 'geo-politics' in a volume titled: *Geopolitical Traditions: A century of geopolitical thought*, edited by David Atkinson and Klaus Dodds (2003). Geo-politics as new term ushered a new type of research and study for a new era. Its focal objective is to offer a new understanding and conceptualization of the geographical and relational networks of the world's nation states (Heffernan 27). Among the studies conducted at the beginning of its development we find researchers such as Ó Tuathail 1996; Holdar 1992; Raffestin, Lopreno and Pasteur, 1995. Like any other discipline in its inception, a coherent and well-defined body of knowledge to geo-politics from theory to a ground application linking the local to the global was absent. Essentially, the term emerged as a substitute to a prior existing intellectual enterprise under the label of political geography. Nevertheless, geo-politics was not introduced as a direct substitute to political geography, rather, such novelty in the discipline sought to introduce a new account to the preexisting and fundamentally

unexamined geo-political dimensions in the political world (Atkinson, Dodds18). Beyond the historical space of geo-politics, my chief concern, in this paper, is to provide insight into the current points of emphasis of research on geopolitics. Principally, bibliometric analysis will be employed with the objective of mapping the current state of the arts in geo-political research.

Bibliometrics as a term is of recent origin. It was coined by Pritchard in 1969. Before 1969, such analysis had no title at all, and sometimes called "statistical bibliography". With initial attempts comprised of statistical methods for the study of different subjects. However, its usage and practical application can be traced back all the way to the 1890s. Essentially, the term bibliometric analysis is defined as a statistical evaluation of published scientific research found in books, journal papers, and other research articles (Sengupta 75-98). The main objective of bibliometric analysis is an extensive mapping of the amount of literature produced in all disciplines and body of knowledge; accounting for the number of publications, the number of citations, the number of authors (individual or group), the co-authorship between authors, the key words used and repeated vocabulary. Research on literature analysis was studied quantitatively dating back to the early 20th century with some of the most important works including F.J. Cole and N.B. Ayers, in 1917, when they first studied the literature of comparative anatomy published from 1543-1860, using a quantitative analysis method. In 1923, E.W. Hume introduced "documentary statistics" as a title. Lastly, in 1969, A. Pritchard, a philologist, proposed to replace "documentary statistics" with bibliometrics as an all-encompassing research of literature statistics from journals, books, to all sorts of publications (Zhang). Fundamentally, bibliometric analysis maps existing literature to provide a report on the state of the art in a specific discipline, and its intersections with other neighboring fields of inquiry. The main objective is to provide a comprehensive overview on the research, identifying gaps or disregarded areas to offer recommendations for both future research and practice.

Based on such objectives, this paper aims to systematically provide the latest account and research development in the geo-political field.

2. Literature Review

Geopolitical research being a multidisciplinary field has had its fair, though limited share of reviews over the years. The few studies on trends in geopolitical research were Investigated relying on different types of analysis; bibliometric analysis, content analysis, systematic literature reviews, reviews mapping, within a delineated time frame. Classifying the literature and documenting the progress as well as content of academic production is essential to uncovering the potential disparities between academics and geopoliticians struggling to assert themselves. In Geopolitical maps: *a sketch history of a neglected trend in cartography* by Edoardo. Borian, 2008, two different practices to knowledge production were uncovered. In this study, Borian asserted "the importance of the cartographic medium in representing phenomena, as well as the courage to experiment with innovative technical solutions and to reclaim a role for cartography as an important mode of expression geopolitical maps" highlighting the competition between academics and geopoliticians (E. Boria 305). Another similar research mapped the geopolitics of the Russian federation where the federal assembly addresses of Putin and Medvedev which builds upon previous research on American state-of-the-union and Russian geopolitics by examining how the Kremlin has represented Russia's geographic and geopolitical position in the post-Soviet era. This study analyzed presidential addresses to the Federal Assembly from 2000 to 2011. In addition to exploring general trends evident in these speeches, it was found that the legacies of the Cold War-era perceptions of threat, as well as dissatisfaction with the Cold War's resolution, remain salient in these speeches. However, there is some movement toward a broadening of Russia's cognitive map. (Ambrosio, Vandrovec). In the field of education, memories, models and mapping of the impact of geopolitical changes on comparative studies in education investigated the progress of international geopolitical research between the years 1996 to 2015, by

Song, D Lu, Liang, Wang, and Lin. The paper systematically reviewed the trends of geopolitical research, including the borders and the territory, global geo-culture and geo-economics, Chinese models of geopolitics etc. The study recommended that Chinese geopolitical studies should reinforce the status of geographical space and scale, through the use of the process of description, as well as integrate humanistic thoughts, to further enrich the theories and practices of geopolitical research.

A similar bibliometric and literature review analysis was carried out in evaluation of one belt one road publications by MF Bashir, B Ma; Y Qin; and Bashir. It was concluded from the research that although OBOR initiative has received considerable grasp, a bibliometric study on this topic is still lacking. Additionally, while contributions to the geopolitical literature have gradually increased over the years, and Chinese scholars are increasingly making contributions to the geopolitical literature, a study on the "Gaps in Chinese geopolitical research." *Political Geography* in 2017, uncovers a visible epistemological gap in understandings of Chinese geopolitics between voices from inside and outside China. Therefore, it was argued that "Chinese geographers should contribute more to the exploration of internal geopolitical vocabularies and theories, and furthermore translate and introduce them out of China, so that it is plausible to construct a link between scholars in China and from the rest of the world" (An, Ning, Xiaomei Cai, Hong Zhu 136-138).

Recently, critical geopolitics appears to be the main area of geopolitical research, especially with its embeddedness with humanistic (emotional, feminism) politics. In a paper titled "Progress in international geopolitical research from 1996 to 2015." (2017). The trends of geopolitical research were systematically reviewed, including global geo-culture and geo-economics, Chinese models of geopolitics, resource conflicts and ecological politics, as well as emotional geopolitics. (Song, Tao, et al. 497-512). Another article titled "Geopolitical assemblages and complexity." *Progress in Human Geography* (2014) proposed a framework for considering materiality in the field of geopolitics: assemblage and complexity theories. Drawing on literatures

beyond the field to imagine a posthuman geopolitics. The study argued for 'a relational ontology that emphasizes the complex interactions among the elements of an assemblage' which carries direct implications for the understandings of agency, subjectivity, and systemic change (Dittmer, Jason 385-401).

3. Objective and Research Questions

Geo-political research has gained momentum over the years. In tandem with advances in communication technologies and technology in general, geo-politics seeks to operate with the conviction that the new world being a 'small village' needs to be understood and accounted for from a micro and macro perspectives, in its entirety, as an integrated global whole. Consequently, a single operating system naturally needs a single all-encompassing discipline capable of capturing its complexity in providing a full view of its continuous ever-changing state. Evidently, the field of geo-politics is linked to various interrelated disciplines and new research avenues are revealed continuously. Hence, the state of the art of geo-politics is in need of continuous review and analyses to gain a wider and accurate perspective on its future search in various domains of inquiry and application. Various scholars and geographers sought refuge in this novel discipline despite the occasional criticism of this intellectual field. Geo-politics' magnetisms offer a privileged insight into the world's geo-political affairs. Accordingly, a thorough and continuous review of every field is vital in the mapping and scrutiny of the impact, relevance, limitations and gaps that are with no doubt present in all areas of thinking. In particular, what concerns us more here in this paper, is the advancement of geo-political research, its impact, relevance, and limitations with special regard to its intersections with other related or unrelated neighboring fields of inquiry. This paper aims, despite its restricted space, to cover the objective in mapping trends in geo-political research between 2000-2021. To cover these objectives, the following research questions led the inquiry:

- Who are the most cited authors in the field?
- Which journals have the largest number of articles in geo-political research?

- What is the leading field in terms of publications in geo-political research?
- What are the chosen methodological approaches in geo-political studies?
- What are the most frequently used key words in geo-political research?
- What terms occur most frequently within the research?
- What is the highest amount of co-authorship between countries in distance language education?
- What is the highest amount of co-authorship between authors in the geo-political discipline?

4. Research Methodology

For this research overview, I developed a search strategy to identify the relevant literature. This search strategy was allotted to one of the most widely used databases: Scopus and the search terms used were the following: "Geopolitics" AND "Research". The search spanned from the database year 2000 until 2021, though present 2021 research was not yet finalized at the time of extraction, an inclusion was necessary for a complete and comprehensive assessment addressing possible measurements for the relevant questions only. The Scopus search engine was used between 2000 and 2021 to identify broad literature in geopolitical discipline. Scopus is one of the most extensive citations and abstract databases of peer-reviewed literature from scientific journals, books, to conference proceedings. The search string was limited to obtain the most appropriate record on publication years 2000-2021. The initial search identifies publication related to geopolitics AND Research 23,196 document results. The search was then limited to the relevant period from 2000 to 2021 and revealed 6,343 document results. After limitations the search revealed 4,358 document results. In their titles, abstract, or keywords: geopolitical AND research AND (limit-to "all"). The query was limited-to (OA, "publisher full gold"). It was limited-to (pub Year, 2000). limited-to (pub stage, "final") AND (limit-to (doctype, "article") and limited-to (doctype, "review") limit-to (doctype, "conference proceedings"). Limit-to (doctype,

"book series") limit-to (doctype, "journal") limit-to (doctype, "books")) and (limit-to (language, "English")) and (limit-to (source type, "journal") AND (limit-to (subject area, "sociology") and limit-to (subject area, "environment") AND limit-to (subject area, "economics") limit-to (subject area, "arts") limit-to (subject area, "computer science") limit-to (subject area, "multidisciplinary").

4.1. Inclusion and Exclusion criteria

The search was guided by a systemic review approach coupled with a set of inclusion and exclusion criteria used to filter irrelevant results to the objectives of the query of the bibliometric search. Accordingly, publications on geopolitical researches in different international journals were obtained comprised of open access publication only between the year (2000-2021). This includes the following items: book chapters, books, reviews, conference proceedings, journal articles, conference reviews, and editorials. The search results used a language limitation to publications in the English language only with no geographical restrictions. In addition, based on the identification of publications and subject area, only those that precisely concentrated on geopolitical research in isolation or with intersections with other disciplines were included. Furthermore, prior to extraction, duplicate records were omitted before the data extraction stage to extract relevant data only capable of meaningfully informing the analysis process.

4.2. Data Extraction and Analysis

At the extraction stage, the results obtained at the end of the search were saved into visualized output results in Scopus. The extracted data were imported into excel sheets where several categories were organized based on each relevant category of obtained data. VOS viewer has been primarily utilized as a visualization program for the imported data to establish network and maps based on collected data. The data was categorized according to many variables; most cited authors based on citation metrics, top journals, types of publications, number of publication per area, number of

publications per research areas, type of methodologies employed, most frequently used key words, identifying networks based on co-authorship between authors and co-authorship between countries, most active discipline in terms of quantity of output research produced, the multidisciplinary studies conducted in intersection with the geo-political field. Using VOS viewer, the imported data was organized in network maps and links were created to showcase the publications' links based on commonly used keywords within publication titles and abstracts (co-occurrence), an assessment of (co-authorship) between authors, and (co-citation). The bibliometric analysis helped identify the research trends of geo-politics in various disciplines: Agricultural and Biological Sciences Arts and Humanities, Biochemistry, Genetics and Molecular Biology, Business, Management and Accounting Chemical Engineering, Chemistry, Computer Science, Decision Sciences, Earth and Planetary Sciences, Economics, Econometrics and Finance, Energy, Engineering, Environmental Science, Health Professions, Immunology and Microbiology, Materials Science, Mathematics, Medicine, Multidisciplinary, Neuroscience, Physics and Astronomy, Psychology, Social Sciences.

5. Results and Interpretation

	Article	Book	Book Chapter	Conference Paper	Editorial	Review
Total	3619	66	112	214	65	282

Figure 1: Publication distribution by year.

Figure 2: Publication distribution by year.

Figure 3: Publication distribution by country/Territory.

Figure 4: Publication's by author.

Figure 5: Records distribution by subject area.

Journals	Number of publications
Sustainability Switzerland	185
Plos One	86
Political Geography	86
Iop Conference Series Earth and Environmental Science	76
Geopolitics	69
E3s Web of Conferences	40
Progress In Human Geography	38
International Journal of Environmental Research and Public	33

Health	
International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy	30
Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences	30
Geoforum	27
Resources Policy	26
Russia In Global Affairs	24
Research In International Business and Finance	19
Environment And Planning D Society and Space	18
Environment And Planning A	17
Energy Research and Social Science	16
Territory Politics Governance	15

Table 1: Journals with most publication records per year.

Table 1 classifies the journals with the highest number of yearly publications from 2000-2021. The leading journal is Sustainability Switzerland with 185 publications per year, followed by Plos One with 86 publications per year.

The extracted data set of the selected empirical studies on geo-political research focused on various topics of all journals in Scopus database; most notably the ones with the highest number of publications per year (figure 2) and type of publication (figure 1). Specifically, most studies conducted between the periods of 2000-2021 have increased considerably throughout the years. The Preliminary data set revealed studies consisting of 3619 articles, 112 book chapters, 214 conference papers, 66 books, 65 editorials, 282 reviews which focused on advancement and amount of production in the field of geo-political studies. However, only few publications addressed the state of the art of geo-political research to document its development and intersection with other neighboring fields of enquiry. Mapping trends in geo-political research over the years plays a significant impact on the way authors and academia in general are fully invested in political analysis tracing steps taken and drawing on links and networks in the world's geo-political arena; the way policy-makers think, the amount of state-to state cooperation, on the one hand, and

academical co-authorship and cooperation between scholars on the other. After the year of 2000, a significant increase in number of publications in the field from 2 in the year 2000 to 883 in 2021. A growing focus on geo-political research on the part of policy makers and academics recognizing the extent of its reach and influence in dealing with international politics and welfare systems that bare a direct effect on each and every citizen with grand implications on either future peace or warfare possibilities. Subsequently, and especially what followed with worldwide health crisis, the increase in trajectories can be, with outmost certainty, predicted to continue and expand much faster in the near future.

When it comes to the documents production by country or area in the third figure and within the same selected year range, we notice that the leading country in terms of articles and conference papers production per year is headed by the United Kingdom. The geo-political research production in various journals of different studies is geographically irregular, where the number of publications in some countries significantly exceeds others. The United Kingdom leads geo-political research production with 1082 from the year range 2000-2021. Followed with a relatively far second position by the United States with an amount of production of 730. In the far east we find the Russian Federation right after the US with 364, and China with a high policy research with 292 publications. Germany (267), Australia (221), Canada (178), Netherlands (174), France (151), South Africa (142), Poland (140), Sweden (137), Finland (120), Italy (120), Spain (113), Norway (110), Nigeria (107), Turkey (101), Switzerland (86), Belgium (84), Brazil (75), Czech Republic (66), Japan (66), India (64). This reflects the most powerful nations' interest and focus on geo-political research considering its powerful and significant impact on their future development and influence in world's politics.

The fourth figure displays the authors published articles in different international journal associated with geopolitical research. The documents' distribution by author shows the number of articles produced by year per author within the same time frame.

The author with most productions per year is Gupta, R. Dr. Rangan. Gupta works currently as a Professor at the Department of Economics, University of Pretoria, South Africa with 32 publications (Books and Articles) per year and 20597 citations. Followed by Su, Chi.Wei with 1 860 citations and 13 publications per year. Bouri, Ellie, with 7,004 citations, is an associate professor of Finance at the School of Business at the Lebanese American University with (12) publications per year. Sonnemann, G. with 124 highly influential citations in semantic scholar and 145 scientific research papers with (11) publications per year. Asongu, S.A. (10), Bilgin, P. (10), Dittmer, J. (10), Ge, Y. Kallio, K.P. Müller, M. Wohar, M.E. (9), Bach, V. Gkillas, K. Katsanevakis, S. (8), Helbig, C. Jurajda, P. Kark, S. Levin, N. Pierdzioch, C. Qin, M. Tao, R. (7). Basham, V.M. Berger, M. Bonato, M. Demirer, R. Doucette, J. (6). The volume of authors in geopolitical related research is centered within a relatively small group of scholars working in a few academic institutions that operate through interdepartmental collaborations as well as in international co-authorship collaborations.

Figure 5 displays documents distribution by subject area with the highest number of articles and conference papers production per year headed by the Social Sciences with 3066 publications from 2000-2021. Environmental Science with 1130, Economics, Econometrics and Finance (773), Arts and Humanities (751), Earth and Planetary Sciences (428), Business, Management and Accounting (317), Agricultural and Biological Sciences (251), Computer Science (216), Multidisciplinary (180), Engineering (167), Medicine (98), Biochemistry, Genetics and Molecular Biology (82), Psychology (76). Geopolitical research is a multidisciplinary field of inquiry that encompasses aspects from neighboring disciplines with the geo aspect Earth and Planetary Sciences, Agricultural and Biological Sciences. The politics part gathers disciplines primarily the social sciences as a leading category, Business, Management and Accounting, multidisciplinary, Engineering, Computer Science, psychology. Accordingly, geopolitical research would naturally gravitate towards the social

sciences that focuses essentially on topics connected to human behavior in relation to society and culture and organizations at large including political issues at the center.

Figure 6: Network of cooperation: co-authorship between countries.

A full counting with a maximum number of counties per document is 10. Minimum number of documents of a country is 5. Minimum number of citations of a country is 1. Of the 164 countries, 70 met the threshold. For each of the 70 countries, the total strength of the co-authorship links with other countries was calculated. The countries with the greatest total links strength were selected. Number of countries selected is 70. The map illustrates the network of cooperation and co-authorship between countries. Based on how frequently the co-authorship occurs in the imported data to the software, the publications being the nodes which represent linkages that denote co-authorship relationships. Larger node signifies the highest amount of co-authorship between countries; meaning, the countries with the biggest number of cooperation internationally. Publications with more occurrences will display a link strength indicated by thick threads attached to the nodes. Nodes are colored depending on the wide-ranging frequency with which the cooperation occurs in a publication in the specified time frame; with the most recent publications given precedence and colored lighter than their darker old counterparts.

Figure 7: Cooperation network: co-authorship between authors.

The maximum numbers of authors per document was limited to 25 authors with a full count. With the minimum number of documents for an author 2 publications. As for the minimum number of citations of an author is 0. Of the 5122 authors, 447 met the threshold. For each of the 447 authors, the total link strength of co-authorship with other authors was calculated. The authors with the greatest total link strength were selected with a total number of 447. The map illustrates the network of cooperation network (co-authorship between authors), based on how frequently the co-authorship occurs in the imported data to the software. After the refinement of the search, the publications are represented by the nodes which represent linkages and denote co-authorship relationships. The larger node signifies the highest amount of co-authorship between authors; signaling publications with the biggest number of co-authorships internationally. Publications with more author collaborations will display a link strength indicated by thick threads attached to the nodes. The nodes are colored depending on the wide-ranging frequency with which the cooperation occurs in a publication. The most recent publications are prioritized and colored lighter than the darker old nodes.

Figure 8: Co-occurrence of all keywords.

Fields from which terms were selected are Title and abstract fields. A full counting with a minimum number of occurrences of a term reduced from a standard 10 to 4. Of the 9860 keywords, 844 met the threshold. For each of the 844 keywords, the total link strength of the co-occurrence links with other keywords was calculated. The keywords

with the greatest total link strength were selected. Number of Keywords selected 844.

Figure 9: Co-occurrence of a term.

Extracted from the title and abstract fields. For each of the 989 terms, a relevance score was calculated. Based on the score, the most relevant terms were selected. The

default choice was to select the 60% most relevant terms. Of a full counting of 42710 terms, 989 met the threshold. Minimum number of occurrences of a term is 10. The Number of terms selected is 593. Both figures illustrate the co-occurrence of all key words and terms in authors title and abstract fields based on how frequently they occur in the same publications. Based on how frequently the key words occur in the imported data to the software, and after refinement of the search, the key words are represented by the nodes. Nodes are colored depending on the frequency with which they occur in a publication. Link strength denote the co-occurrence frequency. The keywords that occur more frequently and with more publications are clustered together and are colored significantly brighter considering their occurrence in various publications compared to other fading and past publications over the delineated time frame.

6. Discussion

Co-authorship between countries in figure 6 shows a collaboration map between major countries based on co-authorship of their authors. The different colors represent the different clusters formed by the group of countries and the circle seizes to constitute the number of articles per country. The bigger the circle or node of each country, the higher number of publications based on co-authorship between countries. Cluster 1, the largest, includes the United Kingdom being the biggest circle and country that collaborates to co-authorship with other countries with an average of 393 publications and 2256 citations. Followed by the United States with a total of 273 and 990 citations. Russian Federation 218 publications and 428 citations. China 188 publications and 1096 citations. Germany with 127 and 533 cites. Canada 80 publications and 356 citations. France 74 publications and 570 citations. Australia 75 publications and 325 citations. Poland 75 publications and 308 citations. South Africa 67 publications with 311 citations. Netherlands 71 publications with 449 citations. Furthermore, Co-authorship between authors displayed in figure 7 shows a collaboration map between major authors based on co-authorship with other authors.

The different colors represent the different clusters formed by the group of authors or one author and the circle seize constitute the number of articles per author in co-authorship with other authors. The bigger the circle of each country, the higher number of publications based on co-authorship between the countries. Cluster 1, Gupta. R 19 publications and 180 citations. Followed by Su. C. Wei with 13 publications and 67 citations. Wang. J 12 publications and 56 citations. Bouri. El 11 publications and 76 citations. Sonnemann. G 7 publications 106 citations. Tao. R 7 publications and 43 citations. Zhang. X 7 publications 36 citations. Qin. M with 7 publications and 54 citations.

One major observation that can be deduced from the list of co-authorship between authors and cooperation between countries in geopolitical research is the predominance of Asian names, German, Russian and English in the networks. Being the leading countries in terms of number of publications in the discipline, it should come as no supervise to see that their occupation of first positions is based on cooperation between leading countries in the field. Additionally, the leading authors in geopolitical research linked to the number of productions per year and extensive number of citations centers around their international collaborations. Furthermore, this was, in a large part, a major strategy implemented by the leading states which saw a significant increase in recent year. With advancement of information technology and globalization, the prime objective was to adopt measures for extreme vigilance tracing and mapping the networks of the world's constantly shifting politics. The competition and ambition to become leaders in the industry drove their decisions with regard to a change in the dynamic of communication and collaboration with co-authorship in academia as example in the collaboration network provided in the displayed figures.

The bibliometric analysis employed in this research focused on published academic studies in geopolitical discipline, with the outputs produced internationally and with English language as medium. Nevertheless, a relatively small number of academic researchers in the field in different international journals explicitly investigated the

research trends of geopolitical research. Furthermore, the lack of mapping for the field is not new to other fields of enquiry, however, it is prevalent especially in geopolitical studies. The mapping and systematic review of existing literature is a necessary applied component of the social and political sciences, economic, and multidisciplinary studies. This latter presents a more complex interrelatedness between knowledge production, evaluation and power. The development and progress in geopolitical research produce a continuous stream of new problems and prescribed solutions when available. Nonetheless, its progress has been criticized for its lack of a well-defined theory and methodology. Still, it remains a vibrant and focal actor in world' politics and academia with leading figures and states eminent in various global sectors. In areas that are highly dependent on geopolitical research, social science, science and technology, agriculture, energy, health, and security. Differences in the geopolitical research geographical distribution production are interesting. Certain countries, which happen to be powerful countries worldwide, show a substantially extensive yearly production and overall higher performance compared to others. On the other hand, geopolitical studies in general are far more prevalent in some fields and appear to surpass others in certain journal collections. Moreover, geopolitical research is arranged within a relatively small set of academics within the diverse associations and academia's research groups that exist internationally. Additionally, while a small portion of research produced in the field of the study showed multidisciplinary with 3%, there is little theoretical bridging between contemporary studies in geopolitics due to the lack of a robust theoretical and methodological grounding and collaboration between authors globally. Thus, to solve most of the field's problems, the demand for ever more knowledge mapping and assessment is vital for an effective building of a geopolitical research structure.

7. Conclusion and Future Implication

To conclude, this study explored the current trends in the field of geopolitical research published between the periods of 2000 and 2021. An extensive overview of research was conducted reviewing all journals in Scopus dataset. A total of 4,358 publications were extracted initially according to relevance and pertinence criterion, and later on refined for 990 articles for thorough the bibliometric analysis. Principally, the bibliometric analysis was employed with the objective of mapping the current state of the arts in geopolitical research. The study identifies the most frequently cited authors and most commonly used keywords and terms and journals with highest number of publications in studies on geopolitics. The research areas were identified with the social sciences taking the lead in the field proximately followed by environmental science, arts and humanities discipline with other disciplines with a minimum number of publications.

The study presented a descriptive macro-level bibliometric analysis identifying the highest amount of research produced in journals, the greatest number of collaborations between countries, the leading countries in terms of publications, citations and co-authorship between authors, the distribution of publications by subject area, the most widely used key terms by researchers in the field of geopolitical research. In terms of the field's intersection with other disciplines, more work is needed to identify the causes and provide solutions for the minimum amount of interdisciplinarity with neighboring fields of similar inquiries and objectives. This latter would immensely enrich the conceptual background and provide limitless avenues for a more refined and effectively applied geopolitical research. Additionally, the collaboration in terms of co-authorship between authors and counties is a golden asset for any field of inquiry and especially geopolitics.

The findings of this research showed a significant increase in the number of yearly publications, especially for the past five years. Such rise can be attributed to the adverse international political atmosphere, with conflicts in different regions of the globe. Additionally, geopolitical research is mostly concentrated in countries either

involved in the conflicts or heavily invested in geopolitical research like UK, US, Russia, China, and Turkey. Accordingly, the majority of the most cited authors are from Asia and the previously mentioned countries. The results of this study contribute to the existing and prospective literature by shedding light on previously untapped avenues which would immensely enrich any potential enquiry in the field. Research in geopolitics has been consistently produced and concentrated in specific parts of the world. Hence, it ought to expand and extend its reach with more international collaborations, and by interacting with other neighboring disciplines acquiring multidimensional lenses.

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V. Mapping Geo-culture across Glocal Relations

Prologue

Mapping geoculture across glocal relations underpins geocultural Power. The latter provides an important complement to 'on-the-ground' perspectives by explaining in great depth the ambitions, aspirations, and logics of how geocultural relations play dynamic roles in connecting the global with the local. These connections are framed into certain discourses which are governed by culture, religion/faith, think-tanks, among others.

Saîdi's paper has three main outcomes: Setting out a conceptual framework for the emergence of geo-culture; Defining the interplay between geo-culture and soft power; Showcasing cross-cultural/ civilizational dialogue as a rhetorical antidote to mono-cultural/ civilizational paradigm in the context of inter-civilizational relations drawing on the philosophical insights of three authorities

Alaoui focuses on Morocco's Geopolitics of religion in Sub-Saharan Africa in order to promote religious dialogue and spiritual security. The geopolitics of religion is used as a soft power to sustain south/south relationships. The outcome is employing some interfaith diplomacy to strengthen African roots and ties.

Mehrez argues that culture is an instrumental soft power tool in shaping and impacting international relations. According to Mehrez, culture has become a geopolitical factor, chiefly when recognizing and acknowledging cultural diversity.

EL Fatin and Nouib tackle the issue of international relations from Think Tanks perspectives. Thinks Tanks do consolidate the international relations vision, as constructed from research centers, labs, universities, etc.

Geo-cultural Interventions in Cross-Civilizational Communication Towards a Dialogical Approach

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Abstract

Current epistemic themes, e.g., geo-culture, capture the epistemological injustices and power imbalances inherent in conventional IR discourses; the emergence of geo-culture is exacerbated by the resurgence of the populist-nationalist resistance to "Western" universal values and the rise of clashism (i.e. Clash of Civilizations thesis) which is nurtured by narratives of cultural irreconcilability. This chapter speaks of the need to rethink and contest the post-bipolar discourses (e.g., the clash theory and the end of history rhetoric) that sustained inter-civilizational tensions and disputes. It proposes geo-culture as an alternative lens through which inter- civilizational relations/encounters may be envisaged. The rationale is to engage with counter-hegemonic discourses that challenge the essentialist and monolithic framings of East-West relations and that promote dialogue, pluralism and co-existence. The chapter therefore seeks to: (a) lay out a conceptual framework for the emergence of geo-culture, along with its intersection with soft power (b) make a case for 'dialogue among civilizations' as an antidote to the clash theory and (c) draw on the the philosophical insights of three authorities (Hans-George Gadamer (1975), Va´clav Havel (1994) and Bassam Tibi, 2012)—all of whom stand in favour of human dialogue and cross-civilizational pollination.

Keywords: geo-culture; cross-civilizational communication; inter-civilizational conflict; inter-civilizational dialogue.

1. Introduction

The post-bipolar international society has entered an era of multicultural and multipolar world order that requires devising an intellectual and peaceful framework committed to fertilizing a cross-cultural landscape of mutual dialogue in the context of inter-civilizational encounters[1]. Notwithstanding, the politics underlying the post-Cold War discourse has been informed by two main notorious theses of the century—namely Francis Fukuyama's 'End of History' and Samuel Huntington's 'Clash of Civilizations'. Both theories endorse a philosophy of a unilateral and mono-logical politics of world order reflecting solely Western-centric civilizational and liberal models. Against these discourses, dialogue of civilizations is proposed by international relations theorists (e.g. Fred Dallmary, 2009; Mohammed Khatami, 1998)[2] as an alternative discourse for mono-cultural or civilizational international coexistence. The latter stresses the importance of establishing the core tenets of dialogue for pursuing a cross-civilizational mutual understanding and mitigating the risks of what Fabio Petito called 'culturalist enclosure—that is, the essentialization of cultural and civilizational differences. By a way of illustration, the critical stance of the dialogical paradigm is to problematize and re-examine the core Western-centric liberal and political assumptions upon which cross-civilizational relations are based. In the same line of argument, geo-cultural philosophy—a third prism of international relations that emphasizes the return of cultural and religious to the public square—rethinks the way cultural pluralism is dealt with in cross-cultural interactions, questions the extent to which under-represented civilizations and cultures are valorized in the discourse of the cultural politics of international and intercultural relations and embraces an epistemological polylogue of cross-civilizational discourse. Geo-culture is, moreover, dialogical in nature as it seeks to envisage bridges for mutual cross-cultural/civilizational understanding at multiple

levels—the topmost civilizational relations. To this end, the present chapter takes the stance against the mono-logical discourses underpinning inter-civilizational encounters and the essentialist conceptualizations of world cultures/ civilizations in academic discourse. In doing so, it equates the geo-cultural paradigm with the dialogical theory in terms of points of convergence and discusses their underlying objectives in reference to inter-cultural/civilization communication and politics of international world order.

2. Theorizing Geo-culture: A conceptual Framework

The emergence of geo-culture, as a nascent paradigm, marks the cultural turn underlying the study of international relations (IRs) scholarship. However, before its inception, a large body of intellectual work has been written on geo-economics and geo-politics to explore complex and pending cultural and political issues governing international communication across diverse cultural and civilizational polities. While the geo-economics approach attempts to ascertain disputes across cultures and civilizations from an economic perspective, the geo-politics or basically critical geo-politics approach addresses these conflicts from a political lens. As such, each paradigm adopts specific schemes of reference in order to deconstruct the cultural, ideological and political discourses and epistemes governing international cultural relations. That said, this section outlines the core tenets of the two paradigms envisaging international relations—namely geo-economics and geo-politics and unravels their drawbacks, which eventually induced scholars to frame international relations from a third paradigm—that is geo-culture.

Since its inception into the study of international relations, geo-economics has gained some attention in the research circles (Fiori[3], 2008; Strange, 1970)[4]. It was first introduced by Edward Luttwak in 1990s in his seminal article "From Geo-politics to Geo-economics: Logic of Conflict, Grammar of Commerce", pointing out that Post-Cold war political and cultural discourses will be sparked by economic factors rather than political or military ones[5]. In the tradition of Luttwak, geo-economics is viewed as a form of power implemented for pursuing strategic goals, realizing political agendas and imposing cultural assets. Hudson et al. (1991)[6], for example, perceive geo-economics as strategies of territorial control that are economically motivated and carried out by economic means, the most

important of which are investment and trade. In another definition put forward by Harris et al (2016, p. 24), "geo-economics is a parallel account of how a state builds and exercises power by reference to economic factors".[7]

On the other hand, non-Luttwakian scholars regard geo-economics as a discourse, informing the agendas and policies of think-tanks and policy-makers (Sören and Mikael, 2018)[8]. For them, geo-economics discourse is used as a soft power tool whereby countries conduct and legitimize their cultural hegemony and political interests. Therefore, such kind of narratives are monological par excellence, thus curbing the plurality of perspectives and polylogical cultural representations in world politics. Against this background, weaving a discourse of cooperation and dialogue across cultures is central to meeting the demands of our globe which is marked by the diversity of cultures, civilizations and religions.

Geo-politics, on the other hand, is another theory of international relations. It was coined in 1899 by the Swedish political scientist Rudolf Kjellen, defining it as "the theory of the state as a geographical organism or phenomenon in space" (Cohen, 2001).[9] In a similar context, Sprout and Sprout[10] (1960) maintain that in classical academic theorization, geo-politics comes to deal with the physical environment (location, resources, territory, etc.) and the conduct of foreign policy. In a more refined conceptualization of the meaning of geo-politics, Ó Tuathali and Agnew (1992, p. 4) understand it "as a discursive practice by which intellectuals of statecraft 'spatialize' international politics in such a way as to represent it a 'world' characterized by particular types of places, peoples and dramas".[11] By incorporating the notion of discourse into the analysis of geo-politics, Ó Tuathail and Agnew argue that geo-politics analyzes the socio-cultural resources, rules and practices whereby intellectuals of statecraft—such as foreign-policy experts, advisors and various public think-tanks—design, articulate and order foreign

policies at the governmental level or implement particular foreign policies and practise statecraft on a daily basis.

