



# Stakeholders of (De-) Radicalisation in Turkey

D3.1 Country Report

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## List of abbreviations

<b>AKP</b>	Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party)
<b>ANF</b>	Fırat Haber Ajansı (Fırat News Agency)
<b>CHP</b>	Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People's Party)
<b>CTE</b>	Ceza ve Tevkifevleri Genel Müdürlüğü (General Directorate of Prisons and Detention Houses)
<b>DEAŞ</b>	Devlet'ül Irak ve's Şam (The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria)
<b>DHKP-C</b>	Devrimci Halk Kurtuluş Partisi-Cephesi (People's Revolutionary Liberation Party-Front)
<b>EGM</b>	Emniyet Genel Müdürlüğü (General Directorate of Security)
<b>FETÖ</b>	Fettullahçı Terör Örgütü (Gülenist Terrorist Organisation)
<b>HBDH</b>	Halkların Birleşik Devrim Hareketi (The Peoples' United Revolutionary Movement)
<b>HDP</b>	Halkların Demokratik Partisi (Peoples' Democratic Party/Democratic Party of The Peoples)
<b>HPG</b>	Hêzên Parastina Gel (People's Defence Forces)
<b>IBDA-C</b>	İslami Büyük Doğu Akıncılar Cephesi (The Great Eastern Islamic Raiders' Front)
<b>İŞİD</b>	Irak ve Şam İslam Devleti (The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria)
<b>MHP</b>	Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (Nationalist Action Party)
<b>MKP</b>	Maoist Komünist Partisi (Maoist Communist Party)
<b>PKK</b>	Partîya Karkerên Kurdistanê (Kurdish Workers' Party)
<b>PYD</b>	Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat (Democratic Union Party)
<b>R2PRIS</b>	Radicalisation Prevention in Prisons
<b>SDF</b>	Syrian Democratic Forces
<b>SETA</b>	Siyaset Ekonomi ve Toplum Araştırmaları Vakfı (Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research)
<b>TAK</b>	Teyrêbazên Azadiya Kurdistan (Kurdistan National Hawks)

<b>TKP-ML</b>	Türkiye Komünist Partisi/Marksist-Leninist (Communist Party of Turkey/Marxist-Leninist)
<b>TTOV</b>	Türkiye Terör Olayları Veritabanı (Turkey Terror Events Database)
<b>YDG-H</b>	Tevgera Ciwanen Welatparêzên Şoreşger (Patriotic Revolutionary Youth Movement)
<b>YPG</b>	Yekîneyên Parastina Gel (People's Protection Units)
<b>YPS</b>	Yekîneyên Parastina Sivîl (Civil Protection Units)

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## About the Project

D.Rad is a comparative study of radicalisation and polarisation in Europe and beyond. It aims to identify the actors, networks, and wider social contexts driving radicalisation, particularly among young people in urban and peri-urban areas. D.Rad conceptualizes this through the I-GAP spectrum (injustice-grievance-alienation-polarisation) with the goal of moving towards measurable evaluations of de-radicalisation programmes. Our intention is to identify the building blocks of radicalisation, which include a sense of being victimized; a sense of being thwarted or lacking agency in established legal and political structures; and coming under the influence of "us vs them" identity formulations.

D.Rad benefits from an exceptional breadth of backgrounds. The project spans national contexts including the UK, France, Italy, Germany, Poland, Hungary, Finland, Slovenia, Bosnia, Serbia, Kosovo, Israel, Iraq, Jordan, Turkey, Georgia, Austria, and several minority nationalisms. It bridges academic disciplines ranging from political science and cultural studies to social psychology and artificial intelligence. Dissemination methods include D.Rad labs, D.Rad hubs, policy papers, academic workshops, visual outputs, and digital galleries. As such, D.Rad establishes a rigorous foundation to test practical interventions geared to prevention, inclusion, and de-radicalisation.

With the possibility of capturing the trajectories of seventeen nations and several minority nations, the project will provide a unique evidence base for the comparative analysis of law and policy as nation-states adapt to new security challenges. The process of mapping these varieties and their link to national contexts will be crucial in uncovering strengths and weaknesses in existing interventions. Furthermore, D.Rad accounts for the problem that processes of radicalisation often occur in circumstances that escape the control and scrutiny of traditional national frameworks of justice. The participation of AI professionals in modelling, analyzing, and devising solutions to online radicalisation will be central to the project's aims.

## Executive summary/Abstract

This report aims to depict and analyze the context of radicalisation in Turkey in the period from 2001 to 2021 as part of the Work Package “Mapping Stakeholders and Situations of Radicalisation” of the D.Rad project. It focuses on the major violent events that can be considered as milestones for the trends of radicalisation and de-radicalisation; analyzes how the political elite and the public opinion perceive radicalisation and violent threats; and maps out the agents and channels of radicalisation and de-radicalisation.

Turkey, as a country with increasing polarisation in its highly complex cleavage structure, has witnessed violent attacks by all four types of radicalised groups, namely ethnonationalist/separatist, jihadist, right-wing, and left-wing since 2001. Due to the lack of detailed and systemic publicly available data on political violence from the national resources, the report relies mainly on the Global Terrorism Database, which provides information on Turkey from 2000 to 2018. The analysis of GTE shows that the biggest threat is posed by separatist radicalisation, which is followed by the jihadist attacks, which peaked in 2015 and 2016. It is noteworthy that no right-wing groups either in the GTD or in any official document of Turkey exist. As there are incidents in which attacks on the minority and oppositional groups are officially downplayed and the perpetrators remain unprosecuted, this raises doubts over the penetration of right-wing radicalisation to law enforcement and party politics.

The Turkish political parties converge in their prioritization of the separatist threat over the other types. AKP (Justice and Development Party) and MHP (Nationalist Movement Party) also emphasize the potential threat from FETÖ (Gülen Terrorist Organisation) in the aftermath of 15 July 2016 coup attempt. These two parties also incriminate the opposition parties, CHP (Republican Peoples' Party) and HDP (Peoples' Democratic Party) for affiliation with the separatist and FETÖ radicalisation. The CHP, as the main opposition party, defines PKK and ISIS as terrorist organisations and warns about state-led radicalisation through the arbitrary abuse of the laws on terror in an attempt to incriminate the peaceful opposition. The HDP emphasizes the need for democratic reforms and the resolution of the social and economic problems for de-radicalisation. Public opinion resonates largely with voting preferences.

Regarding de-radicalisation, all main political parties have a consensus on condemning violent incidents regardless of the ideological leaning of the organisation. However, we do not observe specialized party or civil society organisation activities specifically focusing on de-radicalisation. This may be related to several issues such as polarisation in the political space, the intensity of political struggle at the macrolevel, and the incrimination of opposition parties' activities to reach out to vulnerable social groups. Thus, de-radicalisation programmes are held by state institutions. Among these, prison programmes appear as the most common initiatives. The Presidency of Religious Affairs in cooperation with the Ministry of Justice and Police Force conducts some programmes in the field of jihadist radicalisation in the form of disseminating peaceful and tolerant messages of Islam. In the context of separatist radicalisation, the most important de-radicalisation programme is the "Return to Village and Rehabilitation Project" which was active between 1999 and 2015. The programme



accelerated under the AKP government's National Unity and Brotherhood programme, commonly known as the Peace Process, which was terminated in 2015.

