New or old elites in politics?
On change and stability in the career background of Austrian legislators, 1945-2019

Abstract: To understand if national legislative elites change over time this article investigates the career profiles of all members (N=1,158) of the Austrian National Council (*Nationalrat*) between 1945 and 2019 that either represented Austria´s Social Democrats (SPÖ) or People´s Party (ÖVP). The study finds a great deal more stability than change as parties stick to decentralised recruitment practices. Most MPs are rooted in local party branches/suborganisations and either directly enter the *Nationalrat* or rise through the party machine. The strongly increasing importance of local political resources as well as the growing share of career politicans among MPs hint to party-centered political professionalization as the dominant long-term trend. A turn of trends in legislative recruitment channels becomes only visible with regard to the professional background of MPs as public service becomes a less important supplier of parliamentary representatives.

Keywords: elite circiulation, political elites, legislative recruitment, prosopography, data visualisation

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Introduction

Elite transformation and its consequences are a recurrent theme in the literature on parliamentarians. The rise to dominance of career politicians with no or little experience in professional worlds is found to transform parlaments into closed shops with little input from outside (King, 1981). The end of mass parties and their vanishing ability of parties to provide secure political careers to their functionaries is observed to provide counter-elites such as populist movements with access to legislative power (Vogel, Gebauer and Salheiser, 2020). The political marginalization of the working class, it is argued, goes hand in hand with decreasing shares of workers in parlament (Elsässer and Schäfer, 2022). Regime change and other big socio-economic events are proven to have significant and long-lasting repercussion on elite configurations (Best and Cotta, 2000). Yet, on the other hand, a myriad of empirical studies finds persistent background traits and stable career patterns among members of political elites to be the rule rather than the exception (Vercesi, 2022). The question, thus, whether the legislative elite can change substantially in 'normal times' and why thus demands further inquiry.

In order to tackle this question, this article takes a long-time perspective on the legislative elite in Austria covering a time span of 74 years (1945-2019) and probes whether or not parties' recruitment pools have become more inclusive over time. While post-war Austria has in general been regarded as a model of ultra-stability, the Second Republic has as well experienced endogenous "shocks" such as the rapid rise of the radical populist right to government and the end of the "grand coalition"—the hallmark of post-war Austria. Moreover, a significant intra-party democracy imperative set in latest during the 1990s (Krouwel, 2012). Given these changes, one can expect that the elite-dominated way of candidate selection has at least partially given way to more open forms—a transformation that should have opened the doors for new types of parliamentarians.

The focus of this study is on career characteristics of legislators that are viewed as traces of complex and multi-layered recruitment processes, which implies that change in formal and informal rules governing intra-party selection processes should bring about elite renewal. This is also why the

inner life of parties has occupied center stage in the research conducted—a feature that distinguishes this study from all all previous longue durée research on legislators´ background (Best and Cotta, 2000).

The cases analysed are are two parties that were historically extremely effective in recruiting party members and exceeded most of their respective sister parties in Western Europe in terms of membership (Müller, 1994): Austria´s Social Democrats (SPÖ, or the Socialists before 1991) and the People´s Party (ÖVP).[1] Both cases promise initial insights into whether large parties in Europe that increasingly lose members and the organisational grip on the electorate find themselves "forced" to democratise their selection procedures, and how this impacts the characteristics of party loyal parlamentarians.

The main insight gained is that legislators´ profiles have not become more diverse over time. The basic explanation for the stability over change is a persistent preselection of candidates through local/regional party branches (as in the case of the SPÖ) and party suborganisations (as in the case of the ÖVP). The bulk of all MPs analysed have worked in local councils or in local/regional party organisations. Today, as in the past, local/regional party elites make or break their legislative careers, as is shown by previous in-depth fieldwork (e.g., Shell, 1962),. In general, the case studies suggest that once a particular type of legislative elite is created in a country, it strongly tends to persist. As minor efforts made to democratise candidation selections such as the temporary introduction of primaries in 1993 turn out to have been inconsequential, elite change is likely to be triggered by fundamental party reforms only (Sandri and Seddone, 2021).

In terms of structure, this article proceeds in four steps. First, it reviews the literature on legislative recruitment and candidate selection and outlines how a bridge between both literatures can be built. Second, it describes the (changing) rules of candidate selection in Austria. Third, hypotheses are formulated against the literature reviewed, which are tested using visual explorations of biographical data gathered on 1,522 members of the Austrian National Council (*Nationalrat*). The conclusion distills the key findings and suggests prospects for future research.

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[1] Both major parties have been in flux since 1945. The SPÖ, which had the highest ratio of members to voters of any democratic party in Europe during the Kreisky years (1970-1983) with over 600,000 members, has lost over two thirds of its members since 1990 (Wineroither and Kitschelt, 2017) and has settled at around 300,000 members. Membership in the ÖVP has declined since the 1970s and is today estimated to still amount to about 500,000 members.

Intra-party dynamics and elite change

It is well established that parties control the channels that lead into parliament: "Much like the physical channels from which the metaphor is derived […] they not only concentrate and direct popular input, but also constrict or even restrict popular input" (Katz, 2001, p. 278). The inner life of parties is, thus, key to the understanding of who becomes an elected representative of the people. It is, therefore, even more striking that research on legislators considers the central gatekeeper role of parties to very different degrees: the literature on legislative recruitment is mostly blind to the inner life of parties while the literature on candidate selection puts intra-party practices at center stage.

The first set of literature asks the question of who rises from the pool of eligible candidates into parliament and mostly focuses on selected background characteristics of legislators such as gender, social class or career background (Matthews, 1954). The general mechanism identified that underlies legislative recruitment is professionalisation: Political experience has increasingly become key to success, and "career politicans" (Allen *et al.*, 2020) have become more numerous. Most recent research on pre-parliamentary careers that examines how *exactly* individuals move from lower levels into parliamentary careers (Ohmura *et al.*, 2018; Turner-Zwinkels and Mills, 2020) finds significant differences in the political experience and social capital that successful competitors for a legislative mandate typically accumulate. In reality, there are many fine variations of the laborious career pathways through the party machine (dubbed *Ochsentour* in German). Even if what is researched are essentially "careers through the party" (Fiers and Secker, 2007), the literature neglects party-specific processes of socialising a person into active party members and chooses the party system as a whole as the main unit of analysis.

The second set of literature is concerned with "the predominantly extralegal process by which a political party decides which of the persons legally eligible to hold an elective public office will be designated on the ballot" (Ranney, 1981, p. 75). How electoral lists are made is a private affair. As parties can easily alter selection methods, one can fairly assume that "candidate selection reflects and defines the character of a party and its internal power struggle" (Hazan and Rahaṭ, 2010, p. 11). Most empirical research considers all stages through which participants must travel to gain legislative seats—application, approval, selection, and election—and investigates who advances or fails to advance from

one stage to the next (Ashe and Stewart, 2012). The main finding in this strand of literature is that political success is the most closely linked to being considered a local candidate by local party selectors. It is noteworthy that in all these studies the unit of analysis is a single party at a specific time as parties in the same country may adopt very different methods of candidate selection.

To comprehensively understand change and continuity of legislative elites this article draws from both literatures and studies *recruitment trends within parties* over time which allows to trace back and explain transformed legislators´ profiles through internal party dynamics. The fate of candidates for parliament is determined by party rules as well as by powerful balances between party groups that each aim at promoting their loyal members to top positions on party lists. In the absence of major external shocks new legislative elite will only arise if the the inner life of parties changes substantially. In what follows, due consideration will therefore not only be given to the (changing) career profiles of legislators but as well to the changing rules and key players governing intra-party recruitment.

