




Book of Abstracts



*International Conference
North Atlantic Security and Defense Strategy - (NASDS 2022)
19-20 May 2022 Military University Institute, Lisbon, Portugal*



MILITARY UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE (IUM)

Book of Abstracts
International Conference
North Atlantic Security and Defense Strategy
(NASDS 2022)

Coordinator: Marco Marsili, PhD (conference chair)

IUM - Research and Development Centre

May 2022

This publication contains the abstracts accepted for presentation, after a peer-review process, at the international conference *North Atlantic Security and Defense Strategy (NASDS 2022)*, held on May, 19-20, 2022 at the Military University Institute, Lisbon. The conference was organized by the IUM - Research and Development Center /General Staff of the Armed Forces (Portugal) in cooperation with the Institute of International and European Law of Reykjavík University (Iceland), and the Centre for Security Policy of the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies (Norway).

The conference gathered scholars, experts and practitioners, especially from Arctic countries, EU and NATO member states.

The conference aimed to broaden the debate on the security and defense in the North Atlantic and Arctic region, has the purpose to raise awareness on current pressing global challenges, and provide opportunities for researchers to share views that will enhance the future of the Euro-Atlantic and collective security.



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INTRODUCTION

This publication gathers the abstract selected for participation in the international conference *North Atlantic Security and Defense Strategy (NASDS)*. The book includes proposals submitted by scholars, practitioners, and experts from 15 countries: Portugal, Spain, Italy, India, United States, Romania, Poland, Iceland, Norway, Denmark, Greenland, Ukraine, Estonia, Hungary, and Brazil.

The conference is part of a larger research project that aims to investigate the issues related to the security and defense of maritime space and sea routes from the Arctic Ocean to the North Atlantic, including the control of search and rescue areas.

The North Atlantic area – including the Arctic Ocean – is the main security challenge where malign actors are expanding their role and are challenging the governance on maritime routes and economic exploitation of resources, coming also from the claims to extend continental shelves under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. The NASDS conference aims to scrutinize current and future challenges, also from the perspective of transatlantic cooperation, and to propose solutions to achieve security in this domain.

The proposals gathered in this volume, which will be extended in the form of full papers, to be published in a peer-review book with the conference proceedings. The proposals contain a high level of novelty able to broaden the debate on the topics of the conference, in a holistic, interdisciplinary approach, that includes theoretical frameworks and research methods from various sciences, e.g.: history, political science, military and security science, sociology, law, economy.

The conference chair wishes to thank the leadership and the staff of the IUM – Research and Development Center, as well as the Institute itself, for the invaluable support at every stage of the initiative, which received essential support through the EEA Grants.

Special thanks to our Norwegian and Icelandic partners, who have reserved a warm welcome during the study visit of our research team at their headquarters.

With this initiative, we hope to have laid the foundations for a sustainable partnership, with the aim of establishing a lasting collaboration and extending it to include other entities. We therefore hope that the following editions of the NASDS conference will be organized and hosted on a rotating basis among current and future partners.

Lisbon, Portugal, May 2022



*Marco Manuel Marsili Wick
Conference Chair and Bilateral Initiative Manager*

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*The abstracts are listed in order they were submitted and accepted.

THE ROLE OF INDIA AS AN OBSERVER STATE IN THE ARCTIC COUNCIL

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Having been included as an Observer State in the Arctic Council (AC) in 2013, and with its Draft Arctic Policy released in 2021, India is geared to demonstrate its scientific and technological prowess to reinforce the Arctic as a 'common heritage' to humanity. This is in line with its commitment to a 'rules-based' governance architecture in the region and to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

With its two research stations at the international Arctic research base at Svalbard, Norway, India has evinced responsible sharing of information and knowledge for the benefit of the humankind. Further, it has fostered enhanced bilateral ties with each of the eight states of the AC, namely, Canada, Kingdom of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, the Russian Federation, Sweden and the United States. Given the strategic significance of the pristine Arctic, India's sustainable engagement in the region is in accordance with the provisions [3 (a), (b) and (c)] of the Ottawa Declaration to participate in and contribute to the working of the AC.

