

Supplementary Materials for

Zoonosis at the Huanan Seafood Market: A Critique

Daoyu Zhang et al.


This PDF file includes:

Supplementary Figures
Supplementary Information


Supplementary Figures




Supp. Fig. 1. Looking West along 5th street. Male and Female toilets entrance below yellow sign at left rear of image. WHO Mission (2021).




Supp. Fig. 2. COVID-19 cases at the HSM as at the 13th December 2019. A 3m buffer was drawn around cases (blue). Wild animal stalls in pink, toilets in maroon.




Supp. Fig. 3. COVID-19 cases at the HSM as at the 20th December 2019. A jitter of 10-50cm was randomly added/subtracted to case coordinates. A 3m buffer was drawn around new cases (blue). Cases at or earlier than 13th December shown in light blue. Wild animal stalls in pink, toilets in maroon.




Supp. Fig. 4. COVID-19 cases at the HSM as at the 27th December 2019. A jitter of 10-50cm was randomly added/subtracted to case coordinates. A 3m buffer was drawn around new cases (blue). Cases at or earlier than 20th December shown in light blue. Wild animal stalls in pink, toilets in maroon.




Supp. Fig. 5. COVID-19 cases at the HSM as at the 31th December 2019. A jitter of 10-50cm was randomly added/subtracted to case coordinates. A 3m buffer was drawn around new cases (blue). Cases at or earlier than 27th December shown in light blue. Wild animal stalls in pink, toilets in maroon.




Sup. Fig. 6. COVID-19 cases KDE contour maps. a) at the HSM as at the 13th December 2019 (1 case); b) as at 20th December; c) as at 27th December; d) as at 31st December 2019. Wild animal stalls in pink, toilets in maroon, COVID-19 cases as black dots. At no stage of the outbreak at the HSM was highest case density centered on the wildlife stalls at the SW corner of the West side or the NW corner of the East side of the HSM.



Supp. Fig. 7. Spatstas (Baddeley and Turner 2005) Kcross and Lcross functions applied to wildlife stall locations (B) superimposed with COVID-19 cases (A) in the Western section of the market only.




Supp. Fig. 8. Spatstas (Baddeley and Turner 2005) Kcross and Lcross functions applied to wildlife stall locations (B) superimposed with COVID-19 cases (A) as at the 20th of December at the HSM.




Supp. Fig. 9. COVID-19 cases with fixed stalls in the Western section of the market (Koopmans, 2021) and COVID-19 cases in the Western section of the market after Joint WHO-China Study (2021a,b).




Supp. Fig. 10. a) COVID-19 cases with fixed stalls in the Eastern section of the market (Koopmans, 2021) and b) COVID-19 cases in the Eastern section of the market after Joint WHO-China Study (2021a,b).




Supp. Fig. 11. Analysis of Western section of market only, using COVID-19 cases as per Koopmans (2021) and only wildlife stalls locations in Western section of market using spatstats. a) Simulation (39 runs) of $G_{cross}(A,B)$ function representing the distribution of the distance from case location (A) to the nearest wildlife stall (B); b) Simulation (39 runs) of $K_{cross}(B,A)$ function representing $1/\lambda_A$ times the expected number of cases (A) within a distance r of a typical wildlife stall point (B), where λ_A is the density (intensity) of COVID-19 cases.




Supp. Fig. 12. Location of vegetable stalls and COVID-19 case locations from week ending 13/12 to 31/12/2019. First case location (black arrow), was located at a stall classified as a vegetable stall in the Western area of the market by the Joint WHO-China Study (2021a,b).




Supp. Fig. 13. KDE plot of Location of PCR negative environmental samples taken at the Huanan Seafood Market. Data sourced from Worobey et al. (2022) data and code <https://zenodo.org/record/6908012>




Supp. Fig. 14. KDE plot of Location of PCR positive environmental samples taken at the Huanan Seafood Market. Data sourced from Worobey et al. (2022) data and code <https://zenodo.org/record/6908012>




Supp. Fig. 15. Location of environmental samples taken at the Huanan Seafood Market. Data sourced from Worobey et al. (2022) data and code <https://zenodo.org/record/6908012>




Supp. Fig. 16. Location of PCR negative environmental samples taken at the Huanan Seafood Market. Data sourced from Worobey et al. (2022) data and code <https://zenodo.org/record/6908012>




Supp. Fig. 17. Location of PCR positive environmental samples taken at the Huanan Seafood Market. Data sourced from Worobey et al. (2022) data and code <https://zenodo.org/record/6908012>




Supp. Fig. 18. Relative risk analysis of environmental positive samples using sparr (Davies et al. 2018). a) Ratio of the environmental positive density to control density (environmental negative) using deduplicated samples and default adaptive smoothing=False; b) Ratio of the environmental positive density to control density (environmental negative) using deduplicated samples and adaptive smoothing.



Supp. Fig. 19. Positive environmental samples as a percentage of total environmental samples per grid cell for a 8X8 cell grid over the Huanan Seafood Market.