The report identifies the tendency to downplay the right-wing radicalisation and increasing state-led radicalisation as the most important challenges for correctly assessing the dynamics of radicalisation and developing programmes for de-radicalisation.

# 1. Introduction

This report aims to depict and analyze the context of radicalisation in Turkey in the period from 2001 to 2021 as part of the Work Package “Mapping Stakeholders and Situations of Radicalisation” of the D.Rad project.

We define radicalisation as a process that involves increasing rejection of established law, order, and politics as well as the active pursuit of alternatives, in the form of politically driven violence or justification of violence. It further involves a move away from "dialogue, compromise, and tolerance" as the existing political regime does not hold legitimacy in the eyes of the individual or collective groups (Schmid, 2013, p. 19). Radicalisation also pertains to the state-led radicalisation where the state and/or state-supported groups similarly abandon dialogue and compromise and resort to confrontational tactics to eliminate the radical opposition. De-radicalisation refers to the processes countering such rejection at the individual (micro), organisational (meso), or societal (macro) levels resulting in a shift from violent to nonviolent strategies and tactics.

Turkey has a complex structure of politicized cleavages and an increasingly polarised political context. The political space has been gradually closing since 2011, resort to the systematic use of force and intimidation strategies has become increasingly widespread since 2015 along with exacerbating economic conditions. In this context, all four cases of radicalisation, namely, ethnonationalist/separatist, jihadist, right-wing, and left-wing radicalisation exist in Turkey.

The report begins with outlining the major turning points in the political system that reinforced the extant structural determinants of radicalisation. Then, it focuses on the stakeholders and channels of both radicalisation and de-radicalisation. In doing so, the report relies on official statistics, think tank and human rights reports, political party programmes and publications, newspaper archives, academic research, publicly available datasets, and published survey results.

## 2. Contextual background

Turkey witnessed several episodes of violent conflict in terms of both state-led radicalisation and non-state right-wing, left-wing, Islamist, and separatist radicalisation before 2001. In the period from 1984 to 2001, ethnonationalism/separatism (Barkey, 2000; Ergil, 2000; Marcus 2009; Bajalan et al, 2013; Ünver, 2015) comprised the main form of radicalisation, which came to a halt with the capture of the Kurdistan Workers' Party's (PKK) leader in 1999 (Zaman, 1999). Distrust in the extant parties of the centre-left and centre-right and the repercussions of the 2000-2001 financial crisis resulted in the landslide victory of the Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*, AKP) (Çarkoğlu, 2002; Açikel, 2003). The AKP was established by the younger generation of the Islamists split from the party of the National Outlook movement, with a reformist and liberal-conservative agenda of domestic and foreign policy in its founding discourse (AKP, 2002; Dikici Bilgin, 2008; Hale and Özbudun, 2009; Kumbaracıbaşı, 2009). Improvement of the economic conditions and the relatively liberal political environment in the period enabled the de-escalation of radicalising forces in the first period of the party in power from 2002 to 2007. However, the US invasion of

Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003 brought early jihadist attacks. Al Qaeda attack synagogues, the British consulate, and the HSBC headquarter in Istanbul in 2003 with suicide bombs (see Appendix 1).

Earlier signs of rising social tension and polarisation came in the second AKP period (2007 to 2011), triggered by both domestic and international developments. AKP's well-placed perception of threat from the tutelary military establishment, as a party with an Islamist pedigree, led to the prioritization of demilitarization since its first coming to power (Duman and Tsarouhas, 2006). The government also sued and imprisoned several members of the army based on coup-plotting allegations; both actions producing mixed results. On the one hand, it curbed the institutional power of the military substantially (Gürsoy, 2012). On the other hand, many saw the Ergenekon and Sledgehammer trials as an initiative of the government to undermine the credibility and political power of the secular opposition (Jenkins, 2009; Doğan and Rodrik, 2010; Rodrik, 2011), suffering from judicial flaws including fabricated evidence allegedly placed by the involvement of the *Gülen* Movement<sup>1</sup>. Assassinations of Hrant Dink, an Armenian-Turkish journalist, and three Christian missionaries by right-wing radicals in 2007 created suspicion over the penetration of right-wing radicalisation in law enforcement. The government, during this period, took steps for conflict resolution in the context of the Kurdish question. In 2009, PKK members residing in a camp in Northern Iraq entered Turkey's Habur border and symbolically surrendered (see Appendix 1). The beginning of the Arab Uprisings in December 2010, and the outbreak of the Syrian civil war in 2011 with an influx of migration to Turkey, however, changed the political agenda.

The third AKP period (2011-2015) shows a rise in diversification and escalation of the political conflict. Public discontent towards the extended stay of the Syrian migrants increased. (Erdoğan, 2014; M. Erdoğan, 2014). Turkey's relations with the neighbouring countries as well as the US and Russia also deteriorated. The opposition accused the government of engaging in covert operations in support of the jihadist rebels in Syria (BBC News, 2015b). A corruption scandal known as the December 17-25 Incident broke out in 2013 (Oruçoglu, 2015) and large-scale corruption increased (Soyaltın, 2017; Kimya, 2019; Öniş, 2019). Two events mark this period in terms of radicalisation. First, the democratic backsliding and increased Islamization policies resulted in a massive popular uprising in the summer of 2013 known as the Gezi Park Protests (Arat, 2013; Farro and Demirhisar, 2014; Gençoğlu Onbaşı, 2016; Özen 2015). The left-wing People's Revolutionary Liberation Party-Front (DHKP-C) retaliated to the police brutality in suppression of the protestors by attacking the major courthouse in Istanbul, which resulted in the killing of the public prosecutor (BBC News, 2015a). Second, the government attempted and failed to implement the Kurdish Peace Process in the 2013-2015 period (Pusane, 2014; Yeğen, 2015). The initiative was partly a pre-emptive action against the challenge posed by the establishment of a Kurdish autonomous administration in Kobane, Syria; yet, failed to reconcile the Kurdish separatism in Turkey.

The period since June 2015 under AKP<sup>2</sup> hence should be interpreted under the light of these previous events. Kurdish separatist radicalisation surmounted with several violent attacks of PKK and affiliated youth groups such as Patriotic Revolutionary Youth Movement (YDG-H)

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<sup>1</sup> The *Gülen* movement, also known as the *Fethullahçılar* is an Islamist organisation later accused of plotting the abortive coup on July 15, 2016.

<sup>2</sup> This period covers the interim period from June 2015 elections to the snap elections of November 2015; November 2015 to the 2018 elections; and from 2018 elections until today.

