



Stakeholders of (De)- Radicalisation in Israel

D3.1 Country Report

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Table of contents

List of abbreviations	4
Glossary	5
About the Project	7
Executive summary/Abstract	8
1. Introduction	9
2. Contextual background	10
3. Structures of radicalisation	12
3.1. Data on political violence.....	12
3.2. Perception of radicalisation by the political elite.....	13
3.3. Perception of the violent threat by the general public	15
4. Agents and channels of radicalisation	16
4.1. Jewish terror: main violent agents in socio-political ecosystems.....	16
Civic society organisations and assistive political agents.....	17
4.2. Palestinian jihadist terrorism: main agents	18
4.3. State-driven radicalisation	19
Police brutality	19
Freedom of regulation in the news press	20
Instrumental actions on territory in dispute	20
5. Stakeholders and channels of de-radicalisation	21
6. Conclusion	23
Appendices	24
Appendix 1. Main (de)-radicalisation events in Israel since 2001.....	24
Appendix 2. Political discourse about radicalisation in Israel	28
Appendix 3. Networks of connection of the main agents of radicalisation in Israel.....	37
Appendix 4. Main de-radicalisation programmes in Israel.....	39
References and sources	40

List of abbreviations

ARU	Anti-racism governmental unit
BESA	The Begin-Sadat Centre for Strategic Studies
BTS	Breaking the Silence (NGO)
ELAD	El Ir David, meaning 'to the City of David'
FORTH	Forum for Regional Thinking (NGO)
GDT	Global Terrorism Database
IDF	Israeli defence forces
IDI	The Israel Democracy Institute
IMTI	Im Tirtzu movement (NGO)
INSS	The Institute for National Security Studies
ICT	The International Counter-Terror Institution, Israel
ISA	Israel Security Agency
ITIC	The Intelligence and Terrorism Information Centre, Israel
JPPI	The Jewish People Policy Institute (research institution established by The Jewish Agency)
KKL/JNF	Keren Kayemet Le'Icallel, the 'Jewish National Fund'
MFI	The Movement for Freedom of Information, Israel
PIJ	The Palestinian Islamic Jihad movement, operated by the 'Jerusalem Battalions'

Glossary

Al Aqza Intifada: the second intifada (27.9.2000–8.2.2005)

Amud Anan: ‘Pillar of Cloud’, IDF operation in the Gaza Strip

Blue Line: international borders in northern Israel

Chomat Magen: ‘Protective Shield’, IDF operation in the West Bank, 2002–2005

Hamas: Political party and organisation in the Gaza strip, operates ‘Izz al-Din al-Qassam’ Brigades

Hezbollah: Political party and Shiite Islamic organisation in Lebanon

Intifada: meaning ‘shaking off’, violent resistance of Palestinians against Israel

The Israeli Tribes: a phrase implemented by Israeli president Reuven Rivlin in 2015, explaining that the society is divided into four sectors (tribes in its biblical interpretation of unity): secular, national-religious, Arab, and Ultra-Orthodox, different from one another not only in beliefs, but that are also growing in parallel to shape future Israeli society in a joint process

Kahana Chai: outlawed radical right-wing movement

Knesset: Israeli parliament

The Knife Intifada: the third intifada, 2015

Lahava: Lemeniat Hiotbolelut Beeretz Hakodesh, meaning ‘to prevent assimilation of non-Jews in the holy land’

Magen Tzfon: meaning ‘Northern Shield’, IDF operation along the Lebanese border, focused on uncovering tunnels (4.12.2018–13.1.2019)

Noam: extreme right-wing political party

Noar Ha’Gvaot: ‘Hilltop Youth’, settlers of outposts in the West Bank

Oferet Yetzuka: ‘Cast Lead’, IDF operation in the Gaza Strip

Otzma Yehudit: extreme right-wing political party

Outposts: Illegal Israeli settlements in isolated locations in the West Bank

Return Marches: mass protests next to the fence of the Gaza Strip since 2018

Settlements: villages established by Israelis in disputed areas within the Israeli-Palestinian conflict

Tag Meir: meaning 'Light Tag' (NGO)

Tag Mechir: meaning 'price tag', action of violence including vandalism and/or physical harm

Tribes/sub-tribes: meaning Sector I, based on the biblical structure of Jewish society that contained different tribes. The word 'tribes' was presented by President Reuven Rivlin in June 2015, in what was later called 'The Tribes Speech'. Its main notion is a new multi-culturist political attitude that must be taken in order to keep the liberal rights of all diversities in democratic society: *'a society composed of four major sectors or "tribes" that approach each other in size: secular, religious-nationalist, ultra-Orthodox and Arab.'* This division also includes 'sub-tribes' or sub-sectors, such as Christians, Druze, and refugees.

Tzook Eitan: 'Protective Edge', IDF operation in 2014 along the Gaza Strip

West Bank: disputed territory including Palestinian cities and Israeli settlements, also named Judea and Samaria by the settlers.

Zionism: Jewish national ideology materialized by the establishment of the Israel as a Jewish state, based on the word 'Zion' (Jerusalem)

About the Project

D.Rad is a comparative study of radicalisation and polarisation in Europe and beyond. It aims to identify the actors, networks, and wider social contexts driving radicalisation, particularly among young people in urban and peri-urban areas. D.Rad conceptualises this through the I-GAP spectrum (injustice-grievance-alienation-polarisation) with the goal of moving towards measurable evaluations of de-radicalisation programmes. Our intention is to identify the building blocks of radicalisation, which include a sense of being victimised; a sense of being thwarted or lacking agency in established legal and political structures; and coming under the influence of “us vs them” identity formulations.

D.Rad benefits from an exceptional breadth of backgrounds. The project spans national contexts including the UK, France, Italy, Germany, Poland, Hungary, Finland, Slovenia, Bosnia, Serbia, Kosovo, Israel, Iraq, Jordan, Turkey, Georgia, Austria, and several minority nationalisms. It bridges academic disciplines ranging from political science and cultural studies to social psychology and artificial intelligence. Dissemination methods include D.Rad labs, D.Rad hubs, policy papers, academic workshops, visual outputs and digital galleries. As such, D.Rad establishes a rigorous foundation to test practical interventions geared to prevention, inclusion and de-radicalisation.

With the possibility of capturing the trajectories of seventeen nations and several minority nations, the project will provide a unique evidence base for the comparative analysis of law and policy as nation states adapt to new security challenges. The process of mapping these varieties and their link to national contexts will be crucial in uncovering strengths and weaknesses in existing interventions. Furthermore, D.Rad accounts for the problem that processes of radicalisation often occur in circumstances that escape the control and scrutiny of traditional national frameworks of justice. The participation of AI professionals in modelling, analysing and devising solutions to online radicalisation will be central to the project's aims.

Executive summary/Abstract

The goal of this report is to map out Israel's national security threats and its functioning mechanisms that indicate radicalisation in violent acts towards the civilian population in parallel to de-radicalisation processes led by governmental institutions and civic society movements.

For the past two decades, Israel has been dealing with two main cases of terrorism: Palestinian jihadist and radical right-wing religion-based threats. The first regards Muslim extremists opposing the Israeli Zionist state by three main nationalist movements: Hamas and Palestinian Islamist-Jihad (PIJ) on the southwestern border with Gaza, and Hizballah on the northern border with Syria and Lebanon. The second group of extremists has emerged from Jewish post-Zionist radical right-wing groups who oppose any territorial control by Palestinians and/or Israeli-Arabs within the borders of the Israeli Jewish state.

After summarizing the national political environment to give a relevant contextual background, we used a variety of available data bases to present the possible agents of these radicalisation processes. We took into consideration the structure and main agenda of conflicting radical opinions and acts of violence, racism, and xenophobia in public space, focusing on a number of study cases and drawing a line between agents of violence and their sources of legitimation. This report also analyses the possible influence of de-radicalisation stakeholders as a countering process of de-radicalisation at the individual (micro), organisational (meso), societal (macro) levels, including state and non-state actors that are trying to shift from violent to non-violent strategies and tactics. Finally, the conclusions show that historical, political, and sociological processes should not be disconnected from (de) radicalisation developments, as they are attached to the presence of a liberal democracy approach within civic life.

These findings are based on data taken from academic resources, data-based statistics from various research institutions, military and national security reports, official government statements, news reports, and social media posts to display the wide-ranging expressions of (de) radicalisation in everyday public space.

1. Introduction

The goal of this report is to delineate the main radicalisation agents and de-radicalisation stakeholders in Israel as part of the Work Package “Mapping Stakeholders and Situations of Radicalisation” of the D.Rad project. In this case, radicalisation means a process involving the increasing rejection of established law, order, and politics and the active pursuit of alternatives, in the form of politically-driven violence or justification of violence. It is also an interactive process that is often driven not only by violent agents and their political allies, but also by the repressive reactions of state institutions. Countering this, de-radicalisation involves processes such as rejection at individual (micro), organisational (meso), or societal (macro) levels that result in a shift from violent to non-violent strategies and tactics. This report relies primarily on secondary sources: official statistics, think tank and human rights reports, academic research, publicly available datasets, and published survey results. The cases of radicalisation in Israel presented in this report focus on ethno-nationalist right-wing and Palestinian jihadist terrorism. Recognizing the immense diversity in the histories and national contexts, the cases showcased here focus on the most relevant events of radicalisation and present the greatest perceived threat to the national security of Israel.

The first chapter offers a contextual and historical background that includes dominant local and global events that have influenced the political environment in the past 20 years, beginning with left-wing Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin’s assassination and the failure of the Oslo peace conferences, followed by the Second Lebanon War, the second Intifada, missile attacks from the Gaza Strip into Israeli territory and military responses, economic developments, immigration processes, and an ongoing political governance crisis (specified in Appendix 1).

