De-radicalisation and Integration: Legal & Policy Framework

Israel/Country report

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Table of Contents

List of Abbreviations

Al Aqsa Intifada – the second intifada (27.9.2000 – 8.2.2005)
Arabs – Israeli civilians who live inside Israeli territory
BESA –The Begin-Sadat Centre for Strategic Studies
Hamas – Political party and organization in the Gaza Strip, operating as the "Izz al-Din al-Qassam" Brigade
Hazionot Hadatit- a joint party of three separate radical right-wing parties, all who define themselves as religious Zionists
IDF – the Israeli Defence Forces
IDI – The Israel Democracy Institute
INSS – The Institute for National Security Studies
Intifada – in Arabic "shaking off", the violent resistance of Palestinians against Israel
ISA – Israel Security Agency
ITIC –The Intelligence and Terrorism Information Centre, Israel
Kahana Chai – An outlawed radical right-wing movement
Knesset – The Israeli Parliament
Lahava – in Hebrew "Lemeniat Hiotbolelut Beeretz Hakodesh" or "The prevention of assimilation of non-Jews in the Holy Land"
Noam – An extreme right-wing political party
Noar Ha'Gvaot – "Youth of the Hills" - radical settlers of outposts in the West Bank
Otzma Yehudit – An extreme right-wing political party
Outposts – Illegal Israeli settlements in isolated locations in the West Bank
PIJ –The Palestinian Islamic Jihad movement, operated by "the Jerusalem Battalions"
Return Marches- Mass protests alongside the Gaza Strip border that have taken place since 2018
Settlements – Communities established by Israelis in disputed areas within the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
Tag Mechir – In Hebrew "price tag" and referring to acts of violence including vandalism and/or physical harm against Palestinians
The Israeli Tribes – a phrase used by Israeli President Reuven Rivlin in 2015, explaining how Israeli society is divided into four sectors (tribes in its Biblical interpretation): secular, national-religious, Arab, and Ultra-Orthodox. All differ from each other in their belief systems and are growing in different ways that will shape any future Israeli society in a joint process
The Knife Intifada – the third intifada, circa 2015
Tzuk Eitan – Protective Edge, a military operation carried out in 2014, by the IDF, along the Gaza Strip
West Bank – Disputed territory including Palestinian cities and Israeli settlements, also referred to as Judea and Samaria by Israeli settlers.
Zionism – A Jewish national ideology, embodied by the establishment of the Israel as a Jewish state, based on the word "Zion" (Jerusalem)

About the Project

D.Rad is a comparative study of radicalisation and polarisation in Europe and beyond. It aims to identify the actors, networks, and wider social contexts driving radicalisation, particularly among young people in urban and peri-urban areas. D.Rad conceptualises this through the I-GAP spectrum (injustice-grievance-alienation-polarisation) with the goal of moving towards measurable evaluations of de-radicalisation programmes. Our intention is to identify the building blocks of radicalisation, which include a sense of being victimised; a sense of being thwarted or lacking agency in established legal and political structures; and coming under the influence of "us vs them" identity formulations.

D.Rad benefits from an exceptional breadth of backgrounds. The project spans national contexts including the UK, France, Italy, Germany, Poland, Hungary, Finland, Slovenia, Bosnia, Serbia, Kosovo, Israel, Iraq, Jordan, Turkey, Georgia, Austria, and several minority nationalisms. It bridges academic disciplines ranging from political science and cultural studies to social psychology and artificial intelligence. Dissemination methods include D.Rad labs, D.Rad hubs, policy papers, academic workshops, visual outputs and digital galleries. As such, D.Rad establishes a rigorous foundation to test practical interventions geared to prevention, inclusion and de-radicalisation.

With the possibility of capturing the trajectories of seventeen nations and several minority nations, the project will provide a unique evidence base for the comparative analysis of law and policy as nation states adapt to new security challenges. The process of mapping these varieties and their link to national contexts will be crucial in uncovering strengths and weaknesses in existing interventions. Furthermore, D.Rad accounts for the problem that processes of radicalisation often occur in circumstances that escape the control and scrutiny of traditional national frameworks of justice. The participation of AI professionals in modelling, analysing and devising solutions to online radicalisation will be central to the project's aims.

Executive summary

The aim of national reports is to give a conceptual account of how existing policies and laws address radicalisation, so as to pinpoint their most crucial aspects and best practices, finally developing evidence-based policy and legal guidelines within a state framework.

This report offers a descriptive, explanatory, assessment and policy-oriented analysis. Its findings are drawn from primary sources such as interviews, as well as secondary sources, including official statistics, state reports, academic research, publicly available data and legal materials. For the purpose of locating connections and gaps between legislation, policy and institutional framework we will look at central rules and practices, relevant to issues of ethno-nationalist and religious-based terrorism.

Through this, we will be better able to understand the state's preventive, punitive and integrational approaches toward de-radicalisation.

After discussing the current political culture and presenting the historic context of terrorism threats in Israel, the report will take a closer look at countries' legal organisations and main guiding principles vis a vis the handling of terrorism. In doing so, it will focus on three main themes: ethnicity, religion and nationality, since all three have a major impact on state approaches to radicalisation occurrences.

Additionally, the report will illustrate legislative frameworks including laws and regulations, implemented by state policies that include preventive, punitive and integrative approaches. The relevant institutions work through these state policies that are designed and affected by themes of ethnicity, religion and nationality. In doing this, the paper will present two central case studies, showing both the gaps and potential opportunities in law and policy implementation. Hopefully, the paper will also shed light on how the Israeli state's defence policy is structured and how human rights can be protected within a framework of national security.

1. Introduction

The years prior to Israel's official establishment in 1948 involve certain fundamental historic events, all underpinning its existence today as a national Jewish state. Pre-1948, the struggle of Jews was highlighted in the idea of 'Zionism' - the notion that Jews from across the world (the Jewish diaspora) could be 'gathered in', returning to 'Zion' (Jerusalem) after 2000 years of exile. The War of Independence in 1948 against its Arab neighbour-states, who refused to accept UN recognition of the Jewish state, as well as subsequent wars in the years that followed, only served to increase the tension between Arab and/or Palestinians and Jews, and emphasised other difficulties between the Jewish majority and the Arab minority.

This is the basis for Israeli society's fragile construction in current times, in which "nationalism, religion and ethnicity are the central fault lines in Israeli society, each division with a life of its own, translated into demands, struggles and identities" (Ben Porat and Yuval, 2020, p. 12). Beside protecting its international borders with Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon and Syria, Israel's central conflict involves a deep ethno-religious territorial disagreement that keeps both Israeli and Palestinian populations in a constant war.

Therefore, deradicalization processes have to tread a fine line between maintaining pluralism and equality on the one hand, whilst protecting citizens' safety on the other. Even though it has been customary to assume that the majority of violence in Israel and the territories derives from the national conflict, the goal of this report is to examine additional factors and to provide a wider discourse on Israel's democratic government, led by liberal values. This report will therefore look at Israeli democracy's legislation, policy and institutional initiatives over the past two decades, in terms of how they have dealt with terrorism

The first chapter opens with an introduction. The second chapter, will offer a brief review of the socio-economic, political and cultural context, trying to pinpoint the historical roots of injustice, grievance, alienation and polarisation amongst citizens. Through this, it will look at terrorism and political violence, ethnic and religious tensions, and the gaps between the periphery/centre according to the division of national territory and resources. In addition, this chapter will offer observations on the three central themes that direct policy and legislation today: ethnicity, nationality and religion, all influenced by the radicalisation processes in Israeli society in the last two decades.

The third chapter will present the logic behind the state's legal organization. This part will present the Declaration of Independence as its profound binding legal document, due to the fact that Israel does not yet have a permanent constitution. This part of the report will reveal the mechanisms of Israeli democracy, and provide an explanatory analysis of the relevant principles regarding radicalisation and deradicalization issues, with special attention paid to laws involving youths and counter-terrorism measurements.

The fourth chapter reviews Israeli basic laws   that relate to the protection of human rights in the context of national security. It lays down the two ends of the paradigm used by legislators when it comes to handling radicalisation. The first prioritises state security, and how it characterises Israel as a militaristic society. The second end involves its democratic regime and Israel's obligation to universal human rights, derived from the state's own bitter collective memory. In this chapter, we will pinpoint central laws that show the significant place given to ethnicity, nationality and religion within the framework of Israeli legislation.

Chapter five presents the main policies and institutions targeting deradicalisation by the use of preventive, punitive and integrative approaches. This part will offer a review of the national policy framework, and critical analysis of primary, secondary prevention, and tertiary prevention policies. Section 5 will handle issues of civil rights and freedoms such as religious liberties, freedom of speech, on self-determination and sub-national identities, by pointing out central policy changes within the past two decades regarding deradicalization, followed by main institutions that have been established as a result of handling terrorism. This part of the report reveals that in Israel, policy is bound to national security needs in most cases, and so the central institutions operate in tandem with this approach.

The sixth chapter will offer a closer look at two in-depth case studies, based on regional and local counter-radicalization measures through prevention and integration. Both case-studies will explore t the processes inside Israeli society, connecting legal, policy and institutional frameworks and public discourse.

The final chapter will briefly summarise the findings of the report, highlighting the critical interactions between legal organization, policy and institutions and its practice in the past two decades. It will discuss whether deradicalisation is linked to national tensions, and argue that until the central question of Israeli Palestinian conflict is resolved, Israel will be unable to integrate Arab communities into modern society. Without dealing with the question of Palestinian identity, Israel might eventually find itself more divided since, alongside its national conflict, it has substantial domestic 'cracks' which may deepen and intensify national disputes. The two main threats Israel faces - Jewish and Palestinian terrorism – discussed in parallel, showing inconsistencies in the way the state is treating radicalization, alongside the great influence civic society and the judicial system has on subjects related to human rights and civic equality.

2.   Socio-economic, political and cultural context

Ethnicity played a significant role in the way Israeli culture came to be seen in the state's early years. "The General Zionist Council" who led the fight for Jewish independence, as a response to antisemitism, was established by European Jewish immigrants who later became the founding fathers of the state (the majority of Jews who immigrated from other places then Europe arrived after 1948). The first Prime Minister, David Ben Gurion, argued in favour of the idea of a "melting pot" (Kibbutz Galuyot) of over 70 different nationalities, by defining a new kind of Israeli - the "Tzabar" or "Sabra".[1]

He argued that immigrants needed to adopt a new identity and speak Hebrew as their first language, leaving their traditional customs behind, specifically Jews who came from Muslim countries e.g., Libya, Morocco, Tunisia etc., who spoke Arabic. However, since early Israel was governed by a left-wing party called Mapei, led by Eastern European Jews, this resulted in huge gaps developing in the country. Central parts of Israel developed quickly, whilst peripheral areas in the north and south tended to be left behind (Kimerling, 2004). Immigrants who came predominantly from Arab countries were often sent to these peripheral areas and this only widened the socio-economic gap between Eastern European and 'Arab' Jews. It is important to understand that class differences in Israel are often defined in the above ethnic terms (Shwartz, 2014).

Even after Mapei was voted out of power and replaced by the right-wing Likud party – led by Menachem Begin in 1977 – and Likud started addressing these differences, discrimination

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[1]Secular, Ashkenazi (originated in Europe), Jewish, socialist.

raised its head again when immigrants from Russia and Ethiopia began arriving, in the early 1990's. They contended that they were suffering from unfair treatment when it came to the allocation of public services. Even though the beginning of the 21st century marked a shift towards a more multicultural paradigm, these gaps still exist today. Good examples would be the struggle of the Ethiopian community who have been subject to against police brutality and institutional racism in the past few years (Ben Porat and Yuval, 2020) and Soviet Union immigrants who fought for years against religious coercion after being asked by rabbis to show evidence that they were truly Jewish and suffered from ethnic social discrimination (Shumsky, 2014). Nevertheless, none of this discrimination prevented Israel from remaining a militaristic society, in which serving in the army is compulsory for all citizens (Levy, 2011). The definition of Israeli identity is complex and sharpened by the influence the military have in the political sphere, e.g., most of Israel's past Prime Ministers had impeccable army credentials, showing how success in the military paves the way for future career success. It also persuades the majority of civilians, to support and join the IDF position and defines this as the "normative" path for citizens.

Religious practice is also still a fundamental issue in Israel society, showing many tensions between secular and ultra-orthodox citizens, who have dramatically differing views on the relationship between religion and state. Ben Gurion's vision of a 'Melting Pot' actually led to him making a political compromise, allowing the exemption of ultra-orthodox Jews from conscription. Today, that exemption still exists and has led to great resentment by other sectors of society who feel they have to carry the weight of military service on their shoulders. Moreover, as well as being exempt from Army service, many ultra-orthodox receive state welfare benefits, have built their own educational system and live within their own communities.

Whilst separated from much of mainstream Israeli society, they still maintain a certain political hold, which can be seen in the civic sphere. Public transport is not allowed in Israel on the Jewish sabbath, even though most Israelis are in favour of it operating, and civil marriage does not exist in Israeli society. These are two good examples of the ongoing discussion /argument as to what place religion has in a modern society, particularly when this society consists of citizens from a variety of religious backgrounds.

Religion Is also used by extremists who support violent actions linked to territorial disagreements, both by Palestinians and Jews. The settlements in the West Bank, which began in the 1970's after a change of political leadership and the Peace Agreement with Sadat/Egypt in 1978, led to a new ideological movement, represented by religious-Zionists who argued that Israel needed to maintain its hold on all occupied territories. Here it is important to mention the central political debate on territory in Israel, the general consensus being that the left wing supports 'land for peace' and the right wing opposes any territorial compromise.

By the 1990's, the settlers in the West Bank (which they named Judea and Samaria)) had evolved into a movement which independently decided to build more homes on disputed land, as their solution to repeated Palestinian terror attacks. At the same time, Prime Minister Yitzchak Rabin was instrumental in the signing of accords, both with Arab countries and the Palestinians, and this led to violent resistance among right-wing supporters. The signing of a regional peace agreement with Jordan in 1993 seemed, at the time, the largest attempt of its kind to solve the national Israeli–Palestinian dispute, but it actually resulted in the worst possible outcome—the assassination of Rabin in 1995 (Kariv, 2015).

Part of Rabin's suggestion, as part of the Oslo peace talks, was for Israel to withdraw from the Occupied Territories, despite settler resistance. The result was his murder. This, in turn, led to a deeper a political and social rupture between Israelis and Palestinians and also had an effect on "sub-tribes" of the Israeli population (Rubinstein, 2017). In the 26 years that have

passed, Israeli society has not become any closer to resolving issues such as security borders and mutual agreements on the definition of Palestinian and/or Arab territory. The religious aspect of the national conflict is also expressed in ownership of holy places related to Judaism and Islam, such as Jerusalem and its religious sites. Places like the Al-Aqsa Mosque, which shares mutual territory with the Western Wall and the Temple Mount has the power to ignite radicalisation, which has proved to be more violent and dangerous in the past two decades.