How Austria´s large parties select their parliamentary candidates

While the electoral system in Austria has changed several times since 1945, its basic principles have stayed the same: Election to legislative bodies is conducted on the basis of the electoral list system, i.e., voters are offered a choice between competing party slates. Chances of being elected highly depend on the candidate´s initial position on the list, as very few candidates have succeeded in gaining sufficient votes to move to the top of the party list due to the voters' preference (Harfst, Bol and Laslier, 2021). As the compilation of candidate lists is in the hands of political parties, aspirants to political office have been dependent on the party machine for nomination and election. Since 1992 the electoral system has had three tiers: the national level, nine regional levels (*Länder*), and 43 local voting constituencies (39 since 2013). Seat allocation is logically connected across tiers in a bottom-up process (Müller, 2005). Preferential voting was extended to the national tier for the 2013 elections but proved to be ineffective. To give just one illustration: In 2013, a single MP from the ÖVP won her seat due to preferential votes (Jenny, 2018, p. 38). Before the elections, parties are asked to hand in a national district candidate list (*Bundeswahlvorschlag*) and candidate lists for the Land and the nested regional districts (*Landeswahlvorschlag*). The two parties discussed here for the timespan 1945-2019[4]—which continuously dominated the *Nationalrat* (NR) and formed for most of the years the "grand coalition"— elaborated partly different formal and informal nomination rules for selecting legislative candidates that need to be analysed first.

Candidate recruitment

Regarding the inner-party recruitment process, it is crucial to know whether nominations are either determined mainly by the national party leadership or devolved to regional or district bodies. Like in most other European countries (Norris, 2006), the process is highly decentralised in both Austrian parties. Within the SPÖ, candidate selection is accompanied with bargaining processes between the national party leaders with executive organs in the state and district party organisations; the role of

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[4] Previous work on members of the *Nationalrat* has either considered short time spans (Müller *et al.*, 2001), selectively studied points in time (Lichem, 1966), or concentrated on decades before the founding of the Second Republic (Fornleitner *et al.*, 1974; Matis and Stiefel, 1982).

individual party members is a very minor one (Shell, 1962). In general, it is the subnational organs that propose and the national organs that decide (Bille, 2001). However, the party leadership intended to break up with traditional recruitment practices by introducing intra-party primaries in 1993, which were expected to produce candidates with more electoral appeal. Many powerful public office holders only lukewarmly committed to the reform, and only in the two smallest *Länder* was the participation of party members sufficient to produce binding results (Nick, 1995). In subsequent years, SPÖ party leadership decided not to carry out further primaries.

Within the ÖVP, the recruitment amounts, more or less, to the ratification of a subnational decision by the national organisation that was given the right to exercise a veto, which could, however, be overridden by a 2/3 majority of the Land party executive. Thus, subnational organs select, and national organs approve (Bille, 2001). A party reform in the 1980s finally empowered the national party organisations to nominate "ten percent of those candidates placed in electable positions on the party list" (Müller and Steininger, 1994, p. 20). A watershed moment was the rebranding of the party into the "List Kurz — the New People´s Party" in 2017 and the centralisation of the party´s decision-making power in the hands of its new party leader Sebastian Kurz. Kurz is reported to have changed the party´s parliamentary faction by selecting individually loyal MPs that represented the party directly or were even non-party members rather than representatives of the party´s diverse interests groups that used to nominate their own candidates (Puller, 2018). There is as well some anecdotal evidence that Kurz has had a hand in the selection of some top candidates in Land districts (Jenny, 2018, p. 41).

It is important to note that in both parties decentralisation works not only through territorial organisations but also through party auxiliary associations, which are in essence party/interest-group hybrids run by intra-party groups. Within the SPÖ, NR mandates have been reserved for party members working full-time in leading positions of the Austrian Labor Unions (*Österreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund,* ÖGB) or the Chamber of Labour (*Kammer für Arbeiter und Angestellte, AK*). In a similiar vein, the Business Chamber (*Wirtschaftskammer Österreichs*, WKÖ) and the Chamber of Agriculture (*Landwirtschaftskammer Österreichs*, LKÖ) have been a plentiful reservoir for ÖVP staffers in parliaments (Köppl and Wippersberg, 2014). These chambers that are bodies with legally compulsory membership established by public law and that represent the interests of specific

socioeconomic groups as well as the ÖGB—a federation of industry unions—are the backbone of the Austrian "social partnership," which is essentially an institutionalised network of cooperation between employers and employees. While personal connection between all social partnership organisations and both parties are found to be persistently high (Ennser-Jedenastik, 2017), it has been as well observed that the SPÖ´s leadership has estranged itself from its trade union wing (Müller, Plasser and Ulram, 2004, p. 159).

Moreover, members of the ÖVP are almost always members of one of the party´s three main Leagues: the Farmers´ League (ÖBB), the Business League (ÖWB), and the Workers´and Employees´ League (ÖAAB). On the one hand, the Leagues are financially independent associations (*Vereine*) that have their own legal statutes; and on the other they are constituent units of the ÖVP. Leagues exist on all levels of the political system with the respective territorial organisation functioning as the umbrella organisation. "Pushing the point to an extreme, the party as distinguished from the Leagues can be reduced to the party chairman, the general secretary, the leader of the parliamentary Fraktion and the staff of the party headquarters" (Müller, 1994, p. 57). The selection of candidates is, thus, *de facto* not carried out by the territorial organisations but by the parties´ Leagues (at different political levels).

Theoretical expectations and hypotheses

As we have seen, the formal statutory rules of recruitment—and most likely the informal practices operating below them—have changed to some degree over time and the two parties have not followed the exact same logics in selecting legislative candidates. While it is important to note that the crucial places of selection resemble "smoked filled rooms", a longitudinal study has the advantage of observing which types of candidates won the race for a legislative seat at different points in time. Prosopograpical data (Verboven, Carlier and Dumolyn, 2007) on successful candidates should therefore allow to know to which extent (changed) selection rules determine the profile of legislators. I have the following theoretical expectations based on the reviewed literature above:

First, "partyness" is the ourstanding characteristic of legislative recruitment in Austria. Candidate selection within the SPÖ is decentralised according to territorial party organisation while candidate selection within the ÖVP not only considers territorial but also social representation. In the first case, local/regional party selectorates choose their favourite candidates. In the second case, it is also subnational party organs that select, but these organs choose essentially representatives of the different party´s Leagues.

Hypothesis 1a: Within the SPÖ, local party connections such as being a local councillor, being a mayor, or being involved in *Länder* party politics is key for success.

Hypothesis 1b: Within the ÖVP, local/regional party connections do not suffice for success. Successful candidates must be active members of one of the three party´s Leagues as well.

Second, the many alliances between Chambers and Austria´s large parties as well as the gap that is hypothesised in the literature to have opened between the SPÖ and the Trade Union, are expected to become visible in the prosopographical data analysed.

Hypothesis 2a: Membership in trade unions has decreased among SPÖ legislators.

Hypothesis 2b: Membership in the Economic Chamber and the Chamber of Agriculture has remained significant among ÖVP legislators and membership in the Chamber of Labour has not declined within the SPÖ.

Third, the experimentation with intra-party primaries in 1993 that allowed ordinary party members to, for example, change the rankings of candidates in the pary list may have allowed new actors to make inroads into the party´s recruitment pool. Elite renewal within the ÖVP, on the other hand, is likely to occur as the party´s balance is known to be fluid with its three major Leagues constantly trying to increase their influence. The general "peckinger order" arises from quiet marked differences in the relative strength of each League. In the 1990s, the Workers and Employees´ League organized 49%, the Farmers´ League 38%, and the Business League 13% of all party members.[5] The power of the last two Leagues, however, is known to derive as well from reliance on large resources of the Economic Chamber and the Chamber of Agriculture. Besides internal power struggles the bypassing of the traditional power centers by the party leader Sebastian Kurz can be expected to have brought about change in elite profiles.

Hypothesis 3a: Within the SPÖ, an intra-party democratisation imperative that set in after the 1993 primaries led to an increased number of "career changers" (*Quereinsteiger*) with short or no pre-parliamentary political careers.

Hypothesis 3b: Within the ÖVP, "career changers" (*Quereinsteiger*) especially increased with Sebastian Kurz's rise to power in 2017.