The second chapter includes a close examination of cases of violent radicalisation and identifies the greatest threats and perceptions by the political elite, top-ranking government office-holders, and the general public, including an analytical table of extended quotations (Appendix 2).

The third chapter reveals agents and channels of radicalisation, describing the main collective agents in their socio-political surroundings, including organisations and networks directly involved in violent attacks that are often connected with legally working parties, political organisations, and mass movements that cover, legitimate, and provide recruits for the violent agents. This part of the report is complemented with networks of connections for each main agent of radicalisation (Appendix 3).

The last part of the report addresses stakeholders and channels of de-radicalisation, presenting several of the most important state and non-state organisations and programmes involved in de-radicalisation. This section locates the main agents that work on promoting de-radicalisation such as political parties, NGOs, religious organisations, communal administrations, and certain media outlets. It highlights the main programmes/initiatives and approaches in Israel that mainly concern civic education and participation in political discourse using an analytical table (Appendix 4) with relevant information about the main de-radicalisation programmes in a structured way. Lastly, the conclusions briefly summarise the

findings of the report, finalizing critical interactions between the agents of radicalisation and stakeholders of de-radicalisation.

2. Contextual background

By its very existence, the State of Israel has created a worldwide controversy due to its definition as a national democratic state that relies upon the ethno-religious origin of Judaism. At the beginning of the 1990s, Prime Minister Yitzchak Rabin established a comprehensive peace plan between Israel and countries in the Middle East, as well as with the Palestinian minority, that led to violent resistance among right-wing supporters and leaders. The signing a regional peace agreement with Jordan in 1993 seemed at the time to be the largest attempt to solve the national Israeli–Palestinian dispute, but this event ended with the opposite outcome—the assassination of Rabin—in 1995. The result was a deeper political and social rupture between Israelis and Palestinians that also affected the sectors ("sub-tribes") of the Jewish population (Rubinstein, 2017). In the 25 years that have passed since then, Israeli society has not got any closer in resolving issues regarding security borders or mutual agreement on the delineation of Palestinian and/or Arab territory.

In 1999, the left-wing government ordered Israeli defence forces (IDF) to withdrawal from southern Lebanon. Thus, ended 20 bloody years of fighting over the security of northern Israeli borders, an act that was supported by the majority of the Israeli population (70%) (Dekel and Kortz, 2020). Following authorization by the UN, Israel who had maintained a military presence due to the spread of the Hizballah terror organisation re-established the 'blue line' separation between the two states, an act that had a strategic effect for the following years on its border with Gaza. During peace talks at Camp David, Prime Minister Ehud Barak also tried to suggest a possible solution to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, but had no success at the time (Milstein, 2020). In September 2000, Ariel Sharon, then head of the 'Likud' right-wing opposition party, visited the Temple Mount and ignited the second intifada, named 'Al Aqza'. Jihadist Palestinian terror attacks occurred all across Israel, in parallel with military operations in the occupied territories of the West Bank. After over 450 Israelis died from the violence during 2002, the government headed by Sharon, who was elected as prime minister in 2001 (IDI 2003), approved an extensive military operation named 'Protective Shield' within Palestinian cities of the West Bank (IDF, 2002). This led to more bloodshed and the beginning of Jewish settlers in the West Bank who claimed the right to establish illegal settlements (outposts) as a response to each death caused by jihadist terror. Since then, there has been a debate between right- and left-wing political groups, suggesting, on one hand, that these acts encourage more violence from both sides, and on the other, referring to it as a 'normal' reaction that strengthens Israel's grasp upon Jewish lands. In parallel, the attacks perpetuated by jihadist Palestinian terror groups [mainly Hamas and The Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)] against the Israeli civilian population continued, and prompted Prime Minister Sharon to start 'Kadima' in 2005, a new centre-wing political party, for the purpose of gaining public and political support for a territorial withdrawal plan ('The Disengagement') from parts of the Gaza Strip and from northern parts of Samaria (IDI 2020). Sharon's main goal was to prevent suicide bombings in the West Bank settlements and inside the green line borders of Israel. This was followed in 2006 by the Second Lebanon War led by Prime Minister Ehud Olmert. In addition, Israel was suffering from ongoing soldier kidnappings perpetrated by Hamas terrorists (Walla,

2021). The political regime changed in 2009 after the Likud party headed by Benjamin Netanyahu won the national elections, replacing Olmert, who was accused of corruption and served 16 months in prison (Maanit, 2017). These occurrences deepened public mistrust of the political elite and also undermined the national ideological politics of both the right and left (IDI 2009).

While dealing with religious and nationalist Palestinian terror attacks, Israel's government linked, not for the first time, the 9/11 disaster and its own suffering from jihadist terror as related to the influence of global Islamic terrorism on all democracies around the world. In contrast, the US government made the separation between these different contexts of terror (Ben Tzvi 2002), but it is reasonable to assume that by this linkage, Israel aspired to prevent the entrance of global terror nests into Israeli and Palestinian territory, in addition to the already existing local terror attacks. Saddam Hussein's fall from power, due to the American invasion of Iraq, also had an effect on general tensions in the Middle East (Abu Nasra, 2016). During 2008–2014, Israel underwent three rounds of widespread military actions due to repetitive missile attacks from the Gaza Strip. However, these operations had little effect, as a new type of jihadist terror appeared during 2015–2016 when over 250 knife attacks occurred within a period of six months, injuring and killing dozens of Israelis (Ben David, 2016). Most of the perpetrators came from the area of East Jerusalem (under the Israeli regime). While these attacks were committed individually, they had a definite link to jihadist ideology based on family relations or ties to organisations such as Hamas or PIJ (Bartal and Frish, 2017). Israel managed to contain the events (Ben David 2016), and also revealed a new tactic of soloist actions, similar to ISIS attacks in Europe that occurred in parallel (Levy, 2017). In 2018, the Israeli government termed the phenomena as 'lone wolf' in an attempt to establish new counter-terrorism security strategies (Ministry of Internal Affairs, 2018).

The socio-economic situation, along with the global financial crisis of 2008, and the 'Arab Spring' revolutions of 2010, all had an enormous influence upon Israeli civic society. On July 11, 2011, the largest ever social protest ('The Social Protest') took place in Tel Aviv, with the participation of 250,000 civilians and non-citizens against the cost-of-living (Ram and Filc, 2013). This event symbolized the lack of trust in politicians and opposition within the mid-working class who were negatively affected by the outcomes of the neo-liberal economic system adopted by Israel in the 1980s. Protest participants were mainly young educated Israelis who could not afford to pay their monthly rent. This also flouted the gaps between social classes, levels of income, and 'everyday' national ethnic conflicts (Herzog 2013). Another effect of the Arab Spring was the emergence of a wide range of conspiracy theories against Jews and the Israeli state, resulting from the outbreak of the 2011 Syrian civil war under the Assad regime. Opposition groups against the regime claimed it was 'a Zionist scheme' intended to weaken the resistance and blamed Israel for Assad's political control, while his government described the rebels as the 'perpetrators of Israel's plan to take over the entire area' (Al Nashef and Vinter 2016). Conspiracy theorists went so far as to call the civil war 'the Hebrew Spring'.

Donald Trump's US presidential victory in 2016 was received warmly among right-wing supporters and the Israeli media led by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who was re-elected in the national elections of 2015. The assumption was that Trump would favour Israel when it came to matters of national security and conflicts in the region. According to right-wing politicians, Trump had corrected a historic injustice towards the Jewish majority by formally

recognizing Jerusalem as the capital of the Israeli state, and would pursue peace with the Palestinians, who were against this move (Landau, Tibon, and Liss, 2017). This recognition, was a symbolic political act in order to set the grounds for future planned agreements. It also supported Netanyahu, whose right-wing regime adopted this notion of exclusivity over Jerusalem in their political ideology.

The year 2020, in addition to the international COVID-19 pandemic, brought forth 'Peace to Prosperity': a regional peace plan led by Trump (US Department of State, 2020), and began the 'Abraham Accord' agreements that included annexation of 30% of the territory in the West Bank to Israeli sovereign control (Cohen, 2020), with no consideration from Palestinian officials, who unsurprisingly voiced resistance to the process. In October 2020, the Israeli government fulfilled the Abraham Accords by signing normalisation agreements with several Middle Eastern countries such as the United Arab Emirates (Ministry of Prime Minister, 2020). The annexation, however, was discussed, but not acted on due to political opposition. In addition, over 37 weeks of protests against Netanyahu's regime ensued, as he was accused on three severe indictments of bribery, fraud, and misconduct (Shafir, 2021).

3. Structures of radicalisation

Underground Jewish terrorism was identified in Israel as early as 1930 and continued in various forms during the 20th century (Sprinzak, 1990). In the 1970s, terror actions involving physical violence and racist acts against Palestinians and Arabs were executed by the underground organisation Kahana Chai ('Kahane is alive'), following the ideology of right-wing extremist Rabbi Benjamin Kahane who claimed Arab human transfer, the establishment of a religious law-based Jewish state, and encouraged acts of violence against non-Jews (Levy and Erlich, 2005, p. 8). Even though Kahane's movement was outlawed by the Israeli justice system and state institutions in the 1980s, this ideology still serves right-wing extremists, as will be illustrated in the following sections. This, in fact, has led to attitudes that have fomented the two greatest violent threats against the civic population in Israel over the past 20 years: 1. ongoing jihadist Islamic terrorism of organisations and individuals against Israelis, and 2. an anarchistic counter-response in the form of Jewish terrorism by religious right-wing extremists against Arabs and/or Palestinians. Both go hand in hand with each other, and are drawn from the main national conflict, as most of those involved live in disputed areas of the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem, among other areas.