In September 2000, Ariel Sharon, the then head of the Likud right-wing opposition party, visited the Temple Mount, against the wishes of the Palestinians. With this act began the Second Intifada (also known as the 'Al Aqsa Intifada'). Jihadist Palestinian terror attacks occurred all across Israel, followed by IDF military operations in the West Bank. Over 450 Israelis died from the violence during 2002. The government, now headed by Sharon, then approved an extensive military operation in 2001 named "Protective Shield" within Palestinian cities in the West Bank (IDF, 2002). The rise of retaliatory actions by Jews against Palestinians and vice versa had begun. In 2013 ISA (the Israel Security Association) identified 25 Jewish terror attacks, as opposed to 16 in the year before, and the acts themselves were more vicious (ISA, 2015b). There were fewer "Tag Mechir" actions ('Price Tag'- revenge through vandalism and physical violence against Arabs/Palestinians/Muslims) carried out in 2014 (10 as opposed to 17 in the prior year), but again the methods were more brutal than before.

Some Israelis in the political elite refused to define them as Jewish terror acts, arguing that Jews were not capable of carrying out acts of terror. Some of these individuals were either members of the Israeli Parliament or important rabbis. Until 2014, Jewish terrorism was officially acknowledged by President Reuven Rivlin and other public figures from all sides of the political map, expressing concern over many cases of "Tag Mechir". These attacks were affiliated to several far right-wing extremists' groups and individuals.

Between 2008–2014, Israel underwent three rounds of widespread military actions, in response to missile attacks from the Gaza Strip. However, these operations had little effect, as a new type of Jihadist terror had arrived. During 2015–2016 over 250 knife attacks occurred within a period of six months, injuring and killing dozens of Israelis (Ben David, 2016). Most of the perpetuators of these attacks were from East Jerusalem (which is occupied by Israel), and whilst the attacks were committed by individuals, they were clearly linked to jihadist ideology based on family relations or financial/ ideological ties to terror organizations such as Hamas or PIJ (Bartal and Frish, 2017). Israel did manage to contain the events (Ben David 2016), but acknowledged that this was a new kind of terrorism, similar to ISIS attacks occurring at the same time in Europe (Levy, 2017). In 2018, the Israeli government named the phenomena 'lone wolf' in order to try and establish new counter-terrorism security strategies (Ministry of Internal Affairs, 2018).

All three elements of nationalism, religion and ethnicity issues make up the ideology and norms practised by Israeli political parties and the military elite. The right-wing supports the settlements at its core, while the left encourages human rights first and generally wishes to hand back territories. But the test of time has shown that all Israeli governments share the same belief - that there needs to be an eventual compromise. Unfortunately, the very definition of a Jewish state brings together elements of culture, religion and nationality (Shwartz, 2017; Hellinger, 2019), presenting many difficulties for non-Jewish citizens. The Arab speaking communities that live in Israel (Bedouins, Druze, Muslims, Christian-Arab) are left in a problematic position of being part of the ethno-religious Jewish state under its rules and particular customs on one hand, and identifying with the Arab world culture, or the political struggle of the Palestinians on the other.

Israeli-Arab citizens are also divided according to specific living areas according to an ethno-religious cultural basis. Bedouins have their own municipalities both within the north and the south of the country, and the Druze usually live in northern areas. In other cities and villages

spread out across Israel. similar gaps between the periphery and center applying - with the periphery suffering from lack of resources in education, health and security. The majority of the population there practices Islam, and need to make a compromise between ethno-religious centrism led by Islam and the Sharia law, and their civic status within a democracy who holds liberal values.

There is a tendency among scholars to identify most of Arab society as "Palestinian" but that does not necessarily reflect the position of all Israeli-Arab citizens, for example those who serve in the military. This tension is exacerbated within the Israeli legal framework, since legislation and policy are oriented towards Israel as a military power, as well as a democracy with liberal values. A military approach has to balance the emphasis between power/warfare, and liberal civic values of equality and non-violence. One of the military's primary tasks is maintaining control and preventing national conflict from radicalizing within domestic and international borders. If they fail, the cost can be seen in loss of human life, as well as fewer resources and civic rights for Arab citizens, who identify with the Palestinian struggle, as opposed to others who join the IDF, such as the Druze, Christians and Bedouins therefore defining themselves as more 'Israeli' than Palestinians.

Israel has a population of 9 million citizens, and almost 2 million Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. They are under the jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority, divided between the leadership of Fatah and Hamas and are not subject to Israeli laws. The Israeli state is made up of 255 municipalities, including 77 cities, 124 local councils and 54 regional councils (Central Bureau of Statistic, 2019). Out of these, 79 are Arab localities (containing 14% out of total population) and live in 3.4% of Israeli territory. 1,194,300 million citizens therefore live in crowded conditions (Shani, 2021). Most of the big cities include a heterogeneous population from different ethnic backgrounds, while other municipalities are divided between Arab and Jewish majorities. Different communities also have different practices. For example, in the city of Rahat, populated by Bedouins, the dominant language is Arabic, cultural facilities are more Islamic and tribal, as opposed to the nearby city of Beer Sheva, a mixed city with a Jewish majority. The same is true of ultra-orthodox municipalities such as Bnei Brak, Modi'in Illit, that base their communities' activities on religious and cultural needs. The same is true of religious Zionists in the settlements (Yitzhar, Hebron or Alon Moreh) and even secular kibbutzim for that matter, who essentially set their own rules.

3. The constitutional organisation of Israel and constitutional principles in the field of (de-)Radicalisation

The State of Israel is at the centre of a worldwide controversy due to defining itself as a "dual" state: both democratic and Jewish. As a state, Israel is a young country, established and recognised formally in 1947 by UN as the home of the Jewish people, who were scattered across the globe after the Holocaust and World War II. The Zionist Council operated from western states and from within British Mandate in Palestine, adopting pluralistic practices (free voting between different political groups, freedom of speech, the right to an opinion) in its decision-making processes even before translating those into political state power and establishing itself as a modern democracy (Horowitz and Lisak, 1986).

On 14th May 1948 the Provisional Government of Israel laid down the basis for the future development of the new state and its democratic institutions, by declaring the Israeli state's basic values as manifested by its biblical prophets: freedom, justice and peace, with a commitment to the UN. "The Declaration of Independence" ("The Declaration") was the cornerstone for the creation of legislation and policy-making within Israel. The first prime

minister David Ben Gurion, hoped that over time, Israel would adopt a permanent constitution in the spirit of the declaration (section 12)[2], but it has not occurred yet.

Section 13 of the Declaration, helps in sharpening the dual perception of a Jewish democracy, its basis being an ethno-centred state (Yiftachel, Roohana and Ganhem, 2000)[3] and by that, prioritising its Jewish majority. Simultaneously, it promotes pluralistic values of secularism, religious freedom, self-determination and tolerance toward minority national identities (non-Jewish). Israel's self-perception is as a democracy with pluralistic values, and yet there is no mention of the word "democracy" in the Declaration itself. Even whilst it talks of basic values that define its institutions and policies, led by basic human rights, there is still an emphasis on Jewish dominance.[4]

The Declaration emphasises the obligation for universal human rights according to UN principles (sections 9, 13) but also points out the importance of religious and cultural values of the Jewish Bible within the Israeli state framework (sections 1, 11). It is used as a binding legal document presenting ethnic and socio-political borders in parallel to territorial ones: a Jewish state and the home of the Jewish people worldwide, that is ruled by a Jewish majority (section 11). It should be said, however, that the provisional government also made an offer to the Arab minority who live inside Israeli territory, promising them equality in citizenship and political representation (Section 16).[5]

The declaration also boasts a commitment to equality between religions, but since its establishment- the state has not made any real decision regarding the separation of religion and state. According to the Israeli Institute of Democracy (IDI), the existing arrangement has been preserved since the Ottoman era, and throughout the British Mandate period, and classifies citizens according to their membership in religious communities. It also grants religious autonomy to each community in defined areas, especially in matters of personal affairs. Decisions on questions of divorce and marriage are left in the hands of the religious communities and their courts. The Orthodox rabbinical establishment has decisive power on questions regarding Jewish religious customs and the Israeli Population Registry, supposedly a civic institution, also uses religious classifications in addition to the nationality ones (IDI, 2000). A good example of this is how Israeli Rabbinical courts have complete jurisdiction over marriage and divorce, granted to them by the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Religion (Administration of Rabbinical Courts, 2018), from the power of "The Chief Rabbinate of Israel

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[2] […] a constitution which shall be adopted by the Elected Constituent Assembly not later than the 1st October 1948, the People's Council shall act as a Provisional Council of State, and its executive organ, the People's Administration, shall be the Provisional Government of the Jewish State, to be called "Israel", (The declaration of Independence, 1948).

[3] There is an ongoing debate over Israel characterization as ethno-democracy, or ethnocracy by political science scholars, due to the national conflict and the prioritization of the security needs over others

[4] "THE STATE OF ISRAEL will be open for Jewish immigration and for the Ingathering of the Exiles; it will foster the development of the country for the benefit of all its inhabitants; it will be based on freedom, justice and peace as envisaged by the prophets of Israel; it will ensure complete equality of social and political rights to all its inhabitants irrespective of religion, race or sex; it will guarantee freedom of religion, conscience, language, education and culture; it will safeguard the Holy Places of all religions; and it will be faithful to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations." (The Declaration of Independence, 1948, section 13)

[5] "WE APPEAL - in the very midst of the onslaught launched against us now for months - to the Arab inhabitants of the State of Israel to preserve peace and participate in the upbuilding of the State on the basis of full and equal citizenship and due representation in all its provisional and permanent institutions. " (The declaration of Independence, 1948)

Law, 1980". At the same time. civil and state courts are under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice.

Today, Israel has yet to establish a permanent constitution (Mautner, 2019), but relies on certain laws ("Basic Laws") passed in the spirit of the Declaration of Independence. Basic Laws have a constitutional status and, to date, Israel has 13 current Basic Laws (the Knesset, 2021) regarding state institutions, human and civil rights and territorial boundaries. Each Basic Law contains dozens of sub-laws and hundreds of rules (regular laws) (Knesset Lexicon, 2021) on relevant issues (Rubinstein, 2005), that are open to changes, and can be cancelled or modified according to socio-political changes. Basic laws are permanent and cannot be dissolved or rejected, since they are expected to be part of the building of a future constitution. Such legislation lends itself to new change within constitutional-oriented laws, in the spirits of public acceptance, but also leaves basic law fragile and vulnerable to radicalisation.

Israeli state power is divided between three main state authorities: the government (legislation and implementation), Parliament (legislation and constitution), and the Judiciary (law, rulings and constitutional). The separation between the three is vital for democracy's survival, since they can act independently, but also affect and supervise each other, providing the necessary 'checks and balances'. The Basic Laws are legislated by the Israeli Parliament (the Knesset). This is made up of 120 members, representing a variety of parties with different ideologies, reflecting a number of communities within Israeli society. Some rules often express the specific needs of a certain group, regardless of other communities. On the one hand, this shows great pluralism, since there are parties that do not necessarily agree with the Declaration as a whole (Palestinian-oriented Arab parties), and some which see only parts of the Declaration as relevant (ultra-orthodox parties) (Braun, 2012).

The separation between the government and the Knesset authorities balances each other, but also decentralises power (Rubenstein, 2005) e.g., the government can initiate laws and change sub-laws, but eventually it has to obtain a majority vote in Parliament. It allows both institutions to be involved in legislation and supervise each other, but at the same time this creates deep political struggles that delay the forming of a constitution. Another crucial perspective point is that both institutional state branches are compelled to take into consideration and be open to criticism from the judicial system that can rule against certain laws, if they contradict the Declaration.

The cultural component within Israeli democracy is strengthened by the connection made within the Declaration, stating its values cannot contradict Jewish Biblical law and must reflect its essence. [6] The most vivid illustration of this can be found within the construction of judicial authority. Israel's judicial rulings present a compromise between a religious basis of Hebrew law and British common law within a democratic framework. The Declaration of Independence is the infrastructure for legislation, but also reflects the liberal spirit of the judicial system, in accordance with the British legal tradition at the turn of the 20th century (Mautner, 2019).

Accordingly, Israel's progress in the field of liberal values and human rights is expressed by the judicial system's rulings. These reflect the level of acceptance/rejection of liberal values by the state. The judicial system's liberal approach has also had an effect on liberal political

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[6] Article 1 creates a direct link between the two: "ERETZ-ISRAEL [(Hebrew) - the Land of Israel] was the birthplace of the Jewish people. Here their spiritual, religious and political identity was shaped. Here they first attained to statehood, created cultural values of national and universal significance and gave to the world the eternal Book of Books (The Old Testament)."

culture, since it was first constructed during the British Mandate. The Supreme Court was an agent of the Zionist state, inserting liberal values to Israeli society, while maintaining a relation to biblical Jewish values (Hok Ivri, meaning "Hebrew Law"). At times it contradicted the agenda of the political elite, particularly David Ben Gurion, who held a more socialist-republican perspective of preserving the collective rights of the Jewish community. Ben Gurion was concerned about the overpowering of the judiciary by the government that he delayed enacting a permanent constitution. During the 1960's and 1970's the judiciary, through the Supreme Court, carried out a constitutional revolution, despite the Mapei party's attempt to preserve its hegemony, since it progressed liberal verdicts (Mautner, 2019). The following years were characterized by a significant change in the definition of the Supreme Court's position, from a state institution to a political oriented arbitrator, taking a clear stand in the liberal tradition, led by "judicial activism". This meant the Court was actively progressing secular values, human rights, individualism and moral issues, with the goal of maintaining a liberal spirit within legislation, and some say it still is.

The commitment of the Israeli state to the UN's human rights basic principles, expressed within the Declaration, has also affected its approach to warfare and socio-political decisions over the years. As the Ministry of Justice commented, "The State of Israel is a party to the seven main conventions in the field of human rights" (Office of Legal Counsel and Legislative Affairs, 2021): amongst them, is The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) (also referred to as "Israel Convention") entered into in 1992, including the right to life, the prohibition of discrimination, freedom of thought and conscience and more (United Nations Human Rights, 1966).

Another two vital covenants are the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination (CERD), entered into by Israel on 2nd February 1979 (UNHRC, 1965), and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), entered into by Israel in 1991. Another extremely important one is the International Convention against Torture and Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), also coming into power at the same year (UNHRC, 1984).