Hypothesis 3c: Within the ÖVP, membership in the Workers and Employees´ League stays key to candidates´ success throughout time.

Fourth, like in most other European countries public service functioned in the post-war Austria as the main supplier of parliamentary respresentatives (Pelinka, 1979). It is important to note, however, that the marked trend towards a *Beamtenparlament* did not imply that civil service recruitment pipelines replaced the monitoring functions of parties. Rather, public sector background can be explained by the fact that running for political office became popular among bureaucrats as the public service law allowed

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[5] For a while the loss of intra-party has frustrated the business wings even to such a degree that plans to establish a separate business were developed (Müller, Plasser and Ulram, 2004).

special leaves from their work without affecting claims to old-age pensions, as well as by the many MPs whose focus of work is not in the *Nationalrat* but rather in the many corporatist institutions of Austria, such as Chambers or labor unions. Best (2007) could observe that the increase of of MPs with public sector background has reversed or plateaued in most European countries since the late 1980s, which leads to hypothesis 4:

Hypothesis 4: The public service dominance in the *Nationalrat* has decreased continuously since the 1970s.

Data, variables, and method

To answer these hypotheses, I will draw on a self-created database with information on all members the NR between 1945 and 2019—a time span that covers eleven legislative episodes—who were listed candidates of either the ÖVP or the SPÖ (N=1,158). The main source of information is the online *Who is Who* by the Parliamentary Administration,[6] which was cross-checked[7] with other reliable biographical sources such as carefully edited biographical dictionaries on members of state parliaments (e.g., Voithofer 2007) or the rich online database on members of the Vienna State Parliament and City Council.[8] The file generated on political careers contains a total of 11,416 observations, thus an average of approximately ten career stints per person. Biographical information was coded into nominal categories, which allows for the description of MPs in terms of the following variables:

Political jobs. Considered are preparliamentary career trajectories in politics. Registered career stages are assigned to the following categories: executive and legislative public positions that require elections, positions in parties as well its youth organisations, positions in the party´s auxiliary organisations, and positions in chambers and labor unions (see Table 1). In the case of the ÖVP, only the party´ three main Leagues are considered while the other far less important party auxiliary organisations are neglected. Within some categories, national jobs are further differentiated from jobs on the *Land* (state) and regional level in order to give due attention to the multi-level politics in Austria. Positions in "social partnership" organisations are treated as political due to the close dovetailing between the long-standing government parties SPÖ and ÖVP, on the one hand, and Chambers and labor unions, on the other. Note that what is considered is whether or not a given political position occurs in a curriculum vitae.

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[6] https://www.parlament.gv.at/WWER/

[7] In cases where the official biographies of state legislators were more complete than information from the Parliamentary Administration, I decided to treat the former as the primary source.

[8] https://www.wien.gv.at/infodat/sukri

Table 1. Political career positions considered

Type of career position	Geographical level/ other specification	Abbreviation	Example
Chamber position	Economic Chamber	EcoChamber	President of the Vorarlberg Economic Chamber
	Chamber of Labour	ChamberLabour	Federal President of the Chamber of Labor
	Chamber of Agriculture	ChamberAgric	Councillor of the Chamber of Agriculture of Lower Austria
Executive public position	Federal Level	FederalGov	Federal Minister
	Land Level	RegionalGov	Regional Government Minister
	Regional Level	Mayor	Vice-Mayor
		Municipal Council	Member of the Municipal Council
League position	Ö. Bauernbund	ÖBB	Secretary-General of the Austrian Farmers´ League
	Ö. Wirtschaftsbund	ÖWB	President of the Business League
	Ö. Arbeitnehmerbund	ÖABB	Federal Chairman of the Workers´and Employees´ League
Legislative public position	Land level	StateParl	Member of the State Parliament
	Regional Level	CityDistrCouncil	Member of the City/District Council
Party auxiliary position	All levels	AuxAssoc.	Secretary General of the Tenants Association Austria
Party position	Federal level	PartyNational	Member of the federal party executive committee
	Land level	PartyLand	Member of the party´s regional executive
	Regional Level	PartyRegional	Local party chairman
Trade Union position	All three levels	TradeUnion	Vice-president of the Austrian Trade Union Federation
Youth party position	All three levels	YouthParty	Federal chairman of the youth party

Notes. The category party auxiliaries encompass in the case of the SPÖ all party-affiliated organisations such as, for example, the *Mietervereinmigug Österreich, Kinderfreunde* or the *Bund sozialdemokratischer Akademiker*. In the case of the ÖVP, the party´s three majors Leagues are considered while other (far less important and numerous) party auxiliaries are neglected.

Career changers. Genuine novice career changers are defined as legistlators with no known preparliamentary political career before entering parliament, that is, these parlamentarians have not previously held a career position listed in Table 1.

Professional jobs. In line with previous research (Codato, Costa and Massimo, 2014), I considered the occupation prior to political jobs held by MPs listed in Table 2. Many parliamentarians have spent virtually all of their adult life in public affairs. Others have had many different occupations; a very small number has pursued several occupations at once. Under such circumstances, any classification is

difficult. I decided to consider jobs held for more than a year and immediately before the launching of a political career.

Jobs were coded using a national version of the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO-08) created by Statistics Austria (ILO, 2012). 160 different job codes were assigned to 8 categories: (1) craftsmen, production and related workers, (2) journalists and other writers, (3) legal profession, (4) managers and businessmen, (5) primary sector, agriculture, (6) professions other than law (including military), (7) teachers and professors, (8) technicians, and service workers. The remaining (mostly vague) job titles *not* contained in ISCO were differentiated into two broad meta-categories: "public sector jobs" (9) and "private sector jobs." (10). MPs who have never practiced any effective occupation outside of politics were categorised as "career politicians" (11). King (1981: 250) gave the following poignant description of a career politician: "He regard politics as his vocation, he seeks fulfilment in politics, he sees his future in politics, he would be deeply upset if circumstances forced him to retire from politics. In short, he is hooked."

Departing from the bulk of empirical studies on careers that apply sequence analysis to identify pathways to legislative power (e.g., Ohmura *et al.*, 2018; Turner-Zwinkels and Mills, 2020), I opted for another clustering approach that is based on multiple correspondence analysis (MCA), as it is impossible to collect data on Austria´s parliamentarians with the time granularity needed for SA. (The start and/or end date of a career stint is often not indicated in the available historical sources.) MCA is a multivariate graphical technique designed to explore relationships among sets of categorical (e.g., binary) variables in a multidimensional space. Both individuals (rows in the dataset) and variable categories (columns in the dataset) can be projected onto this space (Hjellbrekke, 2019).

Spatial proximity between two categories indicates that these categories are shared by a larger number of individuals. The more closely individuals are situated to each other, the more categories they share (and inversely, the more distant they are, the fewer categories they share). Most importantly, MCA is designed to reduce the dimensionality of categorical data sets that include more than two variables distributed among individuals. It also assumes that the variables comprising a data matrix together constitute a high-dimensional Euclidean space, which is collapsed by creating new, synthetic

dimensions.[9] In the words of Jean-Paul Benzécri, the inventor of MCA, interpreting a dimension amounts "to finding out what is similar, on the one hand, between all elements figuring on the right of the origin and, on the other hand between all that is written on the left; and expressing with conciseness and precision, the contrast (or opposition) between the two extremes" (Benzécri, 1992, p. 405). The interpretation, thus, must rely on categories in which the dimensions' contributions to the axis exceed the average contribution (see Appendix).

I further extend MCA methodology by clustering individuals on the basis of their coordinates on the principal axes, i.e., their Euclidean distances from one another. The agglomerative hierarchical clustering (AHC) starts with the "smallest partition," which means that each MP initially represents a cluster. The process is continued by merging stepwise two clusters until all MPs are united into a single cluster. This creates a hierarchical relationship between all clusters, which can be visualised in a dendrogram. Ward´s criterion is applied to produce optimally homogenous clusters (Husson, Lê and Pagès, 2017, pp. 179–184).