By contrast, critical geo-politics has emerged as a school of thought to question and deconstruct the discourses of international politics and conceptualize geo-politics as a social, cultural and political practice. As a research endeavour, it seeks to unpack how popular cultural assumptions and artistic representations—such as literature, journalistic media, government communications and other rhetorical strategies—about geography and politics formulate contemporary discourses and ontologies about the cultural/ civilizational Other (Toal and Dably, 1998)[12].

Loosely put, despite the worthwhile contributions advanced by geo-economics and geo-politics to the discussion on how countries sustain their cultural, political and economic dominance by means of economic and political policies, yet both approaches failed to pay heed to the significance of culture and religion in perpetuating ideological and hegemonic discourses about the cultural Other in world politics. In view of this, the geo-cultural theory emerged to address this lacuna.

The geo-cultural paradigm, which has received a scant attention in the literature of international cultural relations, capitalizes on the impact of a specific culture on inter-cultural/ civilizational communication. It was used for the first time by Immanuel Wallerstein in 1991[13] in his book "Geo-politics and Geo-culture: Essays on the Changing World Systems" to refer to the cultural framework within which the world-system operates, speculating that states are in incessant dialectical positions over remaking of the world system along with their cultural, civilizational and religious models. For Wallerstein, the world-system is composed of three sub-systems: the economic and political structure and the symbolic and cultural structure. The latter structure is geo-culture.

It is worth-noting that geo-culture has only been given some attention in the tradition of cross-cultural and civilizational communication since Samuel Huntington's release of his notorious and thought-provoking thesis of 'clash of civilizations'. Since then, inter-civilizational conflicts have been explained in light of the geo-cultural theory—the latter has paved the way for a plethora of themes and areas underdeveloped by geo-economics and geo-politics.

In a recent article, Gaumgaumi (2021)[14] defines geo-culture as the combination of what is cultural and what is geographic by way of intercultural communication and international relations. It is about how what is the cultural (ideas, rituals, objects) get distributed across geography (space). However, other scholars theorize geo-culture in relation to power, cross-cultural diplomacy and politics; namely, the appeal to culture, as a soft power tool, in order to exert influence over a given country by reference to cultural symbols, practices and representations. Tim (2019)[15]; for instance, argues that geo-culture makes use of the strategic mobilization of an array of aspects of culture, religion and history in order to win friends, build loyalties and legitimize expansions both locally and internationally. For him, geo-culture operates through spatial and cultural resources that go beyond territorial and temporal confines of a given state. Tim provides a very pertinent example exhibiting the manifestation of geo-cultural power—that is China's Silk Road narratives, which reflect the spatial and cultural dimensions of geo-culture used for validating the Chinese geo-political and geo-economic aspirations on a global scale.

As an analytic framework, geo-culture challenges universal theories of culture and civilization—which are deeply anchored in Western cross-cultural narratives and adopts a transformative agenda that condemns any sort of cultural centrism or hegemony foregrounding cross-cultural relations and/ or discourses and any

potential sources of Orientalist thinkings that may continue to hold sway in academic discourse and that may result in reproducing biased narratives of the civilizational other. In so doing, geo-cultural philosophy seeks to indigenize communication research by drawing on the cultural values, traditions, ideas and expressions that fall within a certain cultural or geographic boundary (Wang, 2014)[16]; as well as, embraces a culture-centricity as a reference for highlighting cultural and civilizational specificities that are oftentimes subjugated and exploited in cross-cultural relations discourse.

3. Geo-culture and Soft Power: Any Interplay for Soft Cross-Cultural/Civilizational Discourse

The interlock between geo-culture and soft power has been mapped in the literature on international relations (IR) and featured in a series of think tanks publications. In this sense, culture has been regarded as a key asset of soft power discourse whereby countries promote their cultural heritage, achieve their political policies and build mutual relationships across diverse geo-cultural spaces. In such a way, geo-culture and soft power are argued to be part and parcel of inter-cultural discourse and/or hegemony mediation—that is the appeal to cultural aspects to sustain the ascendancy of a given culture in world politics.

The term 'soft power' was coined in the early 1990s by the international relations scholar Joseph Nye, who defines it as "the ability to get others to want the outcomes you want through attracting or co-opting them rather than forcing or coercing them" (2004, p. 5)[17]. A defining attribute of soft power is that it is non-coercive and cooperative par excellence. For Nye, in today's multi-polar society, countries foster their foreign policies by dint of three resources: "its culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when others see them as legitimate

and having moral authority) (p, 11)". As a point of illustration, when the culture of a given country entails a set of values and attributes that are disseminated and shared on a global scale, it helps that country in percolating its outlined objectives and orchestrated policies in the target counties. Contrarily, countries whose cultural norms and values are parochial are not likely to be appealing to other culture groups, let alone the dissemination of their foreign policies. The political values or policies are also resources of soft power. For example, the domestic values that a given country projects in its behaviour such as freedom or democracy affect the preferences of others in international contacts. Similarly, when a country's foreign policies promote universal values such as human rights, liberalism, peace and intercultural pluralism, it affects its diplomatic relations with other countries. These points are succinctly summarized by Nye as follows:

> "A country may obtain the outcomes it wants in world politics because other countries—admiring its values, emulating its example, aspiring to its level of prosperity and openness—want to follow it. In this sense, it is also important to set the agenda and attract others in world politics, and not only to force them to change by threatening military force or economic sanctions. This soft power—getting others to want the outcomes that you want--co-opts people rather than coerces them (p.5)".[18]

It worth-mentioning that although soft power is a non-violent form of cross-cultural discourse, yet it is ideologically-informed because it is argued to be inherently part of cultural hegemony. Powerful countries apply it in order to legitimize their political agendas abroad and reinforce their cultural uniformity worldwide. In other words, despite how attractive the three resources of soft power to the cultural other, they should not be taken for granted. These assets of soft power are, to my stance, tantamount to creating a unilateral and asymmetrical model of interaction between states as well as undermining the diversity and

plurality of cultures and civilizations in a time when cross-cultural dialogue and appreciation of cultural differences are of major importance.

The core tenets of soft power outlined so far intersect with geo-culture in a number of ways. Firstly, both concepts converge in terms of goals—that is building mutual diplomatic relations with other cultures/ civilizations via the conduit of culture. Secondly, they seek to generate positive attitudes of one's own country, to promote its image and to strengthen its influence via the vehicle of cultural products and values. Thirdly, they cater for promoting the local cultural products—ideas, history, art, values and tradition on a global scale. In view of these points of intersection, cultivating a discourse of cross-cultural dialogue in international relations remain among the salient goals of both geo-culture and soft power.

4. Mapping Dialogue among Civilizations as a Global Geo-Cultural Discourse 4

The term cross-cultural dialogue across civilizations and cultures occurred in the era of conflicts and confrontations underlying the relations between states. It has been considered as a powerful rhetoric and antidote against the notorious theory of 'Clash of Civilizations'. And so does the theory of geo-culture. In this chapter, the concept of 'Dialogue among Civilizations' is counted as a global political discourse conducive to reinforcing human coexistence and cross-cultural/civilizational pollination in the context of inter-civilizational encounters.

The dialogue between civilizations emerged as an alternative global political discourse to the two powerful theses of the 'end of history' and the 'clash of civilizations' (Petito, Dallmayr, 2009; Tibi, 2012)[19]. It was proposed by the President and the Islamic Republic of Iran Mohammed Khatami in 1998s and adopted by the United Nations as a normative framework for the post-multi-polar

world order (Petito, 2007). Indeed, Francis Fukuyama's and Samuel Huntington's theories[20] have been the mainstream discourses underlying the politics of post-Cold War international order; both discourses represent the monologue of an essentially Western-centric and liberal world order. On the one hand, Fukuyama contends that world history has reached its end as a dialectical process after the defeat of communism and liberalism represents a mono-civilizational world order centred on a one global polity or model. Within this horizon, the idea of the existence of multi-civilizational polities is no longer valid. Huntington, on the other hand, maintains that conflicts underlying the post-bipolar international society would no longer be ideological but cultural occurring along civilizational fault-lines. In other words, the thesis of the clash of civilizations was advanced as a geo-political map for understanding the new structure of international world which is based on a plurality of civilizations—each of which is trying to map the entire world along its political, cultural and civilizational models. Nonetheless, both theses have received harsh criticism for their infidelity to multi-culturalism and inter-civilizational bridging (Tyler, 2008)[21]. Against these discourses, inter-civilizational dialogue is proposed as a third political discourse that is in support of mutual cross-cultural/ civilizational understanding (Petito, 2007; Dallmayr, 2001). Central to inter-civilizational dialogue paradigm is a dialogical theory proposed by Hans-George Gadamer's (1992: 132, quoted in Dallmayr, Beyond Orientalism: xiii) philosophical thinking, which anticipated the idea of a dialogue across civilizations, which he framed as:

> "The human solidarity that I envisage is not a global uniformity but unity in diversity. We must learn to appreciate and tolerate pluralities, multiplicities, and cultural differences…Unity in diversity, and not uniformity and hegemony—that is the heritage of Europe. Such unity-in-diversity has to be extended to the whole world—to include Japan, China,

India, and also Muslim cultures. Every culture, every people has something distinctive to offer for the solidarity and welfare of humanity".[22]

Those global solidarities underscored by Gadamer reside at the heart of inter-civilizational dialogue turn in the politics of international relations. This paradigm challenges the politics of cultural/civilizational unilateralism and calls for a rhetoric of multilateralism—which is tantamount to constituting a peaceful, multicultural, and globalized international society organized around the notions of multi-polarity, cross-cultural jus gentium, and a comprehensive idea of peace (Dallmayr, 2009). In this connection, Steger (2009)[23] contends that in order to move from an imperial monologue to a dialogue among cultures and civilizations, there is an urgent need for a commitment to cultural pluralism as well as a conscious effort to highlight the contributions of all cultures to the creation of an increasingly global community of communities. This task can only be achieved through fostering geo-cultural and geo-civilizational communications across nations and adopting a dialogical paradigm in the politics inter-civilizational encounters.

It is worth-mentioning that the theory of dialogism in the arena of international relations encompasses a critique of power politics. Khatami (2000) clearly accentuates this idea, contending that:

"We ought to critically examine the prevalent paradigm in international relations based on the discourse of power, and the glorification of might . . . From an ethical perspective, the paradigm of Dialogue among Civilizations requires that we give up the will-to-power and instead appeal to will-to-empathy and compassion. Without the will-to-empathy, compassion and understanding, there would be no hope for the prevalence of order in our world. We ought gallantly to combat this dearth of compassion and empathy in our world. The ultimate goal of Dialogue

among Civilizations is not dialogue in and of itself, but the attainment of empathy and compassion."[24]

It is clear that Khatam's rejection of power politics implies not only the objection of politics that is bereft of cross-cultural consciousness and instead the establishment of the will-to-empathy, but also the idea that ideas, values and norms embedded in cultures and civilizations should inform the whole political apparatus. In such a pursuit, the ultimate goal of dialogue is building avenues for conflict resolution and inter-civilizational peace and coexistence.

On a similar vein, Va´clav Havel, a post-modern dissident playwright, is another outspoken and proponent of dialogue of civilizations (Petito, 2007)[25]. Speaking from Western intellectual tradition, Havel (1994, p. 168) has provided an insightful analysis on the compelling need for an inter-civilizational dialogue, pointing out that: "the central political task of the final years of this century . . . the creation of a new model of coexistence among the various cultures, peoples, races and religious sphere within a single interconnected civilization".[26] Havel articulates further the idea that today world has entered an era of multipolar and multicultural international society contained in a single civilization. He uses the metaphor of the 'common room' to succinctly describe the idea of different cultures living together within a single civilization, which in turn, necessitates a cross-cultural dialogue centred on a genuine openness and the ability to step beyond the confines of our own habits and prejudices.

Another authority that is worth-citing here is Bassam Tibi's thesis of inter-civilizational bridging as a framework for preventing civilizational clash or what he termed 'wars of ideas' in the arena of geopolitical international relations interactions. To Tibi, the amelioration of civilizational conflicts can be conducted through inter-civilizational dialogue—a turn that has become the limelight in the

political theory of international relations communications. Additionally, Tibi perceives inter-civilizational conflicts as emanating from the religionalization of politics and the shrinking of the world brought about globalization. With regard to the religionalization of politics, he focuses on the Islamism (versus Islam), a modern phenomenon, based on an ahistorical ideology whose value-system is non-negotiable, resting on a political claim of Islamic world order. Against this backdrop, Tibi suggests that Muslims should look back to what he terms the actual, "Hellenized" Islam (p. 74) of the medieval era, which embraced civilizational bridging and respect for cultural and religious others. As for globalization, he views it as a concatenation of multiple civilizations with conflicting values. To address these conflicts, civilizations must end 'war of ideas' and adopt an inter-civilizational dialogue based on a mutual respect for cultural differences. That said, Tibi also perceives his trend as distinct from Huntington's thesis of 'clash of civilizations', noting that a 'conflict is not a clash' because clashes essentialize and promote polarity (p. ix). By contrast, he suggests that there is a need for a shared 'cross-cultural morality' for 'preventing the clash of civilizations' and to smooth the way for post-bipolar world peace (p,13). Such an inter-civilizational enterprise can be pursued through de-politicization of religion (here he refers to Islamism) and multi-civilization/multi-culturalism of the politics of international relations discourse.

In a nutshell, the main conclusion that can be deduced from the above-mentioned perspectives is that the ultimate gaol of a cross-cultural dialogue is to set up a peaceful and just world order in which all world's histories, values, arts, literature, cultures, civilizations and traditions are called upon for pursuing a mutual understanding and inter-civilizational fertilization. The latter might unfold only when cultural plurality, civilizational diversity and political multi-polarity are

admitted in the international relations affairs. To this effect, since geo-culture underlies the critical stance of this chapter, I argue that it correlates with the dialogical paradigm in certain points. Firstly, both frameworks advocate a cross-cultural dialogue approach to international cultural relations. Secondly, they call on a rhetoric of convergence of civilizations or cross-civilizational bridging that recognizes and values plurality of different cultural traditions in the intercultural relations discourse. Lastly, they stymie the mono-civilizational framework of world order centred around Western values, ideas and hegemonic perceptions and instead endorse a multi-civilizational approach to international world order.

5. Concluding Remarks

As a recapitulation, this chapter advances the contention that geo-cultural paradigm seeks to bridge cultural/ civilizational-fault-lines through engaging in an active politics of dialogue among and between civilizations in the context of inter-civilizational encounters. In so doing, it denounces "mono-civilizationism" and instead acknowledges the inclusion and recognition of other civilizational traditions in the discourse of international relations, in a bid to circumvent civilizational hierarchy/ hegemony. As such, the implications of geo-cultural interventions in cross-cultural/ civilizational communication reside not only in rethinking asymmetrical power relations across cultural boundaries and catering for cross-cultural/civilizational dialogue on a global scale, but also in drawing on insights from under-represented cultures and civilizations in world politics which have worthwhile contributions to cross-civilization pollination. For these purposes, this chapter has provided a conceptual background for the emergence of geo-culture in international relations as a third paradigm reflecting the cultural turn, mapped the interplay between geo-culture and soft power and advocated a

cross-cultural   dialogue   framework   for   pursuing   a   peaceful   cross-cultural/civilizational contact.

Endnotes

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Morocco's Geopolitics of Religion in Sub-Saharan Africa Promoting Religious Dialogue and Spiritual Security

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Abstract

The intersection of religion and politics dates back to a long history. Religion plays a fundamental role in shaping states' foreign policies and international relations. Morocco has been one of the major religious references in the Sahel region and West Africa; nevertheless, it tries to spread its sphere of influence in other African regions. The overlap between religion and Rabat's foreign policy has two major interests. First, it tries to foster its geopolitical presence in the African continent, and to introduce Morocco as a moderate religious model to be followed. Second, it tries to approach extremism and terrorism with a soft strategy, since religion has a historical powerful role in motivating people. In this regard, this chapter tries to investigate the use religion as a soft power in strengthening Morocco's foreign policy and promoting its public diplomacy in Sub-Saharan Africa. Also, it discusses Morocco's role in spreading interfaith dialogue and spiritual security through: the establishment of religious institutions, the royal tours in African countries and the royal speeches.

Keywords: Morocco's foreign policy; geopolitics of religion; sub-Saharan Africa; soft power; spiritual security

1. Introduction

Morocco has played geostrategic and geopolitical roles in Africa for many decades starting with military, economic and political support to cultural and religious influences in the continent. Morocco has been perceived as a religious reference; mainly in Sahel region and West Africa, the fact that strengthened Morocco's symbolic position in the region. Accordingly, historical as well as new religious ties have been used to achieve Rabat geopolitical interests, especially to curb the spread of terrorism and save the state's autonomy and security.

Morocco is recognized as a leading country in providing and spreading spiritual security in the African continent. In 2014, many African countries requested Rabat to share with them its experience in religious education of moderate Islam. This agreement intended to enhance security cooperation between Rabat and other African states and open promising horizons in this important area. The cooperation is not limited to one country in the region over others but it includes many parts of the continent, which are invited to achieve safe and secure Africa. The African continent is witnessing dramatic events for many decades that have led to violence, human trafficking, poverty and famine; thus, this experience used to be approached from a purely military vision that aimed to curb the spread of violence and chaos. However, after the replication of those experiences and the spread of global violence it was obvious that the military approach in not the only solution for this problem, pointing out that religion and culture play a prominent role in promoting dialogue between nations and civilizations and then decreasing the spread of extremism and terrorism.

This renewed religious cooperation under the leadership of Morocco; including the training of Imams *Morshidin* and *Morshidat*[1], the Institute of *African Ulema*[2], the reconstruction of religious places in African countries, and the

supervision on Sufi trends and *Zawaya³*, has contributed in the development of the region and has shown effective results in preventing extremism. Nevertheless, Morocco did not stop at that level, but was keen to talk about the problems of terrorism and extremism on many national and international occasions. Morocco also stressed the values of tolerance, brotherhood and communication between cultures, civilizations and religions. This approach led to the politicization of culture and religion by virtue of the overlap that the fields of studies are witnessing.

This chapter reviews Morocco's religious policy towards Africa, starting from a general overview of Morocco's Africa foreign policy to the spread of interfaith dialogue and spiritual security in the continent. The paper argues that Morocco's new vision towards the continent is based on a leading, but in the same time cooperative, policy that seeks to use a soft strategy to handle the problems of terrorism and extremism. This strategy goes hand in hand with Rabat's geopolitical interests in the region which aims to increase its religious presence and influence.

2. The Geopolitics of Religion in International Relations and Foreign Policy: *Defining the Term*

Geopolitics is a complex term that has no unified or unique definition[4], nevertheless, it can be, practically, defined as "the science of study of the relation between geography, power and politics and the transactions resulted from their combination"[5]. Additionally, the use of the word geopolitics means to "emphasise the particular significance of a space in order to, for example, identify political actors, formulate political goals, or analyse the tools that are available for the implementation of politics"[6]. From these definitions we can assume that geopolitical sciences studies the intersection of political activities, power (in all its forms) and geography, and how space can play a significant role in determining world's politics in general and regional politics in particular.

However, space in geopolitics does not mean only geographical territories but also "immaterial spaces such as cultural, religious, or virtual spaces"[7].

Since the term geopolitics is complex in nature; then, its intersection with religion becomes more complex and controversial. Religion in its nature is "the ultimate denial of the significance of earthly distinctions", while geopolitics is "a way to wield or explain power by making territorial (geographical) distinctions"[8]. Religion is the relationship between human beings and God, it is "a set of beliefs and practices relating to the gods worshipped by a given group of people and handed down through tradition"[9]. Hence, at first glance, it seems that there is no close relationship between religion, or religious practices, and politics, but in the contrary, religion is one of the fundamental factors that shape international relations, international politics of stats' foreign policies.

Throughout history, it has been proved that religion "has a central force that motivates and mobilizes people" and can lead to conflict and peace simultaneously[10]. Religious teachings have been misleadingly used as arguments to justify political practices such as the Crusades and what is called 'Islamic Jihad'[11]. In those cases religion had a political purpose, since it was the strongest argument to invade or start war especially that it was justified by the doctrine of *divine right of kings[12]* which was widespread in Europe for any centuries[13]. However, even after the spread of the secularization theory after the Peace of Westphalia agreements in 1648, religion has regained its impact and powerful role in international relations especially in the second half of the 20th century[14].

The power of religion has two folds; it can be used to spread clashes and conflicts and promote proxy wars in many regions around the world; on the other hand, it can be used to spread mutual understanding and spiritual security. Recently, and due to globalization process and the spread of technology and communication, religion is omnipresent in every communicative situation or

practice; either formal or informal. Hence, religion as a soft power means to get what you want without the use of hard power, coercion or payments[15]. World states are well aware of the role religion can play as a soft power to promote their political practices softly and gain more followers and more political and economic profits. Accordingly, religion and geopolitics are fused in recent studies to deeply analyse the intersection of religion and politics.

The term geopolitics of religion has become well known in the analysis of recent political topics. The geopolitics of religion analyses the way in which religion can affect political activities within a territory or geographical space in order to serve political objectives[16]. Moreover, geopolitics of religion "focuses on analyses of a political actor and its actions and geopolitical goals", while geopolitics of religions (in plural) focuses more on analyses of the similarities and differences between religions[17]. The geopolitics of religion is the coalition of religion and politics which crosses the geographical borders of states to achieve their national interests[18]. The states purposes and interests are dynamic and subject to change. For instance, decades ago European states were interested in conquering colonial territories to expense their royal realm and secure their crowns, while nowadays states are interested in four common purposes namely security, autonomy, welfare and status and prestige[19]. Moreover, the state's foreign policy objectives are expressed through its policy orientations in four conditions as adopted by Holsti[20]. First, the structure of international system in which the state is involved, second, the nature of the state's domestic attitudes and its social and economic needs, third, the external threat to the state's internal values and interests, and finally, geographical location to which the state belong. Generally speaking, states' foreign policies are determined by their internal needs that cannot be achieved without external help, and different tools are used to achieve them among which we find religion. In this regard, religion is chosen by policy-makers and foreign policy officials to gain the state's interests across

borders, to protect its autonomy, to enhance security and to save its status and prestige.

Religion as soft power is also used as a solution to fight extremism and curb the spread of transnational terrorism. Since religion can strongly motivate people to follow the instructions and obey the laws, religion has become politicised to convince people to follow beliefs and ideas. Hence, religious leaders are viewed also as geopoliticians in international relations[21]. Many states around the world are using religion as a soft power to spread their sphere of influence especially in their geopolitical regions. Islam; for instance, is one of the most influential religions in the world, and two major countries compete to spread their spiritual presence in the world; namely, Iran and Saudi Arabia[22]. Nevertheless, Morocco is also playing a significant Islamic leading role in the African continent.

Moroccan foreign policy toward Africa; for instance, aims at strengthening internal autonomy and political stabilization through external diplomatic relations with a range of African nations. In addition to its strategies of economic diversification, Morocco is working to enhance its internal security, to promote its national prestige, as well as to establish cultural and religious diplomacies in the African region, and religion is a key factor to enhance its foreign policy with Western Africa.

3. Religion in Morocco's Foreign Policy towards Sub-Saharan Africa

3.1. Morocco's Africa Foreign Policy: *An Historical Perspective*

Morocco's African foreign policy is by no means a new phenomenon; rather it is rooted in history for many decades as it is determined by its strategic geopolitical pertinence. However, Morocco's foreign policy in the continent is influenced by many factors that could be reviewed in political, economic, security, cultural and religious dimensions[23] [24].

Morocco had a very prominent military and logistical role in the independence of a range of African States during the European colonisation. Accordingly, in 1960 Morocco trained more than 2000 African fighters from Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau and the republic of Cape Verde[25]. In 1977 and 1978, Morocco had supported Zaire[26] by sending military troops in order to sustain the Mobuto[27] regime[28]. Additionally, Morocco was a founding member of the African Unity in 1963[29], and even after the withdrawal of King Hassan II from the organization, Morocco was always diplomatically present in international summits and forums that tackle issues related to the African region[30]. In addition, "at the non-governmental level, Moroccan universities have been hosting students from other African states since the mid-1980s, which has created solid personal and social links between Moroccans and people from those other states"[31]. All these dimensions have enriched Morocco's Sub-Saharan African intercultural and interfaith communication, as we Morocco's prestigious position in the Continent.

At the cultural level, Abdeljaouad Sekkat maintains that "history witnesses the leading role of Morocco in the cultural movement in the African countries, and its influence in their development for millennia. Similarly, the present witnesses the extension of this role"[32]. In other words, intercultural communication in Morocco's African relations is rooted in history and represented in their civilizations. In the same sense, Sekkat adds:

> it is recognized that this cultural communication between the two sides was not born late, rather its roots are extended in the depths of history; noting that Morocco's African relations date back to a long time […], as well as the cultural intermixture that existed between the two parties in that era […][33]

Going back in history, a great credit for the entry of Islam and its spread in large areas of West Africa or Western Sudan such as Ghana, Senegal, Mali and others, is due to the role of Almoravid dynasty[34], which worked on expanding in these

areas and spreading Islam in its Maliki Doctrine and settling preachers among its tribes[35]; [36]; [37]. Since that time Morocco was playing the leading role of an Islamic sovereignty in those African regions, and it has undertaken a series of scientific missions to West Africa, mainly West Sudanian Savanna in order to teach Quran and Hadith under the supervision of renowned Imams and mentors[38].

In this regard, the acts of intercultural communication and acculturation were determined by the friction and cross-fertilization of cultures. Moroccan culture has become prominent in a range of African religious rituals such as the Moroccan way of reading the Quran, and the Moroccan way of drawing the Ottoman line etc.[39]. In the same vein, Moroccan Tijaniyya, EL-Qadiriyya and Shadhili Sufi trends have been adopted by Sub-Saharan African countries such as Senegal, Sudan and Comoros[40]; [41].

Furthermore, some Sub-Saharan African countries' mosques are built in the Moroccan style such as in Mali, Senegal, Chad, Ivory Coast and Guinea Bissau. In this context, the connotations of some African mosques' architecture and names show the deep religious and cultural representation of Morocco in these countries. For instance, the Moroccan Mosque in Mauritania, Hassan II Mosque in Gabon, Fes Mosque in Comoros, and Mohammed VI Mosque in Tanzania highlight the strong symbolic representation of Morocco in Sub-Saharan Africa[42]; [43]. Thus, Sorrells maintains:

> When you go to places of worship, such as synagogue, church, mosque, or temple, there are particular architectural features, artifacts, uses of space, and language, as well as verbal and nonverbal practices that construct the cultural space of these particular places. These are all cultural spaces that are constructed through the communicative practices developed and lived by people in particular places.[44]

The construction of cultural spaces strongly affects the relationship between the cultural space and the culture in which space was constructed. Hence, the Moroccan culture has been displaced and replaced in Sub-Saharan African countries, the fact that shifted the interests of Morocco's foreign policy towards Africa. More critically, Morocco has played a symbolic role as a religious reference for most Western African countries since the majority of Sufi trends are associated with Morocco. Thus, Morocco frequently uses religion in its public diplomacy towards West Africa.

3.1.1. Cultural and Religious Diplomacies in Morocco's African Foreign Policy 311

In the same line with the south-south strategy proposed by Morocco[45], or as it is also viewed as win-win strategy[46], and which focuses on enhancing the African continent and creating new opportunities at the economic and political levels, cultural and religious diplomacies have taken a very important part in this strategy. The Moroccan successive visits to a range of Sub-Saharan African countries, such as Rwanda, Tanzania, Ethiopia, Senegal, Zambia etc.[47], have shown the Kingdom's intention to set the ground for healthy and strong relationships with sub-Saharan African countries at all levels, which include cultural and religious ties. However, this is evident through the royal donations of thousands of Holy Quran copies, which are printed by *Mohammed VI's Foundation for the Publication of Holy Quran*, the religious meetings with Imams and *Zawiyas'* followers in many African countries and the royal leadership of Friday Prayers in many African cities[48].

The pressing need of promoting dialogue among cultures is highly viewed in Morocco's cultural and religious diplomacy towards Africa. Thus, several cultural and religious events are organized under the patronage of King Mohammed VI in which the presence of African culture, art and traditions are

strongly viewed in many Moroccan cultural projects. Some of these cultural events are; the Folklore Music Festival[49], the International Film Festival of Marrakech[50], Festival Mawazin: Rhythms of The World[51], Tangier International Music Festival[52], The Festival of Meknés Volubilis[53], The International Art Fair in Casablanca[54], The Spirit of Fez Foundation, and The International Festival of African Fashion[55], which took place in Dakhla in 2018 in its 11th edition.

Morocco's cultural diplomacy towards Africa seeks to open a dialogue between cultures and civilisations by bringing artists and participants from different cultural backgrounds to collaborate and produce new meaning of intercultural-interfaith communication. This strategy aims also to affirm the central role of intercultural dialogue as an effective instrument of understanding between peoples and a means by which conflicts could be resolved. Hence, Morocco is regarded as one of the most culturally active countries in North Africa combining its national cultural-religious diversity and its openness to other African cultures and religions.

Moreover, King Mohammed VI stresses the importance of promoting intercultural-interfaith dialogue in his speeches claiming that the world nowadays urgently needs awareness campaigns of the crucial role of effective intercultural-interfaith communication so as to be able to face all kinds of intercultural conflict that lead to terrorism and extremism.

3.2. Religion as a Soft Factor to Promote Spiritual Security in the African Continent

Due to the increase of terrorism and extremism in the globe, intercultural-interfaith dialogue has become a need. Despite the rise of globalization and transportation and the openness to other cultures, conflicts between peoples and nations in the 21st century are argued to be cultural and religious in the first place[56]. For instance, the terrorist operations the world witnessed in recent years,

reinforced hostility and marginalization towards some cultures and religions because they were approached from a religious perspective[57]. However, although the whole world has witnessed such terrorist attacks, the most affected regions are the African continent and Middle East[58].

However, following the demonstrations, political divisions and military coups of many African countries, it was easy to spread terrorism and extremism. Fragile States in Africa are today places where poverty is mostly severe, the thing that led to the spread of weapons-smuggling, corruption, illegal trade and trafficking in human beings. More critically, these unstable regions have become breeding grounds for organised crime and terrorism which threaten many African regions; mainly, Nigeria, Mali, Senegal, Libya, Guinea-Bissau[59].

Such unstable states offer space to train and recruit dissatisfied followers using ideological and xenophobic discourses to spread hostility hatred and revenge. Hence, the growth of radical extremism in sub-Saharan Africa necessitated rapid action by neighbouring countries and international organisations to curb the spread of this phenomenon. In this regard, international organisations, alliances and conferences arise to find practical solutions to stop the incursion of terrorism.

Morocco is regarded as an active agent in the African continent since it is untiringly working towards the promotion of peace, stability and co-existence. After the tragedy of Casablanca in May 2003 which led to the death of 47 people, Morocco realized the need to protect the Islamic religion from distortion and deviation in order to stop the threat of such dramatic events. A proactive management of the religious field was required and urgent solutions were necessitated for the fight against terrorism. The first step towards this mission was to modify the kingdom's constitution, thus, among the fundamental modifications was "He [the king] presides over the Superior Council of the

Ulema, charged with the study of questions that He submits to it" when the superior council is "the sole instance enabled to comment on the religious consultations (Fatwas) before being officially agreed to, on the questions to which it has been referred and this, on the basis of the tolerant principles, precepts and designs of Islam" in order to control the kingdom's religious sphere[60].

In this sense, religion in Morocco's foreign policy has been chosen as an alternative tool to achieve many interests, among which the most prominent are; first, to enhance internal security, which is closely related to external stability, and second, to spread Morocco's sphere of religious influence in the continent; especially West Africa. In other words, Morocco is using its historical religious ties with many African countries to expand its spiritual presence, and promote its public diplomacy and make it more attractive[61].

3.3. The Symbolism of The Commandership of the Faithful in Morocco's Sub-Saharan Foreign Policy

King Mohammed VI represents the commander of the faithful in Morocco, which has a strong spiritual authority in the kingdom. The Commandership of the Faithful is a neutral and impartial institution which; headed by HM King Mohammed VI, plays a fundamental role in preserving the rights and freedom of believers in Morocco and protecting the state's religion "Islam"

Not surprisingly, the symbolic representation of the Commandership of the Faithful is historically rooted in Morocco's African religious relations. The Moroccan sovereign was always recognised as Amir El-Mouminin (Commander of the Faithful) because of Morocco's role in spreading Islam in West Africa and Sahel regions, the fact that strengthened Morocco's African religious relations[62]. For instance, in Timbuktu, Friday prayers and its Khutba (sermon) were delivered in the name of Amir El Mouminin (King of Morocco).

From this point of view, Mohamed Chtatou stated that "Interestingly enough, his religious status is, even, recognized in many countries in West Africa, that acknowledge his religious title of 'Commander of the Faithful,' especially among the Tidjane communities in the Western parts of the continent."[63]. Furthermore, Morocco is recognized as a religious reference and one of the most stable places in the African continent, hence, the Moroccan model of Moderate Islam was needed in several African countries in order to fight terrorism. Morocco; nowadays, is promoting its religious soft power which is led by "Imarate Al Muminin" (commander of the faithful) or even *the commander of the African faithful*.

The keenness of the King of Morocco, as the Commander of the Faithful, to employ his religious and spiritual symbolism for the inhabitants of the countries of the Sahel and West Africa, has positively affected security and stability in the region[64], as well as it has enhanced Morocco's religious geopolitical position in Africa. Additionally, preserving the influence of Moroccan religious privacy that is characterized by moderation has been helping in promoting spiritual security in the continent, by taking the Moroccan experience in managing religious affairs as a successful model for spiritual security and combating terrorism.

