Dear Colleagues:
I am sending you a copy of Ged Davis' IPCC-SRES Zero Order Draft on
storylines and scenarios.  The text is appended below, but I am also
attaching versions in MS Word and in Rich Text formats so that you can
better view the graphics.
Please send any comments directly to Ged Davis at
Ged.R.Davis@si.simis.co
Regards,
Anne Johnson
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Zero Order Draft
IS99
Storylines and Scenarios
February, 1998
Ged Davis et al
For Comment Only
Draft Paper for the IPCC Special Report on Emissions Scenarios
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Contents
1. Introduction
2. Scenarios - overview
3. Golden Economic Age (A1)
4. Sustainable Development (B1)
5. Divided World (A2)
6. Regional Stewardship (B2)
7. Scenario comparisons
8. Conclusions
Appendix 1: Scenario quantification
1. Introduction
The IS99 scenarios have been constructed to explore future developments in
the global environment with special reference to the production of GHGs.
These scenarios are being developed in three phases:
- Phase 1: the Special Report on Emissions Scenarios (SRES) team is
preparing a set of scenarios for wide public discussion, which is the
subject of this note,
- Phase 2: the scenarios will be placed on the World Wide Web, subject to
public scrutiny, and suggestions for relevant modification of the scenarios
will be sought,
- Phase 3: the scenarios will be finalised for peer review, incorporating
suggestions received during the public review, by April 1999.
Phase 1 centred on a facilitated open process for Lead Authors at workshops
in Paris, Vienna and Utrecht.  The scenarios developed allow for a broad
range of GHG emissions and provide a basis for reflection on policy.
1.1	What are scenarios?
Scenarios are pertinent, plausible, alternative futures.  Their pertinence,
in this case, is derived from the need for climate change modelers to have
a basis for assessing the implications of future possible paths for
Greenhouse Gas Emissions (GHGs).  Their plausibility is tested by peer
review, in an open process, which includes their publication on the World
Wide Web.
There are clearly an infinite number of possible alternative futures to
explore.  We have consciously applied the principle of Occam's Razor ,
seeking the minimum number of scenarios to provide an adequate basis for
climate modelling and challenge to policy makers.  The alternative futures
constructed are not, and cannot be, value free since like any work they
self-evidently reflect the team's view of the possible.  The scenarios
should not be construed as being desirable or undesirable in their own
right and have been built as descriptions of possible, rather than
preferred, developments.  There can be no objective assessment of the
probability of the scenarios, although in the prevailing zeitgeist  some
will appear to individuals to be more likely than others.  Scenarios are
built to clarify ignorance rather than present knowledge -- the one thing
we can be sure of is that the future will be very different from any of
those we describe!
2. Scenarios - overview
2.1	Scenarios: key questions and dimensions
Developing scenarios for a period of one hundred years is a relatively new
field.  Within that period we might expect two major technological
discontinuities, a major shift in societal values and a change in the
balance of geopolitical power.  A particular difficulty is that people are
not trained to think in these time-spans, are educated in narrow
disciplines and our ability to model large-systems, at the global level, is
still in its infancy.  Additionally, most databases do not go back much
further than 50 years and many less than that.  How best to integrate
demography, politico-economic, societal and technological knowledge with
our understanding of ecological systems?  Scenarios can be used as an
integration tool, allowing an equal role for intuition, analysis and
synthesis.
Terminology
Storylines, Scenarios and Scenario Families
Storyline: a narrative description of a scenario (or a family of
scenarios), highlighting the main scenario characteristics, relationships
between key driving forces and the dynamics of the scenarios.
Scenario: projections of a potential future, based on a clear logic and a
quantified storyline.
Scenario family: one or more scenarios which have the same demographic,
politico-societal, economic and technological storyline.
Scenario Classification
Our approach has been to develop a set of four "scenario families".  The
storylines of each of these scenario families describes a demographic,
politico-economic, societal and technological future.  Within each family
one or more scenarios explore global energy industry and other developments
and their implications for Greenhouse Gas Emissions and other pollutants.
These are a starting point for climate impact modelling.
The scenarios we have built explore two main questions for the 21st
century, neither of which we know the answer to:
- Can adequate governance -- institutions and agreements -- be put in place
to manage global problems?
- Will society's values focus more on enhancing material wealth or be more
broadly balanced, incorporating environmental health and social well-being.
The way we answer these questions leads to four families of scenarios:
- Golden Economic Age (A1): a century of expanded economic prosperity with
the emergence of global governance
- Sustainable Development (B1): in which global agreements and
institutions, underpinned by a value shift, encourages the integration of
ecological and economic goals
- Divided World (A2): difficulty in resolving global issues leads to a
world of autarkic regions
- Regional Stewardship (B2): in the face of weak global governance there is
a focus on managing regional/local ecological and equity
Within these scenario families we examine plausible energy industry and
other developments which will contribute to GHG emissions.  Although the
storylines cannot have explicit climate change policy measures in them
there are examples of indirect mitigation measures in some of the scenarios.
The scenario quantifications of the main indicators related to growth of
population and economy, the characteristics of the energy system and the
associated greenhouse gas emissions all fall within the range of prior
studies .
3.	Golden Economic Age (A1)
This scenario family entitled "Golden Economic Age", describes rapid and
successful economic development.  The primary drivers for economic growth
and development "catch up" are the strong human desire for prosperity, high
human capital (education), innovation, technology diffusion, and free trade.
The logic of successful development assumes smooth growth with no major
political discontinuities or catastrophic events.  The scenario family's
development model is based on the most successful historical examples of
economic growth, i.e., on the development path of the now affluent OECD
economies.  Historical analogies of successful economic "catching up" can
be found in the Scandinavian countries, Austria, Japan, and South Korea.
"Intangible" assets (human capital, stable political climate) take
precedence over "tangible" assets (capital, resource, and technology
availability) in providing the conditions for a take-off into accelerated
rates of development.  Once these conditions are met, free trade enables
each region to access knowledge, technology, and capital to best deploy its
respective comparative economic and human resource advantages.
Institutional frameworks are able to successfully sustain economic growth
and also to handle the inevitable volatility that rapid economic growth
entails.
The "intangible" prerequisites for accelerated rates of economic growth
also offer long-term development perspectives for regions that are poorly
endowed with resources or where current economic prospects are not
auspicious, such as Sub-Saharan Africa.  There, for instance, fostered
regional trade and capital availability enhance the pull-effects of a
strong South African economy.  In other regions, growth may be fuelled by
domestic know-how and high human capital valued at the international
market.  An example of this is the thriving software industry of the Indian
subcontinent.  In yet other regions, growth could be stimulated by the
expansion of regional economic partnerships and free trade arrangements
(e.g., extensions of NAFTA and the European Union).
The main difference with the historical OECD experience is a certain
acceleration in time and space, (i.e., "leapfrogging") made possible by
better access to knowledge and technology, a consequence of the high-tech
and free trade characteristics of development.  Successful catching up
becomes pervasive; all parts of the "developing world" participate, though
with differences in timing.  The final outcome is that practically all
parts of the world achieve high levels of affluence by the end of the 21st
century, even if disparities will not have disappeared entirely.  The
current distinction between "developed" and "developing" countries will in
any case no longer be appropriate.
As in the past, high growth (a "growing cake") eases distributional
conflicts.  Everyone reaps the benefits of rapid growth, rising incomes,
improved access to services, and rising standards of living.  The economic
imperatives of markets, free trade, and technology diffusion (i.e.,
competition) that underlie the high growth rates provide for efficient
allocation of resources.  Efficiency and high productivity are the positive
by-products of the highly competitive nature of the economy.  They also
provide the economic resources for distributive and social measures
required for a stable social and political climate, vital for sustaining
high growth rates in human capital, productivity, innovation, and hence
economic growth.
The economic development focus explains its central metric: the degree of
economic development as reflected in per capita income levels (GDP at
market exchange rates as well as at purchasing power parity rates).  The
principal driver is the desire for prosperity, all major driving forces are
closely linked to prosperity levels, with actual causality links going in
both directions.  For example, demographic variables co-evolve with
prosperity: mortality declines (i.e. life expectancy increases) as a
function of higher incomes (better diets and affordable medical treatment).
In turn, changes in the social values underlying the fertility transition
also pave the way for greater access to education, modernisation of
economic structures, and market orientation.  These are key for innovating
and diffusing the best practice technologies underlying the high
productivity, and hence economic growth, of the scenario.
3.1	Key Scenario Drivers and their Relationships
3.11	 Population and Economic Development
High education, stable social relations, and incentives for innovation and
experimentation are the preconditions for productivity increases underlying
rapid economic development in this world-- as a result, social, economic,
and demographic development are highly correlated .
The link between demographic and economic variables in the scenario
corresponds to present empirical observations: the affluent live long and
have few children.  High per capita incomes are thus associated with both
low mortality and low fertility. Together, this results in rather low
population growth, characterised in addition by a considerable "greying" of
the population.
This family of scenarios combines high life expectancy with low fertility,
where OECD rates are assumed to stabilize at current (below replacement)
levels, and developing countries follow a similar transition by the
mid-21st century.  Fertility rates range between 1.3 to 1.7 children per
woman.  Life expectancy can approach some 95 years, with a regional
variation between 80 and 95 years.  Global population grows to some 9
billion by 2050, and declines to 7 billion by 2100, the result of continued
below replacement fertility in all regions.
Population ageing results in economic growth rates somewhat lower than
historical experience, especially in the OECD countries.  Economic growth
rates slow over time in proportion to the reduction of the potentially
economic active population (age 15 to 65), which decline in some regions to
50 percent compared to the historical average of approximately 70 percent.
For "developing countries", economic growth is based on the most successful
cases of economic "catch up" found in history.  The economic growth profile
of Japan after WW II served as a model to delineate the upper bounds of
possible GDP growth for all regions.  Consistent with growth theory, GDP
expansion initially accelerates, passes through a peak, in which growth
rates around 10 percent per year can be sustained for several decades, and
then declines.  Once the economic and industrial base is firmly established
and the economy matures, growth rates decline with increasing income
levels.  This reflects saturation effects and a higher emphasis on quality
rather than quantity at high income levels.
