DeRadicalisation
in Europe and Beyond: Detect, Resolve, Reintegrate

Stakeholders of (De)-Radicalisation in France

D3.1 Country Report

April 2021

Stephen W. Sawyer, Roman Zinigrad – The American University of Paris, Centre for Critical Democracy Studies

Horizon 2020
De-Radicalisation in Europe and Beyond: Detect, Resolve, Re-integrate
959198

Co-funded by the Horizon 2020 programme of the European Union

© Stephen W. Sawyer, Roman Zinigrad

Reference: D.RAD D3.1

This research was conducted under the Horizon 2020 project ‘De-Radicalisation in Europe and Beyond: Detect, Resolve, Re-integrate’ (959198).

The sole responsibility of this publication lies with the author. The European Union is not responsible for any use that may be made of the information contained therein

Any enquiries regarding this publication should be sent to us at: ssawyer@aup.edu; zinigradr@gmail.com.

This document is available for download at https://dradproject.com.

Table of contents

Acknowledgements 5

About the Project 6

Executive summary/Abstract 7

1. Introduction 8

2. Contextual background 9

Political polarisation 9

Immigration and *intégration* 9

Laïcité, jihadist violence, and the far-right 10

Inequality and social protests: The Yellow Vests 12

History of extremist violence 12

3. Structures of radicalisation 13

Violent threats – data 14

Jihadism 14

Nationalist separatism 15

Extreme right-wing 15

Radical left-wing 16

Racist violent offences 19

Preliminary hypothesis: correlation between types of violence 20

Perception of violent threats by the political elite 21

Trends 21

Social spaces of radicalisation 21

Hardening policies and discourse against jihadist radicalisation 21

Links between immigration, Islam and extremist violence in political discourse 22

Increasing focus on educational, secularising and pre-emptive measures 23

Islamo-gauchism 23

Perception of violent threats by the general public 24

4. Agents and channels of radicalisation 27

Jihadist violence 27

Islamic State (IS) 27

Al-Qaeda 28

Statistical profile of jihadists extremists 29

Extreme right-wing 29

Violent groups 29

National Rally/Front 30

Other political parties 30

Share of government institutions in radicalisation 31

Prisons 31

Infiltration of law enforcement 31

Neo-Nazi sympathisers 31

Jihadist radicalisation 32

5. Stakeholders and channels of de-radicalisation 33

National Radicalisation Prevention Plan (PNPR) and de-rad. actors 33

Inter-ministerial Committee for the Prevention of Crime and Radicalisation (CIPDR) .. 33

Préfectures and other state authorities 34
Auxiliary assistance 34
Schools: Emphasis on *laïcité* and securitisation of the educational system 34
Prisons: Questionable and counterproductive initiatives 35
UPRA: Units of prevention of radicalisation 35
QER: Districts of Evaluation of Radicalisation 36
Rehabilitation Programmes: Failures along with signs of humble success 36
CPIC 36
RIVE 37
PAIRS 37
Mulhouse Programme 38
Dissolution of Violent Organisations 38
French Broadcasting Authority 39
Civil Society Initiatives 39
6. Conclusion 40
Appendices 42
Appendix 1. Main (de)-radicalisation events in France since 2001 ..... **42**
Appendix 2. Political discourse about radicalisation in France **46**
Appendix 3. Networks of connection of the main agents of radicalisation **51**
Appendix 4. Main de-radicalisation programmes in France **52**
References 54

Acknowledgements

We thank **Zachary Egan** and **Kieran McTague** for their assistance in research for the D.Rad project, and **Anastasiya Sindyukova** for handling the communications for the AUP Centre for Critical Democracy Studies.

About the Project

D.Rad is a comparative study of radicalisation and polarisation in Europe and beyond. It aims to identify the actors, networks, and broader social contexts driving radicalisation, particularly among young people in urban and peri-urban areas. D.Rad conceptualises this through the I-GAP spectrum (injustice-grievance-alienation-polarisation) so as to move towards measurable evaluations of de-radicalisation programmes. Our intention is to identify the building blocks of radicalisation, which include a sense of being victimised; a sense of being thwarted or lacking agency in established legal and political structures; and coming under the influence of “us vs them” identity formulations.

D.Rad benefits from an exceptional breadth of backgrounds. The project spans national contexts, including the UK, France, Italy, Germany, Poland, Hungary, Finland, Slovenia, Bosnia, Serbia, Kosovo, Israel, Iraq, Jordan, Turkey, Georgia, Austria, and several minority nationalisms. It bridges academic disciplines ranging from political science and cultural studies to social psychology and artificial intelligence. Dissemination methods include D.Rad labs, D.Rad hubs, policy papers, academic workshops, visual outputs and digital galleries. As such, D.Rad establishes a rigorous foundation to test practical interventions geared to prevention, inclusion and de-radicalisation.

With the possibility of capturing the trajectories of seventeen nations and several minority nations, the project will provide a unique evidence base for the comparative analysis of law and policy as nation-states adapt to new security challenges. The process of mapping these varieties and their link to national contexts will be crucial in uncovering strengths and weaknesses in existing interventions. Furthermore, D.Rad accounts for the problem that processes of radicalisation often occur in circumstances that escape the control and scrutiny of traditional national frameworks of justice. The participation of AI professionals in modelling, analysing and devising solutions to online radicalisation will be central to the project’s aims.

Executive summary/Abstract

The substantial increase in incidents of jihadist terrorism in France in the past decade coincides with a reorganisation of the far-right and a sharp decline in ethno-nationalist and separatist violence. Political discourse, government de-radicalisation efforts and public opinion focus almost exclusively on jihadist violence, mainly due to the symbolic and traumatising effect of the 2015 Paris attacks. The fight against (jihadist) extremist violence in the past 10-15 years is characterised by two predominant elements: deliberate fusion of Islam and Muslim religious practice – especially in its stricter forms – with extremist violence; and use of educational measures in preventing violence. As a result, France puts an ever-growing emphasis on the principle of *laïcité* (secularism) in public schools and the public sphere.

The main agents of jihadist radicalisation in France are international jihadist terrorist organisations – the Islamic State and Al-Qaeda – but online information and social media increasingly facilitate decentralised modes of radicalisation. The radical right activity in France ranges from stable political representation in the French and European Parliaments through marginal political groups and to small-scale violent militant cells. No evidence points to extensive infiltration of radical right groups in police or military ranks.

French de-radicalisation efforts include various educational tools employed in public schools and the public sphere, rehabilitation attempts in and outside prisons, and administrative bans imposed on organisations inciting violence. However, the most ambitious of these efforts are also subject to the biggest criticism. The public school system is a major de-radicalisation stakeholder in charge of instilling in children respect for the regime's fundamental values (mainly *laïcité*) as well as for identifying and reporting radicalisation instances to the government. Securitisation of schools and stigmatisation of students are the main issues raised against the present model. De-radicalisation measures undertaken in prisons are currently limited to risk assessment of inmates linked with jihadist violence and lack a meaningful plan for their rehabilitation. Private organisations run more promising initiatives that attempt to rehabilitate radicalised individuals and reintegrate them into society under the government's supervision. These initiatives show moderate signs of success in their mission but are too recent to be credibly evaluated.

1. Introduction

"Fight against radical Islam" is the only topic related to extremist violence featuring in the most recent press release of the French Ministry of Interior (Ministère de l'Intérieur, 2021).[1] The release is characteristic of the current zeitgeist. In the past decade, jihadist terror and radicalisation are the predominant source of preoccupation about politically motivated violence in France. The increase in jihadist violence in recent years is one reason for this attention. Fifty-three completed, foiled, or failed jihadist attacks occurred in France in 2012-2019 compared with only four in 2001-2011. In six out of eight years in the 2012-2019 period, France was also the first among other EU member states in the number of jihadist terrorist incidents (Europol, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020). But numbers do not reveal the whole picture. The explanation is rather rooted in the tremendous symbolic weight of the "French 9/11" Charlie Hebdo and Bataclan attacks in 2015, as well as of subsequent incidents, such as the recent beheading of a French teacher who showed caricatures of Mohammed to his students, in October 2020. Amplified by media coverage and inflammatory political discourse, the collective trauma of these events continues to have an overwhelming effect on the perceptions of radicalisation in the eyes of the government and the public opinion. Against this background, other politically driven violence manifestations in France get less attention and raise less concern.

The report accounts for the structure and stakeholders of (de)radicalisation in all preeminent types of extremist violence – jihadist, separatist, extreme right-wing and radical left. In this report, *radicalisation* refers to processes involving the increasing rejection of established law, order and politics, and the active pursuit of alternatives, in the form of politically-driven violence or justification of violence; *de-radicalisation* refers to processes countering such rejection at individual (micro), organisational (meso), or societal (macro) levels resulting in a shift from violent to nonviolent strategies and tactics (de-radicalisation might or might not be an outcome of de-radicalisation programmes).

The present report aims to draw a general overview of radicalisation agents and de-radicalisation stakeholders in France. The report focuses on the most relevant radicalisation cases presenting the biggest or most perceived threat to French national security. Having set the contextual background of extremist violence in France, the report examines contemporary trends of its evolution and decline, and the correlation among its various categories. It considers the numbers of attempted and accomplished attacks, arrests and judicial proceedings, and other violence indicators, including violent incidents not classified as terrorist attacks. The statistical analysis is supplemented with an inquiry into the perceptions of violent threats by the political elites and the general public. Next, the report provides an overview of the main stakeholders of (de)radicalisation in France. The overview includes a review of actors engaged in jihadist and extreme right-wing violence, the prison system's share in the exacerbation of radicalisation, and isolated cases of infiltration of the military by neo-Nazis. Finally, the report evaluates the efficacy of government attempts at de-radicalisation in schools, prisons, and rehabilitation centres. The report relies primarily on secondary sources:

[1] The other two issues mentioned in the press release are "fight against drug trafficking" and "domestic, sexual and gender-based violence".

official statistics, think tank and human rights reports, academic research, publicly available datasets, and published survey results.

2. Contextual background

The following section situates the stakeholders and processes of (de)-radicalisation analysed in the report in a socio-political context. It offers a brief analysis of significant political, social and economic shifts in France's recent past, and an overview of the French history of extremist violence.

Political polarisation

The 2017 presidential elections reorganised the bipolar structure of French politics into a multi-party system controlled by a strong centre. In past decades, the French electorate was characterised by a relatively balanced right-left divide with one or two political parties on each side. The rise of the far-right *Front National* party from the end of the '80s and on was initially linked to the politicisation of migration and processes of globalisation and European integration, and has gradually created a third stable electorate. In 2002, the far-right block was strong enough for its candidate to qualify for the second round in the presidential elections (for the first and not the last time). Despite growing polarisation and distrust, the political landscape remained relatively stable, with the presidency alternating between the centre-left and the centre-right until 2017. In 2012-2017, the system saw a further increase in political polarisation with the appearance of new far-left parties, primarily *La France insoumise* (LFI), led by Jean-Luc Mélenchon. The two establishment-left and -right parties were drawn to their respective extremes and moved away from competing over the centre's moderate undecided voters. The opened gap partly facilitated the overwhelming success of the centrist and neoliberal *La République en marche* (LRM) in 2017, led by Emmanuel Macron (Bedock, 2020; Murray, 2020). The current political scene in France has been described as a state of "polarised pluralism", where "two bilaterally opposed (and internally divided) camps that cannot unite and have little perspective of governing in the near future on either the left or on the right, and a strong centrist pole with ill-defined borders in a system characterized by fragmentation and ideological polarisation" (Bedock, 2020). Macron's reforms, introduced shortly after the elections, played a prominent role in triggering the Yellow Vests movement in October 2018 (see below).

Immigration and *intégration*

Immigrants currently make about 10 per cent of the French population (~6.5 million); more than a third are naturalised. 46.5% of immigrants living in France were born in former French colonies in North and West Africa (mainly in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia), and another third were born in Europe (primarily in Portugal and Italy) (INSEE, 2019). Immigration is a recurring but remarkably fluctuating topic in French election campaigns – it was highly politicised in the 1988, 2002 and 2012 elections but received low attention levels in the subsequent 1995, 2007 and 2017 electoral cycles (Grande et al., 2019). More generally, immigration and the French colonial past, the intersection of which is most vivid in the large waves of migrants arriving

from Algeria in the '60s and '70s, continue to play a significant role in the country's politics and affect its collective identity.

The struggle of second- and third-generation immigrants from former colonies against discrimination and for recognition of their identity began in the '80s. It is still far from being fully addressed by the state. Systemic racism denied them equal opportunity in education, employment and housing, and spatial segregation enclosed communities of North- and West-African immigrants in the French suburbs (*banlieues*), where they continue to suffer from unemployment, violence and marginalisation (Chabal, 2015; Chrisafis, 2015). Until today, "Living in banlieues and immigrant-concentrated neighbourhoods in Paris is a proxy for racial and ethnic background; it marks one as non-white or as a visible minority within France" (Barwick and Beaman, 2019). Revolts against the effective transparency of these conditions have been breaking out in the *banlieues* since the '80s. The protest peaked in 2005, with violent riots that started in a northeast suburb of Paris and grew into a two-week uprising in 300 towns that involved the setting on fire of some 10,000 vehicles. The 2005 riots were met with severe police response, brought to more than 3,000 arrests and led the President to declare a state of emergency for the first time in metropolitan France since the Algerian war (Dikeç, 2007; Horvath, 2018).

Except for an initial period of relative openness to immigrants' identity politics in the mid-'80s, French governments downplay the unique grievances and demands of this group (Chabal, 2015). Multicultural attitudes to ethnic and religious minorities are rejected in favour of a policy of *intégration* into the French republican project, which "requires the effective participation of all those called to live in France in the construction of a society that brings [its citizens] together around shared principles as they are expressed in equal rights and common responsibilities".[2] In recent years, the integration rhetoric increasingly focuses on the religious dimension of the problem and underscores *laïcité* – the French notion of secularism – as the regime's foremost "shared principle" (Chebbah-Malicet, 2018).

Laïcité, jihadist violence, and the far-right

The French government's two principal mechanisms employed to deal with jihadist violence are its security apparatus and public education system. Constitutional and legislative reforms, pumped up by emergency executive prerogatives unfolding in the wake of global jihadist terrorism after 9/11 and intensified after the 2015 Paris attacks, have equipped the state with extensive (and precarious) police powers to detect, trace and foil violent activity.

Coinciding regulatory reforms in the school system have sought to ensure the next generation of French citizens subscribes to the regime's fundamental values, the most important of which in this context is the *laïcité*. Officially written into law in 1905 as a standard ensuring strict institutional separation of (the Catholic) church and state, the *laïcité* has been gradually transformed under the Fifth Republic into a principle that extends to the regulation of individual conduct in the public sphere and encourages "moderate" religious practice. In the past twenty years, it has been famously mobilised to prohibit visual manifestations of religious attributes,

[2] This definition – quoted in *(Chabal, 2015, p. 91*) – was framed by the French High Council for Integration. This government institution was dissolved in 2012 but the definition continues to reflect the government's approach.

such as hijabs in schools and burqas in public places, and presented as the common denominator for all French citizens.

The French government insists that the preventive and integrative policies ensuing from the combination of law enforcement with the principle of *laïcité* target only radicalised "Islamist" individuals and by no means intend to stigmatise Islam or Muslim French citizens and residents as a whole. Yet, notwithstanding the official declarations regarding equality and religion-blind actions, French legal reforms and political discourse increasingly conflate Islam with jihadist ideology.