3.4.   Morocco's Promotion of Moderate Islam in Africa

Morocco, recently, is playing a leading role in religious affairs by promoting new strategy of tolerant Islam in Africa. The religious diplomacy has become one of the most important domains in Morocco's foreign policy, especially during the increase of Jihadist movements in Africa and Middle East[65]. Within the framework of its soft religious and cultural diplomacies, Morocco has launched several initiative contributions in the African continent so as to export its experience in Spiritual Security[66] and Intercultural-Interfaith dialogue.

Hence, ambitious practical responses were proposed by HM King Mohammed VI to prevent the spread of extremism. The King established the Mohammed VI Institute of Morchidins and Morchidates, which is an academy for the training of Imams that was inaugurated on 27 March 2015. However, the main aim of the institution is to spread moderate Islam in the African region based on Maliki School, Ash'ari theology and d Sunni Sufism[67]. Respectively, El Merini stated that "due to the intensive initiatives to build Imams in accordance with the principles of a moderate and tolerant Islam, Morocco is about to become one of the most influential spiritual centres in the Muslim world"[68]. This institution is hosting students from different African countries; mainly, Northern and Western African countries[69] and those imams are going to be able to learn "values of moderate Islam, tolerance, intercultural dialogue and respect between religions"[70].

In the same vein, Mohammed VI Foundation of African Ulema in Fes was established for the same purposes. Thus, the foundation aims to spread and unify the Moroccan way of teaching moderate Islam in all over the continent. By the time of its inauguration, the foundation included 123 Ulema; 103 from several African countries and 20 from Morocco, however, after two years the number of Ulema has exceeded 330. The institution has its branches in 32 African countries including all African regions, the fact that reflects the African awareness of the prominent role that soft religious strategy plays in the African context. Not surprisingly, the member states that mostly join the foundation are those that are affected by terrorist movements; mainly Sahel region and West and East Africa including; Nigeria, Ethiopia, Mali, Central Africa, Tanzania etc.

The promotion of moderate Islam reveals the intensive initiatives of Morocco in the African environment and the new strategies that it is building so as to foster its foreign policy. Likewise, Sekkat stated:

> these and other elements [the cultural and religious diplomacies] are part of the system of the prominent role played by Morocco in favour of Sub-Saharan Africa, and the importance that it attaches to this promising region in various fields and levels, from which the most prominent are the religious dimension and cultural diffusion […][71]

Apparently, Morocco's promotion of moderate Islam is another soft powerful tool to strengthen its geopolitical position in Africa as well as to protect its territories from transnational terrorism.

3.5. The Politicisation of Religion in Morocco's Foreign Policy: *Religious Discourse as Soft Power*

The promotion of interfaith discourse and spiritual security does not only cover the foundation of institutions, but it is also strongly presented in the King's political discourses. In national and international occasions, events and summits, King Mohammed VI discussed topics related to tolerance, coexistence, interfaith discourse etc. to emphasise the role of spiritual security in preventing terrorism and extremism in the continent. This goes back to the importance of political discourses in influencing and persuading people without the use of hard power.

3.5.1. The Politicisation of Religious Discourse

Globalization has catapulted people from different cultural backgrounds to interact either in real or virtual spaces, however, this interaction has two contradictory facets; it can be done effectively by accepting each other's cultural properties, as it can lead to misunderstandings and conflict. In this sense, stereotypes and prejudices are bound to occur. Although intercultural communication and cultural awareness are crossing borders immensely, stereotypes are similarly growing. Thence, the world is witnessing the rise of terrorism, extremism and ideological discourses that affect world security system. Extremist people are justifying their terrorist acts under the pretext of

religion, discrimination and race issues. Therefore, "cultural issues are been politicised, and are been used for political debates although they actually belong to a completely different era."[72]

As a matter of fact, modern political studies are shedding light on the prominence of intercultural discourse in international relations and foreign policy in order to face all kinds of terrorism and cultural clashes that are influencing international peace and security. Therefore, Soyal maintains "culture has become the dominant frame for political issues and policies such as citizenship, security, the economy and so forth"[73]. This stresses the fact that the promotion and politicization of intercultural dialogue is of paramount interest for maintaining global peace and security. In the African continent, Morocco is playing a fundamental role in manipulating cultural issues such as religious extremism and intercultural clashes.

The main aim of discussing cultural and religious topics in Morocco's political speeches is to; first, state the kingdom's achievements in this area, to show its commitment to spread spiritual security in the continent, and to recommend collective actions and shared responsibility towards the continental religious harmony and spiritual security.

3.5.2. Interfaith-Intercultural Discourse as Soft Strategy in Morocco's Foreign Policy

Political discourses are historically recognized as an ideological set of words that function to persuade the public; usually using coercive power. Nonetheless, political discourses nowadays are using more sophisticated words and soft discursive strategies. The promotion of intercultural and interfaith discourses in King Mohammed VI speeches could be recognized as a soft powerful strategy which is used to influence public opinions and political decisions without the use of coercive power. In this sense, soft power is defined as "the ability to

shape the preferences of others, without the use of force, coercion or violence"[74]. Therefore, it is the ability to influence public opinion and make others behave in a particular way voluntarily.

Nye argued that soft power is not only about influencing people since the influence can rest on coercion, but it is also about attraction which leads to "acquiescence"[75]. Morocco's new vision of foreign policy is by all odds a soft powerful strategy which managed to guide the African political opinions towards Morocco and attract them to follow its model. Thus, Morocco is using a collaborative strategy which is based on agreements, reconciliation and compromise instead of competitive one which is based on conflict and disagreement

The increase of promoting intercultural-interfaith discourse in Moroccan political speeches in international events is determined by many factors. First, the diversified nature of Moroccan culture as shaped by the convergence of Arab, Amazigh and Saharan-Hassani cultural properties, as well as the religious variety, which stresses the Jewish Muslim historical coexistence. Second, the geopolitical position of Morocco as a link between Africa and Europe and the role it played as a historical commercial bridge through which acculturation and intercultural communication were bound to occur. Third, the prominent role that is played by Morocco as an agent in many international organizations that are concerned with issues of intercultural communication, immigration and interfaith clashes from which we can count the United Nations, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, Alliance of Civilizations, the League of Arab States and the Tripartite Forum for Interreligious cooperation for Peace. Forth, Morocco is promoting spiritual security and religious awareness to prevent the Moroccan kingdom from all kinds of terrorism and extremism. Morocco is untiringly working towards the promotion of peace, stability and development in the African Continent. This promotion is explicitly viewed in its humanistic projects

towards African migrants, the promotion of moderate Islam, and the promotion of intercultural-interfaith discourse.

In order to combat rumours about Islam and correct the constructed fallacies about it, Morocco's political speeches are used to represent Islam as a religion based on "Middle Path" teachings and a safety valve against the threat of radicalism and terrorism, especially that media reinforces xenophobic discourses. Moreover, Morocco is situated in Africa, and in order to prevent its national and territorial security from outside and inside attacks, it was necessary to treat this phenomenon with a multidimensional approach. Consequently, Morocco is betting on religious diplomacy in order to create soft solutions for these crises[76], which can be clearly viewed in the royal discourses.

For instance, in the speech delivered at the inauguration ceremony of Malian president Ibrahim Boubacar Keita in Bamako in September 2013, the King discussed the issue of Islam and the main similarities between Mali and Morocco in religious practices, and he expressed Morocco's support for Malian government in different sectors to combat terrorism and prevent extremism. The Sahel, including Mali, Nigeria, Chad and other countries, is a region where you can find Jihadist and militant groups. Poverty, ethnic conflicts and poor-governance are the fundamental causes behind the rise of terrorist movements. Accordingly, 400,000 Malians were forced to flee their homes between 2012 and 2013 and more than 18 million people in the Sahel region were affected by food crises[77].

The spread of terrorism threatened the continent security and contributed to the spread of fallacies and misconceptions related to Islam. Hence, the King stressed the role of religious and cultural dimensions to reconstruct spiritually secure and safe Africa. Thus, in the same speech, King Mohammed VI expressed the willingness of Morocco to provide training in the religious sphere for 500

Malian Imams which is mainly devoted to the study of the Maliki rite and of the moral doctrine that rejects any form of hostility and extremism. Moreover, Morocco's commitment towards Mali included also the reconstruction of Mali worship places, the rehabilitation of mausoleums and preservation of manuscripts.

The royal discourses were addressed to high profile politicians to share the action and responsibility towards the African continent in order to combat all kinds of terrorism and organized attacks. Hence, it was mentioned by King Mohammed VI that the military strategies are not enough to stop the spread of xenophobic discourses. In this regard, in the second edition of the International Conference on Intercultural and Interfaith Dialogue held in September 2018 in Fez and represented by Mustapha Ramid, the royal speech highlighted the need for shared responsibility and united action to curb violent extremism:

> To be effective, our joint action should be sustainable, comprehensive and flexible to suit changing environments. […], only a collective resolve capitalizing on the efforts of government, civil society, the media, academics and citizens can tackle reclusiveness and intellectual extremism. Inter-faith, intercultural dialogue is not an abstract concept or a form of intellectual luxury. Determination - on its own - is not enough in this domain. In fact, dialogue is born out of deeply held convictions which require strong commitment, hard work and matching words with action. (Ramid, the International Conference on Intercultural and Interfaith Dialogue, 2018)

The topic of extremism and terrorism is a transnational problem that goes beyond the boundaries of countries to threaten the whole humanity; therefore, all countries including all the components of each country should share the responsibility to demystify and clarify the meaning of Islam to detach it from negative interpretations.

4. Conclusion

In nutshell, religion is one of the main tools in Morocco's foreign policy towards Africa and a key factor in understanding Rabat's role and interests in the region. Religion is an effective and attractive soft power used by geopoliticians to spread their spiritual influence abroad, and Morocco is betting on it to achieve its national and continental goals.

The religious diplomacy pursued by Morocco in the African continent is a major reason for the consolidation of Morocco's foreign relations with the countries of sub-Saharan Africa. Morocco has become a model to be followed in combating all forms of terrorism and extremism, whether on the security level or on the spiritual level. This has made Morocco at the centre of the attention of African countries seeking to solve their internal problems related to the spread of violence, corruption and extremism. Morocco has also been an important religious reference for decades, and its historical relations with African countries have reinforced the role Morocco plays in the region. We cannot separate Rabat's determination to protect its internal security and its persistent and resolute role in combating terrorism at the continental level, since what the world knows today goes beyond separating the country's internal and external challenges.

Even more than that, the Kingdom's endeavour to spread the values of dialogue between cultures and civilizations is closely linked to the royal vision of making Africa at the centre of Morocco's interest and the core of Morocco's foreign policy. From it, we can say that there is a dialectical relationship between the country's public policy and its cultural and religious diplomacies.

Endnotes

[1] Morshidin and Morshidat: male and female religious guides who are responsible of giving; lessons in various Islamic sciences, lessons of preaching and guidance and contribute to the continuous training of religious leaders.

[2] Ulema: Muslim scholars trained in Islam and Islamic law and who can interpret Islam's sciences and doctrines and laws.

[3] Zawaya is the plural of Zawiya which is an Islamic institution associated with Sufis and Sufism in the Islamic World. In Morocco there are many Zawaya like the Qadiriyya and Tijaniyya which are also widely known in Sub-Saharan Africa.

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[5] Ibid p.55

[6] Mazurkiewicz, P. (2021). Geopolitics and religion. Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński University in Warsaw, p. 349

[7] ibid

[8] Dijkink, G. (2006). When Geopolitics and Religion Fuse: A Historical Perspective. Routledge: Taylor & Francis Group, p. 192

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[11] Dijkink, G. (2006). When Geopolitics and Religion Fuse: A Historical Perspective. Routledge: Taylor & Francis Group, p.193

[12] The divine right of kings is a political doctrine that claims that kings derive their authority and right to govern from God.

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[26] Zair: Former name of Democratic Republic of Congo

[27] Mobutu Sese Seko: was the military director and president of the Democratic Republic of Congo

[28] Messari, N. (2018). MOROCCO'S AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICY . Middle East and North Africa Regional Architecture (MENARA), p. 2

[29] ibid

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[34] Almoravid Dynasty was a Berber Islamic Dynasty centered in Morocco in the 11th century (between 1040-1147)

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(Mekki; Ajja; Harrach, 2017).

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[39] Ibid pp. 175-184).

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[48] Ibid

[49] The Folklore Music Festival was created by HM king Mohammed V in 1956 and is held in Marrakech, Sponsored by The Kingdom of Morocco Office of Tourism as well as other institutions and Organisations

[50] International Film Festival of Marrakech was created in 2000 under the patronage of the Prince Moulay Rachid

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[52] Tangier International Music Festival was created in 2010 and is organised by ATRAC – Association Tangier Region Action Culturelle

[53] The Festival of Meknes Volubilis is sponsored by The Moroccan Ministry of Culture with the collaboration of Meknes region

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La culture, enjeu central des relations internationales

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Résumé

La culture assure depuis longtemps sa mission politique de *soft power*, mission dont les mécanismes et les objectifs sont évolutifs et diffèrent d'un Etat à l'autre. Toutefois, depuis au moins le début du siècle, l'enjeu culturel est remonté à la surface et se retrouve désormais au cœur des relations internationales. Entre l'économique, le politique ou encore l'identitaire, la culture est en effet un enjeu relationnel et multi-dimensionnel qui suscite beaucoup de controverses. Ainsi, entre la revendication d'une *exception culturelle* dans le cadre du commerce international, et le débat sur la culture et le développement, cette dernière s'impose déjà en tant qu'enjeu géoéconomique. Par ailleurs, entre la tendance à *l'uniformisation* culturelle d'une part, et la nécessaire réaffirmation de l'égale dignité des cultures et la promotion de leur diversité (convention de l'UNESCO 2005) de l'autre, l'enjeu culturel s'avère aussi un enjeu géopolitique.

Abstract

Culture has long fulfilled its political mission of soft power, a mission whose mechanisms and objectives are evolving and differ from one state to another. However, since at least the turn of the century, the cultural issue has resurfaced and is now at the heart of international relations. Through economy, politics or even identity, culture is indeed a relational and multidimensional issue that gives rise to a lot of controversy. Thus, with the claim to a cultural exception within the framework of international trade, and the debate on culture and development, culture is already emerging as a geoeconomics issue. Moreover, between the tendency to cultural standardization on the one hand, and the necessary reaffirmation of the equal dignity of cultures and the promotion of their diversity (UNESCO 2005 convention) on the other, the cultural issue is also geopolitical.

Mots clés: culture; soft power; enjeu ; diversité culturelle ; relations internationales

1. Introduction

La place de la culture dans les relations internationales n'est pas nouvelle. La culture assure depuis longtemps sa mission politique de *soft power*, mission dont les mécanismes et les objectifs sont évolutifs et diffèrent d'un Etat à l'autre. Toutefois, depuis au moins le début du siècle, l'enjeu culturel est remonté à la surface et se retrouve désormais au cœur des relations internationales. C'est ainsi que la culture s'est imposée comme dimension fondamentale de la géopolitique du 21$^{\text{éme}}$ siècle. Entre l'économique, le politique ou encore l'identitaire, la culture est en effet un enjeu relationnel et multi-dimensionnel qui suscite beaucoup de controverses. Comment expliquer cette *redécouverte* de la culture par le champ des relations internationales ? Comment se manifeste la centralité de la culture au niveau de ces dernières ? Dans quelle mesure cette centralité est-elle effectivement nouvelle ?

Entre la revendication d'une *exception culturelle* dans le cadre du commerce international, et le débat sur la culture et le développement, cette dernière s'impose déjà en tant qu'enjeu géoéconomique. Par ailleurs, entre la tendance à *l'uniformisation* culturelle d'une part, et la nécessaire réaffirmation de l'égale dignité des cultures et la promotion de leur diversité (convention de l'UNESCO 2005) de l'autre, l'enjeu culturel s'avère aussi un enjeu géopolitique.

2. La culture, enjeu géoéconomique

La mondialisation[1] des communications, à travers la libéralisation continue et accélérée des services, permet aux citoyens du monde de découvrir les autres cultures et de pouvoir choisir entre plusieurs biens et services culturels de diverses origines. Mais, cette même mondialisation génère aussi chez les sociétés, la crainte de voir leurs cultures diluées et leurs identités perdues. La culture, ou plutôt les biens et services culturels seraient des produits pas comme les autres, ce sont des produits qui doivent échapper à la logique commerciale de l'OMC (1). Par ailleurs, les activités culturelles et artistiques jouent un rôle économique croissant en tant

que secteurs d'activités contribuant à la croissance économique et peut-être même au développement (2).

2.1. La culture : une marchandise pas comme les autres[2]

La culture est définie par l'UNESCO comme : « l'ensemble des traits distinctifs, spirituels et matériels, intellectuels et affectifs, qui caractérisent une société ou un groupe social et qu'elle englobe, outre les arts et les lettres, les modes de vie, les façons de vivre ensemble, les systèmes de valeurs, les traditions et les croyances »[3]. La culture est d'une double nature ; elle a à la fois une valeur intrinsèque et symbolique, mais aussi une valeur matérielle et marchande. Sont considérés comme des biens culturels les biens, meubles ou immeubles, qui présentent une grande importance pour le patrimoine culturel des peuples, tels que les monuments d'architecture ou d'histoire, les sites archéologiques, les œuvres d'art, les livres, ainsi que les édifices dont la destination principale et effective est de contenir des biens culturels[4]. A côté de cette définition juridique qui met en relief la dimension symbolique de la culture, une autre définition des biens culturels souligne leur nature matérielle et marchande. Ce sont « des biens de consommation qui véhiculent des idées, des valeurs symboliques et des modes de vie, qui informent ou distraient, contribuant à forger et à diffuser l'identité collective tout comme à influencer les pratiques culturelles …(comme) les livres, revues, enregistrements sonores, films, vidéos, séries audiovisuelles, produits multimédia, logiciels, produits de l'artisanat et design »[5].

Les biens et services culturels ne sont donc pas des marchandises comme les autres. Ce sont des biens qui véhiculent des valeurs et une identité qui doivent être préservées. Si tous les Etats n'ont pas la même capacité d'exporter leur culture, ils doivent au moins pouvoir garantir la survie des activités qui portent leurs identités et leurs valeurs pour garantir leur survie en tant que collectivité culturellement identifiable. En principe, tout Etat souverain est libre de mettre en place des

politiques publiques concernant des domaines comme l'éducation et la culture. A travers ces politiques publique l'Etat peut verser des fonds, directs ou indirects aux acteurs culturels, comme il peut entraver l'accès des autres cultures à son territoire dans l'objectif de préserver et protéger son identité et ses valeurs, donc sa culture. Mais si la protection suppose une action positive de la part des Etats à travers leurs politiques culturelles, la légitimité de principe dont jouissaient les interventions gouvernementales est désormais remise en cause en vertu des accords de l'OMC.

Lors des négociations du fameux Cycle de l'Uruguay, deux visions ont opposé les négociateurs. Pour les Etats-Unis, les biens et services culturels sont des moyens de distractions qui n'ont rien de particuliers, et doivent donc être entièrement soumis à la logique libre-échangiste. Pour d'autres négociateurs[6], ces biens sont particuliers, et leur soumission aux règles du commerce international, empêche la prise en compte de leur dimension symbolique et culturelle en faveur de leur aspect purement marchand. Or, afin de maintenir et développer une production nationale viable qui puisse refléter les expressions culturelles locales et éviter une standardisation des goûts et des comportements sociaux, l'Etat doit préserver le droit de protéger les activités culturelles en les subventionnant et /ou en restreignant l'importation de produit similaires. D'ailleurs, la viabilité économique de certaines industries culturelles – comme le cinéma et l'audiovisuel – peut dépendre uniquement de l'appui de l'Etat. Soumises aux seules règles de caractère commercial, notamment la clause de la nation la plus favorisée ou le traitement national, les activités culturelles seraient rapidement remplacées par d'autres productions fortement financées du fait de leur situation de monopole ou de leur implantation multinationale. Serge Regourd explique pourquoi certains secteurs doivent être dispensés du principe de non- discrimination : *« Si j'évoque par exemple, le fond de soutien du cinéma, il est alimenté par tous les films qui sont exploités en salle et il donne lieu à des ressources pour la télévision, mais ensuite ce fond de soutien ne bénéficie qu'aux productions françaises, aux co-productions*

ou aux films provenant de l'Union européenne. Autrement dit, le cinéma américain est en quelque sorte pourvoyeur de fond pour alimenter les fonds de soutien mais ensuite, les subsides qui sont attribués au cinéma sont destinés aux nationaux et plus aux Américains. En d'autres termes, s'il n'y a plus de clause de discrimination, alors le système ne tient pas debout. Il viendrait en quelque sorte, financer celui qui est déjà en position hégémonique »[7]. Reconnaitre l'exception culturelle signifie en principe reconnaitre le droit de ne pas appliquer les règles de libre-échange aux secteurs culturels dès lors que l'application de celles-ci aurait des effets perturbants ou négatifs. Ce qui revient juridiquement à assimiler la culture aux autres domaines protégés par l'article XX du GATT[8]. Toutefois, cette solution juridiquement cohérente est difficile à mettre en œuvre au niveau pratique du moment que le domaine de la culture est difficile à définir ou à cerner. Ce qui est culturel pour les européens qui revendiquent l'exception relève du divertissement pour leur principal interlocuteur, les Etats-Unis qui n'adhèrent nullement à l'idée de la particularité des biens et services culturels. Les biens et services culturels ne sont pas une catégorie bien définie ni au niveau des Etats, ni au niveau de l'OMC. Il s'ensuit que la notion d'exception culturelle, qui ne fait pas l'unanimité, est une notion théorique certes, mais elle n'a aucune consécration juridique, ce qui explique sa très grande malléabilité.

Dans les faits, l'exception culturelle s'est traduite par l'abstention de ses adeptes de faire des concessions (offre de libéralisation) dans certains secteurs culturels. En outre, ceux-ci -notamment les européens - ont demandé une série d'exemptions à l'application de la clause de la nation la plus favorisée (NPF), dont cinq portant sur l'audiovisuel. En revanche, d'autres services culturels ont fait l'objet d'offres de libéralisation, notamment dans les domaines du spectacle, de l'édition ou de l'architecture. Actuellement, dans le secteur de l'audiovisuel, seuls 18 Membres de l'OMC ont contracté des engagements après la conclusion du Cycle d'Uruguay, et certains autres le font dans le cadre de leur processus d'accession à l'OMC. Les engagements sont par ailleurs plus nombreux dans les services liés aux films

cinématographiques que dans les services télévisuels et radiophoniques[9]. Le débat sur la nécessité ou non d'une exception culturelle et donc d'un traitement particulier des services et biens culturels confirme l'importance grandissante de ce secteur dans la dynamique économique de la plupart des pays.

2.2.   Culture et développement : quel rapport ?

Indépendamment de la place de la culture dans les théories économiques[10], on lui reconnaît généralement deux rôles dans les processus de développement des sociétés ; un rôle quantitatif et un autre qualitatif. Le concept de culture est lié spécifiquement aux produits des sociétés dans lesquelles la valeur symbolique ou esthétique occupe une place prépondérante. En effet, la sensibilité et la culture qu'on porte se concrétisent dans des formes d'expression esthétiques, artistiques et culturelles diverses, qui se présentent en objets, œuvres artistiques, littéraires ou musicales, créations, spectacles, etc. Or, la reproduction, le partage et la diffusion de ces *biens et services culturels* constituent les différents secteurs d'activité culturelle, qui sont une composante à part entière de la dynamique économique et social d'une communauté. C'est dans ce sens qu'on peut parler de l'économie de la culture[11] et de la culture comme vecteur de la croissance et du développement économique.

La culture a un apport quantitatif à la croissance économique et donc à la production de richesse des sociétés par la contribution directe et indirecte des secteurs de la culture à l'activité économique et par leur potentiel en termes de développement économique. Selon le rapport sur l'économie créative de 2013[12], les secteurs culturels et créatifs sont les secteurs de l'économie mondiale dont la croissance est la plus rapide, en termes de génération de revenus mais aussi de création d'emplois et de recettes d'exportation.

Des études[13] sont ainsi menées depuis quelques années pour mesurer l'apport direct des secteurs d'activité culturelle dans l'économie. Toutefois, la mesure de la valeur globale de l'économie de la culture n'est pas toujours évidente[14]. Au niveau de

l'OMC, les biens culturels sont des marchandises ordinaires et ne constituent pas une rubrique à part dans les statistiques du commerce mondiales. Les données relatives aux flux des échanges en biens et services culturels sont en réalité dispersées entre différentes rubriques[15], ce qui empêche d'en évaluer le poids réel. C'est dans ce contexte que des experts accrédités par des ONG et appuyés par l'UNESCO ont présenté en Décembre 2015[16] le premier panorama mondial de l'économie de la culture.

En 2015, la culture a généré un chiffre d'affaires total de 2.250 milliards de dollars. Les revenus des industries culturelles et créatives au niveau mondial sont supérieurs aux revenus des services de télécommunications (1.570 milliards de dollars), et emploient 1 % de la population active mondiale avec 29,5 millions d'emplois. Les trois premiers employeurs sont les arts visuels (6,73 millions), la musique (3,98 millions) et l'industrie du livre (3,67 millions) alors que les trois secteurs qui génèrent le plus de revenus sont la télévision (477 milliards de dollars), les arts visuels (391 milliards de dollars) et les journaux et magazines (354 milliards de dollars). Par ailleurs, les secteurs culturels et créatifs sont le principal levier de l'économie numérique. Déjà en 2013, ces derniers ont contribué à hauteur de 200 milliards de dollars à l'économie numérique mondiale.

La répartition des revenus des ICC (industries culturelles et créatives) entre les différentes régions de la planète n'est pas très différente de celle des autres activités économiques. L'Asie-Pacifique est le plus grand marché pour les ICC, avec un tiers des recettes totales. Avec un revenu de 709 milliards de dollars, l'Europe se classe avant l'Amérique du Nord qui réalise 620 Mds $ mais qui est à la fois premier exportateur de film et premier consommateur des contenus notamment numériques. L'Amérique latine (124 Mds$) et l'Afrique/Moyen-Orient[17] (58 Mds$) se classent respectivement en quatrième et cinquième positions, bien que le potentiel et les opportunités dans ces régions soient immenses et prometteuses. Certes, l'importance du nombre de créateurs dans les PMA -par exemple-est un indicateur

du fort potentiel de développement du secteur culturel, car la « matière première » est très abondante. Cependant, le manque de valorisation de cette « capacité créatrice » en termes de développement économique et social s'explique par la versatilité des moyens et ressources disponibles et l'incapacité du système à structurer les fonctions économiques se trouvant en aval de chaque filière[18]. D'ailleurs, la promotion des activités culturelles est aussi perçue comme un facteur de développement social et humain, puisqu'elle contribue aussi à la stabilité et à la cohésion sociale, à la promotion de la tolérance, à l'intégration des catégories défavorisées de la population et à la gestion de conflits[19]. Par ailleurs, outre l'apport des activités culturels à la dynamique économique, la culture -en tant que valeurs et idées- devrait certainement orienter et encadrer le développement d'une société et sa durabilité.

En réalité, le débat sur les valeurs culturelles et le développement donne lieu à trois principales tendances[20]. La première considère qu'il y'a un ensemble de valeurs universelles facilitant le développement. Il s'agit notamment des valeurs occidentales qui ont favorisé **Le** développement au Nord et seraient les seules à pouvoir le favoriser ailleurs. La deuxième tendance est à l'opposée puisqu'elle reconnait l'existence d'une diversité de valeurs, de coutumes et de normes pouvant faciliter les processus de développement. L'accent est ainsi mis sur la possibilité des sociétés non-occidentales de développer leurs propres processus de développement. La dernière tendance rejoint la précédente dans la reconnaissance de la multiplicité et diversité des valeurs favorisant le développement mais la culture ne représente toutefois qu'un des éléments influençant ces processus. Ainsi, selon cette perspective, les facteurs culturels peuvent être utiles à l'analyse du développement mais seulement s'ils sont insérés à des cadres d'analyse intégrant d'autres dimensions, dont notamment les dimensions politique, géographique, historique, économique et sociale. Mais, ces trois tendances ne remettent pas en

question le modèle de développement qui est toujours l'objectif recherché, on se demande plutôt est ce qu'il y'a plusieurs voies pour l'atteindre, ou plutôt une seule.

Or, reconnaitre le lien entre culture et développement passe d'abord par la relativisation culturelle de la notion même de développement. A l'issue de la deuxième guerre mondiale, le *développement* fait son entrée en force dans le discours international dans un contexte de reconstruction de l'Europe de l'Ouest et des présages de la guerre froide sous l'impulsion de la politique étrangère des États-Unis. Ces derniers se sont fait les promoteurs d'un programme de *'développement'* ayant pour but de promouvoir la croissance économique des régions *'sous-développées'* à l'aide du transfert des connaissances scientifiques et des progrès industriels. Après un demi-siècle, on a découvert que ce modèle exemplaire avait besoin d'une petite retouche qui le rendrait durable. On a en effet découvert que l'environnement- qui n'est perçu qu'en tant que stock de ressources- est épuisable et risque de ne plus pouvoir répondre aux besoins de l'activité économique. On a aussi découvert que le nombre des pauvres à travers le monde ne fait que croitre impactant ainsi la consommation - rôle primordial de la société après la production - et donc la durabilité économique. Ainsi, le développement *durable* est désormais supposé agir au niveau 'horizontal', en intégrant diverses dimensions des sociétés et en s'attaquant à des problèmes devenus globaux, mais aussi agir de manière 'verticale', en mettant en œuvre la notion d'équité intergénérationnelle[21]. Bien qu'ayant émergé dans un contexte historique particulier, et bien que servant des intérêts spécifiques, le concept de développement mais aussi de développement durable se présentent comme des valeurs consensuelles, universelles et salvatrices. On oublie toutefois que ces problèmes globaux comme la pauvreté et la dégradation de l'environnement sont des conséquences directes de la vision développementaliste - portée par des valeurs individualistes et égocentriques - initiée aux Etats-Unis et véhiculée depuis par les institutions économiques internationales. Selon Weber, le capitalisme est un contexte et des valeurs qui à la

fois conditionnent l'action sociale - au moins au niveau économique - et s'en alimentent. Ainsi, la notion de développement, redevable notamment d'une conception capitaliste de l'ordre économique, mobilise des idées de valeur associées aux normes et aux valeurs propres au fonctionnement du capitalisme. « Voilà pourquoi certains auteurs, dont par exemple Escobar (1995) et Sachs (1992), portent un regard critique sur le développement durable car celui-ci, en ne remettant pas en question le développement en tant que construit culturel occidental, contribue à faire paraitre comme universelles des valeurs qui seraient particulières »[22].

Qu'importe donc qu'on reconnaisse ou pas la diversité des valeurs culturelles qui favorisent le développement du moment que ce dernier est présenté comme objectif à contenu unique et universel. Or, toutes les sociétés n'ont pas la même vision de la vie, et ne conçoivent pas l'économie, la société et l'environnement comme des pôles séparés pour devoir les rassembler sous le slogan *développement durable*[23]. Ainsi, contextualiser ce dernier et l'adapter aux diverses cultures (Johannesburg 2005) ne fait que conforter l'universalité prétendue du concept en mobilisant les cultures au service de cet objectif ultime. Edgar Morin estime pour sa part que « le développement durable ne fait que tempérer le développement par considération du contexte écologique, mais sans mettre en cause ses principes [...] Ainsi, le développement, notion apparemment universaliste, constitue un mythe typique du sociocentrisme occidental »[24]. D'ailleurs, le débat relatif à l'universalité des modèles et les spécificités culturelles dépasse désormais le domaine économique pour s'inscrire dans le cadre géopolitique global.

3. La culture, enjeu géopolitique

Yves LACOSTE, définit la géopolitique par « les rivalités de pouvoir qui [...] suscitent par la diffusion de leurs représentations contradictoires, des débats politiques entre citoyens »[25]. Ces représentations renvoient aux idées et perceptions collectives d'ordre politique, religieux ou autre qui meublent l'imaginaire collectif,

inspirent les groupes sociaux et structurent leur vision du monde. Ainsi, la culture se trouve au cœur même de la géopolitique à tel point que le terme géo-culture ou encore géopolitique de la culture risquent de n'être que des pléonasmes. Si le *soft power* signifie la capacité à façonner les préférences des autres, à structurer efficacement par la séduction de ses messages l'univers des relations diplomatiques, cette donnée est à la fois ancienne mais aussi en voie de transformation rapide[26]. En effet, l'enjeu culturel s'inscrit désormais dans une épreuve de force qui met en jeux des cultures fortes, hégémoniques et donc offensives (1) et d'autres fragiles résistantes et plutôt défensives (2).

3.1. L'hégémonie culturelle ou l'offensive culturelle ?

La mondialisation économique agit certainement sur les pratiques sociales et impacte indirectement les représentations culturelles. Dans un marché globalisé et afin d'amortir l'investissement en recherche et développement, les multinationales ont besoin de produire en grandes séries des marchandises standardisées. Il faut donc parvenir à façonner un modèle du consommateur standard à l'échelle mondiale, en éliminant l'obstacle que représentent les goûts ou choix nationaux trop prononcés. Les biens et services culturels jouent à ce niveau un rôle non négligeable. Par ailleurs, la mondialisation et la numérisation de la communication influencent directement l'évolution de la substance même des cultures. En effet, les médias, dont la structure oligopolistique reflète l'assujettissement de la culture à la logique marchande, alimentent les imaginaires à travers la création de symboles, de valeurs et d'idées, modifiant les modes de vie et représentations du monde. Et puisque le cinéma, la télévision et les réseaux de communication sont dominés par les Américains, il s'agit désormais d'un processus d'occidentalisation du monde à l'américaine, imposant l'anglais comme langue mondiale, ainsi que les techniques et les conceptions américaines.

