

Fostering trust with transparency in the data economy era: an integrated ethical, legal, and knowledge engineering approach

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ABSTRACT

Why is it hard for online users to trust service providers when it comes to their personal data? Building trust in online services is particularly relevant as digital economy policy strategies, such as the EU Data Strategy, deposit a considerable amount of faith in the benefits of a data-driven society. To achieve this goal, transparency should be considered a necessary feature, on which trust can be built. The more information provided to data subjects, the less power asymmetry, caused by a lack of knowledge, between them and data controllers will exist. Technical developments, such as Solid personal datastores, provide a fertile ground for the negotiation of privacy terms between the involved parties. But to do so, it is necessary to have clear and transparent processing conditions. However, while certain specifications have been developed to accommodate for the representation of privacy terms, there is still a lack of developed solutions to address this problem. With this in mind, we propose the usage of the Privacy Paradigm ODRL Profile (PPOP), which extends ODRL, DPV and other specifications to specify data processing requirements for personal datastores envisaged as key core elements of the data economy. To demonstrate the usage of PPOP, a set of policy examples will be provided, as well as a prototype implementation of a generator of machine and human-readable PPOP policies.

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KEYWORDS

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1 INTRODUCTION

Digital economy policymaking is currently being placed at the forefront of the political agenda, particularly in the European Union with the launch of the EU Data Strategy [4]. Therefore, (re)building trust in online services is of particular interest for both digital services' providers and users to benefit from a data-driven society. These policy developments have pushed forward an agenda around the data economy and the reliance on readily available (personal) data for its sharing and (re-)use in an interoperable manner.

Technical developments, such as Solid, also accompany this agenda and provide a fertile ground for the management of data and machine-readable renderings of the privacy terms associated with a given data processing activity. While certain specifications, such as the Data Privacy Vocabulary¹ (DPV) or its GDPR extension² (DPV-GDPR), which have been developed to accommodate for the representation of privacy terms, or the Open Digital Rights Language³ (ODRL), which allows the expression of declarative rules over the usage of digital assets, there is a clear lack of recognized standards in this particular field. Specifically, considering the introduction of new types of entities in the data economy, such as

¹<https://w3id.org/dpv>

²<https://www.w3id.org/dpv/dpv-gdpr>

³<https://www.w3.org/TR/odrl-model/>, <https://www.w3.org/TR/odrl-vocab/>

the data trusts or data intermediaries put forward by novel regulation as the Data Governance Act (DGA).

As such, it is necessary to rethink how trust can be developed in an environment where privacy can be understood as a social construction that individuals can create as they negotiate their relationships with others. It is possible to pinpoint the importance that the EU Data Strategy has in this respect to empower individuals in the handling of their (personal) data. This policy document recognizes that ‘(...) there are calls to give individuals the tools and means to decide at a granular level what is done with their data (...)’ [4]. One example of these novel technologies are personal data stores as a form of personal information management systems (PIMS) [9].

However, complex data interactions between the data subject and many other stakeholders can put a considerable amount of pressure on the individual by overloading it with decisions. If automation of these decisions relying on a privacy preference profile is considered, then clear transparency over the data flows is necessary to allow these preferences to match with actual practices. As such, providing those machine-readable renderings to facilitate automation on both sides can contribute to the consolidation of a model that respects and safeguards fundamental rights. This is the result of the PROTECT project, in particular of its Work Package 1.⁴ As such, this contribution seeks to, relying on existing legal and ethical requirements, propose an ODRL profile capable of facilitating interactions between different entities upon transparent information on a certain data processing activity.

The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of existing work regarding legal, ethical and machine readable privacy policies, Section 3 describes the motivation, requirements and sources used in our approach, Section 4 introduces PPOP and gives details regarding its development and publication, Section 5 presents a case study where PPOP is used to define a access control policy, and Section 6 concludes the paper.

2 RELATED WORK

2.1 Legal and ethical privacy notices

The risk-based approach in the GDPR implies that data controllers must adopt relevant measures to prevent or, if not possible, mitigate any harm that data subjects might suffer because of a data processing activity [19, 29]. This means that each processing activity demands a tailored set of measures

decided after a thorough analysis of the situation. Authoritative bodies and legal literature have identified different types of measures [13]. Among these, information and transparency are one of the three types of safeguards that data controllers can adopt to mitigate or prevent harm.

While GDPR places a great deal of importance on transparency to the data subjects but despite this, it has come at the expense of lower ratios of data subjects actually reading them [22]. The typical privacy notice consists of a single document, usually located in an inconvenient location and relies heavily on complex and highly legal explanations [32]. In this regard, privacy notices are being used as a tool to comply with a legal requirement and not as a tool to allow data subjects to monitor how their data is used [23].