One of the aggravating factors contributing to the problem is the instrumentalization of *laïcité* to confront violent radicalisation and, more generally, religious *communautarisme* (communitarianism). "Communitarianism" is commonly understood in France as a case of social pathology where an ethnic group prioritises traditional or religious values above the interests of the "nation" and the republican society. Historically, French governments have favoured *communautarisme* as an alternative explanation to their failure in handling the country's colonial legacy, social integration of immigrants and other manifestations of systemic racism and discrimination. Save for the radical left, *communautarisme* is routinely denounced by politicians across the political spectrum who invoke *laïcité* as the ultimate antidote against the "desire to secede from the Republic in the name of a religion" (Faye, 2019). And as the government depicts *laïcité* as being threatened by jihadism, its aversion to *communautarisme* is gradually conflated with its concern for jihadist violence (Chabal, 2015, chaps. 4, 8; Geisser, 2020a).

The bill "reinforcing respect of the principles of the Republic", currently pending in the Senate, illustrates the problem. It is criticised for blurring the line between jihadism and Islam by lumping together security procedures aimed at curtailing terrorism (e.g., "expansion of the national file of perpetrators of terrorist offences to those who advocate and provoke terrorist acts") together with measures limiting the place of religion in the public and private spheres (e.g., "respect for the principles of equality, neutrality and *laïcité* by employees participating in a public service mission" and "strengthening the fight against forced or fraudulent marriages") (Assemblée Nationale, 2020; Geisser, 2020a).[3] Such steps turn attempts to de-radicalise "Islamists" into a policy of "de-radicalisation" of Islam and discredit the government's repeated declarations that in the eyes of the law, "*communautarisme* is not terrorism" (Faye, 2019).

Finally, the legal and political amalgamation of jihadism and Islam plays into the hands of the political far-right. *Rassemblement National* (former *Front National)* and its leader, Marine Le Pen, amplify the alleged contrast between Islam and the republic's basic values, positioning themselves as the "true" defenders of *laïcité* and derive from it their anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim agenda.

[3] See also the formulation suggested by the Senate "Commission of Inquiry into the responses provided by the public authorities to the development of Islamist radicalisation and the means to combat it": "Islamist radicalism is not only about the issue of terrorism or the shift to violent action, but also involves behaviours that can be peaceful and that do not lead to violence. It can be the work of groups that advocate identitarian closure or entryism into the associative and political world. For the commission of inquiry, it is a question of the desire to ensure, in certain parts of the territory, a so-called religious norm over the laws of the Republic" (Eustache-Brinio, 2020).

Inequality and social protests: The Yellow Vests

In the past two decades, France also faces broader socioeconomic challenges of slow recovery from the 2008 crisis, stagnating growth, low social mobility and high unemployment rates, especially among the youth. The neoliberal reforms in labour law and the pensions system introduced by Macron, along with rising taxes, were opposed mainly by the low and middle classes and established his reputation as the "president of the rich". In October 2018, triggered by the seemingly anecdotal imposition of a carbon tax on diesel fuel, residents of rural areas and farther suburbs started gathering in spontaneous protests against the government's economic policies. The rallies quickly grew into weekly mass demonstrations across France and evolved into the "Yellow Vests" social movement. It was driven by economic and democratic grievances of the lower-middle-class, brought hundreds of thousands across France to the first manifestations, and was initially met with approval by 65% to 80% of the population (Chamorel, 2019; Elabe, 2019; Frénois et al., 2018). The 2018-2020 mobilisation of the Yellow Vests produced the most significant political crisis in France since the students uprising in May 1968.

The movement did not position itself as either left or right but was rather backed by both political extremes. The majority of the Yellow Vests supporters voted for either Marine Le Pen (FN/RN) or Jean-Luc Mélenchon (LFI) in the first round of the 2017 presidential elections (Foucault et al., 2019). This phenomenon may indicate that the "right-left cleavage is giving way to one pitting the centre against the far right —a shift caused by splits within both the right and the left, as well as cultural issues that draw the elites toward the centre-left and the working-class toward the far right. A growing class and educational divide is replacing the socially mixed constituencies of the traditional right and left" (Chamorel, 2019, p. 57).

History of extremist violence

Politically motivated extremist violence has a long and diverse record in France. Its main driving forces since WWII may be classified in five (intertwined) categories: 1) anti-capitalist; 2) anti- and pro-colonial; 3) regional separatist; 4) international, and 5) jihadist terrorism. The first category is associated primarily with the extremist left-wing *Action Directe* operating in France in 1979-1987 against French ties with international corporate business and military industry. Anti-colonial violent struggles spread across South-East Asia, North Africa, the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa from mid-'40s to early '60s,[4] and with less success in the French Overseas Territories (DOM-TOM) in the '70s-'80s.

Organisations belonging to the separatist category emerged in Brittany, French Basque Country and Corsica in the '60s-'70s fighting for regional autonomy or independence. The Basque ETA and particularly the *Corsican Front de Libération National de la Corse* (FLNC) have since carried out many thousands of terrorist acts – including more than 500 attacks only in 2011-2018 – and until recently were the most tangible and frequent terrorist threat in the country. Incidents of international terrorism are related to French involvement in other states'

[4] The most notorious of these was led by the *Front de Libération Nationale* (FLN) in Algeria during its War of Independence (1954-1962) – brought to a quick dissolution of most of the French empire. The pro-colonial *Organisation Armée Secrète* (OAS) – a paramilitary group founded by members of the French military in 1961 and fighting *against* the self-determination of Algeria – was the first in this period to "import" large scale terrorist attacks into Metropolitan France.

affairs, predominantly its ex-colonies.[5] Finally, jihadist terrorism characterises attacks that have been carried out in France since 2012 and that are associated with or inspired by Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State (IS). Jihadist violence stands out among earlier types of terrorism in two elements. The first is the medium of its proliferation – widely available online means of recruitment and diffusion of radical propaganda reaches an audience on a previously unimaginable scale. The second is the new profiles of its adherents: foreign fighters, hundreds of whom are returning to France from Syria, Iraq and other warzones; and "homegrown" terrorist groups or "lone wolves", who are often self-recruited, are not formally controlled by a terrorist organisation and are motivated by perceptions of personal grievance and marginalisation (Galli, 2019; Gregory, 2003).

3. Structures of radicalisation

This section analyses the overall violent threat from the cases of radicalisation in France, as well as the perception of this threat by the political elite and the general public. First, it presents the available data on four types of extremist violence (jihadist, national separatist, extreme right and radical left), examines their evolution and offers a preliminary interpretation of their interrelation. To provide a broader overview of the problem, the statistics on extremist violence are supplemented with data on racist violent offences (antisemitic, anti-Muslim and other) that are not classified as terrorism by the French authorities. Second, the section addresses the preeminent narratives in the contemporary political discourse on violent threats (linking jihadist violence to immigration and presenting it as the biggest violent threat, and *Islamo-gauchism*) and the trends of their perceptions (increasing focus on jihadist violence and its prevention through educational measures). Finally, the section discusses the changes in the perceptions of jihadist violence in France over the past two decades.

[5] The main chapters belonging to this category are first, Palestinian attacks aimed at Israeli targets in France and the French state related to the French involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the 1960's-1980's; and second, terrorist operations carried out in the 1990's by the *Groupes Islamistes Armées* (GIA) in Algeria – against French and francophone Algerian nationals – and in France with the purpose of destabilizing domestic Algerian politics and disentangling it from the involvement of France.

Violent threats – data[6]

Jihadism

In the past decade, France has seen a substantial increase in transnational jihadist terrorism. Between 2001 and 2011, only four (foiled) attacks were linked to jihadist groups.[7] The shift was marked in 2012 by Mohamed Merah, a solo terrorist trained in Afghanistan/Pakistan who kills seven people and wounds five in three shooting incidents. In the following 2014-2019 period, 42 completed or attempted jihadist attacks took place in France. Jihadist terrorism reached its most infamous and lethal peak in 2015. The first among the fifteen incidents of that year were the attack on the offices of the *Charlie Hebdo* journal, the shooting of a police officer, and the siege at a kosher supermarket in January 2015 committed by individuals associated with AQAP and the Islamic State.[8] In November of the same year, the IS claimed responsibility for a series of coordinated attacks at a sports stadium, the Bataclan theatre, and several restaurants in Paris that took a toll of 130 killed and 493 wounded (Fenech and Pietrasanta, 2016). The Bataclan attack alone, with 89 people killed, is the single deadliest incident of political violence ever committed on French territory ("Charlie Hebdo, un attentat sans précédent en France," 2015) (See *Figure 1*). The threat continues to linger in France and is higher than in its neighbouring countries. France was the only target of jihadist terrorism in the EU in 2019. Unofficial statistics count as many as nine attacks in 2020, most notably, the beheading of Samuel Paty, a public-school teacher who displayed Mohammed's caricatures in his classroom.

---

6 Note on method: The French government does not publish its own official reports on political violence and its prosecution but transmits relevant information to EU agencies (Europol and Eurojust). Unless otherwise mentioned, the following analysis is based on Europol reports, which provide data for the years 2006-2019. Europol classifies political violence in four categories: jihadist, ethno-nationalist and separatist, left-wing and anarchist, and right-wing terrorism. Terrorist offences are defined based on national legislation. The French legislator includes in this definition certain criminal offences committed against individuals or property if committed with the intention "to seriously disturb public order through intimidation or terror" (*Code pénal*, Art. 421-1(1)-(2): "The following offences constitute acts of terrorism where they are committed intentionally in connection with an individual or collective undertaking the purpose of which is seriously to disturb public order through intimidation or terror: willful attacks on life, willful attacks on the physical integrity of persons, abduction and unlawful detention and also as the hijacking of planes, vessels or any other means of transport [as defined in this Code]; thefts, extortion, destruction, degradation and deterioration, as well as computer offences [as defined in this Code]"). Consequently, certain violent acts committed against minorities where the intention was not proven, as well as some politically motivated acts of violence, do not fall under the French definition of terrorism and are not included in the Europol statistics (e.g., two attacks on mosques in 2019 were not classified as terrorism by the French authorities although "the profile of the perpetrator matched that of the neo-populist fringe of the right-wing extremist scene, characterized by, inter alia, an adherence to conspiracy theories, hatred for Islam and the perception of public institutions' impotence") (Europol, 2019, p. 66). Due to the discrepancies in definitions and methods of collection of data other databases provide different numbers of terror acts, arrests and judicial proceedings. Yet, other data sets corroborate the trends emerging from the Europol reports.

7 Two incidents in 2001, one in 2002, and one in 2001. One of the plots was directed against the US embassy in Paris, a non-French target. Data on the incidents in 2001-2005 is based on (Bakker, 2006; Nesser, 2008).

8 17 killed, 20 wounded (Fenech and Pietrasanta, 2016).

Nationalist separatism

The second evident trend is a steady and sharp decline in French ethno-nationalist and separatist terrorism – from more than 600 completed, failed and foiled attacks in 2006-2008 to 80 in 2016-2018. The drop has mainly to do with the 2014 demilitarisation of the FLNC – the source of the vast majority of separatist attacks in the French territories since the 70's – and the 2011 declaration of ceasefire by the Basque separatist ETA. In 2019 Europol expressed concern about the emergence of new nationalist organisations in Corsica supporting the return to violence. At the same time, 2019 is also the first in at least fourteen years when France reported no separatist attacks in its territories (See *Figure 1*). French statistics on concluded court proceedings reinforce the above findings (See *Figure 2*).[9]

Available figures about arrests made in relation to terrorism show the same tendencies – an increase in suspects' arrests in jihadist terror and a drop in arrests of separatists. Note that arrests are authorised and made based on preliminary evidence that does not necessarily lead to prosecution. Therefore, the number of arrests is likely to indicate the threat as perceived by the state and the general public rather than the actual number of planned attacks. It manifests a decline in institutional and public anxiety from separatist-related terrorism and a growing fear of jihadist terrorism (See *Figure 3*). Although Europol does not distinguish between convictions and acquittals in the count of concluded proceedings for each category, the French percentage of acquittals is meagre (2.6% in 2008-2019) and does not affect these observations. The Global Terrorism Index and the Global Terrorism Database correlate with the shift from separatist to jihadist threats in France (See *Figures 4-5*).[10]

Extreme right-wing

Europol reports and other official estimates indicate that right-wing radicalisation rarely results in terrorist attacks (Ressiguier and Morenas, 2019). The only seven attempted or accomplished acts that qualify as right-wing terror occurred in 2015 in the immediate aftermath of the January 2015 jihadist attacks (since 2008, only one incident of extreme right-wing terror has reached the French courts). Other sources show an increase in the number and scale of extreme right-wing terrorist activity in recent years. In the 2015-2019 period, individuals associated with extreme right-wing groups were involved in at least four incidents that should qualify as terrorism as defined by the French government.[11] The incidents include three foiled

---

9 The overall number of proceeding related to separatist terrorism dropped from 254 in 2008-2013 to 56 in 2014-2019 whereas the number of trials related to jihadist attacks has increased from 104 to 430 respectively (with 392 proceedings concluded in the aftermath of the 2015 attacks).

10 The GTI is compiled by the Institute for Economics and Peace and tradingeconomics.com. It drops from 4.62 in 2002 to 3.38 in 2011, which seems to trace the decline in separatist attacks. Its subsequent spike to 5.41 in 2012 and further to 5.96 in 2016 followed by a gradual improvement also correlate with the 2012 and 2015 terror attacks ("France Terrorism Index | 2002-2019 Data | 2020-2021 Forecast | Historical | Chart," n.d.). The upward trend of the index (higher index values in the 2012-2019 period as compared with 2002-2011) may suggest that jihadist attacks pose a bigger threat than that of separatist terrorism to French political resilience and socio-economic stability. The GTD presents a more conservative account of the number of terrorist attacks but the relative fluctuations in the numbers of attacks at the same period closely follows the trends in jihadist and separatist violence described above (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2020).

11 Some officials refer to five foiled attacks, see (Franceinfo, 2021a; Merchet, 2021).

attacks against public officials and Muslims[12] and a stabbing of worshippers in a mosque in 2019.[13] These cases add to other incidents of racist violence against minorities (see below).[14]

Given these numbers and with the attention of the general public and French authorities being increasingly focused on the jihadist threat (see below), extreme right-wing radicalisation has not been a priority in the government's enforcement and prevention agenda. Yet, in recent years, the state has attempted to better study and act against the proliferation of extreme right-wing violence and online propaganda. One such attempt is a 2019 report submitted to the National Assembly by a committee of inquiry on the fight against extreme right-wing groups in France (Ressiguier and Morenas, 2019). The rise in the number of arrests related to extreme right-wing violence since 2017 is another indication of a possible change in the government's view of the threat.

Radical left-wing

In recent decades far-left violence remains marginal and without significant organisational structure. While some arrests of suspects in radical left terrorism were made in recent years, only one such attack was recorded by Europol in 2017 in the 14 years covered in its reports (since 2008, French courts have dealt with radical left-wing terrorism only in 2012 in cases involving 22 individuals). However, in December 2020, seven suspects in planning a violent attack against the police were indicted for a criminal "terrorist association". Laurent Nuñez, the head of the CNRLT, mentioned this was the first time in 13 years that a radical left group is found to be a terrorist organisation. Taken in the context of 170 other "low intensity" acts of sabotage against the state and "big capital" since March 2020, Nuñez considers this incident to be an indication that the ultra-left is currently "gaining momentum" (Chichizola and Cornevin, 2021).

[12] Plots to assassinate the Minister of the Interior and the head of the radical left party, *La France insoumise*, in 2017; to poison halal meat in supermarkets and kill jihadists released from prison, imams and women wearing a hijab in 2018; and to assassinate President Macron in 2018.