(France 24, 2015) along with military operations which resulted in urban clashes (İbrahim, 2015; BBC News 2015c) and the destruction of several urban settlements (TMMOB, 2019). The government has since then re-termed the Kurdish movement as PKK/YPG implying the external connections. Several leading members of the People's Democratic Party (*Halkların Demokratik Partisi*, HDP), the third-largest party in the parliament, including the party's co-chair were imprisoned (Küçükgöçmen, 2020). A peace activist and lawyer, Tahir Elçi, was assassinated by unidentified hitmen (Malsin, 2015). Jihadist radicalisation, on the other hand, continues to be the biggest source of political violence. ISIS bombed Suruç district of Diyarbakır during a gathering of the Socialist Youth Associations Federation preparing to deliver humanitarian aid to Kobane in July 2015, another bombing occurred in Ankara in October 2015 at the Labour, Peace and Democracy Rally (see Appendix 1), followed by the attack in the Istanbul Atatürk Airport and several others targeting mainly the state institutions as well as Kurdish and left-wing opposition (Crisis Group, 2020). Radicalisation by the state and non-state groups in this period should also be interpreted within the wider context of authoritarianization. The violation of human rights and liberties took a new turn with the failed coup attempt on July 15, 2016. Although it was officially announced as a plot by the Gülenists, several left-wing and Kurdish academics along with public servants were purged; and, journalists and activists were imprisoned (Çalışkan, 2017; Taş, 2018; Altınordu, 2019). In 2017, the government's referendum for transition to the presidential system passed with a meager margin (Aytaç, Çarkoğlu & Yıldırım, 2017; Dikici Bilgin and Erdoğan, 2018). The new system granted extreme executive powers to the president, leading to further personalization of power (Esen & Gümüştü, 2018). The new regime tested its power by not recognizing the results of the municipality elections in Istanbul (Yılmaz and Turner, 2019). Since then, cross-border military operations intensified and racist attacks on the Kurdish minority increased, perpetrators released without proper investigation. The media channels and political organisations of the secular liberal and left-wing opposition face government suppression. The government's efforts to silence the universities continue, illustrated by the appointment of the caretaker rectors. The most recent appointment to the country's ivy-league Boğaziçi University generated popular unrest (Fahim, 2021). The government responded by accusing the LGBTQ groups of trying to undermine the social fabric and religious values (BBC News, 2021; Pitel, 2021).

An overview of the period from 2001 to April 2021 indicates that the changes in the political and economic environment shaped the context of radicalisation and de-radicalisation in Turkey. Improvement of the macroeconomic indicators and the relatively open political environment curbed radicalisation; and, enabled the government to initiate policies for demilitarization of the political system; and start talks with the Kurdish movement in the first half of the period. However, the closing of the political space along with the outbreak of the Syrian civil war changed the political landscape substantially and re-instated a conducive ground for radical movements. The use of coercion against the opposition led to the return of the left-wing radicalisation and downplaying the crimes against the non-Muslim minority and secular actors raised suspicions about the extent of the penetration of the right-wing radicalisation in law enforcement. The regional level conflict translated into a series of jihadist attacks within the borders of Turkey. Separatist violence returned with the collapse of the Peace Process in 2015 and assumed a cross-border nature.

## 3. Structures of radicalisation

### 3.1. Data on political violence in Turkey


Publicly available data on political violence in Turkey is not systemic, and, lacks detail in most cases. The official data sources can be retrieved from the websites of the gendarmerie and Directorate General of Security (police, EGM) under the officiate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. However, the EGM provides disaggregated data only for 2019, without any public access to the archives (EGM, 2019). The only systematic use of data is provided by the pro-government think tank SETA's report, although the dataset is not available for replication. The report is based on Turkey Terror Events Database (*Türkiye Terör Olayları Veritabanı*, TTOV) (not publicly available), focusing on the PKK attacks in the 2004-2018 period (SETA, 2019). It is noteworthy that the extant official data and reports focus mostly on the PKK attacks, with only a casual reference to the jihadist radicalisation. Prioritization of PKK is also salient in the international think tanks such as the International Crisis Group (Crisis Group, 2021).

In these circumstances, we mainly utilized the Global Terrorism Database (GTD).<sup>3</sup> The GTD provides data for the 2000-2018 period for Turkey, details the attacks by the perpetrators, casualties, and as such. Accordingly, the political violence in Turkey increased sharply in the 2014-2017 period as both the separatist and jihadist attacks surmounted (see Figure 1). We recorded the violent groups with the original data tags into 4 categories: Jihadist Groups (ISIS, Al-Qaida, Turkish Hezbollah, IBDA-C, Muslim extremists, Free Syrian Army, The Independent Military Wing of the Syrian Revolution Abroad, Peace at Home Council (July 15 junta), FETÖ, Chechen Rebels), Kurdish Separatists (Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), Kurdistan Freedom Hawks (TAK), Civil Protection Units (YPS), People's Defence Unit (Turkey), Peoples' United Revolutionary Movement (HBDH), Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), People's Protection Units (YPG), Kurdish extremists, Kurdish Separatists), Left-wing (DHKP/C, Maoist Communist Party (MKP), Revolutionary Headquarters (Turkey), Turkish Communist Party/Marxist (TKP-ML)), Other/Unknown<sup>4</sup> (Attacks not assumed by any known organisation, tagged as simply other and unknown).


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<sup>3</sup> The TTOV dataset corroborates the GTD on the PKK attacks.

<sup>4</sup> Other/Unknown might partly be right-wing attacks downplayed by the state and those in which there may be public official involvement.





Armed assault and bombing/explosion emerge as the most frequent type of attacks in all four groups for all years available (see Figure 2).



According to the GTD, Kurdish separatism poses the biggest threat in Turkey. This holds both when we analyze the number of attacks in years and the number of total fatalities (see Figures

3 & 4). It is followed by the Jihadist attacks, which peaked in 2015 and 2016. Left-wing radicalisation appears to have the lowest number of attacks and fatalities. It is interesting that the attacks that were not claimed by any known organisation rank third, higher than the left-wing extremist attacks. Besides, there are no right-wing groups either in the GTD or in any official document of Turkey. The right-wing groups, mainly the Turkish ultranationalists, do have organisations such as the Grey Wolves and the Turkish Revenge Brigade; and, they have been accused of assaults on the leftist and Kurdish journalists and writers. However, there are very few incidents that they claimed responsibility for. Part of these attacks of "unknown origin" might be them. As there has been no indictment of affiliated individuals for being affiliated with an officially designated terrorist organisation to the best of our knowledge; it is possible to argue that there might be public official involvement. This aspect is also the main missing data in all databases, that is the role of the state actors in political violence in Turkey.





