

Deradicalisation and Integration: Legal and Policy Framework in Austria

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List of Abbreviations

Abbreviation German		English	
ВКА	Bundeskanzleramt	Federal Chancellery	
BMAFJ	Bundesministerium Arbeit, Frauen und Jugend	Federal Ministry for Labour, Women and Youth	
BMBWF	Bundesministerium Bildung, Wissenschaft und Forschung	Federal Ministry of Education, Science and Research	
BMEIA	Bundesministerium für Europa, Integration und Äußeres	Federal Ministry for Europe, Integration and Foreign Affairs	
BMGSPK	Bundesministerium Gesundheit, Soziales, Pflege und Konsumentenschutz	Federal Ministry for Health, Social Affairs, Care and Consumer Protection	
вм.і	Bundesministerium für Inneres	Federal Ministry of the Interior	
ВМЈ	Bundesministerium für Justiz	Federal Ministry of Justice	
BNED	Bundesweites Netzwerk Extremismusprävention und Deradikalisierung	National Network for Prevention and Countering Violent Extremism and De-Radicalisation	
BV-G	Bundes-Verfassungsgesetz	Federal Constitutional Law	
BVT	Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz und Terrorismusbekämpfung	Austrian Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution and Counter-Terrorism	
CFR	Charta der Grundrechte der Europäischen Union	Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union	
DERAD	Netzwerk Sozialer Zusammenhalt für Dialog, Extremismusprävention und Demokratie	Conversational Sessions for risk assessment and ideological disassociation	
DÖW	Doumentationsarchiv des österreichischen Widerstandes	Documentation Centre of Austrian Resistance	
ECHR	Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention (EMRK)	European Convention on Human Rights	
EU	Europäische Union	European Union	
GrekoG	Grenzkontrollgesetz	Border Control Act	
FPÖ	Freiheitliche Partei Österreich	Austrian Freedom Party	
FRA	Agentur für Grundrechte	Fundamental Rights Agency	

HiNBG	Hass-im-Netz-Bekämpfungs- Gesetz	Hate-on-the-Net-Combat-Act	
LVT Landesamt für Verfassungsschutz		Provincial Offices for the Protection of the Constitution and Counterterrorism	
MJÖ	Muslimische Jugend Österreich	Muslim Youth Austria	
NEOS	Das Neue Österreich und Liberales Forum	The New Austria and Liberal Forum	
OGH	Oberster Gerichtshof	High Court of Justice	
ÖVP	Österreichische Volkspartei	Austrian People's Party	
PStSG	Polizeiliches Staatsschutzgesetz	Police State Protection Act	
RAN		Radicalisation Awareness Network	
SPÖ	Sozialdemokratische Arbeiterpartei	Social Democrats	
StbG	Staatsbürgerschaftsgesetz	Citizenship Act	
StGB	Strafgesetzbuch	Austrian Criminal Code	
TeBG	Terror-Bekämpfungs-Gesetz	Terror Combat Act	
VdU	Verband der Unabhängigen	Federation of Independents	
VerbotsG	Verbotsgesetz	National Socialist Prohibition Law	
VfGH	Verfassungsgerichtshof	Constitutional Court	
VwGH	Verwaltungsgerichtshof	Administrative High Court	
WNED	Wiener Netzwerk Demokratiekultur und Prävention	Vienna Network for Democratic Culture and Prevention	

Acknowledgements

In order to reach the aim of this report, namely to give a conceptual account on how existing policies and laws address radicalisation and to pinpoint their most critical aspects and best practices, we held interviews with experts active in the field. We would like to thank them for their time and their valuable inputs. Their expertise helped us a lot to contextualise the legal and policy framework in Austria and to improve this report. Furthermore, we want to thank Hanneke Friedl for her thorough language editing and her valuable comments as well as Jakob Fux for his crucial legal inputs. Finally, we want to thank the work package lead for their support throughout the process.

About the Project

D.Rad is a comparative study of radicalisation and polarisation in Europe and beyond. It aims to identify the actors, networks and wider social contexts driving radicalisation, particularly among young people in urban and peri-urban areas. D.Rad conceptualises this through the I-GAP spectrum (injustice-grievance-alienation-polarisation) with the goal of moving towards the measurable evaluation of de-radicalisation programmes. Our intention is to identify the building blocks of radicalisation, which include the person's sense of being victimised, of being thwarted or lacking agency in established legal and political structures and coming under the influence of "us vs them" identity formulations.

D.Rad benefits from an exceptional breadth of backgrounds. The project spans national contexts including the UK, France, Italy, Germany, Poland, Hungary, Finland, Slovenia, Bosnia, Serbia, Kosovo, Israel, Iraq, Jordan, Turkey, Georgia, Austria and several minority nationalisms. It bridges academic disciplines ranging from political science and cultural studies to social psychology and artificial intelligence. Dissemination methods include D.Rad labs, D.Rad hubs, policy papers, academic workshops, visual outputs and digital galleries. As such, D.Rad establishes a rigorous foundation in order to test practical interventions geared to prevention, inclusion and de-radicalisation.

With the possibility of capturing the trajectories of 17 nations and several minority nations, the project will provide a unique evidence base for the comparative analysis of law and policy as nation states adapt to new security challenges. The process of mapping these varieties and their link to national contexts will be crucial in uncovering the strengths and weaknesses in existing interventions. Furthermore, D.Rad accounts for the problem that processes of radicalisation often occur in circumstances that escape the control and scrutiny of traditional national frameworks of justice. The participation of AI professionals in modelling, analysing and devising solutions to online radicalisation will be central to the project's aims.

1. Introduction

The following report gives an overview of the legal and policy framework concerning radicalisation and deradicalisation in Austria. The aim of the report is to outline how existing policies and laws address radicalisation, and to connect the legislative and institutional framework to the socio-economic, political, and cultural context as well as to the constitutional organisation of the state. We cover punitive measures as well as primary, secondary, and tertiary deradicalisation measures and discuss the legislative framework against the background of fundamental rights. Finally, deradicalisation measures are outlined by two in-depth case studies that focus on urban and peri-urban youth. Through this overview of the legislation on the one hand, and institutions as well as practical examples on the other, we pinpoint critical aspects and best practices in Austria.

The report is primarily based on secondary research regarding legislation and a review of the existing literature in the field. However, to gain deeper insights and a better understanding of the Austrian context and the case studies, we conducted six interviews with stakeholders in the field. Approaching the topic from several angles, we spoke with administrative officers as well as with people that are active in NGOs or other institutions of prevention and reintegration. We wished to shed light on the phenomena of right-wing extremism and religiously motivated extremism. Both types of radicalisation have shaped the Austrian landscape of extremism and radicalisation in recent years. The former is closely linked to the history of the country and is characterised by strong networks, while the latter has become the focus of attention in the last decade.