[13] According to the perpetrator, who was found partially insane, his act was a response to the unfounded conspiracy theory that the fire at the Paris Notre Dame cathedral was an arson committed by "Muslims" (Camus, 2020, pp. 25–26, 74–86).

[14] As to other expressions of extreme right-wing radicalisation, despite the rise in extreme right-wing activity since 2015, the overall number of reported violent incidents against ethnic minorities and immigrants associated with the extreme right in France is relatively low. According to one estimate, French extreme right groups were involved in 546 violent acts between 1986 and 2017, whereas in the neighbouring Germany the extreme right was involved in 19,467 acts in 2017 alone (Ressiguier and Morenas, 2019).

Figure 1



	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Jihadist	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	1	15	5	11	10	7
Separatist	283	253	137	89	84	85	121	58	50	50	18	42	20	0
Left-wing/Anarchist	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
Right-wing	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	7	0	0	0	0

Figure 2



	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Jihadist	31	18	14	9	12	20	33	5	68	114	123	87
Separatist	44	59	26	33	63	29	3	9	0	8	18	18
Left-wing/Anarchist	0	0	0	0	22	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Right-wing	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0

Figure 3



	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Jihadist	139	91	78	37	94	46	91	143	188	377	429	373	273	202
Separatist	188	315	283	255	123	126	95	77	41	44	26	13	2	13
Left-wing/Anarchist	15	3	37	11	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	10	3	1
Right-wing	0	0	0	6	0	0	0	3	5	2	0	15	32	7

Figure 4



Figure 5



	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
No. of Terrorist Incidents	21	32	34	11	33	34	16	13	9	3	8	66	18	14	38	25	42	13	20
No. Killed	0	0	0	0	0	1	3	0	0	0	0	8	0	1	162	94	7	13	8
No. Wounded	16	4	21	10	11	3	8	1	11	0	4	8	5	15	443	457	28	34	30

Racist violent offences

Ethnic, religious, and migrant communities in France suffer from hundreds of cases of violence and threats that are not legally classified as terrorism but constitute criminal offences "committed on the grounds of origin, ethnicity, nationality, a claimed race or religion".[15] The numbers of antisemitic, anti-Muslim and other racist acts have increased between 2018 and 2019 (by 27%, 54%, and 130%, respectively). Yet, while the trends of "other" racist offences and the total number of cases are upward, the figures show downward trends of antisemitic and anti-Muslim violence in 2001-2019 (Commission nationale consultative des droits de l'Homme, 2020) (See *Figure 6*). No recent official or precise data is available on the characteristics and profiles of the perpetrators of racist violence.[16]

[15] The French Central Territorial Intelligence Service (SCRT) monitors these incidents based on "feedback from its territorial representatives, its local partners, the media and associations representing the Muslim and Jewish religious communities with whom they have a partnership". The data, available in reports by the National Consultative Commission on Human Rights (CNCDH), is broken in three categories: antisemitic, anti-Muslim (recorded as a distinct type only from 2010) and other offences of racist nature (e.g., against black or Roma). According to the CNCDH the numbers account only for a tiny proportion of the actual scale of the problem as racist offences are massively underreported.

[16] The last available data is information on perpetrators of antisemitic violence in 1997-2011, see e.g., (Jikeli, 2018, pp. 304–305).

Figure 6



	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Antisemitic	219	936	601	974	508	571	402	459	815	466	389	615	423	851	808	335	311	541	687
Anti-Muslim (recorded from 2010)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	116	157	203	226	133	429	185	121	100	154
Other racist	205	381	232	595	470	344	321	467	1026	770	710	724	625	678	797	608	518	496	1142
Overall	424	1317	833	1569	978	915	723	926	1841	1352	1256	1542	1274	1662	2034	1128	950	1137	1983

Preliminary hypothesis: correlation between types of violence

The above analysis allows us to draw preliminary conclusions on potential links between different categories of violent attacks. As illustrated in *Figure 3*, the number of arrests in relation to the extreme right-wing terrorist activity begins to increase in 2013, in correlation with the rise in jihadist terrorism. After six out of seven years of zero extreme right-wing arrests in 2006-2012, the statistics are reversed to only one year with no arrests in the seven years that come after. A similar correlation is observed in the number of foiled and successful attacks since 2015. The surge in extreme right-wing violent activity in 2015-2020 (which includes terrorist plots to assassinate high-ranking politicians) corresponds to the spike in jihadist attacks in the same period. Likewise, the number of anti-Muslim violent incidents in France in 2015 is significantly bigger (up to more than four times) than any other year in 2010-2019. The radical right revival, on a scale not seen in the country since 2002, may be potentially explained as a reaction to the heightened attention to jihadist violence since the 2015 Paris attacks. French officials and research indeed identify extreme right paramilitary organisations "pretexting the impotence of the state to protect the population against the perceived threat from Islam and immigration" (Camus, 2020, p. 75; Europol, 2020, p. 18).

A second correlation in the data is observed between radical left/anarchist violence on the one hand, and separatist and jihadist violence on the other. From 2006 to 2019, the number of terrorism-related arrests of radical left activists increases twice, in 2006-2009 (peaking in 2008), and in 2017-2018, with zero or one arrest per year in 2007-2016. The first increase corresponds with a high number of separatism-related arrests, whereas the second closely follows a rise in jihadist activity (see *Figure 3*). This correlation may suggest that radical left or anarchist violence proliferates in a climate of uncertainty and socio-political instability caused by other violent phenomena.

Both correlations merit further research, especially given that numbers of arrests may be more telling of the government's attention to certain types of violence than of actual violent activity.

Perception of violent threats by the political elite

Two predominant elements characterise political discourse and government reforms targeting extremist violence in the past 10-15 years: the amalgamation of Islam – especially in its stricter forms – and extremist violence; and a stronger emphasis on education as a complementary measure in addressing violent threats. The combination of the two elements results in political elites putting special emphasis on the principle of *laïcité* in schools and the public sphere.

Trends

A recent empirical study of the interpretations of terrorism by the French political elites provides a valuable source for understanding shifts in the political discourse on violent threats (D'Amato, 2019). The work is based on content and discourse analysis of French parliamentary debates and strategic documents released between 2001 and 2015. The study identifies several trends, all of which indicate an increasing perception of jihadist political violence by policymakers as the main threat to the nation's values. The trends include a progressive favouring of religious characterisation of terrorism over the political; developing a perception of terrorism as an "Islamisation of criminal behaviour" (as opposed to politically motivated crimes); and growing emphasis on the tension between the perceived French republican values and national identity, and the religious values associated with jihadist terrorism. Crucially, jihadist violence "has been increasingly understood and discussed as a threat to national values more than to citizens' physical safety" (63% of policymakers consider terrorism to pose a threat to the national identity and culture, versus only 21% considering it a threat to citizens).

Social spaces of radicalisation

Policymakers perceive social exclusion and marginalisation as the predominant causes of radicalisation that render "at-risk" individuals more susceptible to terrorist propaganda. Parliamentary debates in 2012-2015 reveal an increasing awareness of the weakened social resilience of marginalised individuals and tend to their characterisation as victims of social circumstances. Some MPs consider repressive counterterrorism policies to be counterproductive for this very reason (D'Amato, 2019). Notably, Gérard Collomb, Minister of Interior under President Emmanuel Macron, suggested in 2017 to mobilise "all the psychiatric hospitals and psychiatrists so as to try to ward off [the] individual terrorist threat" (Calvi, 2017). These views, however, increasingly give way to a more forceful and belligerent discourse.

Hardening policies and discourse against jihadist radicalisation

Emblematic and large-scale jihadist terror acts in France – such as the 2012, 2015, and the recent October 2020 violent attacks – have pushed politicians to pledge new extensive counter-terrorist measures (not all of which eventually materialised) and hardened the political discourse against "Islamist radicalisation" and "Islamist separatism". The reforms are not always intended to fight terrorism as much as to make symbolic statements and typically play in the hands of the right and extreme-right political factions (Faucher and Boussaguet, 2018a).

Thus, in the aftermath of the 2012 attacks, the rhetoric of war against "these fundamentalist political, religious groups who are killing our children" was enunciated by Marine Le Pen (National Front/National Rally), the extreme right candidate for presidential elections. Three

years later, however, the war rhetoric showed signs of spilling over into the political mainstream. Whereas the January 2015 attacks triggered only "the identification of France as a 'victim' […] accompanied by calls for 'unity', 'solidarity', and 'fraternity', the leadership added in November the notions of 'war', 'act of war', and 'terrorist army'. The symbolism of unity no longer sufficed. Acts were needed (constitutional reform, police in the streets, raids, military investment), as was an action discourse" (Faucher and Boussaguet, 2018b). The November 2015 Paris attacks were immediately branded as "acts of war" by President Hollande (Socialist party) who proceeded to declare a national "state of emergency", a mechanism invoked in France only twice since the Algerian war (Hecker and Tenenbaum, 2017). Another measure vowed by Hollande was a constitutional amendment allowing to denaturalise bi-national convicted terrorists while seemingly aware that the change is neither politically nor legally feasible (Faucher and Boussaguet, 2018a, p. 189).

Links between immigration, Islam and extremist violence in political discourse

The most blatant claims that immigration and Islam are major sources of extremist violence are raised by the French far-right. Since the early 2000s, local and national officials of the far-right *Front National* party (rebranded as *Rassemblement National* in 2018) draw connections between immigration from the French former colonies and terrorism. After the 2012 shootings committed by Mohamed Merah in Toulouse, Marine Le Pen – the chairman of *Front National* – has blatantly asserted that "radical Islam" is a "consequence of mass immigration", asking "How many Mohamed Merah are there in the boats, the planes, which arrive in France every day filled with immigrants?" and "How many Mohamed Merah among the children of these unassimilated immigrants?" (Geisser, 2020b).

More recently, implied links between migration and extremist violence were made by President Macron. In November 2020, Macron stated that "we must in no way confuse the fight against illegal immigration and terrorism, but we must clearly look at the links that exist between these two phenomena" ("Propos liminaires du Président de la République," 2020)

Furthermore, Macron's latest Ministers of Interior have made statements that blur the line between extremist violence and Islam, thus portraying the Muslim religion itself as posing a violent threat. Christophe Castaner said in a 2019 speech before the National Assembly that such signs as "the wearing of a beard, the refusal to shake hands with female colleagues, hyperkeratosis in the middle of the forehead […], untimely religious proselytism, frantic consultation of religious sites from his workstation, […], the wearing of a full veil on the public highway for a female civil servant […] might, after analysis, characterise radicalisation". His successor, Gérald Darmanin, has taken a particularly hawkish and aggressive stance on the topic. His remarks reinforce the impression that Macron's party is currently tacking to the French right-wing ahead of the upcoming elections. Darmanin said that "political Islam is a mortal enemy for the Republic" and that France "must fight all forms of communitarianism" (Sénat, 2020). In a recent debate with the head of the extreme-right party, he consciously positioned himself as more radical than her on the anti-Muslim agenda ("Débat entre Marine Le Pen et Gérald Darmanin," 2021).[17]

[17] Although Darmanin's public statements target mainly jihadist terrorism, he also expresses occasional concern for "other forms of action" originating from "small radical groups or isolated

Increasing focus on educational, secularising and pre-emptive measures

More recently, the government discourse has gone beyond predominantly militaristic and securitised strategies. It increasingly includes a wide-ranging set of policing and educational preventive measures that aim to stop radicalisation at early stages. Prime Minister Philippe noted in 2018 that laws "strengthening internal security and the fight against terrorism" are being supplemented with "a prevention approach has been developed, based on detection, training and support" ("Discours d'Édouard Philippe," 2018). However, some of the preventive measures seem to increasingly bear only a very loose connection to violence and target general religious practices that are found to conflict with the French principle of *laïcité*.

A speech against "Islamist separatism" given by the centrist-right President Macron in October 2020 reflects another step in the evolution of the French attitude towards jihadist violence. Formally, the speech warned against stigmatising Islam as a religion and targeted only "radical Islamism" whose aim is to "contravene the Republic's laws and create a parallel order, establish other values, develop another way of organising society which is initially separatist, but whose ultimate goal is to take it over completely". But at the same time, Macron advocated for significantly tighter control of religious institutions and practices. Thus, the speech announced an anti-radicalisation legislative reform that would include "forging a type of 'Enlightenment Islam'" in France, strengthening *laïcité* (French model of secularism) and consolidating "republican principles". Macron promised to effectively eliminate home-schooling (later softened), prohibit public pools from offering separate time slots for men and women, close schools where girls wear full-face veils and dissolve religious associations not only on the grounds of terrorism or antisemitism but also, more vaguely, for "violations of human dignity and psychological or physical pressures".

Jean-Luc Mélenchon, the leader of the radical left party, *La France insoumise* (LFI), has denounced Macron's reform as targeting Islam rather than "Islamism" and warned against reviving "religious warfare" (Vincendon, 2020). In response, government officials have defined his statements as a manifestation of "Islamo-gauchism" (see below).

Islamo-gauchism

"*Islamo-gauchism*" (Islamist-leftist intersectional radicalism) is a term suggesting an overlap between the radical left and radical Islamist ideologies. Although several researchers – some of whom are themselves accused of Islamo-gauchism – recognise historical, revolutionary and cultural links between the radical left and Islamist movements, the recent use of the term is widely claimed to be used to ostracise and discredit the progressive and radical left as an accomplice of jihadist terrorism (Faure, 2020). The term emerged in the French political discourse in the early 2000s. Initially, it was employed primarily by the right-wing party, *Les Republicans*, and later by the extreme right-wing *Rassemblement national*. But recently, it has been used by three acting ministers to stigmatise the LFI and, more generally, the intellectual left. Minister Darmanin accused an LFI deputy of being "linked with an Islamo-gauchism that is destroying the Republic" (Corbière, 2020); the Minister of National Education said that Islamo-gauchism "wreaks havoc at the university" (Guedj, 2020); and the Minister of Higher

individuals" resorting to violence out of white supremacist ideology ("Plus de 8 000 personnes fichées," 2020).

Education has requested the CNRS to explore its effects out of worry that Islamo-gauchism "plagues the society as a whole and universities are not impervious" (Franceinfo, 2021b).

Perception of violent threats by the general public

Domestic jihadist terrorism is perceived as the predominant violent threat in French public opinion, at least since the 2015 attacks. Data collected by the French Institute of Public Opinion (IFOP, a major international private polling firm) and published in its most recent report from October 2020 offers a twenty-year perspective on the evolution in the assessment of the jihadist threat by the general public (IFOP-Fiducial, 2020). The report suggests that levels of concern about extremist violence closely correlate with the number, intensity and visibility of *jihadist* terrorist attacks *in France*. Major terrorist attacks outside of France in the 2001-2020 period are rarely followed by a substantial public alarm increase among the French. The percentage of people considering the threat to be "very high" or "rather high" drops after the 9/11 attacks in 2001, the London attacks in 2005 or the Boston terror act in 2011(although the most significant decrease in these numbers is recorded after the 2011 assassination of Ben Laden). But the attacks committed by Mohamed Merah in 2012 and subsequent acts of jihadist terrorism up to the January 2015 attacks at Charlie Hebdo raise the assessment of the threat from 53% to a then-record 93%. Between August 2015 and December 2018, the "very high" and "rather high" estimates of the threat remain above 90%. The all-time peak of 99% is detected in July 2016 (after a truck deliberately running into a crowd in Nice on Bastille Day), and the evaluation of the threat as exclusively "very high" – with more than two-thirds of the polled – was at its highest in the immediate aftermath of the November 2015 Paris attacks. Finally, after some decline in the perceived level of threat in October 2019-September 2020, the murder of Samuel Paty in October 2020 was followed by a 13-point increase in "rather high" and "very high" responses combined (from 76% to 89%), and a 22-point spike in "very high" estimates alone (from 16% to 38%), see *Figures 7* and *8* (IFOP-Fiducial, 2020, pp. 7–8).