3.1. Data on political violence

Multiple military operations, soldier kidnappings, widespread responses to missile attacks, and 'lone wolf' phenomena have all deepened the Israeli public's perception that terror always finds ways to rise and re-invent its mechanisms of action. Israel's reaction to missile attacks over its southwestern cities and farms has resulted in three major IDF operations. The first, 'Oferet Yetzuka' (Cast Lead) occurred in 2008–2009. The IDF attacked targets mainly in the Gaza Strip, as by then Israel had been hit by 12,000 rockets and mortar shells (Ministry of Justice, 2009). The Hamas organisation was responsible for the majority of the attacks, and specifically timed many of them to terrorize schoolchildren in the mornings and afternoons. On the Israeli side, these caused deaths, injuries, and extensive property damage, and forced

businesses to close and residents to abandon their homes (Ministry of Justice, 2009). In 2012, the second extensive IDF operation 'Amud Anan' (Pillar of Cloud) occurred as a reaction to over 1,700 missile attacks on Israeli territory (ISA, 2012). The third operation occurred two years later and was called 'Tzook Eitan' (Protective Edge). Beyond the profound damage to the Israeli frontier, these actions also, as reported, cost the lives of 1,768 Palestinians and created 485,000 homeless in Gaza, in parallel to dozens of casualties and property damage in the Israeli communities, which absorbed over 3,356 missiles and counted 64 soldiers and 3 civilians among the dead (Zaytoon, 2014). According to ISA data, the year of 2015 marked an increase in the number of casualties from terror attacks that occurred in Jerusalem and in the West Bank due to escalation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (what is often referred to as "the knife Intifada"), which resulted in thousands of civilians being injured (ISA, 2016). Mostly in the West Bank, 1,719 terror attacks occurred against Jewish settlers. While this was a quantitative reduction in comparison to earlier years, the quality of terror acts became more violent and vicious. This also resulted in the arrest of more than 3,000 Palestinian suspects by Israeli police and security reinforcement forces, one-third of whom were found to be related to the Hamas organisation (Bohbot, 2016). According to the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), in 2018, the missile attacks continued, mainly by Hamas members and other 'Palestinian extremists' recognised as terror organisations (START, 2021). But at the same time, terror attacks perpetuated by Jewish religious right-wing extremists (Israeli 'settlers' according to the GTD, while 'Jewish Terror' is linked to Kahana's activities in the 1980s) were also on the rise, executing violent payback actions during 2019 in Arab cities within Israel, and within Palestinian villages outside of its sovereign territory (GTD, 2019).

During 2011–2013, ISA reported an increase in hate crimes against Palestinians by revealing 52 Jewish terror attacks, calling the phenomena secretive 'Tag Mechir' (price tag) actions perpetuated by radical right-wing settlers (Levinson, 2014). From 2013 to 2014, there was a pick up in the growth of Jewish terrorism. Even though violent Jewish acts were investigated by the police, most of them ended with no indictments and remained open, as opposed to thousands of cases of terrorism by Palestinians against Jews (Ministry of Justice Report, 2014). Accordingly, in these years, over 850 cases of Jewish terrorism occurred, while there were more than 10,000 cases of jihadist Terror (Levinson, 2014, pp. 2, 16). The offences were divided into property damage (the majority), actions against public order, and physical harm (p. 7). In 2016–2017, a decrease was reported in the number of attacks. In the year 2018, nationalist Jewish crime was reported as three times higher than the year before, including 482 violent incidents that involved sabotage of houses, price-tag graffiti, tree clearing, and more (Harel, 2019). Another report claimed a 50% increase, specifically in terror attacks against Palestinians and security authorities (Yochanan, 2019). To sum up, jihadist terror has been escalating in recent years in performance and versatility of actions, but since this is not a new conflict in Israeli terms, it is essential to elaborate more on the counter self-response of Jewish terrorism.

3.2. Perception of radicalisation by the political elite

Israeli political discourse is based on two main ideological streams of left and right, concerning Israeli territorial questions that are in dispute. The first ideology is represented by the Ha'avoda (Labor) party, and stems from the historic Ben-Gurion socialist Mapei movement headed by Golda Meir in the 1970s and Yitzak Rabin in the 1990s. It also named itself the peace camp since its main idea was to establish an agreement with the Palestinians whether through a

Palestinian state or by re-dividing the occupied territories. This notion is also supported by the Meretz party and Arab parties such as Ha'eshima Hameshufet. The right-wing movement has been represented by the Likud party led Netanyahu for most of the past 20 years. Its main agenda is to strengthen Jewish settlements and end the conflict without re-division of territory. Also supporting this agenda are national-religious Zionist parties such as Yamina and Ha'bayit Ha'Yehudi, but scholars claim that the differences between these two political streams has been pushed aside and the arena has become evasive of dealing with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in a direct way since peace talks has not been renewed seriously since the Oslo agreements. They also note the establishing of multi-centre-wing parties that have not define what their stance is regarding the territorial question and that instead focus on the economic, social, and international issues followed by Kadima, such as Yesh Atid led by Yair Lapid and Kachol Lavan led by Benny Gantz.

Radicalisation inside the Likud party was noticed by Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, who had a shift in his political views once the second intifada (2000–2005) ended in many casualties and did not eliminate terror actions. On both sides: *"There is an overtaking of extreme factors in Likud, threats on members of the faction, and I tell you, these things cannot go on"* (Appendix 2). Sharon had the realization that in order for permanent state solutions to progress, he needed to start a new political party and to abandon extreme-right political ideology. Likud won the 2009 elections, led by Benjamin Netanyahu, who stated during the Jerusalem convention that: *'Radical Islam, whose head is based in Tehran, is undermining the very existence of Israel, but it is not a threat only for us, but for the entire world [...] It is a threat to world peace'* (Appendix 2), thus, connecting between global Islamic and domestic terrorism, yet not referring to Jewish terrorism at all as part of the general problem in both societies, nor referring to it as actual terror. This conforms to Sharon's prior statement about radical opinions in the Likud party. Around 2010–2011, price-tag actions were already being identified by the security authorities as terror, but political parties supported it (see Shneler and Ayalon, Appendix 2).

Zehava Galon, chairwoman of the social left-wing party Meretz, warned about the rising use of xenophobic phrases by political right-wing groups during 2014's 'Tzook Eitan' military response to Palestinian acts of terror that would deepen the rupture between nations: 'Arab citizens of Israel are entitled like any other civilians to express solidarity with their suffering brothers in Gaza' (Appendix 2). In 2017, even Avigdor Liberman, leader of Israel Beitenu (a right-wing party and himself a settler of the West Bank), criticized price-tag actions, along with giving his clear opinions against jihadist terror attacks: 'The greatest damage are the terrorist attacks when they occur. When you burn a family or a Palestinian child, it is harmful to all the settlements. It's de-legitimation to the entire settlement enterprise' (Appendix 2).

Another example of the shift in political elite discourse are the statements of Minister of Defence Moshe (Boogi) Ya'alon, who during 2014 IDF actions emphasized that: 'Price tag is terror; perpetrators can expect zero tolerance,' followed by his 2016 resignation from the Likud party and from his official position: 'Unfortunately, I now find myself in difficult disputes with the prime minister and Knesset members. Unfortunately, extreme factors have taken over Likud' (Appendix 2). Furthermore, it symbolises that a new dispute was established about the definition of extreme rightism, as even though price-tag acts were eventually outlawed, the political environment also includes disagreement to perceiving it as terror action. 'Tag mechir is not terrorism, period,' said Betzael Smotrich, head of the extreme-right Hatziyonut Ha'Datit

party (religious Zionists) in 2015, claiming one cannot compare between Islamic terrorism and the Jewish right to avenge its casualties on terror actions (Appendix 2). In opposing the acceptance of radical right-wing parties on price-tag actions, a Knesset representative from the joint Arab party H'areshima H'ameshufet, Osama Sa'adi (see Appendix 2), referred to it as 'parallel terror' and drew out the connections between radical-right extremism discourse and its ideological, socio-political, and financial support through different associations that are enhanced by Smotrich's attitude even though it is prohibited by law, as will be elaborated in Section 4.

3.3. Perception of the violent threat by the general public.

For the past 20 years, Israel has been dealing with dual terrorism, which in both cases is based on the connection between religion and territory. A 2001 survey revealed that 83% of the Israeli population is afraid of being harmed in a terror attack (*Ynet*, 2001). In 2002, research examining the influence of violence on everyday life affecting a population that suffers directly from terror reached the conclusion that the price paid by the citizens is high not necessarily in human lives, but in the quality of life (Zusman and Romanov, 2006). The IDF itself recognizes the danger of long-term exposure to news reports following terror attacks in Israel, and has also established special instructions to the public on how to deal with these reports correctly in order to avoid trauma (IDF, 2020).

According to the IDI, the public's opinion on Jewish terrorism is inconclusive. In comparison to 2011, it seems that the public is currently divided on whether to refer to price-tag actions as terrorism. In recent years, some stated that Jewish terrorism was unacceptable, while in other circles, there was more freedom to express its agenda than ever. According to a survey, the majority of the public saw the event that occurred in the Arab village of Duma as Jewish terrorism, but over 20% had doubts since it was not clear whether to consider it as a terror attack (IDI, 2016). Both in 2011 and 2014, the public was asked about price-tag actions, and most were against them, agreeing that it was a minority of nationalist religious settlers who are involved and that they did not reflect upon all of it. It was found that the more religious the respondents were, the more they supported the notion that Jewish terrorism does not hold a great threat to Israeli society.