When it comes to children and young adults, Israel has signed the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict (CRC-OP-AC), that came into force in 2005 (UNHRC, 2000). Another important obligation of Israel in the field of human rights when it adopting UN's Universal Periodic Review program (UPR) in 2008 (Office of Legal Counsel and Legislative Affairs, 2012), allowing other member states to universally review others and, by that strengthening, promoting and protecting human rights worldwide (UNHRC, 2021).

With that said, Israel has also signed the Geneva Conventions but restricted its commitments only to the territory that is officially recognised as "Israel". This means that international agreements, and Israeli law itself, do not apply in the West Bank and the Gaza strip since they lay outside the country's sovereign territory. Beyond the Green Line, territory is guarded by the military around the borders, and procedurally controlled by the Palestinian authority and Hamas. The IDF has an obligation to protect human rights (Kasher and Yadlin, 2006) but only within the context of warfare. It sees the national conflict as leaving Israel in a perpetual state of emergency and subject to immediate threat, and operates against all threats against terrorism that penetrate Israel.

4. The Legislative framework in the field of (de-) Radicalisation

The basic laws and sub-laws are assembled in the spirit of the Declaration, and encourage, for the most part, the values it presents. But they also define quite accurately its central problem with handling radicalisation while balancing two main goals, as a society dealing with terrorism: keeping citizens safe on the one hand, and guarding human and civil rights on the other (Kremnitzer, 2017, p. 11). It lays down the two ends of the paradigm used by legislators when it comes to handling radicalisation. The first prioritises state security, within the boundaries of a military society (Levy, 2007) since the majority of its citizens carry out compulsory service in the IDF (Security Service Law [combined version], 1986) derived from "Basic Law: the Military -1976" (The Knesset, 2021). The second involves its democratic framework and Israel's obligation to universal human rights, which is inextricably bound up with its own bitter collective memory of diaspora life, immigration, the Holocaust and antisemitism. In this section, we will pinpoint central laws that show the significance of ethnicity, nationality and religion within the framework of Israeli legislation.

Liberal rights are enhanced within a constitutional framework, and rest upon two major Basic Laws which, in turn, the judicial system relies on. (Sommer et al, 2005, p. 8). The first one is "Basic Law: Human Dignity and liberty - 1992", which aims to "protect human dignity and liberty, in order to enshrine in the Basic Law, the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state (clause 1.a)" (The Knesset, 2021). It includes the prohibition of harming a human's body or dignity (clause 2), protection of property (clause 3), protection of life, body and dignity (clause 4), and the right to personal freedom e.g., "no one is allowed to take or limit a person's freedom in detention in extradition or otherwise" (clause 5).

Another central principle is the right to privacy of the individual (clauses 7a-d), including prohibition of searches of an individual's body and/or belongings. The law has a provision by which it is protected from change by virtue of emergency regulations, but in exceptional cases and under restrictive conditions (Ibid). it is limited to the needs of national security but by no other laws in Israel (clause 9). In this regard there is an ongoing debate regarding the lack of a specific law against the use of torture, but drawing on sub-laws and regulations of human rights instead. The Israel judicial system prohibits the use of inquiry methods which offend an prisoner's physical and mental health (Kremnitzer and Shany, 2018, p. 2). Israel has also joined the UN's "Convention against Torture and Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment" in 1986 and began implementing it legally in 1991 (The Association for Civil Rights in Israel, 2000).

The second central law is "Basic Law: Freedom of Profession - 1994", and establishes citizens' and residents' right "[…] to engage in any occupation, profession or job." (Clause 3) (The Knesset, 2021). This law assists in preventing cases of discrimination in the workplace, but also allow citizens to work without ethno-religious limitations, in the spirit of the Declaration of Independence (clause 1). Something that is hotly debated in this regard is the question of freedom of speech. There is a persistent public and legal debate about the subject within the Supreme Court, suggesting two main views that contradict one another. One claims that freedom of speech is accumulated within the interpretation of the law, and the other disagrees, arguing that it is not a part of it (Somer et al. 2005, p. 9). This is possible because, as Supreme Court Judge Dalia Dorner stated, there is no law or basic law that protects the freedom of speech. Accordingly, it seems like the court is the only body that can do so (IDI, 2009). It allows

Judges to widen their interpretation and by that influencing reality on a practical level. e.g. the recent Supreme Court's decision to overturn the Ministry of Education's decision to deprive the state's Lifetime Achievement Reward to a scholar that expressed left-wing views (Shapira, Almog and Coujahinof, 2021).

"Basic Law: Israel - the state of the Jewish Nation - 2003" (the Citizenship Law), has been used within a framework of preventive actions taken by the government, due to terror attacks committed by Palestinians living in Israel at the time of the Second Intifada. It was passed as a Temporary Order and extended 17 times until recently (Hauzer tov, 2021). The law stated that Israel had decided to not allow family reunions between Palestinians and Israeli-Arab citizens, arguing that past terror attacks had been committed by individuals who arrived in Israel through marriage. The purpose of the Order was to restrict freedom of movement in order to prevent terror attacks. (Margalit, 2021). As a result, the policy was adopted by the Ministry of the Interior preventing families from being reunited in the last 19 years.

As the NGO "Adallah" explained, repeatedly submitting petitions to the Supreme Court: "The law prevents any new application by citizens for status to their spouses who are residents of the West Bank or Gaza Strip, and prevents any status in Israel from being granted to anyone who did not apply until May 2002. […] The new law is unconstitutional and contrary to the provisions of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. The law violates the constitutional right to equality between the citizens of the State of Israel." (Adallah, 2003). As a result, in many cases, those who live in Israel remain without any civic status, and husbands and wives cannot be reunited since they are automatically associated with Palestinian terrorism, therefore being prevented from receiving basic state health and social rights.

This gap between human rights and counter-terrorism policy, is being filled by NGO's and the judicial system that is considered more human rights oriented (Abu, 2021).[7] The main problem with this policy, they argue, is that families of Israeli-Arab citizens are considered an automatic danger to national security simply by their national identification (Margalit, 2021). In a way, there is a reliance on the power of NGO's and so on their legal activity which has great impact on Israeli policy, but the place given to NGOs within the ministries is very much depended on the views of the elected government and its desire to progress non-biased policies that serves basic civic and human rights.

In 2016 the Ministry of the Interior decided to grant legal status to approximately 1600 family reunion requests out of 30,000, and showed willingness to discuss cases of humanitarian reasoning, even though it contradicted the Citizenship Law. Date from 2020 shows that only 13,000 Palestinians were granted residence permits in Israel (Margalit, 2021). The Supreme Court approved the constitutionality of the law by a narrow majority, twice, both in 2006 and 2012 (Margalit, 2021). With that, it showed that security in Israel is prioritised over civic rights. Recently, the law failed to pass in the Knesset, after some argued that the law's intention is to keep a Jewish majority in the state.

Recently, the provision failed to pass the Knesset after the establishment of a new government, but it is still considered essential in the political discourse (Hauser-Tov, 2021). This law links citizenship and terrorism, but raises a crucial debate as to whether it is still relevant to treat every family reunion as life-threatening. The explanation for the bill states that

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[7] Abu Rachel (Alias), Interview with the author, Beer Sheva, August 2, 2021.

it is intended to prevent a situation where a person taking advantage of rights like freedom of movement, may carry out or assist terror attacks (Margalit, 2021).

There are significant implications for these such gaps, especially when it comes to one of the weakest sectors in all society - Palestinian women. NGOs fill this vacuum by assisting individuals who suffer as a result of this law. One NGO represents minority group women with legal difficulties regarding their civic status, therefore deprived of the support that would be given to them by the state (welfare, health, education etc.). The most problematic situations that can be seen are with Palestinian women who married Israeli-Arab citizens but do not have a statutory class. For example, a woman who married a Bedouin citizen who re-married shortly afterwards, left her to be considered as a second wife (Abu, 2021). Due to her illness, the woman who was left to treat their children alone on her own, suffered from a life-threatening disease but was denied treatment since she did not have an Israeli identification card. She was treated as having a "lack of status". Cases similar to this are treated mostly by civil rights activists who see people who do not have a legal status, so use the judicial system to represent them before state institutions. The cooperation of a few NGOs, each in their specialty, truly affects human rights in places where the state does not offer legal solutions by law.

What assists to raise critical issues both for the political leadership and public awareness is "Basic law: The State Comptroller -1958". This stipulates that the State Comptroller must investigate complaints from the public about bodies and persons, and is authorized to do so within state institutions (section 9), and also serve as an Ombudsman (State Comptroller, 2021). By publishing yearly reports, it reveals (at the very least) wrongdoings by state institutions and possible offences made by laws: "[..] the State Comptroller's criticism of the actions of the governing authorities directs the Public Complaints Commission to clarify individual complaints on the same issues as well as in deciding their case" (State Comptroller, 2021). To illustrate the importance of this e.g., the issue of public transportation infrastructure in Israel, the State Comptroller investigated incompatibilities between the state's budget and legislation and its implementation during 2017-2019. They found several differences between Arab and Jewish communities' budgets., especially in peripheral areas. This indicated wrongdoing by the government and its proxies (State Comptroller Transportation report, 2019, pp. 247-255).

"The Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance" (1948), was one of the first central orders used in Israel and is still used today as the foundation of the state's defensive and preventive actions against terrorism. Article 2 specifies the definition of one's affiliation to terror activities (Article 2). The ordinance was modified, after the government passed legislation entitled "The Anti-Terrorism Law, 2016". One of its most important claims, is the following: "[…] the State of Israel's commitment to the fight against terrorism in the spirit of international conventions." (Article A (1-2)). This order allows security mechanisms to work 'uninterrupted' when acting against terror-oriented actions, but within the confines of the state's obligations to human rights. In practice, however, Israel does not hold itself to those commitments outside its territory, as mentioned. Some civil right parties claim that the law itself holds a very blurry definition that might harm human right organizations, operating within the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and also motivated by political reasoning then security necessity (Bender, 2016). But it is important to mention that in recent years, the ordinance was updated, and now it allows doubling the punishment against terror perpetrators with racist motives (Shafir, 2021). Additionally, financial policy was also updated regarding terror organizations in banks and

national institutions, legislated by the Bank of Israel, who now has regulations preventing money transfers based upon "the Law of Prohibition on Money Laundering - 2000" (Bank of Israel, 2021).

Another important correction was made within "Basic Law: The Knesset - 1958", implemented in 2002 (no. 35) and in 2017 (no. 46). This law has an important section dealing with the issue of "Prevention of Participation in Elections" (Book of Laws, 2017). Section 7a (A1-3) states that an individual or political party cannot run for Parliament, if they support one of the following criteria: 1. denial of the existence of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state; 2. incitement to racism; 3. support of an armed struggle, of an enemy state or of a terrorist organization, against the State of Israel. Even though the radical right-wing Kahane movement was outlawed by Israeli authorities in the 1980's (see WP3.2), there have been numerous incidents of racist ideology being voiced, and this has only made it more difficult to walk the line between freedom of speech and incitements that offend state security.

"The Penal Code, 1977" (including more than 500 clauses), is used mainly as a set of guidelines for punitive issues that deal with a number of subjects. For example, clause 13b.1 protects Jews - and the state itself - from holocaust denial. This is not just prohibited but is defined as a felony and subject to criminal punishment. The law was modified over the years in a way that was relevant to radicalisation-related topics. For example, chapter VIII of "Violation of the Rules of Regime and Society" refers to actions that are not allowed when it comes to radicalisation parameters. Here, the law's approach to the line between incitement and free speech, under "Legal criticism and propaganda", suggests that incitement should be interpreted as "An act, speech or publication shall not be regarded as rebellion".

Incitement also has a tendency of undermining government, denouncing its law and institutions and different sections of the population, and/or persuading citizens and residents to follow a similar path (Section 138). In fact, section 144 consists of four articles dealing with: Incitement to racism or violence (A1); Hate Offenses (A2); Associations and congregations (B) and public disorders (C), also including the limitations on forbidden assemblies (section 145, Clause 1-5). Thus, limitations on freedom of expression are also accumulated under the penal code, which later sets the punishment for any involvement of this sort. These regulations are central to the question of pluralism within Israeli society and, therefore, have to protect sensitive boundaries that stand between freedom of speech and incitement to hatred.

Usually if a youth is caught in the act of criminal violence, legislation limits the optional punishment according to government law "Youth Law - 1971", which regulates all matters dealing with the Judiciary, punishment and treatment issues. The law obligates state institutions to address the importance of teenagers' rights, meaning an underage criminal should always be sentenced in a special District Court for Minors. Report 64c (2014) of the State Comptroller, agreed with the main changes that were made by law in 2008, and specifically with clause 14, which is responsible for protecting minors' rights by honouring their place and taking into their account future rehabilitation and integration into society (State Comptroller annual report, 2014, p. 401-402).

Even though Israeli laws and their sub-sections are used as a foundation for court rulings, sometimes there is no clear legislation on sensitive matters such as religion and state, security and human rights. The Basic laws emphasise the right to self-determination, even though it is not written specifically. A good example is the 1995 "State vs. Mizrahi Bank", where the Judge used the law in a significant way and set an example for further rulings, and by that empowered the legal system over the legislator, who followed a liberal agenda (Mautner, 2019).

Another example is the ongoing dispute over the religious aspects of Judaism. This issue has been accompanying Jewish leadership from its early years, and as such, made an impact on the value of freedom from religion. Secular values have been progressed by the Israeli judicial and political elite, from the state's first days. Indeed, at the opening ceremony of the Supreme Court, in September 1948 the Judges avoided using any religious language, and publicly stated that they were representing a secular liberal agenda which needed to separate religion from state, as much as possible (Mautner, 2019).

Israel has a law that allows, as mentioned, freedom of religion, such as "The Law of the Preservation of Holy Places" (1967) aiming to protect holy places (Regulations for the Protection of Holy Places for Jews, 1981) (Knesset, 2021). By that, harming in places of faith is prohibited by government law and is strengthened by the judicial system (8182/18 supreme court, 15 July, 2019). But as far as a definitive position on prioritizing freedom from religious limitations upon secular communities, the law remains unclear. "Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty-1992", affords an individual the right o to practice a religion, but does not deal with aspects of freedom arising from religious-based restrictions (Somer et al., 2005, p. 9-11). Consequently, the law can be interpreted as such, but it is still ambiguous.

Another good example is the issue of businesses operating on Saturday (Sabbath- Jewish national- day of rest), an ongoing struggle, particularly between secular citizens and municipalities like Tel Aviv, on the one hand, and the government and ultra-orthodox municipalities on the other. An excellent case in point is the question of whether public transport should be allowed to operate on the sabbath. Religious political parties are strongly opposed to this and secular parties far more in favour (Makor Rishon, 2021). The law, passed in 1991, currently prohibits the operation of public transportation on Saturday, impacting the lives of 25% of the Israeli population who do not own a motor vehicle (Dori, 2016). Some private initiatives are operating independently, and many local authorities want the law to be changed, but until it does, the courts are limited in their rulings on the matter.