Hence with the objective of India to ensure that no country emerges a formidable external power in the Arctic, this paper would focus on:

1. The role of the Observer States in general and that of India in particular in the AC.
2. The subtle and explicit implications of India's engagements in the Arctic affairs- for India and for the Arctic region.
3. Geopolitics of India's bilateral engagements with each Arctic country concerning the Arctic and
4. India's draft Arctic Policy with respect to China's Arctic Policy.
5. India's focus on the global commons and preservation of the livelihoods, cultures, traditions and identities of the Indigenous Peoples and of other communities.

STRATEGIC DYNAMICS OF CHINA-RUSSIA PARTNERSHIP IN ARTIC

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The closer strategic partnership between China and Russia since last one decade, mainly after Russia was subjected to Western sanctions in 2014, reflects a strategic shift in international politics. The initiation of cooperation between the two regarding the exploitation of Arctic resources and developing Polar Silk Road is just one dimension of their comprehensive partnership in the field of trade, energy, and many regional and global issues.

China proposed its 'Polar Silk Road' concept as an extension of BRI in 2018 White paper and reiterated the same in the 14th Five year Plan (2021-25) approved in 2021. China, an Observer State in the Arctic Council since 2013, has unilaterally termed itself as 'near Arctic state' to claim the benefits of Arctic.

But China knows that it cannot realize its arctic ambitions without the support of a major Arctic player like Russia. Russia also needs finance and technology to develop and exploit arctic resources and shipping routes. In view of their strained ties with the US and her allies this is a win-win situation for both. In recent years, both have initiated many cooperative measures in this regards: China purchasing 30 percent stakes in Russia's Yamal Arctic LNG project; regular consultation since 2015 through China-Russia Arctic Dialogue; agreement in 2015 for cooperation in the North Sea Route; pledge for cooperation in 2017 in Ice Sea Route; and setting of Sino-Russia Arctic Research Centre in 2019.

This Paper analyses the Sino-Russian Cooperation Arctic with both Neo-realist and Realist perspective to cover both the dynamics of structural factors (global Strategic order) and national divergence to seek the answer to the two fundamental questions: What are the drivers of their Arctic partnership? And what is future of this partnership?

THE MILITARIZATION OF THE ARCTIC REGION: DEMONSTRATION OF CAPACITIES OR A SECURITY DILEMMA?

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With the outbreak of the Cold War, the Far North and the Arctic proved their importance in terms of security - the region became scene of mutual deterrence between NATO and USSR, with a strong presence of submarines from both sides. After the Cold War its importance was reduced after Gorbachev's Murmansk Initiative that established a preference for cooperative governance. However, because of the thaw the region has, once again, seen its importance renewed due to the possibility of developing integrated land and sea transport networks, increase traffic, and the untapped resources available in the Arctic (around 25% of the world's oil and gas reserves). Hence, the strong commercial interest in the region, that include states outside of the Arctic, has made the governance and sovereignty of the region increasingly politicized and contested, which in turn creates new geopolitical challenges. Despite all interests in the Arctic, most parties have so far not challenged Russia's the facto control, supported by its regional military superiority and regulatory regime.

Hence, in this paper, it will be analyzed Russia's the facto control and its regional military superiority and if it is only a demonstration of capabilities or if it can create a security dilemma. Therefore, the paper will be divided in three parts: the first will analyze the Arctic and the claims by Arctic States to increase their continental shelves, the second part will scrutinize the actors and their motivations in pursuing a policy towards the Arctic, including actors such as the EUA, China, Singapore, etc., and the third part will be dedicated to Russia and the militarization of the Arctic, if this militarization constitutes a security dilemma and whether the geopolitical competition can have consequences for Euro-Atlantic security.