Supp. Fig. 20. Positive environmental samples as a percentage of total environmental samples per grid cell for a 10X10 cell grid over the Huanan seafood market.



Supp. Fig. 21. Positive environmental samples as a percentage of total environmental samples per grid cell for a 13X13 cell grid over the Huanan Seafood Market.

Stall Figures



Supp. Fig. 22. Stall 08-25 as filmed on 07-2019 (on the right, Babarleelehant (2021)). See Fig. 12 for location.



Supp. Fig. 23. Stall 08-25 as filmed in 2018 (on the left, Babarleelephant (2021)). See Fig. 12 for location.



Supp. Fig. 24 a,b. Stall W/8-25 as filmed on 31-12-2019 (closed door in the middle). See Fig. 12 for location.



Supp. Fig. 25 a,b. Stall 08-25 as photographed in 2017. (Top, bottom left) Note the cramped, already-taken-up space and small size of the window making it infeasible for a larger cage such as for small carnivores to fit in or through. Only snakes were found in this stall from available photo and video evidence. See Fig. 12 for location.



Supp. Fig. 26. Stall W8/19-23 W7/20-24 “腊味香食品有限公司”, a seller of preserved and fresh livestock meat or “腊肉” with pig carcasses hanging at corner.



Supp. Fig. 27. Stall W8/19-23 W7/20-24 captured on video in July 2019. Large freezers can be seen inside the stall.



Supp. Fig. 28. a staircase leading upstairs can be seen inside stall W/7 20-24 W8/19-23. From Babarleelehant (2021). See Fig. 12 for location.



Supp. Fig. 29. Stall W7-25 “荣昌冻品” on right of image (green freezer in front). The stall is a frozen food stall, no evidence of wild animals is evident.



Supp. Fig. 30. Stall W7/25 “荣昌冻品” on left of image (green freezer in front). On right hand side is a view to the West down 7th street. W7-31-33 is the third and fourth stall opening when counting from W7-25 to the right along 7th street. W7-35-37 is the fifth and sixth stall opening. Note, Fig. 3 B in Worobey et al. (2022a) was likely taken between W7-29 and W7-31, looking towards W7-31. Here in December 2019, no animal cages (which are routinely placed by vendors outside stalls) can be seen outside W7-31-33 or W7-35-37.



Supp. Fig. 31. View to the West down 7th street. Stall W7/25 “荣昌冻品” at front left of image. W7-31-33 is the third and fourth stall opening when counting from W7-25 to the right along 7th street. W7-35-37 is the fifth and sixth stall opening. Note, Fig. 3B in Worobey et al. (2022a) was likely taken between W7-29 and W7-31, looking towards W7-31. Here in December 2019, no animal cages (which are routinely placed by vendors outside stalls) can be seen outside W7-31-33 or W7-35-37. W7/26-28 can be seen on the right.




Supp. Fig. 32 a,b. Stall W/6 29-33 as filmed from the perspective of the store room at the western end of street 6 (Western section of HSM), looking East, on 31-12-2019 (Babarleelehant (2021), closed doors, third from left of open stall). No evidence of cages or carnivores like raccoon dogs were found (Cages are generally placed outside of stalls). See Fig. 12 for location.



Supp. Fig. 33. Looking West along 5th street. Stalls W5/32 and W5/34 are located behind the environmental cleaner person. Stalls W5/36 and W5/38 do not have a sign and it is unclear if these stalls were occupied in December 2019. W5-26-34 is “志翔冻品商行” and sold frozen meat, not wild animals.



Supp. Fig. 34 a-d. Stall 7/15-17 as filmed on 07-2019 (Babarleelehant, 2021), no evidence that gloves, shoe covers or cages containing live mammals were found in or around this stall (Babarleelehant, 2021) . See Fig. 12 for location.




Supp. Fig. 35. Multiple differences are noted between environmental sampling published by Joint WHO-China Study (2021a,b) and Gao et al. (2022).

Supplementary Information


Sample A20

The Ct value of real time PCR (quantitative PCR or qPCR) represents the number of PCR cycles at which the reaction curve intersects a threshold value. A higher Ct value indicates that less nucleic acid was present in the sample (Supp. Fig. 36). SARS-CoV-2 was only able to be isolated from the three samples with a Ct value <30 (Fig. 12). Notably, of these, the two samples with lowest Ct values were sampled from stalls with confirmed COVID-19 patients (Gao et al. 2022). Since the Ct value is highly correlated with nucleic acid abundance, an expected read depth at positions 8782 and 28144 (Gao et al. 2022) can be calculated based on sample titer genome copies. As shown in Supp. Table 1, we would have expected sample A20 with a Ct value of 32.48 to have read depth between that for sample F46 (Ct value of 31.8) and F98 (Ct value of 35). However this is not the case.