### 3.2. Perception of radicalisation by the Turkish political elite

In the period from 2001 to 2021, four major parties dominate the political scene: the incumbent AKP, ultranationalist MHP, secular-social democratic CHP, and the pro-Kurdish HDP.<sup>5</sup> The analysis of their electoral programmes shows the transformation of the party discourses across time. The first election manifesto of AKP does not devote any special section on terror or security, the document refers to “terror” only in the context that the state security courts, which were identified with the military legacy, would be annulled to be replaced by civilian criminal courts specialized in organised crime and terror (AKP, 2002, p. 27). 2007 manifesto draws attention to the threat of terror stemming from the instability in Iraq (AKP, 2007, p. 224). 2011 manifesto's discourse emphasizes the importance of de-radicalisation; and it introduces a new project titled National Unity and Brotherhood which aimed to reconcile the Kurdish minority with the state, by providing a political and cultural solution (AKP, 2011, pp. 11-12). This third term of the party, as mentioned earlier, attempted a de-radicalisation process in the 2013-2015 period, yet, as the policy failed to provide an accord, the violent conflict between the security forces and the separatists resurfaced at full scale in summer 2015 in the period between the June 2015 and the repeat election of November 2015. These developments are reflected in the two election manifestos of 2015. While the June manifesto emphasizes the successes of the project and owns the peace process, (AKP, 2015a, p. 31) the November manifesto accuses the PKK of sabotaging the Peace Process (AKP, 2015B, p. 25). 2018 manifesto for the elections held for presidential and parliamentary elections concomitantly adopts a highly securitized discourse. The party promises to eliminate “all types of terrorism” with the help of cross-border military operations, documenting the state's combined struggle

<sup>5</sup> The predecessors of HDP were closed by court decisions on the grounds of having ties with PKK.



with PKK, ISIS, and FETÖ (AKP, 2018, p. 245). MHP has been consistently approaching from a security perspective to the social conflicts, increasingly supporting the AKP's policies against PKK and ISIS. AKP's increasingly securitizing and radicalising approach over time has been responded by an opposite trend in the CHP manifestos. While the party consistently defines PKK and ISIS as terrorist organisations, it increasingly emphasizes the arbitrary abuse of the laws on terror for incrimination, the need for democratic reforms on these laws (CHP, 2018, pp. 42-114). Finally, HDP has been consistently pointing out the social and economic problems in the country and the need for democratization and pluralism (HDP, 2018). The election manifestos indicate that Kurdish separatism has been identified as the biggest threat of political violence throughout the term; and, the only period that we see state-led de-radicalisation has been the failed attempt of the Peace Process in the 2013-2015 period.

In the same period, we observe that the attacks on the ethnic (Kurdish) and religious (Alevi, non-Muslims) and the oppositional groups, in general, are largely downplayed by AKP and MHP. Any such attack was seen as individual acts, the perpetrators either were not put on trial or acquitted. For example, the mafia leader who threatened the Academics for Peace with taking shower in their blood acquitted, ironically in the context of freedom of thought (Duvar, 2018). Similarly, a specialist sergeant who raped a young girl was discharged from prison (Aktan, 2020). The incident is considered a symbolic event in which the state officials remain unpunished for the crimes that are committed against the minority citizens. This attitude might be one of the reasons why right-wing radicalisation is almost absent in the databases and the official reports on political violence in Turkey since 2001.

The recent statements of the top-ranking government office-holders and main opposition figures show the current perceptions of the political elite about the threats of radicalisation. The government parties<sup>6</sup> prioritize Kurdish separatism as the main threat led by PKK and YPG, followed by FETÖ. More importantly, the government incriminates CHP and HDP as the affiliates of terrorist organisations; and contextualizes the peaceful protests as extensions of terrorist organisations and acting on behalf of foreign governments. Most recently, the MHP leadership claimed that the student protests against the caretaker rectors appointed by the government were manipulated by the same actors who plotted the Capitol Riot in the United States (see Appendix 2).

### 3.3. Public perceptions on radicalisation and violence in Turkey

The World Values Survey data indicate that worries that there might be terrorist attacks in Turkey increased from the 2010-2014 period to 2014-2017<sup>7</sup>. PKK continues to be the biggest source of threat in the public perception followed by ISIS. In the longitudinal surveys conducted by the same institutions, terror in general and "the Kurdish question" appear among the major problems, recently accompanied by FETÖ (Aydın et al, 2020). We did not come across any study which mentions the right-wing groups as terrorist threats. It is interesting that the terror threat perception also emerges as the most important issue of Turkish foreign policy (Aydın et al, 2020).

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<sup>6</sup> As Turkey has a presidential system since 2017, AKP is the government party. However, ultranationalist MHP acts as the government partner in policy-making and supports AKP against the opposition parties.

<sup>7</sup> <https://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSONline.jsp>

When we look at the research which focuses primarily on how the Kurdish issue is perceived in public opinion and which ways might lead to resolution, there are also promising findings<sup>8</sup>. From 2012 to 2015, the research shows that both those who recognize the problems of the Kurdish minority and the percentage of the population who believe that democratization and improvement in human rights might solve the problem rather than the military solutions increased substantially (KONDA, 2015, p. 5). This might be interpreted as a positive consequence of the Peace Process which was still on the agenda at the time. However, research in later years indicates that military solutions continue to be supported (Doğan, 2017). A civil war is seen as the most imminent threat in Turkey by 2018.<sup>9</sup> Moreover, more than half of the population refuse that the Kurdish children have the right to education in their mother tongue in 2019 (KONDA, 2019). These findings indicate that the level of polarisation increased in Turkey and is gradually attaining a multilevel character. A recent report shows that people think that July 15 coup attempt, the Kurdish problem, and transition to the presidential system are the three most important events that lead to increased polarisation (Erdoğan and Uyan-Semerci, 2018). Finally, perceptions about the Syrian migrants form a recent but troubling aspect of political tensions in Turkey. Studies point out to the increasingly negative attitudes towards the Syrians (Erdoğan & Uyan-Semerci, 2018; M.Erdoğan, 2020); consolidation of a false belief that they threaten the economic well-being of the local population, (Şar and Kuru, 2020) and crimes against the Syrians go unpunished. In this context, it is possible to argue that anti-migrant radicalisation is likely to become a pressing concern in the near future.

An overview of data on political violence shows that Kurdish separatism is seen as the biggest source of threat in Turkey which is a point on which elite and public perception also converge. Jihadist radicalisation comes after and FETÖ gained salience as a potential threat both in elite and public perception in the aftermath of the failed coup attempt of July 15, 2016. Apart from these, negative public perceptions towards Syrians and the fact that crimes against Syrians often go unprosecuted indicate that anti-immigrant radicalisation might be a pressing issue in the future. No mention of right-wing groups in any of the data is striking showing that those groups are downplayed by the state and the role of state actors in political violence is also missing in all databases.

## 4. Agents and channels of radicalisation

### 4.1. Main collective agents and channels of radicalisation

Four major collective agents have been responsible for the most incidents of violent attacks in Turkey: PKK, ISIS, the third group of "unknown" which pertains to the incidents that were not claimed by any organisation, and DHKP-C. The analysis of the GTD database, filtering for the unclaimed incidents reveals that the targets range from officers and their relatives to concerts, churches, embassies, shops and businesses, Roma wedding, journalists to politicians, and various civilians. It is not possible to establish any agents and channels in this group.

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<sup>8</sup> In this section of the report, we mainly benefited from KONDA surveys. We are thankful to KONDA for sharing their questionnaires in addition to the publicly available reports.