RUSSIAN STRATEGIC CULTURE AND DETERRENCE IN THE ARCTIC

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This paper seeks to expand the analytical toolkit of American and NATO deterrence practitioners that will allow them to unpack Russia's increasingly differing approaches to the "ways of war" in general, and to the Arctic, in particular. More specifically, by examining what explains Russia's ambitions and operations in the Arctic, we attempt to demonstrate the utility of analyzing the cultural drivers of Russia's strategic thought in the region when tailoring deterrence responses. In doing so, we highlight the flaw in Western deterrence analysis – the failure to acknowledge that Russian strategic deterrence concepts and understanding of the full spectrum of conflict have evolved differently, erasing the separation between peace and war activities, and merging nuclear and conventional domains with other non-military forms of influence such as economic, informational, and diplomatic. Moreover, we argue that Russian transformation of the Arctic strategic environment must be understood both through its siege mentality – the fear of external attack and internal political and economic collapse - and aspiration to regain great power status. Such an analysis also allows us to assess how these cultural traits relate to both contemporary Russian military and non-military operations that are quickly changing the narrative in the region.

RUSSIA INDIA IN THE ARCTIC

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While so much work has been done on non-Arctic states drive to gain influence in the region and/or internationalise the Arctic affairs, not much has been written on the potential effects of Arctic states own push for attracting foreign investment/partnering with non-Arctic states on internationalisation of the Arctic. As such, the overriding objective of this proposal is to unpack the extent to which Arctic states efforts at attracting foreign investment is motivated by a grander desire for strategic decoupling or diversification and how such efforts could internationalise the region and hence weaken the Arctic eight's insistence on limiting agenda setting to geographical proximity.

Indian-Russian cooperation in the Arctic will be used as the case study because a) very little work have been done on it and b) investigating their motives for cooperation in the Arctic enables the author to demonstrate/discuss the limits of Sino-Russo cooperation in the Arctic. To this end, the paper will consist of three sections.

Section one discusses Russia's motivation for working with India and highlights three major factors: eliminating over-dependence on China, weakening or slowing down fast warming ties between India and the US, and solidifying its already strong ties with India.

Section two sheds light on Indian motives for a stronger presence in the Arctic and singles out India's own rivalry with China and its concerns with the potentially negative effects of a strong Chinese presence in the Arctic on the prospect for its North South Corridor and energy security.

Section three evaluates the implications of the Indo-Russo cooperation in the Arctic and refutes the notion of an emerging alliance between China and Russia in the Arctic. It also elaborates the ways in which Arctic states opens to foreign capital is internationalising Arctic governance.

THE KINGDOM AT THE CROSSROADS? ORIGINS AND TRANSFORMATIONS OF STRATEGIC CULTURE WITHIN THE DANISH REALM

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For people working – academically, politically or practically – with Arctic security issues, it has become a common belief, and reference point for discussions, that the Arctic security environment is rapidly changing. The academic literature shows that while the discussions concerning Arctic security in the late 2010s sprang from the observation that climate change would strengthen accessibility and thus increase activity in the region, the assessments of the 2020s start from the observation that increased great power rivalry (to some extent driven by improved accessibility) and escalating military build-up across the region are posing new strategic challenges for the smaller Arctic states. These changing assessments demonstrate the importance of challenging and reassessing existing assumptions and analyses that are commonly taken for granted. There is therefore reason to investigate the extent to which strategic thinking and practice is indeed changing as well as the character and geographical variation of these (alleged) changes. As part of a planned special issue of the *Scandinavian Journal of Military Studies*, we ask in this paper if recent changes in political and military practices (such as Greenland speaking for the Kingdom of Denmark in the Arctic Council since June 2021) and the establishment of a Joint Arctic Command constitute a paradigm shift in Danish strategic positioning on the Arctic. We employ the concept of “strategic culture” to frame the discussion signalling both a concern with strategic thinking, norms and habits as well as well fundamental understandings of the nature of Arctic security. Our paper first outlines the origins of Danish strategic thinking in the North Atlantic and the Arctic in a Cold War perspective, then analyses the transformations of political and military practises from 2000 onwards, and then, finally, discusses the implications hereof for current strategic culture.