In several surveys carried out during the 2015 knife intifada, participants were asked whether a terrorist should be eliminated at the scene of the crime instead of being led to justice; 75% answered 'yes' (Globe Editors, 2015). Responding to a question about if ignoring human rights was possible in the case of Palestinian terrorism, and if killing a terrorist was a mitzva (blessing), 66% responded affirmatively (Bander, 2016). Also, in the same survey, the majority of people asked about their position regarding global terrorism said that Palestinian terror was the same as international terror. In a survey published among the Palestinian population in Gaza at the same time, more than 75% reported that they supported the knife intifada, but only 53% supported the use of knives as a tactic (Yisascharof, 2016). Likewise, Palestinians feared for their lives and worried over the radicalisation of violent acts against them by Jewish settlers due to the rise in hate crimes (Yochanan, 2019). To conclude, considering the political atmosphere in recent years, the 2020 IDI 'Index of Israeli Democracy' reveals that about two-thirds of the Israeli public think that the democratic regime is at risk, and that there is an indication of weakness in social solidarity, the lowest in the past decade (IDI, 2021). The report also shows a drop in general trust in state institutions, as 58% of respondents believe that

state leadership is corrupt, and they were divided into over 80% from the left wing, opposed to about 40% among right-wing voters.

4. Agents and channels of radicalisation

Among dozens of terror branches that support jihadist ideology, in recent years, three main organisations have emerged as the largest threat against Israeli citizens' security when it comes to radicalisation: Hamas and PIJ on Israel's south and west borders, and Hezbollah on the north. All three movements' agendas support anti-Zionist actions including violent resistance not only against the Israeli military, but also against Israeli and specifically Jewish civilians. But since jihadist attacks are unfortunately not new to Israelis and Palestinians, this section will mainly focus on violent agents and assisting actors and agencies, as well as the surrounding atmosphere (as elaborated in Appendix 3).

4.1. Jewish terror: main violent agents in socio-political ecosystems

The group that best represents the extreme right-wing agenda actively and ideologically are the settlers known as Noar Ha'gvaot (Hilltop Youth). These are religious far-right Zionist teens aged 14–19, who are sometimes led by older leaders to carry out violent acts against nearby Arab communities, and to maintain the ideology of the Kahanist Movement at all costs. In research by the Israeli National Security College, the underground members of Noar Ha'gvaot are characterized as self-dependent; they do not live with their parents or study in a familiar state education facility, and reside in the hills of Judea and Samaria (R. D., 2016). Other youths who identify with their ideological message join them separately. Some of these are students of secondary level Talmudic colleges and participate in some of the actions, but they still live within formal state frames of family and education (Ibid, pp. 9-10). The youths among the hills almost always have the presence of an adult who accompanies them in everyday life. Up to 90% are descended from families who live in the area. As young adults, most of them join the IDF in warrior and commandeer positions.

In 1996, the term 'outpost' first emerged in reaction to the Oslo agreements that sought to eliminate new settlements in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip area (R.D., 2016). In their essence, outposts are settlements established illegally by individuals in isolated areas and/or on hilltops. In the settlers' point of view, these settlements are an answer to jihadist terror, based on a reflection that holds a new Jewish ethos of establishing 'a home' on every hill that has not yet been settled, especially after suffering losses of life caused by jihadists. The bloody events of the Al Aqza Intifada (2000) resulted in operation 'Shield Wall' (Chomat Magen) in 2002, after a 'Black' March in which 135 Israelis were killed in 23 suicide terror attacks (Ben Yishai, 2020). The IDF operation did not stop the attacks completely, but did reduce them until 2005. This period ended with the deaths of over 1,000 civilians (Galey Tzahal, 2020). Around that time, the notion of an active link between land and violent actions was easily made by fanatic settlers since dozens of the attacks had occurred around their villages in Judea and Samaria, inside homes, and on main roads mainly protected by the IDF.

Noar Ha'gvaot holds to a new Jewish ethos that is emotional, racist, and violent. This is materialized through the spiritual movement of Rabbi Yitzhak Ginsburg, who was involved in

the past with Baruch Goldstein, the infamous mass murderer who slaughtered 29 Muslims and injured 120 more in 1994 in Hebron (Fresco in R.D, 2016, pp. 13-14). As Fresco defined it, the importance of blood revenge became crucial on the way to re-establish a religious Jewish State with its temple re-built, replacing the current secular democratic regime. These communities of youths live on the geographic and cultural margins of the settlements, presenting a 'close to nature' perception and longing for simplicity and authenticity alongside a racist-xenophobic consciousness. Some refer to this as post-Zionism – returning to wearing biblical garb, farming, and re-establishing the kingdom of Judea (R. D. 2016, p. 15).

Noar Ha'gvaot members are less attached to digital technology and social media and define themselves as a religious ideological entity. Politically speaking, most of them believe in Kahana's agenda, which was outlawed and defined as a terror organisation in 1994 (Levy and Erlich, 2005, p. 9), seeking to transport all Arabs and/or Palestinians outside of Israel by violent means. A minority of the youths come from the normative national religious stream (R.D., 2016, p. 16). Those who turned to violence still wish to join the military but cannot since they have a criminal record. The first generation of settlers suggests that the main motive for youth to turn to the outpost mechanism is the will to follow in their parent's footsteps against the compromises offered by the Israeli regime of re-defining territory with the Palestinians (p.19). The most notorious action of all, used by those who turn to violence and called 'Tag Mechir' (price tag), is defined as property vandalism and physical harm against minorities. The Israeli government formed a unit of the national police designated specifically to investigate these crimes in both Israel and the West Bank, and to classify groups that perpetrate price tag attacks as 'illegal associations' (US Department of State report, 2013). However, Noar Ha'gvaot is not a solo actor seeking to guard Israeli territory using extreme opinions (see Appendix 3).

Civil society organisations and assistive political agents

This occurs within an environment of rising of political right-wing dominance in public discourse, emphasized, for example, by the movement 'Im Tirtzu' (Yanko, 2020), described as the largest Zionist group in Israel. It was established in 2006, and promotes itself as the *'[...] most influential grassroots Zionist organisation. Our mission concerning Zionism and its values has always been two pronged: to advance the good and to confront the bad'* (IMTI, 2021). The movement has a radical right-wing agenda, and during one of its campaigns in 2015, it accused left-wing supporters and politicians of supporting Islamic terror against Jews (Folber, 2015). Using YouTube and social media channels such as Facebook (IMTI Facebook, 2021), followed by over 250,000 members, the content of some of the posts has been critical of the justice system, complementary to right-wing Prime Minister Netanyahu's expressions in recent times. Thus, this movement plays a part in political notions of closing the space toward left-wing agendas, especially when it comes to territorial compromises. IMTI can be offensive, but because it is not consistently violent, it can work freely inside universities, operating 'academic cells' in which they perform social and political volunteer work for students, even though there is much criticism about allowing it to move freely without supervision. This raises questions among Israeli parliament members about its legality (Knesset News, 2020).

Another dominant civic group with a radical right-wing agenda is 'Lahava', a private fanatical religious organisation. Members of the Israeli parliament accused the organisation of being racist, violent, and anti-liberal, exiting from the normative right-wing agenda (Nachmias, 2015).

However, to date, the organisation has not been outlawed, and it is still active online through a website (Lahava, 2021). Its leaders are known for having connections with the Noam party, established in 2019 (Noam Party website, 2021), that has a radical agenda against LGBT communities (Zaken, 2019). This could explain the 36% rise in violent actions against that community in 2019 (Shikman, 2020). The community itself relates it to the party's campaign against gay marriage among other forms of discrimination from Israeli governmental institutions.

Noam has substantial support from rabbis of the religious-Zionist stream, calling for voters to stop the elimination of *'our national Jewish character as the people of Israel'* by secular liberal Jewish traditions. The group is led by Rabbi Tau and supports the radical notion of re-defining public spaces for men and women, and has an anti-feminist and anti-liberal ideology (Noam Facebook, 2021). The party launched its 2019 campaign under the slogan *'being a normal nation in our country'* opposing the gay agenda as a whole (Harel, 2019). It decided to run again in the March 2021 election and to join forces with 'Otzma Yehudit', another radical right-wing religious nationalist party led by the notorious Itamar Ben Gvir (Barsky, 2021). Noam led by Avid Mao, and Otzma Yehudit headed by Ben Gvir mutually supported each other in recent elections. They won 7 electoral votes, and officially became parliament members. Prime Minister Netanyahu announced that his next regime will be electorally supported by their party now called 'Hatziyonut Hadatit' (Ha'aretz, 2021). The notion of greater radical right-wing closeness to the decision-making table indicates a rise in the atmosphere of extremism against minorities, but also openly supports the Noar Ha'gvaot agenda. Ben Gvir published on social media that *'Noar Ha'gvaot are today's Zionists'* during an interview on national radio (Ben Gvir Facebook, 2019).

4.2 Palestinian jihadist terrorism: main agents

The Intelligence and Terrorism Information Centre (ITIC) identifies Hamas, defined as a terror organisation by Israel, the United States, and the European Union, as *'a fundamentalist Sunni Islamic movement founded in 1987 by Muslim Brotherhood activists in the Gaza Strip'* (ITICa, 2021). Hamas does not recognize Israel's right to a Jewish state and maintains an armed struggle for the establishment of a Palestinian state (Ibid). Nowadays, the group also functions as a political party. It has an armed military branch, the 'Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades', that carry out missile attacks from the Gaza Strip and other types of attacks (shootings, suicide bombings, kidnappings, etc.) in the West Bank and in other parts of Israel. The affinity to Hamas is expressed by membership, ideological identification, or family relations with other members (Bartal and Frisch, 2017). This group has been behind most of the acts of terror (Ayalon and Shafran Gitelman, 2017, p. 28-30). An example of their control over the Gaza Strip is found in the practice of the 'March of Return'. At the beginning of January 2018, a civic initiative began calling for the siege upon Gaza to end by performing non-violent public protests around the security fence marking the border with Israel (Perlov, 2018). In early March, Hamas seized control of this civil initiative and recruited participants. According to UN data on the outcome of these protests, during 2018 and 2019, it appears that 234 Palestinians lost their lives and over 34,000 were injured, whereas six Israelis were killed and 188 were injured (OCHA, 2019).