The global economy in the "Golden Economic Age" expands at an average
annual rate of three percent per year to 2100.  This is about the same rate
as the global average since 1850 and in this respect may simply be
considered "dynamics as usual".  Non-Annex-I economies expand with an
average annual growth rate of four percent per year, twice the rate of
Annex-I economies.  By approximately 2030 Non-Annex-I GDP surpasses that of
the Annex-I economies.  Per capita income disparities are reduced, but
differences between regions are not entirely eliminated.  Non-Annex-I per
capita income reaches the 1990 Annex-I level (14,000 $/capita) by around
2040.  By 2100 per capita income would approach 100,000 $/capita in Annex-I
countries and 70,000 $/capita in Non-Annex-I countries.
3.12	Equity
Equity issues are not a major concern in the world, but is rather a
by-product of the high rates of economic development.  Existing per capita
income gaps between regions close up in a similar way as between Western
Europe and Japan compared to the US in the 20th century. Disparities
continue to persist between regions, but more so within particular regions.
Nevertheless, the high economic growth rates require a certain degree of
income distribution.  Extreme income disparities are found to be negative
influencing factors for economic growth.  Additionally, fair income
distribution only assures the large consumer markets and the social
cohesion and stability required for the realisation of high economic growth.
3.13	Settlement patterns/communication
Communication technologies and styles are highly homogeneous and extremely
developed -- rather than a "global village" future, this is one of "global
cities."  Existing trends towards urbanisation continue, as cities provide
the highest "network externalities" for the educational and R&D-intensive
economic development pattern underlying the scenario.  Regional differences
in settlement patterns persist.  They range from fragmented, compact, but
large (i.e., 20+ million inhabitants) cities that depopulate their
respective rural hinterlands in Latin America to urban "corridors"
connected by high capacity communication and transport networks (in Asia).
Regional transport networks include high speed trains and maglevs, which
ultimately fuse short- and long-distance transport means into single
interconnected infrastructures.  In some parts of the world high-tech cars
take the place that high-tech trains occupy in other parts.
The large urban agglomerates and the high transport demands of a high
material growth economy generate vast congestion constraints.  These are
solved by applying market-based instruments (prices) rather than
regulation.  Economic instruments include access and parking fees,
auctioning off the limited number of new car and truck licenses in
megacities, much along the lines of the current stringent Singapore model.
Therefore, even at very high income levels, car ownership rates could be
comparatively low in parts of the world.  In extremely densely populated
areas, cars remain a luxury rather than a means of mass transport (viz.
Hong Kong).  In areas with lower population density, car densities are high
(+1 car per inhabitant).  Car fuels could be either oil, synfuels,
electricity, or hydrogen.  Intercontinental transport is provided by
energy- and GHG-intensive hypersonic aircraft fuelled by methane or
hydrogen.  They are the physical transport equivalent of the high capacity
virtual communication links of a truly global economy.
3.14	Environmental Concerns/Ecological resilience
Ecological resilience is assumed to be high.  In and of themselves,
ecological concerns receive a low priority.  Instead, the valuation of
environmental amenities is strictly in economic terms, e.g., a function of
affluence.  Non-congestion, clean water and air, and recreational
possibilities in nature all assume increasing importance with rising
affluence, although preferences for environmental amenities may differ
across regions and income levels.  For instance, urban air quality and
human health are valued highly even at income levels lower than those
prevailing in England, where stringent air quality measures were introduced
after the "killer smog" of 1952.  Reduced particulate and sulphur air
pollution become a matter of major consumer preference at levels of $2,000
- 3,000/capita income in Asia.  Altogether, the concept of environmental
quality changes from "conservation" of nature to active "management" --and
marketing-- of natural and environmental amenities and services.
3.2	Scenarios
The core bifurcation (with respect to GHG emissions) of the scenario family
unfolds around alternative paths of technology development in the
agriculture and energy sectors.  In the energy sector, the central question
is how to manage the transition away from the current reliance on
conventional oil and gas.  In the agricultural sector, the key issue
concerns land productivity.
Alternative technology bifurcations lead to a number of scenarios embedded
and consistent within the overall theme of "prosperity via high
techologies".  All scenarios provide the high quantities of clean and
convenient energy forms and diverse, high quality food demanded in an
affluent world.  Because technological change is cumulative, it can go in
alternative, mutually exclusive directions, i.e., changes become "path
dependent".  Alternative directions unfold around the interrelated cluster
of variables of resource availability and conversion technologies in both
energy and agriculture.  For instance, new technologies may enable humanity
to tap either the vast quantities of fossil resources existing in the form
of coal, unconventional oil, and gas with technologies that are both highly
economic, efficient, and clean in terms of traditional pollutants, such as
particulates or sulphur.  Alternatively, technological change could unfold
favouring non-fossil technologies and resources, such as nuclear and
renewables.
A similar bifurcation unfolds in the agricultural sector.  In one
sub-scenario, only incremental improvements are achieved in farming
practices and land productivity.  This is combined with a gradual global
diffusion of meat-based diets.  Both of these trends are land- (and
deforestation-) intensive.  Alternatively, global agriculture could move in
the direction of genetically engineered, high productivity crops and
"sea-farming," combined with a quality- and health-oriented diet based on
fish and vegetables, both of which are relatively less land intensive.  As
a result, GHG emissions range widely even for otherwise similar scenario
characteristics.
3.21	Energy Resources/Technology
Resource availability and technology are tightly interrelated.  The "Golden
Economic Age" of high productivity growth results from substantial
technological innovation.  Both contribute to economic growth, expansion of
accessible resources, and improved efficiency in resource use.  Factor
productivity improvements occur across the board for agricultural land,
materials, and energy.  Improvement rates largely follow long-term
historical trends and are entirely technology- and income- driven.  Energy
intensity (total commercial and traditional primary energy use per unit of
GDP) improves at an aggregate global rate of 1.5 percent per year.
Improvement rates vary across regions as a function of distance from the
productivity frontier and the turnover rates of capital stock.  Ceteris
paribus, improvement rates are higher in regions with currently lower
efficiency and greater than average GDP growth.  This assumes no particular
policy intervention or additional price regulation apart from the ones
consistent with a free market environment (i.e. price subsidies are
removed, and full costing principles are established).
Per capita final energy use gradually converges as income gaps close.
Final energy use per capita in non-Annex-I countries would reach
approximately 85 GJ (2 tons of oil equivalent) by 2050 and approximately
125 GJ (3 toe) by 2100, i.e., about the current average of OECD countries
outside North America.  Despite improvements in productivity and
efficiency, the high income levels lead to resource use close to the upper
bounds of the scenarios available in the literature.  For instance, global
final energy use would increase to approximately 1000 EJ by 2100.
The scenarios developed are a function of the different directions taken by
technological change.  The key question is which primary resources may
become economically accessible in the future, and which technologies will
become available to convert these primary resources into the final goods
and services demanded by consumers.  In the energy area,
resources/technologies are key variables in determining the timing and
nature of the transition away from currently dominant conventional oil and
gas.
Four pathways are possible:
1. Progress across all resources and technologies.
2. "Clean coal" technologies: environmentally friendly except for GHG
emissions and possible resource extraction impacts.
3. "Oil/Gas": smooth transition from conventional to unconventional oil and
gas, tapping the vast occurrences of unconventional fossil fuels, including
methane clathrates.
4. "Bio-Nuclear": rapid technological progress in non-fossil supply and
end-use technologies, e.g. renewables, such as solar and biomass
combustion, nuclear and hydrogen-fuelled end-use devices, such as fuel cells.
For the scenario quantification, a number of contrasting cases,
characterised by the main energy form used in the second half of the 21st
century, have been evaluated with the aid of formal energy models:
1. The dominance of Non-Fossil fuels -- the "Bio-Nuclear" scenario (A1R).
2. The dominance of unconventional gas, including hydrates, and oil (A1G)
3. The dominance of "Clean Coal" (A1C)
A brief scenario taxonomy is given below.
Scenario
Dominant
Oil/Gas Resource
Technology Improvements
Fuel	Availability	Coal	Oil/Gas	Non-fossil
A1R 	Non-fossil	Medium (
75 ZJ)	Low	High	Low
A1C	 Coal	Low (<35 ZJ)	High	Low	Low
*
Depending on the assumed availability of oil and gas, (low/medium/high) and
corresponding improvements in production and conversion technologies for
coal, oil/gas, and non-fossil technologies, different energy systems
structures unfold. For instance, in the dynamic technology cases, liquid
fuels from coal or unconventional oil/gas resources would become available
at less than $30  /barrel, with costs falling further by about one percent
per year with exploitation of learning curve effects.  Non-fossil
electricity (photovoltaics, new nuclear) would become available at costs of
less than 10 mills/kWh ($.01/kWh) and continue to improve further as a
result of learning curve effects.  The basic premise of the "dynamic
technology" scenarios is that energy services could be delivered at
long-run costs not higher than today, but with technologies having
radically different characteristics, including environmental.  In the event
that such technology dynamics do not materialise, energy costs and prices
would be significantly higher than suggested above -- illustrative model
runs suggest energy demand would be up to 20 percent lower for a fossil
scenario without significant cost improvements .
3.22	Agriculture
In the agricultural sector, two contrasting scenarios of land productivity
could unfold, depending on the nature of advances in agricultural
technologies.  However, CO2 emissions from land use changes could range
from 0.5 (low) to 1.5 (high) GtC by 2030 and  from -1 to -2 (low) to zero
(high) GtC emissions by 2100.  In the latter case tropical forests
essentially become depleted as a result of land-use conversions for
agriculture and biomass fuel plantations.  In the former case, land
productivity gains are so substantial that ploughing of marginal
agricultural land is no longer economically feasible and is abandoned,
following recent trends in the OECD.  The resulting expansion of forest
cover leads to a net sequestration of atmospheric CO2.
3.23	Scenario Quantification
An initial scenario quantification in terms of population, GDP, energy use,
and CO2 emissions for the three energy resource/technology sub-scenarios is
summarised in Appendix 1 .  The global scenario for 2100 is also summarised
in the form of a snowflake diagram.  All scenario quantifications are
tentative and subject to revisions.
[Figure: "Snowflake" for A1 scenarios]
3.24	CO2 Emissions
The diverging pathways of resource availability and technological change
characteristic of the three scenarios examined result in a wide range of
annual CO2 emissions: from 10 to 33 GtC by 2100. It is interesting to note
that the emissions of the two "fossil fuel" sub-scenarios, "clean coal" and
"oil and gas," are quite close to each other (33 CtC versus 29 GtC).
