



Protect

The Right to International Protection

Policy Brief

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**Promoting international solidarity:
handling public opinion and social media pressure
on policymaking on international protection**



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PROTECT CONSORTIUM

The PROTECT Consortium publishes original research on international refugee protection. The Consortium is composed of:

University of Bergen, University of Catania, Ghent University, Giessen University, Ljubljana University, Lund University, Open University (London), Queen Mary University (London), University of Surrey, University of Stuttgart, Ryerson University (Toronto), University of Witwatersrand (Johannesburg)

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PROMOTING INTERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY: HANDLING PUBLIC OPINION AND SOCIAL MEDIA PRESSURE ON POLICYMAKING ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION

1. Introduction

How much public pressure is there on policymakers who endeavour to introduce policies promoting international solidarity and collaboration on refugee protection? How should policymakers address inhumane responses to such policies?

This is a vital question as policymakers who are introducing increasingly stricter refugee and asylum policies claim they are following the public will. Answering this question now is crucial because we have several ongoing policy initiatives for international solidarity and collaboration on refugee protection: Since 2016, the United Nation's High Commissioner for Refugees, the European Commission, the African Union, and many states endeavouring to follow suit, have been introducing new policies to bolster international collaboration on refugee protection. Amongst these are the UN's *Global Compact on Refugees* (GCR) and *Global Compact on Migration* (GCM), the European Union's evolving *Common European Asylum System* (CEAS), the European Commission's proposal on a *New Pact for Migration and Asylum* (the New Pact), and the UN Member States' *pledges made in the Global Refugee Forum*. Successful implementation of global policy depends on recognition by the international society, that is, international organizations, governments, parties, non-state organizations, and citizens. However, these new policy initiatives have created controversy within the international society.

A public site where the controversy is the most visible is social media. Social media communication affects society's perceptions of refugees and international protection. Hence, in democratic societies where policymaking must rely on citizens' consent, social media communication has a potential to influence governments' and other policy actors' approaches to international protection. On the other hand, social media also offers opportunities to policy actors to influence the public opinion. As social media often overrepresents the extreme positions in politics, and as stances on refugee protection policies is no exception from this general picture, looking at citizen attitudes in conjunction with social media depictions is a must. Therefore, in order to assess the public discourse pressure on policymaking for international solidarity on refugee protection, PROTECT has conducted studies of citizen attitudes in 26 countries and studies of social media networks and discourses in 9 languages.

In the current social media context where all sorts of actors can make their voices and claims heard, and influence each other, the main challenge for policymakers is to make themselves effectively visible, and their preferences and justifications convincingly understood, against a colourful and chaotic background of voices and political preferences.

POLICY CHALLENGE

The policy challenge for the UN, EU, and states is to reach the relevant policy actors to convince them to comply with the refugee protection objectives of, respectively, the 1951 Refugee Convention, the Global Compact on Refugees, the Common European Asylum System, and the EU New Pact on Migration and Asylum.

2. Evidence and analysis

In its citizen attitude surveys (Cappelen, Sicakkan & Van Wolleghem 2021, 2022) and social media analysis (Dutceac-Segesten & Farjam 2022, Sicakkan & Heiberger 2022), PROTECT has identified the presence of five discourses and attitudes: (i) *human rights-globalist*, (ii) *market-globalist*, (iii) *European-regionalist*, (iv) *nation-statist*, and (v) *nativist*.

PROTECT'S DISCOURSE AND ATTITUDE TYPOLOGY

Nativists focus on the protection of the members of their native community and see no need for international protection. Nativists categorically reject international solidarity and collaboration.

Nation-statists are open to refugees, but give primacy to the state's obligations to its own citizens. Nation-statists accept multilateral state collaboration but reject any binding supranational arrangements.

Regionalists want to work beyond national borders to address the limits of what individual states can achieve. They want well-concerted solutions for regional (European) challenges.

Globalists want to develop a global supranational system of refugee protection based on international human-rights norms in international law.

PROTECT's discourse analysis on Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, and Reddit and its citizen attitude surveys show:

- A dominance of globalist, regionalist, and nation-statist discourses in big countries, which are in contestation with each other at the global governance level
- A dominance of nation-statist and nativist discourses in small countries, which are in contestation with each other at the national governance level
- A weak presence of the nativist discourses and attitudes, which is in contestation with globalists, regionalists, and nation-statists at the regional and national levels.