Certain supervisory authorities, such as the Agencia Española de Protección de Datos⁵ or the Information Commissioner’s Office⁶, have published different standard privacy notice templates that can be used in a wide range of online services. However, the use of standards and templates when it comes to privacy notices might not be ethically appropriate, at least because they do not support or enhance the agency of data subjects or users for each case. Templates are compliance-focused and allow organizations can get away with burying their activities in the fine print rather than help data subjects to actually understand what is happening with their data [30]. This limits data subjects’ freedom to explore and choose what happens to their data. As it shall be explored below, technical developments that allow for individual customization of data and privacy preferences are beginning to emerge and, therefore, should be preferred.

2.2 Machine-readable policies for privacy

Given this, it is possible to address the current state of the most relevant existing Semantic Web solutions for privacy-related machine-readable policy languages. The focus was placed on Semantic Web solutions since they promote interoperability and are based on open Web specifications. Recently, Esteves and Rodríguez-Doncel [18] published a review of 13 privacy-related policy languages and 9 data protection vocabularies that were analyzed in terms of their capacity to represent information described in GDPR’s rights and obligations and concluded that ODRL [20], LegalRuleML [24], DPV [26] and GDPRTEXT [25] are the most adequate solutions as they can be used to fulfill a greater number of representational needs brought on by GDPR.

Moreover, there is already a body of work that uses ODRL to represent policies related to the usage of personal data or in particular connected with the GDPR. Agarwal et al.

⁴The PROTECT project is a Marie Skłodowska-Curie ITN project funded by the European Commission with the purpose of raising up 14 early career researchers in the fields of computer science, ethics, and law so that they are able to tackle current and future issues in an interdisciplinary manner.

⁵<https://www.aepd.es/en/guides-and-tools/tools/facilita-rgpd>

⁶<https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/documents/2617435/privacy-template-v2.docx>

[11] provide an ODRL profile to model GDPR rights and obligations and support for the representation of information related to other legislations. De Vos et al. [16] perform automatic compliance checking using ASP rules that are based on an ODRL profile which models GDPR requirements. OAC [17] is an ODRL profile for the representation of GDPR-compliant access control policies, that can be applied for instance to the governance of access to personal data stored in Solid Pods, which uses DPV to invoke specific data protection terms.

However, through the analysis of these works, it can be concluded that there is still a gap in the representation of concepts related to privacy notices. According to the studies mentioned before, ODRL and DPV are perfect candidates to be extended for the requirements of this work as they have already been successfully used in this field of knowledge and the former is a W3C standard for the representation of policies. Furthermore, beyond maturity, DPV has the highest number of terms with taxonomies to categorize entities, personal data, purposes, processing operations, legal basis, technical and organizational measures and other contextual information, as well as specific extensions for GDPR, technology, jurisdiction and personal data categories.

3 MOTIVATION

3.1 Scope

For the development of the ODRL profile, the scope of this contribution is limited to European personal data-related regulations and ethical guidelines related to the transparency of Artificial Intelligence, given the role that automated decision making can have in the data economy but also the extensive work on building transparency technical solutions. Its main purpose is to support the specification of transparency measures in the context of data sharing activities and data-intensive flows between multiple data subjects, controllers and processors in decentralized data storage environments. This is particularly necessary as the European Commission has indicated that these technologies are still in their infancy and further development on them is necessary to harness their potential benefits [4].

3.2 Requirements

The following requirements were considered necessary for the development and specification of our ODRL profile:

- R1. Classify transparency practices of a PIMS
- R2. Define access control policies for legal and ethical access to group and individual personal data stores
- R3. Model safeguards for the trustworthiness of AI systems and respective rights and duties

To fulfill such requirements, a set of legal and ethical resources were comprehensively reviewed to provide terms to the defined ODRL profile, which can be used to enhance the transparency of policies specified with ODRL. Section 3.2.1 provides an overview of the used regulatory sources and section 3.2.2 of the main sources of ethical requirements. The work was further complemented by scholarly literature on the matter when gaps were identified; a complete list of those sources can be found in the profile documentation⁷.