The second most important Palestinian terror organisation, which first emerged in the late 1970s in Gaza, is known as 'Palestinian Islamic Jihad' (PIJ) (ITICb, 2021). PIJ denies any

Jewish settlement across the Israeli state, and preaches jihad as an immediate response that cannot be contained until a Palestinian state is established. PIJ's military branch, named 'The Jerusalem Battalions' in similarity to that of Hamas, carries out missile attacks from the Gaza Strip and encourages violent actions in the West Bank. During the years of the second intifada, PIJ specialized in carrying out comprehensive suicide bombings in Israeli territory. The group is considered to be the organisation that is closest to Iran, from whom receive extensive support. (In 2019, escalation between Israel and the PIJ revealed rifts in relations between the PIJ and Hamas, as well as the fragility of the situation in the Gaza Strip. *'[...] a new ad hoc equation was created in which Israel and Hamas stood on the same side of the barricade, and on the other hand, the Islamic jihad stood alone'* (Zoref and Schweitzer, 2019). Accordingly, Hamas, although encouraging terror acts against Israelis, has a different attitude towards compromise and negotiations with the Israeli regime. The motives of both organisations are similar, but their paths are divergent.

The past decades also revealed a relatively new type of terror action – the establishment of 'smuggling tunnels' used to store weapons, heavy artillery, and other supplies and also to transport terrorists directly into Israeli territory. A few of these tunnels have been found near the southern border of Gaza, but more extensively, they are littered across the northern border with Lebanon. In 2018, Israeli reporters started to raise awareness of the topic, announcing that *'another tunnel crossing into Israeli territory has been located on the Lebanese border'* (Zaytoon, 2018). On May 29, 2019, the IDF northern command announced another widespread action: *'Operation Northern Shield officially ended to expose and neutralize Hezbollah terrorist offensive terrorist tunnels.'* (Melamed and Baruchim, 2019). Most of the tunnels had been dug by Hezbollah, established by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards in 1982. It is a two-hat Shiite Islamic organisation: an Iran-backed terrorist organisation and a Lebanese Shiite political organisation (ITICc, 2021). While its attacks are mainly against Israel (rockets aimed at northern settlements), it also carries out attacks on Israeli and Jewish targets abroad. After the IDF withdrew from Lebanon (see Section 2), Hezbollah took control of and established an extensive military infrastructure in Lebanon with Iranian assistance. In recent years, the group has been declared a terrorist organisation by the United States and the European Union (ITICc, 2021).

4.3 State-driven radicalisation

Police brutality

Ahuvia Sandak was a 16-year-old teenager who died during a police chase in 2020 after being suspected of participating in a violent riot in the West Bank. Her death caused dozens of daily protests from Noar Ha'gvaot youths, who felt that one of their own had died for no cause. Further investigation showed that the police had acted irresponsibly and did not assist Sandak after the car she was in was crushed due to the chase (Pelman and Dangur, 2021). Many protests spread in ultra-Orthodox Jewish neighbourhoods and cities across Israel, seeking to point out state omission in the case of a settler, so much that an outpost in that territory was established after his death (Dangur, 2021). This represents a matter in which the state does not prevent the outpost phenomena, yet it uses police brutality to handle law violations within these areas of the West Bank. Another recent case of brutality occurred during a protest led by activists and politicians in East Jerusalem, in which Ofer Kasif, a member of Hareshima Hameshutefet was brutally beaten by special police forces even though he holds immunity

due to his Knesset membership (German, 2021). Kasif joins other parliament members who have also experienced violence from police forces. Moreover, it was recently claimed that during the recent protests against Netanyahu's regime in Jerusalem, police also used excessive force against non-right-wing participants in the demonstrations (Maanit and Shafir, 2020).

Freedom of regulation in the news press

An additional link can be made between the right-wing regime in Israel after the elections of 2015 and the rise of the radical right nationalist movement of settlers (JPPI, 2017). The rise of radical right-wing extreme opinions expressed more freely in the media was possible because of cancellation of the law that reduced regulation in journalism in 2017, as the Knesset decided to end the journalism order from 1933 that obligated newspapers to be licensed to operate in Israel (Knesset, 2017). This opened the door for the Israeli regulated news market to enable influential people and groups to freely express right-wing and radical attitudes (Weitz, 2021). Some of these right-wing actors received a wider platform to express their political agenda using right-wing media, such as *Channel 20*, *Israel Hayom*, *Srugim*, *Kipa*, and other social media and online spaces.

Instrumental actions on territory in dispute

The Jewish National Fund (JNF; KKL in Hebrew) is sponsored and works for the State of Israel to acquire lands in order to achieve their national mission of territorial ownership (KKL, 2021). Lately, the government authorized 38 million nis to purchase lands in the West Bank, continuing a recent decision to expand KKL activities openly in the West Bank (Ravid and Shalev, 2021). This has encouraged a right-wing agenda of connecting the development of Jewish settlements and ending the national conflict by putting ownership of these lands into the hands of the Jewish majority. Even though outposts are supposedly illegal, there is no law prohibiting them. In addition, the 1986 establishment of ELAD, an organisation responsible for investing in unearthing the ancient City of David in the midst of Jerusalem, is leading hundreds of excavation activities with its goal to strengthen the relation between the Jewish nation and its lands (*Israel Hayom*, 2020). In 1997, ELAD started to develop the tourist complex at the City of David, and in 2014, the number of visitors reached 400,000 per year. As the foundation activates tourist sites across Jerusalem, it has also purchased Jewish lands through archaeological activities around the area.

'Peace Now' (Shalom Achshav) considers this to be a settlers' movement that is involved with buying up Palestinian lands in East Jerusalem. ELAD also has a mandate from the state to operate the city of David, one of the most profound sites in Jewish history, located next to the al Aqza mosque and the Temple Mount (Peace Now, 2021). According to 2019 official data, it is listed as a registered organisation, funded by the state and donations that employs over 500 people with an annual budget of 145 million nis (Ministry of Justice Index, 2021). In 2018, MFI (the Movement for Freedom of Information) revealed through justice procedures that ELAD has contracts with the Israel land authority to acquire disputed lands in Jerusalem, and not only for tourism purposes (MFI, 2020). Even though ELAD is not directly associated with Noar Ha'Gvaot, its activities deepen the connection between Jewish ownership over Arab and/or Palestinian lands and fulfilling the mission of Zionism through settling the Jewish State. Much of its activity is concentrated in the Arab neighbourhood of Silwan in East Jerusalem. Currently, they are attempting to progress a law that would allow them to establish a national

garden in that area to strengthen Jewish dominance (Chason, 2018). Its political supporters are representatives from the Likud party. Unsurprisingly, the same party representatives voted for the 'Law of Nationality' that passed in 2018 (The Knesset, 2018) This law also contributed to harming the aspirations of civic equality in Israeli democracy, as it reinforces the superiority of Jewish nationality (IDI, 2018).

5. Stakeholders and channels of de-radicalisation

According to its declaration of independence, Israel defines itself as a pluralistic democracy, It was legislated as 'The terror preventive order – 1948' to set up laws regarding actions of violence not permitted under the national state's ruling (Levy and Erlich, 2005). In other words, the State of Israel has a commitment to take care of all civilians in its territory led by the notion of equality, as stated. However, contemporary reality shows a gap between the democratic regime and the liberal roots that Israeli law is based upon (Mautner, 2019). At the meso-level, in 1994, the Kahana Chai movement was outlawed, followed by a few terror attacks on Muslims such as the massacre at the Cave of Machpela (burial site of Abraham) by religious fanatics. This act represents the change in the law's definition of Jewish terrorism and official state recognition of it as a phenomena and not just as random violence. At that level, another organisation under consideration to be outlawed by Likud party members is Lahava because of its racist, violent, and anti-liberal agenda (Nachmias, 2015). But so far, it is still active online through a website (Lahava website, 2021).

At the micro-level, in 2005, the government approved 'the correction of the national security law', recognizing Jewish terror as a compensative act of violence (Rozner, 2005). The law applies only to Israeli civilians – Arabs or Jews – who are victims of violent acts on an ethno-national basis, and does not include compensation to Palestinians affected by Jewish acts of terror, such as the family from Duma (Chovel, 2015). This suggests that the notion of Jewish terrorism being unacceptable is under consideration at the very least. At the same level, individual price-tag actions were also outlawed as the Supreme Court decided these are actions of organised crime (Freadson and Ben Kimon, 2020), relying on reports from the IDF of such occurrences in the West Bank (The Knesset, 2020) and by regional branches of police.

At the macro-level, in 2016, the government established an anti-racism unit (ARU) to handle racist acts against all minorities, with special emphasis on the Ethiopian public in Israel. The unit trains executives in public positions to act against racism and xenophobic agendas, and it compiles a yearly report regarding the levels of hate crimes towards minorities (ARU, 2019). Additionally, in 2019, it published a restriction prohibiting racist comments on social media involving public employees. However, the unit's work does not focus on radical right-wing groups, and according to its data, only 40% of its total complaints evolve racism, while the majority of offences involve the Ethiopian and Arab communities, and others are from LGBT complaints.

Civic society organisations have also been active in recent years, flouting the risks of violence perpetrated by radical right-wing extremists and others. For example, Peace Now was established in the late 1970s and 'B'Tselem' in 1989, in addition to 'Breaking the Silence' (BTS) in 2004. The latter group was activated by former soldiers who share their stories about

the military occupation and its negative long-term influences (BTS, 2021). BTS has collected and published testimonies from soldiers who served in the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem since September 2000, and it holds lectures, house meetings and other public events, and tours in Hebron and the South Hebron Hills in the West Bank.