Les conditions et les modes d'interactions entre les sociétés et les cultures se trouvent donc bouleversées par l'expansion des échanges des biens et services

culturels. En principe, l'échange implique nécessairement diversité, il est supposé favoriser la rencontre et le dialogue entre les diverses cultures. Mais la mondialisation, qui n'est pas un processus *équitable pour tous*, semble incapable de prendre cette diversité en compte[27]. En faisant de la concurrence son principe cardinal, la globalisation économique et culturelle exacerbe les déséquilibres et politise les différences. Ses conséquences sont variables selon que la culture est forte ou fragile. En effet, l'épreuve de force entre les cultures, dont l'enjeu est le pouvoir d'attraction ou d'influence exercé par l'une sur l'autre se trouve amplifiée.

Pour Pierre Bourdieu, la lutte entre les cultures est symbolique, mais tout aussi déséquilibrée en faveur de la partie dominante. Il souligne le lien entre culture dominante et culture légitime. La légitimité appartient à ceux qui ont le pouvoir politique et culturel, alors que les autres formes de cultures sont systématiquement rabaissées[28]. La culture et les représentations participent à la compétition globale des Etats et assurent au niveau international la fonction d'identification de soi et de l'autre. Ce sont *des biens et services culturels* qui nous ont fait croire que les Martiens sont verts, que l'américain est un héros et qui participent à la propagation de préjugés de type raciste, qui ont toujours été présents dans l'histoire du cinéma et le sont encore à travers l'image que propose le monopole des grands studios hollywoodiens par rapport aux Arabes/Musulmans (les 2 étant confondus), Africains, Chinois, Asiatiques ou Latino-Américains[29].

Mais, les représentations véhiculées par des biens et services culturels permettent aussi de maintenir ou de renforcer des rapports de domination et d'hégémonie et participent aux modes de légitimation de l'ordre mondial. L'Etat ou les Etats dominants vont chercher à imposer leurs représentations et leurs modèles culturels comme norme légitime[30]. Ainsi, le pouvoir au niveau international dépend en grande partie de la capacité de produire et de diffuser des idées structurant les imaginaires et propageant ses valeurs et sa vision du monde sans avoir à les imposer par la force. L'hégémonie culturelle avancée par Gramsci est celle qui assure une

adhésion consentante et spontanée des dominés parce qu'elle agit par /sur les représentations et les idées. Au niveau international, c'est l'idéologie néo-libérale -avec tout ce qui viens avec- qui s'est imposée comme seul système d'organisation économique possible. Les outils de cet influence culturelle sont de plus en plus diversifiés. Il s'agit certes des médias audiovisuels et numériques dont la réactivité, favorise une influence culturelle établie désormais sur une temporalité liée à l'actualité. Mais, il s'agit aussi de la diplomatie de l'expertise internationale[31], des éditeurs internationaux, de tous les secteurs de l'économie de la connaissance, ou encore de ces structures politico-intellectuelles que sont les *think tanks*.

Certes, la lutte des représentations et de l'influence culturelle a toujours été la toile de fond des relations internationales. Mais la mondialisation, notamment culturelle, et surtout son accélération au cours des 20 dernières années, élargie l'étendue et modifie les implications de cette lutte. Elle renforce la position hégémonique de certaines cultures tout en affaiblissant les cultures plus fragiles, qui doivent subir l'influence grandissante des cultures dominantes. On assiste ainsi à un processus *d'uniformisation culturelle* à l'échelle planétaire, soit un processus de nivellement des différences qui séparent les cultures du fait du poids hégémonique exercé par certaines cultures dominantes sur l'ensemble des cultures du monde. Selon Edgar Morin, « il existe une civilisation mondiale, issue de la civilisation occidentale, que développe le jeu interactif de la science, de la technique, de l'industrie, du capitalisme »[32]. Or, l'émergence d'une culture globale qui transgresse les frontières culturelles traditionnelles s'oppose à l'affirmation de l'Etat-Nation et réduit sensiblement le contrôle de cet Etat sur la formation de ses citoyens. Dans les pays dominants, l'émergence d'une culture globale assure aux régimes politiques un surplus de légitimité alors que dans les pays dominés, le déficit de légitimité des systèmes politiques se trouve aggravé[33].

Paradoxalement, ce processus d'uniformisation ou d'acculturation suscite des résistances qui se manifestent par le repli identitaire et la xénophobie aux niveaux locaux. En effet, l'uniformisation des pratiques culturelles, principalement

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consuméristes, et l'avènement d'une élite transnationale dont la valeur principale est la quête du succès personnel, peut créer l'illusion de l'homogénéité de la culture dominante qui serait transnationale. Mais, cette dernière n'est en réalité que superficielle, elle atteste plus de la dislocation des cultures fragiles et donc des sociétés nationales dominées. La mondialisation, par la marchandisation de la culture qu'elle déploie à l'échelle planétaire, entraîne inévitablement une fragilisation de la diversité des cultures de la planète au bénéfice d'une culture hégémonique et globalisée, renforçant ainsi le déséquilibre des rapports de force entre les Etats. Le concept de diversité culturelle est supposé réagir à cette menace, mais est-ce qu'il en est capable ?

3.2. Diversité culturelle : ou résistance à l'uniformisation et à la déculturation

La marchandisation de la culture renforce donc la domination des grandes cultures organisées en puissantes industries culturelles (système de financement récurrent, des structures de distribution globales, des stratégies de marketing mondialisées) qui viendraient ébranler les cultures nationales, régionales et locales au sein des marchés nationaux. La forte concentration et le déséquilibre des échanges commerciaux de biens culturels sont indéniables dans les secteurs du cinéma, de la télévision, de la musique et de l'édition. Ainsi, les facteurs de création de production et de consommation de nombreuses et diverses origines culturelles sont-ils privés de visibilité à cause de facteurs de commercialisation imposant des biens et services culturels largement homogènes. Or, la logique commerciale se situe à l'opposé de celle de l'UNESCO qui prône la diversité culturelle.

Le principe de la diversité culturelle a deux sources conceptuelles. La première n'est autre que la notion de patrimoine culturel inscrit dans la Convention sur la protection du patrimoine mondial, culturel et naturel de 1972. Le concept de patrimoine culturel est l'équivalent culturel de la notion de biodiversité, les deux

étant fondés sur la même logique. Si le principe de la biodiversité[34] est une réponse à la menace de disparition qui pèse sur un nombre grandissant d'espèces animales et végétales, le concept du patrimoine culturel a été forgé dans le but de sauvegarder les cultures fragiles qui risquent de disparaitre mettant en péril la diversité culturelle de l'humanité. Et si la sauvegarde d'une riche diversité biologique est bénéfique à l'écosystème terrestre, la « santé » de l'humanité passe par le maintien d'une riche et prospère diversité de cultures. La nécessaire préservation repose sur l'idée qu'un riche patrimoine culturel est quelque chose qui bénéficie à l'ensemble de l'humanité et que sa préservation est un devoir pour toutes les cultures. Or, les menaces qui pèsent sur la diversité culturelle et le patrimoine culturel de l'humanité sont de plus en plus certaines. A titre d'exemple, selon l'UNESCO, 90% des langues du monde pourraient être remplacées par des langues dominantes d'ici la fin du XXIe siècle. On estime aussi que 97% de la population mondiale parle 4% seulement des langues du monde alors que 96% des langues du monde ne sont parlées que par 3% de la population mondiale[35].

La seconde origine conceptuelle n'est autre que le principe de l'exception culturelle qui visait à exclure le secteur culturel du domaine des règles du libre-échange[36]. La consécration de ce concept, essentiellement protectionniste, dans les faits n'ayant été que très timide, il sera de plus en plus délaissé, à la veille du Sommet de Seattle 1999, en faveur de celui de *diversité culturelle*. Cette nouvelle notion, se voulait moins négative et donc plus acceptable, surtout qu'elle était présente dans l'action de l'UNESCO depuis longtemps[37]. Si l'exception culturelle souligne le droit de l'Etat à protéger le secteur culturel, la diversité culturelle évoque plutôt la nécessaire ouverture des marchés nationaux aux petits producteurs pour assurer une diversification de l'offre culturelle. C'est donc une réponse à la concentration croissante des industries culturelles qui assure le monopole de l'offre culturelle sur la plupart des marchés nationaux. La diversité culturelle se veut ainsi une application, au niveau des marchés nationaux, de la logique protectionniste du

principe de l'exception culturelle initialement conçu pour le marché international : pour préserver la diversité culturelle, il faut désormais protéger les petits producteurs à l'intérieur des marchés nationaux.

En vertu de sa seconde source conceptuelle, la diversité culturelle n'a qu'une portée circonscrite au domaine commercial ; il sert ou bien les fins d'une stratégie commerciale protectionniste dans le contexte de la libéralisation des échanges sur la scène internationale, ou bien celles d'une stratégie commerciale de diversification de l'offre sur les marchés nationaux[38]. Or, les relations commerciales sont aussi très imprégnées par les rapports de force entre les partenaires. Ainsi, entre 2005 et 2015, et sur cinquante-deux accords commerciaux[39], seuls les accords conclus par l'UE (3accords) sont assortis d'un Protocole de Coopération Culturelle, reconnaissent un statut particulier à certains services culturels, procèdent à une libéralisation par voie de liste positive d'engagements, et prévoient un traitement préférentiel spécifique aux biens et services culturels, ainsi qu'aux artistes et professionnels de la culture des Parties en développement. Alors que le Canada et l'UE utilisent la technique de l'exemption culturelle, les accords conclues par les Etats-Unis comportent plutôt les réserves. Ainsi, lorsqu'une exemption culturelle n'est pas prévue, les Parties en développement ont parfois tendance à limiter leurs engagements en matière de culture (réserves), comme c'est le cas des accords conclus avec les pays de l'Amérique latine. Dans d'autres cas, ils ont plutôt tendance à ignorer toutes considérations relatives à la culture et à libéraliser le commerce des biens et services culturels, comme c'est le cas avec plusieurs accords conclus par les pays africains ou arabes[40].

De nos jours, le concept de la diversité culturelle n'apparaît principalement qu'en tant qu'héritier du principe de l'exception culturelle alors que la première source conceptuelle de ce concept se trouve-t-elle de plus en plus occultée. Promouvoir la diversité dans la perspective commerciale est certes important, mais n'est

certainement pas suffisant d'autant plus que l'action dans ce cadre dépend en grande partie des poids des partenaires. Par ailleurs, le fait de circonscrire l'action internationale au seul contexte commerciale ne peut que limiter le sens et la portée de la notion de diversité culturelle. Cette dernière étant un patrimoine de l'humanité qui doit être préservé au bénéfice de toute l'humanité.

La notion de patrimoine culturelle devrait en réalité être consacrée comme norme suprême de l'action internationale en faveur de la diversité culturelle surtout que cette dernière est le seul moyen à même de concilier universalité des droits et diversité de la condition humaine. Il faut toutefois reconnaitre que l'un des aspects les plus problématique de cette mondialisation est qu'elle ne reconnaît aucun autre principe que le libre-échange. Ce dernier n'est soumis ni à la souveraineté des Etats, ni aux principes des droits de l'homme et encore moins à la nécessité de protéger le patrimoine culturel ; c'est d'ailleurs une manifestation de l'hégémonie de la culture/ idéologie néolibérale.

4. Conclusion

La culture est donc - plus que jamais - au centre des relations internationales même lorsqu'elle se trouve occultée par d'autres enjeux. Pour les puissances internationales dominantes, l'enjeu culturel coïncide avec les enjeux économique et géopolitique. Il n'y a donc pas besoin de l'exhiber et il se trouve alors occulté et relégué au second plan. Les puissances concurrentes (la Chine notamment) sont plutôt décriées et diabolisées parce qu'elles auraient des visées *hégémoniques*. Pour les autres, la culture est plutôt un enjeu existentiel. Dans l'incapacité d'investir leurs cultures pour se doter de leurs propres modèles politico-économiques, ces Etats n'aspirent qu'à continuer à exister en tant que communauté culturellement identifiable, la culture s'y trouve alors réduite à sa dimension folklorique.

Notes

[1] Le terme mondialisation (*globalization* en anglais) désigne une interconnexion croissante à l'échelle mondiale : les individus, les institutions, les lieux et, plus généralement, les sociétés seraient de plus en plus reliées par-delà les frontières nationales, du fait de la recrudescence des mouvements des capitaux, des marchandises et des hommes. Pour certains, mondialisation et globalisation sont deux concepts de nature différente, la seconde renvoyant notamment à la métamorphose d'un capitalisme financiarisé et émancipé du cadre national**.** La globalisation consiste en une « mondialisation » du capitalisme dans sa version néolibérale.
Les deux termes sont utilisés dans ce qui suit comme synonymes.

[2] Intitulé du Colloque d'experts sur la Culture, le marché et la mondialisation, UNESCO 14-15 Juin 1999.

[3] Déclaration Universelle sur la Diversité Culturelle, adoptée par l'UNESCO en 2000.

[4] L'article premier de la Convention pour la protection des biens culturels en cas de conflit armé, du 14 mai 1954.

[5] G. Alonso Cano, A. Garzon et G. Poussin (2000), Culture, commerce et mondialisation, Paris, UNESCO, p.14

[6] Notamment la France et le Canada appuyés par des pays en voie de développement.

[7] L'exception culturelle**,** synthèse des interventions de Serge REGOURD dans le cadre du séminaire ; Culture et communication : une histoire politique et culturelle. En ligne : https://chmcc.hypotheses.org/10535.

[8] Deux dispositions du GATT portent sur certains des biens culturels : *l'Article IV (Partie II) de l'Accord du GATT contient une clause spéciale relative aux films cinématographiques et permet d'imposer des quotas à l'écran, exigeant la projection d'un minimum de films de production nationale, * l'Article XX(f)l'exception générale qui concerne les mesures destinées à protéger les « Trésors nationaux de valeur artistique, historique ou 42 archéologique » vont dans le sens de la doctrine de l'« exception culturelle ». Les autres biens culturels sont soumis aux obligations du GATT

[9] Site de l'OMC, https://www.wto.org/french/tratop_f/serv_f/audiovisual_f/audiovisual_f.htm.

[10] La position analytique de la plupart des économistes vis-à-vis de la culture est qualifiée par Eric L. Jones - Cultures Merging: A Historical and Economic Critique of Culture 2006, p. 5- de « nullité culturelle », puisque la rationalité instrumentale qui déterminerait le comportement économique des acteurs est universelle et évacuerait alors les facteurs culturels. Dans L'*Éthique protestante et l'esprit du capitalisme*, ou encore *Economie et société,* Max Weber fut l'un des premiers auteurs à avoir identifié l'économie, l'éthique, les valeurs et les institutions comme faisant partie d'un système unifié. Pour une discussion de la place de la culture dans les théories économiques, voir : Dargent, C. (2002). Les explications culturelles du développement économique : pertinence et

faiblesses. Revue internationale de politique comparée n° 9, 343-369. https://doi.org/10.3917/ripc.093.0343.

[11] Patricio JERETIC « La Culture comme facteur de Développement économique et social » Rapport, Novembre 2009, pp.47-55.

[12] Le Rapport sur l'Economie créative, Elargir les voies du développement local, UNESCO, CNUCED et PNUD 2013, p.10. http://www.unesco.org/culture/pdf/creative-economy-report-2013.pdf.

[13] A titre d'exemple : L'Economie de la culture en Europe, KEA European Affaires, pour la CE, janvier 2007 ; le Rapport « Creative Economy » CNUCED et PNUD 2008, 2010 et 2013.

[14] Ce défi fut particulièrement souligné par le rapport sur l'économie créative de 2008.

[15] La dimension culturelle est présente dans plusieurs secteurs : Services personnels, culturels et de loisir, Services de télécommunication, services informatiques et d'information, Services culturels, sportifs et récréatifs, Transmission de l'information, services informatiques et logiciels ; certains éléments peuvent être considéré la fois des biens et des services tels les films de cinéma, avec l'avènement des NTCI, la qualification peut s'avérer plus délicate. Voir : Un monde très culturel, op.cit. p.115 et s.

[16] Marc Lhermitte (dir), (2015) ; Un monde très culturel, Premier panorama mondial de l'économie de la culture et de la création, EY Décembre 2015.

[17] Cette région n'est certainement pas homogène et de grands décalages persistent entre les Etats de ces deux régions. Pour plus de détail, l'Etude EY, op.cit., pp.70 et s.

[18] Patricio JERETIC, op.cit., pp.52 et s. Voir aussi : L'Economie créative, édition spéciale 2013 « Elargir les voies du développement local », Rapport UNESCO et PNUD.

[19] L'Economie créative, édition spéciale 2013, pp.160 et s, Voir aussi : Patricio JERETIC, op.cit., pp. 16 et s.

[20] Felipe VERDUGO-ULLOA, (2018) ; Rôle de la culture dans le développement durable : Portrait des débats et analyse des ODD ; Mémoire présenté en vue de la Maitrise en sciences politiques, pp.14- 23.

[21] Felipe VERDUGO-ULLOA, Rôle de la culture dans le développement durable, op.cit. pp.25 et s.

[22] Idem, p.100.

[23] Lucie Sauvé (2007), L'équivoque du développement durable, Chemin de Traverse, No 4, p. 31-47. En ligne : http://www.psychaanalyse.com/pdf/L%20EQUIVOQUE%20DU%20DEVELOPPEMENT%20DURABLE%20(17%20Pages%20-%20206%20Ko).pdf.

[24] Edgar, Morin. (2002), Pour une politique de l'humanité, Libération du 26 aout 2002, https://www.liberation.fr/futurs/2002/08/26/pour-une-politique-de-l-humanite_413527/

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[26] François CHAUBET (2013) ; Rôle et enjeux de l'influence culturelle dans les relations internationales ; IRIS éditions, Revue internationale et stratégique, 2013/1 n° 89 | pages 93 à 101, p. 93. https://www.cairn.info/revue-internationale-et-strategique-2013-1-page-93.htm.

[27] Parenteau, D. (2007). Diversité culturelle et mondialisation. Politique et Sociétés, 26(1), 133–145, p.138. https://doi.org/10.7202/016443ar.

[28] Pierre Bourdieu, (1979) ; La distinction, Paris, Éditions de Minuit.

[29] GERMANN Christophe, (2004) ; Diversité culturelle à l'OMC et l'UNESCO à l'exemple du cinéma, *Revue internationale de droit économique*, vol. xviii,3, no. 3, 2004, pp. 325-354.

[30] Burhan Ghalioun, (2004) ; Exclusion et dynamiques de représentation en contexte de globalisation, in Représentations et interculturalité, Revista CIDOB d'Afers Internacionals ; N°. 66-67, p. 271-282, p.274.

[31] Nicolas Tenzer, (2008), *Quand le France disparaît*, Paris, Grasset, 2008, cité par : François CHAUBET (2013) op.cit., p.99. L'expertise est un marché économique considérable qui participe à l'influence à travers la diffusion du modèle de l'Etat dans des domaines précis. A titre d'exemple, le projet Louvre Abou Dhabi, porté par l'Agence France-Muséums, pourrait très bien se ranger dans cette catégorie de l'expertise technique de haut niveau où une influence de long terme se trame derrière des œuvres tangibles et des compétences intellectuelles de haut niveau.

[32] E. Morin, (2002) Une mondialisation plurielle, Le Monde*, 26 mars 2002, p. 1.

[33] Burhan Ghalioun (1999), Globalisation, déculturation et crise d'identité, Fundació CIDOB, Afers Internacionals, n°. 43-44, pp. 265-276, p.270.

[34] Le concept a connu une première consécration à travers l'établissement, en 1973, d'une liste d'espèces désignées menacées et vulnérables dans la *Convention sur le commerce international des espèces de faune et de flore sauvages menacées d'extinction*

de Washington, laquelle sera renforcée par la *Convention sur la diversité biologique* lors du Sommet de la Terre de Rio en 1992.

[35] Rapport : Vitalité et disparition des langues, Groupe d'experts spécial de l'UNESCO sur les langues en danger, Paris 2003, http://www.unesco.org/culture/heritage/intangible/CLT/CEI/DCE/ELP/PI/2003/1

[36] Supra, I-A : marchandises pas comme les autres.

[37] La notion de diversité culturelle est défendue au sein de l'UNESCO depuis sa création, particulièrement depuis les années 80, surtout dans le cadre de la lutte contre le sous-développement. L'adoption de la Déclaration universelle de la diversité culturelle de 2001 qui a établi la journée internationale de la diversité culturelle (21 mai) sera ensuite renforcée par la conclusion de la convention de 2005.

[38] Parenteau, D. (2007). Diversité culturelle et mondialisation, op.cit.p.135.

[39] Guèvremont, Véronique (dir.) et Ivana Otasevic. La mise en œuvre des articles 16 et 21 de la Convention sur la diversité des expressions culturelles dans les accords commerciaux bilatéraux et régionaux conclus depuis 2005.cité in : Ivana Otašević, La Convention de 2005 et les accords commerciaux régionaux et bilatéraux : un état des lieux dix ans plus tard, in D.S-P et V.Guèvremont (dir) : les 10 ans de la convention sur la diversité des expressions culturelles (UNESCO2005-2015).

[40] Guèvremont, Véronique (dir.) et Ivana Otasevic. La mise en œuvre des articles 16 et 21 de la Convention sur la diversité des expressions culturelles dans les accords commerciaux bilatéraux et régionaux conclus depuis 2005.cité in : Ivana Otašević, La Convention de 2005 et les accords commerciaux régionaux et bilatéraux : un état des lieux dix ans plus tard, in D.S-P et V.Guèvremont (dir) : les 10 ans de la convention sur la diversité des expressions culturelles (UNESCO2005-2015).

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Les Think tanks Marocains et la consolidation d'une vision en relations internationales

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Résumé

Les unités de recherches et les laboratoires d'idées sont pratiquement très limités dans l'espace public. Toutefois, l'essor de ces structures a connu un véritable changement au cours des dernières années. La diversité des sujets et la présence des plusieurs organisations non gouvernementales et autres de la société civile à l'initiation des débats importants et a participé à la diffusion des connaissances, des analyses et des commentaires relatifs aux politiques publiques tant au niveau national qu'au niveau international.

Considérant les Think Tanks insérée dans des communautés distinctes comme les Laboratoire d'idées, lieux des échanges, de débats d'analyse, notre objectif est de proposer une analyse de l'importance des Think Thanks dans l'influence et la consolidation d'une vision à l'échelle internationale (relations internationales) regroupant plusieurs intervenants tels que les universités, les ONG, les associations, les laboratoires des idées, les partis politiques, les débats idéologiques et divers réseaux spécialisés en politiques publiques.

Mots-clés: Think tanks, relations internationals.

Abstract: In Morocco, research units and think tanks are practically very limited in the public space. However, think tanks have known a considerable boom and a real change in the recent years and an important debate has been initiated by several non-governmental organizations and other organizations of civil society who participate in disseminating knowledge, analysis and discussions related to public, provincial and international policies.

Considering that think tanks have been inserted in distinct communities such as laboratories of ideas, this article proposes an analysis of the importance of think thanks in the influence and consolidation of a vision on an international scale (international relations), namely: universities, NGOs, associations, laboratories of ideas, political parties, ideological debates and various specialized public policy networks.

Keywords: Think tanks, international relations.

1. Définition des concepts:

1.1. Think Tanks

Les Think Tanks sont des « centres d'études et d'expertise extra-universitaires » placés au sein de la société (non au-dessus ou à côté) et participant aux débats sur les différents sujets la concernant: leurs objectifs de recherche sont donc marqués par des questions politiques (et/ou sociales) et non par des priorités scientifiques, même si les standards que les Think tanks appliquent à eux-mêmes, y compris ceux liés aux mécanismes de validation interne, peuvent être d'ordre scientifique.

Afin de permettre une prise en compte globale de phénomènes politiques et sociaux, l'approche interdisciplinaire est indispensable, en particulier en ce qui concerne les questions internationales (histoire, politique, sociologie, économie, culture, etc.).[1]

En effet, un Think Tank peut être public ou privé et peut être représenté ou non par une personne morale, ou typiquement avec un statut de type association ou fondation.[2]

1.2. Relations internationales

C'est l'ensemble des relations entre les Etats et les autres institutions dans un système international. Elles Constituent une sous- discipline des sciences politiques, Il s'agit aussi d'un domaine interdisciplinaire où s'agrègent la politique, le droit, l'économie et l'histoire.

Les théories néolibérales se divisent en deux sous-groupes. Premièrement, une branche transnationaliste et institutionnaliste des Relations internationales utilise les concepts d'interdépendance complexe et de multilatéralisme pour réitérer l'espoir d'une paix internationale, tout en acceptant les principaux fondements réalistes comme l'anarchie du système international.[3]

1.3. L'intérêt de l'article

À l'ère de la mondialisation, les relations internationales interpellent les politiques extérieurs des Etats dans le cadre du « mode de pragmatisme » et des

bénéfices complémentaires des Etats. Ainsi, les Think Tanks et la vielle stratégique de l'information pluridisciplinaire interne et externe (diplomatie culturelle) revêtent aujourd'hui une importance cruciale tant dans son processus que sa participation et sa présence.

1.4. Problématique

L'émergence des laboratoires d'idées dans le système international complexe et l'ouverture dans l'infini des probabilités incertaines dans les relations internationales, donnent une importance primordiale à la construction, et l'analyse des informations, ainsi que l'élaboration des stratégies à moyen et à long terme. Ceci facilite la prise de décision pour les décideurs et les chefs d'Etats. Dans ce sens, nous posons la question : Quels sont les fondements théoriques[4] et historiques du concept des "Think Tank"? quel est l'apport du laboratoire d'idée à la consolidation d'une vision liée aux relations internationales ? Et de quelle façon les Think tanks participent-ils à l'élaboration d'une vision de consolidation de l'image de l'Etat à l'échelle internationale?

1.5. Présentation du plan prévisionnel :

Nous allons présenter dans un premier moment « Le contexte international des Think Tanks ». Ensuite, nous identifierons « les "Think Tanks" au Maroc », et analyserons « le rôle de ces derniers dans la consolidation d'une vision en relations internationales ».

2. Le contexte international des "Think Tank"

Après la seconde guerre mondiale, le concept « Think Tank » était utilisé pour décrire les centres de décision où se retrouvaient les experts militaires et civils afin de développer des stratégies militaires. L'usage du terme a été étendu, dans les années 1960, our décrire les autres groupes d'experts qui formulaient différentes recommandations de politique générale, dont notamment des institutions de recherche quasi académiques – les « universités sans étudiants » - intéressées par l'étude des relations internationales et des questions stratégiques. C'est au cours des années 1970 que l'expression a commencé à s'appliquer aux institutions développant des travaux non seulement liés à la politique étrangère, mais aussi aux questions politiques, économiques et sociales intérieures. L'étendue du domaine des Think Tanks à partir des années 1980 a fait qu'ils sont aujourd'hui devenus des agents de la transformation politique.[5]

Comment définit-on un "Think tank" ? Cette question revient très souvent chez les différents auteurs qui se sont penchés sur l'étude de ces organismes. Selon Donald Abelson[6], il s'agit bien des universités ou un syndicat. Pour certains, le concept "Think Tank" devrait être réservé aux seuls grands organismes dotés des intellectuels reconnus, consacrés à l'étude de problèmes politiques, sociaux, et économiques…[7]

Autrement dit, les "Think tanks" sont définis comme la concentration d'information et d'expertise à moindre coût, une source de recherche et d'analyse précise et centrée sur les politiques actuelles, et très souvent un lieu d'experts "indépendant" et "universitaire" qui peut offrir des arguments normatifs pour venir en soutien à certaines prises de position.

D'ailleurs, les médias peuvent trouver dans les Think Tanks des experts aguerris disponibles pour donner leurs opinions. Les groupes d'intérêt, les associations commerciales et économiques, les syndicats, les églises, les ONG et tous les mouvements sociaux interagissent tous avec les Think Tanks.[8] Ces laboratoire d'idées sont le fruit de la naissance d'un discours et espace servant à fluidifier

des situations rigides, de mobiliser des ressources matérielles et humaines afin de créer un dynamisme relatifs aux grands domaines qui sont concernés par les rapports multiples de plusieurs champs : les relations internationales, le droit international et les aires culturelles, secteurs qui sont séparés, voire en « silos », dans le système universitaire et de recherche.

Selon le sociologue Thomas MEDVETZ (2010), cela implique un jeu d'équilibre dynamique par lequel les administrateurs de Think Tanks doivent signaler l'indépendance et la crédibilité scientifique de leur organisation, tout en affichant, à des moments opportuns, leur influence, leurs convictions et leur utilité dans l'optique d'attirer la faveur de mécènes ou de clients aptes à les financer ou les embaucher, ou encore l'attention d'instances médiatiques portées à diffuser leurs idées[9].

Le Think Tank, peut être considéré comme un groupe de réflexion indépendant ou partisan, une association sans but lucratif ou club de recherche spécialisé dans un champ bien déterminé. Son rôle est de fournir des analyses qui décrivent et expliquent les développements internationaux, identifient les tendances de l'environnement international et contiennent des recommandations et des solutions possibles à mettre en œuvre par les décideurs gouvernementaux et les gestionnaires du secteur privé.

D'une manière plus simple, nous pouvons dire que le Think Tank, est un laboratoire d'idée, un lieu d'échange, de débat, d'analyse et de concertation entre différents acteurs de la société civile du tissu économique et du monde politique dont l'objectif est d'accompagner le développement d'un pays, d'un secteur ou d'une activité et y présenter une influence.

En outre, le laboratoire d'idées est composé par des chercheurs venant du monde académique, des entreprises, politiciens, et des journalistes. Cette composition pluridisciplinaire et transversale représente un ajout et une opportunité pour le Think Tank bien positionnée dans la société, influant ainsi sur le mode de production de la connaissance d'un pays.

Le Think Tank doit être au cœur des projections d'un pays, et c'est primordiale d'être présent et d'accompagner un certain nombre de plateforme de réflexion, d'orienter le débat national avec une grande concentration au niveau méthodologique, et dans les phases d'études stratégiques ou opérationnelles selon les besoins de fonctionnement.

Sur le plan de la communication et des relations publiques, c'est aussi un moyen de valorisations et de promotion de l'image de l'Etat. C'est une façon de créer des passerelles et des ponts entre le monde, l'Etat dans sa vision macro, et les décideurs, chef d'Etat, les directeurs et les ministres et bien sûr le pouvoir public et le monde académique dans un écosystème métamorphosé.

Les laboratoires d'idées assument alors, de pair avec les grandes universités, la fonction de réservoirs de spécialistes. Leurs capacités sont en outre enrichies avec le retour en leur sein des personnes qui quittent le pouvoir et qui apportent à la réflexion théorique leur expérience professionnelle.[10] L'influence des laboratoires d'idées provient également de leur rôle de forum où règne une liberté de parole d'autant plus grande que certains débats sont confidentiels. Membres des gouvernements, chercheurs, protagonistes politiques peuvent s'exprimer sans crainte, fournir des arguments qu'ils lanceront dans les enceintes internationales.[11]

3. Les Think Tanks au Maroc

Le Maroc est devenu de plus en plus conscient de l'importance de la vielle stratégique à l'échelle nationale et internationale. Cette dernière a commencé par la production de l'information, puis la construction des idées et leur analyse, ainsi que l'élaboration des stratégies nationales et internationales à moyen et à court terme.

Le premier Think Tank marocain à vocation orienté vers les politiques publiques est le CERSS[12] créé en 1993, laquelle date coïncide avec les premiers débats sur l'alternance démocratique au Maroc en 1992. De nombreux Thinks Tanks ont été créés depuis le lancement de grandes réformes structurelles au Maroc. Ils

sont venu stimuler, participer, analyser voire même accompagner la transition du pays vers la démocratie. Ainsi la quasi-totalité des Thinks tanks analysés sont créés dans les années 2000.[13]

Une vision claire est annoncée par le Roi du Maroc dans son discours : " ... Notre pays vit une transition globale qui nécessite le renforcement de ses capacités d'analyse, d'adaptation et d'anticipation. Aussi, avons-Nous décidé de créer un institut royal des études stratégiques pour remplir cette mission essentielle, afin d'être en interaction permanente avec les changements et de maîtriser et agir sur les mutations profondes qui s'opèrent aux niveaux interne et externe... ".[14]

Cette conscience sera traduite en novembre 2007 par la création de l'Institut Royal des Etudes Stratégiques (IRES); cet outil a pour vocation de contribuer à éclairer la prise de décision stratégique. Sa mission est de mener des études et des analyses stratégiques sur les questions dont il est saisi par le Roi et d'assurer une fonction de veille, au niveau national et international, sur des domaines jugés stratégiques pour le pays. Il analyse les questions nationales à caractère structurel, examine les relations extérieures du Maroc dans leurs multiples dimensions et accorde un grand intérêt aux questions globales communes telles que les questions de terrorisme, changement climatique, développement durable et l'immigration. Egalement, " … Dans le même contexte et afin que le Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et de la Coopération puisse disposer des analyses et des outils conceptuels nécessaires pour assimiler et mieux anticiper les transformations accélérées que connaît le monde, Nous l'invitons à tirer parti des expertises et des compétences dont dispose l'Institut Royal des Etudes Stratégiques et ce, au mieux des intérêts nationaux, Nous exhortons cet institut à coopérer avec le ministère et à consacrer ses efforts au domaine diplomatique et aux différentes questions liées aux relations extérieures du Maroc, dans leurs différents volets politique, économique, social, culturel et environnemental. … "[15]. Cette tendance s'opère dans un contexte d'ouverture de l'IRES[16] sur son

environnement extérieur, en prônant une démarche partenariale à l'échelle nationale et internationale qui suscite l'émulation intellectuelle et les synergies et libère la création et l'innovation. A cet effet, l'Institut joue un rôle de pont entre les pouvoirs publics, le milieu académique et la société civile.

Les Think tanks au Maroc sont représentés par l'opinion publique, les clubs de recherches, les centres doctoraux, les réseaux des chercheurs académiques qui traitent des sujets d'actualités et mettent l'accent sur les thématiques référentielles du Maroc, notamment les politiques publiques et les politiques extérieures actuelles et futures.