THE MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL COOPERATION SHOULD NOT BECOME A SLIPKNOT

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The progress of the Russian Federation in the conquest of new lands depends and has always depended on the technical support of developed countries. A retrospective analysis of Russia's conquest of the peoples of the North confirms this idea. The colonization of the Ural and Siberia began in the second half of the 16th century and was supported by the construction and settlement of cities and bases by military personnel. The established settlements became bases for military campaigns in the Polar Urals, Eastern and Western Siberia, and Central Asia.

Russia tried to advance to the West, but military defeats forced it to give up such plans. Lithuania, Sweden and Turkey successfully defended themselves. In addition, the mentioned states were also conquerors, attacking Moscovia. The Russian tsars turned their attention to the North, where there were no state formations that could give adequate resistance.

Everyone knows Ermak's military campaigns, a well-organized and equipped army that conquered the peoples of Siberia. The natural tax in the form of fur, whalebone, walrus tusks became like a currency to pay in Europe, including for purchasing weapons. Army of Moscovia used firearms (pistols, muskets, fuselages), and the indigenous peoples of Siberia had bows, spears, knives. The confrontation was unequal.

The next step was the Russia's colonization of the North in the 18th century. Military-scientific expeditions were carried out for the purpose of conquest. One of these expeditions was led by Vitus Jonasen Bering. A native of Denmark, who received an excellent naval education in the Netherlands, was recruited for military service in Russia. He discovered the sea strait between Asia and America, explored Kamchatka, the Pacific coast of Russia, the western shores of North America. He brought fame not to his homeland, he was called a great Russian navigator.

The colonization of the North in Soviet times was carried out with the help of European technical equipment. In 1924, Junkers-20 seaplanes were used to discover the ice situation and to provide sea crossings for transport vessels in the Arctic. In 1929, Junkers W-33 transport aircraft were used to service shipping in the Kara Sea.

In the second half of the 20th century, the Soviet Union actively built an icebreaker fleet and Norway sold the most developed icebreaker vessels at that time. To extract oil and gas in the North, the Soviet Union purchased drilling rigs in Japan and Norway.

The Russian Federation still needs new technologies for mining in the Arctic. These technologies can provide developed foreign states. Is the World ready to strengthen the role of the Russian Federation in the Arctic? It leads to an increase in its military presence. The West can raise a monster with its own hands. Then we should expect that Russia will dictate its own rules in the region.

THE MILITARIZATION OF THE ARCTIC REGION

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Arctic Ocean has untapped petroleum and gas in plenty. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has controlled a major portion of Northern Atlantic Area (GULF GAP). The North Atlantic is already an area of heightened tensions. The challenges for all involved is to prevent those tensions from spilling over into the relatively calm Arctic. Because GULF Gap controlled by NATO and western powers. Russia don't have much access of Atlantic Ocean. Arctic is generally covered with ice in winters. As a matter of convention, 'The Arctic' either refers to Canada, United States of America, Russia, Denmark, Norway. The Arctic Council consists of Canada, United States, Russia, Denmark, Norway + Iceland, Finland, Sweden. These eight Countries makes the Arctic Council. While NATO member States and Russia have significantly reduced the size of their navies, Russian deployment of new icebreakers and missiles and more over nuclear submarines and frigates to control the Arctic. Now from the Russian point of view, increasing militarization of the Arctic makes sense and is legitimate with several straits and passages becoming more accessible to Russian Fleet. Russia unveils recently the most far military base in the Arctic and allows foreign media to showcase its hegemonic stance in the militarization of Arctic. And Russia made videos and photographs public to built a narrative in the Russian public and stress on the western countries. The trouble for NATO is that militarization in the Arctic can become "a control race of Arctic". The Western countries and NATO also worried for the growing presence of China. China is interested in the Northern Sea route to sent its goods to Europe rather than the present sea route in which there is a fear of Malacca Strait.