In response to price-tag attacks, a civic reaction emerged in 2011 known as 'Tag Meir'(Light-Tag), aiming to give an answer to normative religious actors who seek to end the violent discourse undermining the internal solidarity of Jewish society by reporting attacks of violence from Tag Mechir to the state using an *'umbrella organisation that runs a coalition partnership with a forum of 48 organisations and institutions in Israel.'* A few years later, the Forum for Regional Thinking (FORTH) was established as an independent Jewish and Arab research institute, and the 'Think and Do Tank' was founded in 2014 for the purpose of changing public discourse and opinion in Israel regarding its relationship with her neighbours (FORTH, 2021). The organisation seeks to change the attitudes that derive from extreme right-wing thinking. FORTH works to accomplish its mission *'by advancing an in-depth and nuanced understanding of the Middle East, and endorsing a civil, rather than militaristic narrative'*, asking to change the atmosphere of violence. In 2018, another anti-racism movement, the 'Anahnu Movement', appeared in the Israeli socio-political landscape. This organisation is exercising its power against terrorism by attempting to connect all four main sectors in Israeli society (Anahnu website, 2021). In parallel, to efforts to change the political discourse, as part of a global movement, 'Antifa 972' declared that, *'The current cell of activity arose this year following a wave of hatred on the part of the regime and right-wing fascist organisations'* explaining that they are at the root of the horrific attacks that were carried out by Noar Ha'gvaot and/or Kahana supporters all across Israel (Zehavi, 2014). Antifa 972 maintains a presence in the urban space through graffiti, but it also took part in protests organised by the Black Flag movement against the Netanyahu government, calling *'to free Israel from the capitalist right-wing regime'* (Yalon, 2020).

It is noticeable that the Israeli discourse on radicalisation processes has shifted and is getting more attention than in the past from public representatives and civic society. Even though the above NGOs present an agenda of resistance against racism, armed conflicts, and xenophobic opinions, this has not been sufficient to eliminate violence stemming from radical thinking. The implementation of such initiatives must be applied with the assistance of state institutions, meaning that it is crucial to add suitable and definitive legislation to the judicial authority's activities by the Israeli parliament supported by a government that will address violent individual activism, as well as institutionalized violence, at their roots, as presented in Section 4. In addition, state authorities need to insert the educational activities created by these NGOs into formal and informal institutions to offer youths such as those who join Noar Ha'gvaot a different pattern of thinking before they are attracted by an agenda of violence. But most of all, it is evident that the ongoing Israeli–Palestinian conflict has a constant effect upon the entire population. Therefore, positive partnerships and initiatives should be the state's main concern in order to eliminate violent self-responses.

6. Conclusion

The two main terror threats: Palestinian jihadist terrorism and Jewish counter extremists' terror actions are developing in parallel to each other and have resulted in decision makers taking different official positions over the years. It is not clear in which direction spreading a radical agenda will follow. This report has shown that the political environment in which such terror appears is not disconnected from it.

While Israel has suffered from jihadist terror actions since its establishment, in recent years, it is shown that alongside the obvious ethno-national conflict between the Jewish majority and Arab and/or Palestinian minority, a form of inside-house terror has been established by minority groups who are challenging the democratic regime using violent actions such as property destruction and acts that result in the deaths of innocent civilians in regard to 're-building the Temple Mount' in their efforts to make Israel a religious state. Committing avengement attacks mainly towards Palestinians, *Noar H'agvaot* poses an active threat to non-violent public space and a liberal atmosphere by using a racist religious-based paradigm effected by the failure of state educational systems, socio-economic gaps, and counter jihadist violence to attract young people growing up in the West Bank, an area that has been disputed since 1967. For them, price-tag actions are a part of a broad nationalist ideology, or sometimes an instrument that fulfils other political agents' perceptions.

Influenced by regional rabbinic leaders, civic society movements, and political parties, the process of radicalisation does not appear in empty space, and it has been accompanied by a right-wing political regime since 2009. However, four election campaigns in the past two years have not been able to establish a stable government, and this symbolizes the lack of clarity in the political situation in Israel. It is agreed that all institutions – the family, educational, security, and government authorities – share a part in the neglect of these youngsters. *Noar Ha'gvaot* departs from a formal attachment to the basic civic obligation of non-violent democracies in an unstable political environment. It can be assumed that the lack of national solidarity and constant public mistrust in state institutions also provides common ground for extremists to react with their own solutions. Police brutality, freedom from regulation in the news press, and instrumental actions on territory disputes also contribute to the political atmosphere, allowing such radicalisation processes to continue.

As presented in this report, it is crucial to notice the differences between civic society actions occurring as a response to extreme conditions and the state's actions, aiming to prevent the harm caused by radicalisation processes. As such, Israel has not yet ignored the dangers of youthful radical right-wing practices, and is acting through its justice system and parliament, as well as through the political elite to examine the main stakeholders and channels of de-radicalisation. To these parties, we can add NGOs such as Tag Meir and BTS, working to raise awareness of the risks from radicalism and violence. These organisations might create a different path toward dealing with Jewish terrorism, and also attitudes toward jihadist terrorism in the public discourse. However, it is expected that if the state does not solve its national ongoing conflict with the Palestinians, more young people, both Jews and Arabs, may find themselves choosing, inevitably, a road of extremism and continue to challenge the state's monopoly over violence.

Appendices

Appendix 1. Main (de)-radicalisation events in Israel since 2001

Name	Date	Description
Oslo agreements, Rabin assassination and followed reactions	1993–1999	The assassination of Prime Minister Rabin in November 1995, emerging from the Israeli–Palestinian conflict after the beginning of the Oslo peace plan regarding the territory of settlements in the West Bank, showed a rise in the radical-right movement referred to as ‘Jewish nationalism’.
Immigration from the USSR	1990–2010	This followed the collapse of the Eastern state-socialist bloc. Approximately 1 million Jews emigrated from the USSR to Israel. This had a great effect on the income gaps of households in Israeli society.
The withdrawal from Lebanon, Camp David	1999–2000	The majority of the Israeli population (70%) supported the withdrawal of IDF control over southern Lebanese territory, paying a bloody cost for 18 years, after they had maintained a military presence due to the Hizballah terror organisation’s spread, and re-established the ‘blue line’ separation between the two states.
El Aqza Intifada, Chomat Magen military operation	2000–2002	Jihadist Palestinian terror attacks occurred in parallel to military operations in the occupied territories, in which over 450 Israelis died during 2002. This led to the military operation Chomat Magen (IDI, 2003), and led to more bloodshed between Jews and Palestinians.
9/11, Al Qaida and global terrorism, the fall of Iraq’s political regime	2001–2003	Israel linked, not for the first time, the 9/11 disaster and its own suffering from Palestinian terror with the influence of global Islamic terrorism affecting all democracies around the world, Also, Israel wished to prevent the entrance of global terror nests into Israeli and Palestinian territory, in addition to already existing attacks and tensions in the Middle East.
The withdrawal from Gaza and north Samaria 2005, the Second Lebanon War in 2006, the elections of 2009	2005–2008	These security occurrences also deepened public mistrust in the political regime and the politics of right and left.
World financial crisis	2008	Inequality in household income of OECD members was recorded in most countries as a result of the global financial crisis. Israel tried to apply a wide-ranging programme to reduce the differences, but instead increased income differences and the gaps between groups.

Gaza war and ongoing missile attacks on civilian territory	2008–2014	IDF operations through the years have had a significant effect on the way the public reacts to terror acts, and continues living with a reality of constant bloodshed, and suffering from hundreds of casualties among both Israelis and Palestinians.
The social protest	14.07.2011	This event symbolizes the lack of trust in politicians and opposition to the outcomes of the neo-liberal economy system adopted in Israel during the 1980s and expressed by young educated Israelis. It is reflected in the gaps between classes in Israeli society, along with the everyday national ethnic-based conflicts and disparity in income levels.
Syrian civil war	2011–until today	The war brought forth a wide range of conspiracy theories against Jews and Israel as the outbreak of civil war under the Assad regime was presented as a Zionist scheme to weaken the resistance. Opposition groups blamed Israel for Assad's control, while his government described the rebels as the perpetrators of Israel's plan to take over the entire area.
Iran and Middle East relations, Netanyahu speech at the UN	2012	This strengthened the thoughts of Israel about a perpetual immediate threat that might move extremism and shift its actions due to global and domestic terrorism.
ISIS terror	2014	The rise of ISIS in 2014 increased the already existing suspicion of the Israeli government and public opinion toward a possible international link of local Arab individuals to the organisation. This created a constant concern of Israeli security agencies about future jihadist terror attacks within the country's borders that might penetrate from the Syrian border
The cancellation of regulation on newspapers (Israel Hayom law)	2014	The rise of radical right-wing extreme opinions expressed more freely in the media was possible due to cancellation of the law that reduced the regulation of journalism. This opened up the Israeli regulated news market to free influential individuals and other sources that gave place to right-wing and radical attitudes.
The rise of right-wing regimes in Europe, anti-Semitic offences	2015–2020	In a 2014 report, Israel declared that anti-Semitism had shifted from the radical left or right to Islamic terrorist groups. An increase took place in verbal violence, while there was a reduction in the number of violent acts. However, a 2019 report of world anti-Semitic acts revealed as much as an 18% rise in severe violent acts against Jews, synagogues, and community centres, mostly in Europe.
The knife intifada/soloist terror	2015–2017	Over 250 attacks using knives occurred in Israel in a six-month period starting in September 2015. This new tactic of solo attacks was similar to European attacks in the same years. In 2018, the ICT termed these the 'lone wolf'