En 2009, le Maroc a été représenté par le Centre d'Etudes et des recherches en sciences sociales. Dans un classement international des Think Tanks, il a été choisi, parmi les 392 groupes de réflexion nominés, comme l'un des principaux groupes de réflexion au monde, et parmi les 25 meilleurs groupes de réflexion au Moyen-Orient et Afrique du Nord.[17]

Selon le rapport (Global Go To Think Tanks Index Report 2010)[18], le Maroc est classé parmi les pays qui disposent de 10 ou plus Think Tank,s et parmi les 25 meilleurs Think Tanks au Moyen-Orient et les 35 meilleurs en Afrique du Nord (MENA[19]).

Les modes d'influence des Think tanks dans le jeu politique interne[20], a commencé par la création des laboratoires d'idées spécialisés dans l'évaluation des politiques publiques générales de l'Etat, par l'élaboration des rapports, articles ainsi que l'organisation des conférences et colloques nationaux et internationaux en présence des académiciens, acteurs et experts.

Dans le tableau ci-dessous quelques "Think Tanks " Marocain :

Tableau 1: Exemples de "Think Tanks" au Maroc

L'INSTITUT AMADEUS Fondé En 2008 l'Institut Amadeus, Think Tank Marocain Indépendant.[21]
Institut Marocain Des Relations Internationales, Crée En 2003 Sous Forme

d'Association A But Non Lucratif, Ouvert Aux Marocains Et Aux Etrangers.[22]
Le Policy Center For The New South (PCNS) Est Un Think Tank Marocain.[23]
L'Institut Marocain d'Intelligence Stratégique (IMIS) : Un Think Tank Généraliste Consacré A L'étude Des Enjeux Stratégiques Du Maroc.[24]
L'Association Marocaine D'intelligence Economique (AMIE), Créée En Novembre 2006 Par Des Acteurs Appartenant Au Secteur Privé.[25]
Le Centre Marocain Des Sciences Sociales (CM2S)[26] : Est Une Structure Universitaire De Recherche Pluridisciplinaire Domiciliée A La Faculté Des Lettres Et Des Sciences Humaines Ain Chock De l'Université Hassan II-Casablanca.
Le Centre Marocain Interdisciplinaire Des Etudes Stratégiques Et Internationales CMIESI
Centre D'études Et De Recherches En Sciences Sociales CERSS
Centre Marocain De Conjoncture
l'Institut Marocain Des Relations Internationales IMRI
La Fondation Abderrahim BOUABID
Le centre international des études stratégique et de gouvernance globale (Global Governance Center)

Les centres, et les institutions au Maroc depuis leur création, représentent une grande bibliothèque de la science pluridisciplinaire, ce qui nous pousse d'annoncer l'appellation de Think tanks (réservoirs d'idées), cela signifie leur affiliation directe avec des institutions analogues de recherche et de lobbying politique[27].

Les recherches marocaines sont marquées par une évolution notable d'autonomie et liberté qui doit évidemment être consolidée. L'Etat doit, continuer à veiller à ce que la recherche publique soit assez forte et assez indépendante pour garantir l'autonomie et la valeur de nos études, et de promouvoir les mêmes garanties pour les analyses des Think tanks : un défi plus grand, puisque leurs analyses et recommandations touchent directement au domaine politique.[28] Toutefois, il convient de souligner que, Les Think Tanks au Maroc souffrent d'une marginalité auprès des institutions et du parlement marocain. Cette marginalisation est traduite par une absence dans les médias,

dans la vie publique et dans le discours du citoyen marocain ; même au niveau des centres de recherches doctorales des universités qui orientent toujours leurs travaux de recherches vers les revues et les instituts de publications académiques. Les sujets abordés dans les clubs de recherches sont très variés, selon l'importance, l'actualité, les enjeux, les perspectives, les réflexions stratégiques et le développement d'une manière général. Les Think Tanks jouent le rôle d'un accompagnateur des sujets majeurs de l'Etat, donnant l'exemple ici au nouveau modèle de développement, la situation géostratégique de l'Etat marocain et son positionnement dans les relations internationales.

De point de vue stratégique, l'Etat du Maroc devrait comprendre les mouvements internationaux, les conflits entre les Etats, les conflits même internes des Etats voisins, et de tirer les leçons à apprendre dans ce sens.

Les Think Tanks réunissent non seulement des chercheurs, mais aussi des praticiens et produisent des études spécialisées axées sur des questions d'intérêts publics ou de politiques gouvernementales. Pareillement, les domaines de la défense, de la sécurité, des relations internationales et des affaires internationales forment un réseau d'organisations universitaires bien intégré par des praticiens.[29]

L'enjeu aujourd'hui, est d'agrandir et de consolider, sous des orientations stratégiques, le front intérieur et de renforcer l'action diplomatique du Maroc[30]. Nous pouvons évoquer à titre d'exemple le retour du Maroc à l'Union Africaine, les relations extérieurs avec l'Espagne, les pays maghrébins, sans oublier le rôle géopolitique du Maroc dans la région euro-méditerranéenne et au Moyen Orient.

Les organismes se multiplient avec la consolidation de l'État-providence et le déploiement de l'appareillage techno- scientifique gouvernemental.[31] Le travail des Think Tanks commence par le lancement de l'aspect méthodologique, c.-à-d. la réflexion méthodologique des scénarios possibles, et aussi la manière adéquate d'agir avec les décideurs et de faire comprendre ce qui se passe au niveau macro-environnement des politiques extérieurs du pays.

Les laboratoires d'idée, « lobbying actif», devraient travailler en équipe et en coordination et continuer la consolidation d'un réseau de relations serré avec les pouvoirs publics et l'administration. L'influence – toujours difficilement mesurable – des Think Tanks à travers les rapports, les études pilotées par les experts et les professeurs de domaines[32] devrait être entretenue.

La participation des Think Tanks marocains dans la vie politique et économique voire les relations internationales reste insuffisantes et très timide, donnant ici l'exemple du nouveau modèle de développement: Les laboratoires d'idées sont presque absents et non représentés. Malheureusement, c'était l'une des opportunités pour les Think Tanks marocains pour participer à l'élaboration d'une vision de consolidation de l'image de l'Etat à l'échelle internationale. C'est à travers la disposition des moyens et outils de travail très innovants et adéquats aux changements rapides de la communauté internationale que l'Etat peut entretenir son image à l'international. Face à la révolution technologique et le changement radical du contexte de notre environnement sécuritaire, les Think Tanks marocains qui s'intéressent aux questions internationales devraient défendre la sécurité du pays qui reste un enjeu primordiale pour la sécurité nationale intégrée en collaboration avec le ministère des affaires étrangères de la coopération africaine et des marocains résidant à l'étranger. Le vrai travail, à notre humble avis, est de se pencher sur la question de sécurité vu les menaces qui se présentent sur le plan national, régional et international.

4. Conclusion :

En guise de conclusion, nous avons abordé un ensemble de problèmes actuels liés aux Think Tanks qui ont un rôle clé dans la sensibilisation des acteurs et la simplification d'un ensemble de données statistiques et de problèmes actuels connus du monde. La position du Maroc dans ces relations et même ses politiques publiques et étrangères sera consolidée à travers les Thinks Tanks qui s'associent de manière accentuée pour relever aux côtés des pouvoirs publics plusieurs défis tels que la question de la marocanité du Sahara et la préservation

de la position stratégique du Maroc et ses relations commerciales et diplomatiques avec ses anciens alliés et son ouverture sur de nouvelles relations avec de nouveaux pays et pôle économiques Africaine, Asiatique, Américaine…

Les dangers internationaux sont grands et affectent directement le citoyen et le processus de pensée; les acteurs y compris les Thinks Tanks doivent prendre en compte ces évolutions et crises mondiales récurrentes.

Les crises sanitaires récurrentes ont incité de nombreux penseurs à déclarer que nous menons des guerres biologiques, après de nombreuses guerres menées dans le système mondial représenté par les guerres nucléaires, militaires, économiques et civilisationnelles. Ainsi, les laboratoires de recherche devraient servir de guide à de telles crises dans les relations internationales, et apporter des solutions et soulever des problèmes dans la sphère publique interne et externe. Ils feront préparer des Thinkers au lieu des chercheurs spécialisés dans une discipline ou bien une matière bien déterminée.

Pour référence, les Think tanks constituent aujourd'hui une force et une consolidation de la diplomatie culturelle, qui est considérée comme timide au Maroc, et par conséquent, les politiques intégrées et le financement de telles initiatives doivent être orientés au renforcement de la recherche et au développement de la diplomatie marocaine.

Certes, les Think tanks jouissent d'une autonomie financière et morale et ne bénéficient que d'aides et de bourses d'institutions de l'Etat ou de certains partenaires extérieurs, mais ils doivent ouvrir la voie aux étudiants, aujourd'hui chercheurs, qui souhaitent bénéficier de stages dans les Think tanks pour développer leurs compétences de recherche et former des penseurs au lieu de doctorants dans une spécialité donnée.

Endnotes

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[4] Une théorie est un ensemble de concepts, de variables et d'indicateurs établissant des relations causales et des propositions interprétatives sur l'état du monde et ses transformations. Pour plus de détail : **Richard** BALME, **Sylvain** BROUARD, « les conséquences des choix politiques : choix rationnel et action publique ». Revue française de science politique, vol. 55, n° 1, février 2005, p. 33-50. © 2005 Presses de Sciences Po. p. .35

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VI. Geo-applications in Context

Prologue

There have been many attempts to employ Geoculture, geopolitics, and geoeconomics tenets in practical contexts and domains. Theoretically, critics specify themes pertaining to the geo's, analyze data, and synthesize outcomes. Empirically, the intersections among the geo's usually result into practical recommendations that influence the mainstream of international relations.

Adoui exposes how Emotional Intelligence (EI) can be a soft power tool in inter/interpersonal communication and relationships. The dialogic intersection sustains self-awareness and personal magnetism.

Roche and Szobonya study how Gen Z is historically privileged to access technology, and socially enacted to undertake activism and change. Indeed, Gen Z, the digital natives, embody a global platform through social media, as a vehicle of communication to unite and promote awareness of the domestic and global challenges of geo-culturalization.

Saddougui and El Wali's paper is on the geopolitics of legal translation. The authors maintain that legal translation cannot dispense with hegemonic variables of target or source cultures and languages, which is instrumentally and purposefully political and ideological.

Chougrani and Battioui scrutinize the issue of climate change; a lot of global and local activists advocate new strategies to lobby the world geopolitical litigation of ecology related causes and concerns.

Emotional Intelligence, Soft Power and the Value of Dialogical Relationships in Intra/Interpersonal Communication

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Abstract

This paper is going to look at the potential intersection of issues of Emotional Intelligence and soft power. This paper has two main purposes, to shed light on the need for emotional intelligence as soft power, and to view intra/interpersonal relationships from a dialogic perspective. It is going to shed light on the importance of embracing change and ambiguity to retain self-awareness. Additionally, the paper is going to look at one of the major components of emotional intelligence, which is personal magnetism.
Keywords: Emotional Intelligence; soft power; dialogic; intra/interpersonal; change; personal magnetism

1. Introduction

Emotional intelligence is an area of interest that drew in intense attention from professional, scientific, and lay factions. From neuroscience to culture to mainstream culture, EI developed into a concept of concern that continues to evolve. It has been generally associated in the literature with adaptive skills on personal and social levels (Mayer, J. D., Salovey, P. and Caruso, D. R.)[1]. In addition, EI is linked to one's mental abilities of perceiving appraise, and their accurate ability in expressing emotions. It is the knack to invest in emotion relevant concepts so as to promote one's personal and professional growth, create a healthy state of mind, and function smoothly in socially related encounters[2].

EI is achieved through a person's ability to identify, comprehend, administer, and practice a process of reasoning using emotions. "This soft skill is becoming more sought after by employers. With today's focus on company culture and teamwork, emotional intelligence is a critical component to building high performing teams" (Evans)[3]. Thus, "emotional intelligence is the ability to understand, use, and manage your own emotions in positive ways to relieve stress, communicate effectively, and empathize" (Melinda)[4]

Notably, the last two decades have been marked by the changing nature of the structure of global power. The world is shifting towards softer means of intelligence and intelligent power exercise, knowledge is the new power system[5]. The whole concept has transformed and has gained a new form known as "soft Power", the term was coined by Harvard University Professor Joseph Nye in his book *Bound to Lead: the changing nature of American Power*, which was published in 1990. In addition, the prominent American analyst Arquilla, J. is one of the advocates for the need of changing perspectives to power. In the current global information age, success is not always dependent on whose army wins, but

on whose story wins; a belief long held and often echoed in the works of Joseph Nye. I believe that the paradigm shift in today's world focuses on the effectiveness of soft power, and the value of communicating a winning intersubjective global narrative rather than imposing one via violent means. The focus is on dialogic relation, the peaceful practice of communicative processes and power relations.

Significantly, in politics and in the international diplomacy spectrum, soft power refers to the ability to attract and create an image of fascination in the international arena. It is based on diplomacy rather than coercion and the practice of the hard power appeal. Unlike hard power, soft power is concerned with determining the preferences of others and later on shaping them, all through softer means of appeal and attraction.[6]

This paper is going to view the dialogic relations potentially held among emotional intelligence and soft power, especially within intra/interpersonal contexts. This study is jumpstarted by looking at the theory of dialogism, and its influences on the self, identity and the other. Followed by a critical dialogic analogy of emotional intelligence and soft power. The paper than will continue and deal with the importance of embracing change self-awareness. Finally, shed the light on personal magnetism as an essential emotional intelligence component.

2. Method

This paper mainly relies on critical and textual analysis. The paper provides a theoretical framework to the underdeveloped issues of emotional intelligence, soft power, and dialogic relationships within intra and interpersonal relationships.

3. Dialogism, the Self, Identity and the Other

Bakhtin's theory of dialogism helps one establish relationships between culture, language, and the self. It is an explanatory mechanism to intrapersonal and interpersonal communication, and an approach that helps to develop culture, language and identity as interactive and intercultural practices. On the other hand,

life essentially consists of dialogue, whether on a personal or group levels. The masses and elite alike experience dialogue and engage in dialogic discourse.

Dialogism is concerned with the creative processes of creating communication and forming one's personal identity through intrapersonal discourse. The inner speech we normally call *thought*, plays a primordial role in shaping one's identity. Thanks to works of Bakhtin, dialogism was shaped to answer questions of human consciousness. Therefore, it can be assumed that human consciousness replies on intra and interpersonal communication within a dialogic context.

To illustrate, dialogism deals with creating an utterance that is responsive towards another utterance. Understanding and replying to an utterance during a dialogue, means that one must alter their thinking and mental processes of internal dialogue to better listen and reply to the addressee. The space, spirit of the times, state of the arts, ethics, and the developed social common sense are all primary to the creation of the utterance[7]. Thus, the dialogic relationship is never isolated from its surrounding, it's a responsive reaction to the space and what's adjoining, as well as to the utterances created by the other. Nothing is created in isolation; everything is created through an 'inter-influencing' process.

One's dialogic relationship is majorly believed to be influenced by the other according to communication and dialogic theories. No individual creates a speech during a communication event without the use of the other's words, not even when a person is engaging in an intrapersonal communication in total solitude. There is always an echo of previous utterances that shape a person's current state of mind; and thus, the railroad of the thought processes to come. In other words, the other's utterance/language are used as the thinking processes take place, and as the speech is uttered. We are influenced by what we hear. Medina, J (2005) further illustrates the importance of the dialogic relationship taking place, especially through language, and refers that:

> According to Humboldt, it is essential for an adequate understanding of language that we recognize that the web of language is being perpetually recreated in speech, that is, continuously extended, altered, and reconfigured in our linguistic performances and practices. As he famously put it, language is first and foremost energeia, not ergon, an activity, not a product. There are indeed products of our linguistic activities, but these tentative and ever-changing fruits of our practices are webs that we weave as we go and can never amount to a finished and complete system. (Medina)[8]

In this case, we are either at the top of the power relations pyramid or herd by the communication received. It is a stuck loop carefully orchestrated by some divine power to never cease to stop. The human mind is just like an intelligent system that never stops learning new utterances and engaging in new sets of commands within programmed loops. However, unlike intelligent systems, humans have the power of emotions and self-consciousness.

4. Emotional Intelligence as Soft Power

Regarding Soft Power, the term Soft Power has been widely attributed to Joseph Nye. It is a term deeply rooted in one's ability to persuade and brand themselves to attract the other. I believe that it is also attached with one's ability to master their own emotions, and to master the art of emotion-oriented communication. Not in the sense that one must be emotional and to make emotions the center of attention, but to be able to control the state of their emotions to their own gain based on the situation they encounter. This leads us to a power combination of emotional intelligence and soft power.

In soft power leadership, the two key influence and power resources comprise of one's personal qualities as a leader and one's communication skills. Combined with Emotional intelligence, it creates a projection of self-mastery and discipline, it

also showcases the power of empathy which allows a leader to project their passions and softly attract the other. Thus, emotional intelligence (EI) might be an exercise of soft power, where one is in total control of their emotions and is also totally aware of the other's emotions.

Vis-à-vis EI, it is a deeply rooted practice in one's ability to interact effectively, empathize with others, alleviate tension, overcome difficulties, and defuse conflict[9]. All of which are essential elements to succussed both on a personal and professional levels. Having an excellent skillset of EI would lead to the assumptions that EI would allow the individual to engage in:

- Offering a meaningful message as communication processes take place.

- Relating well to colleagues and customers within a certain environment.

- Establishing and sharing smooth relations with others.

- Getting information they need smoothly and without tension.

- Explaining matters easily, clearly, and speaking to the hearts and minds of the other.

- Becoming more successful in their careers and interpersonal relationships.

- Displaying more positive/productive relationship with others.

- Improving their own academic and professional performances.

- Improving their own personal effectiveness and intrapersonal communication skills.

Thus, EI is not only a mechanism to acquire power over the other, but it is also concerned with discipline and establishing power around one's own self. It helps individual better establish a dialogic understanding over themselves, the other, and

the situations they encounter. Therefore, EI skills could be viewed as the ground base for one's soft skills competencies and personal growth. In other words, emotional intelligence is the basis over which competencies of soft skills are built upon.

Emotional intelligence is the ability to differentiate between diverse emotions and recognize and understand them. Daniel Goleman (1995) attributed due importance to Emotional Intelligence, he viewed that it could be of even more value than IQ. For instance, I would argue that cognitive skills help you get the job, but emotional skills help you grow and nurture in the job. Meaning that one's soft skills matter more than the hard skills they possess, it is your ability to intelligently communicate with the others that matter, how you brand yourself, and how you decide the way the others see you that makes the cutting-edge difference. It is your ability to use the power of EI that decides where you are at your personal/professional state and where you would potentially go.

The implementation of EI could be broken down into five key concepts as suggested by Goleman: Self-awareness, self-regulation, self-motivation, empathy, and social skills (Goleman, D. 1995 and 1998). All of which are essential elements not only to EI but also to the acquiring of the soft power it creates. It harnesses one's abilities to think rationally, motivate positive behaviors, and stimulate the ability to solve issues creatively and critically. Thus, establishing a skillset that allows one to make reasonable decisions and become excellent decision makers.

EI is of an immense importance in effective dialogic processes, whether ones occurring at the self or occurring at the social/cultural levels. For instance, an excellent implementation of EI skills is a key factor in achieving academic and professional success. In a busy and fast world, especially during the COVID 19 pandemic, we are drowned and driven by finishing tasks and thinking about the next steps, which consequently results in emotional detachment. Accordingly, the

individual falls to a state of mind where they lose attachment with their emotions; thus, it creates intrapersonal and social tensions. In order to delimit this stage, it is important to implement the Goleman Five Key elements of emotional intelligence. As a result, one will better understand their state of mind, the state of their emotions, and how to delimit negativity resulting from detachment. A good implementation of EI and good practice of social intelligence results in better communication and conflict management at the intra and interpersonal levels (Petrovici and Dobrescu)[10].

To conclude, the dialogic nature of EI and soft power could be seen as the 49th law of power[11]. It permits the individual to indulge in a process of self-discovery, to reach a state of emotional awareness, to be in sync with one's identity, and to be in control over the dialogic processes with the other.

5. Change, Self-Awareness and Framing

It is deeply rooted in psychology that one's self perception is a comfort zone, which is most of time protected at all costs. Nonetheless, evaluating our internal standards and values is inevitable if one wishes to better understand the self; thus, one becomes more accepting of the undoubtable need for change. Embracing a healthy amount of ambiguity through change would help individual gain self-control over stressful situations. Hence, stressful situations are an outcome of one's inability to let go of commonly internalized beliefs, which thus causes an inevitable crisis (Wakeman)[12].

The idea of change; therefore, is a deeply rooted concept in Reality Based Leadership. The individual must work on to delimit drama and learn to accept the need for change as it is. Change is linked to the present; an individual must not be trapped in the shadows of the past. One must be self-aware and gain self-control operating in the present, instead of being confined to past conditions. As Walkman, C (2010) assets:

There is a lot of big talk about leadership in the corporate world these days. Phrases like "engagement," "building trust," "succession planning," and "employee development" get bandied about. But from what I have seen, the amount of talk is inversely proportional to the leadership. Reality-Based Leaders are different. They are less talk, more action. They are willing to forgive, to refrain from judging others, and to serve. Reality-Based Leadership is humility in action, and humility requires that you give your ego a rest. Everyone has heard of the ego, and you might even think that a little ego is healthy, necessary, even, to lead others and succeed.[13]

Just as self-awareness, one must also develop a social awareness that can lead them to success. Being aware of the self and the other requisites a high level of empathy. For instance, practicing social empathy is concerned with putting one's shoe in the other, understanding the hearts and minds of people, and developing an outside perspective to how the other sees the world. If I am able to see the world through someone else's eye, I am going to be able to master the art of EI.

One might ask: What is the difference between self-awareness and emotional intelligence? – There is not a major difference between the two, because both leads automatically to the other. For instance, self-awareness refers to one's ability to identify, distinguish and comprehend their sets of emotions; thus, it is a critical skill to emotional intelligence. It goes beyond only identifying one's emotions. It is about a person being aware of the consequences and outcomes of their actions, moods, attitudes, and emotions on other people or groups of people. Therefore, self-awareness is a basic requirement for emotional intelligence.

EI is also rooted in non-verbal communication, not all emotions are expressed through utterances, one must be able to decipher physical cues (facial expressions, gestures, posture …etc). For instance, Ekman, P.[14] views facial expressions as a primary canvas to express emotions none-verbally; and thus, reading facial

expressions is vital. Therefore, the information one is able to acquire though facial expressions stimulates efficient interpersonal behavior, and consequently maximize social outcomes (McArthur, Z. and Baron, M.)[15]

Through outside cues, one will be able to develop a perception of the other's inner state. One must be on the look for possible responsive reactions. Thus, anticipation is another central component to one's self-awareness, it is the fine line between one's self and the other. As Bakhtin illustrates (Caryl and Michael)[16]:

> From the very beginning, the utterance is constructed while taking into account possible responsive reactions, for whose sake, in essence, it is actually created. As we know, the role of others for whom the utterance is constructed is extremely great. We have already said that the role of these others, for whom my thought becomes actual thought for the first time (and thus for my own self as well) is not that of passive listeners, but of active participants in speech communication. From the very beginning, the speaker expects a response from them, an active responsive understanding. The entire utterance is constructed, as it were, in anticipation of encountering this response.

Therefore, in order to account for the other in practical yet thoughtful ways, one must engage in processes of framing and categorizing. According to Rothman, S[17], normative and analytical framing are viewed as the major tools for soft power practice. *Meaning* is constructed and put on forth through dialogic persuasion where actors take the task of clear-cut communication processes. Normative framing deals with an issue from an emotional and/or moral perspective, while analytical framing is concerned with causal relations, It is a process of analyzing events in order to discover the causes and effects (Adoui, A.).

Normative framing strategy, as suggested by Rothman, is a means to delve into morals or emotions of the receiver. For instance, we could talk about moral framing. Where one relies on influencing the other via appealing to their own

norms, all the while having the end goal in mind. Framing; thus, is based on appealing to the views of the other, and planning based on one's objectives, while finding the middle grounds along the way[18].

Emotional appeal on the other hand is one of the major used strategies in all forms of communication (interpersonal, intercultural, political …ec). There are various ways through which to convince and appeal to someone emotionally. For instance, organizations such as the UN, Green Peace and Doctors without Borders use images, videos, sounds, and share stories that plead to the receiver's emotions. Nonetheless, creating a framing strategy would not be successful without proper analytical framing of all the variables put in place.

Stone (1989) suggests that analytical framing relies on the relationships of causality in a story set[19]. There has to be a process of SWOT analysis, defining strengths and opportunities, but also the potential weaknesses and threats. Rothman (2011) referred to this as defining the points of strength and grant credit or point out the causes of harm and endow responsibility. One is invited to use all information at hand so that to support and legitimize their own views (Jasanoff)[20].

Emotional Intelligence remains a key ingredient in embracing change and the process of development. Emotional self-awareness, a component of EI; thus, is not an overnight process and it is not something you achieve and it is done for. In fact, change and progress remain a cyclic process that does not stop. According to Goleman, D.[21]:

> Emotional Self-Awareness isn't something that you achieve once and then you're done with it. Rather, every moment is an opportunity to either be self-aware or not. It is a continual endeavor, a conscious choice to be self-aware. The good news is that the more you practice it, the easier it becomes. Research by my colleague and friend Richard Davidson suggests that one way to become more

> self-aware is to check in with your sensory experience regularly, and shift your behavior accordingly.

One must be in constant intellectual progress of reviewing and recognizing emotions and understand their impact on one's performance. Individuals must detach themselves and re-experience a particular state of mind, identify strengths and weaknesses, and develop a better strategy.

6. Personal Magnetism as Dialogic Persuasion

Personal magnetism is concerned with inspiring fascination and loyalty (Nye, J.)[22]. It is the process of appealing to the other's self interest in order to persuade. It is not related to deception in fact, not at all, it simply is concerned with mirroring someone else's interests to find common grounds where both parties engage in a win-win situation. It is used interchangeably with terms such as personal appeal, attraction and charisma, all of which indicate a personal attractiveness or interestingness that enables an individual to influence others through a soft power manner (Adoui, A.)[23].

In international relations for instance, soft power is used for dialogic persuasion, state leaders use personal magnetism to acquire power. In turn, soft power in international relations theory is a measurement of influence, a reflection of victory, and a reflection of control over resources. Thus, personal magnetism is overly measured by the power of attraction and influence one holds. Both of which are modified and defined by an actor's ability to adapt their behavior to that of the other. The key point […] here is the notion of the vitality put on understanding the conditions under which an actor's capabilities result in influence. Soft power is conditioned by understanding the different role players and key factors, understanding their capabilities of influence, creates what could be called an action plan to determine the type of soft power necessary to achieve the objective of attraction and influence.

Meaning that, the exercise of soft power's personal magnetism heavily relies on calculated planning. It is not a hit or miss process. One must be aware of the accruing situations, the space and culture, and the causal relationships among the various actors and factors present. Thus, one must practice the power of emotional intelligence in the process of creating their personal action plan model. It is a slower, surer, and much further civilized way of implementing influence than obscene force. The essence of personal magnetism practice in soft power is that our recipients are free to say no. We do not pressure, intimidate or manipulate them. We engage in processes of persuasion and coopting by establishing common grounds and charming the other's self-interest. Thus, both sides eventually gain, although not necessarily on equal footing.

Personal magnetism relies heavily on one's emotional self-awareness. In this regard, Goleman, D. (2021) illustrates that:

> Emotional Self-Awareness is the ability to understand your own emotions and their effects on your performance. You know what you are feeling and why — and how it helps or hurts what you are trying to do. You sense how others see you and so align your self-image with a larger reality. You have an accurate sense of your strengths and limitations, which gives you a realistic self-confidence. It also gives you clarity on your values and sense of purpose, so you can be more decisive when you set a course of action. As a leader, you can be candid and authentic, speaking with conviction about your vision.

Thus, personal magnetism relies on one's ability to shape themselves in accordance to the space and spirit of the times they are encountered with. It is concerned with aligning one's image to the general feel and creating links where one is able to speak to others through one's personality traits. It is one's ability to have others look up to them, through authenticity, and candidness. One must be

able to engage in dialogic relations based on a give and take paradigm, and the ability to be outspoken and candid about one's convictions and visions.

Emotional self-awareness is a gateway to understanding how you are performing; and thus, acquiring the pieces of data that will help you understand your strengths and weaknesses. Consequently, it will assist you in shaping and reshaping the sense of your-self and your image. It will give you a clear perspective in regard to you intrapersonal and interpersonal relations (Petrovici and Dobrescu)[24].

Goleman, D. (2021) pointed a prominent real-world example that hampers one's ability to engage in fruitful and honest interpersonal relations. For instance:

> Consider this real-world example: The chief tech officer at an innovation incubator is a bully, but he doesn't know it. He's very good at what he does except when it comes to managing people. He plays favorites. He tells people what to do. He doesn't listen. He freezes people out that he doesn't like. If you confront him with a specific incident, he denies it. He pins the blame on someone else and gets angry with them. Or he tells you that you're the problem. Last I heard, he was about to be fired.

The tech officer in the example let their ego take the lead, they lack emotional self-awareness. They are too self-absorbed to see the world around them. They are too engrossed in themselves to see potential in others, and to engage with others in meaningful relations. Ego is the scariest trap one would fall into during any process. It renders the processes of attaining emotional intelligent skills and soft power futile. Ego fuels feelings of victimhood, creates low morale, and creates emotional waste. In addition, the inability to control one's emotions and lack of self-awareness makes the person seems incompetent, has poor self-control, and lacks leadership traits.

There has always been an internal battle of ego and reality in one's mind. Therefore, this necessitates one to invest in taming their ego to healthy degrees, and to rely on reality as the driving force of their self-awareness and actions to

come. Walkman, C. [25] put a finger on the need to control one's ego praised the need for realism, she stated that:

> The thing is, we all have one. The ego is the part of our psyche that mediates self-identity and experience, and ego is instrumental in governing how we adapt to reality. Having an ego is nothing to feel bad about. Yet it is also important to recognize that one of the ego's main functions is to generate emotional waste. It is an unreliable narrator of experience because its judging nature separates us from others. It delights in the drama it can create. The Buddha called the ego the source of all suffering.
>
> Reality, in contrast, is your friend. It's the pal who will give it to you straight. The highest-quality data comes from reality. If you rely on reality to guide your decisions, it won't let you down. It gives you reliable, real- time information about what works, what doesn't, and where you need to grow next.

Thus, we must be generally aware of our state of mind and to engage in embracing self-awareness though reality. Ego operates out of self- interest; it seeks validation and approval at any cost so as to seem *right*. Therefore, one must not deny this stage, and not mistake it with confidence. Confidence reflects one's belief in their abilities, but ego is about avoiding self-reflection. Engaging in dialogic processing of self-reflection is a primordial move in attaining or obtaining personal magnetism skills (Nye; Wakeman). Therefore, great leaders have a developed sense of self-awareness and emotional intelligence skills. They are able to bring the best of themselves, others, and create positive and motivating emotional climate in their surroundings. Personal magnetism or charisma is the ultimate soft power.

A prominent example of the practice of personal magnetism and soft power is the recent elections in Morocco, mainly with the National Rally of Liberation - known as RNI. RNI won the elections thanks to digitalization and going beyond traditional election campaigns Morocco majorly knew. Mr. Akhnouch, the head of the party, was able to show, through using the digital space to promote himself

during the campaign period; great skills of leadership, personal magnetism, practicing a coopting dialog, and using a clear-cut soft power that allowed him to lead a successful election campaign, for which his party eventually won. Mr. Akhnouch was able to lead a politically correct campaign, which spoke to all Moroccans. He did not engage in identity, religious, and belonging topics, and he did not at any stage create friction or name called any of the parties. In fact, as the party won, he called all other parties without any exception to join hands and create better governing together. Thus, I believe that during his campaign Mr. Akhnouch skillfully showed great emotional intelligence and soft skills awareness. The leadership of Mr. Akhnouch within the RNI and during the strategic campaign that has been in planning over the past four years, shows the potential – especially within the Moroccan context – of practicing the skillset of EI and soft power. The move to digitalization and the passing of soft messages all over social media and traffic generating websites, allowed the Mr. Akhnouch campaign to go above and beyond. RNI was able to win more votes, engage new voters in the process of electing, singlehandedly create the majority within the government, and sustain a good reputation all through the campaign.

7. Conclusion

In brief, despite the underdeveloped nature of dialogic EI and soft power in the literature, and the absence of these issues interconnectedly in academia, one is able to draw major conclusions thanks to the variables available. This paper is an invitation to draw attention to this issue within academia and especially in the communication and political communication studies.

This paper looked at and intersected the issues of EI and soft power especially through the scope of dialogic intrapersonal and interpersonal communication. The study tackled the dialogic theory and its influence on issues of the self, identity and the other. The conversation continued in the same vein and looked at the

intersection of emotional intelligence and soft skills. Then the study shed light on the importance of embracing change and ambiguity to retain self-awareness. Finally, the paper looked at one of the major components of emotional intelligence, which is also essential for soft power, personal magnetism could be viewed as a common element between both spectrums.