AMBULATORY MARITIME LIMITS IN THE ARCTIC

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The extent of national jurisdiction over maritime zones in the Arctic is determined by reference to baselines along the coast and bilateral maritime boundaries (where they have been delimited). Baselines and derived outer limits are established through unilateral acts and are, consequently, subject to change in accordance with the applicable international law. Boundaries, delimiting overlapping maritime entitlements, are more stable because they are established through agreements or judicial decisions which are binding on states parties to such arrangements. Thus, the delimitation of bilateral maritime boundaries has a stabilizing effect on the extent of national jurisdiction over maritime areas. However, some areas remain un-delimited in the Arctic and jurisdictional lines in such areas fluctuate with changing coastlines. This creates a potential for disputes relating to the location of baselines, the legitimacy of ice-covered baselines, and the presence of provisional boundaries. Indeed, unresolved boundary disputes are a major threat to security in the Arctic and fluctuating baselines can escalate the problem.

This presentation will outline ongoing boundary disputes in the Arctic and explain how the theory of ambulatory baselines operates in the Arctic environment. According to this theory, baselines and derived maritime limits are subject to change worldwide as a result of sea level rise and it can even impact the location of provisional median-line boundaries in un-delimited areas. Moreover, there are special considerations in the Arctic relating to ice-covered coasts and difficulties in locating the low-water line along the coast. This has led to the drawing of baselines along the outer edge of sea-ice, which is particularly vulnerable to change as a result of global warming.

GLOBAL KNOWLEDGE WARFARE IN NORTHERN EUROPE

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The proposed paper focuses on potential strategic outcomes of psychological warfare in Northern Europe, in which Global Knowledge Warfare (GKW) will play a significant role, as both authors indicated in their papers and books. GKW is the purposeful use and management of knowledge in pursuit of a competitive advantage over opponents by influencing the minds and, ultimately, the behavior of the targeted groups and governments in foreign countries. The impact of GKW related to the Arctic on major international actors is growing due to an increasing economic and military competition for resources and geopolitical advantages in the region. Russia has obvious economic, scientific, and defense interests in the region, and President Putin urged greater efforts to secure Russia's strategic interests in the Arctic. Chinese strategic narratives identify China as a "Near-Arctic State" and a major stakeholder in the Arctic. Besides, Russia has several other increasing strategic interests in Northern Europe, especially in the context of the Nord Stream gas pipeline in the Baltic Sea, and Sweden's and Finland's potential NATO membership aspirations. Unstable political situations in Belarus or around Ukraine also increase further security concerns for neighboring NATO members.

In this paper, we are further exploring the method of strategic imagination for analysing the potential methods and consequences of GKW, which includes the widespread psychological warfare. Based on our testable assumptions and examples provided, the key methods of Global Knowledge Warfare related to Northern Europe and the Arctics will likely involve (1) the construction of new historical myths related to "historic justice"; (2) the revival of old historic and nationalistic narratives; (3) deliberate and systemic fabrication of news in where rational perceptions are hardly distinguishable from fakes and where obvious facts are disputed; (4) exaggeration of problems among Western allies, their governments, and experts.