The following chapter gives an overview of the political, socio-economic, and cultural context in Austria and outlines developments in the field of radicalisation. The third chapter introduces the constitutional organisation and fundamental rights and gives examples of paradigmatic case law to illustrate how fundamental rights are executed in practice and to shed light on fields of tension. Chapter 4 discusses the legislative framework regarding counterterrorism and radicalisation and demonstrates how police surveillance powers were expanded over the years while the government introduced several laws that explicitly targeted so-called "political Islam", a term regularly used by members of the current and recent governments. Chapter 5 illustrates the institutional framework, citing the example of the National Network for Prevention and Countering Violent Extremism and De-Radicalisation (BNED), which includes the most relevant stakeholders in the field. The two case studies – the "Vienna Network for Democratic Culture and Prevention" (WNED) and the online street work project Jamal al-Katib – are introduced in chapter six before we conclude the report with some general observations.

2. Political, socio-economic, and cultural context¹

Austria is a federal state that consists of nine federal provinces, with a division of power between the federal level, called *Bund*, and the nine federal provinces (*Länder*). The political system displays a mix of presidential and parliamentary elements, although the presidential

¹ This chapter is a synopsis of the D.Rad 3.1 and the D.Rad 3.2. report. For an overview of stakeholders of (de)-radicalisation in Austria, see Haselbacher, Mattes, and Reeger, 2021. For an overview of trends of radicalisation, see Haselbacher and Reeger, 2021.

element is rather weak (Pelinka and Rosenberger, 2003). The capital, Vienna, is the only large city with 1.9 million inhabitants, followed by Graz in Styria (approximately 300,000 inhabitants) and Linz in Upper Austria (approximately 200,000 inhabitants). After World War II, Austria was constituted as a federal, representative, democratic republic. It has upheld its constitutional status of neutrality until today, despite having joined the European Union (EU) in 1995. Furthermore, Austria has belonged to the Euro zone since the establishment of the latter in 2002. Although Austria has never perceived itself as an immigration country (Bauböck and Perchinig, 2006), around 20% of the current population have a so-called migration background and were either born abroad or born in Austria from parents who both have foreign citizenship (Statistik Austria, 2020).

The official language in Austria is German. Romani, Czech, Slovak, Hungarian, Croatian, Slovenian and the Austrian sign language are officially recognised minority languages. However, only Hungarian, Croatian, and Slovenian are official languages in certain bilingual regions. These languages reflect the history of the country dating back to the Austro-Hungarian Empire. They are included in the Austrian State Treaty of 1955². Nevertheless, their legitimacy has repeatedly been contested by right-wing extremists and nationalists (Hiesel, 2010; kaernten.ORF.at, 2021). Other languages, specifically those spoken by recent immigrants (e.g. Turkish), are not subject to the protection of minority rights, although today they are the most frequently spoken languages beside German.

The majority of the population (around 54%) is Roman Catholic. The Roman Catholic Church plays a distinctive role and church-state relations are defined by the Concordat. The second largest group are people without religious affiliation (around 25% of the population), followed by Islam, Orthodox Christians, and Protestants. These religious communities are all legally acknowledged and thus have, amongst others, the right to religious education, the right to self-determination and administration, and the right to religious assistance.

Austria has one of the highest gender pay gaps in the EU. Furthermore, the proportion of women working part-time is comparatively high (47.7% in 2019, Statistik Austria, 2021). Unemployment rose significantly in the past year due to the COVID-19 pandemic, and Austria consequently suffered from the deepest recession since the global economic crisis in the 1930s (BMSGPK, 2020). A growing number of people is currently at risk of becoming poverty-struck, and social exclusion and economic inequalities have deepened in the past two years. The Austrian government has invested large sums of money in financing short-time employment to avoid insolvencies. However, the concrete effects of the crisis, which are expected to continue characterising the next years, are yet unclear.

The Austrian landscape of political parties was long jointly dominated by the Social Democrats (SPÖ) and the Christian-Democratic People's Party (ÖVP). In this context, corporatism with institutionalised bargaining practices plays an important role that marked the political system

The Austrian State Treaty (State Treaty Concerning the Restoration of an Independent and Democratic Austria, signed in Vienna on May 15, 1955; StV) was signed by representatives of the Allied occupying powers of the United States, the Soviet Union, France, and Great Britain, as well as the Austrian federal government (for more information see Suppan, 2005). The object of the treaty is the restoration of Austria as a sovereign, independent and democratic state after the National Socialist rule in Austria (1938-1945) and the subsequent period of occupation (1945-1955). It defines, inter alia, that Austria cannot enter into any political or economic union with Germany (Article 4, prohibition of annexation) and that is committed to a democratic government based on secret elections (Article 8, democratic institutions).

of the Second Republic (Tálos, 2005). The so-called system of social partnership (*Sozialpartnerschaft*) brings together the side of employees³ (usually SPÖ dominated) and employers⁴ (usually ÖVP dominated) on the one hand and ministries on the other. The social partners are included in the legislative process (if it concerns their area of interest) and can, among other things, review legislation.

The dominance of ÖVP and SPÖ has changed from the late 1980s onwards, with declining votes for these two parties, the electoral rise of the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ), and upcoming new parties – among them the Green Party and more recently (2012), the liberal party NEOS. While the Austrian People's Party (ÖVP) dominates the political landscape in rural areas, the city of Vienna has been under Social Democratic rule since the end of the Second World War. The well-known slogan of the city of Vienna, "Vienna is different" (*Wien ist anders*), summarises the chasm that is typical of the urban/rural divide, which has a religious, cultural, and political dimension.

Linguists and social scientists alike have highlighted the role of the FPÖ in steering public debates, using aggressive populist rhetoric and hate speech (Heinisch et al., 2020; Wodak, 2018). Populist parties have fuelled xenophobic and anti-Islamic sentiments and have steered public debates on migration and integration (Ajanovic et al., 2016). Recent studies show how the rhetoric and the party programmes of the Austrian Peoples Party (ÖVP) and the FPÖ have converged in recent years, as the ÖVP has developed a strong anti-immigrant profile under the leadership of Sebastian Kurz (Hadj Abdou et al., 2021; Hadj Abdou and Ruedin, 2021; Heinisch et al., 2020), who has been a driving force in restricting migration to Austria and in targeting so-called "political Islam". Following their party lines, the respective ministers have framed integration primarily as a problem, and migration and Islam as the central threat to society and to social cohesion.

The strength of rightist ideas also results in the country's longest standing strand of radicalisation, namely right-wing extremism. The anti-fascist political activist Ernst Kirchweger, who was killed in 1965 by a right-wing extremist during a demonstration against the anti-semitic university professor Taras Borodajkewyczis, is considered the first victim of political violence in Austria after World War II (Bruckmüller, 2018). Notably, the right-wing terrorist Franz Fuchs killed four people and injured 15 in bomb attacks during the 1990s (El Refaie, 2004). None-theless, most cases of right-wing radicalism were less violent (involving verbal abuse, racist graffiti, National-Socialist activities, etc.) and somewhat embedded in established structures, such as the FPÖ surroundings and nationalist fraternities or *Burschenschaften* (Weidinger, 2014, 2016). Conspicuously, the extreme right was furthermore successful in establishing networks that cut across all segments of society and has also established their own media channels on- and offline (Goetz et al., 2021, see also Haselbacher and Reeger, 2021).