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Transformational Soft Power of Generation Z:

Analysis of the Geo-Culturalization of the Landscape through Educational Initiatives and Activism

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Abstract

Every generation is influenced by the major events occurring in the world in which they grew up, and Generation Z is no exception. Demographers concur that Generation Z members were born between the years 1997 and 2015 rendering the oldest members 24 and the youngest 6. Throughout this tumultuous era, they have experienced such catastrophic events as 9/11, numerous school and mass shootings, a severe economic downturn in 2008, and the unprecedented events of 2020--a pandemic, a recession, the killing of George Floyd with subsequent racial injustice protests, and a volatile political environment leading up to the U.S. presidential election. Despite their disillusionment and disagreement regarding how many critical issues are being addressed, Gen Z is still confident in their power to make the world a better place. Gen Z is the most educated, diverse, and technologically connected generation in history. Because of these attributes and their sheer numbers, they are able to exert their collective influence toward making change. Their activism will become even more consequential as more and more members are eligible to vote and serve in governmental policy positions. Authors will discuss Gen Z and their future as a geopolitical force to be reckoned with. Slowly emerging into the political arena and sensitive to domestic and foreign policy challenges, Gen Z will soon emerge as key players in policy decision making. The soft power of Gen Z cultivated through educational initiatives and fostered through social activism can have an integral impact on intercultural relationships and in building trust with diverse communities around the world. Virtual exchange opportunities offer unique project-based learning experiences enhancing soft power skills. Gen Z, the digital natives, embody a global platform through social media, as a vehicle of communication to unite and promote awareness of the domestic and global challenges of geo-culturalization.

Keywords: generation Z; geo-culturalization; higher education; soft power; virtual exchange

1. Introduction: Who is Generation Z?

Through their ability to influence via digital platforms and mobile devices, Generation Z (Gen Z) is redefining the global manifestation of soft power. They are commanding the attention of the broad public including empathizers, businesses, and governments around the world. With Gen Z strategically dominating virtual spaces, the traditional dynamics of soft power are being transformed around the world. The collective soft power of Gen Z is emerging and impacting economic, political, educational, and social justice agendas. Their power is charged by their ability to readily access and absorb information from around the world at an exponential rate. Pervasive technology feeds images of global encounters and inequities instantaneously to their mobile devices. These pursuits have produced the most educated and informed generation to date.[1] Witnessing more crises, catastrophes, and violence at a younger age compared to prior generations has cultivated budding activists with deep concern for human rights issues, racial inequalities, and the devastating effects of climate change. Occupying the position of being the most racially and culturally diverse generation has developed the foundation of a very accepting and socially responsive generation.[2] These unique characteristics deepen the desire of Gen Z to pursue an equal playing field in this geocultural landscape.

2. Geo-Culturalization and Gen Z's Soft Power

2.1. What is Soft Power?

Gen Z's candid influence and genuine empathy to make the world a better place have contributed in establishing a positive impact on global diplomacy. Influential media tactics exchanged in cyberspace serve as an integral mechanism in the contemporary

global usage of soft power. In lieu of oppressive military action, more countries are relying on their soft power to solidify their position in global markets and international relationships. Through soft power, a country focuses on the intrinsic nature of the power of persuasion to develop economic stability, political gain, and geocultural status in globalization. The current landscape encompasses not only intercontinental borders but also the infinity of cyberspace necessitating a constructive high-tech geocultural reputation. American political scientist Joseph Nye posits that "when a country is perceived as having an attractive culture and ideology, others are more willing to listen and follow."[3]

However, valuable cyber reputations can deteriorate rapidly initiating backlash derived from a single unpopular post or video. As Gen Z permeates the global scene in their role as digital visionaries, they leverage power through innovation and pervasive media presence. In an article in *Forbes* David Bloom stated it best, "Gen Z represents the fast-changing face of power, a decentralized, social-media-fueled, disruptive approach embraced by young audiences of many kinds, from many places".[4]

Younger members of Gen Z who are not yet eligible to vote can wield political power in other ways. For example, they can join organizations such as the Sunrise Movement, a political action group concerned with issues related to economic inequality, systemic racism, and climate change.[5] This group is pressuring the U.S. government to pass legislation enabling creation of employment opportunities for all. Through their successful outreach efforts, the Sunrise Movement was instrumental in increasing the number of young people who voted in the 2020 U.S. presidential election.[6] When members of Gen Z are elected to governmental positions, their strength will be intensified even further. Besides their use of soft power, they will be able to use newly ordained political power to create and approve legislation that defends their causes.

2.2. Soft Power Activism

Throughout history and continuing in today's politically polarized arena, power is often associated with hostility, aggression, war, and even bloodshed. Although some leaders continue to embrace these pugnacious, oppressive tactics as their dominant strategy, implementing soft power can be more effective and sustainable. Despite the current volatile, competitive geopolitical environment, leaders can heed the wishes of Gen Z to avoid these barbarous tactics when solving conflicts.

Enabled by advances in technology, communication, transportation, and trade, globalization has connected the world. Goods, people, ideas, and employment transcend geographic borders with ease, making lines in the sand less relevant. The destructive effects of climate change and the spread of virulent viruses also connect the world and are indeed profound global challenges. One of the major concerns of Gen Z is the decline of our planet and its natural resources. Because they will be inhabiting the world for many years to come, they demand confirmation that they and their progeny will have a world in which to live.

2.2.1. Environment/Climate Change

One of the most well-known activists for climate change is Swedish environmentalist Greta Thunberg. She gained notoriety in 2019 when in her emotional speech to the UN General Assembly, she berated and shamed world leaders for their failure to adequately address the existential threat of climate change. Her passionate plea was heard by her generational cohorts as evidenced by the million students around the world who walked out of classes to protest government inaction on climate change.[7]

Although Ms. Thunberg was young and determined to champion such a colossal cause, another activist was even younger. Amariyanna Copeny, also known as "Little Miss Flint," was only eight years old when she crusaded for clean water in Flint, Michigan. She contacted U.S. President Barack Obama persuading him to visit Flint to witness the situation. His visit was the catalyst that exposed the problem propelling it onto the national stage. Ms. Copeny continues her efforts related to the cause, and her actions are compatible with addressing one of the 17 United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (UN SDGs): Goal 6 - Clean Water and Sanitation.[8]

2.2.2. Gender Equality

Another activist who gained notoriety for her courage was Malala Yousafzai, author of *I Am Malala*. In 2014 this Afghan teen was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for her efforts against the suppression of educational opportunities for girls in Pakistan. Her advocacy for this cause provoked the Taliban resulting in her being shot while traveling on a school bus. This attack did not cease her cause but rather thrust it into the global sphere. Malala's efforts on behalf of girls aligned with two of the UN SDGs: Goal 4 - Quality Education and Goal 5 - Gender Equality.[9]

2.2.3. Political Power

In 2016 Her Excellency Shamma bint Suhail bin Faris Al Mazrui, the Minister of State for Youth Affairs in the United Arab Emirates, was the youngest government minister in the world. Her inspiring work focused on addressing problems and offering solutions to improve and empower youth and their engagement in society.[10] Besides the well-known activists mentioned, many Gen Z members who are not in the public eye are making strides toward addressing one or more of the UN SDGs.[11] One example is Sejal Makheja. When she was 14, she collaborated with her brother

Jared to start The Elevator Project.[12] This project's goal is to lift people out of poverty by offering them job skills preparation for seeking employment. Her efforts address two UN SDGs: Goal 1 - No Poverty and Goal 8 - Decent Work and Economic Growth.[13]

2.2.4. Cultural Identity

In 2015, 11-year-old Marley Dias observed that black girls were not featured as characters in books written for girls her age. To address this issue and to encourage representation and inclusion, Ms. Dias collected and distributed 1,000 books that portrayed young black girls as characters in the stories (#1000blackgirlbooks). Three years later she published her own book entitled *Marley Dias Gets It Done: And So Can You.*[14] This publication relayed an empowering message to young black female readers and aided them in constructing their own cultural identity.

In her powerful TED Talk, *Danger of a Single Story*, Nigerian writer Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie proclaimed that single stories present only one perspective. When these same stories are told repeatedly, no other perspectives are even considered. Similar to Ms. Dias, Ms. Adichie struggled to discover her cultural identity and to create her own story. She discerns a correlation between single stories and power. Individuals in power have control over what, how, who, and when stories are told. Herein lies the danger of a single story--exposure to only one point of view that becomes the one and only story told.[15]

2.3. Soft Power Protests

2.3.1. Black Lives Matter/Police Reform

Many people around the world are struggling with myriad issues impacting their quality of life. One of these issues is the proliferation of police shootings of individuals of color, in particular black and brown men. In May 2020 a turning point

occurred with the execution of George Floyd in Minneapolis, Minnesota. Although the Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement had already been established, this appalling murder epitomized the pervasive racial injustices rampant in the criminal justice system. This event occurred in the U.S., but its horror echoed around the world on social media posts launched by Gen Z. By July 7 the hashtag #Black Lives Matter was used on over 22 million Instagram posts.[16]

A survey by University of Maryland sociologist Dana Fisher and a team of researchers in New York, Washington, Los Angeles, and London reported that half the protesters surveyed were under the age of 30.[17] They were non-violent, yet passionate, and offered a glimpse of hope of a much brighter future. The BLM movement in the U.S. reminded Parisians of a similar incident of police brutality in 2016 against a 24-year-old black man. Justice for Adama Traore is a movement that decried his detainment in police custody and proclaimed racial injustice in a case with obvious parallels to George Floyd.[18]

2.3.2. Arab Spring

The BLM movement is reminiscent of the 2011 Arab Spring, which yielded protests that swept across the Middle East in demand for social justice. Using their mobile phones primarily to post on Facebook and Twitter, activists publicized and coordinated assemblies of like-minded protesters. They uploaded videos that displayed the brutal treatment of the protesters by their respective governments. These images ignited others across the region to act and join the common cause for social equality. Social media continues to be used for public discourse and as a vehicle to exercise freedom of speech.[19]

2.3.3. Occupy Wall Street

The predecessors of Gen Z were the millennial generation (Generation Y), the architects of the Occupy Wall Street Movement in New York City. This movement called attention to the widening gap between the rich and the poor or the 1% and

99% respectively. The global recession of 2008-2009 illuminated the blatant effects of corporate greed, which served as the impetus for this movement. The decentralized protests began with a meme and were further energized by social media and live streaming--mechanisms that now serve as the blueprint for future movements. Hashtags were an integral element for organizing and recruiting supporters to connect and communicate. The trend has accelerated in the intervening years enabled by such ubiquitous tools as social media, mobile messaging, and other decentralizing technologies.[20]

2.3.4. Gillets Jaune

Gillets Jaune or Yellow Vest Movement in France in 2018 focused on protests against inequality with demands for economic and social justice through political reform.[21] A movement of this type represented a decentralized, amorphously structured, and seemingly leaderless approach. Although many adherents call their movements "leader-full," just about everyone helps lead in some fashion. That shift has empowered many underrepresented voices and groups who previously had little access to broader public opinion or influence. Frédéric Gonthier, a political scientist at the Pacte Research Centre and the School of Political Studies in Grenoble, regarded the movement as a "watershed in French politics."[22]

2.3.5. Hong Kong

About 1.7 million Hong Kong pro-democracy protesters took to the streets to demonstrate their opposition to the Chinese government's efforts to impose political order on the city-state. These protests ignited similar demonstrations in Thailand and inspired protesters in Myanmar. This manifestation of citizens' discontent and anger with governments corresponds to the events that transpired in the Arab Spring.[23]

The above movements all addressed a common theme--inequality in race, gender, and income plus objection to years of repression from authoritarian governments. Despite each movement's specific goals, all movements proclaim the desire for equal

treatment of all citizens. This global message is disseminated via technology, which allows for decentralization and loose structure rendering the appearance that no one individual is in charge. In reality, however, all individuals are empowered, passionate, and in control. This model of community-centered leadership is dissimilar from the U.S. civil and women's rights protests of the 1960s, movements that were organized and led by prominent activists.

2.4. Economic Soft Power

Gen Z comprises about one-third of the world's population, and their accompanying spending power of $143 billion renders them a formidable force in the global economy. Through their soft power, they are able to change strategies and long-established practices conducted in the business world.[24]

Marketers are aware that in order to provide value and satisfy the needs and wants of a target market, both qualitative and quantitative research is necessary. The results of research efforts will enable marketers to delve into the mindset of the consumer. Through environmental scanning of factors evident in the economic, political, technological, social, cultural, environmental, and legal areas, marketers become aware of the attitudes and behaviors of their target markets. Since consumer behavior is continually changing in our fast-paced world driven by technology, marketers must monitor the environment regularly to adapt accordingly to changing consumer tastes and preferences.

Members of Gen Y have often been described as savvy but skeptical consumers, and these characteristics can also be attributed to Gen Z. Exaggerated claims of product supremacy and aggressive sales techniques are not welcome—tactics that were frequently foisted upon naive consumers in previous decades. Gen Z does not want to be preached to and in some instances perhaps even deceived; they seek honesty and transparency in this era of alternate facts and fake news, which they are adept at deciphering.

Since they are foremost digital natives, Gen Z does not respond to traditional mass marketing advertising and promotions delivered through broadcast television and print media. Instead of these non-personalized messages, Gen Z prefers to access online visual content offered on their favorite sites such as YouTube, Instagram, and TikTok. Marketers must gain their attention quickly as attention spans are limited to only eight seconds.[25] However, according to *Fast Company*, this is not a negative eight-second attention span but an efficient eight-second filter enabled by a set of tools used to evaluate information in a very short time period.[26]

2.4.1. Brands

To increase revenue and market share, marketers attempt to elevate consumers to the top level of brand loyalty called brand insistence. This highest level is characterized by repeat purchases of a brand as no substitutes will satisfy the need or want. Gen Z is converting this classic definition of brand insistence into brand enthusiasm. This shift depicts a more accurate portrayal of the Gen Z consumer, one who seeks connections to brands with the ability to play an active role in co-creation and digital content. The move also aligns with both Gen Zs entrepreneurial proclivity and desire for inclusivity and personalization.[27]

2.4.2. Influencers

Not only in the business world but also in other sectors, power structures have been disrupted and, in some cases, dismantled entirely. Traditional structures have been replaced with new entrants whose goal is to engender trust and authenticity and thereby influence Gen Z; namely, influencers.

In previous decades celebrity endorsements and testimonials shared via mass media influenced the buying behavior and purchasing decisions of consumers. However, Gen Z is not engaged in mass media but predominantly social media. Influencers are

now designated as the new celebrity endorsers. However, an individual does not have to enjoy celebrity status to be an influencer.

The majority of Gen Z follow an influencer on social media that is relatable.[28] Gen Z regards influencers as individuals who can be trusted because their values align with their own. Influencers are admired and respected by their followers and serve several functions. For example, they can increase brand awareness, reach new markets, increase market share, and reinforce brands with existing customers. However, it takes time to build an image and reputation as an influencer, especially when striving to attain the highest level, a macro influencer who has amassed 100,000 to 1,000,000 followers. On the contrary, however, it does not take long to be abandoned or canceled.

2.4.3. Cancel Culture

Throughout their lifetime, Gen Z have been devoted fans of social media and have witnessed how their contemporaries have been shifting the power dynamic. Besides the celebrities who "influence" and market products bearing their eponymous names, Gen Z has observed that even ordinary people, regardless of age, have the power to endorse change when they unite and speak with a collective voice. That soft power expands when an influencer is able to take a stand on contemporary issues that matter to targeted consumer segments. The global influencer market size has more than doubled since 2019. In 2021, the market was valued at a record $13.8 billion.[29] When an influencer posts an offensive tweet or photo or makes a comment that clashes with the beliefs of Gen Z, that individual will be ostracized or in more contemporary vernacular, canceled on social media. As retribution for this violation of trust and inappropriate behavior as deemed by the audience, followers will withdraw all support by ceasing to follow the individual on any social media platforms and by boycotting the brand. Even silence representing a position of

neutrality or indifference on an issue important to Gen Z can be characterized as not living up to a brand's promise and can warrant justification for cancellation.[30] Traditional power structures were designed in a hierarchical manner with power flowing downward. However, technology has altered this structure enabling anyone anywhere with a social media account to deploy influence. The soft power of the U.S. has spread the notion of cancel culture abroad. For example, an individual from the U.S. gave an interview for a Dutch media outlet in the Netherlands on the positive and negative aspects of cancel culture. The interview discussed how some individuals use cancel culture to elevate their own positions through the defamation of others. Although the interview received many positive responses, it was removed or "canceled" because it displayed too much sympathy toward the victims of cancel culture.[31]

2.4.4. Fast Fashion and Sustainability

The damaging effect of fast fashion on the environment, which leaves a larger carbon footprint, is another aspect of sustainability that worries Gen Z. A concomitant issue is the violation of human rights often associated with the manufacture of clothing. Manufacturing has been offshored to factories in countries where the cost of labor is less than in the U.S. According to the 2015 documentary, *The True Cost*, the fashion industry is one of the most labor-intensive industries employing one out of six people on the planet, many of whom are female. However, according to reports from NGOs such as Oxfam, Human Rights Watch, and the ILRF, fewer than 2% of workers earn a living wage.[32]

Garments are mass produced in factories, some of which lack safety protocols in addition to absent or weak legislation protecting worker rights. Besides the violation of human rights by not providing a living wage to reduce poverty, the environment is also a victim.[33]

Gen Z is aware that 26 billion pounds of textiles end up in landfills each year. Instead of purchasing new clothing, Gen Z may rent clothing or patronize secondhand or thrift stores. This response saves both money and the environment while providing Gen Z consumers with the opportunity to display their individuality through the unique assortment of clothing available for purchase.[34]

2.4.5. Investing and Environmental, Social, Governance (ESG)

Awareness of and advocacy for sustainability was launched by Gen Y, and this struggle is being pursued by Gen Z. Therefore, they are selective in choosing where to invest their earnings. Just as Gen Z prefers to transact business with companies whose mission statements and actions concur with their own goals, Gen Z wants to invest in companies that exhibit a strong commitment to social responsibility. Their investment choices prioritize companies that promote ESG (environmental, social, and governance) practices. Since Gen Z demands the truth and is capable of dismissing fake news, they can easily detect greenwashing, a term used to describe companies that preach sustainability yet do not actually engage in requisite behavior.[35]

2.4.6. Co-opetition

Despite differences in cultural, economic, and political environments around the world, Gen Z recognizes that we all experience some of the same problems in our daily lives. Only through partnerships can we attempt to address and solve issues that affect quality of life, basic human rights, and ultimately survival. UN SDG Goal 17 - Partnerships for the Goals underscores the need for participation of governments, public and private sector businesses, non-profits, NGOs, and other entities in devising solutions to fulfill all UN SDGs by 2030.

Advances made in the Fourth Industrial Revolution arising from the rapid acceleration of artificial intelligence plus changes attributed to the relentless pandemic have increased our dependence on global network platforms. All of us—

especially Gen Z—rely on these ubiquitous platforms for communication, entertainment, commerce, education, transportation, information, etc. Through their scale, purpose, and popularity, these networks serve as instruments of geopolitics, spawning a battleground where they compete for hegemony in fields such as science, medicine, finance, and politics.

Nations often assume a competitive stance when solving issues unilaterally through their execution of hard power accompanied by domestic nationalism. However, adopting a paradigm called co-opetition can be more advantageous and sustainable. Each nation enjoys certain competitive advantages. When these advantages are combined with the dissimilar strengths of other nations, a viable solution for all stakeholders may be discovered and implemented. This blend of competition and cooperation, aptly named co-opetition, is a form of soft power that has been used successfully by both companies and countries. Omnipresent challenges and opportunities enable nations to work together for the common good and prosperity of all citizens. Gen Z is ready, willing, and able to rise to the challenge.[36]

3. Maximizing Soft Power Through Higher Education

Gen Z are asserting dominance in a digital savvy expanding network of globally minded peers. They have discovered their own soft power of influence in their social and business engagements. Despite the unprecedented disruptions in daily life caused by COVID-19, Gen Z were already accustomed to navigating easily between the physical and digital worlds. They were comfortable pursuing education in alternative formats, seeking entertainment, working, shopping, and communicating in an existing digital paradigm. Notwithstanding their appreciation for face-to-face interactions, they continue to flourish in a virtual world.

Post-pandemic geo-educational challenges call for skills that support the digital needs of Gen Z students in an accelerated tech environment. Current and future higher education professionals will need to focus on developing individualized

learning and student-centered approaches in the classroom and in digital spaces. As online intercultural dialogue continues to increase, so does the need for soft skills that are designed to enrich and sustain impactful conversations. Business and global trends further demand cultural sensitivity skills to effectuate community building. Twenty-first century soft skills such as influence, communication, adaptability, emotional intelligence and cultural sensitivity are vital in building reliable, transparent relationships.[37]

3.1 Developing 21st Century Skills

Contemporary education plays an essential role in guiding Gen Z's influential soft power. Despite the rising costs of pursuing a college education, Gen Z continues to be the most educated generation to date. A higher-ed geo-educational framework should underscore the interconnectedness of economic, social, political and environmental issues to meet the demands of today's societies that transcend international borders.[38] By using a geo-centric approach, educators can focus on student community building through global and contemporary competencies. Global competence is the ability to understand local, global and intercultural issues and to develop an appreciation of multicultural perspectives and alternative viewpoints.[39] It includes interacting with people from different cultures for their collective well-being and encouraging sustainable development around the world.[40]

Hands-on inclusive teaching methods that are integrated into the curriculum foster student interactions within the global community.[41] Contemporary teaching requires educators to develop such global competencies and activities that advance them. Educators should make a deliberate effort to include updated pedagogical strategies that ensure inclusive and equitable learning. Since students possess different learning abilities and preferred learning styles, integrating individualized, personalized, and universal design for learning principles will benefit all students.

With expanding globalization capabilities, it is critical that students be equipped with the social consciousness to effectively communicate and adapt in our multicultural transformative future.[42] Geo-education prepares students not only to critically analyze and problem solve but also to actively listen to their peers' ideas, respect unfamiliar opinions, and ultimately work cooperatively toward solutions. Intercultural discourse bolsters students' confidence and curiosity, while dissolving social and cultural barriers.[43]

3.1.1. Fake News

Gen Z is exposed to a multitude of information daily. Therefore, the ability to identify fake news is critical when navigating digital media and news outlets. Fake news is often written by non-experts and offers no reliable sources. Therefore, this information cannot readily be located on any credible sites as it is solely opinion-based. In addition, fake news typically is used to deceptively appeal to human emotions and is often spread to delegitimize political parties. Gen Z is not immune from believing and sharing misguided information.[44] The false or unfair equal balance journalists provide for certain stories contribute to misleading coverage.[45] For example, when the BBC reported on a piece surrounding society's contribution to climate change, the BBC also devoted significantly more time to stories from individuals who denied that human contribution had any effect on the current climate.[46] When scientific evidence clearly supports one side, but journalism provides more or equal attention to both sides by non-scientific experts, confusion and distrust prevail.[47]

Higher education can be instrumental in preparing students to utilize their inquisitive intellect while surfing the Internet. Educators can assign research opportunities in which students investigate the origins of various ideologies to gain a baseline understanding. By using a critical approach, facts that may require additional authentication are flagged for further inquiry. Students can learn how to confirm

reputable primary sources, which would assist in identifying misinformation and false statements. Research and due diligence in fact checking can aid students in comprehending the underlying context of the material enabling an informed decision--truth or fiction.[48] While fake news is a serious concern, the underlying essence of a polarized society may require further examination as the root cause for the dissemination of fake news.[49]

3.1.2. Emotional Intelligence

An effective communicator is an individual who possesses a high level of emotional intelligence (EQ). Gen Z engages in interminable communications online; therefore, a high level of EQ is paramount. One of the elements of EQ is self-awareness, which enables individuals to know how to appropriately control their feelings in certain circumstances.[50] Besides self-awareness, EQ also involves the ability to be aware of and consider another individual's emotional state. Sensing emotions in others prepares one to act accordingly within those specific encounters. The more interactions one has, the more likely emotional signals can be interpreted. Confidence and self-esteem can increase and contribute to one's ability to share on an emotional level. Educational models often focus on the intellect of students but not necessarily on their emotional aptitude.[51] In order to foster development of EQ, the curriculum can be infused with socio-emotional competencies that assess students' empathetic ability and compassion.[52]

Empathy, another element of EQ, is equally important for global citizenry. Possessing empathy enables one to relate to another person in their specific situation, such as putting yourself in their shoes and viewing an issue from their perspective. When individuals fail to recognize or feel empathy for others, resolving problems or reaching agreements can be difficult and often impossible. Through inadvertent miscommunications and misunderstandings, business and personal relationships can be further complicated when connecting with culturally diverse individuals. The

World Economic Forum (WEF) underscores the importance of EQ for successful communications in the workplace and recognizes that understanding cultural norms and social cues contribute to stronger working relationships.[53]

As lockdowns spread across the globe in 2020 and 2021 demanding isolation, ironically citizens of the world felt a sense of collectiveness. A shared empathy for the crisis affecting all of us, albeit some more than others, was detected. Ultimately, we were united by this ubiquitous disease that was ravaging the world, and we sought opportunities to connect and share our experiences collectively.[54]

3.1.3. Cultural Intelligence

As a result of the issues of systemic racism being acknowledged around the world, diversity, equity, inclusion, and social justice have garnered much attention in business and academia. However, a prerequisite for integrating these initiatives is to develop cultural intelligence. Cultural intelligence (CQ) is the ability to relate and work effectively in culturally diverse situations.[55]

In addition to emotional intelligence, cultural intelligence (CQ) is also a skill valued in today's multicultural environment. Individuals who possess high levels of CQ are able to regard an individual who is a member of a culture different from their own not simply as a member of a stereotypical group but as a unique human being. The cultural environment an individual is raised in aids in the development of daily structure, influence, behavior, and expectations of societal members.[56] These observations and interactions assist one in understanding, interpreting, and expressing their emotional responses.[57] When one is exposed to a variety of cultures, one develops *cultural regulation*, the alignment of emotions with certain cultural values, ideals, goals and concerns of others.[58] As emotional experiences differ across cultures, exposure to a variety of cultures early on is essential for developing this competency.[59]

In order to cultivate students' cultural identity, educators should recognize the social fabric of their student population. Professional development that focuses on the culture and customs of the institution, the community, surrounding areas, and the students should be offered to educators. This training will enable them to tailor contextualized local, social and global cultural customs in projects, resulting in students' deeper understanding of culture and themselves.

3.1.4. Curriculum Innovations

Pragmatic Gen Z has expectations that education will prepare them for employment in the real world. Experiential learning, project-based learning, and/or mentorship programs provide practical learning by doing, beyond lecture-based learning. The juxtaposition of the workforce is a result of the pandemic—initially employees losing jobs due to lockdowns and illness and now employees quitting jobs (the Great Resignation) for a variety of reasons. Gen Z is interested in work that offers a work/life balance, work that is purposeful and resonates with their ambitions, values, and goals.

Higher education can offer skill-based learning to meet the demands of business. Educators should employ teaching methods that deliver skills transferable to workforce opportunities. The traditional lecture method passively dispenses content knowledge and does not address the essential soft skills necessary for future employment. In addition, easy access to knowledge through search engines such as Google, numerous free online resources, and third-party content providers further decries the effectiveness of the lecture method.[60] Therefore, it is imperative that contemporary education include mixed instructional methods designed for individualized learning such as student-centered, inquiry-based, interactive, and collaborative projects. These innovative active learning strategies provide the hands-on opportunities that Gen Z are seeking for seamless transition to the workforce. A recent study of 6,000 members of Gen Z indicated two key areas of education that

need improvement: "greater exposure to real-life work (59%) and professional mentorship (57%)".[61]

For example, in modernizing the law school Socratic lecture method, inclusion of a skill-set approach could offer students a practical hands-on experience.[62] Through simulated activities students can conduct client and witness interviews, draft complaints, negotiate a mock settlement, or participate in a mock trial and a moot court. Assuming the role of legal counsel from inception to trial gives students a realistic preview of a day in the life of an attorney.

3.1.5. Alternative Formats

The emergence of COVID-19 and the continuing spread of its variants has rapidly changed the delivery of education to include more digital remote platforms. A positive and perhaps permanent result of the pandemic is the mobility and flexibility that digital learning offers. For example, students who are not able to travel to campus for a variety of reasons can save commuting time enabling an improved work-life harmony.[63]

Hyflex learning, a recently popularized format, offers students the choice of either face-to-face instruction in a physical classroom or synchronous remote instruction. The instructor teaches from the classroom to students in attendance while a camera and microphone follow the instructor to deliver the lesson to the remote students. Because of the instructor's ability to utilize tech tools to engage all students regardless of location, this method supports an equitable approach to learning. In addition, students may select the venue that is optimal for their learning preferences and styles. To deliver Hyflex instruction, however, institutions must not only finance purchase of the necessary equipment but also train faculty to use the system effectively.[64]

3.1.6. Virtual Exchange

Virtual exchanges enable students to work with students in other countries in a project-based learning environment empowered by technology. In the past international student collaborations through study abroad have served as the conventional vehicle through which students were able to demonstrate soft power. With travel restrictions constantly changing as a result of pandemic variants sweeping the globe, incorporating virtual exchange activities serve many purposes. The intercultural relationships between countries, partnering institutions, faculty, and participating students can be reinforced; and these relationships can serve as the pandemic approach to manifestation of soft power around the globe.

Virtual exchange is an instructor-led, team-teaching approach used to invoke discourse and constructive engagement on issues involving local and global challenges. In a co-facilitated learning environment, a project is developed with tasks spanning a period of several weeks to an entire semester. This activity is designed to build students' confidence as they interact in different educational, social, and cultural situations. Students create an atmosphere of trust when they share their unique perspectives, beliefs, values, and behaviors. Students also develop the ability to have an open mind and master the art of listening to alternative views.[65]

An excellent, relevant method to unite a cohort of international students is through a virtual exchange project focusing on one or more of the UN SDGs.[66]

Project-based learning opportunities involving the UN SDGs raise awareness of global problems and present an opportunity for students to initiate positive action around the globe.

3.1.7. Virtual Exchange Examples

Collaborative Online International Learning (COIL) is a State University of New York (SUNY) initiative established in 2006. The goal of COIL is to engage students in cross-cultural communication and collaboration with students from other institutions around the world. Through co-facilitated project-based tasks delivered

in a team-oriented learning environment, students are given the opportunity to develop 21st century skills necessary for employment and existence in a globalized world.[67]

The Stevens Initiative was established in 2015 to honor the legacy of former U.S. Ambassador J. Christopher Stevens who was killed in the attack on the U.S. Embassy in Benghazi, Libya. He was a staunch, passionate supporter of international education with a penchant for the Middle East North Africa (MENA) region in particular.[68]

Through multilevel partnerships with governments, corporations, foundations, and the U.S. Dept. of State, the Stevens Initiative offered several grants through which Ambassador Stevens' commitment to fortify relationships in this region could continue. The Stevens Grant was divided into three cohorts spanning the years 2016 to 2017, and COIL was one of the grant recipients. Select SUNY and MENA faculty participants attended online professional development workshops in preparation for collaboration. After partnerships were established, partners traveled to either Cairo (Cohort 2) or Beirut (Cohort 3) for face-to-face partner introductions, meetings, and additional training. After the training was completed, U.S. faculty visited the campuses of their MENA partners in Cairo, Egypt; Beirut, Lebanon; and Oujda, Morocco, to continue collaboration discussions and preparations.

Global Solutions is another virtual exchange program that is supported by the Stevens Initiative and administered by the Aspen Institute. International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX) is an independent nonprofit organization that offers the program to higher education institutions in Iraq, Jordan, and the U.S.[69]

Although the basic goals are similar to COIL in terms of strengthening relationships and developing intercultural soft skills in preparation for employment, Global Solutions focuses exclusively on three countries. One of the programs offered is the

Global Solutions Sustainability Challenge, a prescribed curriculum with defined milestones and deliverables to be achieved within an eight-week period. Training workshops and ongoing support are offered to prepare faculty partners; but unlike COIL, partnerships are assigned not self-selected. The focus of the Challenge is on sustainability, an issue that is of paramount importance to Gen Z and one that addresses many of the UN SDGs.[70] Besides the intrinsic motivation that results from participation in experiential learning—researching a problem and offering a feasible solution to a global issue—teams awarded first, second, and third place are provided with funding to finance implementation of their solutions.[71]

3.2. Integrating Diversity, Inclusion, and Equity in the Curriculum
3.2.1. Decolonization

Gen Z appreciates an authentic education rich in history that includes all perspectives and embraces diversity. Lessons that include historic triumphs yet also address the nefariousness of colonizers and conquerors serve to broaden the understanding of the complexities of all peoples. Decolonization is the process of adding the voices of indigenous peoples while removing colonial and Western influence and subjugation.[72] Current educational systems that lack a balanced portrayal diminish the representation of indigenous people's culture, hardships, survival and endurance.[73]

Decolonization of the curriculum suggests a deconstruction of colonial ideology that typically can be found in textbooks and resources and within traditional teaching methodologies. A whitewashed curriculum incorporates Western teaching philosophies and tends to provide inaccuracies or omissions of important historical events, usually rendering the stories more palatable. The failure to accurately portray historical truths subtly perpetuates the inequality in education.[74] Lessons that lack stories about indigenous peoples and marginalized populations affect student

engagement and ability to learn.[75] Students perform better when they are able to relate to stories that resonate with them and their heritage. Understanding the necessary racial context can support students as they feel heard, seen, and valued resulting in an equitable and inclusive learning environment.