Continued reliance on oil and gas, coupled with demand growth, explain the
emission patterns for the oil/gas scenario. Coal is the only fossil
resource available in the "clean coal" scenario. Therefore, over time coal
is increasingly required for conversion into premium fuels such as
synliquids and syngas. This conversion "deepening" leads to a feedstock
premium for coal and increases the market potential of non-fossil fuels.
CO2 emissions are therefore not as high as in traditional coal-intensive
scenarios.
4.	Sustainable Development (B1)
The central elements of this scenario family include high levels of
environmental and social consciousness, successful governance including
major social innovation, and reductions in income and social inequality.
Successful forms of governance allow many problems which are currently hard
or difficult to resolve to fall within the competency of government and
other organisations.  Solutions reflect a wide stakeholder dialogue leading
to consent on international environmental and social agreements.  This is
coupled with bottom-up solutions to problems, which reflect wide success in
getting broad-based support within communities.
The concerns over global sustainable development, expressed in a myriad of
environmental and social issues, results in the eventual successful
management of the interaction between human activities and the biosphere.
While no explicit climate policy is undertaken, other kinds of initiatives
lead to lower energy use, and clean energy systems, which significantly
reduce greenhouse gas emissions.  Besides cleaning up air quality, there is
emphasis on improving the availability and  quality of water.
4.1	Key Scenario Drivers and their Relationships
4.11	Technological Development
High levels of technological development focused on achieving sustainable
development leads to high levels of material and energy saving, innovations
in emissions control technology, as well as labour productivity.  The
latter is essential to support the rapid growth in personal income, given
that a major increase in labour force participation is implicit in the
equity assumptions.  Technologies tend to be implemented in an industrial
ecology mode, implying a much more highly integrated form of industrial
production than at present.  Information technology achieves a global
spread, and is fully integrated into production technologies.   Advances in
international institutions permit the rapid diffusion of new technologies
-- R&D approaches two percent of GDP.
4.12	 Population and Economic Development
Population -- reaches only 9 billion by 2100 -- due to a faster than
expected completion of the demographic transition arising from a large
increase of women in the labour force, universal literacy, and concern for
the environmental impacts of high population levels.  The potential impacts
of ageing populations which emerge from this low level of population growth
are offset by relatively high levels of immigration, which reduce the
negative impacts of ageing populations on savings and the ability of
societies to adapt and implement new and cleaner technologies.
This world has a faster than expected transition from traditional to modern
economic sectors throughout the developing world.  In addition, widespread
education leads to high labour productivity, and high labour force
participation.  Migration serves to sustain the size of the labour force in
developed countries, which helps to maintain their growth in per capita
income.  Developing countries experience few institutional failures,
enabling them to grow at or near the historical upper bounds of experience
given their per capita incomes.
This yields a world of high levels of economic activity, with significant
and deliberate progress being made with respect to international and
national inequality of income.  The current order of magnitude differences
in income between developing and developed countries are reduced to a
factor of two, with moderate growth continuing to occur in OECD countries.
Gross World Product (GWP) reaches $350 trillion by 2100 and average global
incomes $40,000 per capita.  Economic development is balanced and, given
the high environmental consciousness and institutional effectiveness, this
leads to a better quality environment, with many of the aspects of rapid
growth being anticipated and dealt with effectively.  Active management of
income distribution is undertaken through use of taxes and subsidies.  The
composition of final demand will evolve to a mix reflecting lower use of
materials and energy, thus easing the impact of high income levels.
4.13	Equity
In this world there is a preparedness to address issues of social and
political equity.  The increases in equity, reflect a shift in values
which, with widespread education, leads to greater opportunity for all.
New social inventions, such as the Grameen Bank's micro-credit schemes, are
a significant contributor to an increase in institutional effectiveness and
equity improvement.
4.14	Communications, Settlement Patterns and Environment
The social innovations and effective governance rest on high levels of
communication, both in a passive (i.e. TV) and active sense.  Governance
systems reflect high levels of consent from those affected by decisions,
and this consent arises out of active participation in the governance process.
Settlement patterns arise from design, and tend to reflect a distributed,
compact, city design structure.  This results in high amenity levels, and
the careful design and location of these cities results in a lessening of
the natural disasters which plague many cities today.  Advanced hazard
warning systems and careful design limit the impact of such disasters.
Low emission technologies, and careful management of land use, preservation
of large tracts of land, and active intervention to counteract the impacts
of imprudent societal actions strengthen the resilience of the ecological
system.
4.2	 Scenarios
4.21	Energy Resources/Technology
Energy efficiency innovations, and successful institutional innovations
disseminating their use, result in much lower levels of energy use relative
to historic patterns.  The forward-looking nature of societal planning
results in relatively smooth transitions to alternative energy systems as
conventional oil and gas resources dwindle in availability.  There is major
use of unconventional natural gas as fuel supply during the transition, but
the major push is towards renewable resources such as solar and wind.  The
impact of environmental concerns is a significant factor in the planning
for new energy systems.
Two alternative energy systems, leading to two sub-scenarios, are
considered to provide this energy:
1. Widespread expansion of natural gas, with a growing role for renewable
energy (scenario B1N).  Oil and coal are of lesser importance, especially
post-2050.  This transition is faster in the developed than in the
developing countries.
2. A more rapid development of renewables, replacing coal and oil; the bulk
of the remaining energy coming from natural gas (scenario B1R).
4.22	Scenario Quantification
Per capita incomes in the developed world are close to ___ in 2100, while
average per capita income in the developing world grows from ___ % of the
developed world in 1990 to ____ % in 2100.  Energy per unit of output
continues to fall at about historical rates in the developed countries,
resulting in total energy use of ____ EJ in 2100.  Rapid spread of
technology from developed to developing countries enables an energy growth
of ___ percent less than GDP, resulting in total energy use of ___ EJ in
the developing part of the world
An initial quantification of the scenarios in terms of population, GDP,
energy use, and CO2 emissions for the two energy resource/technology
scenarios is summarised in Appendix 1.  The global scenario for 2100 is
also summarised in the form of a snowflake diagram.  All scenario
quantifications are tentative and subject to revisions.
[Figure: "Snowflake" for B1 scenarios]
4.23	CO2 Emissions
The range of carbon in CO2 emissions for the scenarios is 7.5 to 20 billion
tons in 2100, reflecting 3 and 2 percent per year reductions in carbon per
unit of GDP
5.	Divided World (A2)
In a retreat from the globalising trends of the previous century, the world
"consolidates" into a series of roughly continental economic regions.
Regions pursue different economic strategies based on the resources and
options available to them.  Trade within economic regions increases, while
trade between regions is controlled by tariff and non-tariff barriers to
support the region's economic strategy.  High income regions restrict
immigration and impose selective controls on technology transfer to
maintain high incomes for their residents.
High income regions encourage higher levels of education to increase the
productivity of their labour force. They impose restrictions on immigrants,
except skilled immigrants, to keep per capita incomes high.  They also try
to impose selective restrictions on technology transfer to maintain the
productivity of their labour force.
Low income regions are only able to increase per capita incomes slowly.
They do not have the resources to invest in educating the labour force or
in research and development.  Investment from other regions is constrained.
Thus exports are primarily products manufactured with low cost labour and
some natural resource-intensive products.  Population growth is high
relative to high income regions. Income inequality becomes more pronounced
within low income regions and increases between regions.
Regions use non-tariff barriers, such as differences in standards and
labelling requirements, to limit trade.  Trade is also dampened by
differences in tastes in products.  These factors favour the use of
resources found within each region.  Regions that have abundant coal
resources but very limited oil resources, for example, encourage use of
"local" coal by heavy industries and electric utilities while allowing
restricting free imports of crude oil and petroleum products .
5.1	Key Scenario Drivers and their Relationships
5.11	Population and Economic Development
Fertility rates vary among regions.  North America, Northwest Europe and
Asia experience falling fertility rates and populations.  The Middle East,
Africa, and to some extent, Southern Europe and South America see rising
population although the rate of growth decreases.  This leads to a shift in
the world population balance from the Indian sub-continent and South East
Asia to the Middle East and Africa by the end of the century.  World
population reaches 16 billion by 2100.
Regional economies emphasise self-sufficiency with wide variations in
growth levels.  Average global economic growth is relatively low at around
2.5%/year, leading to a GWP of $250 trillion by 2100.  Trade across regions
consists primarily of raw materials and semi-finished goods in a relatively
low trust world where dependence on other regions is minimised.
5.12	Government and Geopolitics
National boundaries become less important within the regions as an
increasing share of policy is agreed at the regional level.  This allows
considerable cultural diversity within regions.  Governmental style is also
diverse across regions.  In some, government and religion strengthen their
links, in others, secular democracy is maintained or consolidated.
Education is strengthened in most regions with a deepening understanding of
cultural history and religion.  The growing strength of the economic
regions, and their competing economic interests, lead to reduced
international co-operation.  Global environmental, economic and social
issues are subject to relatively weak governance.  Conflicts between ethnic
and religious groups within economic regions become less violent as a
result of economic pressures on the parties.  Where ethnic and religious
violence persists, the groups are excluded from the economic region.  Thus
wars occur in the boundary zones between economic regions.  Wars may also
occur near regional boundaries for control of scarce natural resources.
5.13	Technology Developments
While underlying science is conducted in all regions an information about
scientific developments are available world-wide, consumption and
production patterns and hence, technology and practices, are determined by
local circumstances.
Research activity increases in all regions; in high income regions due to
the need to increase productivity with limited regional resources and in
low income regions due to the growing size of the population.  Restrictions
on transfer of some technologies to other regions is widespread.
High income regions invest heavily in education to enhance labour
productivity. Some high-income regions move towards broad-based education
for a knowledge-based society. Others move towards practical education
(lots of science and engineering) for an advanced industrial society.  Low
income regions are not able to invest as heavily in education, but the
levels (and future rates of economic growth, vary significantly.
Technological change is rapid in some regions, slow in others, with
industry adjusting to local resource endowments, cultural characteristics
and education levels.
5.14	Communication and Settlement Patterns
Languages become more uniform within regions, but globally more diverse.
Speakers of the main world languages are fairly evenly split.  Computerised
translation eliminates the language barrier to technology diffusion and
economic development.
Urban concentration continues except in Europe and North America, which
move towards larger numbers of smaller cities and towns. Urban shares of
population in other countries rise to current OECD levels by 2020.  While
there is free movement within most regions, there is very little migration
among regions.  Refugee problems are confined to edge areas, for example,
Baltics and Tibet.