Note that reliance on the IFOP data warrants some caution due to its surveys' implied presumption that "terrorism" refers exclusively to violent jihadist attacks. The relevant question in the survey states simply, "How do you evaluate the terrorist threat in our country today" without specifying any specific type of terrorism. Yet, the answers are correlated only with incidents of *jihadist* terrorism, ignoring multiple incidents of ethno-nationalist and separatist terror mentioned above. Accounting for this difficulty seems to weaken any conclusions drawn in the report on this topic at least up to 2015. Nevertheless, the relative decline in separatist terror and increase in the visibility of jihadist terrorism since 2015 provides more solid grounds for a presumption of causal links between domestic jihadist attacks and perceived level of threat.

Figure 7


Evaluation of [jihadist] terrorist threat in France
- Evolution since October 2001 -
September 2001:
May 2011: Death
December 2014: Hostage-
June 2015: Attacks
March 22 2016:
July 26, 2016: Attack
November 2016: Arrests
June 19 2017:
October-November
January 2015: Killings
August 2015:
August 2017: Failed attack
August 31, 2019: Knife
16 octobre 2020 : Assassinat de Samuel Paty
Elevée
Faible

Figure 8


Evaluation of [jihadist] terrorist threat in France
- Evolution since September 2010 -
May 2011: Death of Osama
October 2012: Arrest of members
April 2013: Boston
January 2015: Killings at
April 2015: Arrest of
June 2015: Attacks
August 2015: Attack
November 13
March 22, 2016:
June 2016: Orlando
July 14, 2016:
July 26, 2016: Attack of
September 2016:
November 2016: Arrests in
December 19
February 3, 2017:
April 19, 2017:
April 20, 2017:
June 19, 2017:
August 2017: Failed attack in
October 2017: Attack in
October-November 2017:
March 2018: Terrorist
Dec. 2018:
August 31, 2019: Knife
October 3, 2019: Knife
October 16, 2020:
5
17
5
11
12
14
15
10
16
17
18
49
25
40
41
68
41
46
53
61
65
43
55
45
48
50
35
40
51
51
59
45
50
50
43
39
37
30
18
30
16
38
Sept. 2010
Mai 2011
Sept. 2011
Mars 2012
Oct. 2012
Janv. 2013
Avril 2013
Août 2013
Juin 2014
Sept. 2014
1er jan. 2015
8-9 jan. 2015
3-5 juin 2015
25-27 juin 2015
Août 2015
16 nov. 2015
5 janvier 2016
18 avril 2016
17 juin 2016
15-16 juillet
27-29 juillet 2016
5-6 Septembre 2016
12-14 Septembre 2016
21-27 Octobre 2016
28-29 Novembre 2016
20-22 Décembre 2016
3-6 Février 2017
19-20 Avril 2017
21 Avril 2017
2-5 Mai 2017
20-21 Juin 2017
24-28 Août 2017
20-27 Septembre 2017
3-4 Octobre 2017
9-10 Novembre 2017
27-28 Mars 2018
16-17 Mai 2018
12-13 Décembre 2018
2-3 Septembre 2019
8-9 Octobre 2019
1-2 Septembre
20-21 octobre 2020

Statistical data available for the 2006-2019 years points to several changes in the nature of extremist violence. A sudden increase in jihadist terrorist activity, and a revival of extreme right-wing groups are detected since the mid-'10s, whereas nationalist-separatist terrorism is in sharp and steady decline throughout the whole period. Left-wing extremist violence remains relatively low-key with two peaks in the second halves of the '00s and the '10s. The report addresses two patterns emerging from the statistics. First, spikes in extreme right-wing activity, especially violence against Muslims and immigrants, may be motivated by the visibility of jihadist extremist violence. Second, the two phases of increased radical left activity coincide with intensified violence by other groups (the first of separatist, the second of jihadist), which may suggest that radical left or anarchist violence proliferates in a climate of uncertainty and socio-political instability. Among these categories of violence, jihadist terrorism is constructed by the political elites as the main, *voir* only, threat to the French values and public peace; it is also perceived as such by the general public. The highly polarised political discourse favours the representation of jihadist terrorism as a direct continuum of strict Muslim conduct, and even the political mainstream alludes to links between terrorism and immigration. Some right wing and centrist politicians and journalists argue, furthermore, that radical jihadism shares interests with the radical left.

4. Agents and channels of radicalisation

Because of the consistent decline in separatist terrorism and the relatively low intensity and scale of extreme right-wing and radical left-wing political violence, the main radicalisation agents in France are international jihadist terrorist organisations. Even as the Islamic State is dismantled in Syria and Iraq, its online information remains attractive and French foreign fighters recruited in the past still present a potential threat.

This section discusses radicalisation agents in what concerns both jihadist and extreme right-wing extremist violence. First, it gives an overview of the (lasting) impact of the Islamic State and Al-Qaeda on radicalisation, and recounts the available empirical data on the characteristics of individuals engaging in jihadist violence. Second, the section examines several manifestations of extreme right-wing ideology in France, which include active violent groups, the *Rassemblement/Front National* far right political party, and other, fringe, political organisations. Third, the section addresses the potential contribution of the prison system to processes of radicalisation. Finally, it takes up instances of radicalisation in the military.

Jihadist violence

Islamic State (IS)

The Islamic State is responsible for multiple and deadliest terrorist attacks in France in the past decade. As of 2017, it is estimated to be "the organisation most likely to send fighters to carry out more attacks" (Hecker and Tenenbaum, 2017). The perpetrators of the November 2015 attacks in Paris trained with the IS in the Middle East. Most arrests of suspects in jihadist terrorism in 2019 involved individuals linked to the IS. Finally, at least three out of the seven attempted or accomplished jihadist attacks in 2019 are associated with the organisation (Hecker and Tenenbaum, 2017; US Bureau on Counterterrorism, 2019).

IS cites three main motives for targeting France: 1) French domestic policies claimed to be discriminatory and oppressive towards Muslims (e.g., prohibiting the wearing of hijabs in schools and burqas in public spaces); 2) French military interventions in Muslim countries, such as Mali, Iraq and Syria that are presented as a general war against Islam; 3) destabilisation of the regime and of social cohesion to increase the IS influence in Europe (Hecker and Tenenbaum, 2017).

Despite the territorial decline of the IS, it continues to pose a threat via two main channels. The first is the return home of "foreign terrorist fighters" (FTFs) – French nationals who left for Syria to train and fight with the IS. The estimated number of French FTFs in 2018-2019 was 1,324, with 398 returnees (van der Heide and Bergema, 2019). In 2015, The French Ministry of Interior had estimated that about 1,700 people joined militia groups in Syria, 250 of which returned to France (Samaan and Jacobs, 2020; Weill, 2018). According to the 2019 Europol report, "Since the beginning of the Syrian conflict, countries such as Austria, Belgium, Finland, France and Italy have seen a return rate of between approximately 20% and 30%".

Second, IS has been reportedly successful in online radicalisation by propagating jihadist ideology, training sympathisers, and recruiting potential perpetrators, including women. Online information and interaction are not considered to be sufficient for the completion of a radicalisation process. Still, they become increasingly central in it by providing jihadist texts, *nasheeds* (songs) and videos, virtual proximity, means of communication, and a coordination platform for extremist violence (Hecker, 2018; Lacroix, 2018). The internet is a significant – yet, not the ultimate – factor of radicalisation among French youth, which nurtures "homegrown" and "lone-wolf" terrorism (Galli, 2019; Hecker and Tenenbaum, 2017). Researchers cite a "large number of examples of individuals who have admitted to having used the internet intensively in their radicalisation process before switching to terrorism or joining extremist organisations" (Breton, 2016; Guidère, 2016). A typical radicalisation process of young men and women is individualised, conducted in French, adapted to their interests and beliefs, and implicates manipulation (Breton, 2016; *Enrôlement et exploitation*, 2017). IS has, for example, alternately used the "empowerment" and "purity" discourse for their online marriage announcements to attract both progressively and conservatively leaning young women (Breton, 2016; Dearden, 2017; Thomson, 2014, p. 65).

More generally, IS has made extensive use of video and social media networks – e.g., YouTube, Twitter, and Facebook – and regularly published literature rationalising its philosophy and calling to carry out attacks in France. One such publication is the *Dar al-Islam* online magazine in French, published in 2014-2016 and still available online. A recent increase in online content regulation pushed the IS to switch to more confidential platforms, such as Telegram, where it continues to regularly publish its materials, including in French (Counter-Extremism Project, 2020; Sparks, 2020; Zelin, 2016). IS has managed to reach populations of all socio-economic levels and all across France, from big cities to poorer suburbs and remote rural areas (Hecker and Tenenbaum, 2017).

Al-Qaeda

Al-Qaeda follows patterns of recruitment and radicalisation methods similar to those of the IS. The organisation's affiliate in Yemen claimed responsibility for the attack on the *Charlie Hebdo* team in January 2015, displaying it as revenge for the journal's insult of Mohammed. (Europol, 2020) Other branches, such as the "al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb" (AQIM), justifies its

attacks against France by the country's colonial past and current "occupation" of Muslim territory in Mali (Europol, 2014).

Al-Qaeda competes with the IS to recruit radicalised French residents and spreads online propaganda (Hecker and Tenenbaum, 2017). YouTube videos distributed by Al-Qaeda members have hundreds of thousands of views. One of the prominent figures active in this field was Omar Omsen, a French-speaking recruiter for the Al-Nusra Front, considered singlehandedly responsible for the departure of 80% of young French to Syria and Iraq as of August 2016, thanks to an effective online campaign (Elbagir et al., 2016; Toscer, 2015). Another example of jihadist propaganda is the Ansar Al-Haqq website that served as a "jihadist library of reference in the Francophone world" and "openly supported jihadist fighters and terrorist organisations" in a "media jihad" up to its fold up in 2015. The site's managers were tried in France and sentenced to up to four years in prison for indoctrinating, inciting and recruiting for armed combat ("Djihad médiatique," 2018; Hecker, 2018).

Statistical profile of jihadists extremists

The majority of jihadist radicals in France fit a specific profile – these are non-immigrant, young French men of Maghrebin origin, raised in a Muslim family and coming from poor urban districts (Karoui and Hodayé, 2021; Crettiez and Barros, 2019; Hecker, 2018). According to a recent study, 61% of individuals engaging in jihadist violence are 18-26 years old; 80% are men; 94% are French nationals, and 89% are born in France; 76% have family ties in countries other than France (at least 55% are descendants of immigrants from the Maghreb); 70% to 75% are born to Muslim parents (i.e., not converts); and 86% live in poor metropolitan areas or cities suffering from urban decline (Karoui and Hodayé, 2021).

Extreme right-wing

Under the current definition of terrorist violence in France, the extreme right-wing does not pose a significant terrorist threat in the country, especially if compared with the number of incidents and extent of separatist and jihadist activity (see above). Yet, right-wing extremists engage in other types of physical and symbolic violence. Incidents of such violence include "harassment, threats, recording and dissemination of images of violence; destruction, degradation, deterioration; condoning crimes, and inciting discrimination, hatred or violence; insult and defamation" (Ressiguier and Morenas, 2019). Extreme right-wing groups in France count approximately 3,000 members as of 2020, ~1% of whom are incarcerated. The French extreme right-wing landscape ranges from the populist National Rally (*Rassemblement national*, known as *Front National* until 2018) political party to neo-Nazi and revolutionary groups.

Violent groups

Notwithstanding government bans issued against multiple extreme right-wing associations (see below), the French scene counts at least a handful of such groups, propagating violence against ethnic minorities, migrants and politicians. The groups differ in the age of their members (early 20's to over 60), background (including former police and military), level of organisation (including militant cells), type of violent activity (street violence to terrorism), and targets (political activists and figures to minority groups).

The terrorist threat currently emanates from small cells of "super-patriots", individuals with police or military background preoccupied with and operating against what they perceive as the "Islamisation" of France. Among these groups are the *Action des Forces Opérationnelles* (AFO) and the *Barjols*. AFO members, aged 32 to 69, are responsible for the 2018 plot to kill Muslims. The group calls for a "war of civilisations" and prepares "French citizen-soldiers for combat on national territory" against "Islamisation" (Deve, 2018). The *Barjols* plotted to attack Emmanuel Macron with a ceramic knife in 2018. The individuals arrested in relation to the plot were 32-62 years old. The cell's members claimed to have thousands of followers on social media (Camus, 2020; Soullier, 2018; "Un membre de la mouvance ultradroite mis en examen," 2021).

A small group of younger neofascists has recently formed *Les Zouaves*. The group's members engage in street violence against Antifa activists and have been involved in violent incidents during the Yellow Vests protests. The group is inspired by the Italian *CasaPound* and includes former adherents of the *Bastion Social* cell (suspected in violent attacks and banned in 2018) (Berteloot, 2019; Camus, 2020).

National Rally/Front

Currently, the *Rassemblement/Front National* (National Rally/Front) is the only far-right party in the French Parliament. It holds 8 out of 577 seats in the National Assembly and 23 out of 79 French seats in the European Parliament. In the past decade, the party is led by Marine Le Pen, MEP in 2004-2017 and Member of the French National Assembly since 2017. Le Pen received 21.3% and 33.9% of the votes in the first and second round of the 2017 presidential election, respectively.

The party's nationalist platform (e.g., in the most recent 2020 municipal elections) features anti-immigration and anti-Muslim sentiments (Evans and Ivaldi, 2020). Yet, Le Pen advances a "de-demonisation" strategy and attempts to distance the party from its original Fascistic agenda devised by its founder and Le Pen's father – Jean-Marie Le Pen (Camus, 2020; Camus and Lebourg, 2017). As part of the disassociation with some of its most radical fringes, the party ostracised members with records of racist or violent past (Camus, 2020). This strategy shows some signs of success among young (18-24 years old) voters on the right who consider the party's ideas to be "in the majority" and are attracted to them in the context of economic insecurity generated by COVID-19 (Pouzadoux, 2021).

Other political parties

France counts several non-violent and nonregistered extreme right-wing political parties. These associations serve as a more radical alternative to those dissatisfied with the less radical discourse of the *Rassemblement/Front National* (see below) (Camus, 2020, p. 74). They operate legally; some have in the past (unsuccessfully) run for national elections. Notable among them is *Parti de la* France, founded in 2009 by Carl Lang, a nationalist (Perrineau, 2016), former MEP and former member of the *Front National* (see below). Lang's anti-immigration and Islamophobic statements include calls to stop "the process of Islamic colonisation of France and […] the construction of new mosques in our country" (Carhon, 2011); the current party platform includes the "de-Islamisation" of France, zero immigration policy and remigration (Joly, 2020).