PROTECT's network analysis on Twitter shows that:

- The social media networks around the UN distinguish between migrant and refugee related events.
- The social media network around the EU reacts to asylum and refugee issues mostly during migration related policy events and weakly during refugee policy events.
- This indicates that the network around the EU conflates "refugee policy" with "migration policy", which may dilute the EU's and its Member States' international responsibility and commitment to protect refugees.
- National authorities, political parties, civil society organizations, and non-governmental organizations are largely outside the communication networks of the UN and EU.

These findings, combined, indicate that there is a significant public support in Europe and globally for international solidarity on refugee issues. However, there is also discursive pressure from nation-statist and nativist stances on UN and EU policymakers regarding their initiatives to introduce international solidarity in refugee protection policy. Moreover, the UN and EU cannot influence these policy actors on social media because they are outside the UN's and EU's networks of communication in social media.

2.1 Citizen attitudes towards international solidarity on refugee protection

Two important international solidarity instruments are *relocation* and *financial aid*. Relocation of asylum seekers has been at the heart of fierce controversies over the past decade. When the refugee crisis erupted in Europe in 2014-2016, the large inflows of asylum seekers shed light on the inadequacy of the Dublin Regulation. The Dublin regulation aims to determine which EU member state is responsible for a given asylum claim lodged in the Union. It relies on a hierarchy of principles that often ends up in attributing responsibility to the member state in which asylum seekers arrive first. The states at the external borders of the EU are the ones bearing much of the responsibility. While this system works when influxes are low, the sizeable increases of the years 2014-2016 unveiled its limits; with Italy and Greece struggling to deal with the situation and calling for solidarity from their fellow member states.

The uneven distribution of influxes of asylum seekers created tensions between member states. In 2016, the European Commission tabled a reform of the Dublin Regulation that provided for the creation of a *permanent and mandatory relocation mechanism* intended to enforce responsibility-sharing in matters of asylum claims. The principle was simple: each member state is attributed an “adequate” proportion of the total asylum claims lodged in the EU as a function of its GDP and population; once this threshold is exceeded, a redistribution mechanism is automatically triggered so that asylum seekers are relocated to other member states. The mechanism also provided for member states unwilling to relocate to pay their way out of it through a financial contribution of €250,000 per applicant not accepted. The proposal sparked the ire of some member states, notably so-called Visegrád 4 countries (Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic and Slovakia), which have repeatedly voiced their opposition to relocation.

Here, we provide evidence on where Europeans stand on the issue. The analysis that follows is based on a survey conducted in 19 EU member states. Asked whether countries should collaborate to protect the world’s refugees, an overwhelming share of the respondents’ answers affirmatively: 64.9% of them tend to agree with the statement while a mere 13.5% tend to disagree (see Figure 1). This pattern is similar in most countries under study, with the exception of the Visegrád 4 countries, which tend to present higher values of disagreement with the foregoing statement (see Figure 2). This is particularly the case in Slovakia and the Czech Republic where there are more people disagreeing than people agreeing: respectively 39% and 41% of the respondents disagree with the statement.


PROTECT’S CITIZEN ATTITUDE SURVEY

PROTECT conducted a citizen attitude survey in 26 countries in June-July 2021. The survey included at least 1000 respondents per country and measured attitudes to a range of international refugee protection policies and instruments through conventional survey methods as well as survey experiments.

The analysis in this policy brief focuses on only two of the survey questions and 19 EU member states: Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, and Sweden. The countries not included in the analysis here are: Norway, the UK, South Africa, the US, Turkey, Mexico, and Canada.


All figures presented here are weighted with post-stratification weights. Population weights are also applied where the figures show aggregate of countries.

Fig.1: Percentage of respondents in 19 EU countries agreeing or disagreeing with the statement: “All countries should collaborate and strive by all means to protect the world’s refugees” (N=19,292)



Source: Cappelen, Sicakkan & Van Wolleghem (2021, 2022)

Fig.2: Percentage of respondents in Visegrád 4 agreeing or disagreeing with the statement: “All countries should collaborate and strive by all means to protect the world’s refugees” (N=4,051)




People's stance on whether all countries should collaborate to protect the world's refugees begs the question of how they would want to collaborate. The statement presented above mentions "strive by all means", without specifying what those means are. We thus ask the survey respondents whether they would be willing to accept asylum seekers in their country or if they would rather prefer their government to pay another country to accept asylum seekers. PROTECT survey, in this respect, conducts an interesting experiment: in asking what respondents prefer, we vary the amount their country would have to pay per asylum seeker in order to have another state accept them. Respondents are randomly distributed into three groups: the first group is presented with a financial contribution of €5,000 per asylum seeker, the second one with a contribution of €50,000, and the third one with a contribution of €250,000.