<sup>9</sup> <https://interaktif.konda.com.tr/2018-matris#>

#### 4.1.1. PKK

PKK (Partîya Karkerên Kurdistanê) (Kurdistan Workers' Party) has a founding ideology, based on a nation-colony antagonism with the idea of establishing an independent Kurdistan state, attributing an emancipatory role to political violence. The original ideology was modified since the capture of its leader; the short-term aim is democratic self-government (Akkaya, 2020, p. 740). The organisation's membership increased as high as 5500 in 2014, sharply dropping in the later years (Soylu, 2021). The decline in the membership might be because many PKK members moved to Iraq and Syria after Turkey's cross-border operations began. The PKK largely recruits from the Kurdish minority in Turkey, mostly from the eastern and southeast provinces (Özeren et al, 2014, p. 330). PKK-affiliated groups are also active in Europe in pursuit of recruitment, finance, and propaganda (TE-SAT, 2020, p. 54). As the conventional media organs such as TV channels and printed newspapers and journals have been systematically closed and banned; social media, especially Twitter and Youtube channels carry out propaganda. The organisations' major media outlets are also mostly based in European countries, primarily in Germany, France, and the Netherlands. ANF (Firat News Agency) remains the major broadcasting agency among several smaller media outlets (see Appendix 3). The coverage from northeast Syria is provided largely by Rojava Information Centre, though the outlet does not declare allegiance to any organisation.

PKK assumed responsibility for several violent attacks since 1984; however, the organisation's deadliest attacks occurred since July 2015<sup>10</sup> (Crisis Group, 2021). In the period since 2015, the PKK claimed responsibility for only those incidents where there was a clear armed conflict with the state security forces such as those in Çukurca (Hakkari district) (BBC News Türkçe, 2016) and Dürümlü (Diyarbakır district) (Sabah, 2016) in 2016. The most resonant incidents occurred in public places which resulted in civilian casualties. Among them, the Ankara Güvenpark Bombing which resulted in the death of 37 people was claimed by TAK (Kurdistan Freedom Falcons) (France 24, 2016). HPG (People's Defence Forces)<sup>11</sup> (Crisis Group, 2021) claimed responsibility for the deadly skirmish in Şemdinli (Hakkari district) (Bianet, 2016). TAK's affiliation with PKK remains contested to this day (Degli Esposti, 2017). In the last three years, Turkey's military casualties occurred during the cross-border operations in Syria and Iraq. YPG (People's Protection Units)<sup>12</sup> and HPG is suspected to be responsible for these incidents in collaboration with PKK (see Appendix 3).

High-level government officials, including the president and the minister of interior, as well as the de facto government partner MHP leaders, frequently accuse HDP of being the political wing of PKK (see Appendix 2). The predecessors of HDP were closed by the courts (Celep, 2014). Since the collapse of the Peace Process in 2015, several deputies along with the two former co-chairs of the party (7 MPs remain imprisoned by 2021), and nearly 6000 party members were arrested and imprisoned (Bişkin, 2020). HDP is the third-largest party and has 56 seats in the Turkish parliament as of February 2021 (TBMM, 2021). The party's electoral stronghold comprises of the Kurdish voters, though there has been a shift of leftist and liberal voters in the 2015 and 2018 elections to the party as the party moderated its ethno-nationalist

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<sup>10</sup> <https://www.crisisgroup.org/tr/content/grafik-ve-haritalarla-t%C3%BCrkiyedeki-pkk-%C3%A7at%C4%B1%C5%9Fmas%C4%B1>

<sup>11</sup> An armed wing of PKK active in Turkey and Iraq. <https://www.crisisgroup.org/content/turkeys-pkk-conflict-visual-explainer>

<sup>12</sup> PKK affiliated armed organisation in Syria.

attitude towards radical democracy (Celep, 2018; Kaya & Whiting, 2019; Güneş, 2020). The nature of the party's connection with separatist radicalisation remains contested. The party leadership denounces all sorts of violence, frames its founding principles as freedom, justice, peace, and equality; and contextualizes the minority rights as an essential part of human rights and liberties in its programme.<sup>13</sup>

The official resources in Turkey also accuse the PYD (Democratic Union Party) (The Kurdish Democratic Union Party, 2012) in Syria of a political extension of YPG and PKK (Acun and Keskin, 2017) (see Appendix 3). It is argued that PKK militants and Kurdish fighters across the region joined the leadership PYD in its fight against ISIS (Ünver, 2016, p. 78).

#### 4.1.2. ISIS

ISIS<sup>14</sup> (ad-Dawlah al-Islāmiyah fī 'l-'Irāq wa-sh-Shām, Islamic State of Iraq and Syria): The organisation is referred to by the Turkified acronym DEAŞ by the government officials, adopted from its Arabic-derived acronym Deash. The media and academy in Turkey more commonly use IŞİD as the acronym. The organisation's main ideology is based on a Salafist interpretation of Islamism with the primary goal of establishing a global Islamic state under the caliphate. In this context, ISIS targets non-Muslims and heterodox Muslim groups such as Alevi and Nusayri claiming that their elimination will contribute to the cause of establishing an Islamic state. The first violent attack occurred in Ulukışla (Niğde district) on March 20, 2014; followed by several bombing attacks with a high number of casualties. 49 staff members working at the Turkish consulate in Mosul (Iraq) were held hostage for three months in 2014. More than 300 people were killed in the suicide attacks at Istanbul's Sultanahmet district in 2015, during a peaceful protest in Suruç (Şanlıurfa district) in July 2015, followed by another attack on the protestors in Ankara Train Station in October 2015, Istanbul Atatürk Airport in 2016, during the new year's party at a night club in Istanbul in the first day of 2017 (Ministry of Internal Affairs, 2017). The violent attacks came to a halt in 2017, as ISIS prioritized its search for power in Syria and Iraq against YPG.

It is estimated that the number of Salafis in Turkey might be as high as 20.000 (Saymaz, 2017, p. 41), though the Salafist groups diverge among ISIS and Al Nusra related groups. As per the origin of ISIS, Sunni Turks form the most substantial group of recruits.

As ISIS members condemn all political activities including voting as bi'dat (inventions which came after the lifetime of the Prophet Mohammed, therefore, not directly sanctioned by the original code of religion) and even as haram, we cannot talk about overt relations between the ISIS branch of Turkey and any legally established political parties. So far, none of the legal pro-Islamist parties have declared any support for the ISIS ideals. The provincial branches are organised under the local leaders rather than associations. However, from time to time, we came across newspaper coverage informing us about the closure of local associations which were officially registered to provide aid and education to the Syrian youth (Ayas, 2017).

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<sup>13</sup> The party program is available at <https://hdp.org.tr/tr/parti-programi/8/> (accessed February 19, 2021).

<sup>14</sup> The organisation started to use the name "Islamic State" in 2014; however, as the scholarly work concerning its activities uses the acronym ISIS, we use it throughout the report.