Other examples include the *Dissidence française*, an ultranationalist and racist group founded in 2011 by Vincent Vauclin (self-dissolved and rebranded as the *Mouvement national-démocrate* in 2020), known for his antisemitic statements and nostalgia for the Nazi regime (Assouline, 2018). The party initially called for seizing power by a "military coup" and later advocated for remigration and "reconquest" of France by the white (Assouline, 2018; Boissieu, 2019; Lambrecq, 2019). The *Parti Nationaliste Français* (PNF), established in 1983 and led by WWII collaborationists and Nazi sympathisers, has been revitalised in 2015 by former members of organisations banned by the government in 2013 (Camus, 2020). Its current spokesman is Yvan Benedetti, self-described as "anti-Zionist, anti-Semitic, anti-Jewish".("Un très proche de Gollnisch exclu du FN pour deux ans," 2011)

In addition to their activity on social media, extreme right-wing groups publish books and journals, such as *Synthèse nationale* (launched in 2006) and *Militant* (published since 1967) (Camus, 2020).

Share of government institutions in radicalisation

Prisons

Recent studies show that Islam, as opposed to other religions, is perceived by prison authorities as a security threat and identify the widespread sentiment of discrimination among Muslim detainees. According to a 2020 report by Bartolomeo Conti, "the fight against radicalisation has rendered religion suspicious in itself, or at least made it the subject of specific control measures […] The fear of proselytism, of contagion, of Islamist ideas and practices has broadened into questioning Islam as a whole, so 'Islam in prison' has become an issue. The feeling of being discriminated against for being Muslim, reinforces the construction of conspiracy discourses as well as narratives of victimhood, which are already present due to the punitive and constraining nature of prison" (Conti, 2020). Empirical studies indicate further that the "mechanism put in place by the prison in the management of 'radicalised' detainees fuels hatred and, by extension, the potential violence of detainees" (Chantraine et al., 2018).

Infiltration of law enforcement

Neo-Nazi sympathisers

In the past fifteen years, the French media has reported multiple incidents of members of the French military being involved in racially motivated violent attacks or expressing sympathy with neo-Nazi and with other types of extreme right-wing ideology and symbols. The first case that attracted wide public attention was a photo of three paratroopers giving a Nazi salute and wrapped in a Nazi flag in April 2008 (Vironneau and François, 2008). The same month, a soldier took part in an event celebrating Hitler's birthday, followed by vandalising and setting on fire a mosque (Atchouel, 2014). In 2011, four infantry soldiers were involved in a series of attacks against blacks and North Africans, during which they reportedly gave Nazi salutes and exclaimed "Sieg Heil" (Rouagdia, 2019). In 2013, two elite mountain infantry force soldiers sent on a terrorism-prevention patrol in Paris were photographed performing a "quenelle" (a gesture associated with anti-Semitic views and resembling an inverted Nazi salute) in front of a synagogue ("Affaire des 'quenelles' devant une synagogue," 2013). Also in 2013, a French

soldier deployed in the Central African Republic is spotted with a patch of the Waffen-SS on his uniform ("Centrafrique," 2013). Similar cases of vandalism, attacks and signs of adherence to neo-Nazism were reported in 2015, 2017, 2018 and 2020 (Bourdon and Suc, 2020). The French journal *Mediapart* has published two extensive investigative articles tracing the manifestation of Nazi views and symbols on social media by French soldiers. In July 2020, *Mediapart* identified a dozen military members openly displaying Nazi signs, tattoos and paraphernalia on their publicly accessible Facebook and Instagram accounts (Bourdon and Suc, 2020). Finally, in March 2021, *Mediapart* found fifty new cases of neo-Nazi sympathisers among the military ranks. The social media posts included tattoos and signs of the SS motto and symbols, logo of the "Blood and Honour" network, Nazi salutes, swastikas, posing in front of Nazi flags in WWII museums, Hitler and Mussolini accessories, black flags adorned by a Celtic Cross, and other neo-Nazi sings displayed, among others, in the soldiers' military barracks. Overall, such cases were detected in fourteen different regiments – primarily in the French Foreign Legion – and some of the soldiers were found to be in contact with each other (Bourdon et al., 2021a).

The official responses of military and government officials to these revelations condemn the acts but tend to downplay their gravity and the scope of the phenomenon as a whole. In response to the *Mediapart* investigation, the Ministry of Armed Forces stated that the army "fights against all types of radicalism" and that "[a]ny proven case is the subject of a disciplinary procedure leading to an immediate and strong sanction". Yet, the Ministry also considers the military ranks to be affected by far-right radicalisation only "in a very limited way" and sees "these reprehensible behaviours [as falling] within the domain of individual drift" (Bourdon et al., 2021b).

Jihadist radicalisation

Cases of jihadist radicalisation were also detected in military ranks. A French think tank has identified 25 soldiers linked to terrorist organisations or activities in 2012-2019 (Centre d'analyse du terrorisme, 2019). Army and government officials do not consider these cases to pose a significant threat. According to a 2019 report submitted to the National Assembly, "[w]ithin the army, radicalisation, whether Islamic or political, appears marginal. The proportion of suspected radicalisation is evaluated at 0.05%" and the army leaves "little room for behaviour incompatible with the service of the nation and republican values" (Diard and Poulliat, 2019).

Organised jihadist networks continue to exert influence over radicalisation processes in France even as they lose territory and resources. Online information and communication with members of extremist organisations have considerable impact on the development of domestic jihadist extremism, especially among marginalized youth. Despite government efforts to prevent jihadist violence – especially in prisons – the systemic discrimination and stigmatisation of incarcerated individuals in fact contributes to their alienation and radicalisation.

Right-wing extremism is less tangible in the French public discourse and perceptions, but multiple agents of extreme right-wing radicalisation currently operate in France. The biggest representative of far-right views in the political sphere is the *Rassemblement/Front National* party whose popularity continues to consistently grow since the '80s and has representatives in the French National Assembly and the European Parliament. Other political formations are

relatively marginal with followers adhering to more radical, racist and anti-immigrant ideology. Violent manifestations of the extreme right range from street attacks to terrorist plots. Overall, the far right is estimated to undergo a process of revitalisation. Groups that were previously banned manage to successfully reorganise and continue their activities, and multiple recent cases of open adherence to neo-Nazi ideology are detected in the French military.

5. Stakeholders and channels of de-radicalisation

The main actors of de-radicalisation in France are government bodies within the executive and judicial branches. This section presents an overview of the programmes and strategies employed by these actors. It analyses the general national plan for the prevention of radicalisation and the actors responsible for its implementation, educational efforts in public schools and the public sphere, administrative sanctions against individuals and organisations inciting violence or spreading "fake news", and rehabilitation plans in and outside prisons for individuals who have been prosecuted for terrorist activity or identified as undergoing a process of radicalisation. Given the focus on jihadist violence in the public and political discourses, it is hardly surprising that de-radicalisation plans target, almost exclusively, "Islamist" individuals and networks.

National Radicalisation Prevention Plan (PNPR) and de-radicalisation actors

In February 2018, the French government rolled out a comprehensive National Radicalisation Prevention Plan (PNPR) built "around 60 measures and broad fields: school, internet, university, sport, health, business, public services, strengthening the professionalisation of actors and the evaluation of practices, and disengagement". The PNPR is built around five axes:

1. *Protect minds against radicalisation.*
2. *Complete the detection/prevention network.*
3. *Understand and anticipate the evolution of radicalisation.*
4. *Professionalise local actors and evaluate practices.*
5. *Adapt disengagement.*

The Plan was developed and is managed by the General Secretariat of the Inter-ministerial Committee for the Prevention of Crime and Radicalisation (CIPDR). It is implemented by various national, local and private actors.

Inter-ministerial Committee for the Prevention of Crime and Radicalisation (CIPDR)

The CIPDR comprises 20 ministries and provides support, expertise and advice to prefectures, local communities and other actors in charge of prevention of delinquency and radicalisation. The Committee's proclaimed objective is "to bring the values of the Republic to life in order to protect our social cohesion and rebuild a united nation". Its main mission is to ensure the realisation of the PNPR in cooperation with local authorities and organisations. In

addition, since 2020, the CIPDR takes part in implementing the government's new policy of "fight against Islamist separatism".[18]

Préfectures and other state authorities

French prefectures (local administrative authority on the level of French *départements*) are in charge of assessing and monitoring radicalisation in the community. The prefects receive intelligence reports on individuals suspected of undergoing radicalisation and report to the prosecutor's office if the monitored person is estimated to present a risk to themself or to society. Each prefecture has three operational units specialising in radicalisation: (1) an assessment unit; (2) a monitoring unit that provides support and assistance to radicalised individuals and their families, "to allow the radicalised person, if necessary, to disengage and reintegrate, according to the values of the Republic"; and (3) a unit for the "fight against Islamism and communitarian withdrawal".[19] In addition, the prefect is authorised to appoint a departmental coordinator for the prevention of radicalisation. The coordinators are responsible for harmonising and facilitating the work of the monitoring unit and local actors (see below) (SG-CIPDR, 2021).

Other State agencies involved in the coordination, monitoring and support system set up by the CIPDR on the local level are the administration of the national education system that appoints a radicalisation prevention referent for every *département*; prosecutors representing the judicial administration; the Directorate of Judicial Protection of Youth (DPJJ) under the Ministry of Justice appointing *laïcité* referents for every region; and representatives of correctional and probation services. Radicalisation referents for the monitoring units are also appointed by the employment services, departmental directorates on social cohesion (DDCS), the regional health agencies, and the social security system (SG-CIPDR, 2021).

Auxiliary assistance

Public and private social welfare organisations contribute to de-radicalisation efforts by providing support and services to radicalised individuals and their families. Among these organisations are "Parents Listening, Support and Accompaniment Networks" (REAAP), "Local School Support Contracts" (CLAS), "Youth Listening Reception Service" (PAEJ), (*Maisons Des Adolescents* ("Houses of adolescents"), "Schools of Parents and Educators" (EPE), and the National Union of Family Associations (UNAF). Finally, the National Liaison Committee for Specialized Prevention Actors (CNLAPS), offers information and professional training in de-radicalisation strategies for actors working on social reintegration of marginalised youth.

Schools: Emphasis on *laïcité* and securitisation of the educational system

French public schools play a central role in the government's strategy of de-radicalisation. The current "policy for the prevention of violent radicalisation" implemented by the Ministry of National Education is part of the 2018 National Radicalisation Prevention Plan (PNPR) (see above). The two main pillars of the policy are civic education and securitisation of the school, with an increasing emphasis on the latter. According to the Ministry of Education website, the

[18] On *communautarisme* and government discourse on "Islamist separatism", see above.
[19] On *communautarisme*, see above.

plan revolves around “4 axes: prevention, identification and reporting, monitoring of young people in the process of radicalisation and staff training” (“Politique de prévention de la radicalisation violente en milieu scolaire,” 2020).

The pedagogical aspect of preventing radicalisation consists of moral and civic education. The main components of this curriculum are the principle of laïcité (the French notion of secularism); media and information education; the development of critical thinking and of a “feeling of belonging to a society”; and a “nuanced and objective approach to the history of religious ideas and facts”.

Civics classes are supplemented by a variety of security mechanisms. These include extensive staff training to identify students at risk of radicalisation; creation of special inter-governmental bodies in charge of assessing the reports on students and monitoring “young people reported as being ‘in the process of radicalisation’ but not charged with ‘terrorist acts’”; instituting a “multi-category watch units” in schools consisting of school officials together with social services and medical professionals and responsible for identifying situations that must be reported to government officials responsible for the prevention of radicalisation; and instructions on supporting minors returning from combat zones in Syria and Iraq (“Ecole et radicalisation violente,” 2020; “Politique de prévention de la radicalisation violente en milieu scolaire,” 2020).

Schools’ securitisation as an instrument of de-radicalisation, especially when the line between education and surveillance remains unclear, is controversial. First, it erodes the role of the school as a pedagogical and autonomy nurturing institution. Consider, for instance, cases of students who refused to observe a minute of silence or subscribe to the “I am Charlie” (*Je suis Charlie)* slogan after the Charlie Hebdo attacks in January 2015 and were reported to the police as potential cases of radicalisation (“Apologie du terrorisme,” 2015; Michalon-Brodeur et al., 2018, p. 239). Second, an empirical study of reports submitted by schools’ personnel to law enforcement has recently raised concerns about the stigmatisation of Islam implicit in the government’s policy of de-radicalisation. The study demonstrated a “tendency to conceptualise Muslim religiosity as potentially dangerous for minors [thus] reshaping the relationship forged between schools and religion, both in its historical foundations and in its daily practices” (Donnet, 2020). Finally, studies have also shown that more than reducing violence and radicalisation in schools, surveillance may drive students to conceal their internal conflicts and violent plans for fear of being classified as “dangerous” (Michalon-Brodeur et al., 2018, p. 238).

Prisons: Questionable and counterproductive initiatives

UPRA: Units of prevention of radicalisation

The first de-radicalisation programmes for French prisons were swiftly developed after the 2015 Paris attacks. Prior to that, penitentiary authorities did not run any special de-radicalisation programmes, assuming that the regular disciplinary sanctions are sufficient for the control and rehabilitation of all incarcerated persons (Robert, 2017). But in March 2016, the government decided that radicalised individuals should be isolated and grouped in “units for radicalisation prevention” (*unités de prévention de la radicalisation*), specially created to this end in four prisons across the country. The units hosted “people imprisoned for acts of

terrorism linked to violent radical Islamism as well as those identified in detention as radicalised, or in the process of radicalisation, and advocating the use of violent action" (Benbassa and Troendlé, 2017). The stated goal of these units was de-radicalisation which involved assessing the level of radicalisation and risk of engaging in violent actions or propagation of violence among other prisoners, and subsequent referral to a personalised "programme of care" that would provide "better treatment" (Benbassa and Troendlé, 2017; Conti, 2020).

The nature and functioning of the special units received severe criticism. The Controller-General in Places of Deprivation of Liberty disapproved of the urgent and underdeveloped planning in creating the units, and the disparities in the evaluation methods and care programmes across penitentiary institutions. More critically, the Controller-General questioned the judiciousness of bringing together radicalised individuals who may only benefit from the situation by creating new networks and concluded that given the overcrowded nature of prisons, further extension of the programme is not realistic (Benbassa and Troendlé, 2017; Contrôleur général des lieux de privation de liberté, 2016).

Ultimately, the programme was abruptly discontinued before any improvements could occur due to an assault of two correctional officers by a detainee in one of the special units unit. The new strategy prioritises security and safety in prisons and shifts the focus away from care and de-radicalisation.

QER: Districts of Evaluation of Radicalisation

The current approach to radicalisation in prisons focuses on the assessment of risk and securitisation. In February 2017, the de-radicalisation units were replaced by six "Districts of Evaluation of Radicalisation" (*quartiers d'évaluation de la radicalisation*) that accommodate around 120 detainees for four months. The primary purpose of the "districts" is not rehabilitation but determining whether the radicalised individuals may be assigned, depending on the risk they are considered to pose to others, to a regular or a high-security detention facility (Chantraine et al., 2018; Conti, 2020; Observatoire International des Prisons, 2020). Under this model, the notion of de-radicalisation is estimated to transform into yet another method of policing to the detriment of potential recovery and social reintegration:

> *Within the framework of the fight against radicalisation, detection appears to be aimed not at assisting the detainee but at providing information to intelligence services and helping the process of criminal judgement. Concerns about taqya (dissimulation) and thus the possibility of 'missing' a threat, mean that the imperative to 'reduce the risks' prevails and the work of professionals is torn between the security approach (oriented towards reducing risk) and the social approach, which aims to establish a relationship of trust with the detainee, to help social reintegration* (Conti, 2020).

Rehabilitation Programmes: Failures along with signs of humble success

CPIC

The "Centre for Prevention, Integration and Citizenship" (*Centre de prévention, d'insertion et de citoyenneté*, CPIC), colloquially known as the Pontoury de-radicalisation centre, was

opened by the government in September 2016, in the aftermath of the 2015 Paris attacks. The centre was legally defined as a public interest group (regulated by public law) and subject to the Inter-ministerial Committee for the Prevention of Crime and Radicalisation (CIPDR, see above).