3.2.1 Regulatory sources. As specified in Section 3.1, for this work the focus was put on the analysis of legal requirements from European legislation related to privacy and data protection. As such, in-force regulations and proposals of the European Commission were taken into account as well as existing case law and guidelines by the European Data Protection Board (EDPB). The sources used in this respect were the following: (i) GDPR[2], (ii) DGA [10], (iii) eIDAS 2 [7], (iv) DSA [6], (v) EDPB's guidelines on consent [12], (vi) Article 29 Working Party guidelines on transparency [27], and (vii) WhatsApp Ireland decision from the Irish data protection supervisory authority [15].

3.2.2 Ethical sources. A review of existing ethical guidelines related to the transparency of Artificial Intelligence was performed for the collection of requirements that our profile must fulfill. As such, the sources used in this respect were the following: (i) Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy AI [3], (ii) Understanding artificial intelligence ethics and safety [21], (iii) Recommendation of the Council on AI [8], (iv) First draft of the recommendation on the ethics of artificial intelligence [5], and (v) European Convention on Human Rights [1].

4 PRIVACY PARADIGM ODRL PROFILE

As discussed above, this work aims to provide open-source policy representation tools fit for the data sharing and platform economy that can contribute to providing transparency of these complex data flows by building bridges across the different gaps identified when reviewing the existing ethical and legal documents on the matter of this work. Besides this, a considerable gap was identified in the effective implementation of policies for a data-intensive sharing environment around personal data stores.

Therefore, we have developed an ODRL profile – the Privacy Paradigm ODRL Profile (PPOP) – which extends previous efforts, such as the OAC profile, to demonstrate concrete situations where this falls short on the representation of transparency measures and can be improved for instance in scenarios where data subjects store their data on personal data stores and want to trust in an intermediary to facilitate the sharing of their data with other entities.

⁷<https://w3id.org/ppop#references>

Besides incorporating in a functional manner both existing machine-readable standards to render privacy terms, such as DPV or DPV-GDPR, as well as creating new classes and properties to accommodate for recent regulatory and technical developments necessary for the data/platform economy, the development of the Privacy Paradigm model would not be complete without the generation of a human-readable template of privacy notices.

Due to the use of English as the main working language in the project, a template from a native English-speaking authority was selected as the basis for this work. While the Irish Data Protection Commissioner lacks such a template, the Information Commissioner's Office, the UK data protection supervisory authority, does have one that was produced before Brexit. Therefore, this work extends the UK template with the terms captured by the Privacy Paradigm, which is described in the PPOP ontology, to provide a more transparent notice of the personal data processing practices of organizations. The templates are available at <https://github.com/besteves4/ppop/tree/main/templates>.

4.1 Ontology development and evaluation

For the development of the profile, the LOT methodology [28] was followed and, to determine its extent, formal competency questions (CQ) were made using the methodology described by Suárez-Figueroa et al. [31]. The collected requirements are presented in an abbreviated Ontology Requirement Specification Document (ORSD), available at <https://w3id.org/ppop#orsd>.

Based on the related work and motivation described in Sections 2 and 3, it was concluded that there is a gap in the existing work, particularly when trying to approach this phenomenon of intensive data sharing flows in an interdisciplinary manner. In this context, ODRL can provide an already validated model to represent policies related to the use of data resources and, when aligned with DPV, it can be applied to define data sharing preferences aligned with data protection requirements. Therefore, these two vocabularies were used as the foundation of the PPOP ontology.

Once the requirements were specified and using the terms generated through the preparation of competency questions, the Chowik Visual Notation tool [14] was used to generate the first version of the ontology's diagram and RDF specification. After the generation of the first version of the ontology, the created terms were evaluated against a set of concrete data sharing scenarios⁸, derived from previous work conducted in the PROTECT project. From this evaluation, a new set of terms was added to the ontology and the ORSD, more

specifically the CQs, was updated accordingly. PPOP's applicability was also evaluated by modeling concrete example use cases (examples available in Section 5) and by using the Ontology Pitfall Scanner (OOPS!)⁹. As a final evaluation, a complete review of the terms, and their definitions, was performed by the legal and ethical experts present in this work and each term was connected with the relevant legal and ethical legislation, guidelines and other literature.

4.2 Ontology overview

The profile online documentation and RDF serializations can be found at <https://w3id.org/ppop>. Since a few regulatory sources, e.g., eIDAS 2 and DSA, are still proposals for regulation, and as such subject to change, PPOP's terms and requirements will need to be revised and updated at the time of publication of the final text of the mentioned regulations. Additionally, other relevant documents published by supervisory authorities, case law and other ethical guidelines or publications might be useful to update and improve the quality of the ontology. Table 1 contains a list of the main competency questions and respective derived concepts – a complete list of all considered CQs is available in the online documentation.