ISIS in general has a highly sophisticated network of propaganda in multiple languages. Amaq (with reference to the plato in Hatay) is the main news agency. The organisation has published a periodical called *Konstantiniyye* in Turkish, broadcasts via Al-Bayan radio, has an additional multilingual magazine called *Rumiyah* (Göksun & Salihi, 2018) (see Appendix 3).

#### 4.1.3. DHKP-C

DHKP-C (Devrimci Halk Kurtuluş Partisi-Cephesi, Revolutionary People's Liberation Party-Front): DHKP-C is a left-wing organisation with a military wing, aims at establishing a proletariat-led regime and a classless society in Turkey. It was originally established in 1978 and renamed in 1994. Among its most resonant activities are the suicide attack at the American consulate in Istanbul in 2013 and the murder of the public prosecutor in the Istanbul Çağlayan courthouse after a hostage crisis in 2015. Other than the violent attacks, the convicted members organise hunger strikes to generate a public reaction. It is estimated that the organisation has fewer than 300-400 members in Turkey; and, that the main cadres are located among the Turkish citizens living in European countries such as the Netherlands, Belgium, and Germany. Europol claims that the European countries are used for logistical purposes (TE-SAT, 2020, p. 60). Working-class Kurdish and Alevi origin families are claimed to be the main recruitment pool.

Connections between DHKP-C and political parties as well as civil society organisations remain controversial. Despite the consistent disclaimers from the opposition parties, the AKP politicians accuse the CHP members of being affiliated with DHKP-C (Purtul Uçar, 2021). However, to the best of our knowledge, there are no institutional allegations against CHP for harboring DHKP-C members or providing support. The Ministry of Internal Affairs accuses cultural organisations and certain music groups of making terrorist propaganda (Ministry of Internal Affairs, 2020), yet these allegations have been disclaimed by these groups. The main problem in analyzing the network and connections around DHKP-C is that any leftist politician, civil society organisation, or human rights association owning the Gezi Park protest as a lawful peaceful protest or accusing the government of supporting Islamist and right-wing attacks on the Alevi minority are likely to be accused as a DHKP-C member. A symbolic example in this respect can be found in the accusations against the philanthropist Osman Kavala (Kulaoğlu, Can & Hatipoğlu, 2017).

## 4.2. Issues regarding state-led radicalisation

Difficulty in analyzing left-wing and Kurdish separatist radicalisation in terms of their agents and channels stems from the fact that there are an intensive propaganda and criminalization strategy by the state organs against the secular and pro-Kurdish opposition. Human Rights Watch reports document politically motivated prosecutions and detentions, torture, and abuse in the police stations and prisons. Bill on Preventing Terrorism Financing, which entered into force on December 31, 2020, restricts the functioning of civil society organisations (Human Rights Watch, 2020). The Ministry of Internal Affairs and the security forces functioning under the ministry have been gradually equipped with extreme powers. The appointment of caretaker administrators (named as *kayyım*) in place of elected mayors, mostly from HDP (HDP, 2020) threatens the viability of democracy as it violates basic electoral rights.



To what extent, the radical movements penetrated law enforcement is difficult to analyze. However, there have been several incidents that showed police officers sympathizing with right-wing attackers (Gazetekarınca, 2020). Crimes against religious and ethnic minorities often go unprosecuted which makes us think about the right-wing sympathy in the security and judiciary staff.

Four major collective agents have been responsible for the most incidents of violent attacks in Turkey: PKK, ISIS, the third group of "unknown" which pertains to the incidents that were not claimed by any organisation, and DHKP-C. The analysis of the GTD database, filtering for the unclaimed incidents reveals that the targets range from officers and their relatives to concerts, churches, embassies, shops and businesses, Roma wedding, journalists to politicians, and various civilians. It is not possible to establish any agents and channels in this group.

The main agents of radicalisation responsible for most of the violent attacks in Turkey are PKK, ISIS, a group of "unknown" which pertains to the incidents that were not claimed by any organisation and DHKP-C. PKK as an ethno-separatist terrorist organisation largely recruits from the Kurdish minority in East and southeast regions and its propaganda is made through media outlets in European countries. ISIS as a Salafi terrorist organisation is responsible for most of the jihadist attacks in Turkey. It recruits from Sunni Turks and no overt relationships with any legal political party or civil society organisation are detected. DHKP-C as a far-left organisation with a military wing has few members in Turkey and the main cadres are located in European countries, mostly recruiting from Alevi origin families there. Its connections with political parties and civil society organisations are difficult to assess as the government accuses any opposition as potentially affiliated with DHKP-C. Finally, issues regarding state-led radicalisation are difficult to analyze however the fact that crimes against religious and ethnic minorities often go unprosecuted makes us consider that there might be right-wing sympathizers among police and judicial staff.

## 5. Stakeholders and channels of de-radicalisation

The main political parties in Turkey unanimously condemn the violent incidents regardless of the ideological leaning of the organisation. This consensus among the political parties is remarkable; however, we do not observe any public event which targets de-radicalisation at the party level. It might be because of the polarisation in the political space and the intensity of political struggle at the macro level. The official tendency to incriminate the opposition parties' activities to reach out to the social groups with vulnerable individuals and the potential of providing a social milieu for radicalisation might be another factor that prevents the political parties from taking action in this regard. The same is valid also for independent non-governmental associations. In this context, available de-radicalisation programmes are undertaken by the state institutions.

Prison programmes appear as the most common de-radicalisation initiatives (see Appendix 4). The Presidency of Religious Affairs in coordination with the Ministry of Justice (particularly, General Directorate of Prisons and Detention Houses) and the police force conducts some programmes in the field of jihadist radicalisation. These programmes aim to disseminate

"peaceful and tolerant messages of Islam" among the inmates in Turkish prisons, cultural centres in Central Asia, and the Balkans; to raise awareness among the refugees under temporary protection in Turkey on the dangers of religious radicalisation, to provide training programmes in the child protection units against radical narratives, to raise imams who are capable of disseminating tolerant messages. There is also a programme of twin sister cities with the African countries to develop a counter-narrative (OHCHR, 2015, p. 15). Turkish national police hold conferences at schools for awareness-raising; and contact families designated as at-risk by the police force. There are also programmes funded by the EU and the General Directorate of Prisons and Detention Houses functions as a project partner (R2pris, 2015).

In the context of separatist radicalisation, the most important de-radicalisation programme was the "Return to Village and Rehabilitation Project" which was initiated in 1999. The programme accelerated under the AKP government's National Unity and Brotherhood programme, commonly known as the Peace Process, which was terminated in 2015. Although the process was claimed to be officially initiated in 2013, initial efforts for putting a permanent end to armed conflict and beginning of the talks between the PKK and the state officials can be traced back to 2009, when more than 30 PKK members were permitted to enter Turkey legally from the Habur border gate with the promise of non-prosecution. In this context, the project was renewed on June 23, 2010, with an additional budget,<sup>15</sup> with an effort to sustain the peaceful return of the habitants of the villages evacuated and destroyed during the height of the armed conflict in the mid-1990s, providing occupational training and employment to the returnees, re-construction of the infrastructure, repairing the basic education and health care facilities, and providing logistical support for the reconstruction of the damaged houses.