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[9] Based on the so-called *eigenvalues,* or the contributions of each dimension to the variation contained in the data (called *total inertia*), the researcher has to choose how many of the dimensions (axes) he or she wants to omit to reduce the multi-dimensional space. Besides the interpretability of each dimension (axis), a cumulative rate of Benzécri´s modified eigenvalues of about 80% has established itself as a criterion for dimension selection (Le Roux and Rouanet, 2010, p. 52).

Results

Newcomers and career changers (1945-2019)

Across European countries it is found that seniority has the most significant impact on the electoral prospects of MPs (Norris, 1997). Previous research has established as well that members of the *Nationalrat* have an extremely good chance of being renominated and reelected for legislative office (Fischer, 1974). It is still unclear to what extent ÖVP and SPÖ´s striking tendency to prefer incumbents over newcomers has varied across legislatures. Besides turnover rates, the changing number of "career changers" in parliament who have no known political career before entering parliament can serve as a very rough indicator for changing intra-party recruitment practices. The evolution of both indicators is depicted in Figure 1.

The upper panel in Figure 1 indicates that the proportion of newcomers hovers around 25% in almost all of the legislative periods, which suggests that previous legislative service has been persistently key to candidate success. However, some legislative periods that allowed many novices to enter the *Nationalrat* stand out: In the immediate aftermath of World War II, more than 80 percent of all MPs were new to parliament, which is easily explained through the many discontinuities in political careers caused by the annexation of Austria to Nazi Germany. At two different points in time, newcomers within the ÖVP amounted to half or almost half of all MPs, namely when the ÖVP formed the first center-right coalition with the FPÖ in 2002 and when the rebranded ÖVP ("Sebastian Kurz List") agreed on another coalition government with the right-wing party FPÖ in 2017. Within the SPÖ, the number of newcomers peaked in 1990 under the Socialist leader Franz Vranitzky and after the parliamentary election in 2017, when the SPÖ had to take on the role as an opposition party.

The lower panel in Figure 2 clearly shows that throughout the Second Republic political amateurs such as journalists, managers, university professors or athletes comprised in most years less than 5% within the SPÖ. In contrast, the share of career changers has grown significantly within the ÖVP reaching, for example, a share of about 15 % under the party leadership of Sebastian Kurz.

The overall picture that emerges from Figure 1 is that continuity prevails over change, which contradicts the hypotheses on intra-party democratisation trends (Hypotheses 3a and 3b).

Figure 1. Newcomers and career changers (in %)

Political career positions (1945-2019)

Preparliamentary careers can be decomposed into its smallest components, which are career positions at a certain life stage. Figure 2 uses a colour scheme to display the percentage of MPs holding different political positions by party and legislation. Any interpretation of the figure needs to take into consideration that the general availability of different career positions varies immensely. If we see, for example, that local politics background is much more dominant than membership in regional government, we cannot conclude that the first is important while the second is not since there are comparatively much fewer positions available at the *Land* level.

For both parties we can equally observe a high relative frequency of party positions at different geographic levels, which suggests the consistent prevalence of intra-party careers. Legislative positions at the level of the nine federal states (German: *Länder*) and executive positions at the local levels (Member of the Municipal Council, Mayor) are clearly frequent career steps. Note, however, that the importance of state legislatures as springboards or steppings stones towards more attractive positions at the national parlament have decreased over time. In the last decades, legislative experience at the Land level was by no means a precondition for becoming a member of the *Nationalrat*.

Instead, as posited in Hypotheses 1a and 1b, becoming a member of a local council (*Gemeinderat*) or holding offices in local/regional parties appears to be the "eye of the needle" through which the bulk of all MPs must go. Please note in this context the increasingly red colour intensity of positions in local/regional party branches. The growing importance of membership in party youth organisations is also noticeable.

Marked inter-party differences exist as well. As expected, membership in one of the main party´s constituent Leagues (ÖBB, ÖWB, ÖABB) is almost a precondition for becoming an ÖVP-MP, which is evidence for Hypothesis 1b. Interestingly, ÖABB membership is by far the most frequent (Hypothesis 3c). Over time, membership in the Chamber of Agriculture decreases while the percentage of ÖVP-MPs affiliated with the Economic Chamber continues to hover at around 20 percent—results that either contradict or support Hypothesis 2b. Within the SPÖ, the number of trade unionists among MPs plummets markedly from nearly 50 percent at the end of the 1970s to about 20 percent in 2017, while the share of SPÖ-MPs working in City Councils or District Councils (including district

representatives in Vienna) grows over time (Hypothesis 2a). In general, Figure 2 suggests that all of the career positions included are central to legislative careers, albeit to different degrees.

Figure 2. Career Positions Listed in MPs' Resumés (Yes/No)

ÖVP

	5 (1945-49)	6 (1949-53)	7 (1953-56)	8 (1956-59)	9 (1959-62)	10 (1962-66)	11 (1966-70)	12 (1970-7)	13 (1971-75)	14 (1975-79)	15 (1979-83)	16 (1983-86)	17 (1986-90)	18 (1990-94)	19 (1994-96)	20 (1996-99)	21 (1999-02)	22 (2002-06)	23 (2006-08)	24 (2008-13)	25 (2013-17)	26 (2017-19)
Party position national	19.3	25.6	19.3	18.9	22.6	24.4	22.1	25	28.4	33.7	38.9	41.1	44	50	54.9	52.9	45.5	39.4	42.3	50	60.8	40.5
Party position land	21.6	28	26.5	27.8	27.4	27.9	21.1	26.1	22.7	22.1	22.2	20	19.8	23.8	22.5	25	30.3	29.8	30.8	32.9	35.3	34.2
Party position local/regional	14.8	18.3	21.7	21.1	23.8	36	35.8	50	44.3	46.5	46.7	50	46.2	47.6	45.1	50	54.5	51.1	52.6	60	62.7	63.3
Major	26.1	23.2	24.1	24.4	23.8	24.4	24.2	25	23.9	20.9	27.8	33.3	25.3	20.2	28.2	30.9	28.8	28.7	33.3	27.1	27.5	26.6
Regional Government	19.3	20.7	15.7	11.1	11.9	12.8	7.4	6.8	2.3	4.7	4.4	4.4	3.3	6	8.5	7.4	10.6	3.2	2.6	4.3	5.9	7.6
Federal Government	18.2	24.4	19.3	20	25	24.4	18.9	14.8	12.5	11.6	12.2	12.2	12.1	21.4	25.4	27.9	24.2	20.2	24.4	22.9	17.6	15.2
State Parliament	28.4	20.7	24.1	22.2	16.7	19.8	24.2	29.5	23.9	19.8	16.7	15.6	13.2	11.9	18.3	17.6	15.2	14.9	15.4	20	15.7	7.6
Federal Council	18.2	17.1	15.7	16.7	16.7	18.6	16.8	17	15.9	14	14.4	17.8	16.5	19	12.7	16.2	12.1	19.1	17.9	14.3	13.7	11.4
Municipal Council	35.2	24.4	21.7	17.8	16.7	23.3	21.1	21.6	20.5	25.6	31.1	33.3	35.2	32.1	38	38.2	37.9	35.1	43.6	35.7	35.3	38
City/District Council	2.3	2.4	1.2	2.2	3.6	5.8	7.4	14.8	10.2	11.6	8.9	7.8	6.6	7.1	4.2	5.9	7.6	9.6	7.7	5.7	7.8	10.1
Youth party	1.1	1.2	1.2	0	0	0	0	1.1	1.1	3.5	5.6	7.8	8.8	9.5	9.9	11.8	7.6	11.7	16.7	21.4	23.5	27.8
ÖBB	22.7	20.7	18.1	17.8	19	29.1	24.2	20.5	22.7	20.9	23.3	27.8	26.4	23.8	15.5	14.7	10.6	17	16.7	18.6	23.5	17.7
ÖWB	9.1	14.6	9.6	12.2	10.7	16.3	15.8	21.6	19.3	19.8	16.7	13.3	12.1	15.5	12.7	8.8	13.6	16	14.1	15.7	13.7	20.3
ÖAAB	11.4	17.1	15.7	21.1	22.6	23.3	29.5	27.3	28.4	31.4	30	26.7	26.4	29.8	29.6	35.3	36.4	29.8	29.5	30	31.4	25.3
EcoChamber	17	18.3	20.5	18.9	21.4	19.8	18.9	25	22.7	22.1	23.3	24.4	18.7	16.7	14.1	14.7	16.7	19.1	17.9	21.4	21.6	19
ChamberAgric	23.9	22	25.3	23.3	25	31.4	28.4	25	26.1	24.4	24.4	26.7	20.9	16.7	15.5	13.2	9.1	11.7	12.8	18.6	17.6	10.1