Supp. Fig. 36. Fluorescence above baseline (ΔRn) plotted against PCR cycle number. Ct is the cycle value where the PCR curve crosses a threshold value. After ThermoFisher Scientific <https://www.thermoFisher.com/au/en/home/life-science/pcr/real-time-pcr/real-time-pcr-learning-center/real-time-pcr-basics/real-time-pcr-understanding-ct.html>

Average Ct vs. Sample_No.



Supp. Fig. 37. Ct value (averaged for samples C8,SJ-D,SJ-CS,SJ-L3,RLC-4,RLC-3) per sample. SARS-CoV-2 was isolated from samples F13, F54, and B5 which all had a Ct value <30 (black). Sample A20 is shown in orange. Based on data in (Gao et al. 2022).

Position	8782				28144				PCR
	A	T	C	G	A	T	C	G	Ct
F13*	5	10	1874	3	0	1669	0	0	23.85
F54*	1	1	106	0	1	39	0	0	25.8
B5*	0	0	86	0	0	85	0	0	29.32
F46	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	31.8
A61	0	0	2	0	0	0	1	0	32.04
A20	7	359	1	0	1	5	1596	5	32.48
F98	0	0	20	0	0	3	0	0	34
A33	0	0	2	0	0	0	1	0	34.46
A88	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	36.69
A87	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	36.94

Supp. Table 1. Summary of number of reads mapped to positions 8782 and 28144 in different samples and their PCT Ct values after (Gao et al. 2022) Extended Data Table 2 and Table 1. * samples where SARS-CoV-2 was isolated.

We see an inverse correlation between read depth and Ct for the three samples where viral isolation was successful, samples F13, F54 and B5 (Supp. Table 1). For the samples where viral isolation failed, other than sample A20, F98 exhibited the highest coverage at positions 8782 and 28144 with no other samples (other than A20) having significant coverage on 8782 and 28144.

Sample A20 is clearly anomalous in that it has a moderate Ct value, yet has the second highest coverage at positions 8782 and 28144 of all samples (Table 1).


Extrapolating from sample F98 gives an upper bound of $20 \cdot (2^{(34-32.48)}) = 58$ reads on 8782 for samples of which viral isolation have failed and have a qRT-PCR Ct number of 32.48, and extrapolating from sample B5 gives an upper bound of $86 \cdot (2^{(29.32-32.48)}) = 10$ reads on 8782 for samples where viral isolation succeeded, defining a range of which the number of reads covering position 8782 could may be expected to land on for a sample with qRT-PCR Ct number of 32.48 using the particular sequencing protocol for this particular batch of samples (DNBSEQ-T7). However, the A20 genome has a read depth of 359 at 8782 which is 6.18 times higher than expected given the upper bound estimate of a sample with a qRT-PCR Ct number of 32.48 for samples sequenced with this particular protocol with this particular batch of samples.

Similarly, for position 28144, extrapolating from sample F98 gives an upper bound of $3 \cdot (2^{(34-32.48)}) = 9$ reads on 28144 for samples of which viral isolation have failed and have a qRT-PCR Ct number of 32.48, and extrapolating from sample B5 gives an upper bound of $85 \cdot (2^{(29.32-32.48)}) = 10$ reads on 28144 for samples of which viral isolation have succeeded, defining a range of which the number of reads covering position 28144 could may be expected to land on for a sample with qRT-PCR Ct number of 32.48 using the particular sequencing protocol for this particular batch of samples (DNBSEQ-T7). However, A20 has a coverage of 1596 at 28144 which is 159.6 times higher than expected given the upper bound estimate of a sample with a qRT-PCR Ct number of 32.48 for samples sequenced with this particular protocol with this particular batch of samples.

In addition, for all the samples that have significant read coverage depths at positions 8782 and 28144, the number of reads covering 8782 is greater than the number of reads covering 28144, whereas in sample A20, the number of reads covering 28144 is greater than the number of reads covering 8782.

Additionally, sample A20 is the only sample where a complete viral genome was obtained yet no live virus was isolated. Using a correlation analysis, Quay (2022) concluded that the lineage A/S reads in A20 was a statistical outlier (Supp. Fig. 38), with a likely source of post-sampling contamination, while the lineage B/L reads within A20 was consistent with what is expected by the qRT-PCR Ct value.

Given these anomalies we cannot exclude the possibility that the lineage A SARS-CoV-2 genomes within sample A20 may have been introduced to the high-throughput sequencing library before genome sequencing took place but after the qRT-PCR reaction and the virus isolation attempt took place.



Supp. Fig. 38. Log2 of the total sequencing depth at 8782/28144 in all sequenced Huanan market environmental samples plotted against the qRT-PCR Ct value of each sample. After Quay (2022).


As the qRT-PCR process is an exponential amplification process, the Ct value denotes the number of cycles it takes to exponentially amplify the RNA target in the sample to a set concentration that is then detected by the PCR machine, it is expected that the Ct value of a sample to be linearly and inversely correlated to the original concentration of the RNA template within the sample, which is directly correlated to the sequencing depth of the sample, with each multiplication in the concentration of the original RNA sample by the single cycle amplification efficiently (which is close to 2, the ideal condition) of the qRT-PCR setup being expected to reduce the qRT-PCR Ct value by roughly 1.