5.15	Environmental Concerns
Environmental management follow pragmatic paths: with rising incomes,
people become increasingly concerned first about urban pollution, then
about regional pollution, finally about global problems.  In this world,
global environmental problems are discussed extensively but the will to
tackle them is lacking.   Propensity to worry about the environment is
regionally variable.  Sulphur emissions are rapidly reduced in South and
South East Asia due to the impacts on agriculture but increase in Africa
with exploitation of coal and minerals there.
5.2	 Scenarios
Divided World is explored through a single scenario.
5.21	Resource Availability
Regions try to use their resource endowment for their economic advantage.
Regions with abundant energy and mineral resources use those resources
domestically and to produce exports (surplus to expected long-term needs).
Regions poor in energy and mineral resources will minimise their dependence
on these resources.  High-income, resource-poor regions will develop as
service-based, dematerialised economies, while low-income, resource-poor
regions are forced to limit their consumption of resources.
High-income regions without indigenous oil and gas undergo a near-complete
conversion to an energy economy based on nuclear or renewable based
electricity and synthetic gases and liquids by 2050.  India and China adopt
these technologies at the largely exhausting domestic coal reserves by
2050.  Renewable input, zero waste industry is pioneered in South East Asia
and adopted in Europe, minimising mineral and fossil fuel requirements by
2050.  Oil and gas-rich regions (North Africa, the Middle East, Central
Asia, Russia) continue to use fossil fuels but towards 2050 the falling
cost of renewable technology (wind and biomass in Russia, photovoltaic in
the other regions) begins to make them competitive even in these regions
5.22	Scenario Quantification
An initial quantification of the scenario in terms of population, GDP,
energy use, and CO2 emissions is summarised in Appendix 1.  The global
scenario for 2100 is also summarised in the form of a snowflake diagram.
All scenario quantifications are tentative and subject to revisions.
[Figure: "Snowflake" for A2 scenarios]
5.23	CO2 Emissions
The level of carbon in CO2 emissions for the scenario is 15 billion tons in
2100 as only oil and gas rich regions continue to use fossil fuels.
6.	Regional Stewardship (B2)
"Regional Stewardship" is based on a natural evolution of the present
institutional policies and structures.  As such it does not incorporate
major geopolitical power shifts or fundamental technological
discontinuities.  There is relatively low trust, global agreements are
difficult to reach and the result is 'multiple islands' with inward looking
policies.
This is a world of good intentions, which are not capable of being
implemented.   The late 20th century value shift towards environmental
stewardship continues, for example as envisioned in the Cairo and Rio
Programs of Action, with increasing recognition of the importance of human
welfare and inequity.  These concerns cannot be tackled at a global level
and are resolved regionally or locally.  Environmental solutions are
tempered by the desire for balance with economic goals in many areas - but
poor governance means that meeting the needs of the poor and future
generations is hampered by limited prosperity.
Families think seriously about the fact that their offspring may be dealing
with a more ecologically stressed world, moreover one with limited
financial resources for dealing with such problems.  Education levels are
high so that the ability of families to internalise global concerns in
their family planning decisions is also high.  The relative stabilisation
of world population growth after 2050 leads to general optimism about the
ability of society to solve problems such as food and water supply.
6.1	Key Scenario Drivers and their Relationships
6.11	 Population
Both local governance and environmental concerns limit population growth.
The world largely supports efforts to reduce unwanted births both as a
social service but also because there is an implicit belief that even
increasing populations have severe environmental consequences.  Education
and welfare programs for the young and illiterate are widely pursued.
Population stabilises at 10.5 billion people by 2100.  Since economic
growth is relatively slow, fertility rates do not decline strongly.  But,
the effect of fertility rate declines on lowering population size outweigh
those of mortality rate decreases increasing population size.
The stabilisation of global population (largely after 2050) leads to a new
atmosphere for social planning.  It becomes considerably easier than at
present for education, health care and pension programs.  Age cohort sizes
are much more stable through time than at present, although of course,
overall ageing continues.
6.12	 Economic Development
GWP grows to around 240 trillion $ in 2100 with a North/South income ratio
of approximately 7/1 (presently 13/1).  Concerns about the ecological costs
of consumerist lifestyles receive wide attention and attempts are made,
first in industrial countries, but later in developing countries, to seek
satisfaction through community activities rather than high consumption.
Overall people are eager to find alternatives to the high income world of
materialism.
6.13	 Governance
Governance is weak globally but strong nationally and regionally.
Deliberate policies to limit trade for environmental and social reasons
hinder the transfer of technologies.  However pollution trading concepts
catch on as a way of driving down the costs of pollution control.
International alliances occur based on particular national circumstances,
such as in the development of biomass technologies.  This fragmentation
gives rise to pockets of environmental and social justice activists.
Environmental policies vary widely across regions, for example in
acceptable sulphur emission levels.  NGO and public interest groups are
strong, influential and busy.
6.14	Equity
While strong redistribution policies are enacted within regions to reduce
income disparity, income differences between regions persist globally
throughout the century and even increases in absolute terms, although the
relative inequity decreases.  The mechanism by which global equity
increases relates in part to population dynamics: as fertility rates
decline in developing countries, the decrease in youth dependency ratios
leads to an increase in savings rate and strengthened economic growth
during the first half of the century.  In the developed regions, by
contrast, ageing becomes an increasing drag on economic growth in helping
to converge global incomes, concerns about the persistence of income
inequality world-wide are swamped by the local concerns and conscious
policies to limit international trade.
6.15	Settlement Patterns
A strong deurbanization trend occurs in this world because of increasing
concern about the marginalization of the very poor that accompanies massive
urbanisation.  There are also concerns about managing large transient
populations that migrate seasonally to cities for short term employment,
for example in the construction industry.
Immigration is controlled but accepted, partly to compensate for very low
fertility rates in some regions and partly to help economic development
worldwide without the problems of uncontrolled globalisation.
6.16	Environmental Policy
Environmental improvement is strongly pursued although regional policies
vary widely such as with sulphur controls.  Marked reductions in S, CH4,
deforestation, CFCs and N2O occur and water quality is addressed.
Ecological resilience is not seen as high.  The environment is viewed as
quite fragile and requiring careful policy stewardship.  Resource
extraction is viewed as intrinsically problematic and scepticism persists
regarding the ability of society to prevent environmental disasters like
the Valdez oil spill and Kuwaiti oil fires.  Indeed the world is
increasingly sensitive about and intolerant of such events and much tension
exists concerning this aspect of development.  Environment groups lobby
hard on these themes and paint a picture of rapidly depleting natural
resources.
6.2	 Scenarios
6.21	Energy Resources/Technology
Because of the concern about ecological fragility, alternative and
renewable energy systems are viewed with much hope and are socially and
politically encouraged.  Biomass technologies and policies are invigorated.
The labour and land intensive developing countries pursue biomass
production while the capital intensive developed regions develop the
required technologies.  A degree of co-operation coalesces about such
mutually symbiotic activities.
Consumers accept a rather long return in evaluating energy-efficiency
investments.  Mass transit systems are very successful and profitable.
Advances in transportation technology are rapid.
Hydroelectric power is a constrained bag.  Dams are viewed with disdain
because there are soon no more wild rivers anywhere and the rights of
indigenous people have been egregiously violated.  Although they are
relatively clean from the perspective of carbon emissions, their effects on
indigenous people (mercury poisoning of fish, etc.) becomes unacceptable.
Decommissioning dams is widespread to restore pristine ecological systems
downstream.
Reduction in carbon intensity is not viewed as a policy goal but it
declines for other reasons.  It is a frugal world with limited resource
availability and so the paradigm grows that it is less costly to save
energy than it is to buy it and use it.  This spurs the development of
technologies that use carbon more efficiently.  In addition the
accompanying emissions of NOx and SOx and tropospheric ozone are
increasingly viewed as unacceptable.
6.23	Scenario Quantification
An initial scenario quantification in terms of population, GDP, energy use,
and CO2 emissions for the scenario is summarised in Appendix 1.
Energy intensity declines at a rate of 1.3%/year to a value of 0.12
toe/$1000 in 2100.  This represents a total global energy usage in 2100 of
1250 EJ, of which 300 EJ is oil and gas; 100 EJ coal and 900 EJ is
non-carbon renewables, with nuclear's role limited.
The global scenario for 2100 is also summarised in the form of a snowflake
diagram.  All scenario quantifications are tentative and subject to revisions.
[Figure: "Snowflake" for B2 scenario]
6.24	CO2 Emissions
By 2100 CO2 emissions 11.5 GtC/year, of which 5 GtC/year is emitted by the
North and 6.5 GtC/year by the South.  Carbon intensity declines at a rate
of 0.8%/year to 2100, to a value of 0.3 tC/toe, some 50% of today's value.
7. Scenario Comparisons
[To be written]
8. Conclusions
[To be written]
Appendix 1: Scenario Quantification
[To be written]
Attachment Converted: "c:\eudora\attach\davis.doc"
Attachment Converted: "c:\eudora\attach\davis.rtf"
Anne JOHNSON
IIASA
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis
A-2361 Laxenburg, Austria
E-Mail: johnson@iiasa.ac.at
Phone : +43 2236 807-0
Fax   : +43 2236 71313


Dear Keith
Yesterdy we had the final meeting to a natonal research program climat and
natural catastrophies. Local authorites and Grassel, WMO summarised the
major open questions on which Switzerland could work:
-Changes of Forest and treeline borders eg. subalpine, or invasion of
evergreen species in the chestnut forests in the Tessin
-long term chronologies (they spoke about climate)
-seasonal chronologies
-frequency and intensity of extrem climatic events.
-amount of anthropogenic input on climate and natural catastrophies.
- reconstruction of precipitations
-influence of natural phenomena as volcanoes and el nino on climate
Nowbody said anything about growth but few were aware of the local validity
of the studies made in Switzerland.
Our actual studies fit perfectly to this topics. For the future (discussion
in Kopenhagen) I see the following condensation points:
-continue millenial temperature sensitive chronologies.Some money should go
to Taimyr and Yamal an perhaps French Alps.
-start with a precipitation sensitive network in Eurasia. Pinus, Juniperus
in a transect from Spain to Tibet including dry sites in Sibirea. Partner
could be Inst. of Geography, Bonn (Jan Esper) and Birmensdorf.