In Figure 3, the graph on the left-hand side displays the overall preferences of respondents. On the whole, a sizable majority of the respondents would opt for accepting asylum seekers in their countries (63.5%) rather than paying another country to accept them (36.5%). The figure then varies with the amount the respondents are presented with (right-hand side graph): the higher the amount, the more inclined people are to accept the asylum seekers. Where respondents are presented with the choice of either accepting the claimants or paying a financial contribution of €5,000 to the country that accepts them, 43% of the respondents would rather pay (and, thus, 57% would rather accept them). If the amount presented is €250,000, only 31.9% would rather pay than accept the asylum seekers.

The EU aggregate however hides disparities between countries. People's willingness to accept asylum seekers is, in some countries, lower than their willingness to pay a €5,000 contribution. Figure 4 displays people's response to the different amounts in countries in which at least one of the amount categories is chosen by more than 50% of the respondents. For instance, in the Czech Republic, a staggering 64% would rather pay €5,000 than relocating an asylum seeker in their country. It is followed suit by Hungary with 59.3% and Slovakia with 58.7%. Note that the Czech Republic and Slovakia are also the two countries in which there is a larger share of people disagreeing with the international collaboration duty than that of people agreeing (see Figure 2).


Conclusively, a large majority of the Europeans surveyed consider that all countries should collaborate to protect the world's refugees. When asked how international solidarity should manifest – either through admission of asylum seekers or through financial solidarity – they are a majority to be willing to admit protection seekers. Despite the clashes between member states' leaders during and after the refugee crisis, our findings suggest that there is significant support in public opinion for more solidarity and, specifically, for relocation within the EU. The degree of support for international solidarity is lower in the Visegrad 4-countries. When causes for these attitudes are explored, our preliminary analyses show that nativist sentiments and discriminatory notions of citizen identity lie behind the attitudes that tend to pay big sums of money rather than protecting refugees in own country.

Fig.3. Respondents' willingness to accept asylum seekers or pay another country to accept them (left-hand side; %); and responses to different amounts presented (right-hand side; %) (N = 19,268)



Source: Cappelen, Sicakkan, Van Wolleghem (2021, 2022)

Fig.4. Responses to different amounts presented in countries with responses over 50% (1,008<N<1,016 per country)



2.2 Discourses on international solidarity on refugee protection in social media

PROTECT'S SOCIAL MEDIA DISCOURSE DATA

Protect's social media discourse database contains data from 2015-2019 on Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, and Reddit in 12 languages, of which 9 are analyzed here: English, German, French, Italian, Spanish, Polish, Dutch, Swedish, and Danish.

The data were downloaded via keywords related with migration and refugee protection and key institutions of interest: References to the EU or UN needed to appear within a 20-word distance to the migration keyword.

PROTECT performed a cross-platform, cross-language comparison of social media content from Twitter, Reddit and YouTube related to refugees and migrants in the context of two major players in international protection: the United Nations and the European Union (Dutceac-Segesten & Farjam 2022). The data covers a period of five years (2015-2019) and is analyzed using a combination of computational methods (word2vec) and computer-assisted content analysis (keyword-in-context) for nine languages. The results show that the most dominant discourse categories are the *globalists* and the *nation-statists*. The most dominant topics present across the language clusters are *Limiting and anti-migration*, *Global politics*, *Economy & job-market*, and *Humanitarian and compassionate attitudes* towards migration. While these trends apply to the entire dataset, there are notable differences among language clusters and among the social media platforms, which point out the need to take into account the specific contexts when analyzing the digital discourse on international refugee protection.

Looking at the results on the *discourse categories*, for the large languages, globalist, regionalist, and nation-statist discourses have the highest percentages. Content-wise, the positions of the globalist and nationalist agendas are not entirely aligned in terms of refugee protection, but they are not necessarily at odds with one another either. The absence of a strong nativist political group signals that the migration issue is not pushing parties to adopt more radical positions on refugee protection. Those who want to uphold and implement the Geneva Convention and the Global Compacts for Refugees and Migration appear to be quite vocal on social media, whereas those emphasizing national/ethnic identities are less present. However, the picture is rather different for the smaller languages. Here the nation-statists are the largest group.