Plotting the log₂ of the sequencing depth at 8782+28144 of each environmental sample against their Ct value reveals that for all samples, including the lineage B alignment in sample A20 (the alignment depth with C8782 and T28144) show an inverse linear correlation as expected, with a correlation factor being close to -1 as expected from the exponential amplification process of qRT-PCR.


The lineage A alignment within sample A20 however is found to be a statistical outlier with an absolute standard residual of 3.4 when this correlation is considered, compared to the maximal standard residual level of 1.3 for other points on the graph, including the number of lineage B alignments at 8782 and 28144 within sample A20.

As mentioned previously, we urge Gao et al. (2022) to review the sample in light of our findings to determine if our concerns are warranted. Making the raw NGS dataset available will allow validation of lineage A in the A20 environmental sample, rather than cross-contamination from other sequencing runs.

Sample A20 carried 2 additional mutations: C6145T and G26262T (Supp. Fig. 39). Both mutations have been found in isolates of SARS-CoV-2 in humans, whereas while C6145T is of uncertain ancestry due to it being a hypervariable site in Sarbecoviruses (both C and T have been found in closely related genomes of the same clade, such as BANAL-52, BANAL-103, BANAL-116, BANAL-236 and BANAL-247, RaTG13, RacCS203 and RpYN06, making it difficult to say for certain whether C6145 or T6145 was present in the immediate ancestor of SARS-CoV-2). G26262T is not found in any other Sarbecoviruses, which makes it a novel site and clearly non-ancestral (Supp. Figs 40-41).



Supp. Fig. 39. Alignment of complete SARS-CoV-2 genomes assembled from HSM environmental samples, after (Gao et al. 2022).



Supp. Fig. 40. Closest SARSr-CoVs to SARS-CoV-2 Wuhan-Hu-1 (MN908947) in 6135-6180 region using blastnt excluding SARS-CoV-2 and synthetic constructs. Position 6145 is highlighted in red box and is a variable site in sarbecoviruses.