-Analysis of recovery of upper timberlines in Putorana mountains in
north-central Sibirea,( similar study like Shiyatov in Polar Ural). A Vice
director of the Inst. of Forest in Krasnoyarsk made a little Proposal (Dr.
Abraimov). I have a PhD Student who make the same in the Swiss Alps near
St. Moritz.
-Growth-climate studies in a test region in central Sibirea. Very good is
the baikal region. There is a very steep precepitation gradiant ,200mm -
1800mm in a distance of 40 km.and in accordance a steep vegetation gradiant
from the steppe to pine forest to Abies sibirica stands.Victor Voronin made
a little proposel) At least one valley in the Abies region in the south of
lake Baikal is heavily polluted An almost identical study has been made in
southern Germany(Spiecker) in a transect from Lorraine to the black forest
mill,(SO2).
-Reconstruction of extreme events in Central Europe (R. Vogels thesis shows
how to do it) I am convinced that we could gather much mor material across
Europe. That could be a topic for a thesis. It must not be part of an
EU-proposal.
Can we discuss this suggestions at Kopenhagen?
Sincerely        Fritz


Dear Colleagues,
Due to the large number of participants at the Lead Authors meeting, the
location has been changed from IPCC WG II TSU offices to the World Bank,
H Building, 600 19th Street, N.W.
The closest metro stop to this building is Farragut West on the orange and
blue lines.  Take the 18th Street exit from the metro and go one block to
19th Street and then two blocks over to G Street.  You will need a badge to
get
into the meeting, but someone will be there to help you with this.  In any
case, it may be a good idea to come a bit early on the first day to get
checked in.  The meeting begins at 8:30 a.m. Wednesday morning.
The Modelers meeting will still be held at the WG II TSU office as
originally planned.  That meeting starts at 8:30 a.m. on Monday morning.
The address, once again, is 400 Virginia Avenue S.W., Suite 750,
Washington, D.C.
We look forward to seeing everyone in Washington.
Best regards,
Anne Johnson
Anne JOHNSON
IIASA
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis
A-2361 Laxenburg, Austria
E-Mail: johnson@iiasa.ac.at
Phone : +43 2236 807-0
Fax   : +43 2236 71313


Find below guidelines on how to present the IS99 storylines and scenarios.  Could you the nominated authors send me your first drafts as soon as possible.
In writing up your contribution could you cover the following areas, ideally structured as follows:
1. Scenario family narrative to discuss main themes, dynamics and a diagram showing 'grand logic'
2. Key Scenario Family Drivers and their Relationships
Topics you should cover include the following:
*	population
*	technology developments
*	governance and geopolitics
*	economic development
*	equity
*	communication and settlement patterns
*	environmental concerns/ecological resilience
3. Scenarios, include reasons for branches: this section should state clearly the reasons behind selection of scenarios and review the key highlights of the scenario quantification
*	energy resources/technology, include resource availability
*	land use and agriculture
*	scenario quantification, include snowflake
*	CO2 emissions
There may be other factors you wish to add to the paper.
Regards,
Ged Davis SI-PXG Tel: 0171-934 3226 Fax: 0171-934 7406
Shell International Limited, London
Scenario Processes and Applications


>Return-path:
>Envelope-to: f023@cpca11.uea.ac.uk
>Delivery-date: Tue, 12 May 1998 17:42:11 +0100
>X-Sender: mbaillie@143.117.30.62
>Date: Tue, 12 May 1998 16:42:31 +0000
>To: Keith Briffa
>From: Mike Baillie
>Subject: Re: report- edit this and send an email
>
>Keith, here are some thoughts on belfast work.  Come back to me on this.
>Cheers   Mike
>
>10K  Belfast Report.
>
>All the remaining long chronology (prehistoric) oak data from Ireland,
>England, north and south Germany (including the major Hohenhein holdings
>(2827 tree series spanning 8239 BC to 841 AD) and the Netherlands (667
>series spanning 6025 BC with gaps to 1721 AD) has now been centralised and
>screened.
>Work has been progressing on calculating running statistics on and between
>these data sets and their constituent ring patterns.  Additional attention
>has been paid to attempting  to understand/interpret the data in various
>ways.  During the year, three principal work packages have been explored
>with respect to assessing the oak data.
>
>work package i)
>signatures
>With such a wide grid of chronologies it is possible to review the
>occurrence of years of common growth trend.  Signatures are normally
>defined as those years in which 80% or more of all trees in a 'region'
>exhibit the same trend towards wider or narrower growth.  All sub-regional
>and overall European signatures have been isolated and the intention is to
>re-do the 1985 analysis of Kelly et al. comparing rainfall, temperature and
>drought index data with the ocurrence of widespread signatures.
>
>work package ii)
>Stepped windows of correlation
>With the availability of the raw data from each laboratory all regional
>chronologies for Ireland, Britain, North Germany and South Germany have
>been reconstructed by standard means (initially fitting a 30-year spline to
>each individual tree-ring pattern).  Using these standardised chronologies,
>stepped windows of correlation have been run comparing all regions across
>time back to 5000 BC.  Notable changes are observed indicating periods of
>consistent, north-European-wide similarity and dis-similarity.  The
>availability of the raw data then allows interrogation of anomalies.  For
>example, there is a notable fall-off in correlation between the
>standardised Irish and English chronologies at AD 775 to 825.  In the past
>this would have been attributed to aspects such as a) poor replication or
>b) narrow versus wide rings.  In this case examination of these aspects
>showed that neither was the cause of the poor correlation; it appears that
>English and Irish trees were responding in completely opposite manner
>during this period.  Such findings have important implications for both
>identifying and interrogating such episodes throughout the record.
>
>work package iii)
>Widest and narrowest rings.
>It had always been assumed that the widest (or narrowest) ring in any tree,
>in any year, would be idiosyncratic.  This assumption produced the
>expectation that the information from such extremes would be largely
>meaningless.  With the availability of the raw data it is now possible to
>create new chronologies of the 1st narrowest, and or the 2nd/3rd narrowest,
>the widest, etc, rings in each year, for each region, or for the entire
>regional dataset.  The result of isolating these extremes turns out to be
>surprising in that plots of the extremes show remarkable coherence.  Figure
>Z shows a section of the Irish chronology constructed from the widest (and
>narrowest) raw ring widths (the narrowest values being converted to indices
>for clarity).  This presentation shows the 'maximum envelope of oak growth'
>year by year through time.  This is a remarkable way to demonstrate periods
>when there are no narrow rings in any trees and others where there are no
>wide rings in any trees.  Extreme events such as that in AD 540 can be seen
>as an overall downturn in the ring width envelope, not just a reduction in
>mean ring width.
>
>Extreme events.
>Work has continued documenting extreme events in the European oak, and
>other, records, partly as a preliminary to the detailed comparison between
>the oak and Fennoscandian and Finnish pine chronologies.  Some of the
>events appear to be of a sufficiently global character that their effects
>should be apparent in the more temperature sensitive northern pine
>chronologies.  Recently preliminary work has documented declines in the
>seventeenth century and twelfth century BC and in the later fifth century
>BC.  Notable declines in the 1620s and 1120s in Foxtail pine chronologies
>from the Sierra Nevada (Scuderi 1993; Caprio and Baisan 1991) suggest
>reduced temperatures around the time of spaced events in the floating
>Fennoscandian record.  With several exactly-spaced events available over
>several millennia it should be possible to link the major oak and pine
>holdings, with the additional possibility of using dated English and Irish
>sub-fossil pine chronologies to confirm linkages.
>Refs
>Caprio, A.C. and Baisan, C.H. 1992. Multi-millennial tree-ring chronologies
>from foxtail pine in the southern Sierras of California.  Abstract in
>Bulletin of the Ecological Society of America 73, 133.
>
>Scuderi, L.A. 1993,  A 2000-Year Tree-Ring Record of Annual Temperatures in
>the Sierra Nevada Mountains,  Science 259, 1433-6
>
>
>Related applications:
>
>Interhemispheric Radiocarbon Calibration
>In addition collaboration has continued on a range of topics including
>interhemispheric radiocarbon calibration.  Oak samples from Ireland and
>exactly contemporaneous samples of cedar from New Zealand have been measued
>in radiocarbon laboratories in Belfast and Waikato (samples from each
>hemisphere being dated in both laboratories).  This work is showing
>interesting hemispheric changes through time with implications for carbon
>cycle modellers (related paper accepted for publication).
>
>Global tree-ring responses to environmental change.
>As part of our network of collaborators, it is possible to have access to
>tree-ring patterns and related temperature reconstructions from a wide grid
>of chronologies outside Europe.  An example of the power of such grids is
>provided by the observed changes during the fourteenth century AD.  Here
>chronologies from the EU oak group have been combined with those from Ed
>Cook (Tasmanian Huon pine); Keith Briffa (Fennoscandian and Polar Urals
>pine); Peter Kuniholm (Aegean oak and pine) and Xiong Limin (New Zealand
>cedar).  When permed (random groups of five from seven chronologies) to
>show common responses, the overall pattern exhibits reduced growth in the
>1340s, the decade of the arrival of the Black Death in Europe, see Figure.
>Such a clear environmental context for the plague has never been available
>before.
>
>Comparisons with other proxy data.
>The strict annual character of tree-ring data is only truly comparable with
>precisely dated human records.  For the early fourteenth century
>surprisingly complete records exist from England for crop yields and
>prices.  In an attempt to compare two different but parallel proxy records,
>namely those for tree growth and for crop prices, collaboration with
>economic historians (Prof. Bruce Campbell Econ. and Soc. Hist. QUB) has
>been initiated.  Preliminary plots of robust, screened European master
>chronologies against grain prices reveals surprising levels of common trend.
>
>Innundated trees
>As part of an effort to understand physiological response of oak to
>waterlogging, 21 oaks were sampled at garryland Wood, County Galway.  These
>trees grow in a limestone area which is flooded in some winters to depths
>of 10s of metres, for durations up to months.  Some of the trees exhibit
>scar damage almost certainly from bark burst during submersion.  Scars
>appear to to coincide with winters of higher than average rainfall.  The
>fact that the trees are not submerged during the growing season means that
>they do not show the extreme dieback and micro-rings associated with trees
>left standing in permanent water, such as examples from beside Loch Lomond,
>Scotland.