Regarding topics, the most discussed subjects across all languages were *Limiting and anti-migration*, *Global politics*, *Economy & job-market*, *Humanitarian and compassionate attitudes*, and *EU politics*. This distribution of topics fits well together with the distribution of discourse categories identified in Figures 5 and 6. The topics Humanitarianism and Global politics have considerable conceptual overlap with the 'globalist' discourses. The topic *Economy & job-market* overlaps with market-globalism, and the topic *EU politics* is strongly related with the regionalist discourse. However, some other subjects picked up by our inductive analysis span across cleavages, such as *Limiting and anti-migration*. The *Refugee Crisis*, and *National politics* are subjects not entirely related to the five discourses, but that give us an additional insight into the nature of the online discussion surrounding the issue of migration.

Fig.5: Distribution of discourse categories for the five largest languages. For those language, Twitter was analyzed separately from the other social media.





Fig.6: Distribution of discourse categories in the for smaller languages in which posts from all social media were analyzed jointly



Source: Dutceac-Segesten & Farjam (2022)

While the general trends mentioned above are valid, there are some national divergences. English and Spanish, the most globally used languages in our set, are also clusters of high focus on global politics. Italian, French, and Polish discourses include many references to EU politics, whereas Danish is overwhelmingly displaying references to national politics. Most of the language clusters have the topics of *Limits to migration* or *anti-migration* attitudes as the second most frequent topic. However, national discourses vary; generalizations should be made with caution outside the most dominant themes that are mentioned above.

Conclusively, PROTECT's results on social media discourses in 9 languages are to a significant extent in conformity with the results from our citizen attitude surveys in 19 EU countries. That is, the presence of a set of contesting discourses on migration, asylum, and refugee protection is confirmed by the two studies that were conducted independently by using diverse types of data and methods. The resultant picture is: On issues of migration, asylum, and refugee protection, the globalist discourse aiming to introduce a human rights-based refugee protection system coordinated at the global level, is the most prevalent discourse. The globalist discourse is confronted by the nation-statist discourse, which aims to hold on to an intergovernmental, multilateral protection regime that allows for national sovereignty, voluntary state collaboration, and state discretion. The European-regionalist discourse that we found is primarily about harmonizing, regulating, and coordinating member states' migration, asylum, and refugee protection policies at the EU level without much reference to norms or other topics. The nativist discourse, aiming to abandon all international commitments and binding collaboration arrangements, is in minority but still visible and vocal at all geographical scales, from the national to the global.

2.3 Communication Networks around the United Nations and European Union on Twitter

For a policy actor to win the discursive struggle, be it on social media or other communication platforms, it is vital to (i) recognize these five discourses when they are used and be able to navigate through the pandemonium of rhetoric, arguments, and concerns emerging from them, and (ii) be visible, interactive, and linked with the full scope of policy actors working and speaking about migration, asylum, and refugee protection. Achieving such an elevated level of publicity is a greater challenge for global and transnational policy actors like the UN and EU, whose target groups are significantly diverse, than policy actors addressing national audiences. Their main challenge is to attract policy actors and citizens into their own communication networks from a very fragmented social media space across all countries and parts of the world.

Therefore, PROTECT identified in its social media study the structural communication gaps that leave some policy actors outside the reach of the UN and EU and the most central policy actors who are able to fill the structural gaps and control the communication flows in the Twitter networks (see Heiberger, Schmitt, Sicakkan & Van Wollegheem 2022).

As Figures 7 and 8 show, communication in the UN and EU networks is triggered by different events. In the EU network, Twitter interactions around refugee and migration issues reached its climax during the European migration crisis (2015-2017) whereas, in the UN network, Twitter activity makes peaks after the UN General Assembly's affirmation of the GCR and GCM in December 2018 and around the First Global Refugee Forum in December 2019. This is the picture that we get from the full data set.

Fig.7: Weekly Number of Tweets and Retweets in the UN-Twitter Network*





Fig.8: Weekly Number of Tweets and Retweets in the EU-Twitter Network*



* Figures 7 and 8 use a 12-week moving average to smooth out short-term fluctuations and highlight longer-term trends or cycles.