NCBI Multiple Sequence Alignment Viewer, Version 1.22.0

Sequence ID	Start	Alignment	End	Organism
MN908947	(+) 26,255	T C G T T T C G	26,300	Severe acute respiratory...
MT121516.1	(+) 26,083		26,134	Pangolin coronavirus
MF072865.1	(+) 26,207		26,252	Pangolin coronavirus
MT072864.1	(+) 26,203		26,248	Pangolin coronavirus
MT040336.1	(+) 26,215		26,260	Pangolin coronavirus
MT040335.1	(+) 26,215		26,260	Pangolin coronavirus
MT040334.1	(+) 26,209		26,254	Pangolin coronavirus
MT040333.1	(+) 26,215		26,260	Pangolin coronavirus
MT098071.1	(+) 23,753		23,778	Pangolin coronavirus
MG372594.1	(+) 26,091		26,136	Bat SARS-like coronavirus
MG372593.1	(+) 26,160		26,205	Bat SARS-like coronavirus
KJ472516.1	(+) 25,927		25,972	Bat SARS-like coronavirus
KJ472515.1	(+) 25,843		25,888	Bat SARS-like coronavirus
KJ472514.1	(+) 25,917		25,962	Bat SARS-like coronavirus
KF294457.1	(+) 26,057		26,102	Bat SARS-like coronavirus
MR691102.1	(+) 26,307		26,352	Severe acute respiratory...
MM532696.1	(+) 26,220		26,265	Pangolin coronavirus
OK017858.1	(+) 25,919		25,964	Sarbecovirus sp.
OK017846.1	(+) 25,924		25,969	Sarbecovirus sp.
OK017845.1	(+) 25,939		25,984	Sarbecovirus sp.
OK017844.1	(+) 25,939		25,984	Sarbecovirus sp.
OK017843.1	(+) 25,942		25,987	Sarbecovirus sp.
OK017842.1	(+) 25,840		25,885	Sarbecovirus sp.
OK017841.1	(+) 25,840		25,885	Sarbecovirus sp.
OK017839.1	(+) 25,936		25,981	Sarbecovirus sp.
OK017838.1	(+) 25,939		25,984	Sarbecovirus sp.
OK017837.1	(+) 25,945		25,990	Sarbecovirus sp.
OK017836.1	(+) 25,939		25,984	Sarbecovirus sp.
OK017835.1	(+) 25,939		25,984	Sarbecovirus sp.
OK017831.1	(+) 25,945		25,990	Sarbecovirus sp.
OK017830.1	(+) 25,890		25,935	Sarbecovirus sp.
OK017829.1	(+) 25,945		25,990	Sarbecovirus sp.
OK017828.1	(+) 25,945		25,990	Sarbecovirus sp.
OK017827.1	(+) 25,942		25,987	Sarbecovirus sp.
OK017826.1	(+) 25,945		25,990	Sarbecovirus sp.
OK017825.1	(+) 25,948		25,993	Sarbecovirus sp.
OK017824.1	(+) 25,942		25,987	Sarbecovirus sp.
OK017823.1	(+) 25,942		25,987	Sarbecovirus sp.
OK017822.1	(+) 25,942		25,987	Sarbecovirus sp.
OK017821.1	(+) 25,945		25,990	Sarbecovirus sp.
OK017819.1	(+) 25,942		25,987	Sarbecovirus sp.
OK017817.1	(+) 25,945		25,990	Sarbecovirus sp.
OK017816.1	(+) 25,945		25,990	Sarbecovirus sp.
OK017815.1	(+) 25,945		25,990	Sarbecovirus sp.
OK017814.1	(+) 25,945		25,990	Sarbecovirus sp.
OK017813.1	(+) 25,942		25,987	Sarbecovirus sp.
OK017812.1	(+) 25,945		25,990	Sarbecovirus sp.
OK017811.1	(+) 25,939		25,984	Sarbecovirus sp.
OK017810.1	(+) 25,939		25,984	Sarbecovirus sp.
OK017809.1	(+) 25,945		25,990	Sarbecovirus sp.
OK017808.1	(+) 25,939		25,984	Sarbecovirus sp.
OK017807.1	(+) 25,942		25,987	Sarbecovirus sp.
OK017806.1	(+) 26,033		26,078	Sarbecovirus sp.
OK017805.1	(+) 25,988		26,033	Sarbecovirus sp.
OK017804.1	(+) 26,009		26,054	Sarbecovirus sp.
OK017803.1	(+) 26,018		26,063	Sarbecovirus sp.
OK017802.1	(+) 25,939		25,984	Sarbecovirus sp.
OK017801.1	(+) 25,945		25,990	Sarbecovirus sp.
OK017792.1	(+) 25,939		25,984	Sarbecovirus sp.
MZ937000.1	(+) 26,150		26,237	Bat coronavirus
MZ091982.1	(+) 26,079		26,154	Beta-coronavirus sp. PpY
MZ091381.1	(+) 26,170		26,215	Beta-coronavirus sp. PpY
JX993988.1	(+) 26,385		26,330	Bat coronavirus GpYurn
MG705458.1	(+) 25,152		26,177	Sarbecovirus sp.
HG994860.1	(+) 26,255		26,300	Severe acute respiratory...
HG994859.1	(+) 26,255		26,300	Severe acute respiratory...
HG994858.1	(+) 26,255		26,300	Severe acute respiratory...
HG994857.1	(+) 26,255		26,300	Severe acute respiratory...
HG994856.1	(+) 26,255		26,300	Severe acute respiratory...
HG994855.1	(+) 26,255		26,300	Severe acute respiratory...
HG994854.1	(+) 26,255		26,300	Severe acute respiratory...
HG994853.1	(+) 26,253		26,298	Severe acute respiratory...
HG994852.1	(+) 26,252		26,297	Severe acute respiratory...
MM269006.1	(+) 26,945		26,990	Reverse genetics vector
MT926412.1	(+) 26,945		26,990	Reverse genetics vector
MT926411.1	(+) 26,945		26,990	Reverse genetics vector
MT926410.1	(+) 26,945		26,990	Reverse genetics vector
MM251312.1	(+) 26,109		26,154	Bat coronavirus RaC2S21
MM251311.1	(+) 26,109		26,154	Bat coronavirus RaC2S2
MM251310.1	(+) 26,109		26,154	Bat coronavirus RaC2S2
MM251309.1	(+) 26,116		26,161	Bat coronavirus RaC2S2...
LC555375.1	(+) 26,090		26,135	Severe acute respiratory...
MM996322.2	(+) 26,240		26,285	Bat coronavirus RaTG13
MT782115.1	(+) 26,122		26,167	Bat SARS coronavirus H...
MT782114.1	(+) 26,122		26,167	Bat SARS coronavirus H...
GI133545.1	(+) 26,041		26,086	Bat SARS coronavirus H...
GI133544.1	(+) 26,059		26,113	Bat SARS coronavirus H...
GI133543.1	(+) 26,059		26,104	Bat SARS coronavirus H...
GI133542.1	(+) 26,059		26,104	Bat SARS coronavirus H...
GI133541.1	(+) 26,059		26,104	Bat SARS coronavirus H...
GI133540.1	(+) 26,068		26,113	Bat SARS coronavirus H...
GI133539.1	(+) 26,068		26,113	Bat SARS coronavirus H...
FJ111559.1	(+) 26,091		26,136	recombinant SARS-CoV-2
DC022905.2	(+) 26,068		26,113	Bat SARS coronavirus H...
DC064209.1	(+) 26,051		26,096	Bat SARS coronavirus H...
DC064199.1	(+) 26,051		26,096	Bat SARS coronavirus H...
OK017832.1	(+) 25,914		25,957	Sarbecovirus sp.
OK478992.1	(+) 25,937		25,982	Severe acute respiratory...