Overall and compared to other countries, terror attacks and incidents involving fatalities have been rare exceptions in Austria. Due to its geographical position at the heart of Europe and its strategic role as a centre for international organisations and diplomacy, Vienna has experienced terrorist attacks in the past that can be classified as imported conflicts. The attack by the Palestinian Abu-Nidal group on the Israeli airline *El Al*, which killed three people at the

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³ The side of employers is represented through the WKO (Wirtschaftskammer), the Austrian Economic Chamber, and the LKO (Landwirtschaftskammer), the Chamber of Agriculture.

⁴ The side of employees is represented through the ÖGB (Österreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund), the Austrian Federation of Trade Unions, and the AK (Arbeiterkammer), the Chamber of Labour.

Vienna International Airport in 1985, is an example of such an incident (Bunzl, 1991; Pluchinski, 2006). However, most of these more violent attacks predate the events that took place on 11 September 2001 in the USA. Due to international developments, jihadist terrorism, and here above all the phenomenon of so-called foreign fighters, have more recently played a significant role in Austria. The country has had a comparatively large number of young people who have left Austria to join jihadist groups or attempted to do so (Hofinger and Schmidinger, 2020). In November 2020, a terror attack related to the terrorist militia Islamic State took place in Vienna. A single perpetrator killed four people in the city centre and wounded a further 22 (Bell, 2020). As Bauer and Mattes note (2021, p. 1): "This terror attack has shaken Austria heavily and has brought the already dominant securitisation of Islam to the very centre of attention".

Although the characteristics and operational modes of right-wing extremism and jihadism differ, both ideologies include feelings of injustice, grievance, alienation, and polarisation. Leading figures in both milieus have nurtured these feelings and have used them to recruit followers. While injustice, grievance, and alienation pertain to a more personal level, polarising effects have been quite visible in society in the past years. In its most extreme manifestation, the terrorist militia Islamic State has called for a holy war against all people who do not subscribe to the Muslim faith, while neo-fascist actors advocate against foreign infiltration and the imminent Islamisation of the "occident". Moreover, although left-wing extremism has played a rather small role compared to the situation in other European countries, left-right polarisation remains an issue. The political left is smaller, less institutionalised, fragmented, and less violent than right-wing groups. However, when it comes to grievances and polarisation, left-wing and right-wing conflicts have fuelled demonstrations and actions of both strands of radicalisation. Current developments associated with the COVID-19 pandemic have fuelled these developments, as anti-vaccinists, esoterics, conspiracy theorists, far-right extremists, and many more took to the streets (Euronews, 2021). As is the case across Europe, the threat that these groups pose in terms of radicalisation and violent extremism becomes increasingly evident, although it is still too early to make assumptions about future developments.

Constitutional organisation of the state and fundamental rights

The centrepiece of the Austrian constitution is the federal constitutional law (*Bundesverfassungsgesetz* B-VG). The B-VG was in force from 1920 until the annexation ("*Anschluss*") of Austria by Nazi-Germany in 1938 and was reinstated in 1945. Among other things, the B-VG determines the organisation of the state and the division of powers. It also includes fundamental and human rights. A fundamental principle of the Austrian state is the separation of powers (see also Heinisch et al., 2020; Pelinka and Rosenberger, 2003; Ucakar, Gschiegl and Jenny, 2017) The legislative power is exercised by the parliament and the parliaments of the federal provinces. The Austrian Parliament is a bicameral system that consists of two chambers: the National Council (elected every five years directly in general elections) and the Regional Council (elected indirectly through the provincial assemblies). The executive power is exercised by the government and the administration. The executive branch includes, among others, the Federal President, the Federal Government, federal ministers, but also the provincial governments, district administrative authorities or municipal administrations. The

party with the largest number of votes in general elections receives the mandate from the President to form the government and usually provides the Federal Chancellor, who, as head of the government, holds a powerful position. The judiciary is separated from the administration in all instances.

Austrian constitutional law is highly fragmented: Each federal province has a state constitution, there are several other constitutional acts (so-called *Bundesverfassungsgesetze*, BVG, without the hyphen) and state treaties that have constitutional rank, and constitutional provisions can also be included in Basic Laws. Consequently, Austrian constitutional law is rather complex and diffuse (Berka, 2008; Öhlinger and Eberhard, 2019). In Austria's liberal-democratic system, there are multiple legal sources of fundamental rights, that is, constitutionally guaranteed rights with special status and special enforceability, which protect individuals from the powers of the state (Berka et al., 2019). Besides the B-VG, the most important laws of constitutional rank are the Basic Law on the General Rights of Nationals (StGG)⁵, the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFR)⁶, with the last two having several overlaps⁷. The StGG represents a catalogue of central civil rights such as the right to freedom of association and assembly (Article 12), the right to freedom of expression (Article 13), or the right to freedom of belief and conscience, including freedom of worship (Articles 14-17).

The overarching constitutional principle is the religious and ideological neutrality of the state. The Constitutional Court (VfGH) derives this fundamental right from the principle of equality, normed in Art 7 B-VG and Art 2 StGG in conjunction with Art 9 EMRK and Art 14 § 2 StGG. Recently, in December 2020, the VfGH has overturned a law that had introduced a ban on headscarves in schools. The court based its decision essentially on the fact that the law violated the principle of equality and the freedom of thought, conscience, and religion pursuant to Art 9 ECHR, and the freedom of faith and conscience pursuant to Art 14 StGG.⁸ The principle of equality in Article 7 of the Federal Constitution ("all citizens are equal before the law") was emphasised by the court: "There must be objective reasons for differences in the law".

In another recent decision by the VfGH, the court has further expanded on determining the aspect of "self-determination" of individuals. In this decision, the VfGH paved the way for assisted suicide (death on demand and assistance in suicide). The constitutionally guaranteed right to self-determination proclaimed in this context is derived from the reference to the principle of equality in Art 7 B-VG and Art 2 StGG and the right to private and family life in accordance with Art 8 ECHR and the right to life in accordance with Art 2 ECHR.⁹

⁵ It should be noted, however, that not all of these rights are guaranteed to "everyone" (see, for example, Article 12 of the Austrian Constitution on the freedom of assembly and association, which is only granted to Austrian citizens).

⁶ The CFR binds the Member States only when applying Union law (Art 51 (1) CFR). However, the CFR constitutes a standard of review in proceedings before the Constitutional Court within the scope of application of Union law (see VfSlg 19.632).

For a more detailed discussion of the ECHR and the CRR see Grabenwarter, 2014; Peers et al., 2014; Vries et al., 2015.

⁸ VfGH 11.12.2020, G 4/2020.

⁹ VfGH 11.12.2020, G 139/2019.

Regarding minority rights, the most relevant legal provisions are Art 8 § 2 B-VG, which specifies that Austria "is committed to its evolved linguistic and cultural diversity, which is expressed in the autochthonous ethnic groups", and further "the language and culture, existence and preservation of these ethnic groups are to be respected, safeguarded and promoted". In addition, Art. 149 B-VG raises Section V (Protection of Minorities) of Part III of the State Treaty of Saint Germain of 10 September 1919 to constitutional status. This section contains various provisions on the protection of minorities.