% of all ÖVP MPs
0
20
40
60

legislation

SPÖ

	5 (1945-49)	6 (1949-53)	7 (1953-56)	8 (1956-59)	9 (1959-62)	10 (1962-66)	11 (1966-70)	12 (1970-7)	13 (1971-75)	14 (1975-79)	15 (1979-83)	16 (1983-86)	17 (1986-90)	18 (1990-94)	19 (1994-96)	20 (1996-99)	21 (1999-02)	22 (2002-06)	23 (2006-08)	24 (2008-13)	25 (2013-17)	26 (2017-19)
Party's auxiliary orga.	31.8	31	30.3	32.1	37.2	34.5	33.3	30.8	29.9	31.4	38.8	36.7	35.5	28.7	30.4	28.9	28	35.6	34.1	40.3	50	54.4
Party position national	35.3	39.4	36.8	38.3	33.7	35.6	34.6	36.3	31.8	34.3	31.9	35	36.4	40.6	41.8	46.7	56	57.5	58.8	51.4	57.4	50.9
Party position land	28.2	31	40.8	40.7	40.7	41.4	38.3	38.5	44.9	42.9	47.4	46.7	51.4	57.4	58.2	57.8	58.7	56.2	54.1	58.3	55.9	57.9
Party position local/regional	23.5	25.4	34.2	38.3	45.3	52.9	60.5	60.4	60.7	63.8	62.1	60.8	67.3	70.3	75.9	74.4	77.3	69.9	75.3	80.6	79.4	82.5
Major	25.9	26.8	26.3	22.2	20.9	19.5	21	22	22.4	22.9	20.7	17.5	20.6	15.8	13.9	16.7	18.7	21.9	27.1	29.2	20.6	28.1
Regional Government	16.5	12.7	13.2	13.6	11.6	10.3	3.7	6.6	9.3	7.6	6	10	11.2	7.9	10.1	10	10.7	11	8.2	13.9	10.3	7
Federal Government	21.2	22.5	19.7	19.8	18.6	24.1	22.2	27.5	20.6	21	20.7	20	12.1	14.9	21.5	21.1	18.7	15.1	16.5	15.3	23.5	21.1
State Parliament	32.9	33.8	32.9	29.6	22.1	26.4	27.2	28.6	27.1	26.7	22.4	24.2	23.4	20.8	17.7	16.7	17.3	19.2	23.5	30.6	23.5	19.3
Federal Council	11.8	15.5	18.4	23.5	18.6	21.8	17.3	16.5	17.8	16.2	19	19.2	18.7	12.9	16.5	14.4	13.3	15.1	12.9	9.7	8.8	10.5
Municipal Council	27.1	31	27.6	25.9	26.7	32.2	34.6	31.9	36.4	36.2	42.2	39.2	43	49.5	45.6	48.9	42.7	47.9	45.9	51.4	55.9	50.9
City/District Council	4.7	4.2	5.3	4.9	9.3	13.8	14.8	12.1	15	14.3	13.8	15	20.6	23.8	24.1	26.7	29.3	23.3	30.6	26.4	26.5	26.3
Youth party	10.6	12.7	15.8	16	17.4	18.4	19.8	28.6	26.2	30.5	27.6	32.5	27.1	30.7	25.3	24.4	22.7	24.7	25.9	31.9	36.8	33.3
Trade Union	35.3	35.2	35.5	39.5	39.5	43.7	46.9	50.5	45.8	48.6	49.1	46.7	43.9	37.6	26.6	26.7	26.7	24.7	23.5	27.8	32.4	21.1
ChamberLabour	7.1	11.3	11.8	12.3	14	27.6	29.6	31.9	27.1	27.6	26.7	27.5	29	25.7	22.8	18.9	18.7	20.5	17.6	18.1	16.2	14

% of all SPÖ MPs
20
40
60
80

legislation

Notes. Abbreviations are ÖBB = Farmers´ League, ÖWB = Business League, ÖAAB = Workers´and Employees´ League, EcoChamber = Business Chamber, ChamberAgric = Chamber of Agriculture, ChamberLabour = Chamber of Labour.

A typology of ÖVP-MPs (1945-2019)

To construct the space of all ÖVP members of the *Nationalrat*, MCA is performed on a dataset with 579 individuals and 16 variables comprising 32 categories. In Table 1A, the eigenvalues, the modified rates, and the cumulated modified rates of the first five axes are shown. As the first two axes jointly explain aalmost 80% of the variance contained in the data, I decided to restrain the analysis to these axes only. The contributions of active variables on both axes can be seen in Table 2A. In the following Figure 3, the first axis corresponds to the horizontal axis, and the second axis to the vertical one. Only the top 20 contributing categories are displayed.

The first horizontal axis is labeled with six categories with above-average contributions (100/32 = 3.1%). Most importantly, on the left-hand side, we find members of the Farmers´ League (18.29%) and the Chamber of Agriculture (20.26%) as well as mayors (6.3%). On the right-hand side we find members of the Economic League (13.04%). The first axis, thus, distinguishes between legistlators that either belong to the rural or the economic fraction of the legislative elite while the second vertical axis captures differences between career politicians with prolific experience in party politics and others who became politically socialised within the Economic Chamber and whose careers are not marked by a long rise to the top of the party.

It turns out that five clusters are optimal in accounting for the variance found in the space of ÖVP parliamentarians (see the dendogram in Appendix A3). The positions of these clusters in factorial planes 1-2 are shown as well in Figure 3. As we can see, four out of five clusters are clearly spread out across the first two dimensions with a significant overlap between "party localists" and "party animals."[10] One clusters centers around the centroid as the individuals contained therein have not held any political positions at all. My interpretations of these clusters are based on both their positions in the space and their most significant categories (see Table 2).

The categories in Table 2 describing the clusters are sorted in decreasing order according to their significance, such that the first three to seven categories have the lowest p-values as a result of the

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[10] It should be emphasised that all labels such as "party animals" are short-hand terms for my interpretation of identified clusters and should thus not be essentialised. The term "party animals" was first introduced to the literature on legislative careers by Ohmura et al. (2018).

v-test, which is a test to compare the proportion of the category in a cluster compared to the proportion of the category in the global dataset. To make the table understandable I provide here an interpretation of the first row: of all registered ÖVP legislators 81.8% with membership in the Chamber of Agriculture belong to cluster 1; 84.1% of the individuals contained in cluster 1 have joined the Chamber of Agriculture; 19% of all ÖVP politicians studied are known to be members of the Chamber of Agriculture. These percentages determine the statistical significance (p-value) of the category (Lebart et al., 2006).