On the matter of human rights, the Supreme Court emphasized its commitment to the subject on a verdict from 1999, when Judge Barak determined that "a reasonable inquiry is a torture-less one […]" (Kremnitzer and Shany, 2018, p. 3). Even so, in many situations of warfare in Israel, human rights remain compromised. Since that verdict, the judicial system has actually stepped back from the normative ruling made by that Judge Barak (p. 6). The tension between security institutions and the legal process was highlighted in "the Law of Israel Security Association - 2002" (ISA, 2021). This law exempts ISA agents from being criminally and civically responsible for any actions committed within duty (Kremnitzer and Shany, 2018, p.7). This law was passed during the Second Intifada, as were other laws deemed necessary to protect state security (e.g., The Citizenship Law).

Since the events of 2014-2015, a more punitive approach has been taken to youth participation in price-tag actions. An example of this can be seen in a ruling on March 29th, 2018 in the Lod District Court, which ruled against three youths from the settlement Nachliel. They were convicted in a plea bargain of arson and assault with aggravated racist motives and sentenced to 2.5 years in jail. The court stated: "[…] a series of violent and property offenses, most of which were racist and directed against Palestinians and their property, solely because of their religious or national affiliation. The minor involved in the affair committed offenses within the framework of a terrorist organization." (Breger, 2018). The conviction of the youngest (16 at the time of committing the act) for membership of an organized group,

pinpoints the first time the court made a connection between price-tag actions and terror organizations. As a result, it made a definitive association between racism and nationalism.

The court's rulings show its ability to support verdicts that can complement the law, in cases where the political leadership have avoided taking a firm position against terror actions, because of their own ethno-religious and national interests. When it comes to Jewish terrorism, as shown in earlier reports (WP3.2, WP3.1), radical right-wing politicians refuse to treat it as such, attempting to downplay its lawful meaning and by that trying to prevent future punishment (Ali, 2021).[8] In itself, this can encourage a discourse that legitimises violence and contradicts the law. The involvement of teenagers in this type of violence, is an example of a shift in the Israeli court's attitude toward "price-tag" actions.

This last example shows the extent of the shift that has occured in the past two decades, in order to prevent future radicalisation. On August 25th, 2019, prior to that year's second state elections, the Supreme Court decided to disqualify Baruch Marzel and Benzi Gupstein, two party members who intended to run for office, within Itamar Ben Gvir's party Otzma Yehudit (Jewish Power) (Liss, 2019). By rejecting the two's requests to be considered valid nominees, the Court's ruling grounded its position as to the limits on freedom of speech and assembly.

Gupstein is the Head of the LAHAVA organization (see WP3.1), a fanatical religious organisation which has not been outlawed but still poses a great threat to liberal rights, the Judges argued. They explained that he was consistently promoting incitement against the Arab population (5487/19, 25 August, 2021).[9] although the Attorney General stated that this, in itself, was not enough to conclude that the entire party list should be prohibited from running in the 22nd Knesset elections. The court relied on "Basic Law: The Knesset", clause 7a(a)(2) that concerns incitement to racism. The Judges did not accept Marzel's statements of remorse, which he hoped would mitigate his actions. Marzel eventually signed a document at the request of the committee chair, in which he renounced his offensive publications on social media but the judge disallowed it (Liss, 2019).

5.   The policy and institutional framework in the field of (de-)Radicalisation

Israeli state's policy is actively exposed to a changing political climate since it does not have a constitution, and is still legislating Basic laws administered by elected political representees, thus leaving policy in the hands of the oriented political elite. Ministerial offices have responsibility for performative institutions, divided into four main fields: national state affairs, financial, social and administrative (Nachmias, Arbel-Ganz & Medini, 2010, p. 250-294). Currently there are 27 ministries, as opposed to 36 in the former government (the Knesset, 2021). Ministries' areas of responsibility change according to the elected political coalition, and therefore can create/eliminate ministerial offices coordinated to socio-political needs and oriented to institutional implementation. However, when it comes to handling terrorism, policy is bound up in most cases with national security needs, and so the central institutions operate

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[8]Ali, Rafael (Alias), Interview with the author, Beer Sheva, June 26, 2021
[9]"Gupstein presents the Arab public in general as an enemy and as someone who should not have any contact with him who might be interpreted as coexistence [his remarks] reveal a new low point in the racist discourse the like of which we did not know before and Gupstein even stated that he has no regrets and does not back down from it".

in accordance with them. The following section will present the policy and institutions targeting terrorism and reveling the uses of both punitive and integrative approaches.

There is a fundamental struggle by the state and its operative branches to maintain the structure and values of democracy, in the light of Israeli-Palestinian conflict and other security threats. Policy is affected by a range of actors, including political parties, social movements and lobbyists, and also by local human right organizations that have a significant influence on the political elite, and on policies, as a result. The matter of ethno-religious dominance and its influence on policy, is also heavily bound up with the question of nationalism. Judaism, as culture, religion and nationality, sometimes creates difficulties at a micro level for non-Jews and non-religious citizens.

For example, in 2016, a 24-year-old man who was registered as a "Muslim" in the Interior Ministry's database requested that his status be changed. He explained that since he does not have any relation to religion, he therefore wished that 'religion-less' therefore be written in his identity card (Ephraim and Shumpalvi, 2016). After this request was refused by officials, in 2019 it was granted by the court. The fact that he had to turn to the judiciary illustrates the fact that whilst religious freedom is profoundly embedded in the declaration that the Israeli state. actively, there is a contradiction in how it is enacted. Nevertheless, change is coming, albeit slowly. Today, the Ministry of the Interior office has adopted a new policy of omitting details of an individual's religion on their ID card. This shows that protocol can, indeed, change over time, (Population and Immigration authority, 2021, pp. 3-6).

Another example is Arab municipalities that are dealing with a lack of infrastructure in roads and public transportation, rising violence (especially against women) and limitations on territory jurisdiction. In disputed areas such as East Jerusalem, where neighbourhoods are populated by a majority of Israeli-Arabs and Palestinians (non-citizens), violence and tension are more common. None of the Jewish localities suffer from such high levels of density and lack of land for development, which prevent the building of new neighbourhoods. In these neighbourhoods, there is no land for public institutions and employment areas (Shani, 2021). "Consequently, a complex situation arises in which the authorities' revenues fail to increase and their ability to provide basic services, such as hazard repairs, sanitation, and public building maintenance deteriorates even further." (Shani, 2021).

In recent data published in "the Israeli Voice Index", it was found that 54% of the Arab citizens within Arab localities trust the government more than their local officials, in comparison to 74.5% of Jews (Chadge-Yichya and Ron, 2021). It was also found that 80% of the municipalities did not act with financial transparency, but moreover- "[…] even when the state devotes resources, sometimes the authorities do not utilize it to the full or intelligently, which will ensure that the public resources do not go down the drain." An example of this can be found in some of the components of governmental operative decision no. 922[10], in which billions of shekels were allocated to the Arab authorities, but some of which did not fulfil their purpose" (Chadge-Yichya and Ron, 2021).

Above all, the most immediate threat to the Arab population is internal violence and criminal activity. More than 70 Arabs have been murdered since the beginning of 2021, meaning that every 3 days someone dies in relation to personal involvement in criminal activity (Shaalan, 2021). Haaretz reported that "The police attribute the increase in murder cases to the difficult

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[10] Special plan that was offered by government and did not succeed in lowering the difficulties within the authorities since it is not yet to reach its fully implementation.

economic situation in the Arab public and the high unemployment rate among young people", and quoted a senior police official saying "A person who has no future and does not find employment in the fields he went to study is going to look for a livelihood in the criminal world" (Brainer, 2021). Just as alarming, almost 100 women have lost their lives in the past decade at the hands of their spouse or husband (Araaf, 2021). The murder of women shows just how patriarchal Arab society still is, since the common thread linking all of the victims was their will to be independent.

Another central aspect in the area of human rights is policy relating to religion freedoms, often exploited for political purposes by both Palestinian and Jewish extremists. One central issue involves actions and measures taken to secure the ability to pray in holy places, and it is very much affected by the national conflict in terms of territory (where you can pray) and nationality (who can pray). Policy is decided according to the Ministry for Religious Affairs, which has been through some changes during the years. the central one (2004) being to spread out services given to non-Jewish sectors to other governmental ministries according to their functional affiliation.[11] As a result it no longer has influence on disputed religious places, such as the Al Aqsa Mosque and Mount Temple in Jerusalem - Islam and Judaism 's most sacred houses of prayers. This case exemplifies the difficulty in holding on to a policy that is trying to calm ongoing tensions, between upholding the basic human right to practice a religion and security policy which prevents the same right.

It took more than 20 years to agree clear borders between Jewish areas of prayer and Muslim ones, after a Peace Agreement was signed in 1993 with Jordan. The decision to involve the Jordanian Wakf in the Al Aqsa Mosque dispute came about after the realization that there needed to be an involvement of a neutral institution to negotiate between Jewish religious Zionists who wished to pray on Temple Mount, and Israeli-Arab Muslim citizens who wished to pray in the same place. The riots that took place in the Second Intifada forced Israel to explore legal options to assist in preventing violence without harming the universal right to practice religion This later helped in agreeing a division of prayer hours to prevent clashes between Jews and Muslims. In 2015, the US Secretary of state John Kerry signed an agreement that agreed a status quo between Israel, Jordan and the Palestinian authority. Whilst it prohibited Jews from practicing rituals and praying at the Mount Temple, it afforded them to Muslims, it also regulated visits to the area by Israelis (Shragai, 2015). Unfortunately, since Israel and the Palestinian Authority are not co-operating on a regular basis, this has turned out to be a fragile arrangement.

The Temple Mount status quo has therefore reduced Palestinian and Israeli-Arab citizens' anger on the one hand, but deepened the feelings of injustice, grievance and polarization of religious Zionists, especially right-wing extremists who are not willing to accept the agreed terms. As of today, special approval is needed for Jewish citizens to pray inside Mount Temple, in an attempt to reassure Muslims that their basic rights will not be offended. In recent times, more and more radical right-wing politicians have been encouraging religious Zionists to pray there, therefore violating national policy (Gabay, 2021). It is creating a link between civil rights and nationality-based rights (as does the Citizenship Law), contradicting national policy and the Declaration itself and deepening social tensions. The last armed conflict (Guardian of the Walls – May 2021) was ignited next to Al Aqsa Mosque, then spread out to cities within Israel

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[11] For example: the rabbinical courts were annexed under the Ministry of Justice, the care of holy places was transferred to the Ministry of Tourism, religious services for non-Jewish citizens were annexed to the Ministry of the Interior and more.

where Muslims and Jews lived in close proximity. It eventually reached a peak that ended with military intervention within the Gaza Strip, as the Hamas terror organization used the situation to encourage rocket attacks on Israel (Dekel, 2021).

Israel's current national policy responds to Palestinian terrorism as its first priority and lists it as the highest-level threat on the security scale, along with international-level attacks. Its secondary threat involves domestic terror acts committed by Jewish citizens with an affiliation to religious-nationalist right-wing extremism. Both situations came to a head in 2014-2015 and, subsequently, there has been a slight change in the power distribution between different actors, preventing future escalations. Even though policy puts great stock in a punitive approach, suggesting the military and other security mechanisms are the main actors involved in counter-terrorism initiatives, Israel still operates several integrative programs that might pave the route to a more inclusion-oriented policy within the country.

The disengagement agreements also brought about government decision no. 4780 in 2006, declaring Israel's policy toward the Palestinian Authority after the establishment of the Hamas government: "Following the Palestinian Authority elections, in which the Hamas […] a government that does not recognize the existence of the State of Israel and the agreements signed with it and does not renounce the path of terrorism" (Prime Minister's office, 2006). Israel has established principles that represent its contemporary approach towards its primary threat, [12]therefore any terror action that comes out of the Palestinian Authority is related to the Hamas regime. There was no change of policy in the following 15 years, while governments tried to deal with terror groups, "lone-wolf" knifers and suicide bombers from the West Bank, and rockets, explosive balloons and terror tunnels from the Gaza Strip. "Silence will be answered with silence", has been a sentence repeated by the political elite (Israel Hayom, 2012; Ushomirsy and Eichner, 2019), which means that when terrorism increases, so does the Israeli security forces defensive operations.

Clause 6 of the decision states that "Subject to security considerations, the crossings from Israel to the Gaza Strip will remain open to allow humanitarian aid to enter the Gaza Strip" (4780/6), but repeated military operations and daily "routine" counter-terrorism operations as a response to Hamas attacks, has taken a toll on civilians on both sides. This has led in recent years to a debate regarding the actual policy of the state. On one hand, there is the issue of rehabilitation of the Strip; on the other, there is the possibility of a military solution that might involve a ground invasion in order to neutralise/destroy Hamas's control.

It is important to mention that internal political disputes within Palestinians also make it more difficult to find a long-lasting solution. A point in question is what happened on June 24th, 2021, when Nizar Banaat, an activist that was a vocal critic of Palestinian Authority, was killed. He was arrested and severely beaten in his house in Hebron by Palestinian security officials (Hass, 2021a) before he died. Thousands protested for days afterwards, against the regime, claiming Banaat's death occurred simply because he was holding different opinions to that of

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[12] 1. The Palestinian Authority is a terrorist authority hostile to Israel. 2. The State of Israel, for all its governing bodies, will not have relations with the Palestinian Authority and its governing bodies. 3. The Palestinian Authority is one authority and therefore there will be no other reference to the Chairman of the Palestinian Authority or the Ministry of the Presidency. However, there will be no personal disqualification of the Chairman of the Palestinian Authority. 4. Foreigners who visit the area and meet with Hamas officials will not be accepted, at the same visit, for meetings with Israeli officials 5. Israel, together with the international community, will coordinate the ways in which humanitarian aid is provided to the Palestinian population, not through governmental mechanisms.

the Palestinian Authority (PA). Other activists and journalists also fear violations of their human rights in the West Bank (such as freedom of speech) (Abu Maria, 2021) and are fearful that the Head of the PA, Abu Mazen, will punish subsequent protesters even harder, using even more violence (Hass, 2021b).

At the same time, Israel has built an updated framework of actions to combat the financial infrastructure of terror organizations, terrorist operatives and entities involved in terrorist financing, accumulated in decision no. 273 (Ministerial Committee for National Security (Cabinet), 2018). This financial policy is another tool that helps authorities prevent money transferring and illegal activities. e.g., in 2019 the court rejected an appeal of one of the biggest banks that violated this policy, and ordered them to pay a fine of more than 4 million NIS. The court emphasized the significance of abiding by the rules, together with international financial cooperation with the state (Bank of Israel, 2019).