>
>Publications with Grant number
>
>Baillie, M.G.L. 1996  Chronology of the Bronze Age 2354 BC to 401 BC.  Acta
>Archaeologica 67, 291-298
>
>Baillie, M.G.L. 1998 Evidence for climatic deterioration in the 12th and
>17th centuries BC. in Hänsel, B. Ed. Man and Environment in European Bronze
>Age, Oetker-Voges, Kiel, 49-55
>
>Baillie, M.G.L. and Brown, D.M.  1996 Dendrochronology of Irish Bog
>Trackways. (in) Raftery, B.   Trackway Excavations in the Mountdillon Bogs,
>Co. Longford. Irish Archaeological Wetland Unit, Transactions Vol. 3, Dept.
>of Archaeology, University College, Dublin, 395-402
>
>
>In Press (with Grant number)
>
>Baillie, M.G.L. 1998 Putting abrupt environmental change back into human
>history, Environments and Historical Change; The Linacre Lectures, ed. Paul
>Slack, Oxford University Press
>
>Baillie, M.G.L. 1998  Exodus to Arthur. Close encounters with comets and
>the fiery dragons of myth.  Batsford, London.
>
>Baillie, M.G.L. 1998 A View from Outside: Recognising the Big Picture.
>Proceedings of the Joint AEA/QRA Conference, Sheffield January 1996.
>
>Baillie, M.G.L. 1998  Hints that cometary debris played some role in
>several tree-ring dated environmental downturns in the Bronze Age.
>Proceedings of the 2nd SIS Conference, Cambridge July 1997.
>
>Baillie, M.G.L. 1998 Dendrochronology. in Jones, T. and Rowe, N. Ed Fossil
>Plants and Spores: Modern Techniques. Geology Society.
>
>Other
>Baillie, M.G.L. 1998 Bronze Age myths expose archaeological shortcomings;
>reply to Buckland et al. 1997 Antiquity, (forthcoming).
>
>
>Mike Baillie
>Palaeoecology Centre
>School of Geosciences, Queen's University, Belfast
>(01232) 335147
>
>
>


Dear Phil,
Of course I'll be happy to be on board. I think the opportunity for some
direct collaboration between us (me, and you/tim/keith) is ripe, and
the plan to compare and contrast different approaches and data and
synthesize the different results is a good one. Though sidetracked
by other projects recently, I remain committed to doing this with
you guys, and to explore applications to synthetic datasets with
manufactured biases/etc remains high priority. It sounds like it
would all fit into the proposal you mention. There may be some
overlap w/proposals we will eventually submit to NSF (renewal
of our present funding), etc. by I don't see a problem with that
in the least.
Once the collaboration is officially in place, I think that sharing
of codes, data, etc. should not be a problem. I would be happy to
make mine available, though can't promise its the most user friendly
thing in the world.
In short, I like the idea. INclude me in, and let me know what you
need from me (cv, etc.).
cheers,
mike
____________________________________________________________________
Michael E. Mann
Adjunct Assistant Professor, Department of Geosciences
Morrill Science Center
University of Massachusetts
Amherst, MA 01003
____________________________________________________________________
e-mail:  mann@snow.geo.umass.edu
Web:
Phone: (413) 545-9573                            FAX: (413) 545-1200


Dear colleagues,
I will like to post here some correspondence which is clearly relevant for this
"scenarios discussion group" regarding some issues related to the use of the new
emission scenarios, simple models, etc. Please post any comments on these issues
or any other issue that you may want to raise to the following address
"scenarios@meto.gov.uk".
I have added the following experts to the list posted in my first Email:
P Wagner
R Watson
J Edmonds
S Smith
G Marland
Many thanks.
Maria Noguer
***********************************
Issues raised by J Mitchell:
1. There are several uses for scenarios:
a) Conversion to concentration using chemistry models to produce forcing curves
b) Forcings for GCM runs
c) Use in simpler models to produce global mean curves of concentrations,
forcing, temperature and sea level. This would requires a simple model which is
documented and calibrated against one (preferably several) climate models.
The final IPCC approved scenarios will not be available until February 2000, so
we should decide now on which draft scenarios to use
2. The provisional emissions will be made available imminently. These need to be
evaluated as there are four basic families and many variants. How is the median
scenario defined?
3. What criteria are to be set for the simpler models used for global mean
projections?
*************************************
Issue raised by Tom Wigley and reponses:
Date: Mon, 13 Jul 1998 11:00:54 -0600 (MDT)
From: Tom Wigley
To: Sir John Houghton
,
Patricia WAGNER
,
Hugh Pitcher
,
Robert Watson
Cc: Jae Edmonds
, Mike Hulme
,
Atul Jain
,
Fortunat Joos
,
Richard Richels
,
Dave Schimel
, ssmith@ucar.edu
Subject: IPCC CO2 Emissions Scenarios
Dear Bob, Hugh, Naki and John,
Mike Hulme has told me something that is quite alarming about the
soon-to-be-released 'IPCC' CO2 emissions scenarios. If this is correct,
you/IPCC should try to remedy it as a  matter of some urgency. He said
that the new 'IPCC' CO2 emissions scenarios will still begin in 1990 and
will not use observed (Marland) emissions for the 1990s.
You may either not realize, or not remember, that during the preparation
of the SAR and (especially) TPs 2 and 4, IPCC was frequently criticized
for using out-of-date emissions data that were manifestly wrong during the
1990s. It would be extremely embarrassing to be subject to the same
criticism with the TAR. Indeed, since the criticism is a justifiable one,
it would be inexcusable not to have responded to it.
Equally embarrassing should be the fact that, in the published literature
(my 1997 Nature and 1998 GRL papers), this 'error' has already been
avoided.
How can you get around this problem? Ideally, the energy-economics models
need to be revised to begin in or around 2000 instead of 1990. Indeed, in
talking to Rich Richels about this issue, as well as echoing my concern,
he noted that his model (MERGE) is currently being updated in just this
way. He also pointed out that beginning an energy-economics model run in
1990 leads to considerable 'flexibility' in 2000 emissions; when, in fact,
the 2000 emissions will already be fixed and known by the time the TAR
comes out.
It is probably impossible to make this ideal type of 'fix', but a 'fix'
can still be made. What you could do is just what I have done in the above
two papers. This is a simple procedure that CAN be used since it is in the
published literature. All I did was use observed emissions to 1996 (as far
as data were available), linearly extrapolate these to 2000 (under the
assumption that this was a better projection than the corresponding IS92a
projection), and then use IS92a CHANGES from 2000. You may be able to
improve on the second step, but this is unimportant. The crucial thing is
to get the beginning years of the record to match observed emissions as
far as such data are available.
The above, by the way, does not have to be applied to emissions from
land-use change because of the way we deal with initialization with the
carbon cycle models. We do not use historical land-use- change emissions.
You may argue that, in terms of projected CO2 concentrations, incorrect
1990s emissions have only a minor effect. This is such an obviously
specious argument that I won't bother to discuss it. Not least, it will
not satisfy the critics.
A parallel issue does, however, arise with the CO2 concentration
stabilization profiles. The 'S' profiles are already ludicrous, since
their concentrations and implied emissions already diverge markedly from
observations. The WRE profiles diverge less, but still enough for me to
deem that they need revising. I have, in fact, already done this. I would
be happy to pass the new profiles on to IPCC.
Best wishes,
Tom
=======================================================
>From Robert Watson on July 13:
Tom:  I appreciate you bringing this critical issue to the fore - you are
absolutely right that we must not look naive.  I assume that Naki and Jon
et al. Will deal with this while I an on vacation for the next four days.
Bob
=========================================================
Date: Wed, 15 Jul 1998 02:18:09 +0000
From: David Schimel
To: Tom Wigley
Subject: Re: IPCC CO2 Emissions Scenarios
Tom,
I raised this issue at the scoping meeting in Bad (very bad)
Munstereieffel, where it was greeted with general agreement but it
appeared to come as a complete surprise to many that scenarios should have
a relationship to reality.
There was also general mild surprise at the degree of non GCM-community
interest in following Kyoto and stabilization rather than 1% per year and
similar reactions to the fact that 1% year doubles the current rate of
change.
But the wind is shifting
DS
========================================================
Date: Thu, 16 Jul 1998 09:46:49 -0500
From: Atul Jain
To: Tom Wigley
Cc: Sir John Houghton
,
Patricia WAGNER
,
Hugh Pitcher
,
Jae Edmonds
,
Mike Hulme
,
Fortunat Joos
,
Richard Richels
,
Dave Schimel
,
ssmith@ucar.edu
Subject: Re: IPCC CO2 Emissions Scenarios
Dear Tom,
I got the same impression from Hugh's talk during the last week Community
Meeting on IA, which was sponsored by NSF. It does not matter so much
whether the starting point for the scenario calculations is 1990 or 2000.
The main concern is that the emission scenarios should reflect the recent
changes in fossil emissions, which show a decreasing trend from 1990 to
1995 in Annex B emissions.  Using projected emissions that are incorrect,
rather than updating them with observed emissions, is clearly not
acceptable.
I agree with you that the effects of these emissions on CO2 concentration
is minor.  However, recent observed emissions will have a major impact on
estimates of the cost of CO2 abatement, which depend mainly on cumulative
emissions rather than on concentration.  It is important, especially in
light of Kyoto commitments, not to produce inaccurate emission pathways
that overestimate emissions from 1990-2000, since they may be used as
baselines for producing cost estimates.
Cheers! Atul
=========================================================
Date: Thu, 16 Jul 1998 08:19:22 -0700
From: "Pitcher, Hugh M"
To: "'jain@uiatma.atmos.uiuc.edu'"
,
Tom Wigley
Cc: Sir John Houghton
,
Patricia WAGNER
,
Hugh Pitcher
,
Robert Watson
,
Jae Edmonds
,
Mike Hulme
,
Fortunat Joos
,
Richard Richels
,
Dave Schimel
,
ssmith@ucar.edu
Subject: RE: IPCC CO2 Emissions Scenarios
Dear Tom et al
In setting up the MiniCAM to do the scenario work for the SRES, we tuned
the 2005 energy and hence emissions numbers to reproduce the latest IEA
forecast, which explicitly incorporates the slowdown in 1990 to 1995.  The
only problem here is that informal feedback from within Russia(Igor
Bashmakov) suggests the IEA data significantly overstate the reduction in
energy use.  Our scenarios all go through the short term forecast for 2005
and then diverge onto alternative paths.