Table 2. Characteristic Categories for Each ÖVP Cluster, Ranked By Test Value

| Type 1: Rural Fraction					
Categories	Cla.Mod	Mod.Cla	Global	p-value	v-test
ChamberAgric: Yes	81.8	84.1	19.0	< 0.01	17.3
ÖBB: Yes	73.9	79.4	19.9	< 0.01	15.6
Mayor: Yes	37.8	55.1	26.9	< 0.01	6.9
Municipal Council: Yes	41.9	45.8	20.2	< 0.01	6.7
Type 2: Party Localists					
PartyLocal: Yes	45.6	88.9	39.7	< 0.01	12.5
ÖABB: Yes	54.7	64.4	24.0	< 0.01	10.8
PartyYouth: Yes	72.7	27.1	7.6	< 0.01	7.8
CityDistrictCouncil: Yes	48.5	13.6	5.7	< 0.01	3.7
Mayor: Yes	30.8	40.7	26.9	< 0.01	3.6
MunicipalCouncil:Yes	29.0	28.8	20.2	< 0.05	2.5
PartyLand:Yes	27.7	34.7	25.6	< 0.05	2.5
Type 3: Economic Fraction					
EcoChamber:Yes	87.2	86.4	20.2	< 0.01	18.8
ÖWB: Yes	88.5	65.2	15.0	< 0.01	15.4
CityDistrictCouncil: Yes	36.4	10.2	5.7	< 0.05	2.2
Type 4: Party Animals					
FedGov: Yes	69.9	65.2	14.3	< 0.01	12.7
RegioGov: Yes	76.9	44.9	9.0	< 0.01	10.6
PartyNational: Yes	41.0	71.9	26.9	< 0.01	9.7
PartyLand: Yes	40.5	67.4	25.6	< 0.01	9.1
StateParl: Yes	29.0	40.4	21.4	< 0.01	4.4
ÖABB: Yes	23.7	37.1	24.0	< 0.01	3.0

The strongest unique characteristics are membership in the Chamber of Agriculture (Cluster 1) or the Economic Chamber (Cluster 3), followed by having held positions in the Federal Government (Cluster 4) and membership in the local branches of the party (Cluster 2). I call these characteristics unique as they are only significant in a single given cluster (and not in other clusters). Combinations of salient characteristics give each cluster a distinct profile. What distinguishes, for example, Cluster 1 from all other clusters the most is that its members are disproportionately often members of the Farmers´ League (ÖBB) and the Chamber of Agriculture. Membership in the Worker´s and Employee´s League (ÖABB)

and in the Business League (ÖWB) significantly determines membership in Clusters 2 and 3, respectively. Thus, clearly, the ÖVP recruitment system is first and foremost characterised by functional decentralisation.

´The MP closest to the center of Cluster 1 is Peter Mayer, the Deputy Chairman of the Farmer's Leagues of Upper Austria. Other prototypical cluster members are the Mayor of the municipality Altenberg bei Linz Michael Hammer (Cluster 2), the Vice Secretary-General of Austria´s Economic League Carmen Jeitler-Cincelli (Cluster 3) and the former Federal Minister of Education Elisabeth Gehrer (Cluster 4).

Altogether the MCA results for the ÖVP provide support for Hypotheses 1b, as affiliations to the Leagues clearly structure the space. Thus, it can be assumed that the three functional Leagues, which have not only provided the overwhelming majority of the party´s indirect membership but have also been closely linked to social partnership organisations (Chamber of Agriculture, Economic Chamber), are the main network players in the intra-party recruitment system, which is an important difference in comparison to the SPÖ´s system of recruitment.

Figure 3. The Space of ÖVP-MPs

A typology of SPÖ-MPs (1945-2019)

The space of all SPÖ members of the *Nationalrat* MCA is based on a dataset including 579 individuals and 14 variables with 28 corresponding categories. The first horizontal axis in Figure 4 reflects 13.7% of the total inertia, and the second vertical axis reflects 13.2% of the total inertia. For the interpretation of both axes, I will again only refer to those categories with contributions to the inertia that are above average (see Table A3). The first axis is above all determined by the following binary variables whose categories correlate negatively and are located at opposite ends of the axis: federal government, national party, youth party, and regional government. We find MPs who made it into the federal government (13.44%), held political jobs in national party organisations (13.38%), started their careers in the party´s youth branch (13.35%) or played an active role in regional governments (10.37%) on the right-hand side and all others on the left-hand side.

The second vertical axis receives the highest contributions from the following variables: party local, Chamber of Labour, Mayor, trade unions, *Land* party. At the top of the figure, we find members of local (9.12%) and *Land* party branches (5.96%) as well as mayors (11.03%) and at the bottom trade unionists (7.93%) and functionaries of the Chamber of Labour (12.16%).

Thus, the first axis is determined first and foremost by differences in national political experience while the second axis visualises a clear cleavage between MPs with party careers and especially strong ties with *Länder* and local party branches, and unionists as well as members of the Chamber of Labour whose careers are not marked by intra-party ascensions at the bottom. Again, we can observe as well that a significant number of individuals clusters in the center of the two-dimensional space as their career profiles are not distinct.

AHC reveals four distinct clusters that emerge significantly with a certain combination of characteristics (see Figure A2). Table 3 indicates that all clusters are characterised by a combination of three to seven categories except cluster 1, which can be mainly explained by the loose involvement of representatives of collective labor interests in the SPÖ party network. The prevalence of local, regional and Land party positions in Table 3 suggests that the SPÖ recruitment is characterised by a high degree of territorial decentralisation: the majority of "mayors" or "party localists" had never held a position in the national party organisation.

Table 3. Characteristic Categories for Each SPÖ Cluster, Ranked by Test Value

Type 1: Organized Labour Representatives					
Categories	Cla.Mod	Mod.Cla	Global	p-value	v-test
ChamberLabour: Yes	78.0	88.5	20.4	< 0.01	17.5
TradeUnions: Yes	48.3	95.2	35.4	< 0.01	14.3
Type 2: Mayors					
MunicipalCouncil: Yes	71.7	59.7	17.1	< 0.01	12.5
Mayor: Yes	60.3	68.9	23.5	< 0.01	12.2
PartyLocal: Yes	31.4	86.5	56.6	< 0.01	7.8
PartyLand: Yes	29.6	61.3	42.7	< 0.01	4.6
Type 3: Party Localists					
CityDistrictCouncil: Yes	80.8	92.6	13.5	< 0.01	16.8
PartyLocal: Yes	18.0	86.8	56.6	< 0.01	5.6
StateParl: Yes	18.0	42.6	27.8	< 0.01	2.8
Type 4: Party Animals					
PartyNational: Yes	47.5	77.7	34.2	< 0.01	11.1
YouthParty: Yes	57.2	58.7	21.5	< 0.01	10.4
RegioGov: Yes	69.2	37.2	11.2	< 0.01	9.0
FedGov: Yes	56.0	42.1	15.7	< 0.01	8.2
PartyLand: Yes	34.8	71.1	42.7	< 0.01	7.1
AuxAssoc: Yes	31.1	49.6	33.3	< 0.01	4.2
StateParl: Yes	28.6	38.0	27.8	< 0.01	2.7

Notes. The table shows the within-cluster (Mod.Cla), across-cluster (Cla.Mod), and global distributions of variables used in the MCA.

All clusters are visualised in the right panel of Figure 4. At the center of Cluster 1, one can find the the unionist and Chamber of Labour representative Franz Riepl; a representative MP for Cluster 2 is the Mayor of the market town Altmünster Elisabeth Feichtinger; for Cluster 3 it is the former Member of the Vienna City Council Brundhilde Fuchs; and for Cluster 4 it is the former Vienna Land party leader and President of Austria Franz Jonas.

To recap: The MCA results for the SPÖ suggest that local/regional branches have an important say in the candidate selection as even "party animals" turn out to be partly rooted in the Land organisations (Hypothesis 2a). It is only labor representatives who succeed in winning a legislative mandate without service in the local or regional branches of the party.

Figure 4. The Space of SPÖ-MPs

Time trends

Figure 5 allows to examine the prevalence of different types of MPs over time. It emerges from the figure that the number of MPs that can not be attributed to a distinct type is the highest for the 1950s and 1960, which can be easily explained through the incompleteness of the historical data used. Further, one can observe that numbers drop below the value of ten percent only for selected years, which indicates that a time-boundedness of the types identified is not given. There is, however, a limited variability in prevalence over time. The most noticeable general trend is the increase of party localists. Together with evidence on a consistently low percentage of career changers in parliament (see Figure 1), this suggests more generally that subnational political party elites have kept their role of gatekeepers that limit access to the national legislature.