In terms of Jewish terrorism, the state has also made a major shift, since the Ministry of Defense decided in 2013 to change its policy and declare "price-tag" actions to now be defined as "unpermitted assembling" under the anti-terrorism law, which up until then was preserved only to jihadist terrorism attacks (Zeitun, 2013). The Ministry of Defense has identified "[…] minor groups within them do not honour the regime of law and therefore attack the legal system as well as security forces. These are the ones that commit price-tag actions." (Yaalon, 2018, p. 240). Former Minister of Defence Meshe Bogi Yaalon, stated that […] "At the centre of the ideology of the "youth of the hills" lays the notion that the Jews are superior to the Arabs (p. 241). The disengagement created a crisis that increased the activity of radical marginal groups, and the local leadership failed to handle it alone. The infrastructure of radicals"[…] harms Arab property as a revenge for a previous terror action or against state actions, e.g., the evacuation of an outpost" (p. 241-242). Certain settlers are even offended by these radical actions. "I saw the connection between the merciful attitude (of the regime) toward price-tag actions of the youths of the hills and the disrespect for the rule of law, and the escalation within Jewish terrorism" (p. 243), says Yaalon.

Since some areas of the West Bank are under military jurisdiction, the IDF has also decided to enforce price-tag cases. One significant event has shown that the military operates in that field as well. In 2016, a soldier living in the Bat Ayin settlement was sentenced to 4 years in military prison, for passing on secret information to aid price-tag actions. The IDF stated that "the punishment expresses a strict attitude of the military prosecutor's office. Such offenses must be eradicated in the IDF and anyone who violates the trust given to him by the military system and harms security interests must be severely punished" (Zeitun, 2016). The court then gave its verdicts accordingly. e.g. in one of the Judges' explanations regarding an appeal that was rejected by price-tag offenders. Judge Mazuz emphasised that: "the ruling states that the uniqueness of a terrorist organization is reflected, among other things, in the fact that the motives of the organization's members are ideological, and their purpose is not purely criminal, but aimed at achieving a policy change goal." (Friedson and Ben Kimon, 2020). He added that the appellants undermined the democratic regime by carrying out revenge attacks on innocent people.

Alongside its security operative performance, primary prevention policy is being carried out by the Ministry of Education and municipal authorities and also by NGOs initiatives operating within schools, youth movements and in public spaces. Promoting the importance of civic society, helped the expansion of NGOs in the world, has had a significant impact on the field within Israel, by helping in maintaining human rights issues on public and political awareness.

Unfortunately, in the past decade Israel has regressed in its democratization, especially when it comes to inclusive attitudes (Chazan, 2019, pp. 149-150).

And yet, the third sector is very central within Israeli society, and specifically in these type of educational integration initiatives. NGOs working in different fields (humanitarian, education, citizenship, personal security, religion, etc.) in order to improve the social gaps between the population and the state, are dominant within Israeli society (Yishai, 1993; Hazan, 2018). The third sector has a significant influence, after state legislation was passed in 1980 regarding regulations of non-profit organizations, since it saw it as an interruptive operator against governments policies, and over the years have become part of its financiers (Limor, 2010, pp.15-16). In 2008, the government decided to publicly recognize the third sector as essential to Israeli democracy and, with that, established round-table discussions within the ministries as a new norm, alongside establishing a digital data-base of NGOs (p. 19). By then there were about 25,000 registered NGOs dealing with civil rights and basic social needs. Between 2015-2019, the majority of new established organizations were religion-oriented (Guidestar report, 2020, p. 14). even though in Israel there are 35,000 estimated active NGOs. In 2018, only 16,469 reported activity (p. 16), as the Israeli government mentioned. Of the active NGOs who receive financial assistance from the state (Knesset report, 2021, p. 5). Some are targeting anti-racism and advocating an anti-nationalism educational approach by teaching in schools but also performing social activism within the public sphere. Therefore, the following section will discuss the education's system modifications on the matter, presenting the government's openness and reliance on civic society.

The Ministry of Education has identified the escalation of socio-political public violent clashes between the Arab population and the police and violence between Jews and Arabs as beginning with the Second Intifada and so it decided to spearhead a policy of tolerance by implementing the law (Education Law - 2000). The outcome was the establishment of "The Society and Youth Administration" (SYA), who are responsible for the social-values education of all students of the State of Israel in light of the goals of education. The SYA "specializes in the development of social skills, strengthening education for values, fostering thinking and moral behaviour, education for involvement, solidarity and social responsibility" (SYA, 2021). Their goal is to implement a policy of deradicalization, by developing, teaching and assisting teachers in faculties to implement programs as part of educational pedagogy,[13] e.g., it has a bilingual program in Hebrew and Arabic, as well asadvanced training for school educational staff. This training examines in depth the events of the Intifada in coordination with civic society developments.

The Ministry of Education has also modified its policy of clarifying the use of educational programs from outside resources such as NGOs, referring to it as "round table between sectors", following permanent order no. 0149 (Ministry of Education, 2018). It is now set to develop and regulate a dialogue between representatives of the different sectors, involved in the educational activity, formulating policy designed to be learned and applied by the staff units, institutions, managers of the education and different sectors (first, second and third) working in the education system. Through this, the Israeli government has recognised that its policy has to take into account extensive civic activities.

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[13]"Students of the State of Israel will be immersed in the cultural heritage of their people, will love their country, country and homeland, will be committed to its democratic values and laws, will act in a value and moral way, contribute to society and the state and lead a reformed society in the spirit of the Declaration of Independence.

Secondary prevention, involving youths that might turn to violence, usually works in the public education system by detecting populations "at risk" and working with educational youth villages to treat them with detailed attention. As described in section 2, Israel is suffering from inequality between the peripheral and central areas (i.e., including gaps in health, welfare, income and low infrastructure, etc.). Therefore, a substantial number of youths at risk groups are located in geographically peripheral areas. The relevant local municipalities are operating this policy by appointing special experienced educational officers responsible to direct youths into proper facilities that can give more appropriate treatment (Bikur Sadir, 2021). Israel has a state budget for youth educational villages, but it is insufficient. In 2020, the government decided to increase the budget under decision no. 682, in order to improve infrastructure and educational needs, but it has yet to be implemented. Youth villages usually deal with urban and peri-urban teens who are at risk by helping to keep them away from unsupportive families, violence and identity struggles (Yachdav, 2021). This applies to all Israeli civilians.

Tertiary prevention addresses radicalisation after it occurs, including different educational programs within prisons. A new approach, which began in 2001 has led to the establishment of the first separate juvenile (14-18 years old) prison in Israel (Shabas/Ofek, 2021). After moving to a separate location from the adult facility, in 2004, Israel opened its first juvenile prison, which serves as a punitive institution but also combines educational programs preparing youth for reintegration into civil society. Accordingly, "The prison staff undergoes special training for working with youth and operates according to an integrative-educational, therapeutic and rehabilitative concept, which sees the care of the youth as a social vocation.

The basic premise is that every boy is changeable and entitled to the opportunity to mend his ways and integrate into society" (Shabas/Ofek, 2021). In 2017, an article was published under the headline "I proved it is possible to be reborn", telling the story of a young prisoner who relied on Ofek's education programs and succeeded in turning his life around and joining the military (Ariel Amur, 2017). in 2018, the Ministry of Homeland Security was criticized severely by Members of Parliament, journalists and the National Council for the Child, all claiming that the authority does not adhere to national policy by its refusal to provide information on prison's work and youth-related subjects, i.e., human rights, prison abuse, proper facilities and prison protection. After this was revealed, it was found that, being the only imprisonment youth facility in the state, it houses much more residents than it should, and in addition no sexual assaults were reported during 2010-2016 (Curiel, 2018).

In 2019, the National Council for the Child examined, in its annual report the alternatives to imprisonment of minors. One of the Judges stated the courts are operating according to state policy, meaning: "Most children who come to the judicial system in a juvenile court in Israel do not face detention or imprisonment. We are talking about a population that goes to prison because attempts at rehabilitation in the community were unsuccessful. These are children who committed very serious offenses, causing serious harm to others. For them, significant work is being done to find an alternative to detention" (Alon, 2019). [T]

[T]his committee also exposed that whilst in 2014 about 150 boys were imprisoned in Ofek, in 2019 only about 70 were in prison. The most upsetting statistic was that, in fact, about 75% of the boys in Israel who sat in prison returned to prison for up to five years, while the corresponding figure for adults is about 40% (INCC report, 2019). This has deepened the debate regarding the necessity of this type of facility and on punitive approaches in general. Member of the Knesset, Gadi Yavarkan, offered to shut it down, arguing "there should be a youth prison in the country" In an effort to encourage alternatives to minor incarceration,

serious offences excluded (Yanovsky, 2020). [R]ecent debate offers one position that endures closing Ofek prison on the claim that it does not serve its purpose since the majority of youths are going back to criminal activity. The other claims that the educational programs that the prison offers, make the youths find the way to re-integrate within society and should remain as an alternative. Nonetheless, in terms of policy the state prefers to avoid minor incarceration as much as possible, and detect youth at risk priorly to the time of committing a crime, by referring them to youth villages and other educational institutions to begin with.

As a militaristic society (Levy, 2007), Israel has several security institutions, each responsible for particular counter-terrorism policy implementation, under the budget and jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defence. The IDF is responsible for the main preventive and defensive activities on the international borders and beyond the borders of the Green Line (West Bank and the Gaza Strip). Alongside the IDF, intelligence units operate, and are divided up between a few institutions. Here we will review the dominant ones.

The Ministry of Homeland Security is in charge of enforcing order within the police force and also the national prison authority (Shabas in Hebrew). As for the question of integration, this section will take a look at the institution of the Presidency and initiatives it supports with regard to multi-cultaralism in Israel. In addition, we will look at civic society as another semi-institutional branch that operates in the light of all others. This section will show main trends and modifications, made within these institutions in connection to legislation and the socio-political atmosphere.

Two new institutions were created in the past decades, dealing with the prevention of terrorism. The first was the National Security Council (NSC), which operates according to government decision no. 4889 (1999) has been the Prime Minister and government's advisor in matters of security since 2008 (NSC, 2021). The second was the National Bureau for Counter-Terror Financing of Israel (NBCTF). It plays an essential role in coordinating and outlining enforcement policy at the national level, regarding financial infrastructure of terrorist organizations, terrorist operatives and entities involved in terrorist financing (NBCTF, 2021). it formulates national policy in the field of the fight against terrorist financing, manages declarations of terrorist organizations, initiating and managing seizure orders of terrorist property; establishes inter-ministerial forums and operates as an "integrated intelligence center" in the field of the fight against terrorist financing (NBCTF, 2021).

Accordingly, each year the Ministry of Defense updates its list of new terror organizations, and gives authority to the relevant administration to handle it operatively. The central one is the Israeli Security Authority (ISA) which has modified its policy in the past two decades because of radicalisation. For reasons of security, it does not publish operative information beyond regulations and provisions that have been established by law and known to the public (ISA, 2021).[14]The actions of the ISA can be reviewed by ex-operatives and past reports viewed,

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[14]1.The institutional aspect - the status of the ISA and the manner in which its powers are determined, its subordination to the government, the status of the head of the Shin Bet. 2. The functional aspect - the designation of the ISA, its functions, general powers given to it (including the authority to conduct investigations), specific powers given to it (including - search powers, receipt of communication data, determination of security compliance). 3. The aspect of supervision and control - the status of the internal auditor, temporary reporting obligations to the Knesset, the Government and the Attorney General, the obligation to approve by external bodies regulations, rules and regulations, the establishment of an external achievement mechanism regarding determining security compliance. 4.

showing its key role in the field of radicalisation and it boasts a special unit named "The Jewish Division" (Levy, 2021). Its name has evolved over time, ever since Rabin's assassination by a religious right-wing fanatic. This unit specializes in surveillance of Jewish and non-Arab individuals that pose a threat to Israeli democracy, i.e. non-Arabs from both the right and left of the political spectrum. (Ali, 2021).

In the past decade, radical right-wing ideological-based terrorism has become more of a threat to Israeli society. July 2015 was a particularly dramatic month in this regard with three major events occurring, followed by huge counter-activity by the ISA.[15] These events provoked the ISA into acting more firmly and arrested many of the individuals involved in price-tag attacks. As a result, radical right-wing activists 'attacks came to a halt until 2017 (Ali, 2017).

In term of institutional responsibility, violent actions come under the jurisdiction of the ISA when characterized as terrorism, e.g., radical religious-Zionists groups such as the "Youth of the Hills". Accordingly, the interface between ideological movements and violent youths, whether urban or peri-urban, has an effect on future radicalisation. The proximity of the relationship between the "Youth of the Hills" and other violent groups within Israeli society, to ideological movements such as LAHAVA might create further violence that has all the features of terrorism.

When it comes to radical right-wing ideology, there are also lone wolf attacks, which are harder to prevent. In general, most of them are related in one way or another to a larger movement or as a result of ideological indoctrination. Moreover, within those groups, there is a "culture of silence" or a "code of honour", which makes prevention of the attacks and capture of the individuals that much harder. What assists the ISA is the law, which allows it to interrogate perpetrators and use a range of methods to prevent potential terror attacks from coming to fruition (Ali, 2021).

Regarding punitive actions, there is a lack of effectiveness when it comes to arresting and charging non-Arab terror perpetrators. This harms the ability of the ISA to foil future actions of other terrorists. If short jail sentences are handed down, for example, this will be interpreted by them as a low price to pay for committing these kinds of actions, therefore, perhaps, reasonable price to pay. The rule of law should not be ambiguous when dealing with Jewish citizens – it needs to apply to every citizen that commits an attack. Unfortunately, current punishments for non-Arab perpetrators are disproportionate to their crimes, therefore they are not deterred from future nationalist criminal activity.

Social media also helps promote aggressive and violent reactions within the Israeli population, and is usually more intense during military operations or when terror attacks are performed by the Palestinians. Today, the ISA has greater technological capabilities when it comes to locating radicalisation. It is working harder and acknowledges that it needs to take a new approach to actors within radical social groups. Even so, it is not enough just to rely on the security authorities to prevent outbreaks of violence. Rabbis, leaders of local municipalities and other civic and political leaders, must take a role in calming and restoring stability within

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Various provisions derived from the unique characteristics of the ISA 'operation - the status of the internal investigation, a restriction on the responsibility of the GSS employee or acting on his behalf, restrictions on ISA employees during and after their work, provisions regarding confidentiality.
[15] 1. The arson of a church, 2. Dawabsha family murder, and 3. Shira Banki's murder during the LBGTQ parade.

their communities. In addition, the reaction of the police towards settlers in the midst of the Gaza disengagement of 2005, have deepened mistrust of security authorities, which only serving to encourage the actions of the Hilltop Youth (Ali, 2021).