However, the fundamental rights guaranteed in the ECHR and the constitution are, with exceptions, not absolutely protected, i.e., they can be subject to certain restrictions. In most cases, a substantive legal reservation must be applied. This is the case, for example, if the interests of national security and the self-determination of the state weigh stronger than the fundamental right, and, of course, proportionality must always be given. For example, Art 8 ECHR "Right to respect for private and family life" states that: "There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others." Legal constraints to fundamental rights thus become relevant in the field of counterterrorism, deradicalisation, and integration. Some of these constraints will be discussed in the following paragraphs.

Regarding associations and assemblies, Article 11 § 2 of the ECHR stipulates that the exercise of these rights might need to be impaired in the interest of national security, public safety, the maintenance of order and the prevention of crime, the protection of health and morals, or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. The Assembly Act entails provisions that account for these aspects. These tensions have recently become apparent in the context of far-right COVID-19 demonstrations, to give an example.

Concerning the freedom of expression¹⁰, there is one particularly important constraint, namely the criminal act of "incitement to hatred" as stipulated under Art 283 of the Austrian Criminal Code, which states: "(1) Anyone who publicly in a manner suited to jeopardise public order, or in a manner perceivable to the general public incites violence against a church or religious denomination or any other group of persons defined on the basis of race, skin colour, language, religion or world view, nationality, descent or national or ethnic origin, gender, disability, age or sexual orientation, or against a member of such a group, explicitly on account of his or her belonging to such a group, shall be punished by imprisonment for up to two years. (2) Likewise, anyone who incites against a group referred to in subsection (1) in a manner perceptible to the general public or insults it in a manner that violates human dignity and thereby seeks to bring it into contempt shall be punished." This aspect has recently also become relevant in the context of online hate speech.

Regarding religious freedoms, legal restrictions can be found in the terminology of Article 9 ECHR which stipulates that "Freedom of religion or belief shall not be subject to restrictions other than those provided by law, which in a democratic society are necessary measures in the interests of public safety, public order, health and morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others." Over the past decade, debates on the abuse of religious freedoms

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¹⁰ Provisions concerning freedom of expression can be found in Art 13 StGG and in Art 10 ECHR.

through fundamentalist groups have been primarily conducted in relation to Islam and practices related to women, children, and homo- and transsexual persons.

Fundamental rights have constitutional status and thus take precedence over simple legal regulations. State measures must always be evaluated against fundamental rights, which set limits to state action and thus constitute an objective yardstick. Fundamental rights also include the subjective rights of individual citizens that can be enforced before independent courts. In the event of ambiguities regarding constitutional norms, the Constitutional Court has jurisdiction. Provisions of the ECHR can also be interpreted by the Constitutional Court, but it follows the interpretation of the law by the European Court of Human Rights, which can only be invoked after the domestic courts have been exhausted. If a provision of the CFR is involved, the Constitutional Court must refer the question to the ECJ if it cannot decide beyond doubt (Kreil, 2020).

In the prevention of extremism and counterterrorism, the right to individual freedom and the right to security must always both be taken into consideration. State surveillance measures usually result in the restriction of the fundamental rights of those who are under surveillance. While the extension of surveillance measures is in conflict with the fundamental right to respect for privacy and the fundamental right to data protection (Adensamer, 2020), measures targeting hate speech and incitement are partially in conflict with the right to freedom of expression (Cannie and Voorhoof, 2011; Howard, 2017).

However, surveillance as a multi-layered phenomenon includes not only the aspect of the restriction of freedom and the limitation of fundamental rights but also has protective aspects and contributes to the production of a social order (Kreissl, 2020; Lyon, 2012; Wright and Kreissl, 2015). The task of the legislator is to balance these two aspects. In addition, the state must ensure that fundamental rights are protected against state interference, but also against the interference of third parties and individuals. To this end, there are several institutions that focus on the monitoring of fundamental rights, such as the Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA) of the EU, based in Vienna, or the United Nations Human Rights Council.

4. Legal and policy framework in the field of radicalisation and counterterrorism

The policy framework addressing the issues of extremism and terrorism is rather complex and concerns many policy areas, ranging from public security and immigration as well as immigrant integration to the governance of political and religious associations. The mode of intervention also displays a great variety of approaches, including preventive policies, punitive measures, and the curtailing of rights. European legislation and socio-political events such as the politicisation of refugee immigration and Islam as well as the subsequent electoral success of rightist parties have all strongly influenced Austrian legislation in the realm of extremism and terrorism during the past three decades.

Regarding political associations, the post-war republic (and its later sovereignty) depended on its commitment to anti-fascism. One of the oldest laws addressing political extremism is the National Socialist Prohibition Law (*Verbotsgesetz*), which has had constitutional status since its adoption in 1947. It forbids any activity in the spirit of National Socialism (denial, trivialisation, approval, and justification), including the denial of the Holocaust. Whereas the

Nationalist Socialist Prohibition Law is unique in its form, the legislation targeting terrorism and extremism is dispersed across many different acts of law. Austria's current National Security Strategy¹¹ was adopted in 2013 and proposes a series of different political approaches to prevent or combat extremism, ranging from international cooperation on counterterrorism to immigrant integration.¹² One of its key recommendations at the level of domestic politics comprises the promotion of a good and safe community life through the strengthening of democratic attitudes. The further development and implementation of the National Security Strategy and the National Action Plan for Immigrant Integration¹³ attempt to prevent extremist and fundamentalist trends, placing particular emphasis on dialogue concerning fundamental rights across cultures and religions. Thematically, there is a strong convergence of the topics of security, migration, asylum, and integration. The next section focusses on the legislation on counterterrorism and traces the process of the expansion of surveillance laws, whereas section 4.2 illustrates that the legislative framework in the field of radicalisation has increasingly focussed on political Islam.

4.1. Federal counter-terrorism legislation: General developments and surveillance laws

The terror attacks of 11 September 2001 in the USA mark a critical moment for Austrian counter-terrorism legislation. Consequently, and in accordance with the EU framework decision of the council on combatting terrorism¹⁴, the federal government introduced three new offences to the Criminal Code (StGB) (Forsthuber, 2017, p.17)¹⁵: § 278b on terrorist organisations (membership of a terrorist organisation can be penalised with one to ten years of imprisonment); § 278c on terrorist crimes; and § 278d on the financing of terrorist activities. § 278c covers murder, specific forms of bodily injuries, extortionate kidnapping, aggravated coercion, specific forms of dangerous threat, and the damaging of critical infrastructure. Punitive measures were expanded in the following years by adding § 278e on training for terrorist purposes in 2010 (i.e. education towards the construction of weapons) and § 278f covering instruction to commit a terrorist offense in 2011 (i.e. media work promoting or instructing terror attacks made available online).