Decolonizing the curriculum can enhance the development of one's critical consciousness.[76] Students inquire and analyze beyond the written text and identify the subtle biases and assumptions plagued within the contextualization of stories. Identification of lessons that perpetuate Western approaches and superiority are scrutinized and reflected upon for change.[77] Decolonizing education extends beyond just the curriculum as it includes incorporating individualized learning methods and ensuring that the climate of the institution is equitable and inclusive.[78] Gen Z seeks to challenge the imbalance of educational power dynamics and are willing to use their soft power of persuasion to expose a diversified narrative. Gen Z's digital aptitude enables them to create digital spaces that inspire conversation surrounding the demobilization of these oppressive systems.[79]

3.2.2. Critical Race Theory

Critical race theory (CRT) and decolonization are closely related topics, but they have some notable differences. CRT is often confused by many as an academic discipline or subject. However, CRT is more appropriately defined as a practice of unmasking deeply embedded racial injustices in legal contexts.[80] Law professors learned that the justice system had played a pivotal role in the perpetuation of inequality through its law making and continues to contribute to the oppression of historically marginalized populations. Court decisions seemingly appear to resolve certain injustices, but the continuing results show an unequal outcome for marginalized groups. For example, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enacted to end racial discrimination in the United States; however, racial inequities continue

today.[81] Exploring CRT forces one to take a deeper dive into questioning why racism still exists within law and other institutions such as education, healthcare, and the financial system. CRT aims to challenge the fundamental source of policies in these institutions and determine what requisite change is necessary. CRT also acknowledges that law can impact positive change and enhance the upward mobility of historically marginalized populations.[82]

3.2.3. Culturally Responsive Teaching

In 1992 educational theorist Gloria Ladson-Billings coined the term *culturally relevant pedagogy*. Through her classroom experiences and subsequent research, she recommended that instruction focus on three student goals: academic success, cultural competence, and socio-political awareness. Attainment of these goals would empower all students, especially members from marginalized groups (Culturally Responsive Teaching). Building upon her research, another educational theorist, Geneva Gay, coined a term widely recognized today, *culturally responsive teaching*. Her 2001 award-winning publication entitled *Culturally Responsive Teaching: Theory, Research, and Practice* proposes that students will perform better when teaching is relevant to their lives and is filtered through their own cultural experiences.[83]

Both scholars regard the integration of student culture and background into all aspects of education to be a valued asset rather than a deficiency or liability to be resolved. Project-based learning focused on solving real world problems that emanate from oppression of marginalized students will enable all students to examine issues through their own cultural lenses. As a result, learning will be more relevant and effective in engaging a diverse population and will comply with diversity, equity, inclusion, and social justice educational reforms.

4. Conclusion

Increased utilization of technology, persistent effects of COVID-19, and omnipresent Gen Z have impacted how our nations can navigate toward a geo-cultural, equitable, and sustainable future. Gen Z has already begun to shape the future of the social, political, and economic structure of the global landscape. Their activism, tenets, and practices continue to influence outcomes in local, global and digital spaces. Gen Z's soft power has already been revealed as a vital tool in building global partnerships and resolving global challenges. Gen Z can make a difference in the world without using coercive force, which is often the prevailing approach in foreign policy diplomacy.

The role of education is the conduit to guide this resilient, passionate population towards building a global community through international connections. Educators should continue to facilitate skill-based culturally immersive experiences to prepare Gen Z to use their soft power toward foreign policy challenges. Emphasizing competencies such as cultural sensitivity, emotional intelligence, diversity, equity, and inclusion through virtual exchange will enable higher education faculty in producing socially interconnected, culturally responsible citizens.

Gen Z has undoubtedly transformed the indelible nature of soft power and will continue to crusade in their quest for global consciousness. To achieve their ambitious goals, co-opetition should be considered as a feasible strategy for implementation.

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Géopolitique de la traduction juridique

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Résumé

Si la géopolitique de la traduction juridique est le résultat de la tendance hégémonique des cultures et des langues, la traduction géopolitique est l'expression d'un environnement où l'enjeu politique de l'interaction culturelle est prégnant. Dans un tel contexte, l'acte de traduction de la norme juridique se trouve manipulé et instrumentalisé à des fins politiques, idéologiques, etc.
Mots clés : géopolitique ; traduction juridique ; hégémonie ; langue ; culture ; politique

Abstract
If the geopolitics of legal translation is the result of the hegemonic tendency of cultures and languages, geopolitical translation is the expression of an environment where the political stake of cultural interaction is significant. In such a context, the act of translating the legal norm is manipulated and instrumentalized for political, ideological, etc. purposes.
Keywords: geopolitics; legal translation; hegemony; language; culture; politics

1. Introduction

De par ses dimensions culturelles et linguistiques, la traduction est sans conteste l'opération qui véhicule d'un système linguistique à un autre des valeurs, des idées, des informations, des messages, voire des émotions. Son pouvoir de favoriser les interactions, la diversité, la connectivité, etc., est sans doute plus que désirable.

Certes, l'opération traduisante, est souvent confrontée à des difficultés d'ordre linguistique, sémantiques, etc ; cependant, cette complexité a d'autres aspects, outre ceux inhérents à ses problèmes théoriques au sens de George Mounain. En effet, dans le cas de la traduction juridique, elle pourrait générer des problèmes d'ordre géopolitique.

La géopolitique de la traduction juridique est assurément l'un des espaces de l'interférence de la géopolitique et de la géoculture. Une telle interdépendance est davantage favorisée dans le contexte actuel de la mondialisation.

Autrement dit, si la géopolitique, dans son sens propre, exprime l'état de concurrence et de rivalités entre les acteurs, ses adjuvants sont exprimés par une multitude de sources de modulation dont notamment, les représentations, l'Histoire, le contexte international, mais surtout la culture à travers l'ethnologie, la religion et la linguistique[1].

C'est à travers cette conception que la géopolitique de la traduction juridique puise sa légitimité et procure plus d'intérêt ; elle est aussi l'expression de la tendance hégémonique des cultures et des langues. La géopolitique de la francophonie est un cas illustratif de velléités linguistiques et culturelles en quête de plus de rayonnement dans le monde. En effet, si « la pratique d'une langue commune doit créer entre ses usagers des liens privilégiés de solidarité[2]», cette dernière génère en contrepartie chez d'autres communautés linguistiques des sentiments de concurrence, voire de répulsion et de rivalité.

C'est dans ce contexte que l'on assiste à l'émergence de la géopolitique de la traduction juridique et de sa difficulté d'accomplir son rôle de véhiculer un sens à travers des espaces imperméables.

L'opération de traduction juridique n'est donc plus uniquement le résultat des difficultés classiques inhérentes à la traduction, mais elle est aussi révélatrice de rapports de force entre les acteurs géopolitiques. Dans ce contexte, la traduction juridique est le résultat de négociations, de compromis, voire de discordance et de tensions.

La question qui s'impose est de savoir comment les enjeux géopolitiques se répercutent-ils sur l'activité de la traduction juridique.

Pour traiter d'une telle problématique, il est opportun d'adopter une approche analytique en étudiant dans un premier temps la traduction géopolitique et l'impact des enjeux antagonistes et conflictuels, puis la mise en exergue de la Géopolitique et des dérives de la traduction juridique, dans un second temps.

2. La traduction géopolitique et l'impact des enjeux antagonistes et conflictuels

La traduction devient géopolitique dans tous les contextes où les enjeux politiques et les conflits l'emportent sur l'interaction culturelle **(A).** De tels antagonismes et conflictualités ne sont pas sans impact sur la traduction juridique **(B).**

2.1. La traduction géopolitique

La traduction est un contact de langues et de cultures différentes et un fait de bilinguisme[3]; tandis que la géopolitique est l'expression d'interaction entre politique et territoire.

Si au sens de la traductologie les interactions culturelles sont appréhendées dans leurs dimensions linguistiques, sémiotiques, anthropologiques, etc., les enjeux

politiques qui les gouvernent imprègnent les relations entre les groupes ou les Etats de conflictualité et transforment la traduction en géopolitique[4].

Par ailleurs, si en apparence le lien entre ces deux notions semble écarté, il n'en est rien de cette assertion dès lors qu'elles se trouvent associées dans divers contextes et régions du monde[5]. En effet, cette situation se trouve davantage confirmée, notamment à l'ère de la mondialisation où l'information et la communication sont diffusées dans des contextes géopolitiques très tendues.

Plusieurs facteurs participent donc dans le sens de renforcer ce lien et l'émergence d'une géopolitique de la traduction juridique. Ainsi, si les flux de traductions sont favorisés par les technologies de l'information et de la communication et participent, en conséquence, au développement du multilinguisme, ils sont, en revanche, orientés et adaptés en fonction du pouvoir hégémonique d'une langue donnée. Autrement dit, l'hégémonie d'une langue est un facteur déterminant des flux de traduction qui, à leur tour, sont l'expression de la géopolitique des rapports de force.

A titre illustratif, dans certains Etats qui ont adopté le bilinguisme, généralement la langue nationale et une langue étrangère (Le français ou l'anglais), leurs systèmes juridiques se trouvent confrontés au paradoxe selon lequel « le droit doit s'exprimer dans les deux langues et la norme juridique produite doit traduire l'unité du peuple et de l'Etat » (…) sachant que « les rapports en termes d'équipollence ou d'hiérarchie entre les langues officielles soient déterminés [6]». De tels rapports traduisent les enjeux de pouvoir et géopolitiques qui sont exprimés par les phénomènes de traduction.

En conséquence, ces enjeux ont une influence directe sur le pouvoir décisionnel dans l'acte de traduction impacté par l'ampleur d'obstacles d'ordre politique, économique ou culturel. « *La traduction n'est pas seulement ce qui relie, ce qui fait circuler et échanger, elle n'est pas seulement un instrument de la paix ; il s'agit aussi d'une action qui s'insère dans des luttes d'influence et de*

concurrence[7] » (…) « les enjeux de pouvoir qui se cachent derrière la traduction dépassent de beaucoup le simple fait de faire connaître un « contenu » textuel à un nouveau groupe, et qu'il réside précisément, aussi, dans l'acte même de traduire et la manière précise de traduire [8]».

La traduction géopolitique prend toute sa teneur sémantique dès lors que les principes déontologiques de fidélité, d'indépendance et d'impartialité ne sont plus sollicités. Le traducteur est désormais guidé par les exigences d'un contexte dominé par les conflits et les crises. De ce fait, l'acte traductionnel se trouve manipulé et instrumentalisé à des fins politiques, idéologiques, etc.

Dans ces conditions inappropriées à un acte traductionnel remplissant les exigences théoriques et pratiques de la traductologie, les principes fondamentaux de neutralité et d'indépendance du traducteur sont bafoués ; l'opération traduisante se transforme ainsi en un service régi par la loi de l'offre et la demande pour satisfaire des intérêts antagonistes.

Si généralement les choix du traducteur sont orientés par une grande variété de contraintes textuelles et extratextuelles ; le processus traductif auquel vient se superposer des préoccupations géopolitiques joue un rôle de manipulation très important dans la production de traductions.

« Au cours des siècles, les individus et les institutions ont appliqué leurs croyances particulières à la production de certains effets en traduction[9]». Cela est dû au fait que la traduction a historiquement souvent été pratiquée en faveur d'agendas idéologiques divers[10]. L'un des premiers exemples serait les Romains qui "impliquaient l'assimilation du texte source à la culture cible" et leurs besoins particuliers[11].

Il est utile de préciser que les chercheurs en traductologie n'ont pas perdu de vue ces aspects géopolitiques de la traduction au sens large en s'éloignant de la perception traditionnelle de l'équivalence en montrant comment la puissance

idéologique peut être coupable de changements dans la traduction et comment la manipulation et les relations de pouvoir sont impliquées davantage dans la traduction de divers textes[12].

Autant dire que l'idéologie d'une traduction ne réside pas simplement dans le texte traduit, mais dans l'expression et la position du traducteur, et dans sa pertinence pour le public destinataire. Ces derniers traits sont affectés par le lieu d'énonciation du traducteur qui est un positionnement idéologique aussi bien que géographique ou temporel. Ces aspects d'une traduction sont autant motivés et déterminés par les affiliations culturelles et idéologiques du traducteur que par l'emplacement temporel et spatial à partir duquel le traducteur parle[13].

2.2. La traduction juridique, impactée par les enjeux antagonistes et conflictuels

Dans le contexte actuel de mondialisation marqué par la concurrence, les conflictualités et les crises récurrentes, la traduction juridique est impactée par les enjeux antagonistes des différents acteurs internationaux. Au niveau des organisations internationales où sont élaborés les conventions et textes juridiques, la traduction joue un rôle primordial dans la gestion des flux de traduction, dont notamment ceux qui concernant les textes juridiques.

De ce fait, Il est inutile de trop verser dans les techniques de la traduction juridique en mettant en exergue les aspects du processus traductif qui est le sien, puisque les problèmes d'ordre terminologique et néologique sont relégués au second plan.

Dans un tel contexte où la coexistence de plusieurs langues se côtoient, le problème central est donc celui du statut des langues en contact. Le multilinguisme devient alors source de conflits. De ce fait, la traduction juridique est tributaire du pouvoir hégémonique des langues officielles dans les organisations internationales. En effet, même dans le cas l'Union européenne, dont les institutions sont censées fonctionner dans toutes les langues des pays

membres, des problèmes surgissent en ce qui concerne des langues comme le maltais, le basque ou le catalan. Généralement, seules les langues officielles sont couvertes par le budget de l'organisation concernée, alors que les autres langues doivent trouver un financement extérieur.

Par ailleurs, la qualité de la traduction se trouve impactée par un flux de grande ampleur d'opérations de la traduction. En effet, les traducteurs apportent des transformations ciblées aux textes à traduire et le recours à la traduction automatique semble encore bien loin de fournir des résultats d'un niveau satisfaisant[14].

Les phases sémasiologique et onomasiologique [15] de l'opération traduisante du discours juridique se trouvent transcendées et guidées par des intentions de conflictualités et de rapports de force. Ainsi, la norme juridique traduite devient flottante et ne s'apprête pas aisément à être appréhendée par le système juridique cible. Cette situation est potentiellement génératrice de discordes qui déboucheraient sur des conflits. La traduction se trouve ainsi instrumentalisée en véhiculant une norme juridique source de tension et de conflits.

Or, si cette situation est en quelque sorte atténuée par les négociations des parties prenantes lors de la conclusion d'un contrat, d'une convention, d'un traité, etc, elle est en revanche aggravée une fois la norme juridique est interprétée par les mass médias. Il en est ainsi du terme 'jihad' qui a envahi la presse internationale. « En effet, le mot a totalement perdu de vue son contexte d'origine et son espace culturel de formation à tel point qu'il a été considéré sous son seul aspect de lutte armée. Cette confusion dans le discours médiatique est évidemment volontaire et est l'expression d'un contexte géopolitique ou des rapports de force sont en jeu[16] ».

Cette situation est d'ailleurs très bien illustrée par la théorie de Samuel Huntington, professeur américain de science politique, qui repose sur le choc de civilisations en divisant le monde en huit civilisations. C'est d'ailleurs cette

conflictualité qui a remplacé la guerre froide et a généré des tensions notamment avec la civilisation islamique, décrite comme réticente au modèle démocratique[17].

3. Géopolitique et dérives de la traduction juridique

Dans un contexte de plus en plus mondialisé, la traduction est de plus en plus sollicitée pour véhiculer l'information. Cependant, l'hégémonie de l'anglais sur la scène internationale est déterminante dans la limitation des contours de la géopolitique de la traduction juridique **(A).** En outre, la traduction juridique est révélatrice de rapports de force entre les acteurs géopolitiques **(B).**

3.1. La géopolitique de la traduction juridique

La géopolitique de la traduction juridique exprime les effets de domination et d'hégémonie visibles à travers la traduction dans un contexte caractérisé par un plurilinguisme législatif. La traduction juridique est de ce fait comprise dans une logique de domination par une ou quelques langues hégémoniques[18]. Il suffit d'évoquer à titre illustratif la question parlementaire avec demande de réponse écrite à la Commission européenne relative à l'hégémonie de l'anglais dans les institutions européennes. Les textes européens sont de moins en moins ou de plus en plus tardivement traduits, que les interprètes sont moins disponibles lors des débats, et que l'UE semble ne plus reconnaître le français comme l'une de ses langues officielles.

C'est d'ailleurs pour cette raison que d'aucuns expriment leur crainte d'une imminente négation de la diversité des cultures juridiques par leur dissolution dans des espaces géopolitiques dominés exclusivement par les modèles de civilisation véhiculés par les États-Unis et la chine[19].

Il en est de même pour la Francophonie qui se veut un espace géopolitique et géoéconomique qui serait en mesure de faire face aux tentatives de domination d'un tel imperium en essayant de se présenter comme une alternative humaniste à l'hégémonie d'une « Chinaméricanie » très matérialiste[20].

Cependant, Il y a lieu de préciser que le développement de la traduction juridique trouve son origine dans la situation géopolitique du pays. Le Canada est un cas illustratif puisque la traduction juridique dispose d'un dispositif notionnel et conceptuel qui guide l'activité traduisante et, de ce fait, permet d'établir ce qui est approprié ou inapproprié dans les différentes instances du pays (provinces, juridictions, etc.)[21].

En revanche, au Mexique, le processus de traduction juridique connaît une situation géopolitique considérablement différente de celle du Canada dès lors qu'il ne reconnaît officiellement que la langue espagnole. Ainsi, En matière juridique, le Código Federal de Procedimiento Civil prévoit, à l'article 272, que tous les actes et procédures des tribunaux mexicains et du Tribunal Fiscal de la Federación doivent être produits en langue espagnole[22].

Depuis le XIXe siècle, le statut officiel des langues employées dans la diplomatie internationale évolue parallèlement à la diplomatie elle-même. Avant la Conférence de la paix de 1919 et la création de la Société des Nations où, pour la première fois, traduction et interprétation étaient assurées en anglais et en français, les conférences internationales tenues au niveau gouvernemental se déroulaient exclusivement en français, langue par excellence des diplomates. Bien que la Charte des Nations Unies souligne que « L'Organisation est fondée sur le principe de l'égalité souveraine de tous ses Membres », le statut donné aux différentes langues par les signataires témoigne d'une volonté de trouver un juste milieu entre la réalité géopolitique résultant de la Seconde Guerre mondiale, du souci de s'éloigner de la pratique diplomatique du XIXe siècle, et d'un pragmatisme imposé en partie par des raisons financières. D'autres organisations nées après la guerre ont agi de même.

A l'ONU, organisation au sein de laquelle cohabitent différentes communautés utilisant des langues très diversifiées et dont le régime est multilingue[23], l'hégémonie linguistique est flagrante. En effet, malgré l'adoption de la résolution

2(1) de l'assemblée générale des nations unies en date du 1er février 1946, intitulée « règlement concernant les langues[24]», qui mentionne deux langues de travail, l'anglais et le français, et cinq langues officielles : l'anglais, le chinois, l'espagnol, le français et le Russe ; et plus tard, la langue arabe est devenue officielle en vertu de la résolution 3190(XXVIII) de l'assemblée générale en date du 18 décembre 1973, c'est le monolinguisme anglais qui fait son œuvre[25]. Ainsi, la plus grande partie du travail quotidien se fait en anglais et la plupart des documents sont rédigés dans cette langue, le français venant en second rang, mais assez loin, dans la rédaction et les autres langues ne constituant qu'une faible proportion de la documentation interne[26].

Ces cinq langues dans lesquelles fait foi la Charte des Nations Unies, adoptée à San Francisco en juin 1945, sont celles des puissances victorieuses de la seconde guerre mondiale auxquelles a été ajouté l'espagnol, langue du continent américain[27]. Avec l'arabe, « Ces six langues de grande diffusion sont parlées par près de 3 milliards d'habitants »[28].

Les chartes et constitutions de presque toutes les organisations du système mettent en lumière l'importance d'un échange constant d'informations et de communications entre les Etats Membres. L'efficacité des Nations Unies est étroitement liée à leur aptitude à obtenir, traiter, utiliser et transmettre l'information.

Depuis bien longtemps, "les organismes des Nations Unies utilisent de deux à sept langues dans leurs fonctions d'information et de communication. Ces langues et leur utilisation varient d'une organisation à 1'autre et la distinction traditionnelle entre langues officielles et langues de travail s'est estompée"[29].

Etant considéré comme "facteur essentiel d'une communication harmonieuse entre les peuples, le multilinguisme revêt une importance toute particulière pour l'Organisation des Nations Unies. Favorisant la tolérance, il assure aussi une participation effective et accrue de tous au processus de travail de l'Organisation,

ainsi qu'une efficacité plus grande, de meilleurs résultats et une plus grande implication"[30].

L'adoption du multilinguisme résulte de l'évolution naturelle et d'une reconnaissance continue de l'importance que revêt la diversité des langues comme vecteur de la diversité culturelle au sein de la communauté des Nations Unies.

On pourrait alors imaginer que le quotidien des organisations internationales repose sur un multilinguisme spontané et harmonieux, en corrélation avec le prisme transnational de leurs activités, leurs régimes linguistiques officiels et les compétences requises pour faire partie de leur personnel. Dans les faits, les Nations Unies opèrent un système de multilinguisme interne ou encore bureaucratique. L'anglais est hégémonique dans la plupart d'entre elles. La question du déséquilibre entre les langues officielles[31] et des disparités entre les langues de travail du Secrétariat préoccupe les États Membres de cette Organisation.

Malgré les nombreuses résolutions et les appels répétés du Secrétaire général soulignant l'importance cruciale que les États Membres attachent au strict respect des règles établissant le régime linguistique des différents organes, la parité linguistique n'avait pas encore été atteinte et la préférence manifeste accordée à certaines langues par rapport à d'autres devait être éliminée[32].

Dans son examen de 2011 sur le multilinguisme, le Conseil Commun des Inspecteurs[33] a mis l'accent sur les obstacles au plein respect du multilinguisme constatés de façon récurrente dans l'ensemble du système. Pour y remédier, les Inspecteurs ont souligné la nécessité, pour les entités des Nations Unies, d'adhérer plus strictement aux principes d'égalité des langues officielles et d'utilisation équitable des langues de travail au sein des secrétariats. Ils ont conclu que les organes délibérants ou directeurs devraient prendre « des mesures audacieuses en instituant un juste équilibre entre la mise en œuvre effective du multilinguisme et l'allocation des ressources nécessaires »[34].

En fait, on tente d'offrir une image, une illusion de multilinguisme stricte au sein de l'Organisation, alors que ce n'est pas le cas. Soixante-dix ans après la création de l'ONU, le mythe de l'utilisation d'une langue unique dans le fonctionnement interne des organisations et dans la préparation des conférences internationales, continue de faire son œuvre[35].

 Les Nations Unies, comme de nombreuses autres organisations internationales, voient l'anglais devenir petit à petit la ***lingua franca*** des communications et des relations internationales. « Les langues de travail des organismes des Nations Unies ne sont pas utilisées sur un pied d'égalité, la tendance prédominante étant d'utiliser l'anglais comme seule langue de travail »[36].

Peu d'organismes des Nations Unies ont une politique formelle du multilinguisme, bien que l'utilisation de différentes langues dans les domaines liés à la documentation, aux réunions et aux communications externes soit d'une manière générale une réalité. Dans le contexte des réalités économiques et des restrictions financières, la tendance au « monolinguisme » est loin d'être en recul, avec l'utilisation « hégémonique » d'une langue, l'anglais, par rapport aux cinq autres langues des Nations Unies, pour des raisons de pragmatisme. Les chefs de secrétariat des organisations ne montrent pas toujours l'exemple et n'assurent pas non plus efficacement la surveillance, le contrôle et le respect de la parité entre les six langues officielles ni le traitement égal des langues de travail au sein des secrétariats, y compris l'utilisation de langues de travail supplémentaires dans certains lieux d'affectation[37].

Au sein de l'ONU, plusieurs facteurs ont eu pour effet de consolider la place de l'anglais dans la documentation et les conférences internationales. Mathieu Guidère en énumère trois[38] : la disparition de la distinction entre langue de travail et langue officielle ; la légitimation du multilinguisme sans l'octroi de moyens supplémentaires et la politique d'austérité et ses conséquences pour la traduction.

Cette hégémonie de l'anglais au sein de l'ONU[39] est également notable à l'OCDE où les deux langues officielles sont l'anglais et le français, mais l'anglais y devient hégémonique, et ce d'autant plus que s'il est exigé des francophones qu'ils parlent correctement l'anglais (avec des entretiens oraux de recrutement dans cette langue), l'inverse est loin d'être vrai, et bien des anglophones ne parlent pas le français ou le parlent mal, certains ne s'efforçant même pas de l'apprendre. Il est ainsi possible qu'en interne une réunion de travail dirigée par un francophone et à laquelle assistent d'autres francophones (de naissance ou bilingues) doive se tenir en anglais car le seul anglophone présent est monolingue. Par ailleurs, les ressortissants des pays n'ayant ni le français ni l'anglais pour langue maternelle ont tendance à choisir l'anglais (ou plutôt le « globish »[40]), qu'ils estiment plus facile, comme langue de communication[41].

L'exception qui confirme la règle, c'est peut-être l'Union européenne, dont les institutions sont censées fonctionner dans toutes les langues des pays membres, mais même dans ce cas, bien sûr, des problèmes surgissent en ce qui concerne des langues comme le maltais, le basque ou le catalan[42].

La prévalence d'une seule langue officielle sur les autres a une incidence sur l'utilité du travail des organisations internationales. Une langue véhiculaire qui est aussi, partout, celle de la puissance et de l'argent, n'est pas un moyen neutre de communication[43]. La réponse à ce problème peut être apportée par la traduction qui demeure l'un des moyens de maintien de la paix et la contribution des traducteurs est essentielles pour autant qu'on leur donne les moyens d'agir[44].

3.2. La traduction juridique, révélatrice de rapports de force entre les acteurs géopolitiques

Il paraît invraisemblable qu'une erreur de traduction puisse être à l'origine d'un conflit entre États, a fortiori lorsqu'elle porte sur un énoncé juridique. En effet, le degré d'expertise des linguistes, traducteurs et interprètes, associé à celui des diplomates dans la conduite des relations internationales, devrait prévenir la

survenance d'une telle situation. Pourtant, l'histoire des relations internationales est marquée par plusieurs exemples d'erreurs de traductions qui ont engendré des conséquences dramatiques.

3.2.1.   L'erreur de traduction qui a changé le cours de la Seconde Guerre mondiale

Parmi les erreurs de traduction historiques qui ont trait à des conflits internationaux, l'une des plus connues concerne la capitulation inconditionnelle du Japon[45]. C'est même l'un des exemples les plus célèbres d'erreur de traduction, ayant eu des conséquences historiques dramatiques. Il date de la Seconde guerre mondiale et concerne le terme japonais "mokusatsu". Pour mettre fin à la guerre du Pacifique, les Alliés adressent au Japon un ultimatum, contenu dans la Déclaration de Potsdam[46] du 26 juillet 1945. Le Japon y est incité à se rendre de manière inconditionnelle, s'exposant à une destruction immédiate et totale s'il ne répond pas aux exigences des Alliés. Selon les écrits des observateurs de l'époque, les autorités japonaises ne souhaitent pas réagir de façon prématurée et le Premier ministre Kantaro Suzuki décide d'employer le terme « mokusatsu » devant les journalistes japonais qui cherchent à connaître sa position à l'égard de l'ultimatum posé par les Alliés. Ce terme est composé de deux kanji (idéogrammes) : « moku » (silence) et « satsu » (tuer). Equivoque, il peut signifier « ne pas tenir compte de » ou « ignorer », mais aussi être interprété comme signifiant « sans commentaire », voire « traiter avec mépris ». Alors que le Premier ministre souhaitait vraisemblablement s'abstenir de commenter, les journalistes japonais relaient le terme « mokusatsu » en laissant entendre qu'il exprime la volonté du gouvernement japonais d'ignorer l'ultimatum. La réaction japonaise est perçue par le président américain Harry Truman comme une marque de mépris et l'amène à mettre les menaces des Alliés à exécution, en ordonnant le largage de deux bombes nucléaires sur les villes de Hiroshima et de Nagasaki les 6 et 9 août 1945. Ainsi, une erreur de

traduction a indirectement causé la mort de plusieurs dizaines de milliers de personnes.

3.2.2. Simple erreur de la traduction !

La procédure de conclusion des traités internationaux suppose une longue et laborieuse phase de négociation ayant vocation à permettre l'élaboration d'un instrument juridique contraignant pour les parties signataires. Les traités ont pendant longtemps été rédigés en une seule langue, principalement en latin puis en français. À partir du XXe siècle toutefois, l'anglais a occupé une place de choix dans la rédaction d'engagements internationaux et la traduction juridique des traités, désormais multilingues, est devenue un exercice subtil susceptible d'affecter la bonne exécution des obligations y contenues, notamment en cas de divergences entre les versions linguistiques d'un même instrument juridique.

Cette divergence peut être due à une simple erreur de traduction. En effet, parfois des versions non authentiques sont publiées par les Parties dans leurs langues respectives sauf que celles-ci ne reflètent pas fidèlement la substance du traité. C'est, par exemple, le cas du Traité d'amitié conclu entre l'Union soviétique et la République arabe unie en 1971. En effet, les versions arabe et russe du traité sont réputées faire foi mais les parties ont chacune entrepris de procéder à l'élaboration d'une version anglaise du texte à partir de leurs versions linguistiques respectives, de sorte que les obligations contenues dans les deux versions anglaises ne présentent pas un contenu similaire.

La divergence entre les différentes versions authentiques d'un traité peut également résulter de l'incapacité des rédacteurs à trouver un terrain d'entente sur le terme à employer dans les langues respectives des Parties contractantes, comme ce fut le cas pour le traité d'amitié germano-soviétique de 1970 : alors que la version soviétique qualifie les frontières d'« intangibles », la version allemande emploie le terme « inviolable »[47].

3.2.3.   Résolution 242 de l'ONU : une résolution ambiguë

L'adoption de plusieurs versions linguistiques d'instruments de droit dérivé peut donner lieu à des traductions incompatibles les unes avec les autres, y compris dans le cadre des Nations Unies. La résolution 242 de l'ONU sert souvent de texte de référence dans les actions et tentatives de paix des Nations unies, dans le cadre du conflit israélo-palestinien.

À la suite de la guerre des Six jours, les différentes discussions onusiennes à l'Assemblée admettent généralement le principe de la non-acquisition de territoires par la guerre et le besoin de résoudre urgemment les conflits de la région. Mais l'incapacité militaire des pays arabes affaiblit leurs revendications. De plus, les Etats-Unis considèrent qu'Israël a attaqué les Etats arabes afin d'assurer sa défense suite à de multiples agressions ; ils refusent donc d'exercer une pression contre l'Etat hébreu. Un puissant lobbysme américain pousse en outre le gouvernement en faveur d'Israël. Dans ce contexte, un projet de résolution est présenté au Conseil de sécurité. La résolution est adoptée à l'unanimité par le Conseil de sécurité le 22 novembre 1967.

La résolution commence par préciser « l'inadmissibilité de l'acquisition de territoires par la guerre et la nécessité d'œuvrer pour une paix juste et durable permettant à chaque Etat de la région de vivre en sécurité ». Deux principes sont ensuite énumérés : le retrait d'Israël des territoires nouvellement conquis en échange de la cessation de l'état de belligérance ; la reconnaissance de tous les Etats de la région et de leur intégrité territoriale[48].

Israël réclame ainsi des négociations directes avec les pays arabes et refuse de se replier sur les frontières d'avant la guerre des Six Jours. Pour justifier son action, le gouvernement s'appuie sur la version anglaise du texte de la résolution (le texte a été rédigé en anglais et en français, les deux langues officielles de l'ONU en

1967) qui parle d'un retrait israélien « de territoires occupés » (« *from territories occupied in the recent conflict* »), ne précisant donc aucunement de quels territoires il s'agit (« *from 'the' territories* » aurait précisé l'origine des territoires), reniant ainsi la version française qui est nettement plus contraignante et qui parle « des territoires occupés lors du récent conflit »[49].

3.2.4.   Erreur de traduction intentionnelle

Mais il peut arriver aussi que la traduction soit faussée de façon intentionnelle. Le traité Waitangi[50] est l'exemple qui illustre bien ce cas de figure. Le traité vise à installer un gouverneur britannique de la Nouvelle-Zélande, à reconnaître la propriété des Maoris sur leurs terres, leurs forêts et d'autres propriétés et à leur octroyer le statut de sujets britanniques. En contrepartie, les Maoris cèdent la Nouvelle-Zélande à la Couronne. Les versions anglaise et maorie présentent des divergences qui ne sont pas attribuables uniquement à la négligence des traducteurs. Alors que la première version consacre la souveraineté britannique sur la Nouvelle-Zélande, la seconde laisse penser aux Maoris qu'ils n'ont cédé à la Couronne qu'un « droit de gouverner » en contrepartie de l'octroi d'une protection britannique, sans pour autant avoir renoncé à leur pouvoir de gérer leurs propres affaires[51].

La divergence entre la substance des termes employés dans les deux textes[52] a contribué à des oppositions de vues ultérieures entre la Couronne et les Maoris, amenant ces derniers à qualifier le traité de document frauduleux jusque dans les années 1980.

On peut citer également le cas du traité de Wouchalé[53]. Le traité, censé maintenir la « paix et l'amitié » (article 1), consistait principalement en la cession par l'Éthiopie de diverses régions du Nord à l'Italie qui, en échange, fournirait du matériel militaire et une aide financière. Les régions cédées par l'Éthiopie correspondent à l'actuelle Érythrée.

L'article 17 reste le plus connu puisqu'il fut à l'origine de la guerre entre l'Éthiopie et l'Italie. En effet, dans la version amharique[54], l'article 17 « autorise » l'Éthiopie à utiliser l'Italie comme représentant diplomatique à l'étranger alors que dans la version italienne l'Éthiopie « doit » passer par Rome pour être représentée diplomatiquement, ce qui plaçait l'Éthiopie sous souveraineté italienne[55].

À travers ces quelques exemples, nous avons pu monter que le Droit est un domaine très sensible : le traducteur n'a pas le droit à l'erreur. Une mauvaise interprétation peut avoir des conséquences… littéralement catastrophiques.

3.2.5.   Guerre en Ukraine : invasion ou '' opération spéciale'' ?

Acte d'agression, invasion, opération spéciale, etc., sont autant de qualificatifs donnés par les acteurs internationaux au conflit qui s'est déclenché entre la Russie et l'Ukraine. Si un tel acte doit être constaté par le conseil de sécurité qui doit décider en vertu des dispositions du chapitre VII de la charte des nations unies quelles mesures seront prises conformément aux Articles 41 et 42 pour maintenir ou rétablir la paix et la sécurité internationales, cette fois-ci c'est un membre de ce même conseil qui est impliqué.