SOUTH ATLANTIC STATES INTERESTS IN THE POTENTIAL ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF POLAR ROUTES

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Discussions about the relevance of the economical viable sea passages' routes through the Arctic, in general, focus their debates among the Arctic States (permanent members of the Arctic Council). Interests of third States began to be better monitored from some singular movements of other States willing to participate in this debate and in the decisions resulting from it, especially the interest of China and India - apparently with little polar relationship, including by their formal requests for membership as an observer on the Council. Recently, some South Atlantic States movements in the same direction is seen. Brazil, Argentina and even Strategic Arrangements such as the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) show a singular interest in following this debate. The present work begins by demonstrating diplomatic and economic signals from South Atlantic States participating in this debate. Next, it analyzes, based on primary and secondary sources from Global South States, the two main reasons of interest in this debate, namely: the possibility of migration of maritime routes that make it economically unfeasible to travel through Southern Africa and southern America; and, the eventual unfolding of the Polar Code, in the Antarctic region, in case of non-continuity of the singular situation of the Antarctic Treaty. It concludes that the impacts of eventual polar trade routes through the Arctic will also have significant consequences in the South Atlantic, and not only in the North Atlantic (where most of the observers of the Arctic Council are concentrated).

ARTIC STATES AND THEIR CONTINENTAL SHELF CLAIMS OUT OF ARTIC: SIGNALS OF SINGULAR POSITIONS

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The overlapping requests of extend continental shelves of the Arctic countries have been the subject of constant debate and the presentation of arguments. However, as most of them are States with vast territory and coastline, positions of these States in other distinct regions of the Arctic often allow a reading of a unilateral position that can influence this debate. Thus, the present work presents some State positions of relative expansion of power (understood in a comprehensive way) in other regions. Canada with its position in relation to its inland or archipelagic waters, Norway and Denmark with its positions in relation to Antarctica, Russia in relation to the islands off its coast near Japan and even Sweden, with potential expansion of war power in the region. Thus, starting from the mosaic of the eight Arctic states, the work concludes that there is a clear predisposition of power expansion, with some territorialism character underlying the UNCLOS and that, consequently, it may impact on the discussion about the Arctic continental shelf.

THE EXPLOITATION OF RESOURCES AROUND NORWAY'S SVALBARD ARCHIPELAGO

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The presentation will focus on the issue of the exploitation of resources around Norway's Svalbard archipelago, specifically snow crabs and Arctic cod. This shall include an historical survey of the region, particularly European exploration and competition that occurred there in the past with regards to whaling and claims of sovereignty and the general status of Svalbard regarding various European powers, including the Svalbard Treaty which attempted to solve the legal status of the archipelago. In more recent times Svalbard has once again become a source of contention and competition, specifically between the European Union and Norway as a result of the issue of the right to fish for snow crabs and lately the matter of the allocation of quotas for the fishing of Arctic cod that came about due to the United Kingdom's having ceased to be a Member State of the European Union. As a result, both sides have utilized various arguments and strategies in an attempt to bolster their position. These issues shall be surveyed and analysed during the course of the presentation. The tensions that have arisen with regards to Arctic cod fishing around Svalbard between the European Union and Norway have been dubbed by some as being a new kind of "cod war", which naturally brings to mind the Icelandic Cod Wars that occurred between 1958 and 1976, involving Iceland and the United Kingdom, as well as certain other actors. The presentation shall include an overview of these Icelandic Cod Wars, including what relevance or comparisons may be drawn between them and the present EU-Norway tensions regarding the fishing of Arctic cod around Svalbard. The presentation in general will incorporate historical, legal and geopolitical perspectives in order to provide a holistic approach and understanding of this complex and increasingly important issue within the broader Arctic Circle region.

ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF THE EXISTENCE OF SEVERAL PLAYERS IN THE ARCTIC: FROM COMPETITION TO COOPERATION

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In order to cover all relevant aspects a holistic approach is considered. In particular, this paper proposal states that not only economic factors would be taken into account but also legal, geopolitical and historical considerations would be factored in. Consequently, the methodological approach is based on the interdisciplinary review of the existing setup as well as potential legal and economic implications for future competition and/or cooperation in the Arctic region.

The outline of the paper proposal is composed of three main sections, apart from the introduction and concluding remarks.