In 2014, Austrian parliament passed a legal package that primarily addressed Islamist terrorism and the recruitment of jihadi combatants. The amendment to the Symbols Act prohibits

https://www.bmi.gv.at/502/files/130717_Sicherheitsstrategie_Kern_A4_WEB_barrierefrei.pdf

¹² https://www.bundeskanzleramt.gv.at/themen/sicherheitspolitik/sicherheitsstrategie.html

https://www.bundeskanzleramt.gv.at/dam/jcr:76ab3e9a-19e0-40cb-89eb-44a7b177cf97/nap massnahmenkatalog.pdf

¹⁴ Framework decision of the Council 2002/475/JI on combatting terrorism.

¹⁵ Criminal Law Amendment Act 2002, BGBI I 2002/134.

These acts have a terrorist connection if "the act is likely to cause serious or prolonged disruption of public life or serious damage to economic life and is committed with the intent to seriously intimidate the population, to coerce public authorities or an international organisation to act, acquiesce or refrain from acting, or to seriously shake or destroy the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a state or an international organisation".

¹⁷ BGBI I 2010/108 and BGBI I 2011/103.

the use and dissemination of symbols of the Islamic State, Al-Qaeda, and organisations associated with these groups. ¹⁸ In the same year, the amendment to the Border Control Act (GrekoG) and the Citizenship Act enabled authorities to check whether departing minors have their parents' consent to leave the country if there is a suspicion that they intend to take part in hostilities abroad. ¹⁹ Amendments to the Citizenship Act stipulate that Austrians who have participated voluntarily and actively in combat operations abroad in the context of an armed conflict will have their citizenship revoked if they hold another citizenship.

In 2016, the coalition between the SPÖ and ÖVP agreed on a new Police State Protection Act (PStSG) and amendments to the Security Police Act (*Sicherheitspolizeigesetz*).²⁰ The main goal of this legal reform was to provide effective protection against terrorist threats, as the government argued that authorities had too few opportunities to become active in the run-up to criminal acts. Apart from the reorganisation of the Austrian Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution and Counter-Terrorism (BVT), an extensive database was created and powers of observation were expanded for authorities. Under this law, it became possible to recruit confidential informants in the course of undercover investigations, to store the data of all contacts of suspects, and to determine cell phone location data in the event of a concrete threat without judicial control, a fact that was heavily criticised by experts and by the opposition.

In 2018, when the Austrian government transposed the EU Directive on combatting terrorism,²¹ the Criminal Code and the Criminal Procedures Act were amended.²² The law now enables authorities to consider a wider scope of offenses as potential terrorist attacks, lowering the threshold regarding levels of bodily harm, damage to property, and data capturing and storage. Furthermore, the law introduced "travelling for terrorist purposes" to the Criminal Code. Persons who travel to another country to commit a terrorist offense can be fined with a prison sentence of six months to five years.

In April 2018, the National Council adopted the so-called Security Package (also referred to as Surveillance Package by critics).²³ It included a series of measures to prevent terrorist attacks. The then Interior Minister Wolfgang Sobotka (ÖVP) had advocated, among other things, the introduction of video surveillance in public space and the vetting of online communication services. According to an ÖVP member of parliament, these legal changes aimed to address "Islamic extremist structures" and "jihadi travellers".²⁴ A security package would accordingly be the next logical step following the establishment of deradicalisation measures. However, due to massive resistance from the opposition and from civil society, the package was adopted with small changes following the snap elections of 2017 and the establishment of a coalition with the far-right FPÖ. The amendment²⁵ included, inter alia, the introduction of state spyware

¹⁸ BGBI I 103/2014.

¹⁹ BGBI I 104/2014.

²⁰ BGBI I 5/2016.

²¹ BGBI I 2017/541.

²² BGBI I 70/2018.

²³ BGBI I 29/2018.

²⁴ https://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/PR/JAHR_2017/PK0782/

²⁵ BGBI I 29/2018.

(also referred to as *Bundestrojaner*²⁶) and IMSI catchers.²⁷ It furthermore authorised security agencies to access video and audio surveillance of public spaces in order to prevent probable attacks through facial recognition and automated identification of conspicuous behaviour.²⁸

In December 2019, the VfGH annulled most parts of the Security Package.²⁹ The court argued that data collection was "disproportionate" and a "serious interference" of secrecy interests as defined in the Data Protection Act (*Datenschutzgesetz*) and of the right to respect for private life under Art 8 ECHR. Likewise, regarding the application of spyware, the court argued that such measures were only permissible within extremely narrow limits.

In December 2020, the federal government introduced a bill to amend the Citizenship Act (StbG) and the Symbols Act (*Symbole-Gesetz*), aiming to facilitate the withdrawal of citizenship in the event of a final conviction for a terrorist-motivated crime and pursuing action against the spread of extremist and radicalising ideas.³⁰ Furthermore, the scope of the Symbols Act was extended and now includes groups that use symbols that glorify or support violence or crimes against humanity. In this vein, Austria expanded prohibitions to include the far-right "Identitäre" movement as well as Islamist organisations like "Hizb ut-Tahrir," and "Caucasus Emirate".

At the same time, the federal government introduced the bill for the Counter-Terrorism Act (TeBG) in response to the Vienna terror attack. Its aim was to intensify the monitoring of terrorist offenders after their release from prison, to counter religiously motivated extremism, and to address terrorist financing. It also provides, among other things, for the electronic monitoring of extremists even after their conditional release and foresees the introduction of case conferences, a fact that was appreciated by experts. More importantly, the bill includes the introduction of Art 247b StGB on "Religiously Motivated Extremist Association", which targets specifically so-called Islamic extremism. According to Amnesty International, this is a violation of the principle of certainty and the principle of proportionality. The organisation expressed serious concerns that the introduction of this provision could have a discriminatory effect on Muslims living in Austria³¹. Several organisations (inter alia Amnesty International, Neustart,

³⁰ By amending the Citizenship Act, Austrian citizenship can be revoked, provided that the person does not become stateless, if the person concerned has been convicted of leading or participating in a terrorist organisaisation, committed a terrorist offense, financed terrorism, conducted training for terrorist purposes, instructed others to commit a terrorist offense; travelled for terrorist purposes, incited someone towards or approved of someone committing terrorist offenses, or has been convicted by final judgment to an unconditional or partially conditional custodial sentence.

²⁶ The *Bundestrojaner* enabled so-called remote hacking of suspects' digital devices in order to vet encrypted messages.

²⁷ Devices that enable the location of cellphones and the interception of calls.

Furthermore, security agencies were given access to the recordings of Austrian roads (vehicle license plate numbers, car brand, type, and colour) as well as the possibility to require the storage of data for telecommunications operators for up to one year. It foresaw the obligatory identity registration for the purchase of SIM cards (including prepaid ones), and the restriction of the secrecy of correspondence for persons imprisoned for more than one year.

²⁹ G 72-74/2019 and G 181-182/2019.