Also, when we look at the intensity of interactive communication activity in the specific periods between one month before and one month after global and European policymaking events, we observe that the UN network's activity increases during refugee and asylum related policy events, and the EU network's activity increases during migration related policy events (see Heiberger, Schmitt, Sicakkan & Van Wolleghem). Certainly, this doesn't mean that refugee-protection related events are not discussed in the EU network, but they are discussed mostly as part of migration policy events.

This is an indication that the notions of “migrant” and “refugee” are being conflated in the network around the EU institutions, which is regarded by the UNHCR and many specialists of refugee studies as a danger to deteriorate the 1951 Refugee Convention and the international protection system in the long run.

To counter the development towards conflation of the “migrant” and “refugee” categories with facts, human-rights values, and international legal norms on refugee protection and asylum seeking, a strong presence of global, regional, and national political institutions as well as non-state organizations that are involved in refugee protection is needed in social media. However, we observe that some of these policy actors remain isolated from the UN and EU networks. A vital communication gap in this respect concerns the prevalence of *international and national NGOs* among

PROTECT'S SOCIAL NETWORK DATA

PROTECT collected two data sets to assess the influence of global institutions, European authorities, states, and non-state organizations in public communication on refugee protection.

PROTECT's network data covers thirteen European languages and the time period between 2014 to 2020.

Here, we use communication that contains interactions: more than 11.8 million retweets and 4.7 million mentions for the EU network and 13 million retweets and 5.5 million mentions for the UN network.

We deploy measures of importance in network methodology to assess policy actors' influence and control on the communication flows.

the isolates. That is, many global inter-state organizations, global NGOs, and global activist groups who are active on protection issues are outside the UN and EU Twitter sphere. Also, majority of sub-state institutions like ministries of justice and home affairs, almost all national political parties, and national NGOs are beyond the reach of the UN and EU. The UN and EU do not reach the US policy actors either. For any policy actor, it is of vital interest to reach the most influential players in global politics. In this regard, this means that the UN, the EU, and other policy actors who are active in the two networks are not able to effectively reach an important group of organizations that are interested in refugee protection issues.

That state and sub-state authorities, political parties, and other national policy actors are isolates on the UN and EU Twitter networks is a crucial fact in the light of another PROTECT finding: small countries' discourses on migrants and refugees on Twitter, YouTube, and Reddit are characterized by nationalism and nativism to a larger extent than big countries (Dutceac Segesten and Farjam 2022, Cappelen, Sicakkan & Wollegghem 2021). UN and EU institutions add global and transnational perspectives to public debates on international protection. However, when national states and policy actors from small countries are outside the UN and EU social media networks, the risk for the formation of ethno-nationalist and nativist echo-chambers increases, reinforcing the current populist tendency to question the legitimacy of the international refugee law and international organizations and embedding asylum and refugee protection policies in countries' strict particularistic migration policy objectives.

However, concerning the policy actors who are within UN's and EU's Twitter networks, the UN and EU institutions do have a high degree of control over the communication flows in their respective Twitter networks, they do reach and bridge many important policy actors, and they do fill important communication gaps within their respective networks. Nevertheless, regarding the ability of global and regional policy actors to influence each other, the UNHCR is more present in the EU-network than EU institutions are in the UN-network. For instance, while the UNHCR's activity and centrality in the EU-network increased after the EC's announcement of the New Pact, the EC's and other EU institutions' presence in the UN-network during the same period barely increased beyond being mentioned more.

Besides the UNHCR and the EC, the two most central actors are PICUM and ECRE, two transnational non-state organizations driving the global and European scale communication on international protection. They control the communication flow in the two networks by bridging the parts of the network that would otherwise remain separate. Their centrality keeps pace with other stakeholders before and after critical global policymaking events. They also fill important structural gaps in both the UN and EU networks by being linked with many policy actors that are not linked with each other. Although PICUM and ECRE share with the UN and the EU the predicament of not having much influence on national level policy actors, their communication can be regarded as examples of best-practice for reaching and influencing a wide spectrum of policy actors on Twitter, and their social media strategies need to be studied in more depth.