		attacker phenomena and tried to establish new strategies for dealing with terror.
Donald Trump's victory in the US, Israel-US relations	2016	Trump's victory was received warmly among right-wing supporters in Israel and Prime Minister Netanyahu, who had just won his election in 2015.
Trump declaration on the recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, the 'Nationality law – 2018'	2017–2018	President Trump's speech on December 6, 2017, according to right-wing politicians, corrected a historic injustice towards the Jewish majority that would help progress peace with the Palestinians, who stated just the opposite. US recognition was a symbolic political act to set the groundwork for future planned agreements in the Middle East. It also supported Netanyahu's right-wing regime in adopting a notion of exclusivity over Jerusalem in its political ideology. In the same year, the 'Nationality law –2018' was proposed, determining the superiority of the Hebrew language, customs, and Jewish symbols over all others. Even though the law was not in compliance with the notion of a liberal democracy, it gave right-wing extremists the ability to feel empowered by their legitimate ruling, purifying Israel of Arabs and making it a post-Zionist religious regime.
US withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal	8.5.2018	President Trump's declaration of withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal was made after Prime Minister Netanyahu gave a crucial speech at a special conference, revealing documents captured from Iran about developments in its nuclear programme. This verified the Israeli concern for the danger of the agreement, while also supporting agendas for responding more aggressively to the terror nests of Iranian fanatics on the borders with Syria, Lebanon, and Egypt, and as a result, it deepened mistrust of parts of the Arab world that support the regime.
Israeli air assaults on Iraqi and Iranian targets	2019	Due to reports of Iran building a new ground missile base directed toward Israeli territory, Israel increased attacks on suspected terror targets in the Middle East. Specialists assume that Israel, which had tried hard to prevent the spread of the Syrian civil war was now also putting efforts into initiating attacks, allegedly in to prevent the establishment of regional jihadist terror nests.
Deal of the Century – Abraham Accords and the annexation of Judea and Samaria	2020	'Peace to prosperity' was the American peace plan, introduced by President Trump through the Abraham Accords at its beginning. This plan included the annexation of 30% of the territory in Judea and Samaria by Israel without consideration from the Palestinian side. The plan aroused hope in the hearts of extremists from the settlements, but in October 2020, the Israeli government confirmed the Abraham peace agreements, offering normalisation with several countries in the distant

		region of the Middle East, such as the United Arab Emirates.
Crime minister movement, COVID-19 pandemic, and rise of social protests	2020–2021	35 weeks of protest against Netanyahu were carried out at the same time the COVID-19 pandemic began to spread.

Appendix 2. Political discourse about radicalisation in Israel

Quotation	Author(s)	Date of quotation	Source	Comments
‘Beating radical Islam everywhere in the Middle East is crucial for our regional security, of Europe, of the world. And I know Mark, that Holland is contributing its share in this effort. But allow me to say loud and clear, so is Israel. On the fight on Islamic terrorism, Holland does not have a better friend than Israel.’	Benjamin Netanyahu, Prime Minister	6.9.2016	https://mfa.gov.il/MFAHEB/PressRoom/Pages/PM-Netanyahus-remarks-at-a-joint-press-conference-with-Dutch-PM-Rutte_060916.aspx	Meeting with Netherlands Prime Minister Rutte, where Netanyahu emphasized Israel’s attitude towards jihadist terror actions
‘I think both our nations understand each other in the most profound way. We cherish the values of peace, liberty, democracy. We fight the same forces of radical Islam that threaten not only our countries, but our joint civilization.’	Benjamin Netanyahu, Prime Minister	30.10.2017	https://www.gov.il/he/departments/news/vent_australia_301017	Netanyahu in a declaration on radical Islam and democracy during a meeting with Australian Prime Minister Turnbull
‘After long years of suspicion and hostility, a row of Israeli entities – political and public – are deepening their ties with extreme right-wing parties and movements, sometimes against the official position of the Israeli government.’	Nitzan Horowitz, Chairman of the Meretz Party	8.7.2018	https://nitzan.org.il/tag/%D7%99%D7%9E%D7%99%D7%9F-%D7%A7%D7%99%D7%A6%D7%95%D7%A0%D7%99/	About extreme-right wing international cooperation
‘Radical Islam, whose head is based in Tehran, is undermining the very existence of Israel. But it is not only a threat to us, but to the entire world. It is a threat to world peace. Surely, their arming imposes a threat upon us, but also on the world as a whole. There are leaders in the Middle East saying if Iran gets nuclear	Benjamin Netanyahu, Prime Minister	17.2.2010	https://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-3850707,00.html	About Iran and the threat to Israel and the rest of the world

weapons, we will arm ourselves with them as well, and there will be a nuclear race, go figure how it will end. A year ago, we asked ourselves "Is Iran arming itself?" Today, there is argument that Iran is making progress.'				
'Netanyahu is the architect of the Nationality law, the racist incitement, the occupation, and the settlements and is not worthy of any vote. Netanyahu's method is to harm Arab citizens and humiliate them in order to win the right-wing votes on one hand, and to try to bribe the Arab public by making no cover promises for money allotment and problem solving on the other.'	BALAD party official campaign agenda	January 2021	https://www.kan.org.il/item/?itemid=98376	A response to the 'Nationality law – 2018' and its implications on Israeli democracy
'No patience toward outlaws'	Benjamin Netanyahu, Prime Minister	20.10.2019	https://news.walla.co.il/item/3318881	Referring to Noar Ha'gvaot after assaulting IDF soldiers with rocks in the Yitzhar settlement
'(I am) proud of the legal advice to Noar Ha'gvaot.'	Itamar Ben Gvir, Chairman of the Otzma Yehudit party	12.2.2020	link	Ben Gvir is also an advocate who represents accused Jewish participants of terror activities, and he is now running for election.
'The privatization created an unbearable social gap. I hear stories of a father of a family earning 9,000 nis monthly – not a small amount of money – and he can't break even.'	Nachman Shai, Knesset representative from the Kadima party	9.2.2012	https://main.knesset.gov.il/News/PressReleases/Pages/PR_1462.aspx	On the neo-liberal economic crisis
'Noar Ha'gvaot is an extreme perverted issue, like they came out from the bible. They don't give a damn about the country, and show contempt over	Daniel Ben Simon, Knesset representative from the	9.2.2012	https://main.knesset.gov.il/News/PressReleases/Pages/	About Noar Ha'gvaot during a special discussion in the Israeli parliament

the judicial court and police. I would call them "the contempt authority."	Labour party 'Avoda'		PR 1462.aspx	
'Part of it is the failure of the education system; some are complete anarchists who caused massive damage. The biggest damage are the terror attacks when they occur. When you burn a family or a Palestinian child, it is harmful to all settlements. It's de-legitimation to the entire settlement enterprise [...] the treatment starts with the educational system, but I don't mind signing executive orders for these groups. When it comes to these disturbed (people), there is a significant decrease.'	Avigdor Liberman, Minister of Defence	29.8.2017	https://www.haaretz.co.il/news/politics/premium-1.4401065	On price-tag actions committed by Noar Ha'gvaot
'It is an unimaginable disgrace and insolent action, and we have no intention to of ignoring it.'	Naftali Bennet, Minister of Defence	16.4.2020	link	About Noar Ha'gvaot's action of entering a military base and stealing army equipment
'One crisis is over, but many more dangerous ones might break out due to the ongoing violations of Israel, like the one we have witnessed today [...] it was published that the number of extremists invading the Temple Mount reached 1,080, which is a new record since the beginning of the 1967 occupation.'	Jordanian Minister of Foreign Relations	1.8.2017	https://13tv.co.il/item/news/politics/state-policy/jordanianforeignminister-395506/	Religious Jewish worshipers pray freely on the Temple Mount – a sacred Jewish synagogue located next to the Al Aqza mosque – against international agreements with the Israeli government
'The confrontation in the Middle East is not between Israelis and Palestinians, but between extremists and moderates.'	Avigdor Liberman, Minister of foreign relations	7.5.2009	https://mfa.gov.il/MFAHEB/PressRoom/Pages/FM_Liberman_meets_with_German_FM_Steinmeier	During a meeting with the German minister of foreign relations, regarding the situation of terror in the Middle East and in the global arena

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'I worked in harmony out of appreciation for the prime minister for a long period of time [...] and for that, I thank him. But, unfortunately, I now find myself in harsh disagreement with him and Knesset members. Unfortunately, extreme factors have taken over Likud.'	Boogi Ya'alon, former Minister of Defence	20.5.2009	https://www.themarker.com/news/1.2949721	Populism in the right-wing Likud party is blamed on Prime Minister Netanyahu's politics
'Again, the minister of foreign affairs, who is supposed to be the face of the State of Israel, reveals his ugly racist face. Arab citizens of Israel are entitled, like any other civilians, to express solidarity with their suffering brothers in Gaza [...] Liberman, the serial pyromaniac, is trying once again to set fires and start riots like in October 2000.'	Zehava Galon, Chairwoman of Meretz party	21.7.2014	https://www.haaretz.co.il/news/politics/1.2383153	Criticism during the Tzook Eitan military operation, warning about the loss of universal human rights thinking amidst military battles and jihadist terror
'The order of the press stems from Mandate rule, and we should, as a democracy, sanctify freedom of speech, [...] the state should not interfere with newspaper permits. Canceling permit procedures will allow more newspapers to operate, complement democratic and pluralistic procedures, and demolish the old anachronistic procedure.'	Arye Deri, Minister of Internal Affairs	10.3.2016	https://www.mako.co.il/news-israel/local-q1_2016/Article-a3ff75cad906351004.htm	Cancelation of the law on journalism, allowing right-wing media to be more active in political discourse in Israeli society
'The governmental violence is more severe than civilian violence, and is sending the wrong message to society about the way one should behave toward the right to demonstrate. If we don't stop the brutality of the	Tamar Zandberg, Chairwoman of the Meretz party	12.6.2017	https://tamarzandberg.co.il/archives/4403	Reaction against police brutality during civilian protests from all minorities in Israeli society

reinforcement system in appropriate ways, the situation will get worse and the basic rights of each one of us will be discounted.'				
'There is an overtaking of extreme factors in Likud, threats on members of the faction, and I tell you – these things cannot go on.'	Ariel Sharon, former Prime Minister	24.6.2005	https://news.walla.co.il/item/751930	Sharon before starting the Kadima party
'Israeli society is going through a difficult crisis as a result of the disengagement. Now, it is in need of union. Now, it's the Palestinians' turn to prove their desire for peace [...] the most important test for the Palestinian leadership will be to fulfill its obligations to end terror and its infrastructures, eliminating the anarchy regime of the armed gangs and stopping the incitement and education of hatred towards Israel and Jews. Until then, Israel will know how to defend itself from the horrors of terrorism.'	Ariel Sharon, former Prime Minister	15.9.2005	https://mfa.gov.il/MFAHEB/ForeignRelations/Documents/shnaton_2005.pdf	UN speech due to 'The Disengagement' from Gaza
'The war on terror requires two moves: one is fighting the terrorists and the other is fighting the support for terrorism [...] the war on terror is not just one on the fishes of terror, but also of changing the water that gives terrorism a living habitat [...] I cannot vouch for not having more attacks. There will be, will be maniacs. Maniacs unfortunately exist in all nations, from Japan to the United States of America.'	Shimon Peres, Minister of Foreign Relations	25.7.1995	https://knesset.gov.il/tqi/knesset_new/knesset14/HTML_27_03_2012_06-21-01-PM/19950725@1995072502@002.html	About the notion of terrorism, two years after Oslo, a few months before the assassination of Rabin