³¹ https://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XXVII/SNME/SNME 36479/imfname 880960.pdf

epicenter works, the Austrian Bar Association, the Austrian Association of Prosecutors³²) criticised §247b StGB for being excessive, as the current legal framework would be sufficient to effectively combat terrorism. In addition, the national Council passed a law in June 2021 that provides for the organizational restructuring of the Austrian Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution and Counter-Terrorism, which will be discussed in detail in chapter 5³³.

4.2. Federal legislative measures targeting counter-extremism and deradicalisation: Targeting political Islam

In 2015, the parliament passed the Islam Law 2015 (*Islamgesetz*), which replaced the previous Islam Law stemming from 1912.³⁴ While the Islam Law of 1912 was a reaction to the constitutional integration of Bosnia and Herzegovina into the Habsburg monarchy aiming at officially recognizing the religion in Austria (Potz, 2013), the Islam Law of 2015 included measures that aimed at curbing Islamic extremism.³⁵ The federal Security Strategy paper from 2015 names Islamist extremism as the primary threat to national security. It identifies the "establishment of a so-called 'home-grown' scene, consisting primarily of young Muslims from the second and third generations of immigrants and of people who have converted to Islam" as the central threat (BMI, 2015, p. 9).³⁶ This points to the politicization of Islam in Austria (Hafez and Heinisch, 2018; Mattes, 2018a). In the country report on Stakeholders of (De)-Radicalisation in Austria, we have outlined how the differentiation between Islam as a religion and the phenomenon of political Islamism became increasingly blurred in the past years (Haselbacher, Mattes, and Reeger, 2021). Accordingly, Mattes has stated that "drawing on religion for boundary-making is in practice not limited to Austria's far right populist representatives" (Mattes 2018b, p.159).

In 2017, Austria adopted a legal package for the integration of refugees, which entailed a ban on full-face coverings in public places (particularly targeting the wearing of the niqab and burqa).³⁷ The package also provided legal grounds to prohibit the distribution of radical campaign materials, which was aimed at Quran distribution campaigns by Salafists. In the following year, parliament passed an agreement based on Art 15a B-VG that regulated the adoption of subnational legislation on nursery schools.³⁸ One aspect of the agreement is the mandatory

³² For comments on the TeBG see https://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XXVII/ME/ME_00083/index.shtml#tab-Stellungnahmen

³³ BGBI I 148/2021.

³⁴ BGBI I 39/2015.

It included provisions on the relations between the state and Islamic institutions, regulated religious teachings, banned foreign funding of Muslim organisations, required imams to be able to speak German, and barred foreign clerics from leadership positions in mosques (which primarily affected Turkish civil servants).

³⁶ https://www.bmi.gv.at/501/files/Teilstrategie_Innere_Sicherheit_V20150324_web.pdf

³⁷ BGBI I 68/2017; Concealing one's facial features in public was fined with up to €150. This applies not only in public places but also for example when travelling by bus, rail, and air, as well as in courts, schools, and universities.

³⁸ BGBI I 103/2018.

teaching of fundamental rights and the ban on headscarves in nursery schools. In 2019, this ban was extended to girls in primary schools.³⁹ It was overturned by the VfGH in 2020.⁴⁰

In June 2018, federal government announced the closure of seven mosques as a result of the dissolution of the religious community Zikri Gabal, which operated those mosques. It was argued that representatives had made Salafist statements and did not display positive basic attitudes toward the state and society in Austria as prescribed in the Islam Act. 41 In addition to that, the Austrian government also considered the expulsion of around 40 imams who were related to the Turkish association Atib due to financing from abroad. However, in October 2018, media reported that only one imam had been expelled, that 38 procedures were still in progress, and that the mosques were operating again.⁴² In 2019, the Regional Administrative Court of Vienna annulled the dissolution of the Arab Religious Community.⁴³

In March 2019, the governing parties ÖVP and FPÖ introduced an action plan against radicalisation to prevent Islamist radicalisation and the formation of parallel societies in Austria. In July of the following year, attacks on Kurdish groups committed by fascist Turkish groups in Vienna led to the further politicisation of the topic of immigration and Islam. Subsequently, political conflicts arose between the City of Vienna, which pursues an inclusionary approach based on diversity, and the federal government. In reaction to these conflicts, the Immigrant Integration Minister and the Interior Minister announced a first set of five measures contained in the action plan, which focussed explicitly on Vienna. The measures included⁴⁴: a) increased levels of policing in "sensitive areas" (targeting Vienna); b) the re-establishment of the Austrian Network for Prevention and Countering Violent Extremism and De-Radicalisation (BNED) (see chapter 5); c) the further examination of foreign influence on Islamist associations and organisations; d) the organisation of a round-table discussion with Turkish and Kurdish groups; and f) the establishment of an early warning system for Islamist activities.

Furthermore, the government established the Documentation Centre of Political Islam, which aims at identifying "parallel societies" and "segregated milieus" and at documenting and researching Political Islam scientifically. In 2021, the Documentation Centre published the socalled "Islam map" on the Internet. 45 It listed the addresses of all associations and organisations that have a connection to Islam, including, in some cases, private persons. The map was heavily criticised as it originated in an idea of the right-wing extremist youth organisation Identitarian Movement and puts people of Muslim faith in danger. An open letter by the Muslim Youth Austria (MJÖ) to delete the map was signed, inter alia, by former State President Heinz Fischer and a former president of the High Court of Justice (OGH), Irmgard Griss.

³⁹ BGBI I 54/2019.

⁴⁰ G4/2020.

⁴¹ https://www.bundeskanzleramt.gv.at/bundeskanzleramt/nachrichten-der-bundesregierung/2017-2018/bundesregierung-trifft-erste-entscheidungen-im-kampf-gegen-politischen-islam-.html

⁴² https://www.derstandard.at/story/2000089356122/bisher-nur-ein-imam-ausgewiesen-38-verfahrenlaufen-noch

⁴³ https://www.wienerzeitung.at/nachrichten/politik/oesterreich/1017654-Moscheenschliessung-warrechtswidrig.html

⁴⁴ https://www.diepresse.com/5837045/neuer-aktionsplan-schickt-mehr-polizei-in-abgeschottene-mi-

⁴⁵ https://orf.at/stories/3217399/

Regarding right-wing extremist activities, the National Council adopted a resolution in 2020 to call upon the federal government to examine possibilities to prevent the ultra-nationalist and partly fascist commemoration of the so-called "Bleiburg Massacre" in Carinthia. 46 Consequently, Interior Minister Karl Nehammer (ÖVP) initiated an interdisciplinary working group with representatives from academia, various ministries, the Constitutional Service, the diocese of Gurk-Klagenfurt (Carinthia), as well as the Documentation Centre of Austrian Resistance (DOW). In December 2020, the National Council passed a law against hate speech on the Internet, ⁴⁷ which aimed at preventing vicious insults, defamation, incitement, threats, and other illegal content on major online platforms. Large online platforms (over 100,000 users) must remove illegal contributions within 24 hours after they have been reported and the option of accelerated civil proceedings was introduced to remove postings more quickly. At the same time, the criminal offense of incitement to hatred was legally expanded. While the crime had previously only covered violations explicitly related to certain groups (e.g. Jews, homosexuals), it was expanded to attacks that are directed against individuals as (assumed) members of these groups. Thus, they are no longer merely considered as insults and can thus be prosecuted ex officio.48