Being in charge of enforcement of law concerning public security and safety, makes the Israeli police subject to much. Even though it is supposed to provide the first response to emergency situations and prevent criminal offences, the police are also part of a wider discourse dealing with ethnicity, religion and nationality. The police play a significant role within society since relations between police and minorities operate within socio-political contexts (Ben Porat and Yuval, 2020, p. 2). Israel is a divided society, its status-quo dependent on religion (p. 52), and it has normalised the separation between nationalities.

Problems in the granting of citizenship for non-Jews are also a source of exclusion and inequality for Arabs (P. 54). According to scholars, the police differentiate between those they see as 'normative' civilians and those they perceive as a threat (p. 9). "Nationalism, religion and ethnicity are the central fault lines in Israeli society, each division with a life of its own, translated into demands, struggles and identities" (p. 12). Without a doubt, it is easier for Jews to secure citizenship than Arabs, since they are more likely to be regarded as a minority "threatening" the state. Security values emphasise social order and security […] justifying the suspension of citizenship and human rights (p. 27). This is true especially when it comes to Arab citizens, who are a national minority demanding equality and recognition, suffering from police neglect and insecurity (p. 3) and often regarded as "enemies" (p. 75). Police brutality is also present towards other minorities such as the ultra-orthodox, religious-Zionists, Ethiopians etc. Even though the police play a key role in enforcement, they struggle to do so because of a lack of public trust.

Something else that needs to be mentioned is the use of technology as a tool of recognizing and eliminating offensive content from online platforms. The State Attorney Cyber Unit prosecutes a few dozen digital offenses a year including those relating to incitement to terrorism, incitement to violence, publication of sexual content without the consent of the person being photographed etc. (Justice Department report, 2020). It is a new national unit established in 2015, in light of the need recognized by the State Attorney to concentrate on efforts dealing with crime and terrorism in cyberspace (State Attorney's office, 2021). Its 2019 report shows that there was a significant increase in the number of requests for the removal of offensive publications served to internet companies, and 90% were removed. About 76% of the requests involved terror organizations' publications, and 22% dealt with incitement to violence and terrorism (Justice Department report, 2020). This raises the question of boundaries between state initiatives that require the tracking of citizens, and to what degree the state should intervene in security issues.

In contrast to institutions that take a central part in punitive and protective operations, the understanding of a more integrative approach has led to the rise of new attitudes, materialized by state institutions. One that is central to the understanding of the changes in Israeli society is the institution of Presidency, which changed its historic function as a representative official. Former President Reuven Rivlin (2014-2021), was the first prominent political figure who pointed out the problem of Jewish terrorism, which threaten to deepen the ruptures in an already divided Israeli society, by price-tag actions. After his election in 2014, President Rivlin, who came from the "Likud" (right-wing) political party, supported a new integrative approach to deal with ethno-religious racism and violence towards Arabs and other minorities. In a 2015 conference, Rivlin presented a new paradigm that sees Israeli society as a combination of four

main sectors that should all receive equal civic rights, regardless of their identity (Israeli Hope Official website, 2015).[16]

Rivlin decided to oppose the idea of segregation between the majority of Jewish society and the minorities within it, the purpose being to change the discourse of hate, naming the program "Israeli Hope". Rivlin's goal was to establish a partnership between the main sectors, seeking to strengthen Israeli society through inclusion. At first, Rivlin's interpretation of Israeli society was disregarded by politicians and other opponents of the idea of inclusion. Added to this was the fact that some disagreed with this explanation of the construction of Israeli society.

Even so, in the last few years, Israeli Hope has become a program implemented in education institutions all over the country. It started with a variety of activities within academia, and over time managed to become part of annual visits to schools in Israel promoting the discourse of change, and the acceptance of all cultures within society (Amin, 2021).[17] In addition, in 2018 it managed to create a municipal forum that offered a key role to local municipalities and directors of Education Departments in changing and leading their educational systems' meaningful processes, focusing on local needs and challenges in the relations between the different sectors of the population (Israeli Hope Official website, 2021).

Another relevant development is the Education Award given each year to schools that are active in strengthening partnerships by inclusion, based on the realization of the importance of local authorities in the cooperation between youths from all parts of society (Amin, 2021). It did change the educational approach in some schools, e.g., in Haifa, where the first and only so far High School coordinator of Israeli Hope, explained that it is a role that must be built-in at all schools since it connects between different views. By choosing to dedicate a full day of schooling to a discussion on Israeli democracy, youth are talking about politics in depth as part of the program's goal (Saab, 2021).

Rivlin's idea of tolerance became institutionalised in a variety of fields such as: sport, employment, regional cooperation, and education within academia and public schools (Amin, 2021). With that said, it is crucial to highlight that despite the fact that it became the leading initiative in the field of integration, the Ministry of Education has not yet fully implemented it. According to an article published in Haaretz: "Some of the fruits of the policy can be found in the data in the follow-up report: only 21 schools (out of about 5,000) participated in the "Israeli Hope" program, which promotes coexistence between different groups in Israel; less than 14,000 high school students (out of about 970,000 participated in the joint study of schools from different streams of education; not a single meeting took place between ultra-Orthodox students and their peers from other sectors." (Kashti, 2021).

The last important aspect of this institutional framework in Israel is the respective central place NGOs hold, supported by state legislation and policy. Violence in recent years has also led to

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[16] "Over the past few decades, demographic and cultural processes have been re-shaping Israeli society, changing it from a society comprising a clear majority with several minorities to a society comprising four principal sectors or "tribes" that are similar to one another in size: secular, orthodox, Haredi [ultra-orthodox], Arabs. This new social structure is reflected in the composition of the current first grade classes, where the Haredi and Arab educational streams together represent close to fifty percent of the total, indicating, in effect, a "New Israeli Agenda". In these circumstances there are no longer clear majorities and minorities in regard to basic ideological issues. We must now, therefore, move beyond the current approach of "majority and minority" and find a new approach based on partnership between the different population sectors that make up Israeli society" [From the President's address at the Herzliya Conference, June 2015].

[17] Amin Nelly (Alias), Interview with the author, Beer Sheva, June 2, 2021.

the creation of NGOs that recognise and fill the vacuum created between national conflict-oriented policy, and basic human rights, which otherwise might be filled by radical groups. "Tag Meir" is an NGO, first established in 2011 as a response to the increasing violence carried out by price-tag actions. Through its name ("tag of light" in Hebrew), it wishes to change the discourse around terrorism and ethno-religious radicalization, led by political entities that approach youths in order to promote racism instead of inclusion. The organization is active in few several fields, including the legal system and as such they participate in case laws dealing with Jewish terrorism and human rights offences.

One specific example relates to Rabbi Eliyahu, who was summoned to a disciplinary hearing by the courts after he was found to be inciting youths against minorities, using his religious status (Bloch, 2020).[18]The organization was a major partner in the petition submitted to court, stating: "Rabbi Eliyahu has consistently incited against the courts, leftists, Arabs, the proud community and on the other hand has sponsored the far right and Youth of the Hills in racism against the Arab sector from the heights of their status as rabbis on behalf of the kingdom." (Bloch, 2020). A central initiative act of Tag Meir since 2014 is a direct response to LAHAVA organization's yearly "Flag Parade"[19], taking place in the Muslim market of the Old City of Jerusalem. The parade's participants often chant racist slogans as they walk past the Al Aqsa Compound, and the fact that this parade takes place close to Ramadan only fans the flames of violence. Most participants are youth that identify with radical religious Zionists, such as the current member of the Knesset Itamar Ben Gvir. Tag Meir decided to organise a parallel parade in which flowers would be offered to Arab visitors and shop owners along the route.

Seven years later, the parade has organised the participation of hundreds of young people from all over Israel, and by that made the "flower parade" a new and integrative tradition (Mako, 2019). The recent parade of 2021 showed hundreds of youths participating in the alternative parade, sharing their experiences through social media, and inviting more teenagers to take part. (Tag Meir Facebook Video, 2021). Tag Meir is operating within schools and youth movements, and, as such, is pursuing an integrative approach, cooperating with official establishments as part of a normative framework.

6.   Case Studies

Case study 1: The Anti-Racism Governmental Unit

Inequality has always been a major issue in Israeli society (Chazan, 2019). Recently, civic protests and social activism have become more prevalent, especially after the huge social protests of 2011, even if protestors didn't succeed in their mission of immediate change of the state's policy (Ram and Filc, 2013; Herzog, 2013). But on May 4th, 2015, an important shift occurred. A video documented an Israeli soldier, of Ethiopian heritage, being beaten by two policemen for no reason. It was shown on the nationwide news and soon went viral on social media (Yarkatzi, 2015). This led to enormous protests by thousands of youngsters between the ages of 14-24, decrying the fact that public spaces are not safe for people from the

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[18]For example, Eliyahu refers to Arabs as "wild creatures": "What do you do with these wild creatures on the Temple Mount? They're just like a photographer in a shrine. The most upside-down place is there. The people hate peace. That's what King David calls it right? And we foolishly give them the right to rule there so why not exploit us, you have no "With more exploiters than them, just exploiters, give them money, give them food, give them electricity, give them water […] and they spit in your face and stab the best of our guys".

[19] Taking place on Jerusalem day- national day of celebrating the deliberation of Jerusalem.

Ethiopian community (Yarkatzi and Shimoni, 2015). The protest itself, which took place in central streets of Tel Aviv, provoked high levels of police violence in return, since it ended with 68 injuries and 43 arrests.

Up until then, the state of Israel did not consider racism to be an issue within its society (Akir, 2021).[20] Now, global awareness has raised the subject of police brutality and heavy-handed policing and revealed that the individual story of the Ethiopian soldier, was part of a much larger phenomenon of group-association based racism, taking place within official state institutions. The crucial aspect of this particular incident is the fact that even though the soldier's IDF uniform was supposed to "protect" him from random violence, did not prevent the policemen acting out of clear ethno-based discrimination motives (Akir, 2021).

As a result, in 2016 a governmental committee was appointed. "The Palmore Committee" was set up and asked to examine the question of police brutality within society. Its conclusions were that the state was being actively racist towards the Ethiopian community, followed by the establishment of a special governmental unit to handle institutional discrimination and respond properly to racism-based charges. The Anti-Racism Coordinating Government Unit (ARCGU) under the Ministry of Justice, was a result of protests of the Ethiopian community against racism and police brutality (ARCGU, 2019; Akir, 2021). The unit is now handling complaints and performing training for state institutions in issues of racism in public spaces and public institutions (Institutional racism) and racist behavior by law enforcement (racist behavior of public service workers). It works to eradicate racism against all individuals in Israel, regardless of their skin color, origin, nationality or religion (Akir, 2021).

The unit defines racism as an act of terror, since the result of it is fear and horror. Groups with similar characterizations that share the same vulnerability level, leave them in a state of constant anxiety and that is an obvious characterization of terrorism (Akir, 2021). The unit was established in February 2017, created as an institutional entity that could give a proper response to racism-based actions. Even though it started with its focus on the Ethiopian community, it has now expanded its investigations into including all types of racism performed on the basis of group association, e.g., ultra-orthodox on the basis of cultural-religious association. The unit is led by three main branches:

1. Public complaints - targeting institutional racism, and every event or occurrence involving government units and offices and individual employees committing racist practice. The unit is also involved in legal class-actions against public administrations following public complaints, e.g., a public transportation driver who refused to allow Ethiopians on to buses due to their skin colour, or Ultra-orthodox captured as "virus spreaders" in working places. It also ensures that governmental ministries publish clear guidance to their performative units whenever an issue of racism is revealed.

2. Progressing lateral moves - the unit is trying to influence state institutions and their approach towards racism as a strategy and therefore seeks to progress long-term changes on legislation and policy.

3. Training and improved knowledge - the unit has appointed 72 supervisors within government offices that offer professional training to employees on the matter. One its more recent initiatives offers education for teaching the history of racism through mandatory history classes in schools. The program presents racism as a result of culture and politics and by that

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[20]Akir Yoni (Alias), Interview with the author, Beer Sheva, July 22, 2021.

educates the next generations. The Ministry of Education has agreed to the establishment of a 10-year plan which will train teachers in this subject. (Akir, 2021).

One of the central difficulties described by the unit's officials is the lack of regulative legislation, that "Even though the unit was established on the basis of a government decision we do not have the authority to enforce it" (Akir, 2021). The Punitive Law does not include clear punishment against all types of racism. The definition of racist actions by law in Israel, as a country of immigrants, is made within a security discourse, meaning it is too narrow to contain other types of racism that haves nothing to do with the national Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

In order to convict someone on a felony of racism in Israel, you have to prove special intent, which makes proving the accusation almost impossible. The state's laws show that a larger weight is given to the value of freedom of speech than to active legislation against racism. It could be possible to overcome this by creating an echelon within the punitive law, so perpetrators could be punished for all levels of racism. Another gap is between legislation and its implementation and enforcement. The lack of a constitution in Israel means certain sectors are given more resources and can promote laws that benefit their own interests.

The problem with this is the enforcement of such laws by different ministries has created great mistrust amongst the public. There is also an absence of an institutional entity responsible for the subject of human rights. There are a few commissioners that handle the subject of inequality but they are all subordinate to the State Attorney and therefore cannot truly criticize the state's actions (Akir, 2021). It challenges the state and have the ability to criticize and affect decision makers which is vital even if not leading to immediate changes. E.g., Basic Law "The nationality law - 2018" is racist by definition, and therefore offensive to people who are not Jewish, even though some adjustments were made.

Another difficulty lies in a lack of resources. It is an independent unit within the Justice Ministry, which only has five employees and options are limited. Racism against the Arab society is a problem they do not have enough resources to handle. Arab communities are suffering from racism, that is explained away by national and security considerations.

Case study 2: "City Without Violence" and the municipal model

Endless political disputes within a background of religion, ethnicity and nationality, have left Israel in a perpetual state of war. A national key initiative made in an attempt to decrease negative influences of socio-political tensions described earlier, is "City without Violence", implemented by the Ministry of Homeland Security. This national program is being carried out in municipalities across Israel, as an inter-ministerial institutional cooperation that operates under state policy in more than 150 localities throughout the country (Ministry of Welfare and social Security, 2019). This initiative involves working under the premise that geographical communities can reduce internal violence, by using social and technological mechanisms to detect radicalisation and prevent it. City without Violence operates with two main objects:

1. Information days for residents educating them about the phenomenon of violence and its consequences.

2. Surveys to examine local needs (Ministry of Welfare and Social Security, 2019).

The program's main purpose is to decrease situations of violence, delinquency, crime and anti-social behaviour in urban and public space in Israel (CECI report, 2018). It requires each municipality to appoint a trustee that defines the actions and regulations that the city is committed to, in order to implement non-violence practices (Lok, 2021). The implementation

requires government budgets transferred to municipalities accordingly. The budget is supposed to be divided between educational enforcement, welfare activities and more, and its yearly strategy is set in advance by its particular population's needs. As a result, each municipality has to map its violence to types and regions, taking into account local infrastructure to begin with. Some regulations are assembled in all municipalities and some are individually set (CECI report, 2018).