There are as well party-specific changes. The ÖVP recruited disproportionally many MPs of the rural party fraction between the 1960s and 1980s, which may be explained through a higher inter-penetration with the subsystem of farmers' interests in the past. Since the 1990s the rural fraction has been represented significantly less. Interestingly, the centralisation of recruitment under the 31-year old party leader Sebastian Kurz led the share to even plummet to 7.6 percent, which can be partly explained by the fact that Kurz hand-selected loyal members of the party´s youth to become MPs.

Turning to the SPÖ, we can observe a stark decline in unionists over time, who represented more than 25% of all MPs in the 1970s and accounted for only about 12% of all MPs between 2017 and 2019. Mayors are especially well represented among SPÖ-MPs since the 1990s.

Figure 5. Types of Members of Parliament Over Time (1945-2019)

ÖVP

	5 (1945-49)	6 (1949-53)	7 (1953-56)	8 (1956-59)	9 (1959-62)	10 (1962-66)	11 (1966-70)	12 (1970-71)	13 (1971-75)	14 (1975-79)	15 (1979-83)	16 (1983-86)	17 (1986-90)	18 (1990-94)	19 (1994-96)	20 (1996-99)	21 (1999-02)	22 (2002-06)	23 (2006-08)	24 (2008-13)	25 (2013-17)	26 (2017-19)
Rural Fraction	26.1	22	19.3	17.8	17.9	26.7	25.3	21.6	23.9	22.1	24.4	26.7	23.1	16.7	16.9	16.2	10.6	13.8	16.7	20	15.7	7.6
Party Localists	3.4	4.9	10.8	12.2	13.1	10.5	13.7	20.5	18.2	22.1	26.7	27.8	24.2	27.4	26.8	26.5	30.3	26.6	28.2	25.7	31.4	36.7
Party Animals	20.5	26.8	19.3	20	21.4	19.8	14.7	17	11.4	9.3	10	12.2	14.3	20.2	23.9	26.5	24.2	18.1	19.2	22.9	17.6	17.7
Economic Fraction	17	18.3	19.3	18.9	21.4	23.3	21.1	28.4	25	23.3	23.3	18.9	16.5	16.7	9.9	10.3	13.6	19.1	15.4	17.1	19.6	20.3
No Type	33	28	31.3	31.1	26.2	19.8	25.3	12.5	21.6	23.3	15.6	14.4	22	19	22.5	20.6	21.2	22.3	20.5	14.3	15.7	17.7

legislation

% of all ÖVP MPs
10
20
30

SPÖ

	5 (1945-49)	6 (1949-53)	7 (1953-56)	8 (1956-59)	9 (1959-62)	10 (1962-66)	11 (1966-70)	12 (1970-71)	13 (1971-75)	14 (1975-79)	15 (1979-83)	16 (1983-86)	17 (1986-90)	18 (1990-94)	19 (1994-96)	20 (1996-99)	21 (1999-02)	22 (2002-06)	23 (2006-08)	24 (2008-13)	25 (2013-17)	26 (2017-19)
Party Localists	3.5	2.8	2.6	2.5	3.5	5.7	8.6	7.7	8.4	8.6	9.5	12.5	15.9	15.8	20.3	20	22.7	19.2	24.7	19.4	19.1	15.8
Party Animals	22.4	23.9	25	25.9	25.6	26.4	18.5	20.9	22.4	23.8	22.4	25.8	22.4	23.8	24.1	24.4	25.3	26	22.4	25	32.4	29.8
Organised Labour Repr.	7.1	9.9	9.2	9.9	11.6	23	30.9	31.9	27.1	25.7	25	23.3	25.2	24.8	19	16.7	17.3	17.8	12.9	16.7	16.2	12.3
No Type	57.6	53.5	51.3	49.4	45.3	28.7	21	18.7	21.5	21	21.6	21.7	18.7	14.9	15.2	17.8	16	12.3	14.1	9.7	14.7	12.3
Mayors	9.4	9.9	11.8	12.3	14	16.1	21	20.9	20.6	21	21.6	16.7	17.8	20.8	21.5	21.1	18.7	24.7	25.9	29.2	17.6	29.8

legislation

% of all SPÖ MPs
10
20
30
40
50

Professional groups

The longitudinal analysis of professional backgrounds reveals lower-status legislators as the main losers in legislative recruitment. Within the SPÖ the share of manual workers dropped from 40 to 5 percent, which can be partly explained throught the fact party leadership became more and more confronted with a shrinking constituency of manual workers and started to increasingly reach out for white-collar and middle-class support. A similar trend can be observed for farmers within the ÖVP, albeit on a different level.

While there is preponderance of MPs with public sector background throughout time (especially if one includes teachers and professors into the category of "public sector jobs") public sector representation peaked during the 1970s and 1980s and decreased significantly afterwards, which opened windows of opportunity for other professional groups such as career politicians, managers or legislators coming from other professions than law. It is therefore perhaps not to far-fetched to speak of a pluralization of recruitment channels. While lawyers are generally known to overrepresented in parlaments the share of MPs with a background in legal professions stays surprisingly low throughout time.

Figure 6. Professional background, 1945-2019

Conclusions

Elite structures are not static. In politics, like in other areas of life, elite positions are continually filled with new persons, and some organisations (in parties) lose power while others gain it. To understand whether these processes result in a mere reproduction of elite status, or whether new social or professional groups rise to power this study analysed biographical information on professional background, public offices, and party positions of 1,158 members of the Austrian parliament. Ideal types of elite circulation strive for outlining who may be next in power if specified conditions obtain. The Austrian case suggests that in times that are not marked by deep economic and societal transformation political elites tend to smoothly recruit into their status aspirants whom they prepare and therefore elite circulation is very slow.

The slow elite circulation—often considered to be a necessary precondition democratic stability (Verzichelli, 2018)—can be explained through rather stable intra-party recruitment systems established after World War II that served continuously as a template used by different party leaders to secure the cooperations of others. Paradigmatic change such as the emergence of novel career types cannot be observed. Career changers (*Seiteneinsteiger*) remain, for example, the exception to the rule. There are, however, certain internal dynamics of change that manifest themselves in varying rates of prevalence in the types of parliamentarians. Within the SPÖ, the interorganisational mobility between collective labor organisations and the parliament has significantly decreased. While the party-union link is far from becoming a historical relic, it is also clear that the bonds of loyalty between both organisations have weakened. In a similiar vein, the organisational penetration of the ÖVP through the Chamber of Agriculture—a Catholic-conservative player in Austria´s corporatism—has diminished. While this "social partnership" organisation is, like all others, not questioned fundamentally, its influence has diminished . Consequently, politicians can no longer easily change from chamber to party functions and back again, and while double functions (*Personalunion*) remain common, they are no longer a guarantee for success.

Elite change manifests itself the most through the ascent of career politicians (and the descent of MPs coming from blue-collar working-class occupations). More specifically, the strongly rising importance of political experience at the local/regional level suggest that today more than ever those

who are able to implant themselves in local party offices stand a much greater chance to overcome the many barriers to a parliamentary seat (Best, 2007).

The rather strong elite stability in Austria during non-turbulent times becomes less puzzling if one considers the fact that primaries were either not held or only lukewarmly implemented. With recruitment being firmly under control by national and subnational party leaders elite reproduction established itself easily as the norm. One can therefore assume that only fundamental party reforms such as regularly held and binding primaries or other inclusive candidate selection methods can open doors for legislators with more diverse backgrounds (Sandri and Seddone, 2021). What this study especially adds to the sparse literature on long-term changes in the recruitment patterns of European representative elites is evidence that legislators´ profiles can be explained through party-specific recruitment practices. It is above all the durability of different decentralised intra-party recruitment systems of the ÖVP and SPÖ that can best explain why local/regional political experience is key for winning a national legislative seat. As long as the internal working of both parties does not change substantially the legislative elite in Austria is unlikely not become more open.