5. Institutional framework in the field of counterterrorism and deradicalisation

Both the Ministry of the Interior and the integration agendas (gradually institutionalised since 2011, see Gruber, Mattes and Stadlmair, 2015) have been in the hands of either ÖVP or FPÖ ministers since 2000. At the federal level, matters of counterterrorism, deradicalisation, and integration are primarily subject to the portfolios of the Federal Ministry of the Interior (BM.I). The BM.I covers matters related to federal borders, immigration and emigration, asylum, return, citizenship, as well as criminal persecution and counterterrorism. The Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution and Counterterrorism (BVT) is a key counterterrorism agency in the form of a national intelligence agency. It was created in 2002 as part of a restructuring initiative that bundled parts of the state police and special tasks forces of the Federal Ministry of Interior. In accordance with the federal structure of Austria, there are nine Provincial Offices for the Protection of the Constitution and Counterterrorism (LVT). In previous years, the BVT was caught up in some scandals and it has become apparent that the relationship between the BVT and certain LVTs is strained. This concerns questions of competence, resources, and mutual trust. As a result of the so-called "BVT affair" and the investigative mishaps in connection with the Vienna terror attack, the BVT is currently subject to restructuring. The Federal Act amending the Police State Protection Act, the Security Police Act, the Criminal Code, the Code of Criminal Procedure 1975 and the Expungement Act 1972 paved the way for organisational reforms.⁴⁹

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In May every year, several thousand people (mainly from Croatia, Austria, and Germany) gather in the Carinthian town of Bleiburg/Pliberk to commemorate post-WWII killings of fascist Croatian Ustasha

⁴⁷ BGBI I 148/2020

https://www.wienerzeitung.at/nachrichten/politik/oesterreich/2073741-Was-das-Gesetzespaketgegen-Hass-im-Netz-bringt.html

⁴⁹ BGBI I 148/2021.

5.1. The BVT and the BNED

The tasks of the BVT comprise the protection of state institutions and the maintenance of the basic democratic order inscribed in the constitution. It also protects representatives of international organisations and critical infrastructure. The BVT is a police authority with intelligence competence. As such it conducts investigations on behalf of the public prosecutor's office, exchanges information with foreign authorities, and has access to different databases for criminal persecution, including data relating to vehicle license plates, addresses, passports, border crossings, weapons licenses, and criminal records. The BVT must operate according to the principle of legality (as opposed to the principle of opportunity), which means that it is not at their discretion whether to prosecute a crime, but they must do so as soon as they learn of it.⁵⁰ The most important legal foundations for the work of the BVT are the Police State Protection Act (PStSG), the Security Police Act (SPG) as well as the Code of Criminal Procedure (StPO). In terms of institutional anchoring, it is subordinate to the Directorate General for Public Security, which forms part of the Federal Ministry of Interior.

Since its creation, the BVT has been subject to party-political conflicts and in 2018, the BVT itself became the subject of investigation, which was later to become known as the "BVT affair". In a raid, the premises of the BVT and various private residences of its employees were searched by officers of a taskforce for combatting street crime (a unit which does not possess the competencies to carry out such a raid). The allegations concerned suspected criminal procedures in the BVT and the passing on of North Korean passport samples to foreign intelligence services. Following these events, a political debate ensued on whether there were political motives in the department of Interior Minister Herbert Kickl (FPÖ) for the action against the BVT. During the raid, diverse data carriers were taken, which included material on rightwing extremist activities of networks with connections to the FPÖ. Following these developments, the Washington Post reported that several international intelligence services excluded Austria from their information exchange activities.⁵¹ In 2020, an employee of the BVT was suspected of having sold personal data to the company Wirecard.⁵²

Furthermore, investigative mishaps were reported in connection with the Vienna terror attack:⁵³ First, the German Federal Service of Criminal Investigation (BKA) had informed Austrian authorities about the perpetrator's links to the jihadi movement in Germany. Second, the Slovakian police reported attempts of the perpetrator to buy ammunition in Bratislava. The recommendation for a reconsideration of the risk assessment were not acted upon, because of preparations for an operation against the Muslim brotherhood (Saal and Lippe, 2021). The events were reviewed by an independent investigative commission that criticised the lack of exchange between the institutions entrusted with probation and supervision (DERAD and Neustart) and the LVT, the BVT and the public prosecutor's office (Zerbes et al. 2020). Zerbes

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⁵⁰ https://www.profil.at/oesterreich/bvt-das-kaputte-amt/401173240

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/austrias-far-right-government-ordered-araid-on-its-own-intelligence-service-now-allies-are-freezing-the-country-out/2018/08/17/d20090fc-9985-11e8-b55e-5002300ef004_story.html+&cd=1&hl=de&ct=clnk&gl=at&client=firefox-b-d

https://www.derstandard.at/story/2000123836144/das-bvt-wirecard-und-die-politik-ein-ueberblick-ueber-eine

For a more detailed overview on the Vienna terror attack and investigative errors see Haselbacher and Reeges, forthcoming.

et al. (2021) conclude that the events related to the Vienna terror attack have revealed considerable shortcomings in the fight against terrorist crimes that are closely connected to the inadequate exchange of information between the agencies involved and organisational problems within the security apparatus. Critics demand a depoliticization of the BVT on the one hand and the separation of state protection and intelligence services (i.e. a separation of police tasks from the field of extended threat research) on the other (epicenter.works, 2021). Currently, the BVT is subject to restructuring. The reform of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution adopted in June 2021 provides for an organisational separation of the areas of state protection and intelligence, with the term "protection of the constitution" anchored as an umbrella term for the areas of "intelligence" and "state protection". Furthermore, the Police State Protection Act will be renamed to the State Protection and Intelligence Service Act (SNG) and the BVT will be renamed Directorate of State Protection and Intelligence Service (DSN).

The BNED gives a good overview of the institutional framework in general. Founded in 2017 and coordinated by the BMI, the nationwide network includes all relevant stakeholders in the field of deradicalisation and prevention of violent extremism (see figure 1). It includes all ministries that deal with issues of deradicalisation, integration, and the prevention of extremism, the most relevant NGOs in the field, representatives of the nine federal provinces, and other relevant actors such as the Association of Municipalities or the Federal Office for sect-related issues. Thus, it connects actors from the local, the regional, and the national spheres that are embedded in the federal structure of the state, and it ensures the cooperation between state and non-state actors.

The BNED meets at regular intervals and can invite additional experts as needed, depending on the topic at hand. According to the Federal Ministry of the Interior (2020), the BNED is the central strategic and policy-advisory body for the nationwide discussion of extremism prevention and deradicalisation in Austria. The network is tasked with a) bundling individual measures for extremism prevention and deradicalisation; b) promoting professional and interdisciplinary exchange c) identifying suitable intervention measures (such as an exit program); and d) drawing up recommendations for action, strategies, action plans, etc. on current topics (see BNED, n.d.).