The programme was destined for individuals in the process of radicalisation who are yet to engage in criminal terrorist activity – "people whose behaviour may lead to fear of the preparation or even the commission of violent acts inspired by jihadist ideology, while constituting the 'bottom of the spectrum' due to a weaker radicalisation than people being in the process of taking action" (Benbassa and Troendlé, 2017). The participation in the CPIC programme was voluntary and involved isolation from the family and social environment. It was meant to "constitute a medium-term between a totally open environment and prison" (Sénat, 2017).

Initially, the government hoped to extend the programme and open a CPIC in every French region by the end of 2017. Instead, the one operating CPIC lost all its participants by February 2017 and was shut down in July of the same year, mainly due to difficulties in convincing individuals with the right profile to sign up and stay in the programme. At its peak, the centre hosted only nine individuals (in a facility that had a maximum capacity of 25 people, employed 27 people, and operated on a €2.5 million budget) and the last person left in the programme was expelled, having been convicted in violence and glorification of terrorism (Benbassa and Troendlé, 2017).

RIVE

The RIVE programme (*Recherche et intervention sur les violences extrémistes*: "Research and intervention on extremist violence") is the French government's first attempt at a public-private partnership in de-radicalisation of persons convicted in terrorism. The programme's integrative approach was determined by law to provide "health, social, educational or psychological care intended to allow […] reintegration and the acquisition of values of citizenship […] in a suitable reception establishment in which the convicted person is required to reside" (*Code de procédure pénale*, Art. 138-18).

The pilot ran for two years (October 2016-November 2018) and was operated by *APCARS* – a private association specialising in criminal offenders' social reintegration. The programme targeted individuals already convicted of terror-related crimes, before or after serving their sentence. The participation did not require internment in a closed institution and included frequent and substantial encounters with social, religious and psychological mentors.

The government contract with *APCARS* was not renewed despite overall positive reviews of its work. Instead, the RIVE model was reintroduced under a new name (PAIRS) and in partnership with a new private body. In the two years of its operation, the programme had 22 participants, none of whom has thus far relapsed into terrorism (Hecker, 2021).

PAIRS

The Programme of Individualised Support and Social Reaffiliation (PAIRS) – has succeeded RIVE in 2018 and is executed by *Groupe SOS*, a voluntary association specialising in social entrepreneurship. The declared objective of PAIRS is "the disengagement" of persons

convicted in terrorism "from violent radicalisation and the prevention of risk of a violent act while promoting social reintegration and the acquisition of the values of citizenship". The programme accepts participants that attend it voluntarily or due to a court order. As of the end of September 2020, it has hosted 120 individuals in its four centres (Paris, Marseille, Lyon and Lille), including those ranking "high" on the "radicalisation spectrum". To date, none of the participants has returned to terrorist activity.

Each of the PAIRS centres is required to employ a multidisciplinary professional team of educators, social service assistants, professional integration counsellors, clinical psychologists, a temporary psychiatrist, and "specialists in contemporary Islam". As disclosed by an official working for the Ministry of Justice, PAIRS accepts only participants whose radicalisation involves a religious dimension (Hecker, 2021).

Mulhouse Programme

The Mulhouse programme is an example of a regional reintegration project initiated by a local authority in Alsace. After the January 2015 attacks, an Attorney General in the Mulhouse region has defined "the fight against violent radicalisation as an objective of the regional criminal policy" and set up an experimental three-month care programme with the participation of judicial, municipal and medical stakeholders. The project targets individuals that are already undergoing criminal proceedings for involvement in violent crimes. It is not restricted to a specific type of violence and concerns adherents to "jihadist violence, which represents most cases, and members of extreme right-wing groups" (Benbassa and Troendlé, 2017). Participation in the programme is mandatory for those found suitable. It is offered as an alternative to prosecution or, in case of an already convicted offender, in conjunction with a suspended sentence (Benbassa and Troendlé, 2017).

The Mulhouse programme consists of three phases: 1) understanding the person's personal situation and causes for their radicalisation and building an adjusted care programme; 2) re-establishing their social ties 3) designing a plan for future educational or professional prospects and acquiring a critical view on their radicalisation. It is considered a success and has hosted eighteen participants as of 2017 (Benbassa and Troendlé, 2017).

Dissolution of Violent Organisations

French law authorises the government to issue an administrative order of dissolution, effectively banning "associations or de facto groups":

1. *Which provoke armed demonstrations in the street;*
2. *Or which present, by their military form and organisation, the character of combat groups or private militias;*
3. *Or whose aim is to undermine the integrity of the national territory or to attack by force the republican form of government;*
4. *[…]*
5. *Or whose purpose is either to bring together individuals who have been condemned for collaboration with the enemy, or to exalt this collaboration;*
6. *Or which either provoke discrimination, hatred or violence against a person or a group of persons because of their origin or their belonging or not belonging to an ethnic group, a nation, a race or a specific religion, or*

propagate ideas or theories tending to justify or encourage such discrimination, hatred or violence;

7. *Or who engage, on French territory or from this territory, in acts with a view to provoking acts of terrorism in France or abroad.* (*Code de la sécurité intérieure*, Art. L212-1).[20]

The state resorts to administrative bans on associations when lacking sufficient evidence for the pressing of criminal charges (reconstituting a banned association is a criminal offence). In the past twenty years, the French government has used these provisions to ban more than 30 jihadist and extreme right-wing organisations (Ressiguier and Morenas, 2019). Most recently, decrees were issued against the neofascist *Génération identitaire* in March 2021, and, controversially, against the Collective Against Islamophobia in France in December 2020 (*Décret du 2 décembre 2020*, 2020; *Décret du 3 mars 2021*, 2021).[21]

However, experts call into question the efficacy of the dissolution, citing two recent examples where the organisations have quickly regrouped and continued their activity under a different name (Camus, 2020, p. 75; Ressiguier and Morenas, 2019).

French Broadcasting Authority

The French Broadcasting Authority (*Conseil supérieur de l'audiovisuel*, CSA) is in charge of enforcing the 2018 law against manipulation of information, "which aims to better protect democracy against the different ways in which fake news is deliberately spread" (*Loi n° 2018-1202 du 22 décembre 2018*, 2018; Alington, 2021, p. 30). The CSA's powers include preventing the dissemination of fake news by digital tools and broadcasts of television services ("Against information manipulation," 2018).

Civil Society Initiatives

Citizen initiatives to promote tolerance and dialogue include cultural events and awareness campaigns. The government advertises theatre plays, educational media tools, sports events, exhibitions, and other events advocating against violence. Some projects receive financial support from the the Inter-ministerial Committee for the Prevention of Crime and Radicalisation (SG-CIPDR). Initiatives from recent years include the plays "Jihad" (2014) and "Géhenne" (2018) by Ismaël Saïdi intended for a young audience and focusing on jihadism, racism and antisemitism; "Spotlight on *laïcité*": YouTube series of short clips "aimed at deconstructing received ideas on one of the fundamental values of the Republic"; and "the tournaments of fraternity", mixed sports events organised throughout France ("Prévention de la radicalisation," 2019).

The primary stakeholder of de-radicalisation in France is the government. It employs various channels and vast resources to prevent extremist violence and rehabilitate individuals who

[20] This provision was enacted in 2012, replacing an older version from 1936 (*Loi du 10 janvier 1936 sur les groupes de combat et milices privéesLégifrance*, 1936).

[21] The dissolution of the latter was criticized by Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch as being unfounded in facts, violating the freedom of association of the Collective's members, and creating a cooling effect on the fight against discrimination in France (Amnesty International, 2020; Human Rights Watch, 2020).

are undergoing radicalisation or were already involved in criminal extremist activity. The efforts include a comprehensive national plan for the prevention of radicalisation; school programmes promoting the value of *laïcité* and monitoring radicalisation of students; introduction of special "districts" evaluating radicalisation of incarcerated persons; programmes of social reintegration of individuals subject to criminal proceedings in relation with radicalisation or convicted in extremism-related crimes; administrative sanctions against associations involved in radicalisation; regulation of online disinformation; and support of de-radicalisation civil society campaigns. These plans are criticised for their almost exclusive focus on jihadist extremism to the neglect of violent right-wing threats, questionable efficiency, and in the case of schools, also for securitisation of education.

6. Conclusion

In recent years, jihadist terrorism filled the void created by the decline of nationalist-separatist violence. Jihadist extremism dominates the public and political agenda and is widely perceived to pose the biggest threat to France ever since the traumatic 2015 Paris attacks. Organised jihadist networks like the Islamic State and Al-Qaeda are still a significant factor in the proliferation of extremist ideology and violence. Online radicalisation plays a substantial role in the formation of domestic jihadist extremism, especially among marginalized youth. The success of these strategies is evident from the high number of completed or attempted jihadist attacks in France in recent years. Yet, the almost exclusive attention of political elites and the general public on jihadist violence and the aggressive response towards it are rooted not only in statistics but in the astounding traumatising effect of the 2015 Paris attacks on the individual and collective experience of violent threats. Jihadist extremism is increasingly characterised as religious, rather than political, violence that threatens not only the physical safety of the French but also their national identity and fundamental values. The most flagrant claims that Islam and Muslim immigrants are the most dangerous source of extremist violence come from the French far-right, but the narratives of anti-Muslim hardliners are making their way into mainstream politics. Two of Macron's Ministers of Interior have made statements that blur the line extremist violence and Islam. The president himself stated recently that there are links between illegal Muslim immigration and terrorism (right-wing and centrist politicians and journalists go as far as arguing that radical jihadism shares interests with the radical left, thus polarising the public discourse even further).

Consequently, the extensive security measures of surveillance, detection and prevention of violent attacks employed by the state law-enforcement apparatus target primarily agents of jihadist violence. The de-radicalisation programmes established by the government for this purpose include the promotion of *laïcité* and monitoring radicalisation of students in public schools; special units in prisons evaluating radicalisation of incarcerated persons; pilots of social reintegration of individuals linked to or convicted in terrorism-related activity; and other sanctions and public campaigns aiming to reduce the levels of jihadist violence. Not all of these initiatives are equally successful or functioning. While social reintegration programmes show signs of success, de-radicalisation efforts in schools, and especially in prisons, are criticised for an excessive focus on securitisation, stigmatisation of Islam, and ineptitude.

The main issue with the French attitude towards jihadist radicalisation appears to be the double meaning consciously assigned to it by the government – as a process that nurtures violence and as a process that leads to stricter religious observance. Presenting both as the same phenomenon risks exacerbating the Muslim population's systemic discrimination in France and elevating their sentiments of injustice, grievance, and alienation.

What is more, these attitudes and reforms play in the hands of the far right and contribute to the re-emergence of extreme right violence. Right-wing extremism is less present in the French public and political discourses, but multiple agents of extreme right-wing radicalisation are currently active in the political sphere or engaged in violence. The *Rassemblement/Front National* party is the main far-right political party, but other political organisations promote more radical and straightforward racist, anti-Muslim and anti-immigrant agendas. Violent groups differ in the age of their members, education and professional background, level of organisation and type of violent activity, which ranges from vandalism to terrorist schemes. The government, however, makes no significant steps to prevent this type of violence and is generally reluctant to address extreme right radicalisation. Typical examples of the current policy on this matter are the refusal to extend anti-jihadist programmes to all types of extremist violence and downplaying the proportions of adherence to neo-Nazi ideology in the military ranks.

Appendices

Appendix 1. Main (de)-radicalisation events in France since 2001

Name/Short description	Date	Description
Administrative dissolution of the neofascist organisation, *Génération identitaire*	04.03.2021	One of several attempts at de-radicalisation of the extreme right-wing in past years.
Bill reinforcing respect for the principles of the Republic (“bill against separatism”)	December 2020	Proposed legislative reform reinforcing government prerogatives to curtail jihadist radicalisation.
Administrative dissolution of the Collective Against Islamophobia in France	02.12.2020	A controversial attempt at de-radicalisation of an institution without clear evidence of jihadist links. The incident may achieve the opposite purpose and lead to radicalisation.
Murder of Samuel Paty; Beheading of a middle-school teacher who showed his students caricatures of Mohammed	16.10.2020	Symbolic jihadist attack perceived as a direct assault against the French basic values – freedom of speech and *laïcité*.
Stabbing in Police headquarters; a radicalised worker at the Paris headquarters, stabbed four people to death	03.10.2019	Jihadist attack by a worker at the Police headquarters.
Stabbing in prison; inmate stabbing two prison guards in a high-security prison	05.03.2019	The stabbing was described as a terror attack in view of the perpetrator’s statements. It sparked a protest organised by the guards’ unions and created unrest that lasted several weeks.
"Prevent to Protect": National Radicalisation Prevention Plan (PNPR); government plan comprising of “60	February 2018	De-radicalisation plan.

measures to reorient the prevention policy".		
"Policy for the prevention of violent radicalisation" in schools focusing on civic education and securitisation.	2018	De-radicalisation plan for schools.
Barjols plot; foiled attempt to assassinate President Macron	2018	Indications for the reorganisation of the extreme right-wing as a self-perceived protector of the country against Islam that must act where the government fails.
Foiled plan of the *Action des Forces Opérationnelles* (AFO) to poison halal meat in supermarkets, and kill jihadists released from prison, imams and women wearing a hijab.	2018	
Foiled plot to assassinate the Interior Minister Castaner and radical left MP Jean-Luc Mélenchon.	2017	
2017 Presidential elections; Marine Le Pen, leader of the extreme right-wing *Front National* (today, *Rassemblement National*) finishing second in the first round of presidential elections (21.3% of the votes vs. 24.01% voting for Macron) and receiving one third of the votes in the second round (33.9% vs. Macron's 66.1%).	04-05.2017	Continuous ascendance and normalisation of far-right politics.
Vehicle ramming; cargo truck run into a crowd celebrating the Bastille Day in Nice, killing 86 and injuring more than 400 people	14.07.2016	Symbolic jihadist attack of a new type with a large number of casualties.

Action plan against radicalisation and terrorism	May 2016	
Bataclan attacks; series of coordinated attacks at a sports stadium, the Bataclan theatre, and several restaurants in Paris. 130 killed and 493 injured.	13-14.11.2015	Deadliest attack in French modern history. Committed by jihadist terrorists, leading the government to declare a “state of emergency” for the next two years and undertake extensive security reforms.
Declaration of “state of emergency”	13.11.2015	
Charlie Hebdo and *Hypercacher* attacks; attack on the offices of the *Charlie Hebdo* journal, shooting of a police officer and a siege at a kosher supermarket. 17 killed, 20 injured.	07-09.01.2015	Major symbolic jihadist attack perceived as an assault against the French basic values – freedom of speech and *laïcité*.
Enactment of Law n°2012-1432 of 21 December 2012 relating to security and the fight against terrorism.	21.12.2012	Legal reform that included allowing the prosecution of acts of terrorism committed abroad by a French person or by a person habitually residing on French territory.
2012 Presidential elections; Marine Le Pen, new leader of the extreme right-wing *Front National* (today, *Rassemblement National*) finishing third in the first round of presidential elections (17.9% of the votes vs. 27.18% and 28.63 for Sarkozy and Hollande, respectively).	04-05.2012	Continuous ascendance and normalisation of far-right politics.
Toulouse and Montauban shootings; killing of three schoolchildren, a rabbi	11-22.03.2012	First attack marking the increase of jihadist violence in France.

and three soldiers, and injuring five more.		
Bombing of customs and treasury offices in Nice committed by the National Liberation Front of Corsica	20.07.2003	Last major separatist attack on French soil, marking gradual decrease in separatist violence
Failed assassination attempt of President Chirac with a rifle on Bastille day by a skinhead	14.07.2002	Signal of extreme right-wing radicalisation
2002 Presidential elections; Jean-Marie Le Pen, leader of the extreme right-wing *Front National* (today, *Rassemblement National*) finishing second in the first round of presidential elections (16.86% of the votes vs. 19.88% for Chirac) and receiving 17.79% in the second round (vs. Chirac's 82.21%).	04-05.2002	Continuous ascendance and normalisation of far-right politics.