These programmes on which we have publicly available information approach radicalisation with a combined approach of identifying the root causes, disconnecting the vulnerable population from the mobilizing actors, raising awareness, and mainly integrating a religious outlook sanctioned by the government. The programmes against jihadist radicalisation, which also have an implied target of the FETÖ members, operate at the national level; while those targeting the individuals and groups vulnerable to separatist radicalisation are specifically applied in the southeast and eastern provinces of Turkey where the population is overwhelmingly Kurdish. It should be noted that we did not come across any programme in any state institution targeting right-wing radicalisation. Political assassinations targeting leftist and Kurdish individuals, crimes against the religious and ethnic minorities, and the suspected involvement of law enforcement in these crimes make us think that right-wing radicalisation is a significant threat that should be seriously taken into consideration by the state institutions.

## 6. Conclusion

This report focuses on the context, agents, and channels of radicalisation and de-radicalisation in Turkey since 2001. The Turkish political system is characterized by majority party governments formed by the same party, the AKP, as the party came first in all consecutive elections in this period. The party's initial liberal-conservative outlook provided a brief period

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<sup>15</sup> <https://www.icisleri.gov.tr/koye-donus-ve-rehabilitasyon-projesi-kdrp>

of stability and de-radicalisation. The policy attempts to formulate a peaceful solution to separatism brought de-radicalisation until 2015. However, the conflict re-emerged since that period. Gradual closing of the political space brought increased polarisation and state-led radicalisation has become a more common phenomenon across time.

In this period, separatist radicalisation forms the biggest threat of violence, followed by jihadist radicalisation. The fact that many violent attacks on the individuals and institutions remained unclaimed by any known organisation, and, that a substantial percentage of these attacks targeted leftist and Kurdish political actors, non-Muslim clerics, and belief centres are thought-provoking. This creates doubts over the possible penetration of right-wing radicalisation in law enforcement if we also take into account another fact that in the crimes against such groups the perpetrators often go unprosecuted.

The main de-radicalisation agents have been the state institutions due to the closing of the political space and increased polarisation. De-radicalisation programmes targeting separatism provided partial success until its termination in 2015. The element of increased state-led radicalisation such as increasing intimidation of the peaceful opposition actors, imprisonment, and use of disproportionate force, makes Turkey vulnerable to multiple types of for the future. Downplay of right-wing radicalisation by the state authorities may further strengthen this type of radicalisation and trigger retaliation from the targeted groups.



## Appendices

### Appendix 1. Main (de)-radicalisation events in Turkey since 2001

Name	Date or period of time	Description
Neve Shalom and Beth Israel Synagogues Suicide Bomb Attack (Istanbul)	15.11.2003	Al Qaeda attacks the synagogues in Istanbul. One of the first jihadist attacks in Turkey
Hrant Dink Assassination	19.01.2007	The editor in chief of Agos newspaper, an ethnically Armenian citizen of Turkey was murdered. The alleged involvement of law enforcement sympathizers
Zirve Publishing House Murders (Malatya)	18.04.2007	3 Christian missionaries were murdered. No organisation claimed credit. Symbolic importance for concerns about the penetration of radical right-wing into the law enforcement
Habur Incident	20.10.2009	PKK members located in Iraq entered Turkey and surrendered weapons. Considered a symbol of attempts for resolution of the violent conflict between PKK and the state.
Gezi Park Protests	27.06.2013 - 20.08.2013	Protests against authoritarianization. Brutally repressed by the government. Important for understanding state-led radicalisation.
Initiation of Peace Process	July 2013	Initiated by the AKP government for the separatist conflict resolution. A key de-radicalisation process and policy
Public prosecutor's murder in the Çağlayan Courthouse (Istanbul)	31.03.2015	DHKP-C members held the prosecutor hostage to protest police violence during the Gezi Protests. This shows that left-wing radicalism remains active
Ulukışla (Niğde) attack	20.03.2014	ISIS's first attack in Turkey.

Suruç Suicide Bombing	20.07.2015	Attack targeted young students preparing to cross the border to Kobani with humanitarian aid. Important for understanding how Turkey became a war zone for the clash between religious and separatist groups in Syria
Ceylanpınar incident	22-24.07.2015	Considered as the turning point for the re-invigoration of the PKK attacks
Hendek Clashes	08.08.2015 - 09.03.2016	Urban warfare between the separatist youth groups and the security forces. Important to understand the extent of youth radicalisation and state-led radicalisation
The assassination of Tahir Elçi (Kurdish lawyer and the chairman of Diyarbakır Bar Association)	28.11.2015	He was shot during a shootout between police and members of the (YDG-H), the PKK's youth wing, following a press statement during which he had been calling for an end to violence between the PKK and the Turkish state. The alleged involvement of law enforcement sympathizers
Atatürk Airport Attack Istanbul	28.06.2016	ISIS
July 15 Coup Attempt	15.07.2016	Closure of the political space sped up after the coup. Important for state-led radicalisation
Operation Euphrates Shield (Cerablus, El Bab, Aleppo)	24.08.2016 - 29.03.2017	The cross-border military operation against both ISIS and YPG. Important for understanding the international context of radicalisation in Turkey
Constitutional Amendment	16.04.2017	Transition to presidentialism with weak checks and balances. Another milestone for state-led radicalisation and closing of the political space
Prosecution and Detention of Selahattin Demirtaş, HDP Leader and Co-chair	21.02.2017	Important for understanding state-led radicalisation vis-à-vis separatist radicalisation

Appointment of a caretaker rector to Boğaziçi University	04.01.2021	Another milestone in the closing of the political space
Gara Incident	14.02.2021	13 military and intelligence personnel taken hostage by the PKK 5-6 years earlier, found dead in a cave in Northern Iraq's Gara district after an air-strike by the Turkish fighter jets. Important for understanding state-led radicalisation vis-à-vis separatist radicalisation.


## Appendix 2. Political discourse about radicalisation in Turkey

Quotation	Author(s)	Date of quotation	Source	Comments
"They attacked my veiled sisters, entered the mosque with beer cans"	Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, AKP, PM of the time	9.6.2013	<a href="https://twitter.com/RT_Erdogan/status/343741493640564737">https://twitter.com/RT_Erdogan/status/343741493640564737</a>	The former PM incriminates the Gezi Park protestors, claiming that they attacked the veiled women and violated the mosque. The allegations are still not substantiated and remain refuted by the chief cleric of the mosque in question.
"My Kurdish brother, my Turkish brother, my Zaza brother; this republic is your republic, there will not be assimilation in this country anymore"	Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, AKP, former PM	16.11.2013	<a href="https://t24.com.tr/haber/erdogan-diyarbakir-sadece-turklerin-kurtlerin-araplarin-degil-hepimizin,244136">https://t24.com.tr/haber/erdogan-diyarbakir-sadece-turklerin-kurtlerin-araplarin-degil-hepimizin,244136</a>	Former PM Erdoğan's speech in Diyarbakır meeting, considered as the opening statement of the Peace Process
"What we call ISIS may seem like a radical and terrorizing structure at its core, but the Turcomans form a substantial majority of the masses who joined the ISIS...Along with the Kurds and the Sunni Arabs. Previous injustice, grievance, exclusion, and insult created a massive reaction. If the Sunni Arabs hadn't been excluded from the process in Iraq, there would not be an accumulation of rage as such"	Ahmet Davutoğlu, AKP, former minister of foreign affairs	7.8.2014	<a href="https://www.dailymotion.com/video/x6hwn58">https://www.dailymotion.com/video/x6hwn58</a>	The former minister of foreign affairs of AKP claims that exclusion from the political process and previous exclusion and insults created a reaction in the region which explains why the masses join ISIS.
"The mob who call themselves as the academics sided with the	Recep Tayyip Erdoğan,	14.1.2016	<a href="https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gunde">https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gunde</a>	The president accuses the academics of peace