In Figure 1, the main concepts of the PPOP ontology are depicted. As mentioned before, PPOP reuses concepts from the ODRL Access Control (OAC) profile, mainly to represent information related to legal entities, personal data categories, processing activities and purposes for processing – these particular taxonomies include a very large collection of terms that stem from DPV. PPOP also extended DPV's technology, safeguard, processing context and rights concepts with new terms and introduces a taxonomy of organization duties.




Figure 1: Main concepts of the PPOP ontology



Regarding entities, PPOP included 8 new terms that extend DPV's Entity taxonomy, to reflect the new stakeholders

⁸The human and machine-readable renderings of the developed scenarios are described in detail at <https://w3id.org/ppop#examples>

⁹<https://oops.linkeddata.es/>

Table 1: CQs derived from regulatory and ethical sources and respective concepts

Competency Questions	Main concepts
What measures were taken into account to improve the transparency of an AI system?	Measure, TransparencyMeasure,
To what extent did you safeguard the trustworthiness of the system under harsh conditions?	SafeguardForTrustworthiness
How to ensure that the decisions of the system do not have discriminatory or inequitable impacts on the lives of the people they affect?	Right, GroupRight,
How to ensure that the users are able to make free and informed decisions while enforcing their rights?	DataSubjectRight,
Is there any applicable exemption to the legal obligations of a company regarding data subject rights?	OrganisationDuty,
Who are the new stakeholders involved in the data sharing economy?	RightExemption
Which technologies can be used to return control over data to the users?	Group, DataSharingEntity,
	DataTrustProvider
	Technology, PIMS

**Figure 2: PPOP's measure taxonomy****Figure 3: PPOP's measure taxonomy**

involved in personal data sharing activities, coming from the DGA, eIDAS 2 and DSA. These include terms to specify data intermediaries such as data sharing service providers and data altruism organizations, as well as data holder, data user and data trust entities. The concept of “Group” was also added to represent a collection of individuals who share a common purpose, for instance regarding the processing of their personal data. A complete definition of each term, and respective legal and ethical sources, is available at <https://w3id.org/ppop#x3-1-entities>. The “Technology” terms that were added to PPOP to model PIMS, such as personal data

stores and identity wallets,¹⁰ and their definition and respective legal source, are available at <https://w3id.org/ppop#x3-2-technologies>. These terms are particularly important to be able to specify the technology used in conjunction with the service provider and the location of the data.

In Figure 2, the developed PPOP measure taxonomy is presented. The term measure is defined as “Any action deployed by an entity involved in a data processing activity, due to the existence of a legal obligation, to guarantee and protect that the personal data involved shall not be affected in any way and, consequently, cause harm to the data subject” and is intended to be a superclass for DPV’s technical and organizational measures and to the transparency measure term which is also an addition brought by PPOP. In addition, the term “safeguard for trustworthiness” was added as a subclass of DPV’s safeguard term to specify subclasses of this term such as safeguards for explainability or safeguards for general safety. A complete definition of each new term, and respective legal and ethical sources, is available at <https://w3id.org/ppop#x3-3-measures>.

The new individual and group rights that were added to PPOP, and that extend DPV and DPV-GDPR’s Rights taxonomy are displayed in Figure 3. A collection of data subject’s rights exemptions, described in the GDPR, was also included in PPOP. A complete definition of each right and right exemption term, and respective legal and ethical sources, is available at <https://w3id.org/ppop#x3-4-rights> and at <https://w3id.org/ppop#x3-5-right-exemptions>. As for duties of organizations, also present in Figure 3, the terms explainability, traceability, auditability and accuracy were added to PPOP, which can be connected with the previously described safeguards to describe how they can be implemented organisation-wise. A definition of each duty, and

¹⁰These terms were suggested for inclusion in the DPV’s vocabularies and the PIMS and IdentityWallet terms were included in the DPV-TECH extension – <https://w3id.org/dpv/dpv-tech>.

respective legal and ethical sources, is available at <https://w3id.org/ppop#x3-6-duties>.

5 USING PPOP AS AN ACCESS CONTROL MECHANISM TO PIMS

In order to assess the ontology's expressiveness and for the purpose of demonstrating it in a practical concrete situation, a cohort of case studies was selected. By deploying the profile using the developed terms to model concrete use-case scenarios, it is possible to argue that these use cases serve as validation that the ontology requirements have been met. In this context, Section 5.1 discusses a use case where PPOP is used to draft an access control policy for family data stored on a personal data store. More examples are available in the profile documentation. In addition, a prototype implementation of a generator of machine and human-readable PPOP policies, based on the profile ontology and the privacy notice template, is available at <https://github.com/besteves4/ppop-gen>.