<p>'An act of Tag Mechir is similar to the actions of terror organisations.'</p>	<p>Otniel Shneler, member of Kadima</p>	<p>3.10.2011</p>	<p>link</p>	<p>Reaction and warning of the effect of price-tag terror actions</p>
<p>"Tag Mechir is not terrorism, period."</p>	<p>Betzalel Smotrich, head of Ha'tziyonut Ha'datit</p>	<p>12.12.2015</p>	<p>https://twitter.com/bezalelsm/status/675734911324708864?lang=he</p>	<p>The right-wing Zionist party reacts to price-tag actions</p>
<p>'In the name of the Israeli government, I came to support you. The act of terrorism against you offended not only the people of the monastery, but the Jewish people and the state of Israel. This is not the way of Zionism and Judaism – on the contrary. Freedom of religion and rituals are of supreme value in Israeli democracy, and we will not allow any harm from it. Offending a church is like hurting a synagogue or a mosque.'</p>	<p>Dani Ayalon, Vice Minister of Foreign Relations</p>	<p>5.9.2012</p>	<p>https://mfa.gov.il/mfaheb/pressroom/spokesman/2012/pages/dfm-ayalon-at-latrun-monastery-060912.aspx</p>	<p>On price-tag action committed against the Latrun monastery</p>
<p>'So instead of the Israeli government fighting these gangs, these terror groups, and outlawing them, just like the Lahava organisation and Tag Mechir, today, we witness how the constitutional committee boycotts the government by member Smotrich, and instead of drying out the settlements, they continue to give them hundreds of millions.'</p>	<p>Osama Saadi, member of Hareshima Hameshutefet</p>	<p>22.12.2015</p>	<p>https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:djEj6sIFstEJ:https://fs.knesset.gov.il/20/Plenum/20_tor318401.doc+&cd=1&hl=iw&ct=clnk&gl=il</p>	<p>Reaction of the joint Arab parties of the Israeli parliament, criticizing Jewish terror acts through price-tag harm on Arabic society</p>
<p>'There is no academia without independent thinking, putting doubt on the obvious, and self-criticism. IMT is hunting down professors defined as left on the political map, as they are the ones to determine what is left and</p>	<p>Ofer Kasif, Head of the Sub-Committee for Higher Education in the Knesset</p>	<p>25.11.2020</p>	<p>https://m.knesset.gov.il/newspressreleases/pages/press25112020m.aspx</p>	<p>On the IMT organisation</p>

what is not by their own conception. They have informers, and they burst into lectures that in their opinion have a left tendency and "blow" them up.'				
'Shame! I stand on the right of every man to protest, demonstrate, and express his opinion, but there is a big difference between a legitimate protest and mortification of state symbols. No state in the world will allow disgrace of its symbols [...] I expect the law enforcement authorities to act immediately and put to justice the protestor, not just for the punishment, but mainly to pass on an educational and civilian message that needs to be loud and clear.'	Yariv Levin, Chairman of the Knesset	22.7.2020	Facebook link- https://www.facebook.com/341448679281672/posts/3184583544968157/?d=n	About the demonstrator from antifa972 during the Black Flag movement protest
'The agreement that was signed between Smotrich and Ben Gvir is very important for the right wing. It will help us to win the elections. I congratulate them for showing leadership and responsibility that led to the right decision.'	Miki Zohar, head of the coalition	3.2.2021	https://www.cacalists.co.il/local/articles/0,7340,L-3891211,00.html	Member of the Likud party supporting the entrance of radical view politicians to strength the right-wing political bloc
'That is the same rabbi [...] who set up a new record of calamity towards women alongside social imperviousness: "[...] education for women will offend the nation's quality of life [...]" claims Rabbi Tao and continues "[...] the house is the place of a woman, and not the social sphere.'	Avigdor Liberman, member of the Knesset	19.7.2019	Link	About the establishment of the NOAM party
'They did me wrong. I did not take the car symbol – I just held it in my hands.'	Itamar Ben Gvir, member	21.3.2019	https://www.israelhayom.co.il	

<p>And when they asked me "What will you do to him?," I said: "I will protest, shout at him." For some reason, they did not write that. It was cut off in editing. Anyhow, today, I would not repeat the same [...] I don't educate my kids to kill Arabs [...] 20 years ago they said I was at the far-right political scale. Today I'm in the consensus.'</p>	<p>of Otzma Yehudit party</p>		<p>/article/643055</p>	
<p>'The (car) symbol is a symbol, indicating that as we have reached to this symbol as well, we can get to Rabin.'</p>	<p>Itamar Ben Gvir, right-wing activist</p>	<p>October 1995</p>	<p>https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JQ0sXLyOQeg&ab_channel=Alternative-%D7%90%D7%9C%D7%98%D7%A8%D7%A0%D7%98%D7%99%D7%91%D7%94</p>	<p>Before the Rabin assassination</p>
<p>'Do not let them (Noar Ha'gvaot) harm the values of the Jewish nation and lead us towards depreciation. Do not allow this dangerous phenomenon to expand.'</p>	<p>Avi Mizrachi, General High Commander, IDF</p>	<p>11.3.2012</p>	<p>https://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-4201241,00.html</p>	<p>About Noar Ha'gvaot, when retiring from office</p>
<p>'Everyone I know did not volunteer to put his hand on this hot potato. Military, police officials, government offices, and, excuse me, not even the local leadership and relevant rabbis. We all pushed them away and said that it is not our problem. And I think it's only our problem [...] I think mutual recoiling is something we can all identify with.'</p>	<p>Tamir Yadeei, General High Commander, IDF</p>	<p>20.1.2021</p>	<p>https://www.kan.org.il/item/?itemid=98677</p>	<p>After the death of Ahuvia Sandak, the military forces had public debates with representatives from the settlement due to escalation with terror actions and/or public interference.</p>

<p>‘The issue of evacuating un-authorized outposts, especially in Palestinian territory is mandatory for Israeli society. A society that treasures life can't accept the attempts of civilians to undermine the State's authority over its civilians.’</p>	<p>Ehud Barak, Minister of Defence</p>	<p>21.5.2009</p>	<p>https://news.walla.co.il/item/1489561</p>	<p>About illegal settlement outposts</p>
<p>‘Under your leadership, the alliance between America and Israel has never been stronger, deeper. It is expressed in ways that people can see and also in ways they cannot, so I want to thank you for that. In the same breath, I would like to discuss with you what you justifiably call "the horrible nuclear agreement" with Iran and on the way its growing aggression can be blocked, especially in Syria.’</p>	<p>Benjamin Netanyahu, Prime Minister</p>	<p>18.9.2017</p>	<p>https://mfa.gov.il/MFAHEB/PressRoom/Pages/PM-Netanyahu-meets-with-US-President-Donald-Trump-180917.aspx</p>	<p>About the Iranian agreement and the withdrawal of US from it</p>
<p>‘Investigate the investigators.’</p>	<p>US President Donald Trump, followed by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu</p>	<p>25.11.2019</p>	<p>link</p>	<p>Netanyahu called out the Israeli justice system regarding his personal trial and accusations, while, Trump, as a strategy, accused prosecutors in the investigation over Russian involvement in the US election 2016.</p>

Appendix 3. Networks of connection of the main agents of radicalisation in Israel





Figure 3.1. Network of Jihadist radicalisation



Appendix 4. Main de-radicalisation programmes in Israel

Name	Date initiated	Agents	Approach	Scale	Targets
Correction of the national security law	22.9.2005	Ministry of Justice	Compensative	National	Israeli citizens offended by acts of Jewish terrorism
Price-tag acts as an action of organised crime	4.5.2020	High Supreme Court	Punitive, self-defence, and adds to civic education by educative law	National, individual	Extremists who use violence against property and people
ARU – Anti-Racism Governmental Unit	July 2016	Ministry of Justice	Integrative, civic education	National	Israeli citizens offended by acts of racist/xenophobic violence
BTS – Breaking the Silence	2004	NGO	Civic education	Local, individual	Discourse on ending the Israeli occupation
Tag Meir	2011	NGO	Civic education	Local, individual	Israeli citizens offended by acts of Jewish terrorism
FORTH – The Forum for Regional Thinking	2014	NGO	Civic education	Local, individual, regional	Jewish and Arab researchers
Anahnu Movement	2018	NGO	Civic education	Local, individual, regional	Discourse on ending the Israeli occupation
Antifa 972	2018	NGO	Activist	National	Left-wing activists

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