"City without Violence" is considered a municipal model for handling all types of violence committed by adults and youths. The model is based on the corporation and integration of all systems that deal with violence: education, welfare, security enforcement and health, and also third sector organizations (Wiseblay, 2010, p. 6). A special report made by the Knesset research division uncovered some difficulties in implementation of the program and the lack of sufficient data to examine its actual impact on youth criminal activity. It was first developed in 2004in the city of Eilat as a pilot study, due to increasing numbers of criminal activity among teenagers in Israel (Wiseblay, 2010, pp. 2-3). followed by additional 12 other localities who joined it in 2007.

In 2009, the program was extended to 66 additional municipalities, financed mainly by the Ministry of Homeland Security and local authorities (Wiseblay, 2010, p. 2). It significantly decreased the rates of youth involvement in criminal activities between 2004-2009 and some believe this is a result of this program. But some believe that it is underfunded because not all localities can join the program, due to a lack of unified authority to unite all inter-ministerial work (p. 13-14). In 2015, what started as a pilot under government decision no. 1561 within the territory of the settlements under the model of "youth endorses youth", continued as a permanent project. It targeted youth at risk that live within the West Bank area, recognized by the authorities as teenagers who were not part of the education system, motivated by ideological perceptions and characterized by their carrying out of dangerous activities to the community and towards themselves (CECI, 2018, p. 8). In 2016 special funds were given by the government for its implementation.

Government decision no. 3756 from 2018, is particularly interesting as it shows a central shift in strategy of the authorities. This resolution concerns the expansion of the "Community Adopting Youth" program within city without violence, to Judea and Samaria (the West Bank area) aiming, for the first time, to connect young people with a local educational framework (Prime Minister's Office, 2018). it was supported by a report that proved there had been a significant reduction in criminal activity of youths in the area, and accordingly was given more funding (CECI, 2018, p.4-6). Two additional important decisions have expanded the use of technology on the implementation of City without Violence (no. 3757; 3758).

Another significant development was made under decision no. 2710. In 2017 the Ministry of Public Security raised the budget given to mixed cities within the program, "for the purpose of expansion of the technological systems (which include a "seeing" center, cameras and sensors) in their field." (Ministry of Homeland Security, 2017). But despite its success in decreasing crime rates among youths, it is not clear whether this program will continue to work in its current format. In 2017 the Knesset authorized that a special new governmental authority will unite all different actors involving the struggle against violence and will work independently, ordered by "the law of the authority of the fight against violence, drugs and alcohol", updated in 2020 (Knesset book of laws, 2020).

7.   Conclusion

   Legal organization and basic democratic principles of the separation between state institutions (meaning that they can supervise one another) is very much present in Israeli society. Simultaneously, it seems that the central focus placed on ethnicity, religion and nationality, has a major influence on its policy framework and operative institutions, and so undermines the discourse of citizenship and equality.

The constant mindset of "fear of elimination", fuelled by political elites and the collective trauma of the Jewish nation's history, has had an enormous influence on Israeli legislation, policies and institutional framework, only making worse the problem of terrorism that is very present within everyday life. The lack of a permanent constitution has assisted the state in times of emergency (passing legislation to solve ad-hoc terror related threat), but has also used the same rules to undermine human rights, in contradiction to its commitments stated within The Declaration of Independence.

Citizenship and religion, two basic universal issues that are fundamental both to the population and the national state, apply to the most crucial "soft belly" spots within Israeli society. The fact that they are interconnected and also a result of the national conflict, emphasises that the lack of a permanent constitution in Israel makes it harder to define clear borders and boundaries between religion and state. The struggle to preserve human rights and also secure the Jewish nation's right to national freedom, leaves Israel further exposed to radicalisation from domestic sources. The boundaries that are set by religion, ethnicity and nationality make it difficult for the country to move towards inclusive approaches when it comes to deradicalization, for this requires solidarity between citizens and politicians, a change of discourse and a joint effort.

Core issues, such as the definition of citizenship, contributes to that as well as its inability to handle socio-economic gaps between its geographic and demographic peripheries and the centre, especially when it comes to the Arab population. Israel is a ruptured society, and has no way of integrating Arab communities without confronting the question of Palestinian identity, and including different ethnicities as part of its equal citizenship discourse.

The two main threats - Jewish and Palestinian terrorism - are handled in parallel ways, showing the great influence civic society has on human rights and civic equality as an answer to places that centralize ethnicity, religion and nationality differences. The fact that the state has a strong foundation of civic responsibility, suggests that citizens are active and are taking part in the democratic process. They have the ability to act with purpose and impact future changes. Widespread volunteer programmes are actually encouraging the government to take action in areas where otherwise there would be no proper response. Unfortunately, it also highlights the state's lack of ability to solve problems, using NGOs as a convenient "temporary" solution, that now seems like a permanent one for certain subjects for which the state has no resolution

The implications of these constant disputes, eventually leads to feelings of injustice, grievance, alienation and polarisation, not just by terror perpetrators that already find themselves excluded, but also by citizens that pay the price in the quality of their lives. Despite noticeable efforts by the state to fight racism at an institutional level and address integrative approaches to education, it seems that there are still serious gaps in the implementation of proposed policies. This has had a major effect on youths' perceptions of the way the

government is addressing these issues. Maintaining these conflicts on such a scale will surely have an effect on future generations of Jews and Arabs, even though it is quite clear that both groups are "here to stay".

COVID-19 brought the subject of surveillance into the public eye after the government decided to task Israel's secret security agency to use its power to track individuals during the first waves of the COVID-19 pandemic. The Supreme Court's position was identical to that of the ISA itself and the Court ruled that ISA's use of personal information in order to locate infected civilians was a violation of their basic right to privacy. They argued that such actions are against the law in Israel and also disproportionate compared to the behaviour of other western states at that time (Kabir, 2021). One of the judges even commented that "the time has come to get rid of this measure, as it is addictive and even encourages the creation of further abusive practices." (Herschkowitz and Altshuler, 2021).

This approach of the Judiciary only highlights the dispute that exists between state institutions. One encourages the use of preventative security measures, whilst the other wishes to prioritize the safety of civil and human rights. These opposing views highlight the constant tension that exists in Israel between democracy/liberal values and the war on terrorism/public safety. Of course, it is necessary to have a balance between the two, especially in places where the political elite might use their power. However, since Israel is constantly relying on security institutions to enforce its policy, it is necessary to provide 'checks and balances' in the form of different approaches, which are less punitive and more integrative.

8. Annexes

Annex I: Overview of the legal framework on radicalisation & de-radicalisation

Legislation title (original and English) and number	Date	Type of law (i.e. statute, regulation, rule, etc…)	Object/summary of legal issues related to radicalization	Link/PDF
The Declaration of independence	May 14th, 1948	Statute	This is the central legal basis for all legislation that follows, in the shape of basic laws until a future constitution is written. Here one can find Israel's definition as a Jewish democracy that is obliged to human rights according to UN	https://main.knesset.gov.il/About/Occasion/Pages/Declaration.aspx
Basic Law: Law of the return-1950	July 5th, 1950	Statute	This law relates to Jews that still live in the Diaspora, for their future immigration to Israel. It creates friction between the majority and non-Jewish minorities, who do not receive similar rights.	https://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/mfa-archive/1950-1959/pages/law%20of%20return%205710-1950.aspx
Basic Law: Law of Citizanship-1952	April 8th, 1952	Statute	Provides detailed laws regarding the requirements of becoming a citizen: from the authority of return right (see above); by living in Israel; by birthright; by citizenship procedure.	https://www.knesset.gov.il/review/data/heb/law/kns2_nationality.pdf
Law: Compensation in acts of Hostility law-1970	July 30, 1970	Rule	Facilitates compensation in cases of harm caused by terror acts, and has been through multiple corrections along the years, the latest which was in 2018 (see link attached.)	https://main.knesset.gov.il/Activity/Legislation/Laws/Pages/LawPrimary.aspx?t=lawlaws&st=lawlaws&lawitemid=2000607
Basic Law: The Military -1976	March 31st, 1976	Statute	Gives the military authority. The law itself is very short, and is updated each year, if necessary, with minor changes.	https://m.knesset.gov.il/Activity/Legislation/Doc

				uments/yesod9.pdf
Law of Israel Security Association - 2002	February 21st, 2002	Rule	This law was passed in 2002 in the midst of the Second Intifada, and regulates Israel's intelligence agency services and authorities.	https://www.shabak.gov.il/SiteCollectionImages/%D7%90%D7%95%D7%93%D7%95%D7%AA/shabak-law.pdf
Basic Law: The Citizenship Law (temporary provision)-2003	August 6th, 2003	Temporary provision	This law was refined in the past 18 years, and recently did not pass the threshold, so is expected to be re-assigned with modifications	https://www.nevo.co.il/law_html/law01/999_180.htm
Basic Law: Freedom of Profession-1994	March 10th, 1994	Statute	This law establishes citizens' and residents' rights to engage in any occupation, profession or job, and is central to the issue of civic freedoms	https://m.knesset.gov.il/Activity/Legislation/Documents/yesod1.pdf
Law of the Preservation of holy places (1967)	June 28th, 1967	Rule	Regulates the prohibition on violation of holy places and monuments	https://main.knesset.gov.il/Activity/Legislation/Laws/Pages/LawPrimary.aspx?t=lawlaws&st=lawlaws&lawitemid=2000599
Regulations for the Protection of Holy Places for Jews-1981	July 16, 1981	Regulation	Deal with special regulations regarding Jewish sacred places of prayer e.g., the Western Wall.	https://www.nevo.co.il/law_html/law01/p224k1_002.htm
Basic law: The State Comptroller-1958	March 17th, 1958	Statute	Orders the state to maintain the institution of state comptroller, who supervises over state's actions.	https://www.mevaker.gov.il/he/Laws/Pages/14.aspx?AspxAutoDetectCookieSupport=1

The Penal Code, 1977	August 4th, 1977	Regulation	A guiding line for punitive issues in a very wide scope of subjects, e.g., protects Jews and the state itself from Holocaust denial, and sets it as criminal felony with a defined punishment. In general, it accumulates penalties over crimes including prohibition on racist motivations.	https://www.nevo.co.il/law_html/law01/073_002.htm#Seif498
Youth Law (Judgment, Punishment and treatment) - 1971	July 23rd, 1971	Rule	Regulates all matters concerning Judiciary, punishment and treatment issues, the law obligates state's institutions to address the importance of teenagers' rights, meaning an underaged criminal should always be judged by special minor's court, according to district.	Link
Basic Law: The Knesset - 1958	February 2nd, 1958	Statute	Regulates the Israeli Parliament's work and supervision responsibilities as a separate authority from the government and the judicial system.	https://m.knesset.gov.il/Activity/Legislation/Documents/yesod4.pdf
Basic Law: The Nationality law - 2018	July 6, 2018	statute	This is a disputed law that amplifies Jewish nationality majorities' mandate and ignores human rights and liberties as premised in the Declaration of Independence	https://fs.knesset.gov.il/20/law/20_lsr_504220.pdf
Law of the Fight against terrorism - 2016	June 23, 2016	Rule	The present rule annuls its prior law (1948) and redefine what is considered to be terrorism. Minister of defence is the authority in announcing and recognising terror organization in and outside Israel	https://fs.knesset.gov.il/20/law/20_lsr_343902.pdf
Prison Regulations - 1978	August 17th, 1978	Regulations	Offers definitions of regulations regarding incarceration	https://www.nevo.co.il/law_html/law01/056_007.htm#_ftn1
Law of prohibition on money laundering and terror funding-2000	August 17th, 2000	Rule	Includes prevention and punishment rules for capital felonies involving terror	https://www.boi.org.il/he/BankingSupervision/AntiMoneyLaunderingAndT

				errorFundin gProhibition /Pages/Def ault.aspx
Education Law -2000	February 29, 2000	Rule	This rule has been established in 1953 but went through modifications in 2000 due to security issues	https://www. nevo.co.il/la w_html/law 01/152_024 .htm
law of the authority for combating Violence, Drugs and Alcohol (Amendment), 2020	December 21st, 2020	Rule	A law that is still in legislation process, aims to unite all different actors involving the struggle against violence and work independently	https://fs.kn esset.gov.il/ 23/law/23_l sr_593574. pdf
Basic Law: Human Dignity and liberty- 1992	March 25th, 1992	Statute	This law includes the prohibition on harming a human's body or dignity, protecting property, life, body and dignity, and supporting the right to personal freedoms.	https://m.kn esset.gov.il/ Activity/Legi slation/Doc uments/yes od3.pdf
Basic Law: Freedom of profession-1994	March 10th, 1994	Statute	This law enshrines the fundamental right to choose one's own occupation	https://main. knesset.gov .il/Activity/L egislation/D ocuments/y esod1.pdf
Basic Law: The Knesset-1958	February 12th, 1958	Statute	The first Basic Law that was legislated in Israel	https://main. knesset.gov .il/Activity/L egislation/P ages/BasicL aws.aspx

NATIONAL CASE LAW

Case number	Date	Name of the court	Object/summary of legal issues related to radicalization	Link/PDF
5100/94	June 9th 1999	Supreme	The High Court ruled that during the investigation of a suspect in violent activity against the state, the ISA is not authorized toto use physical pressure. It ruled in favor of the use of various methods of	http://www.hamoked .org.il/files/2011/264. pdf

			torture, such as "shaking", upholding the ISA position.	
9018/17	November 26th, 2018	Supreme	The High Court rejected a Palestinian's claim of torture in his investigation, leaving the use of torture in Israel in the hands of the security forces	Link
8182/18	July 15th, 2019	Supreme	The Court's decision regarding the regulations relating to the protection of Jewish holy places	https://supremedecisions.court.gov.il/Home/Download?path=HebrewVerdicts/18/820/081/a11&fileName=18081820.A11&type=2
5487/19	August 25th, 2019	Supreme	This verdict explained the disqualification of some political nominees for 2019 elections, because of racism and their anti-democratic philosophy. These candidates belonged to the radical religious-Zionist party "Otzma Yehudit".	link
1908/94	November 9th, 1995	Supreme	Issued the Mizrahi Bank ruling, which stated that the Basic Laws of the State of Israel are in fact a kind of "constitution" that prevails over "ordinary" laws. It gave the Court the power to invalidate and interfere with Knesset laws. In addition, it clarified, interpreted and established the constitutional authority of the Supreme Court for anjudicial review of laws, which the Knesset established in the Basic Laws enacted in 1992 - Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty and Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation	https://www.nevo.co.il/psika_word/elyon/padi-nh-4-221-l.pdf
830/07	January 11th, 2012	Supreme	Citizenship law, joint NGO's appeal on previous rulings, rejecting the request to cancel the law claiming against its racist	link

			basis. the court rejected this as well, and decided not to intervein in the citizenship law following state security situation and policy.	
3793/18 9057/18 5591/19	February 2nd, 2020	Supreme	The Court rejected the appeal of three offenders convicted in 2018 by the District Court of Lod for price-tag actions (see section 4.2). The Court added that price-tag attacks an indicate an affiliation to terror organizations	link
7150/16	September 21nd, 2020	Supreme	A joint petition submitted to the supreme court by four NGOs: Tag Meir, the reformist centre of religion and state, the Israeli civil rights association, and among them and the pre-existing unit against racism who became later on a governmental unit (see section 6.1). here the court decided on disciplinary hearing against the Rabbi of the city Tzfat on charges of racism and incitement.	link
13173/01 /19	March 24nd, 2019	District of Tel Aviv-Jaffa	The court granted a citizen's request to be 'religion-less' ('without religion') in his identification details, after being refused this request by th e Ministry of Internal Affairs	link