Dans ce contexte très tendu, les règles de la traduction juridique et le droit international ne font plus bon ménage dès lors que ce sont les positions géopolitiques qui dictent pour chaque membre des nations unies la qualification de ce conflit. En effet, pour la majorité des pays, il s'agit d'un acte d'agression pur et simple ; cependant, pour la chine apparue assez embarrassée sur le dossier ukrainien et souhaitant préserver de bonnes relations avec les pays de l'Union européenne pour des raisons économiques, elle refuse de qualifier l'intervention russe d' «invasion », préférant l'expression officielle du Kremlin d'« opération militaire spéciale ».

Pour la Chine, s'afficher sans réserve du côté de la Russie viendrait donner raison à ceux qui pensent qu'il y a une menace chinoise qui pointe à l'horizon et que sa montée pacifique n'est qu'un trompe-l'œil[56].

Pour justifier sa position, la chine a rappelé à la coalition menée par les États-Unis son intervention armée, sans l'aval du conseil de sécurité, en Afghanistan et en Irak et qu'elle a qualifiée l'acte d'agression perpétré contre des pays souverains d'opération de libération.

4. Conclusion

Deux ou plusieurs systèmes juridiques sont en contacts s'ils sont interchangeables dans un processus de traduction dont les conséquences sont l'encodage de la norme juridique dans le texte d'arrivée et sa réception. Cependant, aux interférences d'ordre linguistique au sens de Uriel Weinreich qui ont des effets sur les systèmes juridiques en contacts, vient se superposer les enjeux politiques des interactions culturelles où la traduction juridique devient géopolitique.

Dans un contexte impacté par la thèse de Samuel Huntington sur le choc des civilisations, la traduction juridique est de plus en plus politisée et affecté par les bouleversements que l'époque actuelle. L'opération traduisante n'est pas seulement une situation de contacte de langues, mais elle est le résultat de négociations, de compromis, voire de discordance et de tensions. De ce fait, l'on assiste à l'émergence d'une géopolitique de la traduction juridique révélatrice des rapports de force entre les acteurs géopolitiques sur la scène internationale.

Le conflit Russo - Ukrainien qui s'est déclenché juste après que le monde espérait se débarrasser de la pandémie du coronavirus n'est que la consécration de la tendance où la traduction juridique, dans le contexte international, est le résultat de compromis.

Notes

[1] Joël Dubos, une introduction à la géopolitique, Académie d'Orléans-Tours, en ligne, https://www.ac-orleans-tours.fr (consulté le 20/09/2021)

[2] Abdou Diouf, Secrétaire général de la Francophonie, cité par : Jacque Barrat (sous la dir.), Géopolitique de la francophonie, PUF, 1ère édition, 1997, p.7.

[3] Georges Mounin, Les problèmes théoriques de la traduction, Edition Gallimard, 1963, p.4.

[4] Mathieu Guidère (sous la dir.), Traductologie et géopolitique, Paris, L'Harmattan, 2015, p.7

[5] Ibid.

[6] Gaëtan Thierry FOUMENA, « Bilinguisme et normes juridiques au Cameroun », In, Joseph FOMETOU & Philipe BRIAND (sous la dir.), La langue et le droit, L'Harmattan Cameroun, 2018, p.30.

[7] Sébastien Schick, « La traduction comme enjeu de pouvoir. Approches socio-politiques d'une pratique culturelle (xvie-xxe siècle), Éditions de la Sorbonne | « Hypothèses » 2017/1 20 | pages 315 à 324, [En ligne], https://www.cairn.info/revue-hypotheses-2017-1-page-315.htm (consulté le 30/09/2021).

[8] Ibid, p.319.

[9] Fawcett, Peter. Ideology and Translation. In: Baker, M. and Malmkjær, K. eds. Routledge Encyclopaedia of Translation Studies. London and New York: Psychology Press, 1998, p.107. cite par: Fenik M. Ghafur, Ideological mediation in the translation of geopolitical texts: an ENGLISH-KURDISH case-study, A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Translation Studies, Cardiff University School of Modern Languages, Department of Translation Studies, May 2016, p.30.

[10] Tymoczko, M. 2000. Translation and Political Engagement: Activism, Social Change and the Role of Translation in Geopolitical Shifts. The Translator 6(1), p. 25. cite par: Fenik M. Ghafur, Ideological mediation in the translation of geopolitical texts: an ENGLISH-KURDISH case-study, A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Translation Studies, Cardiff University School of Modern Languages, Department of Translation Studies, May 2016, p.30.

[11] Fawcett, Peter. Ideology and Translation. In: Baker, op.cit., p.108.

[12] Fenik M. Ghafur, Ideological mediation in the translation of geopolitical texts: an ENGLISH-KURDISH case-study, A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Translation Studies, Cardiff University School of Modern Languages, Department of Translation Studies, May 2016, pp.29-30.

[13] MARIA TYMOCZKO, « Ideologu and the position of the translator in what sense is a translator " in between", In: María Calzada Pérez (Edited by), Apropos of Ideology Translation Studies on Ideology – Ideologies in Translation Studies, Published by Routledge, 2014, p.183.

[14] Thomas AFTON, « Traduction et interprétation dans les organismes internationaux », Entretien réalisé par Michaël Oustinoff, CNRS Éditions | « Hermès, La Revue » 2007/3 n° 49 | pages 115 à 123, Article disponible en ligne à l'adresse : https://www.cairn.info/revue-hermes-la-revue-2007-3-page-115.htm (consulté le 12/10/2021).

[15] La phase sémasiologique désignant tout le processus intellectuel qui se déroule depuis la lecture des signes écrits jusqu'au stade de conceptualisation du sens du texte.
 - La phase onomasiologique partant de ce stade pour aller jusqu'à la production du texte écrit dans la langue d'arrivée.

[16] Mathieu Guidère (sous la dir.), Traductologie et géopolitique, op., cit., p. 13.

[17] Manon-Nour Tannous, Les relations internationales, https://www.vie-publique.fr/ouvrages-numeriques (consulté le 21/11/2021).

[18] Céline Guilleux, « Politiques et géopolitiques de la traduction », Appel à contribution, Calenda, Publié le mercredi 18 mars 2020, https://calenda.org/761051 (consulté le 21/11/2021)

[19] Christian Gambotti, « La Francophonie, espace géopolitique et géoéconomique », Géoéconomie 2015/1 (n° 73), pages 189 à 199, DOI : 10.3917/geoec.073.0189. URL : https://www.cairn.info/revue-geoeconomie-2015-1-page-189.htm (consulté le 23/11/2021).

[20] Ibid.p.190.

[21] GLADYS GONZÁLEZ MATTHEWS, L'équivalence en traduction juridique : Analyse des traductions au sein de l'accord de libre-échange Nord-Américain (ALENA), Thèse Présentée à la Faculté des études supérieures de l'Université Laval pour l'obtention du grade de Philosophiae Doctor (Ph.D.), FACULTÉ DES LETTRES UNIVERSITÉ LAVAL QUÉBEC NOVEMBRE 2003, p.10.

[22] Ibid.

[23] Charlotte Dion, « Les Nations Unies et le multilinguisme »,
[En ligne] : https://odl.openum.ca/les-nations-unies-et-le-multilinguisme/ (consulté le 26/11/2021).

[24] Le règlement fut adopté dans les termes suivants :
a. Dans tous les organismes des Nations Unies autres que la Cour internationale de justice, le chinois, l'anglais, le français, le russe et l'espagnol sont les langues officielles. L'anglais et le français sont les langues de travail.
b. Les discours prononcés dans l'une des langues de travail sont interprétés dans l'autre.
c. Les discours prononcés dans l'une des trois autres langues officielles sont interprétés dans les deux langues de travail.
d. Tout représentant peut prendre la parole dans une langue autre que les langues officielles. Dans ce cas, il assure lui-même l'interprétation dans l'une des langues de travail. L'interprète du Secrétariat prend pour base de son interprétation dans l'autre langue de travail, celle qu'il aura faite dans la première langue de travail utilisée.
e. Les comptes rendus in extenso sont établis dans les deux langues de travail. La traduction de tout ou partie d'un compte rendu in extenso dans l'une des autres langues officielles sera fournie si elle cst demandée par une délégation.

    f.   Des procès-verbaux sont établis aussitôt que possible dans les langues officielles.
    g.   Le Journal des divers organismes des Nations Unies est publié dans les langues de travail.
    h.   Toutes les résolutions et autres documents importants sont communiqués dans les langues officielles. Sur demande d'un représentant. Tout autre document sera établi dans l'une quelconque des langues officielles ou dans toutes ces langues.
    i.   Les documents des organismes des Nations Unies, seront publiés dans n'importe quelle langue non officielle, si ces organismes en décident ainsi.

[25] Marie-Josée de SAINT ROBERT, Rôle et place de la traduction dans les organisations internationales, In : Mathieu GUIDERE (sous la dir.), Traduction et Géopolitique, L'Harmattan, pp.78-79.

[26] Mark E. Allen, Zakaria Sibahi & Earl D. Sohm, La traduction dans les organismes des Nations Unies, Rapport d'évaluation, Genève, Avril 1980.

[27] Marie-Josée de SAINT ROBERT, op.cit., p. 79

[28] Ibid.

[29] Nikolay Lozinskiy, Le multilinguisme dans le système des Nations Unies, Nations Unies, Genève, 2020, p. 1.

[30] Papa Louis Fall, Yishan Zhang, Situation du multilinguisme dans les organismes du système des nations unies, Genève, 2011, p. 2.

[31] L'arabe, le chinois, l'anglais, le français, le russe et l'espagnol sont les six langues officielles des Nations Unies. L'anglais et le français sont les langues de travail du Secrétariat des Nations Unies et sont utilisés au quotidien dans les échanges professionnels. Conformément à la résolution 68/268 de l'Assemblée générale, les organes conventionnels peuvent utiliser au maximum trois des langues officielles pour leurs travaux, avec l'inclusion, à titre exceptionnel, d'une quatrième lorsque cela est nécessaire pour faciliter la communication entre les membres. Chaque État partie conserve également le droit d'interagir avec les organes conventionnels dans l'une des six langues officielles.

[32] Nikolay Lozinskiy, op.cit., p. 1.
[33] Le CCI est le seul organe de contrôle externe indépendant du système des Nations Unies à être mandaté pour conduire des évaluations, des inspections et des enquêtes à l'échelle du système. Il vise à garantir qu'il est fait le meilleur usage possible des ressources disponibles pour mener à bien les activités, à améliorer l'efficacité du fonctionnement administratif et financier du système des Nations Unies. Le Corps commun vise également à recenser les meilleures pratiques, proposer des repères et faciliter le partage de l'information à travers tout le système.

[34] Ibid.

[35] Marie-Josée de SAINT ROBERT, op.cit., p. 79.

[36] Papa Louis Fall, Yishan Zhang, op.cit., p. 42.

[37] Ibid.

[38] Mathieu Guidère, op.cit., p. 79.

[39] Une étude réalisée en octobre 2018 par l'Organisation internationale de la Francophonie (OIF, basée à Paris) souligne qu'au siège de l'ONU à New York, près de 85% des documents sont rédigés en anglais, et 2% seulement en français, deuxième langue de production. Cette proportion dépasse à peine les 10% aux bureaux de l'Onu à Genève, ville pourtant francophone (et 84% en anglais).

[40] Version contractée de *« global english »*.

[41] Hélène Gadriot-Renard, « L'anglais : lingua franca des institutions internationales », Hérodote 2004/4 N°115, pp. 25-29.

[42] Thomas Afton, « Traduction et interprétation dans les organismes internationaux », HERMÈS N° 49, 2007, p. 118.

[43] Claude Hagège, Halte à la mort des langues, Odile Jacob, Paris, 2000, p. 172.

[44] Mathieu Guidère, op.cit., p. 97.

[45] Relaté par William Craig dans son ouvrage The Fall of Japan.
Voir : https://www.bonnefous.com/blog/erreurs-de-traduction-juridique/

[46] Le 26 juillet 1945, un ultimatum est signifié à l'empire du Japon par le président américain Harry Truman, le premier ministre britannique Winston Churchill et le président chinois Tchang Kaï-chek (l'URSS n'en fait pas partie car le pays n'est pas encore en guerre contre le Japon) : «Nous appelons le gouvernement du Japon à prononcer aujourd'hui la capitulation sans conditions de toutes les forces armées japonaises. [...] Sinon, le Japon subira une destruction rapide et totale ».

[47] Ibid.

[48] Lisa Romeo, « Résolution 242 de l'ONU : une résolution ambiguë ». [En ligne] : https://www.lesclesdumoyenorient.com/Resolution-242-de-l-ONU-une.html (consulté le 10/12/2021).

[49] Ibid.

[50] Traité de Waitangi signé en 1840 en Nouvelle-Zélande, entre les représentants de la Couronne britannique et les chefs tribaux locaux.

[51] Valère Ndior. Op.cit.

[52] Cette différence est si grande que l'on considère aujourd'hui en Nouvelle-Zélande qu'il y a deux textes parallèles – *the Treaty* et *te Tiriti* – plutôt qu'un original et sa traduction. Alors qu'un traité en droit devrait être la forme ultime d'une reconnaissance réciproque au sens où chacune des parties reconnaît l'identité de l'autre, le caractère bilingue du traité de Waitangi, unique dans les annales de l'Empire britannique, a plutôt créé un conflit d'interprétation. Voir :

René Lemieux, « La souveraineté peut-elle se transférer ? Les enseignements de la traduction du traité de Waitangi (1840) ». [En ligne] : https://www.erudit.org/fr/revues/ttr/2016-v29-n2-ttr03940/1051014ar/

[53] Le traité de Wouchalé (en italien : Trattato di Uccialli) est un traité entre l'empire d'Éthiopie et le royaume d'Italie, signé le 2 mai 1889 à Wouchalé entre le Negus du Choa Menelik II et le comte Pietro Antonelli.

[54] Langue sémitique parlée dans la majeure partie du haut plateau abyssin. L'amharique est la langue officielle de l'Éthiopie.

[55] De tels actes relèveraient sans doute aujourd'hui du champ de l'article 49 de la Convention de Vienne de 1969 sur le droit des traités. Il y est affirmé que :
« Si un État a été amené à conclure un traité par la conduite frauduleuse d'un autre État ayant participé à la négociation, il peut invoquer le dol comme viciant son consentement à être lié par le traité ».

[56] Le jeudi 24 février 2022, Vladimir Poutine, président de la Fédération de Russie, a lancé une opération militaire en Ukraine. Le prétexte avancé par la Russie est que, depuis les années 2000, l'Ukraine qui n'est pas dans l'Otan, songe à se rapprocher de l'Organisation du traité de l'Atlantique du Nord, créée en 1949 pour freiner l'expansion de l'Union Soviétique. La Russie ne veut pas que Kiev rejoigne l'Otan.
Malgré des rapprochements entre la Russie et la Chine ces dernières années, l'invasion Russe de l'Ukraine a montré que la Chine semble vouloir prendre une certaine distance vis-à-vis de la Russie.
La chine est apparue assez embarrassée sur le dossier ukrainien. Elle se trouve actuellement dans une position d'équilibriste entre la Russie et l'Occident. Si la Chine reconnaît aujourd'hui l'existence d'un conflit, elle refuse toutefois de qualifier l'intervention russe d'« invasion », préférant l'expression officielle du Kremlin d'« opération militaire spéciale » . < Marc Julienne, « Quelle est la position de la Chine dans le conflit russo-ukrainien ? », [en ligne]:https://www.lefigaro.fr/vox/monde/quelle-est-la-position-de-la-chine-dans-le-conflit-russo-ukrainien-20220303 >
Depuis le déclenchement du conflit, la Chine s'est présentée comme neutre dans le conflit. Elle a appelé toutes les parties à exercer de la retenue, a plaidé pour résoudre les différends pacifiquement à travers le dialogue et la consultation, et a exhorté à respecter les principes de la Charte de l'ONU. < Ibid. >
Mais en réalité, elle est dans une situation délicate et cela à plusieurs égards. De prime abord, l'invasion de l'Ukraine par la Russie va à l'encontre de l'une des valeurs fondamentales de la Chine qui a une position très connue sur le respect du principe de la souveraineté des États. C'est un principe cardinal de sa politique étrangère. < THOMAS LABERGE, «Invasion de l'Ukraine: trois questions sur les relations entre la Chine et la Russie », [en ligne]:https://www.lesoleil.com/2022/03/03/invasion-de-lukraine-trois-questions-sur-les-relations-entre-la-chine-et-la-russie-3b5c552e841b8e297c80b2c193b927f5 >
Par ailleurs, la Chine se retrouve dans une situation très difficile face à la violence en Ukraine qui accueille des investisseurs chinois. La Chine souhaite donc préserver de bonnes relations avec les pays de l'Union européenne pour des raisons économiques. Les pays occidentaux n'ont pas seulement sanctionné économiquement la Russie, mais aussi son allié la Biélorussie. La Chine souhaite bien entendu éviter des sanctions. Elle essaie donc de garder une distance avec la Russie.

En outre, bien que la Russie et la Chine soient tous deux des États autoritaires, leurs stratégies sont bien différentes. Alors que Moscou a davantage une approche belliqueuse, Pékin utilise plutôt son pouvoir économique pour étendre son influence à l'internationale. <Ibid.>

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The New Era of Climate Advocacy
Climate Change Litigation

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Abstract

This paper aims to explain the new forms and varieties of advocacy in the context of climate change and international climate commitments. Global and local climate activists have developed their advocacy strategies over the years, but these efforts resulted in the absence of any national obligations, even morally, and non-binding effects. As for now, the activists changed their advocacy strategies to litigation against the government.

Those new forms of climate advocacy create different ways of political pressure on governmental actors. Because the activist's used climate agreements and treaties ratified by governments, it is almost impossible for the official actors to ignore this kind of action unlike protests or other forms of advocacy. This paper is navigating climate litigation as an advocacy mechanism in different contexts to better understand the effectiveness of this instrument in the national climate advocacy.

Keywords: Climate change; advocacy; NDCs; legal; law; litigation

1. Introduction

After the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment was held in Stockholm, Sweden(1972), Several United Nations institutions and bodies working in the field of the environment and climate change were established, such as the United Nations Environment Program, the Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD), The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC, 1992), the High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development and others. These environmental agencies resulted in creating legal instruments such as the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC[1] and the Paris Climate Agreement on climate change (2015)[2] which are the most important legal frameworks related to climate change.

1.1. Methodology

This paper will center on how the global community is demanding that governments enhance their measures against climate change. We will analyze the strength of their demands and present various cases where activists used litigation to pressure governments.

1.2. Problematic

This paper focuses on climate change as a global issue and the limited action taken by states in their limited jurisdictions. It is a contending position and level scale about a shared responsibility between all governments or focusing only on national actions.

2. The Kyoto Protocol and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: A Foundational Stage

The Kyoto Protocol (1997) operationalizes the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change by requiring industrialized countries and economies in transition to reduce greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) according to individualized mutually agreed targets; which requires those countries to adopt mitigating policies and measures and give periodic reports[3].

The main Kyoto mechanisms are The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)[4], Joint Implementation (JI), and Emissions Trading (ET). According to Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol, the CDM allows the country committed to reducing emissions to implement a project for the same purpose in developing countries. Such projects can earn salable Certified Emission Reductions (CER) credits. This mechanism is a standard tool for emissions compensation. This mechanism stimulated sustainable development and reduce emissions while giving industrialized countries more comfort in how they meet the desired goals[5]. In addition, the "Joint Implementation" mechanism (that is in Article 6 of the Kyoto Protocol) provides parties with a flexible and cost-effective means of fulfilling part of their Kyoto Protocol obligations, while the host Party benefits from technology transfer and foreign investment[6]. Thirdly, the emissions trading mechanism, specified in Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol, allows countries with an unused emission allowance to sell this excess capacity to countries that have exceeded their targets[7].

These mechanisms show that the drafters of the Kyoto Protocol used market logic (in the language of the invisible hand) where supply and demand prevail. Some industrialized countries have fulfilled their obligations, though they have engaged in the trick of transferring factories to the global south countries. In effect, the

planet has become divided into two halves, one polluted and the other pure, and a balance is created between them through buying and selling, ignoring that industrial and non-industrial countries live in a common future[8].

Until this point, the advocacy forms are campaigns, protests[9], and political participation such as Germany's 90/Greens Alliance political party, in addition to press and academic writings critiquing capitalist climate policies. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Reports[10] showed the danger of pollution and global warming.

 The approaching end of the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, demonstrated the need for another more serious agreement, especially with the rise of some southern countries such as China and India. These shortcomings led to the Paris Agreement on Climate Change.

3. Paris Agreement on Climate Change: The Turning Point

The Paris Agreement on Climate Change as a legally binding international treaty is seeking to limit global warming to less than 2 degrees Celsius, compared to pre-industrial levels[11]. As authors such as Robert Falkner highlight, the logic of the Paris Agreement is one of "domestically driven climate action," recognizing and formalizing the existing trend of multilevel governance in this field[12].

To achieve this, an economic and social transformation must be carried out based on the best available science. All countries involved in the Paris Agreement, including developing countries, are required to commit to mitigation efforts[13].

Article 12 of the same international treaty emphasizes public awareness, public participation, and access to information[14]. With these changes, states no longer have room for flexibility, as was the case with the Kyoto Protocol, but through the right to information and clarity of NDCs every five years, countries can be held

accountable for breaching their obligations. The question here is who is holding them accountable and how?

The NDC reflects its highest possible ambition (Article 4 (3). The Paris agreement can improve climate change security, but the constraint is that this agreement is characterized by these binding elements. Therefore, it is difficult to apply the collective obligation and thus relate to protecting human rights.

4. Global North: Transnational Climate Litigation

4.1. The U.S. Litigation in Juliana v. the United States

In the United States of America, twenty-one young citizens, an environmental organization, and a "Representative of Future Generations" filed a complaint against the United States of America, its president, and federal agencies, for "allowing, authorizing, and supporting" the use of fossil fuels despite knowing the dangers associated with it[15]. Many plaintiffs sustained damages caused by climate change, including psychological damage, destruction of recreational interests, and property damage. The plaintiffs sought declaratory relief and an injunction ordering the government to implement a plan to phase out fossil fuel emissions and reduce carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. Although the government filed a motion for refusal, the district court did not accept it because, in its view, the plaintiffs had the right to sue and presented sufficient litigable evidence[16].

The case was mainly directed toward how competent plaintiffs would sue the federal government for alleged climate-change-related injuries that resulted from the federal government's continued "permit, authorize, and subsidize" of fossil fuels.

The court noted that the plaintiffs must prove that the relief they sought was most likely to compensate for their injuries, which they failed to prove. According to the

court, this was outside of its power as an Article III court because it could not order, design, supervise or carry out the plan of treatment requested by the plaintiffs, as an effective plan would require a set of complex policy decisions that are entrusted to the executive and legislative branches. Consequently, the court concluded that the plaintiffs' case should be taken to the political branches or the electorate[17].

Regardless of the details of the case, we can consider it a victory for the environmental community and a turning point in environmental advocacy in the United States of America.

4.2.   Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) in the United States

In 2006, twelve states as well as various cities and organizations sought to require the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to regulate greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide under its authority to regulate pollutants. The lawsuit presented in front of the Supreme Court of the United States was based on Section 202(a) (1) of the Clean Air Act, a provision that requires an EPA official to set standards for the emission of air pollutants from automobiles with significant polluting potential. These emissions are expected to jeopardize public health and well-being.

In response, the EPA determined that it lacked the authority to regulate greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide for climate change[18].

This case addresses two issues: first, whether the agency made a correct decision on these issues, and second, the procedural question of whether states, cities, and organizations have the right to make such a claim. Especially since their main argument was the loss of the coast due to rising sea levels caused by global warming. The argument of the EPA was considered insufficient by the court, and therefore the case was returned to the agency to reconsider its decision. This

prompted the EPA to change its decision, concluding that regulating greenhouse gases had a reasonable relevance to protecting public health and welfare[19].

The fact that global warming and climate change are global does not mean that individual or national/ local institutions do not have any responsibility for this. Rather, everyone has a role to play within the scope of their competencies. Opening court cases about the matter from time to time would prompt officials to do more in the fight against climate change.

4.3.   Thomson v. Minister for Climate Change Issues

In 2015, a law student in New Zealand filed a Statement of Claim against the Minister of Climate Change issues, which has failed in several respects to set the greenhouse gas emissions reduction targets required by the New Zealand Climate Change Response Act 2002[20].

The plaintiff requested an order for the Minister for Climate Change Issues to review New Zealand's 2050 Greenhouse Gas (GHG) reduction target based on Section 225 of the Climate Change Response Act. The court ruled that this was unnecessary since the new government had announced that it would set a new target for 2050[21].

The plaintiff also requested an order declaring the Minister's Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) decision unlawful because he had not considered the cost of dealing with the negative impacts of climate change in a "business as usual" situation and the negative effects on citizens living in high-risk areas. The scientific consensus was that the NDCs of the Paris Agreement parties fall short of preventing a dangerous climate system. In addition, the NDC decision lacks a reasonable basis for believing that the NDC will enhance the global climate response and avoid a dangerous climate system, according to the plaintiff. The

court found that the government followed the international framework, and the errors did not require judicial intervention. The request for judicial review was thus rejected[22].

The efforts of this New Zealand student embarrassed the previous Minister, and although each government has its agenda, this case serves as a foundation for judicial advocacy in the environment by New Zealand civil society, paving the way for similar issues that represent a new kind of pressure on decision-makers in various positions.

4.4. The Urganda appeal in the Netherlands: Hague Court of Appeal's decision in Urgenda v. Netherlands

A lawsuit heard by the Supreme Court of the Netherlands in 2019 related to the government's efforts to reduce carbon dioxide emissions[23]. The case was brought against the Dutch government in 2013 by a Dutch environmental group, the Urgenda Foundation, along with 900 Dutch citizens arguing that the government failed to achieve a minimum CO2 emissions reduction target set by scientists to avoid harmful climate change, which threatened the human rights of Dutch citizens as provided by National Union and European laws[24].

The Supreme Court upheld the initial 2015 ruling, requiring the government to meet the target of cutting emissions by 25% from 1990 levels by 2020, in appeals, asserting that emissions cuts were necessary for the Dutch government to protect human rights. This case is considered a precedent in the field of climate litigation based on human rights[25].

In Urgenda, the Supreme Court of the Netherlands has upheld that the State's obligation to protect the right to life and the right to private and family life under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) implied an obligation to

reduce its GHG emissions by at least 25 percent by the end of 2020 compared with 1990 levels[26].

There are many aspects to environmental litigation, and this case is an example of the plaintiff using human rights in building a case against the Dutch government. The lessons that the environmentalist community can learn from this case is that starting from the agreements ratified by the government greatly guarantees the success of the case. Success is not necessarily winning the case, but getting the public's attention, which is the primary purpose of advocacy. The details of each agreement provide a starting point for environmental and climate litigation.

4.5. L'Affaire du siècle[27]: From Negotiation to the Court

In late 2018, four organizations[28] sent a 41-page letter to ministers in the French government, titled "Demande indemnitaire préalable [29]", as a mandatory step before any judicial proceedings. This letter shows the country's decades of inaction in the face of climate change and calls for compensation for the damage caused by this inaction. Then the state had two months to respond, or not to respond. On February 15, 2019, the government rejected this request in a 10-page memo[30] that includes the efforts of the French government to combat climate change.

After this refusal, on March 14, 2019[31], they filed a brief petition in front of the Paris Administrative Court against the state's climate inaction. On May 20, 2019, they enriched their application by filing an additional memorandum before this same court[32].

The court ordered the French state to pay a symbolic sum of one euro as compensation for the moral damage suffered by the complainants; and, to convict the state of paying a symbolic 1 euro for environmental damage[33].

Paris appears as a city of contradictions; on the one hand, it hosted COP21 which resulted in the most important agreement in the history of climate negotiations, the Paris Agreement on Climate Change, and on the other hand in Paris' court the French state was found guilty of its non-compliance with the Nationally Determined Contributions.

Despite the media name given to the experiment, the "case of the century" as it is foundational in France, is not the first in the world, as we explained in the previous cases.

5. Global South: Transnational Climate Litigation

Many courts in the Global South are taking bold steps to compel action on climate change.

Moreover, the cases from Asia, Africa, and Latin America have characteristics that distinguish them from climate cases in the Global North and suggest new dimensions to explore in our understanding of transnational climate litigation and its contribution to global climate governance. These characteristics include climate change issues often at the periphery of cases rather than at their center, a stronger trend of employing constitutional and human rights arguments than we have seen to date in the Global North climate cases[34].

In addition to a preference for implementation and enforcement of existing policies and laws rather than using litigation as a tool to force regulatory change, and strategic choices made by petitioners in many cases to pursue a more indirect or "stealthy" route in litigation that puts the focus on less politically charged or more

policy salient issues rather than on climate change per se to advance environmental goals that also benefit climate change mitigation[35].

A Pakistani farmer, Mr. Ashgar Leghari, filed a petition with the Lahore High Court claiming that the government of Pakistan was violating his fundamental constitutional rights by failing to address the challenges and to meet the vulnerabilities associated with Climate Change[36].

Due to multiple stresses, Africa is one of the continent's most vulnerable to climate change and climate variability. Climate change and climate variability not only have the potential to impose additional pressures on human security and overwhelm the adaptive capacities of societies, climate change is also deemed to influence a diverse array of conflicts[37]. In addition, the global South had serious constraints with climate change resilience.

Africa has the highest number of "core" climate change cases in the Global South docket. Three of the five African cases are from South Africa, and the most recent one is from Kenya. The central argument in the South African cases was that the environmental impact assessment for the project in question was flawed because of the failure to take climate change impacts and greenhouse gas emissions into account (whereas the Kenyan case raised climate change as one of several grounds of invalidity)[38].

Nigerian environmental activists initiated a civil lawsuit against Royal Dutch Shell and its Nigerian subsidiary Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria LTD[*]:

The plaintiffs (four Nigerian farmers) filed suit in 2008 against Shell in The Netherlands, where Royal Dutch Shell (the parent company[*]) is headquartered. The plaintiffs filed three separate lawsuits, each one addressing the impact of oil

spillages in the three villages – Oruma, Goi, and Ikot Ada Udo. In January 2021, the Dutch Court of Appeal held Shell Nigeria liable for damage caused by the oil spills. Royal Dutch Shell was held to owe a duty of care to affected villagers and liable for a failure to prevent future oil spills[39].

Multinational corporations behave differently from one country to another depending on the context, power, and space they have. Therefore, it is a smart move by the African complainants to file the case in the company's home country, but this does not mean that in the future African courts will not be resorted to climate cases, but rather it is a snowball that is growing continuously.

6. Conclusion

In this type of issue, we aim to embarrass governments and expose their failure to fulfill the commitments they made in combating climate change. This phenomenon continues to grow as a new form of climate advocacy and litigation against government actions. It relates to the vision of sustaining society and the obligation of the maker's decision to take into account the needs of future generations.

Generally, states are not capable to achieve their climate responsibility. So, the movements impose a variety of instruments including the process of climate change mitigation from local to national and global levels and advocacy of an alternative way to address the climate problem.

Advocacy is one primordial element to improving our consciousness of climate risk society. Civil society can progress through climate litigation. It is an engagement to mitigate climate change. However, it is a collective action to influence the decisions of the government.

Climate litigation is a prospect for political society to take a package of measures and actions to the climate change mitigation/attenuation. In the same way, it is an

opportunity to measure the equilibrium between civil-society and political society. It is also an opening policy for new climate mitigation reforms.

Endnotes

[1] The Kyoto Protocol was adopted on December 11, 1997, entered into force on 16 February 2005. Followed by The Doha, Qatar Amendment, which was approved on December 8, 2012, for a second commitment period from 2013 to 2020. See What is the Kyoto Protocol?, UNFCCC, https://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol accessed December 17, 2021.

[2] The Paris Agreement on Climate Change is an international treaty on climate change, adopted in 2015. The agreement was negotiated by 196 parties during the conference of parties 21 in Paris, France entered into force on 4 November 2016, The Paris Agreement, UNFCCC, https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-paris-agreement/the-paris-agreement accessed December 17, 2021.

[3] UNFCCC, What is the Kyoto Protocol? https://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol accessed December 17, 2022

[4] The Clean Development Mechanism, UNFCCC https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-kyoto-protocol/mechanisms-under-the-kyoto-protocol/the-clean-development-mechanism accessed December 17, 2021

[5] Idem

[6] Joint implementation, UNFCCC, https://unfccc.int/process/the-kyoto-protocol/mechanisms/joint-implementation accessed December 17, 2021.

[7] Emissions Trading, UNFCCC, https://unfccc.int/process/the-kyoto-protocol/mechanisms/emissions-trading accessed December 17, 2021.

[8] How cap and trade works , https://www.edf.org/climate/how-cap-and-trade-works accessed on April 12, 2022

[9] For example: Earth Day, which is continuing since 1970, Campaign against Climate Change, Climate Rush, Earth First! Earth life Africa, Gezi Park protests, Global Climate March, Global Day of Action etc.

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[11] The Paris Agreement on Climate Change (2015).
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[13] As mentioned in Article 4 of The Paris Agreement on Climate Change, countries should submit every five years their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) which should be provided with clarity and transparency.

[14] Idem.

[15] Lexis Nexis, Juliana v. United States - 947 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 2020), https://www.lexisnexis.com/community/casebrief/p/casebrief-juliana-v-united-states access February 1, 2022

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[27] It is a French initiative, in English could be translated as "The case of the century".

[28] Notre Affaire à Tous, Fondation pour la Nature et l'Homme (FNH), Greenpeace France and Oxfam France
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