Section 1 would set the scene by describing the boundaries of the Arctic region and the existing legal framework as well as the cooperation fora.

Section 2 would elaborate on the economic aspects by focusing on four main economic sectors:

- Energy: covering oil and gas as well as renewable energies;
- Fisheries: based on the Central Arctic Ocean Fisheries Agreement and beyond;
- Transport: tackling mostly maritime transport (port control, shipping rules, etc.);
- Raw materials: elaborating on both mining and minerals distribution.

Section 3 would study the cooperation between the EU and the non-EU European Arctic jurisdictions, with a special focus on Greenland, Iceland and Norway, as well as the cooperation and/or competition with the Russian and Chinese alliance (e.g. the Arctic Council, the Barents Euro-Arctic Council, the Nordic Council, the Northern Dimension, etc.).

THE RUSSIAN AND NATO'S MILITARY BUILD-UP IN THE ARCTIC REGION: LEGAL AND SECURITY CHALLENGES

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Over the last decade, the Russian government has steadily increased its military presence in the Arctic region also through series of reforms of its Arctic Policy over the last few years. Though military presence in the Arctic is not a novelty from both NATO and Russia, it is undeniable that, over the past few years, there has been a greater emphasis on the deployment of specialized troops, equipment and weapon systems, as well as the construction of new bases and the re-commissioning of older one. This is especially the case for Russia and the US, which have recently mirrored each other in the deployment of military personnel and equipment in their respective Arctic spheres of influence (respectively the lands facing the so called Russian Northern Passage, and those facing the American-Canadian Northwest Passage). With the continuous thawing of the Arctic ice-sheets caused by global warming, these spheres of influence are becoming increasingly overlapped. At the same time, the melting of the ice sheets, while paving the way for the discovery and potential exploitation of new gas and oil reserves, it will also inevitably open up new uncertainties and challenges. This article seeks to explore and understand the level of current military build-up from both sides in the region, and their respective Arctic strategies, as well as the outlining the challenges posed by a "less icy" Arctic Ocean, which will have both legal as well as military consequences.

THE ICELANDIC NUCLEAR WEAPON FREE ZONE FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

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The unilateral establishment of an Icelandic nuclear weapon free zone is a classic foreign policy subject in Icelandic politics connected to the presence of the US military in Iceland (from WWII until 2006) and Iceland's NATO membership. For more than 40 years the topic has regularly appeared before the Icelandic parliament, either as parliamentary resolutions or bills. It was one of the foreign policy goals of the left green social democrat coalition that was in power 2009 to 2013 and is now part of the 2016 parliamentary resolution on National Security Policy which states that it shall be ensured "that Iceland and its territorial waters are declared free from nuclear weapons, subject to Iceland's international commitments, with the aim of promoting disarmament and peace on Iceland's part".

Given that Iceland is a founding partner of NATO, which remains a nuclear alliance, one could see problems with this emphasis in Iceland's National Security Policy. As is clearly pointed out in the National Security Policy, the Icelandic Nuclear Weapon Free Zones is supposed to be subject to Iceland's international commitments. The international commitment that are of relevance in this context can be divided into two categories. On one hand, classic questions concerning territory and maritime jurisdiction. On the other hand, Iceland's obligations as a NATO member state. In my presentation these questions will be addressed as well as the long history of attempts to declare Iceland a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone.

THE NECESSITY OF THE PROCESS OF MODERNIZATION THE HUMAN RESOURCES FROM THE MILITARY SYSTEM

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The militarization of the Arctic region depends of a series of different factors and implies a lot of changes and transformations of different structures. The human resources field has an important role in the process of militarization and it's necessary that human resources from the military system to adapt to all the transformations which are taking places. In the last years, the Romanian military system had to upgrade, to adapt and to transform all the structures which are implied in ensuring national security. Those transformations implied the necessity of modernization of human resources from the military system because militaries have new responsibilities, they have to apply different procedures and in most of the cases the way of working has changed. Romania seems to be the NATO center of gravity in the Black Sea region and in this context one of the main objectives of Romania should be to modernize its military capabilities in order to ensure security in the Region and to take part with success in NATO operation in the Black Sea Region. In order to adapt to all those changes, employees have to modernize and commanders are those who support them in this process of modernization.