Getting a good handle on recent historical data and a
consistent/reasonable forecast for tuning the short term aspect of the
scenarios is going to be increasingly critical as we try to sort out
strategies and costs of strategies. This is a separate problem from the
long term scenario work, and requires rather different tools.
cheers, hugh
=========================================================
Date: Fri, 17 Jul 1998 14:27:51 -0600 (MDT)
From: Tom Wigley
To: "Pitcher, Hugh M"
Cc: "'jain@uiatma.atmos.uiuc.edu'"
,
Sir John Houghton
,
Patricia WAGNER
, Hugh Pitcher
,
Robert Watson
, Jae Edmonds
,
Mike Hulme
, Fortunat Joos
,
Richard Richels
,
Dave Schimel
, Gregg Marland
,
ssmith@ucar.edu
Subject: RE: IPCC CO2 Emissions Scenarios
Dear all,
I appreciate the responses regarding my concern about the new 'IPCC'
fossil CO2 emissions scenarios. However, no-one seems to be willing to
grasp the nettle and suggest what can be done about it. From what Hugh
says, all scenarios go through the same 2005 value, so this suggests an
obvious 'fix'.
(I am curious to know what this 2005 value is, and how close it is to what
I used in my Kyoto papers.)
Hugh also suggests the 'IPCC' 2005 value may be open to improvement, but I
presume it is too late to do this now. So ... what should be done? The
obvious solution would be to use Gregg Marland's 'observed' values as far
as they go, and then linearly interpolate from his latest year to 2005.
When I did my work, I had Gregg's values to 1995, and was able to make a
good guess from what he told me about what the 1996 value would be. By
now, 1996 should be available, and a good estimate may be possible for
1997. If so, then the linear interpolation would go over 1997 to 2005.
Do you all agree with this strategy? ... or does someone have a better
idea??
I'm copying this to Gregg to see what more recent data he can provide.
Cheers,
Tom


As promised here is the second part of the SRES description:
----------
SRES WRITING TEAM
ADDRESS LIST
Dr. Joseph M. Alcamo
Professor, Scientific Center for
Environmental Systems Research
University of Kassel, Germany
Dr. Knut H. Alfsen
Director, Center for International Climate and Environmental Protection (CICERO)
University of Oslo, Norway
Prof. Akhiro Amano
Dean, School of Policy Studies
Kwansei Gakuin University, Japan
Dr. Dennis Anderson
Professor, Oxford University
Oxford, UK
Dr. Zhou Dadi
Energy Research Institute
State Planning Commission
Chinese Academy of Sciences
Beijing, China
Dr. Gerald R. Davis
Group Planning
Shell International Petroleum
London, UK
Dr. Bert de Vries
National Institute for Public Health
and Environmental Hygiene (RIVM)
Bilthoven, the Netherlands
Dr. Jae Edmonds
Senior Research Scientist
Pacific Northwest National
Laboratory
Washington, D.C., U.S.A.
Mr. J/0rgen Fenhann
Energy Systems Group and
UNEP Collag. Ctr. on Energy
and Environment
Ris/0 National Laboratory
Roskilde, Denmark
Dr. Stuart R. Gaffin
Atmosphere Program
Environmental Defense Fund
New York, NY, U.S.A.
Dr. Henryk Gaj
Polish Foundation for Energy
Efficiency (FEWE)
Warsaw, Poland
Dr. Ken Gregory
Centre for Business and the Environment
Middlesex, UK
Dr. Arnulf Gruebler
Environmentally Compatible
Energy Strategies
International Institute for Applied
Systems Analysis
Laxenburg, Austria
Mr. William Hare
Greenpeace International
Amsterdam, the Netherlands
Dr. Erik Haites
Margaree Consultants, Inc.
Toronto, ONT, Canada
Dr. Tae-Yong Jung
Korea Energy Economics Institute
Euiwang-Si, Kyunggi-Do, Korea
Dr. Thomas Kram
Project Head of ETSAP
ECN Policy Studies
Netherlands Energy Research
Foundation
Petten, the Netherlands
Dr. Emilio Lebre La Rovere
COPPE/UFRJ
Universidade Federal do
Rio de Janeiro
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
Prof. Matthew Luhanga
University of Dar es Salaam
Dar es Salaam, United Republic
of Tanzania
Dr. Laurie Michaelis
Environment Directorate
OECD
Paris, France
Dr. Shunsuke Mori
Department of Industrial Administration
Faculty of Science and Engineering
Science University of Tokyo
Tokyo, Japan
Dr. Tsuneyuki Morita
Head of Global Warming Response Team
National Institute for Environmental
Studies
Tsukuba, Japan
Dr. Richard Moss
Head of Technical Support Unit
IPCC Working Group II
Washington, D.C., U.S.A.
Prof. Nebojsa Nakicenovic
Project Leader
Environmentally Compatible
Energy Strategies
International Institute for Applied
Systems Analysis
Laxenburg, Austria
Dr. William Pepper
ICF Kaiser
Fairfax, VA, U.S.A.
Mr. Hugh Martin Pitcher
Senior Scientist, Global Change Group
Pacific Northwest National Laboratory
Washington, D.C., U.S.A.
Ms. Lynn Price
Energy Analysis Program
Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory
Berkeley, CA, U.S.A.
Dr. Hans-Holger Rogner
Section Head, Planning and Economic
Studies Section
International Atomic Energy Agency
Vienna, Austria
Dr. Priyadarshi Shukla
Indian Institute of Technology
Ahmedabad, India
Mr. Alexei Sankovski
ICF Kaiser
Washington, D.C., U.S.A.
Dr. Robert Swart
Air Research Laboratory
Policy Analysis and Scenarios
RIVM
Bilthoven, the Netherlands
Prof. John P. Weyant
Director
Energy Modeling Forum
Stanford University
Stanford, CA, U.S.A.
Dr. Ernst Worrell
Energy Analysis Program
Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory
Berkeley, CA, U.S.A.
/p/ecs/general/admin/ipcc-sr/corr/open process/naki-short.doc       06/26/98,
11:34 AM


Dear Colleagues,
Zhou Dadi has been kind enough to organize the next SRES Lead Authors
meeting in Beijing, China, to be held on 7-9 October, 1998.  Dadi will
provide us with more detailed information on meeting logistics in the near
future, and I will send out a meeting agenda as we get closer to the
meeting date.  Basically, there are four items that need to be discussed at
the meeting:  1) SRES progress to date; 2) the open process; 3) scenario
revisions and additional work; and 4) planning the final report.
Please mark you calendars for this date and RSVP to both Zhou Dadi
(becon@public3.bta.net.cn) and Anne Johnson (johnson@iiasa.ac.at) as soon
as possible I will be out of the office 10-26 September and will not be
able to receive messages during this time.
I look forward to seeing you in Beijing.
Naki


Dear Colleagues,
This is a follow up on the earlier announcement of the next SRES Meeting.
First, I would like to thank all those of you who have confirmed that you
will join us in Beijing.  Unfortunately, some of our colleagues also had to
cancel due to other commitments.  Attached you will find the venue of the
meeting and hotel that Dadi reserved for us at a special discounted price.
My proposal is to convene at 13:00 hours on 7 October and try to finish on
early afternoon on 9 October so that you have some free time left for
sight-seeing before we all depart.
I will soon send to all of you formal invitation letters on IIASA
letter-head just in the case you need it for travel approval (unless you
cancel your participation in the meantime).  Dadi will send you a similar
invitation letter to use in order to obtain a visa for China.
Appended is my last e-mail concerning this meeting in case you did not
receive a copy.  In the attachment to this e-mail you will find two
letters.  One is from IPCC outlining the possible role of scenarios in IPCC
assessment (Microsoft Photo Editor file).  It is important for our work as
it indicates possible uses of new IPCC emissions scenarios.  One of the
agenda items at the meeting will indeed be to discuss which of our marker
scenarios we recommend be used in the interim period before our scenarios
are approved by IPCC in early 2000.  The other letter is also from IPCC
announcing the SRES web-site (PowerPoint file).  The web-site includes most
of the scenario variants we have developed to date.  Please circulate this
second letter as widely as you can because we need as much feedback from
the wider community of possible users as we can obtain.
Please let us know as soon as possible whether you are planing to attend.
I hope to see you all in China.
Regards,  Naki
Venue:
National Meteorological Administration (No. 46 Baishiqiao Road, Haidian
District, Beijing).
Accommodation:
Olympic Hotel (No. 48 Baishiqiao Road, Haidian District, Beijing,
Tel: 086-10-62176688); discounted Price: US$65+15% service costs.
Meeting Announcement:
Dear Colleagues,
Zhou Dadi has been kind enough to organize the next SRES Lead Authors
meeting in Beijing, China, to be held on 7-9 October, 1998.  Dadi will
provide us with more detailed information on meeting logistics in the near
future, and I will send out a meeting agenda as we get closer to the
meeting date.  Basically, there are four items that need to be discussed at
the meeting:  1) SRES progress to date; 2) the open process; 3) scenario
revisions and additional work; and 4) planning the final report.
Please mark you calendars for this date and RSVP to both Zhou Dadi
(becon@public3.bta.net.cn) and Anne Johnson (johnson@iiasa.ac.at) as soon
as possible I will be out of the office 10-26 September and will not be
able to receive messages during this time.
I look forward to seeing you in Beijing.
Naki


Dear Keith,
Some days ago I came back from the Polar Ural Mountains. I was there
about 30 days making photos from the points where I have made photos
35-40 years ago and evaluating the changes which were happened during
this period. Unfortunately, Rashit could not be able to go to the
Yamal Peninsula for collecting subfossil wood this summer as a result
of deficiency of money.
I am glad that we have been successful in INTAS proposal. Financial
situation in our country so terrible that we will not work
successfully without support from international grants.
Yesterday I have sent by post the signed form (official power of
attorney). If you have any additional information concerning this
grant, please give me know.
I wish the best to you, your family and Phil.
Sincerely yours
Stepan Shiyatov
stepan@ipae.uran.ru


Mike
I think the problem is the same one as in 1988 and 1994. In order to answer the
question: "what is IPCC's best estimate of climate change over the next hundred
years, and the uncertainties?" we need a single best estimate of emissions (plus
a range of uncertainty). In the same way as modellres say "here is our best
estimate of climate sensitivity plus a range" then the SRES group should do the
same thing. Of course they can make all the usual disclaimers and talk about
surprises just as the climate modellers do. But NOT to come up with an estimate
for a Business as Usual emissions scenario (plus a range, of 6GtC to 30GtC at
2100) seems to be ducking responsibilities. "Getting away from single number
answers" is very laudable scientifically, but it presents policymakers (for
whome the whole IPCC exercise is undertaken) with a problem. As long as there is
a central estimate and a range, the surely both communities could be happy, as
they ultimately were with BaU in 1990 and IS92a in 1995?