Supp. Fig. 41. 100 closest SARSr-CoVs to SARS-CoV-2 Wuhan-Hu-1 (MN908947) in 26255-26300 region using blastn excluding SARS-CoV-2 and synthetic constructs. G26262 highlighted in red box is conserved across all searched sarbecoviruses.

While C->T transitions frequently happen in poorly sequenced genomes of SARS-CoV-2 due to the frequent deamination of cytosine both by RNA editing enzymes and by non-enzymatic processes during RNA degradation, G->T transversion happens mainly through oxidative stress in human airway cells and is considered to be a feature that is uniquely found for human isolates of SARS-CoV-2, requiring some level of passage in a human airway (Roy et al. 2020). 8-oxoguanine generated by reactive oxygen species has been shown to lead to G-T mutations (Ohno 2014). As we also observe two mutations C18129T and G22801A forming after three passages in VERO E6 cells of the isolated sample F54 compared to the original, it can not be ruled out that the mutations we see in A20 was the result of cell culture-associated mutations from a cell cultured isolate of lineage A SARS-CoV-2 of indeterminable (but likely type-strain) origin contaminating the library as it was being sequenced.

It is worth mentioning that the sample F54 accumulated two mutations compared to the original at the third passage in VERO E6 cells. We cannot rule out the possibility, however unlikely, that contamination by cultured SARS-CoV-2 sequences within the same laboratory during the sequencing of sample A20 in 2021 could have led to the appearance of mutations C6145T and G26262T within the final assembled genome. Access to raw data is important to confirm all samples.

Read Depth

The environmental sample A20 deposited on GISAID by Gao et al. (2022) has 2 “N”s within 60nt of 28144 (Supp. Fig. 42), which is below the length of the average Illumina read which is usually 100 or 150nt. Gao et al. discusses that position 28144 has been sequenced to a coverage of 1596X. This indicates either a sudden increase in coverage with many reads ending between 28091 and 28144 or base calls at 28090 and 28091 containing similar amount of all four nucleotides at the location (as opposed to two or three which are assigned R,Y,W,S,M,K or B,D,H,V). This may be caused by amplicon contamination or cross-sample contamination by cell cultured strains of SARS-CoV-2. However, due to the unavailability of the raw data, it is impossible to deduce the exact scenario.

hCoV-19/env/Wuhan/IVDC-HBA20/2020|EPI_ISL_10497477|2020-01-01
 Sequence ID: Query_56425 Length: 29854 Number of Matches: 4

Range 1: 477 to 16373 [Graphics](#) [▼ Next Match](#) [▲ Pre](#)


Score	Expect	Identities	Gaps	Strand
28755 bits(15571)	0.0	15739/15899(99%)	4/15899(0%)	Plus/Plus
Query 493		TCGAACTGCACCTCATGGTCATGTTATGGTTGAGCTGGTAGCAG--AACTCGAAGGCATT		550
Sbjct 477	NNNNNNN.---....		534
Query 6131		AAAGTTACATTTTTCCCTGACTTAAATGGTGATGTGGTGGCTATTGATTATAAACACTAC		6190
Sbjct 6115	T.....		6174
Query 8771		ACATGGTTTAGCCAGCGTGGTGGTAGTTATACTAATGACAAAGCTTGCCCATTTGATTGCT		8830
Sbjct 8755	T.....		8814
Query 20215		AATTTACAAGAATTTAAACCCAGGAGTCAAATGGAAATTGATTTCTTAGAATTAGCTATG		20274
Sbjct 20199	NA.....		20258
Query 26228		CTGATGAGTACGAACCTTATGTACTCATTCGTTTCGGAAGAGACAGGTACGTTAATAGTTA		26287
Sbjct 26212	T.....		26271
Query 28088		TGGTCTAAATCACCCATTTCAGTACATCGATATCGGTAATTATACAGTTTCCTGTTTACC		28147
Sbjct 28072		.NN.....C...		28131
Query 28148		TTTTACAATTAATTGCCAGGAACCTAAATTGGGTAGTCTTGTAGTGCCTTGTTCGTTCTA		28207
Sbjct 28132			28191

Supp. Fig. 42. Alignment of sample A20 (EPI_ISL_10497477) to SARS-CoV-2 (NC_045512.2).

PPE

The potential significance of PPE-related terms in regards to collection of samples A18-A20 is not discussed in Worobey et.al. (2022b) and we expand on these terms. Samples A18 and A20 were taken from stall 17,18 of street 7 (Fig. 12), and with 1 other sample, A2, have two unique sample definitions in Chinese CDC report 2020 No. 53: “Shoe covers and soles” (鞋套鞋底) for A18 and “Gloves” for A20 (Epoch times, 2020). Although it is plausible that waterproof boots may have been left at stalls, we speculate that shoes are unlikely to have been left available for sampling, given the non-sanitary condition of the ground inside a wet market. In addition, as waterproof boots are already resistant toward sewage and offal penetration, wearing shoe covers over such boots would be redundant.