5.1 Family Pod use case

In this scenario, represented in Listing 1, a family, with two parents and two children, has created a policy to allow the use of their medical health data (represented as target data of the policy in `odrl:target oac:MedicalHealth`), that is stored on their family Pod, for the purpose of research and development (represented in the policy as the `ex:RD-purpose` constraint with `odrl:rightOperand dpv:ResearchAndDevelopment`) and to have a data-sharing service provider as a data intermediary. Since the data in the Pod can belong to any of the four members of the family, the assigner of the policy is a `ppop:Group` which is composed by both the parents and the children, where the parents are data holders and act as data holders for the children (represented in the policy with the property `ppop:isDataHolderFor`). The family also wishes to have a `ppop:DataSharingServiceProvider` to act as a data intermediary for the use of the data for the specified purposes.

6 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK

The Privacy Paradigm's main goal was to achieve the development of two elements, both technical and legal: the Privacy Paradigm ODRL Profile and the Privacy Paradigm notice template. These elements are intended for use in tandem in order to facilitate the communication of privacy preferences between data subjects and data controllers in the data/platform economy.

While the Privacy Paradigm constitutes a considerable improvement that has bridged in a practical manner existing gaps between the three different fields mentioned previously, there remains considerable work to be done beyond our current contribution. First and foremost, some of the regulatory proposals still need to be passed by the relevant European

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1 PREFIX dc: <http://purl.org/dc/terms/>
2 PREFIX odrl: <http://www.w3.org/ns/odrl/2/#>
3 PREFIX oac: <https://w3id.org/oac#>
4 PREFIX ppop: <https://w3id.org/ppop#>
5 PREFIX dpv: <https://w3id.org/dpv#>
6 PREFIX ex: <https://example.com/>
7
8 ex:family-pod a odrl:Policy ;
9   odrl:profile ppop:, oac: ; dc:issued "2022-02-22" ;
10  odrl:uid <https://pod-provider/familyA/policy1> ;
11  odrl:permission [
12    odrl:assigner ex:family-pool ;
13    odrl:assignee [ a ppop:DataSharingServiceProvider ;
14      odrl:target oac:MedicalHealth ;
15      odrl:action [
16        rdf:value oac:Use ;
17        odrl:refinement [ odrl:and (ex:RD-purpose, ex:tech) ] ] ] .
18  ex:RD-purpose a odrl:Constraint ;
19    odrl:leftOperand oac:Purpose ;
20    odrl:operator odrl:isA ;
21    odrl:rightOperand dpv:ResearchAndDevelopment .
22  ex:tech odrl:leftOperand ppop:Technology ;
23    odrl:operator odrl:isA ;
24    odrl:rightOperand ex:PersonalDataStore .
25  ex:PersonalDataStore a ppop:PersonalDataStore ;
26    dpv:hasStorage [ dpv:hasLocation <https://pod-provider/familyA/> ] .
27  ex:family-pool a ppop:Group ;
28    ppop:hasVoluntaryMembership ex:Parent1, ex:Parent2 ;
29    ppop:hasNonVoluntaryMembership ex:Child1, ex:Child2 .
30  ex:Parent1 a ppop:DataHolder, dpv:DataSubject ;
31    ppop:isDataHolderFor ex:Child1, ex:Child2, ex:Parent1 .
32  ex:Parent2 a ppop:DataHolder, dpv:DataSubject ;
33    ppop:isDataHolderFor ex:Child1, ex:Child2, ex:Parent2 .
34  ex:Child1 a dpv:Child .
35  ex:Child2 a dpv:Child .

```

Listing 1: Family sharing policy related to its health data.

bodies, which could have an impact on their current wording. Secondly, the technical landscape of PIMS technologies is ever-evolving and widespread adoption of them can present new challenges not identified by this work, which should also be monitored to adjust as necessary the proposed Privacy Paradigm ODRL Profile.

In terms of future work, the legal impact of upcoming regulations related to the creation of Common Data Spaces for the healthcare, financial and other industry sectors needs to be considered in order to have an ontology that supports group, collective and collaborative control of data sharing and reuse to enable trust and can also be used by data controllers to deliver 'fit-for-purpose' advice when making choices in the platform economy. The profile should also be evaluated in real case scenarios where people can define their personal data sharing preferences. PPOP's ethical research can also be extended to preserve group rights to privacy by mitigating privacy risks against groups caused by the processing of aggregated data and disclosure of information.

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