Taking into consideration the last events from the Arctic region and the risks increased in the region, NATO should take into consideration the modernization of the Arctic region military system, especially from the point of view of human resources because it's important to increase security in the Arctic by deploying military resources in the region. The deployment of military resources implies also a very good organization of the military system, establishing clear procedures. Human resources are the first implied in the process of militarization and modernization and it might be interesting to do a research about what implies the modernization of the human resources from the military system from Romania and what implies the modernization of the human resources of the military system of the Arctic region.

THE MILITARIZATION OF THE ARCTIC: A THREAT OF ARMED CONFLICT?

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In recent years, there has been an observable increase in the militarization of the Arctic due to a number of factors - territorial claims made by Denmark, Iceland, Canada, and Russia; the US and UK promoting the maintenance of freedom of navigation in this region because of its growing importance for world trade and the energy security; and Russia securing economic benefits from the exploitation of natural resources in the region.

Currently, the Arctic militarization process is reinforced mostly by Russia's policy of intrusions into the airspace of Arctic states, which is thus testing the reactions of NATO countries. Additionally, strategic challenges for the Arctic states are posed by the systematic growth in China's activity pushing the construction of the 'Polar Silk Road' through the region.

The aim of this article is to analyze the militarization of the Arctic taking into consideration; (i) interests of Arctic states and China in the region; (ii) measures and forms of military activities enabling potential operations - defensive or offensive; (iii) tensions between the Arctic states, as well as their relations with China, and (iv) communication channels for dialogue. The research seeks to answer the following question: does the current militarization of the Arctic threaten an outbreak of armed conflict?

ABOUT THE COORDINATOR AND CONFERENCE CHAIR

Marco Manuel Marsili Wick is graduated in Political Science and International Relations and in Institutional communication, both cum laude. He holds a PhD in History, Security Studies and Defense, and two advanced post-graduate diploma degrees: History, Security Studies and Defense; Political Science and International Relations: Security and Defense. He holds research positions in civilian and military institutions: Research Centre of the Institute for Political Studies of the Catholic University of Portugal (CIEP-UCP), Center for International Studies of the ISCTE-University Institute of Lisbon (CEI-IUL), IUM – Research and Development Center (CIDIUM), Centre for Strategic Research and Analysis (CESRAN). Dr. Marsili carries on his research in the broad area of international relations, security and defense, with a specific focus on international law, international humanitarian law, fundamental human rights, terrorism, counter-terrorism, hybrid warfare and unconventional conflicts. He has a NATO and EU security clearance. Recently, Dr Marsili was engaged as a cyber defense and cyber security expert in two studies commissioned by the European Defence Agency and in a cyber defense platform for real-time threat hunting, incident response and information sharing financed by the European Commission within the first European Defense Industrial Development Programme. He is also the principal investigator of the North Atlantic Security and Defense (NASDS) project supported by the Fund for Bilateral Relations/EEA Grants and chair of the homonymous conference. He is the recipient of international grants, fellowships, prizes and awards, among which stands up the Seal of Excellence of the European Commission in 2021. Dr. Marsili is a reviewer and article editor for international scientific publishers and journals. He participates and attends many international conferences and workshops; he chairs panels and is also member of scientific and organizing committees. Dr. Marsili held also corporate positions and served as a public official and election observer for the OSCE/ODIHR. He is an outstanding member of the International Society of Military Sciences (ISMS), the International Political Science Association (IPSA), the affiliated Portuguese Political Science Association (APCP), of the European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR), and of the European Sociological Association (ESA).

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