We note that there is no “cover” to a shoe and there is no “sole” to a shoe cover, whereas the sole means the bottom of a shoe and a shoe cover is a type of cover worn over the shoes typically by disinfection workers and epidemic control staff as a part of their personal protective equipment (PPE). As the shoe cover and the sole can only be present on one object (for the purpose of environmental sampling) if the shoe is still worn on the foot (Fig. 47). It is thus unclear if an investigators’ own PPE or if a vendors shoe was sampled.



Supp. Fig 47. A Shoe cover and names for different parts of a shoe.

As gloves are also part of the investigators' own PPE, it is possible that sample A20 also referred to a sample taken from the PPE of an investigator at the same time as A18, possibly at the end of one specific round of sampling within the 3 days from 30-12-2019 to end 01-01-2020 where sampling of the market took place.

We notice that the sampling of gloves (glove prints, glove tips) appears to be a standard method of environmental microbial monitoring (Boom 2020; Technical Safety Services, 2022). We also note that specialized “boot cover swab kits” (or “shoe cover swab kits”) were sold for the specific purpose of pathogen sampling and testing by certain suppliers (Romer labs, 2022).

The significance, if samples A18 and A20 were sampled from disinfection/environmental samplers shoe covers and or gloves respectively, is that the SARS-CoV-2 RNA could have come from anywhere in the market, or potentially from outside the market.

As sample A20 also shows several unique inconsistencies with other metagenome sequenced samples generated by this study (Quay 2022), we urge Gao et al. (2022) to review this sample to check for the source of these inconsistencies. Making the raw dataset available would enable validation of the sample and help to rule out potential contamination.

Animal Testing and Susceptibility

Common name	Species	HSM animals tested	Experimental IP/Entry/Binding Energy	Live infection/transmission	Found in wild	In silico risk	Summary
Hog badger	Arctonyx albobularis	(Badger) 6	IP (S1/RBD): Trace (Zhao et al. 2020); Pseudotyped entry: Low/Medium (Zhao et al. 2020)		No		Unlikely
Asian badger	Meles leucurus				No	1 very low (Mellivora capensis) (karlssonlab 2022/Damas et al. 2020)	Unlikely
Pallas squirrel	Callosciurus erythraeus				No		Unknown
Amur Hedgehog	Erinaceus amurensis	16	(european hedgehog) Binding Energy: Nil (Wu et al. 2020)		No	Very low (Erinaceus europaeus) (karlssonlab 2022/Damas et al. 2020); Unlikely to bind: Luan et al., 2020; Liu et al., 2020; Lam et al., 2020; Wu et al., 2020	Unlikely
Malayan procupine	Hystrix brachyura				No	2 low (Hystrix cristata) (karlssonlab 2022/Damas et al. 2020)	Unlikely
Chinese hare	Lepus sinensis	52	(rabbit) IP (S1/RBD): Strong (Zhao et al. 2020); Pseudotyped entry: Medium/High (Zhao et al. 2020); Medium (Mykytyn et al. 2021); Binding Energy: (rabbit) High (Huang et al. 2020); High (Wu et al. 2020)	(rabbit) Yes (Mykytyn et al. 2021); (rabbit) Transmission: unable to support sustained intraspecies transmission (Mykytyn et al. 2021)	No	3 medium (Lepus timidus) (karlssonlab 2022/Damas et al. 2020)	Possible
Marmot	Marmota himalayana				No	3 medium (karlssonlab 2022/Damas et al. 2020); unlikely Liu et al., 2020	Unknown

Chinese muntjac	Muntiacus reevesi	6		(Odocoileus virginianus (from Capreolinae, a different Subfamily)) (Cool et al. 2021)	No (nor C. elaphus; Dama dama) (Moreira-Soto et al. 2022); No (Muntiacus reevesi; Dama dama; Cervus elaphus) Holding et al. (2022); only found in White tailed deer and Mule deer in North America (https://www.who.org/app/uploads/2022/06/sars-cov-2-situation-report-13.pdf). Note the different C-terminus for US continental Odocoileus ACE2 relative to other Cervids (Cool et al. 2021) (https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/nucleotide/XM_020913306.1?report=genbank&log\$=nucleotide&blast_rank=1&RID=D60DWJT2016)	1 very low (karlssonlab 2022/Damas et al. 2020)	Unlikely
Siberian Weasel	Mustela sibirica	1	(ferret) Binding Energy: High (Huang et al. 2020)	(ferret) upper respiratory tract only (Shi et al. 2020)	No	1 very low (Mustela erminea) (karlssonlab 2022/Damas et al. 2020)	Possible
Coypu	Myocastor coypus				No	1 very low (karlssonlab 2022/Damas et al. 2020)	Unknown
Mink	Neovison vison				Yes (Europe and Americas only, not Asia (https://www.who.org/app/uploads/2022/06/sars-cov-2-situation-report-13.pdf))	1 very low (karlssonlab 2022/Damas et al. 2020); Likely: Lam et al. 2020	Possible
Raccoon dog	Nyctereutes procyonoides		IP (S1/RBD): Trace (Zhao et al. 2020); Pseudotyped entry: Medium (Zhao et al. 2020); Binding Energy: Medium (as per Dog, lower than Cat (Wu et al. 2020))	D614G variant (Freuling et al. 2020), Antibody study by Wernike et al. (2020) used serology from lab infection with D614G variant (Freuling et al.	No	Unlikely: Luan et al., 2020b; Zhai et al., 2020	Possible