Appendix 2. Political discourse about radicalisation in France

Quotation	Author(s)	Date of quotation	Source	Comments
"This is essential, we must in no way confuse the fight against illegal immigration and terrorism, but we must clearly look at the links that exist between these two phenomena. The Nice attack, unfortunately, also illustrates this. The Schengen area of free movement is one of the main achievements of European construction, but it was based, in return for the promise of free movement without internal borders, on a promise to protect and secure our external borders. This second promise has not been sufficiently kept, and the public opinions of the countries confronted with the terrorist threat will not be able for long to accept the maintenance of our open borders if we do not reform in depth the Schengen area. We saw it in the spring, in the pandemic context, we see it today with regard to terrorism."	Emmanuel Macron, President of France (Party: *La République En Marche*)	10.11.2020	https://www.elysee.fr/front/pdf/elysee-module-16543-fr.pdf	Drawing links between immigration and terrorism
"Does the Council still consider there is no link between terrorism and immigration? Is the Council ready to suspend the Schengen area and leave the states free to control their borders to face a deadly threat to the countries of Europe?"	Jérôme Rivière, MEP (Party: *Rassemblement national*, extreme right-wing)	10.11.2020	https://rassemblementnational.fr/communiques/terrorisme-et-immigration-le-conseil-de-leurope-doit-abandonner-schengen/	Communication to the President of the Council of Europe
"Here in France, we love the project, both earthly and universal, promoted by the Republic, its order and its promises. […] So yes, in every school, in every collège, in every lycée, we'll give teachers back the power to "make republicans," restore their	Emmanuel Macron, President of France (Party: *La*	21.10.2020	https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-	Speech given during the national tribute to the memory of Samuel Paty

rightful position and authority. […] Inside and outside school, the pressures, the abuse of ignorance and obedience which some would like to establish have no place in our country. […]. So why was Samuel killed? […] Because he embodied the Republic, which comes alive every day in classrooms, the freedom that is conveyed and perpetuated in schools."	*République En Marche*)		policy/human-rights/freedom-of-religion-or-belief/article/national-tribute-to-the-memory-of-samuel-paty-speech-by-emmanuel-macron	
"Communautarisme is not terrorism, we must distinguish between these two concepts. *Communautarisme* is the desire to secede from the Republic, in the name of a religion, but deviating from it."	Emmanuel Macron, President of France (Party: *La République En Marche*)	16.10.2020	https://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2019/10/16/communautarisme-terrorisme-emmanuel-macron-pointe-l-irresponsabilite-de-certains-commentateurs-politiques_6015785_823448.html	
"The Catholics have nothing to fear of."	Gérald Darmanin, Minister of the	05.10.2020	https://www.la-	Commentary on the "anti-separatism" bill

	Interior (Party: *La République En Marche*)		croix.com/France/Gerald-Darmanin-laicite-les-catholiques-nont-riencraindre-2020-10-05-1201117757	announced by the government in October 2020 an intended to reinforce the principle of secularism in France
"The problem isn't *laïcité* […] What we must tackle is Islamist separatism. A conscious, theorised, political-religious project is materialising through repeated deviations from the Republic's values, which is often reflected by the formation of a counter-society as shown by children being taken out of school, the development of separate community sporting and cultural activities serving as a pretext for teaching principles which aren't in accordance with the Republic's laws. It's indoctrination and, through this, the negation of our principles, gender equality and human dignity. The problem is this ideology, which claims that its own laws are superior to the Republic's. […] Islam is a religion that is currently experiencing a crisis all over the world. We're not just seeing it in our country, it's a deep crisis linked to tensions between forms of fundamentalism, specifically religious and political projects which, as we're seeing in every region of the world, are leading to a very strong hardening, including in countries where Islam is the majority religion."	Emmanuel Macron, President of France (Party: *La République En Marche*)	02.10.2020	https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/coming-to-france/france-facts/secularism-and-religious-freedom-in-france-63815/article/fight-against-separatism-the-republic-in-action-speech-by-emmanuel-macron	
"France is at war. The acts committed Friday evening in Paris and near the Stade de France, are acts of war. They left at least 129 dead and many injured. They constitute an aggression against our country, against its values, against its youth, against its way of life. They are the work of a jihadist army, the Daesh	François Hollande, President of France (Party: *Parti socialiste*)	16.11.2015	https://www.senat.fr/evenement/archives/D46/hollande.html	In the aftermath of the November 2015 attacks

group which fights us because France is a country of freedom, because we are the homeland of Human Rights."				
"The state of mind of January 11 must remain. It is a new state of mind, it seems to me, for our country […] An exceptional response, it is not only that of the State - and all the means that we have implemented and the fact that thanks to the work of the forces of the order the terrorists have been put out of harm's way, [...] but there has been an incredible response from our compatriots."	Manuel Valls (Party: *Parti socialiste*), French PM	11.01.2015	https://www.nouvelobs.com/charlie-hebdo/20150111.OBS9715/4-millions-de-personnes-en-france-pour-la-marche-republicaine.html	In the aftermath of the January 2015 attacks
"Today, the Republic was attacked. The Republic is freedom of expression. The Republic is culture, creation, pluralism, and democracy. That is what the assassins were targeting. It is the ideal of justice and peace that France carries everywhere on the global stage."	François Hollande, President of France (Party: *Parti socialiste*)	09.01.2015	https://www.sciencespo.fr/research/cogito/home/the-politics-of-symbols-the-french-governments-response-to-the-2015-terrorist-attacks/?lang=en	In the aftermath of the January 2015 attacks
"The 'Merah affair' has tragically launched a new era of 'lone wolfs', marginalised individuals with confused demands, with spontaneous actions and variable links with the external terrorist	Jean-Patrick Courtois, Senator, session of the Senate	15.10.2014	https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.	

universe, introduced to their radicalisation by modern means of communication."			1177/147737 0819828955	
"This new terrorist threat is often generated within our popular districts. Personal shifts towards radical Islam can lengthen a criminal past, in a pseudo-redeeming manner, sometimes started during detention or on leaving prison. This risk justifies particular attention to individual histories and to the development of a Muslim chaplaincy."	Manuel Valls (Party: *Parti socialiste*), Minister of the Interior, session of the Senate	16.10.2012	https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/147737 0819828955	
"How many Mohamed Merah in the boats, the planes, which arrive in France every day filled with immigrants? […] How many Mohamed Merah among the children of these unassimilated immigrants? […] Mohamed Merah is perhaps only the tip of the iceberg."	Marine Le Pen (Party: *Front nationale*, extreme right-wing)	25.03.2012	https://www.liberation.fr/france/2012/03/25/marine-le-pen-fait-l-amalgame-entre-immigration-et-terrorisme_805592/	In the aftermath of the 2012 jihadist attacks
"Europe is a target and France even more as we embody everything that our enemy wants to fight: human and civil rights, freedom of thought and expression, equality between men and women. Secularism and, in the end, the art of living with a certain idea of civilisation. The French Republic is in danger because is completely and totally incompatible with the pan-Islamist project of a worldwide Caliphate."	Guillaume Larrivé, Deputy, session of the National Assembly	15.09.2004	https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/147737 0819828955	

Appendix 3. Networks of connection of the main agents of radicalisation

Figure 3.1. Jihadist links



Figure 3.2. Far-right network[22]



[22] For a detailed mapping of the far-right networks on France, see (Horde, 2021).

Appendix 4. Main de-radicalisation programmes in France

Name	Dates	Agents	Approach	Scale	Targets
"Stop Djihadisme" website – information on civil initiatives	November 2019-present	*French government*	Educational	National	
Controlling manipulation of information (*Loi n° 2018-1202 du 22 décembre 2018 relative à la lutte contre la manipulation de l'information*)	December 2018-present	*French government*	Sanctions	National	
PAIRS (Individualised Support and Social Re-affiliation Programme)	October 2018-present	*Organisation*: Groupe SOS (Artemis; pôle Solidarités)	Integrative (autonomy and empowerment), horizontal	National (4 centres)	Persons convicted in terrorism-related crimes, before or after serving their sentence (de-facto, only religious Muslims)
"Prevent to Protect": National Radicalisation Prevention Plan (PNPR)	February 2018	*National and local state institutions*	Preventive	National	
Policy for the prevention of violent radicalisation	February 2018-present	*State institution*: Ministry of National Education	Educational	National	School-age children
QER (Districts of Evaluation of Radicalisation)	February 2017-	*State institution*: Penitentiary system	Rehabilitation	National	Incarcerated individuals
RIVE (Research and intervention on extremist violence)	October 2016-September 2018	*Organisation*: APCARS (Association of Applied Criminal Policy and Social Reintegration)	Integrative	National (1 centre)	Persons convicted in terrorism-related crimes, pre or post serving their sentence (de-facto, only religious Muslims)

CPIC (Centre for prevention, integration and citizenship) (public interest group)	May 2016-28.07.2017	*State institution*: CIPDR (Inter-ministerial Committee for the Prevention of Crime and Radicalisation)	Integrative	National (1 centre)	Individuals inspired by "jihadist ideology" (early stage radicalisation)
Mulhouse programme	16.10.2015-present	*State institutions*: Colmar Court of appeals (Alsace); Mulhouse regional court	Integrative, rehabilitation	Regional	Individuals arrested or convicted in violent crimes. Participation irrespective of religious/political ideology
UPRA (Units of prevention of radicalisation)	March 2016-February 2017	*State institution*: Penitentiary system	Rehabilitation	National	Incarcerated individuals
FSPRT (Database of alerts for the prevention of terrorist radicalisation)	March 2015-	*State institution*: UCLAT (Counter-Terrorism Coordination Unit)	Security	National	
CNAPR (National Centre for Assistance and Prevention of Radicalisation);	April 2014-	*State institution*: Police	Security	National	
Administrative dissolution of violent organisations (*Code de la sécurité intérieure*, Art. L212-1)	2012- (original law dates back to 1936)	*French government*	Sanctions	National	

References

Affaire des “quenelles” devant une synagogue: “Des gestes incompréhensibles”, pour le Commandant du 13e BCA, 2013. France 3 Auvergne-Rhône-Alpes.

‘Against information manipulation’ [WWW Document], 2018. Gouvernement.fr. URL https://www.gouvernement.fr/en/against-information-manipulation (accessed 3.4.21).

Alington, D., 2021. *Conspiracy Theories, Radicalisation and Digital Media.*

Amnesty International, 2020. ‘France: shutting down anti-racist organisation risks freedoms’ [WWW Document]. URL https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/11/france-shutting-down-antiracist-organisation-risks-freedoms/ (accessed 3.11.21).

‘Apologie du terrorisme: pourquoi un enfant de 8 ans a-t-il été entendu?’, 2015. *Le Monde.fr.*

Assemblée Nationale, 2020. ‘Projet de loi confortant le respect des principes de la République, n° 3649 rectifié, déposé(e) le 9 décembre 2020.’

Assouline, P.-S., 2018. ‘Avec B. Gueudin, la « dissidence » est-elle entrée au conseil municipal du Havre ?’

Atchouel, G., 2014. ‘Cet ancien para de Carcassonne qui combat aux côtés des «pro-russes».’ *ladepeche.fr*

Bakker, E., 2006. *Jihadi terrorists in Europe: their characteristics and the circumstances in which they joined the jihad.* Clingendael, Den Haag.

Barwick, C., Beaman, J., 2019. ‘Living for the neighbourhood: marginalization and belonging for the second-generation in Berlin and Paris.’ *Comparative Migration Studies* 7, 1. https://doi.org/10/gjnr83

Bedock, C., 2020. ‘Understanding the Unexpected: Emmanuel Macron’s Victory in the 2017 French Presidential Election’, in: Drake, H., Cole, A., Meunier, S., Tiberj, V. (Eds.), *Developments in French Politics*. Macmillan Education UK, London, UNITED KINGDOM, pp. 37–56.

Benbassa, E., Troendlé, C., 2017. ‘Rapport final de la mission d’information sur le désendoctrinement, le désembrigadement et la réinsertion des djihadistes en France et en Europe, n° 633.’

Berteloot, T., 2019. ‘Ultradroite: «La bagarre de rue est la raison d’être des “Zouaves”».’ *Libération*.

Boissieu, L. de, 2019. *Dissidence Française* (DF)—France Politique [WWW Document]. URL https://www.france-politique.fr/wiki/Dissidence_Fran%C3%A7aise_(DF) (accessed 3.23.21)

Bourdon, S., Brabant, J., Suc, M., 2021a. ‘Une filière néonazie au sein de l’armée française.’ *Mediapart*.

Bourdon, S., Brabant, J., Suc, M., 2021b. ‘Néonazis dans l’armée: la longue litanie des «cas isolés».’ *Mediapart*.

Bourdon, S., Suc, M., 2020. ‘Des néonazis font carrière dans l’armée française.’ *Mediapart*.

Breton, D.L., 2016. ‘Jeunesse et djihadisme.’ *Le Debat* n° 188, 119–130. https://doi.org/10/gjh9d8

Calvi, Y., 2017. ‘Collomb veut “mobiliser les hôpitaux psychiatriques.”’ *RTL.fr.*

Camus, J.-Y., 2020. *Violent Right-Wing Extremism and Terrorism – Transnational Connectivity, Definitions, Incidents, Structures and Countermeasures.*

Camus, J.-Y., Lebourg, N., 2017. *Far-Right Politics in Europe.* Harvard University Press.

Carhon, P., 2011. ‘Carl Lang, l’Islam et la laïcité. Le Salon Beige.’ URL https://www.lesalonbeige.fr/carl-lang-et-la-laicite/ (accessed 3.23.21).

‘Centrafrique: un soldat français arbore une devise nazie sur son uniforme, 2013’. *BFMTV*.

Centre d’analyse du terrorisme, 2019. *Les militaires français et le djihad.*

Chabal, E., 2015. *A Divided Republic: Nation, State and Citizenship in Contemporary France.* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107447936

Chamorel, P., 2019. ‘Macron Versus the Yellow Vests.’ *Journal of Democracy 30*, 48–62. https://doi.org/10/ghv2q8

Chantraine, G., Scheer, D., Depuiset, M.-A., 2018. *Enquête sociologique sur les “quartiers d’évaluation de la radicalisation” dans les prisons françaises.*

‘Charlie Hebdo, un attentat sans précédent en France, 2015.’ *Le Parisien*.

Chebbah-Malicet, L., 2018. ‘La laïcité, nouvel étendard de l’intégration ?’ *Confluences Mediterranee* N° 106, 69–80. https://doi.org/10/gjnr84

Chichizola, J., Cornevin, C., 2021. ‘Laurent Nuñez: «Avec 170 sabotages perpétrés depuis mars 2020, l’ultragauche monte en puissance».’ *Le Figaro.*

Chrisafis, A., 2015. ‘“Nothing’s changed”: 10 years after French riots, banlieues remain in crisis.’ *the Guardian.*

Code de la sécurité intérieure, Art. L212-1.