Geoff
-----Original Message-----
From:   m.hulme@uea.ac.uk
Sent:   15 September 1998 20:23
To:     scenarios
Subject:        WGI emissions/scenarios conference
Dear All,
Here are three comments on the questions raised by WGI TSU on 7 Sept. and
by some of the other contributions to the discussion about scenarios for
IPCC TAR.  I am commenting from the perspective of a climate scenario
constructor servicing the impacts research community:
1. The SRES Working Group have identified 4 Marker Scenarios (out of a much
larger range, although these 4 largely capture the range).  I think the
choice is good.  I do not see why some modelling centres should not be able
to run all 4 emissions scenarios through their GCM.  From an impacts
perspective I believe this would be very desirable and would enable a fair
range of climate change scenarios to be used in impacts work using direct
GCM output (without the need for scaling).  And if all four Markers could
be run through more than one GCM (i.e., with different climate
sensitivities) then impacts work would have an even better sample of the
possible climate change space to analyse.  These aspects of uncertainty
seem to me to be critical for impacts people (and integrated assessors) to
explore, to get us away from single number 'answers'.
2. If a single emissions scenario *has* to be adopted by some GCM groups,
B2 seems to have the recommendation from Naki (and maybe SRES too - the
storyline refers to it as 'dynamics as usual').  I think there are probably
good reasons why SO2 emissions fall so much in this storyline - regional
rather than global solutions and the encouragement of environmental
protection.  The fact that the reduced C emissions relative to IS92a are
offset by the big fall in SO2 emissions (the net global warming in B2 is
actually slightly higher than IS92a if aerosol effects are included) should
simply be seen as a reflection of a more carefully worked out storyline
than was the case with IS92a.  I do not think it a good idea (indeed, I
think it would be a very *bad* idea) for GCM centres to mix-and-match
elements of IS92 and SRES98 scenarios - the TAR should try and stick with
the SRES stories and emissions wherever possible.  The internal consistency
in these storylines (and hopefully emissions) is important to maintain
(especially later on for impacts work), and the thinking behind the SRES
scenarios is considerably better than was achieved in the IS92 scenarios.
3.  The problem of different Markers having different 1990 emissions values
(and the fact that 1990s C emissions diverge from those observed) is more
serious.  By 2000 the four Markers range in C emissions from energy sources
from 6.6GtC (B1) to 8.0 GtC (A1).  Given where we are right now (about
6.7GtC in 1997) it seems daft to have such a range for only 2 years hence
(as Tom Wigley has pointed out).  For example, by the time TAR is published
we will know that A1 C emissions for 2000 are too high by, say, 15%.
Surely we need to impose a 'fix' on all 4 Markers to account for this.
Such amendment may occur as a result of the SRES 'open-process', but this
will take up to 12 months to be agreed and published.  Should not someone
(WGI or WGIII TSUs) impose a temporary solution now for climate modellers?
Similarly, something needs to be done for CH4 and N20 1990 emissions.  CH4
1990 emissions range from 281 to 481Tg in the 4 Markers (compared with
506Tg in IS92).  Surely this range is not defendable.  I think at the least
we need some assurance from SRES that there has been some investigation
into these differences and that they will withstand scientific scrutiny in
peer review.  Again, maybe the open-process may lead to revisions, but what
do climate modellers do in the meantime?  [By the way, the difference in
global warming by 2100 that the SRES CH4 and N2O scenarios generates
relative to those in IS92a is between 0.05 and 0.3degC - lower in all cases].
Mike
****************************************************************************
Dr Mike Hulme
Reader in Climatology             tel: +44 1603 593162
Climatic Research Unit            fax: +44 1603 507784
School of Environmental Science   email:  m.hulme@uea.ac.uk
University of East Anglia         web site: ~mikeh/
Norwich  NR4  7TJ
****************************************************************************
Mean temp. in Central England during 1998 is running
at about 1.2 deg C above the 1961-90 average
***************************************************
The global-mean surface air temperature anomaly estimate for the
first half of 1998 was about +0.60 deg C above the 1961-90 average,
the warmest such period yet recorded
****************************************************************************


Dear Phil,
Thanks for your message. I've chosen to "expand" the distribution
list to include a few other individuals who can better address some
of the key points you raise.
A meeting in January built around the AMS meeting (which should
bring people into the Boulder vicinity) sounds like a good tentative
plan. Peck? I'm assuming everyone on this list is a potential
attendee...
As for your general comments, they get to some essential points.
The modeling community leaders are probably about as skeptical about
our paleo-reconstructions as we are of their sulphate aerosol
parameterizations, flux corrections (or more worrying, supposed
lack thereof in some cases!), and handling of the oh-so-important
tropical Pacific ocean-atmosphere interface...
So my personal philosophy is that more than one side here can
benefit from extending the olive branch, and there are a few
individuals in the modeling community who could benefit from slowing
down on the stone throwing from their fragile glass tower :)
More to the point, though, I strongly believe the paleo community
needs to present an honest but unified front regarding what we all
agree we can definitely, probably, and simply not yet say about
the climate of the past several centuries, and plan strategies
that will allow us all to work towards improved reconstructions
without stepping on each others toes. There's a challenge there,
but one I'm sure we can all rise to. I am grateful to Peck for
realizing that the time is ripe for a workshop in which we all
strategize as a group towards these ends. I believe we all go
into this in "good faith", and I'm very excited about what the
workshop might produce, in particular, in terms of effective
long-term strategies.
I share Phil's concern about getting things "straightened out"
before the IPCC report. As one of the lead authors on the
"observed climate variation and change" chapter for the 3rd assessment
report, a key goal of mine will
be to present fairly and accurately all of our different efforts,
and the common denominator amongst them...
I also understand all-to-well Phil's concerns about free data
exchange. In fact, we've been working closely w/ Peck to get
every aspect of our reconstructions, including calibration/verification
statistics, etc., available on-line at NGDC. The one catch w/ the
paleo network is that a few of the indicators we used were provided
us under conditions that they not yet be passed along (this includes,
I believe, the Morrocan tree rings, and some others. And at least
one important indicator--Malcolm's Yakutia record--was as yet
unpublished. Not myself knowing the details of the propietary
issues involved here, I have resisted simply putting our entire
multiproxy network out their for public consumption. But working
w/ Peck and Malcolm, I'm sure we can do this appropriately and
quickly. That's an example of a key issue that would be on the
table at the workshop in question.
--------------------PHIL'S MESSAGE TO PECK------------------------
Peck,
Thanks for the comments on the paper in The Holocene !
The paper stems from work Keith and I have been doing with the
Climate Change Detection group headed by Tim Barnett. It is
much toned down from some of the things about paleo data that
Tim and Simon Tett wanted to say. Long paleo series (either the
individual ones or regional/hemispheric averages) have got to
be good before these sorts of people will begin to use them and
believe they tell us something about variability in the past -
something that cannot be got from long control runs of GCMs.
A small meeting would be a good idea, therefore. Mike Mann
knows the next few times I'll be in the US. The first possible
date for him is the AMS annual meeting in Dallas in Jan 99 -
maybe we can tag something onto the end of this for a day or two.
I'll let you and Mike work something out on this. I'm also
in the US for a meeting on Climate Extremes which is tentatively
scheduled for March 9-13 in Asheville.
Prsentation of the paleo data is the key in all this. Tim
Barnett was somewhat horrified by the coherency diagrams he
produced (fig 9). He then produced Fig 10 from the GCM and
that was not much better. Hidden between the lines of the
paper is the theme that a number of us have been saying for
years ( especially Ray and Malcolm) that the LIA and MWE
were not that global and not that different from today's
temperatures. Mike's paper in Nature reiterates this. Keith
and I have been thinking of writing a forum piece for The
Holocene addressing in somewhat provocative terms what
paleoclimatologists should be doing with regard the detection
issue and to some extent with respect to science in general -
should be continue using terms like LIA and MWE for example.
We hope to address many of the issues you make in your email -
seasonality, consistency of the proxy through time, goodness
of the proxy etc.  We need to come up with some agreed strategy
on this especially with IPCC coming up.
What we did in the paper was one way of assessing proxy
quality. Something like Tables 2 and 4 are what is required
though to inform the uninitiated (modellers) about proxy data.
For use in detection at the moment a paleo series has to be a
proxy for temperature. I know proxies tell us about other aspects
of the climate as well, but a clear, unambiguous temperature
signal is what is needed.
Some other quick answers -
1) Happy to send to you all the series and the hemispheric values.
I hope Mike will send all his as well, but the last time we
discussed this he said that some could not be made freely
available.  This isn't Mike's fault but there are still
some stumbling blocks to free exchange of data within the
various paleo communities.
2) We all know the quality of proxies changes with time. Trees
don't have dating problems but do have the reduction in
sample depths you talk about. Dendro people are much more
open about this though than the coral and especially the
ice core communitites.
3) Trees may not grow everywhere but they are more global in extent
than the others. There are also many more chronologies
available and this is a factor. We had much more choice there
than in the other paleo groups.
4) Whilst we are taking bets, proxies will never be better than
instrumental data. Corals will eventually extend the SOI
series but never be better than it for the years after 1850.
Similarly with the NAO. Instrumental data exists to extend
this to about 1750 and the fact that such data is sitting
out there is only just begining to be realised. A great NAO
reconstruction could be produced if the real data extended
over nearly 200 years, enabling the low-frequency aspects
to be considered in much more detail than ever before
( a la Stahle with the SOI).
That's enough for now.
Cheers
Phil
Prof. Phil Jones
Climatic Research Unit        Telephone +44 (0) 1603 592090
School of Environmental Sciences    Fax +44 (0) 1603 507784 University of
East Anglia
Norwich                          Email    p.jones@uea.ac.uk
NR4 7TJ
UK
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_______________________________________________________________________
Michael E. Mann
Adjunct Assistant Professor, Department of Geosciences
Morrill Science Center
University of Massachusetts
Amherst, MA 01003
_______________________________________________________________________
e-mail:  mann@snow.geo.umass.edu (normal)
memann@titan.oit.umass.edu (attachments)
Web:
Phone: (413) 545-9573                            FAX: (413) 545-1200