3. Policy Implications and Recommendations

PROTECT's results imply that governments need not be concerned about the legitimacy of their policies aiming to enter international solidarity and collaboration arrangements that promote a human rights-based approaches to refugee protection:

POLICY IMPLICATION 1

As international solidarity is the most prominent preference among European citizens and the strongest discourse on the social media, the UN, EU, and states can proceed with strengthening their international collaboration on the implementation of the Global Compact on Refugees and the New Pact on Migration and Asylum without being concerned about the democratic legitimacy of this policy line. Though, the governments of the Visegrad countries, Denmark, the Netherlands, and other small countries may need to be more cautious as anti-refugee groups in these countries are more audible.

European countries were among the main drivers behind the birth of the international human rights and refugee regimes. A weakening of the international legal norms and global institutions for refugee protection in Europe is foreseen to be detrimental to the whole international refugee protection system. Whereas increasing government unwillingness for international solidarity and collaboration is one important feature of this trend, the main instrument of deterioration is embedding asylum and refugee policy within governments' particularistic migration policy objectives by putting an equality sign between the notions of "refugee" and "migrant". Embedment of refugee policy in migration policy entails giving primacy to migration policy objectives when they conflict with states' international refugee protection commitments. However, these are two distinct legal categories that imply fundamentally different moral obligations and political approaches, and their conflation may dilute the 1951 Refugee Convention, the right to asylum, and the rights of refugees in the long run. Whereas migration policy is within the domain of national sovereignty, asylum and refugee policy is within the domain of states' international obligations that require the pursuit of the legal norms and criteria defined by international law. A tendency to such embedment of "refugee policy" in "migration policy" is observed in the Twitter network around the European Union whereas the network around the United Nations distinguished better between these categories. Therefore:

POLICY IMPLICATION 2

The European Commission, the European Parliament, the European Council, and the other EU organs, directorates, and agencies overseeing, or handling refugee and asylum policy need to adopt and promote discourses that distinguish more clearly between refugee protection commitments and the EU's migration policy objectives.

Whereas the above policy implication calls for caution in the EU's official discourse on international refugee protection, the next two policy implications concern the UN's and EU's ability to reach and influence other policy actors in the social media. This requires development of communication strategies that link the UN and EU with policy actors that are outside their current social networks. This implies adopting special strategies to attract global and transnational NGOs, national state authorities, political parties, and national NGOs into their networks. Looking from the perspective of the UN and EU institutions, and national states, the main reason for these policy actors not directly addressing each other online is highly likely related with diplomacy concerns as well as the existence of established channels of offline communication. However, it is possible to find strategies that are diplomatically not too tricky:

POLICY IMPLICATION 3

The UN and EU need to include state authorities, national political parties, and transnational and national NGOs in their Twitter networks by following them, inviting them to follow various UN and EU institutions, re-tweeting and mentioning them, and highlighting best-practices of the states and sub-state institutions in retweets and mentions.

When links are established with the currently isolated policy actors mentioned above, the next step should be to initiate interactions with them on social media to increase the probability of mutual influence by (i) bridging between their networks and the UN and EU networks and (ii) filling the structural communication gaps. To achieve this objective, policy actors would not only need to simply tweet, retweet, and mention; it is important to whom one is referring in mentions. Addressing actors from different *social media communities* increases the amount of non-redundant information rapidly and, hence, fills structural communication gaps:

POLICY IMPLICATION 4

This entails a need for frequent community-detection and actor-centrality measurements on social media by the communication departments of the UN, EU, states, and other policy actors in order to identify and mention the most central policy actors who are communicating interactively in their respective social media communities.

Further reading

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4. Project Identity

- Coordinator: Prof. Hakan G. Sicakkan, University of Bergen, Norway, info.protect@uib.no
- Horizon 2020
- Duration: 1 February 2020 – 31 January 2023 (36 months).
- Website: <https://www.protect-project.eu/>.
- Social Media: [Facebook](#), [Twitter](#), [YouTube](#), [LinkedIn](#), [Blog](#)
- Contributions to this policy brief by:
 - Professor Hakan G. Sicakkan, University of Bergen
 - Professor Anamaria Dutceac-Segesten, Lund University
 - Professor Raphael H. Heiberger, Queen Mary University of London
 - Postdoctoral researcher Pierre-Georges Van Wolleghem, University of Bergen
 - Postdoctoral researcher Mike Farjam, Lund University
 - Doctoral researcher Sara Schmitt, University of Stuttgart

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