OTHER RELEVANT ISSUES

	Constitutional provisions	Statutory law (statues, rules, regulations etc.)	Important case law	Comments/issues relevant to radicalization

Freedom of religion and belief	Section 13, The declaration of Independence ("[…] it will guarantee freedom of religion […] it will safeguard the Holy Places of all religions")	Basic Law: Human Dignity and liberty-1992	72982/10/18	There is no clear law that permits civic rights, but only a general accumulation of variety of freedoms (such as religion), that is open to interpretations. In 2016 a la suggestion was made, named "freedom of religion, from religion and freedom of consciousness", with the purpose of guaranteeing religion freedoms was submitted to vote, but has not made any progress since. The Case law refers to District Court who ruled a citizen could be registered as religion-less
Minority rights	**Sections 15-16.** ("We call on the Arab people of the State of Israel to maintain peace and take part in the building of the state on the basis of full and equal citizenship and on the basis of appropriate representation in all its institutions, temporary and permanent, even in the context of the bloody attack on us.")	Basic Law: Human Dignity and liberty-1992; Basic Law: Freedom of profession-1994 Basic Law: Israel- the state of the Jewish nation-2018	5555/18	The Nationality Law passed in 2018, and has increased distrust of minorities towards the Israeli state, since it promotes the superiority of the Hebrew language and Jewish culture over others, such as Arabic. In this situation, minority rights were claimed to be compromised, even though the judicial system refused to intervene to date. Being a basic Law, the Supreme Court rejected 15 motions applied by NGOs supported by some Parliament members, asking that the law be annulled.
Freedom of expression and assembly	**Section 13, The declaration of Independence** ("[…] Israel will foster the development of the country for the benefit of all its inhabitants. […] it will guarantee freedom of […] conscience, language, education and culture […] it will be faithful to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations")	Basic Law: Human Dignity and liberty-1992	5078/20	The Association for Civic Rights in Israel points out in their report from 2017: "the reduction of freedom of expression in Israel, as part of the reduction of the democratic space. This year the public took over the right to demonstrate across the country, making the protest on various issues present and effective in the public space. However, the High Court still has to defend the basic right to demonstrate and protest, in the face of unfounded and illegal demands made by the police against demonstrators. The government has also continued attempts to censor cultural works and silence artists for political reasons." The Supreme Court applied and

				authorized protests against government corruption during 2020-2021, under noise restrictions. By that it encouraged freedom of speech as well free assembly, even though the government tried to object and eliminate the scale demonstrations across the country.
Hate speech and Freedom of association	**Section 13, The declaration of Independence** ("[...]it will ensure complete equality of social and political rights to all its inhabitants irrespective of religion, race or sex")	The aw of Parties, 1992	5487/19	The law permits political association with corrections that were inserted during 2002, 2017, 2020, regarding the prohibition of engagement with terrorism or anti-state incitement, as was shown in the case of radical religious Zionists.
Church and state relations	**Section 10, The declaration of Independence** ("It is the natural right of the Jewish people to be as much a people as possible and a nation standing on its own two feet in its sovereign state.")	The Chief Rabbinate of Israel Law, 1980	7339/15	There is no separation between religion and state, and it sometimes affects civil matters, such as non-religious marriages. There are a few standing law suggestions, among them one named "Law of civic marriage-2020", This was an attempt to try to separate he Orthodox procedures common in Israel, and liberal rights of other communities who contradict its premises, such as the LGBTQ community. The Supreme Court rejected a request of same-sex marriage, claiming that proper legislation is required to have the authority to accept requests of this kind.

Annex II: List of institutions dealing with (de-) radicalisation

Authority (English and original name)	Tier of government (national, regional, local)	Type of organization	Area of competence in the field of radicalization& deradicalization	Link

Israel Security Association	National	Security intelligence state division	Pre-locating Jewish and Palestinian terrorist attacks	ISA
The Anti-Racism Coordinating Government Unit	National	Justice department State unit	Enforcement of initiatives to counteract institutional racism and xenophobia, integrational initiatives in education	ARCGU
Israel Defence Forces	National	Security operations state division	Prevention of terror escalation	IDF
Israeli House of the President	Regional and local	Educational state unit	Israeli hope program, integrative discourse in education, academia, employment and sports.	Israeli Hope
The National Security Council	National	Security state unit	Responsible on behalf of the Prime Minister, for the inter-organizational and inter-ministerial staff work on matters relating to foreign affairs and security. Proposes to the Prime Minister an agenda and subjects for discussion on terrorism, amongst other things	NSC
National Headquarters for Economic Warfare against Terrorism	National	Financial prevention state unit	Unifying and concentrating national efforts to counter financial infrastructure of terrorist organizations, perpetrators and parties involved in the financing of terror	NBCTF
State Attorney Cyber-Unit	National	Cyber prevention state unit	Prevents offenses against computer and information; Classic offenses fully copied to the computer space; Expression offenses in the computer space	SACU
The Society and Youth Administration	Multi-level	Educative integration, state unit	Specializes in the development of social skills, strengthening education for values, fostering thinking and moral behaviour, education for involvement, solidarity and social responsibility	link

the National Council for the Child	Multi-level	NGO	A unique activity in its combination of assisting children who turn to them with specific and concrete issues, and broad activity in the field of legislation and policy design, in a way that achieves results for hundreds of thousands of children in Israel. Among other things, the staff of the Referral and Assistance Center include social workers, and in appropriate inquiries there is also close involvement of other units in the Child Welfare Council, such as the Child and Justice Center (Legal Department) or the Child Victims of Violence and Violence Program .	link
The Reform Centre for Religion and State	National	NGO	The Reform Center deals with the protection of Israeli democracy, arguing against anti-democratic legislation through the writing and distribution of position papers, participation in coalitions with other organizations in civil society, as well as working with partners from the party system and Diaspora Jewry. Also, it fights racism, especially that which stems from religious motives, and is one of the great threats to Israeli society today. It fights racism on two levels - the fight against racist incitement perpetrated by religious extremists, and work to create a common society in Israel.	Link
The a=Association for Civil Rights in Israel	Multi-level	NGO	Established in 1972, the ACRI is Israel's oldest, largest human rights organization, and the only one dealing with the entire spectrum of rights and civil liberties issues in Israel and the Occupied Territories. An independent and non-partisan	ACRI

			organization, ACRI's mandate is to ensure Israel's accountability and respect for human rights, and is committed to promoting and defending the human rights and civil liberties of all, regardless of religion, nationality, gender, ethnicity, political affiliation, sexual orientation, or socioeconomic background.	
Tag Meir	National and local	NGO	Tag Meir sees the battle against racism as part of a wider campaign to support democratic values and Jewish values of loving one's neighbors and seeking justice for all. Whatever their politics, the majority of Israelis oppose acts of violence against innocent people who are being used as pawns in a political fight that has little or nothing to do with them.	Link
The Israel Democracy Institute	National	NGO	The Israel Democracy Institute is an independent center of research and action dedicated to strengthening the foundations of Israeli democracy. IDI works to bolster the values and institutions of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state. The institute partners with government, policy and decision makers, civil service and society, to improve the functioning of the government and its institutions, confront security threats while preserving civil liberties, and foster solidarity within Israeli society.	IDI
Movement for Quality Government in Israel	National	NGO	The Movement for Quality Government in Israel (MQG) is an independent, non-partisan, grassroots, non-profit organization that has been defending Israeli democracy since 1990. With tens of thousands of members	MQG

			and continuously growing, MQG has evolved into one of Israel's largest and most effective public interest organizations. it actively promotes the rule of law and better government.	
Adalah- the legal center for Arab minority rights in Israel	Multi-level	NGO	Adalah ("Justice" in Arabic) is an independent human rights organization and legal center. It was founded in November 1996 as a joint project of two leading Arab NGOs - The Galilee Society and the Arab Association for Human Rights (HRA), and it became an independent NGO in 1997; promoting and defending the human rights of all individuals subject to the jurisdiction of the State of Israel (e.g., Palestinian residents of the Occupied Territories). Adalah is the first Palestinian Arab-run legal centre in Israel, and the sole Palestinian organization that works before Israeli courts to protect the human rights of Palestinians in Israel and in the Occupied Territories.	Link
Sikkuy - The Association for the Advancement of Civic Equality	Regional and local	NGO	Sikkuy is a shared Jewish and Arab non-profit organization that works to advance equality and partnership between the Arab-Palestinian citizens of Israel; work with local Arab municipalities and the leadership of Arab society and engage in advocacy vis-à-vis government ministries, public bodies, the media, and the public at large, promoting policy change that will bring about full and substantive equality and a shared society	Link
HaMoked Lehaganat Haprat (Center for the Defence of the Individual)	National and regional	NGO	An Israeli human rights organization with the main aim of assisting Palestinians of the occupied territories whose rights are violated due to Israel's policies.	Link

			This site contains information relating to these human rights violations. It gives the texts of Israeli laws and regulations, including those of the Military Government; international conventions; petitions to the Israeli High Court of Justice; claims for compensation for damages; decisions by Israeli and other courts; and other official documents and reports.	
Givat Haviva	National	NGO	Givat Haviva is a non-profit organization founded in 1949 as the national center of education of the national kibbutz. It encourages divided communities to work together to achieve their common goals, through a process of interaction, support and mutual empowerment .This is done by leading inter-community ventures ;Guided tours and capacity-building activities ;Convening seminars, workshops and conferences to develop practical ideas that support change ;And translating these ideas into reality .Givat Haviva, as a leader in its field, has won the UNESCO Peace Education Award for its many years of activity in promoting Jewish-Arab dialogue.	Link
AJEEC – the Arab Jewish Center for Equality, Empowerment and Cooperation	Multi-level	NGO	AJEEC-NISPED is a non-profit organization dedicated to social change and Arab-Jewish partnership, based in Beer Sheva. Founded in 2000, the organization works to promote sustainable development among communities in transition as a foundation for the establishment of prosperous and equal communities living in peace. Programs operate inside of Israel, with partners from the wider Middle East and for beneficiaries from across the developing world. Activities in Israel focus on community	Link

				development among the Arab Bedouin residents of the Negev, who are part of the broader Arab population in Israel. It works to create meaningful partnerships between the Arab and Jewish populations and to advance social and economic justice for all of the country's residents

Annex III: Best practices/interventions/programmes

National level

Name of the Project	Institution (s)	Aim	Source	Evidence of effectiveness / literature
1. Israeli Hope	House of the President with Universities and local authorities	Change the discourse of inequality within Israeli society by operating in four dimensions: Academia, employment, sports and education.	State	This initiative has expanded since 2016 to public schools, especially within mixed cities, which are given awards for encouraging inclusive discourse, particularly between Jews and Arabs: https://www.haaretz.co.il/blogs/sherenf/BLOG-1.9667546 in addition, the municipality increases the number of local authorities participating and gives them the tools to fight racism and exclusion within their communities: https://www.israeli-hope.gov.il/en/node/413
2. The Anti-Racism Coordinating Governmental Unit (ARCGU)	Ministry of Justice	Handling complaints and performing trainings for state institutions in issues of racism in public spaces and public institutions (Institutional racism)	Government decision no. 1958	The unit has opened the first channel of communication between government and public, by accepting and handling complaints about racism. In addition, it adheres to a number of institutional practices, such as disciplinary actions against officials who perform racist behavior. In addition, the justice department has pinpointed unit's activities as part of its preventive social initiatives. The unit's annual reports are used by state officials

Name of the Project	Institution(s)	Aim	Source	Evidence of effectiveness / literature
				and racist behavior by law-enforcement (racist behavior of public service workers).			https://www.calcalist.co.il/local_news/article/rjhyblpjt https://www.mako.co.il/news-law/2021_q1/Article-647f4993a1b8771026.htm

Local level

Name of the Project	Institution(s)	Aim	Source	Evidence of effectiveness / literature
1. City without violence	Municipalities under government supervision	Decrease violence in cities by using preventive technology and educative explanatory initiatives to the public	State ministries	2010 report, submitted by the Israeli Parliament's (Knesset) research division, explaining how the project succeeded in lowering crime rates and recommending that it be expanded to more municipalities in Israel https://fs.knesset.gov.il/globaldocs/MMM/c3546b58-e9f7-e411-80c8-00155d010977/2_c3546b58-e9f7-e411-80c8-00155d010977_11_9484.pdf

Annex IV: Policy recommendations

- **NGO**- deep-in the ties and support on non-profit educational organizations in order to implement government policies that the municipalities are struggling with. It is also suggested that state's comptroller will appoint a team that will gather all essential activities that are made by civic society, on the purpose of highlighting constant injustices from local communities.
- **Integrational approach**- Israel should foster more integrational approaches in addition to its progress within intelligence and security authorities. It is simply not enough to rely on security institutions and operations, since it preserves the tension between human rights and security protection.
- **Judicial system**- even though it helps in matters of civic rights it is in fact also bound up with national, ethnic and religious considerations. In addition, citizens ability to reach out to the Supreme Court is dependent on resources and usually rely on NGOs assistance. Therefore, it is crucial to make the legal system more accessible to individuals and groups. The ccourt's long lasting bureaucracy procedures might make the use of it as redundant, an effective tool to population at risk.

- **DE-radicalisation authorities** – Israel should define its particular institutions that are dealing with this field and strength them by legislation, e.g., define jurisdictions and authorities under permanent law, instead of the current fluidity of different rules under multiple ministries and governmental units.
- **Constitutional work and policy**– Israel need to establish a permanent constitution in order to better handle social ruptures that are created as a result of the absence of a unify constitutional frame. This raises difficulties on policy stability and by as a result creates that preserves mistrust in state institutions, that use ethnicity, religion and nationality as political leverage.

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