terrorist organisation and spit hatred to their state and nation"	AKP, President		<a href="https://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/kilicdaroglu-pkk-feto-ve-isid-ortak-noktalari-akpdir-628339">m/cumhurbaskani-erdoganda-n-imza-atan-akademisyenlere-terorun-yaninda-saf-tuttular-40040614</a>	who called for the termination of violent conflict between the state security forces and PKK in Southeastern Anatolia, of taking sides with PKK
"PKK, FETÖ, and ISIS. They are all murderous terrorist organisations and their common point is that they all got the support of AKP"	Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, CHP, party leader	09.11.2016	<a href="https://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/kilicdaroglu-pkk-feto-ve-isid-ortak-noktalari-akpdir-628339">https://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/kilicdaroglu-pkk-feto-ve-isid-ortak-noktalari-akpdir-628339</a>	The main opposition accuses AKP of having supported PKK, FETÖ, and ISIS in the past.
"The CHP, which has been working together with the separatist and sectarian terrorist organisations and their affiliates, added FETÖ to this staff after December 17-25."	Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, AKP, Turkish President	12.2.2020	<a href="https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/son-dakika-haberler-cumhurbaskani-erdogan-fetonun-siyasi-ayagini-size-acikliyorum-41445579">https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/son-dakika-haberler-cumhurbaskani-erdogan-fetonun-siyasi-ayagini-size-acikliyorum-41445579</a>	The president and the chair of AKP incriminates the main opposition party with the allegation of having links with all types of terrorist organisations
"Erdoğan is the number one political pillar of FETÖ"	Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, CHP, party leader	14.7.2020	<a href="https://www.birgun.net/haber/kilicdaroglu-erdogan-feto-nun-bir-numarali-siyasi-ayagidir-308278">https://www.birgun.net/haber/kilicdaroglu-erdogan-feto-nun-bir-numarali-siyasi-ayagidir-308278</a>	The secular-social democratic main opposition party accuses the president of being a member of the Islamist FETÖ.
"Some people know how Alaattin Çakıcı served this state... Alaattin Çakıcı and our friends	Devlet Bahçeli,	24.11.2020	<a href="https://www.evrensel.net/haber/419546/mhp-">https://www.evrensel.net/haber/419546/mhp-</a>	The ultranationalist MHP takes side with the convicted mafia leader

like him fought fearlessly against the terrorist organisations plotting assassinations against the Turkish state”	MHP, Party leader		<a href="#">lideri-bahceli-demirtasa-terorist-dedi-arinci-teror-sempatizani-ilan-etti</a>	claiming that he served in the struggle against terror on behalf of the Turkish state
“HDP is a terror problem, a haven for separatism, a malign weapon targeting our democratic security... HDP’s doors should be locked up to be never opened again.”	Devlet Bahçeli, MHP, Party leader	11.12.2020	<a href="https://www.trthaber.com/haber/gundem/bahceli-hdpnin-kapisina-acilmamak-uzere-kilit-vurulmalidir-537858.html">https://www.trthaber.com/haber/gundem/bahceli-hdpnin-kapisina-acilmamak-uzere-kilit-vurulmalidir-537858.html</a>	The government party’s ally MHP asks for the closure of the pro-Kurdish legal party which has the 3 <sup>rd</sup> highest number of seats in the parliament
"It is remarkable that 'We don't want caretaker rectors at the universities' themed protests overlap with the Congress invasion in the US, and it shows that they are fed from a single resource”	Devlet Bahçeli, MHP, Party leader	11.1.2021	<a href="https://www.milliyet.com.tr/siyaset/son-dakika-mhp-lideri-bahceliden-kilicdaroglu-na-sozde-cumhurbaskani-tepkisi-6403191">https://www.milliyet.com.tr/siyaset/son-dakika-mhp-lideri-bahceliden-kilicdaroglu-na-sozde-cumhurbaskani-tepkisi-6403191</a>	De facto government partner MHP’s leader associates the student protests with the Capitol Riot and imply foreign intervention in Turkish politics
“The terrorist organisation massacred 6021 civilians since 1984. Did the Human Rights Association say something about it?”	Süleyman Soylu, AKP, Minister of Interior	16.2.2021	<a href="https://www.sabah.com.tr/gundem/2021/02/16/son-dakika-bakan-soylu-bunu-ilk-kez-acikliyorum-diyerek-duyurdu-buldan-birkac-gun-misafir-edip-birakacaklar-dedi">https://www.sabah.com.tr/gundem/2021/02/16/son-dakika-bakan-soylu-bunu-ilk-kez-acikliyorum-diyerek-duyurdu-buldan-birkac-gun-misafir-edip-birakacaklar-dedi</a>	The minister accuses the human rights groups of taking the side of PKK

## Appendix 3. Networks of connection of the main agents of radicalisation in Turkey



**Figure 3.1. PKK network of connections**





Figure 3.2. ISIS network of connections





## Appendix 4. Main de-radicalisation programmes in Turkey

<b>Name</b>	<b>Dates</b>	<b>Agents</b>	<b>Approach</b>	<b>Scale</b>	<b>Targets</b>
Return to Village and Rehabilitation Project	1999-2015	Ministry of Internal Affairs, General Directorate of Provincial Administration	Rehabilitation, integrative	Southeast and East Anatolia	The population who were forced to migrate from their villages due to the armed conflict
Radicalisation Prevention in Prisons (R2PRIS)	2015-2020	Erasmus + & General Directorate of Prisons and Detention Houses	Integrative and civic education	National	Prison staff & intelligence staff
Turkish National Police Projects against Radicalisation	2015-unknown	Turkish National Police	Preventive	National	Vulnerable youth and under risk social milieu
Cooperation Protocole between the Ministry of Justice and the Presidency of Religious Affairs	03.12.2019-today	Ministry of Justice & Presidency of Religious Affairs	Integrative and civic education	National	All inmates, with a specific focus on those convicted for being affiliated with a terrorist organisation
Activities of the Presidency of Religious Affairs against Radicalisation	Not available	Ministry of Justice & Presidency of Religious Affairs	Integrative, awareness-raising, civic education	Turkey, Central Asia, Balkans	Jihadist radicalisation, refugees

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