				2020)			
Masked palm civet	Paguma larvata		IP (S1/RBD): Trace/Low (Zhao et al. 2020); Pseudotyped entry: Low (Zhao et al. 2020); Binding Energy: Very low (Huang et al. 2020); Very low (Starr et al. 2022); Nil (Wu et al. 2020)		No	Low (Piplani et al.); Damas et al., 2020; Zhai et al., 2020; Likely: Luan et al., 2020; Wu et al., 2020	Unlikely
Chinese bamboo rat	Rhizomys sinensis	6			No	3 medium (Rhizomys pruinosus) (karlssonlab 2022/Damas et al. 2020); (Spalax galili) Likely: Lam et al., 2020; (Spalax galili) Unlikely Liu et al., 2020	Unkown
Red squirrel	Sciurus vulgaris		(Arctic ground squirrel) Binding Energy: High (Huang et al. 2020)		No	4 high (karlssonlab 2022/Damas et al. 2020); unlikely Pach et al., 2020	Unkown
Wild boar	Sus scrofa	2	(Pig) Binding Energy: Medium/High (Wu et al. 2020)	(sus scrofa domesticus) No (Meekins et al. 2020; Vergara-Alert et al. 2021)	No	2 low (karlssonlab 2022/Damas et al. 2020); Likely: Lam et al., 2020; Wu et al., 2020; Melin et al., 2020; Liu et al., 2020; Qiu et al., 2020	Unlikely
Complex tooth flying squirrel	Trogopterus xanthipes		(Arctic ground squirrel) Binding Energy: High (Huang et al. 2020)		No		Unkown
Red fox	Vulpes vulpes		Binding Energy: Medium (Huang et al. 2020); High (Wu et al. 2020)	Yes (Porter et al. 2022); Tranmission borderline as maximal shedding (~4.9 log PFU/ml) less than minimal PFU (5.1 log PFU) used for innoculation (Porter et al. 2022)	No	2 low (karlssonlab 2022/Damas et al. 2020); Likely: Luan et al., 2020; Liu et al., 2020; Lam et al., 2020; Praharaj et al., 2020	Possible
Cat	Felis catus		Binding Energy: Medium (Wu et al. 2020); High (Huang)		Yes		Possible
Dog	Canis familiaris		Binding Energy: Medium (Wu et al. 2020); High (Huang)		Yes		Possible
Human	Homo sapiens		IP (S1/RBD): Strong (Zhao et al. 2020); Pseudotyped entry: High (Zhao et al. 2020); High (Mykytyn et al. 2021); Binding	D614 and D614G	Yes	5 very high (karlssonlab 2022/Damas et al. 2020); High (Piplani et al.)	Likely

			Energy: Very High (Huang et al. 2020); High (Wu et al. 2020)				
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Supp. Table 2. HSM wild and domesticated animal SARS-CoV-2 susceptibility risk. Where a species has not been tested/predicted and a species from the same genus/family has been tested, these results are shown (and related species indicated in brackets), but may not reflect true susceptibility. Note in silico studies are predictions only and may not reflect true susceptibility. Homo sapiens is shown for comparison.

Species	HSM samples tested	HSM tested animals	HSM tested RT-PCR	Remarks
Rabbit/Hares	104	52	0	
Snake	80	40	0	
Stray cat	80	27	0	Including faeces
Hedgehog	67	16	0	
Chinese muntjac	18	6	0	
Dog	17	7	0	Including one stray dog
Badger	16	6	0	
Chinese bamboo rat	15	6	0	
Mouse	12	10	0	Captured around the market
Pig	6	NA	0	
Chicken	5	5	0	
Chinese giant salamander	5	3	0	
Crocodile	4	2	0	
Wild boar	4	2	0	
Soft-shelled turtle	3	2	0	
Fish	2	2	0	
Weasel	2	1	0	Captured around the market
Sheep	1	1	0	
Others	16	NA	0	
Total	457	188	0	

Supp. Table 3. Refrigerated and frozen animal samples at the HSM and warehouses supplying the HSM and animals caught and tested around the HSM tested for SARS-CoV-2 after Joint WHO-China Study (2021a) Table 4.

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