Code de procédure pénale, Art. 138-18.

Code pénal, Art. 421-1(1)-(2).

Commission nationale consultative des droits de l’Homme, 2020. *La lutte contre le racisme, l’antisémitisme et la xénophobie: année 2019.*

Conti, B., 2020. *Case studies of interactive radicalisation: France.*

Contrôleur général des lieux de privation de liberté, 2016. ‘Radicalisation islamiste en milieu carcéral 2016: L’ouverture des unités dédiées.’

Corbière, A., 2020. ‘Gérald Darmanin et l’«islamo-gauchisme», qualificatif usé jusqu’à la corde.’ *Libération*.

Counter-Extremism Project, 2020. *France: Extremism & Counter-Extremism.*

Crettiez, X., Barros, Y., 2019. *La Réalité de la menace djihadiste en France 2015-2018.*

D'Amato, S., 2019. 'Islamization of criminal behaviour: The path to terrorism? Terrorist threat and crime in French counterterrorism policy-formulation.' *European Journal of Criminology 16*, 332–350. https://doi.org/10/gh6qb4

Dearden, L., 2017. 'How Isis is recruiting European women with promise of "empowerment."' *The Independent.*

'Débat entre Marine Le Pen et Gérald Darmanin: la dédiabolisation par procuration', 2021. *Le Monde.fr.*

Décret du 2 décembre 2020 portant dissolution d'un groupement de fait, JORF n°0292 du 3 décembre 2020, 2020.

Décret du 3 mars 2021 portant dissolution d'une association, JORF n°0054 du 4 mars 2021, 2021.

Deve, S., 2018. 'Tout savoir sur l'Action des Forces Opérationnelles, le groupuscule d'ultradroite qui préparait des attentats.' *CNEWS*.

Diard, É., Poulliat, É., 2019. 'Rapport d'information sur les services publics face à la radicalisation, n° 2082'.

Dikeç, M., 2007. 'Revolting Geographies: Urban Unrest in France.' *Geography Compass* 1, 1190–1206. https://doi.org/10/bjq73d

Directorate-General for Internal Policies of the Union, 2014. *Preventing and countering youth radicalisation in the EU.*

Discours d'Édouard Philippe sur le plan national de prévention de la radicalisation, 2018.

'« Djihad médiatique »: le site Ansar Al-Haqq au cœur d'un procès à Paris, 2018.' *Le Monde.fr.*

Donnet, C., 2020. 'Les signalements pour « risque de radicalisation » dans les établissements scolaires en France, nouvel outil de régulation de l'islam.' *Deviance et Societe* Vol. 44, 420–452. https://doi.org/10/gh73f8

Ecole et radicalisation violente [WWW Document], 2020. Stop-Djihadisme. URL http://www.stop-djihadisme.gouv.fr/lutte-contre-terrorisme-radicalisation-radicalisation-tous-concernes/que-fait-france-a-lechelle-1 (accessed 3.7.21).

Elabe, 2019. 'Le mouvement des « gilets jaunes » reste approuvé par 55% des Français. ELABE.' URL https://elabe.fr/gilets-jaunes-1an-apres/ (accessed 4.9.21).

Elbagir, N., Haddad, M., Jones, B., 2016. 'France's super jihadi recruits teens to Syria.' *CNN*.

Enrôlement et exploitation: Les femmes occidentales dans le pìege de Daech, 2017.

Europol, 2020. 'TE-SAT 2020: European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report.'

Europol, 2019. 'TE-SAT 2019: European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report. Publications Office, LU.'

Europol, 2018. ‘TE-SAT 2018: European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report. Publications Office, LU.’

Europol, 2017. ‘TE-SAT 2017: European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report. Publications Office, LU.’

Europol, 2016. ‘TE-SAT 2016: European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report. Publications Office, LU.’

Europol, 2015. ‘TE-SAT 2015: European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report.’

Europol, 2014. ‘TE-SAT 2014: European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report.’

Europol, 2013. ‘TE-SAT 2013: EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report.’

Europol, 2012. ‘TE-SAT 2012: EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report.’

Europol, 2011. ‘TE-SAT 2011: EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report. European Police Office, NL.’

Europol, 2010. ‘TE-SAT 2010: EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report.’

Europol, 2009. ‘TE-SAT 2009: EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report.’

Eustache-Brinio, J., 2020. ‘Radicalisation islamiste : faire face et lutter ensemble: Rapport n° 595’ (2019-2020).

Evans, J., Ivaldi, G., 2020. ‘Building a local powerbase? The Rassemblement National in the 2020 municipal elections in France.’ https://doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.35704.26883

Faucher, F., Boussaguet, L., 2018a. The Politics of Symbols: Reflections on the French Government’s Framing of the 2015 Terrorist Attacks. Parliam Aff 71, 169–195. https://doi.org/10/gctm7h

Faucher, F., Boussaguet, L., 2018b. The politics of symbols: the French government’s response to the 2015 terrorist attacks. Cogito. URL https://webserver07.reims.sciences-po.fr/research/cogito/home/the-politics-of-symbols-the-french-governments-response-to-the-2015-terrorist-attacks/?lang=en (accessed 3.4.21).

Faure, V., 2020. ‘« Islamo-gauchisme »: histoire tortueuse d’une expression devenue une invective.’ *Le Monde.fr.*

Faye, O., 2019. ‘« Le communautarisme, ce n’est pas le terrorisme »: Macron souligne « l’irresponsabilité » de certains « commentateurs politiques ».’ *Le Monde.fr.*

Fenech, G., Pietrasanta, S., 2016. ‘Rapport fait au nom de la Commission d’enquête relative aux moyens mis en oeuvre par l’État pour lutter contre le terrorisme depuis le 7 janvier 2015, Tome 2: compte rendu des auditions’, *Assemblée nationale*, n° 3922.

Foucault, M., Algan, Y., Cohen, D., Beasley, E., Péron, M., 2019. ‘Qui sont les Gilets jaunes et leurs soutiens? (No. 2019– 03)’, *Sciences Po publications*, Sciences Po publications. Sciences Po.

France Terrorism Index | 2002-2019 Data | 2020-2021 Forecast | Historical | Chart [WWW Document], n.d. URL https://tradingeconomics.com/france/terrorism-index (accessed 2.26.21).

Franceinfo, 2021a. ‘Terrorisme: deux attentats islamistes ont été déjoués en 2020 en France, selon le coordonnateur national du renseignement.’ *Franceinfo*.

Franceinfo, 2021b. ‘Enseignement supérieur: on vous explique la polémique sur l’enquête visant l’"islamo-gauchisme" réclamée par le gouvernement.’ *Franceinfo*.

Frénois, M., Maurice, S., Allain, P.-H., Darnault, M. ‘ «Gilets jaunes»: la mobilisation en recul après «une nuit agitée» et 409 blessés.’ *Libération*.

Galli, F., 2019. ‘Case Studies of National Counter-Terrorism Policies: Case Study of France’, in: Shor, E., Hoadley, S. (Eds.), *International Human Rights and Counter-Terrorism.*

Geisser, V., 2020a. ‘Is France Fueling Muslim Terrorism by Trying to Prevent It?’ *The New York Times.*

Geisser, V., 2020b. ‘Immigration et terrorisme: « corrélation magique » et instrumentalisation politique.’ *Migrations Societe* N° 182, 3–13.

Grande, E., Schwarzbözl, T., Fatke, M., 2019. ‘Politicizing immigration in Western Europe.’ *Journal of European Public Policy* 26, 1444–1463. https://doi.org/10/ggz74s

Gregory, S., 2003. ‘France and the war on terrorism.’ *Terrorism and Political Violence* 15, 124–147. https://doi.org/10/dp937d

Guedj, L., 2020. *Ce que veut dire le terme “islamo-gauchisme” pour ceux qui l’emploient... et pour ceux qu’il vise.*

Guidère, M., 2016. ‘Internet, haut lieu de la radicalisation.’ *Pouvoirs* N° 158, 115–123. https://doi.org/10/gjh9d9

Hecker, M., 2021. *Once a jihadist, always a jihadist? A De-radicalisation Program Seen from the Inside.*

Hecker, M., 2018. *137 Shades of Terrorism. French Jihadists Before the Courts.*

Hecker, M., Tenenbaum, E., 2017. *France vs. Jihadism: The Republic in a New Age of Terror*.

Horde, L., 2021. ‘Cartographie de l’extrême droite française: version janvier 2019’ [WWW Document]. *La Horde*. URL https://lahorde.samizdat.net/cartographie-de-lextreme-droite-francaise-version-janvier-2019 (accessed 3.16.21).

Horvath, C., 2018. ‘Riots or revolts? The legacy of the 2005 uprising in French banlieue narratives.’ *Modern & Contemporary France* 26, 193–206. https://doi.org/10/gjnr82

Human Rights Watch, 2020. France: Dissolving Anti-Discrimination Group Threatens Rights [WWW Document]. Human Rights Watch. URL https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/12/04/france-dissolving-anti-discrimination-group-threatens-rights (accessed 3.11.21).

IFOP-Fiducial, 2020. *Le regard des Français sur la menace terroriste et l’islamisme.*

INSEE, 2019. L’essentiel sur les immigrés et les étrangers [WWW Document]. URL https://www.insee.fr/fr/statistiques/3633212 (accessed 4.3.21).

Jikeli, G., 2018. ‘Antisemitic Acts and Attitudes in Contemporary France: The Effects on French Jews.’ *Antisemitism studies* 2.

Joly, T., 2020. *Les 9 idées-froces du Parti de la France.*

Karoui, H.E., Hodayé, B., 2021. *Les militants du djihad: Portrait d’une génération*. Fayard.

Lacroix, I., 2018. ‘Radicalisations et jeunesses: Revue de littérature, INJEP’, *INJEP Notes & Rapports.*

Lambrecq, M., 2019. *Du jamais vu: deux listes anti-islam pour les élections européennes en France.*

Loi du 10 janvier 1936 sur les groupes de combat et milices privées. - Légifrance, 1936.

Loi n° 2018-1202 du 22 décembre 2018 relative à la lutte contre la manipulation de l’information, 2018.

Macron, E., 2020. *National tribute to the memory of Samuel Paty* [WWW Document]. France Diplomacy - Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs. URL https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy/human-rights/freedom-of-religion-or-belief/article/national-tribute-to-the-memory-of-samuel-paty-speech-by-emmanuel-macron (accessed 4.17.21).

Merchet, J.-D., 2021. ‘Terrorisme: l’ultra-droite «inquiète» Laurent Nuñez.’ *L’Opinion.*

Michalon-Brodeur, V., Bourgeois-Guérin, É., Cénat, J., Rousseau, C., 2018. ‘Le rôle de l’école face à la radicalisation violente: risques et bénéfices d’une approche sécuritaire.’ *ef* 46, 230–248. https://doi.org/10/gjh9fk

Ministère de l’Intérieur, 2021. *Dossier de presse: point mensuel de février du ministre de l’Intérieur et de la ministre déléguée.*

Murray, R., 2020. ‘All Change? Partisan Realignment and Parliamentary Reform Under Emmanuel Macron’, in: Drake, H., Cole, A., Meunier, S., Tiberj, V. (Eds.), *Developments in French Politics*. Macmillan Education UK, London, UNITED KINGDOM, pp. 57–76.

National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2020. Global Terrorism Database [WWW Document]. URL https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/ (accessed 4.8.21).

Nesser, P., 2008. ‘Chronology of Jihadism in Western Europe 1994–2007: Planned, Prepared, and Executed Terrorist Attacks.’ *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 31, 924–946. https://doi.org/10/fgrz74

Observatoire International des Prisons, 2020. Au QER, une évaluation en trompe l’œil. oip.org. URL https://oip.org/analyse/au-qer-une-evaluation-en-trompe-loeil/ (accessed 4.17.21).

Perrineau, P., 2016. ‘Les droites en France à l’horizon de 2017.’ *Le Debat* n° 191, 113–120. https://doi.org/10/gjjftt

‘Plus de 8 000 personnes fichées pour radicalisation à caractère terroriste, annonce Gérald Darmanin, 2020’. *Le Monde.*

Politique de prévention de la radicalisation violente en milieu scolaire [WWW Document], 2020. éduscol | Ministère de l'Éducation nationale, de la Jeunesse et des Sports - Direction générale de l'enseignement scolaire. URL https://eduscol.education.fr/1017/politique-de-prevention-de-la-radicalisation-violente-en-milieu-scolaire (accessed 3.7.21).

Pouzadoux, M., 2021. ' « En quoi Marine Le Pen serait pire ? » : ces jeunes qui voteront pour l'extrême droite en 2022'. *Le Monde*.

Prévention de la radicalisation: quelles initiatives citoyennes? [WWW Document], 2019. Stop-Djihadisme. URL http://www.stop-djihadisme.gouv.fr/lutte-contre-terrorisme-radicalisation-radicalisation-tous-concernes/tous-concernes-devenir-acteur-2 (accessed 3.6.21).

Propos liminaires du Président de la République à l'occasion de la conférence de presse conjointe sur la réponse européenne à la menace terroriste, 2020.

Ressiguier, M., Morenas, A., 2019. *Rapport de la commission d'enquête sur la lutte contre les groupuscules d'extrême droite en France* (M. Adrien Morenas).

Robert, M., 2017. 'La prise en charge des personnes « radicalisées »: brève histoire d'un impensé pénitentiaire.' *Deliberee* N° 2, 26–30. https://doi.org/10/gh73gb

Rouagdia, H., 2019. 'Nîmes: ex légionnaires condamnés pour violences racistes.' midilibre.fr.

Samaan, J.-L., Jacobs, A., 2020. Countering Jihadist Terrorism: A Comparative Analysis of French and German Experiences. *Terrorism and Political Violence* 32, 401–415. https://doi.org/10/gh55dx

Sénat, 2020. Séance du 8 juillet 2020.

Sénat, 2017. Séance du 14 février 2017.

Soullier, L., 2018. 'Qui sont les Barjols, « bande d'autochtones » identitaires et anti-Macron?' *Le Monde.*

Sparks, A.C., 2020. 'Dar al-Islam: A Quantitative Analysis of ISIS's French-Language Magazine.' *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 43, 688–705. https://doi.org/10/ggqhfh

Thomson, D., 2014. *Les Français jihadistes.* Groupe Margot.

Toscer, O., 2015. 'Les confidences d'Omar Diaby, recruteur en chef des fous d'Allah.' *L'Obs*.

'Un membre de la mouvance ultradroite mis en examen dans un projet d'attaque contre Macron', 2021. *Le Figaro*.

'Un très proche de Gollnisch exclu du FN pour deux ans, 2011.' *Libération*.

US Bureau on Counterterrorism, 2019. *Country Reports on Terrorism 2019*.

van der Heide, L., Bergema, R., 2019. *Terrorism Threat Assessment 2018—2019*.

Vincendon, S., 2020. 'Séparatisme: Jean-Luc Mélenchon ne veut pas ranimer "trois siècles de guerre de religion" en France.' *BFMTV*.

Vironneau, F., François, J.-P., 2008. ‘Montauban. Rituels nazis chez les paras du 17e RGP’. ladepeche.fr.

Weill, S., 2018. *Terror in Courts. French counter-terrorism: Administrative and Penal Avenues*.

Zelin, A.Y., 2016. New issue of The Islamic State’s magazine: “Dār al-Islām #10" [WWW Document]. URL https://jihadology.net/2016/08/20/new-issue-of-the-islamic-states-magazine-dar-al-islam-10/ (accessed 3.23.21).