Limitations and Future Research

It is well established that a limitation of case studies is their lack of generalizability. However, future research could establish whether a decentralised intra-party recruitment system persisently captured by subnational party elites is also a common characteristic of mainstream parties in other federalistically organised countries such as Germany, Belgium, and Switzerland. If so, it is clear that new career types of MPs may only be observed if new recruitment strategies are adopted by both national and subnational elites. The pursuit of this research is worthwhile as an ever growing body of evidence finds pre-parliamentary careers to determine MPs' legislative behavior (e.g., Binderkrantz *et al.*, 2020).

Despite its contributions, this article, like most analyses developing a *longue durée* perspective on elites, builds on data with limitations. The major limitation is the partially missing information on the duration of career stints, which makes it impossible to know how exactly careers unfolded over time. Data with higher granularity would likely have allowed for the construction of a larger number of clusters due to variations in the ordering and duration of career stints. Detecting, for example, different

varieties of the *Ochsentour* through the party may add valuable insights. The main finding of this contribution, however, can be expected to remain unaltered: The decentralised opportunity structures for making it into the Austrian parliament have not substantially changed between 1945 and 2019 within the two political parties investigated, which explains why elite elite circulation in the Austrianb legislative elite remains slow.

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Appendix

Table A1. MCA Conducted for All ÖVP Members of Parliament: Eigenvalues, Modified Rates, and Cumulated Modified Rates for Axes 1-5

	Axis 1	Axis 2	Axis 3	Axis 4	Axis 5	Axis 6
Eigenvalue	0.14	0.12	0.10	0.09	0.08	0.07
Modified rate	52.4	26.2	15.1	4.5	1.7	0.1
Cumulated modified rate	52.4	78.5	93.7	98.1	99.9	100

Table A2. Multiple Correspondence Analyses Conducted for All ÖVP Members of Parliament – Contributions of Active Variables

Variable	Category	Axis 1	Axis 2	N
Party National	Party National: No	0.88	3.03	423
	Party National: Yes	2.40	*8.23*	156
	Total	3.28	**11.26**	579
Party Land	Party Land: No	1.22	3.10	431
	Party Land: Yes	3.56	*9.03*	148
	Total	4.78	**12.13**	579
Party Local	Party Local: No	0.05	0.43	349
	Party Local: Yes	0.08	0.66	230
	Total	0.13	1.09	579
Party Youth	Party Youth: No	0.10	0.11	535
	Party Youth: Yes	1.20	1.30	44
	Total	1.30	1.41	579
Federal Government	Federal Gov.: No	0.59	1.59	496
	Federal Gov.: Yes	3.54	*9.53*	83
	Total	4.13	**11.12**	579
Regional Government	Regional Gov.: No	0.12	0.91	527
	Regional Gov.: Yes	1.26	*9.20*	52
	Total	1.38	**10.11**	579
State Parliament	State Parl.: No	0.01	1.22	456
	State Parl.: Yes	0.04	4.49	123
	Total	0.05	5.71	579
Federal Council	Federal Council: No	0.00	0.00	480
	Federal Council: Yes	0.01	0.00	99
	Total	0.01	0.00	579
Mayor	Mayor: No	2.33	0.11	431
	Mayor: Yes	*6.31*	0.30	148
	Total	**8.64**	0.41	579
Municipal Council	Municipal C.: No	1.54	0.00	395
	Municipal C.: Yes	*6.08*	0.01	184
	Total	**7.62**	0.01	579
City/District Council	City/District C.: No	0.09	0.01	535
	City/District C.: Yes	1.46	0.24	44
	Total	1.55	0.25	579
Chamber of Agric.	ChamberAgric: No	4.75	0.15	469
	ChamberAgric: Yes	*20.26*	0.63	110
	Total	**25.01**	0.78	579
Economic Chamber	EcoChamber: No	1.53	3.83	462
	EcoChamber: Yes	*6.04*	*15.13*	117
	Total	**7.57**	**18.96**	579
ÖABB	ÖABB: No	0.79	2.48	440
	ÖABB: Yes	2.49	*7.84*	139
	Total	3.28	**10.32**	579
ÖBB	ÖBB: No	4.53	0.02	464
	ÖBB: Yes	*18.29*	0.87	115
	Total	**22.82**	0.89	579
ÖWB	ÖWB: No	1.27	2.31	492
	ÖWB: Yes	*7.18*	*13.04*	87
	Total	**8.45**	**15.35**	579

Legend: Variables with a contribution above average (100/16 = 6.3 %) are in **bold**; categories with a contribution above average (100/32 = 3.1%) are in *italics*.

Figure A1. Dendrogram for the Hierarchical Representation of ÖVP Parliamentarians

Cluster Dendrogram

Table A3. MCA Conducted for All SPÖ Members of Parliament: Eigenvalues, Modified Rates, and Cumulated Modified Rates for Axes 1-5

	Axis 1	Axis 2	Axis 3	Axis 4	Axis 5
Eigenvalue	0.14	0.13	0.09	0.08	0.08
Modified rate	50.6	42.3	4.4	1.5	1.2
Cumulated modified rate	50.6	92.8	97.2	98.8	100

Table A4. Multiple Correspondence Analyses Conducted for All SPÖ Members of Parliament – Contributions of Active Variables

Variable	Category	Axis 1	Axis 2	N
Party National	Party National: No	*6.95*	0.31	381
	Party National: Yes	*13.38*	0.60	198
	Total	**20.33**	0.91	579
Party Land	Party Land: No	2.71	*4.43*	332
	Party Land: Yes	3.65	*5.96*	247
	Total	6.36	**10.39**	579
Party Local	Party Regional: No	0.08	*11.92*	251
	Party Regional: Yes	0.06	*9.12*	328
	Total	0.14	**21.04**	579
Party Youth	Youth Party: No	*3.64*	0.00	455
	Youth Party: Yes	*13.35*	0.01	124
	Total	**16.99**	0.01	579
Federal Government	Federal Gov.: No	2.51	1.21	488
	Federal Gov.: Yes	*13.44*	*6.48*	91
	Total	**15.95**	**7.69**	579
Regional Government	Regional Gov.: No	1.31	0.00	514
	Regional Gov.: Yes	*10.37*	0.01	65
	Total	**11.48**	0.01	579
State Parliament	State Parl.: No	0.60	0.04	418
	State Parl.: Yes	1.57	0.12	161
	Total	2.17	0.16	579
Federal Council	Federal Council: No	0.27	0.06	480
	Federal Council: Yes	1.32	0.28	99
	Total	1.59	0.34	579
Mayor	Mayor: No	1.62	3.39	443
	Mayor: Yes	*5.29*	*11.03*	136
	Total	6.91	**14.42**	579
Municipal Council	Municipal C.: No	0.14	2.35	341
	Municipal C.: Yes	0.68	*11.39*	238
	Total	0.82	**13.74**	579
City/District Council	City/District C.: No	0.00	0.40	475
	City/District C.: Yes	0.00	2.59	104
	Total	0.00	2.99	579
Chamber of Labour	ChamberLabour: No	0.56	3.11	461
	ChamberLabour: Yes	2.17	*12.16*	118
	Total	2.73	**15.27**	579
Trade Unions	TradeUnions: No	3.18	*4.34*	374
	TradeUnions: Yes	*5.79*	*7.93*	205
	Total	**8.97**	**12.27**	579
Auxiliary Association	AuxAssoc: No	1.79	0.25	386
	AuxAssoc: Yes	3.57	0.50	193
	Total	5.36	0.75	579

Legend: Variables with a contribution above average (100/14 = 7.1 %) are in **bold**; categories with a contribution above average (100/28 = 3.6%) are in *italics*.

Figure A2. Dendrogram for the Hierarchical Representation of SPÖ Parliamentarians

Cluster Dendrogram