Figure 1: BNED, own illustration, information based on interviews and BNED, n.d.

5.2. National and sub-national policy framework on radicalisation and deradicalisation⁵⁴

Given the fact that Austria has seen a comparatively low number of truly violent acts in the context of extremism and terrorism, the country is quite a latecomer as far as introducing specific measures and programmes focussing on the prevention of extremism is concerned (Reicher, 2015). Götsch (2017, p. 170) describes the current situation of measures dealing with prevention, intervention, and deradicalisation as a heterogeneous mix of private bottom-up and institutionalised top-down government initiatives. The list of measures in Annex II proves the large variety of approaches and methods.

Over the past decade and due to the arrival of refugees from countries with a Muslim background, measures of deradicalisation have had a strong focus on the youth in general and on Muslims in particular, which is surprising given the overall numbers and the scope of extremist offences as provided in official sources. Experts interviewed by Tamas (2020) argued that right-wing extremism is currently on the rise in Austria, which is not reflected in the media, as public debates on radicalisation centre on jihadism and Islamic extremism. The past decade has however seen a vivid phase of implementation of new initiatives as well as the reorientation of existing measures, which should be seen in the context of the prevalence of so-called

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⁵⁴ This chapter is a synopsis taken from Haselbacher, Mattes and Reeger, 2021.

foreign fighters and the "summer of migration" of 2015. The latter heralded the arrival of many refugees with a Muslim background, which became rhetorically intertwined with the attacks associated with the terrorist militia Islamic State across Europe.

There are several ways to group the stakeholders and initiatives pertaining to deradicalisation in Austria. One may discern between the public and private spheres and cooperative action, by scale (the national, regional, and local levels), by target groups (whole populations, specific target groups, individuals) and by type of approach (punitive, integrative, educational). In this section, we focus on approaches that are integrative or educational in nature; the punitive element was discussed in chapter 4. A useful way of grouping approaches is to focus on the type of approach and to discern between primary, secondary, and tertiary prevention, although there may be overlaps and blurred lines in this respect.

Primary prevention consists of encompassing programmes and approaches aimed at larger groups with no pre-defined targets. The aim is to prevent radicalisation before the process even starts. This area of primary prevention has recently received major political attention in Austria and measures usually combine the efforts of many public and civil-society actors, with emancipatory efforts prevailing in these preventive activities (Mandl and Katona, 2018). Most of these measures are implemented in cities, with Vienna leading the way. The focus is on activities in schools and youth associations. Another strand of primary prevention deals with data collection, documentation, and the raising of awareness. Mostly run by NGOs, these initiatives focus on anti-racism campaigns and extremism-prevention efforts.

Secondary prevention measures address identified target groups or individuals, trying to help in difficult situations in order to avoid problematic action and the progress of radicalisation. This is often done in an indirect way via close relatives, mothers, friends, or other close-contact persons who are searching for help and advice. There are nationwide initiatives as well as bottom-up approaches that are noteworthy due to their innovative nature.

Tertiary prevention programmes are aimed at individuals who have put their extremist views into action or who are or have been imprisoned or otherwise legally penalised. These programmes focus on behavioural changes and involve numerous agents from federal ministries (notably the Ministry for Justice and Internal Affairs), local administration, and non-governmental actors.

Altogether, we see quite innovative new approaches alongside measures that already have been in place for a longer time and have been adjusted to new challenges. Still, there is ample room for improvement in terms of the provision of resources and the development of comprehensive strategies, especially as Austria is a relative latecomer to this field.

6. Case studies

We will now provide insights on two examples of initiatives that have been implemented in Austria. The first is a primary prevention measure called "Vienna Network for Democratic Culture and Prevention" (WNED). The second case study is "Jamal al-Khatib – My way" (Jamal al-Khatib – Mein Weg), which originated in Vienna. It is an online initiative in primary as well as secondary prevention, with its roots in tertiary prevention. Both initiatives target the youth, the first one being top-down and the second bottom-up, in order to account for the large variety

of projects aiming at tackling radicalisation and extremism in Austria. By choosing these two examples, we are furthermore able to showcase an online as well as an in-person intervention.

6.1. WNED – Vienna Network for Democratic Culture and Prevention

Founded in 2014, the WNED is coordinated by the Vienna Children's and Youth Ombuds-Office (*Kinder- und Jugendanwaltschaft*, KJA), an organisation established by the City of Vienna for the protection of children's and young people's interests. The Ombuds-Office is an independent institution that addresses all children and young people in Vienna, as well as concerned parents, neighbours, teachers, and institutions, who also may approach the KJA with any relevant problems.⁵⁵ The general objectives defined by the WNED are: a) The promotion and strengthening of democratic culture, human rights, and social cohesion. b) The protection of children and young people from extremism as well as the devaluation of ideologies and anti-democratic attitudes, poverty, and violence. c) The integration of groups at risk of social exclusion, and finally, d) the elimination of all forms of group-related hostility and nationalist tendencies (Source: Folder WNED).

The foundation of the federal network BNED in 2017 brought some changes to the WNED. Many members active in WNED also joined the BNED (Neustart, DERAD, Counselling Centre Extremism, DÖW). The WNED thus decided to deal with issues related to the justice system, law enforcement, and deradicalisation primarily in the BNED and to strengthen the focus of its own portfolio further on city-specific agendas within the administration. Those include the integration of groups at risk of exclusion, the promotion of democracy and human rights, counselling, and care (e.g. working with children and young people on these issues).⁵⁶

The strength of the WNED lies in its very large, close-knit network and in its ability to act quickly through cross-organisational cooperation and the exchange of information among members of the network. The steering group consists almost entirely of administrative facilities of the City of Vienna: the Administrative Group Education, Youth, Integration, and Transparency; the Executive Group for Organisation and Security of the City of Vienna; the management of the Municipal Departments 11 (Child and Youth Welfare Service) and 17 (Integration and Diversity); the Addiction and Drug Coordination Vienna; members of the City Council; the Vienna Youth Officer (Municipal Department 13, Education and Youth); the Directorate of Education for Vienna, and the Vienna Social Fund. Finally, it is complemented by the Vienna Provincial Police Directorate (LPD). Most of the members of the steering group also are members of the group of competence centres, which is complemented by the Public Employment Service (AMS), the waff (*Wiener Arbeitnehmerförderungsfonds*), and the municipal department responsible for nursery schools (MA 10).

In the expert interviews, which we conducted primarily with stakeholders based in Vienna, there was broad consensus that the WNED is a useful and strong tool that is successful in accomplishing its goals. Some of the experts are active in the network in their professional capacity. They highlighted the networking aspect, which enables them to contact other network members easily, should need for action arise. Yet, it seems that the WNED focusses on

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⁵⁵ Source: https://www.wien.gv.at/english/social/cyoo/

⁵⁶ Source: https://kja.at/praevention/netzwerk-deradikalisierung-praevention/

municipal departments and their agendas rather than on involving NGOs and other actors in the field who are part of the BNED.

Regarding the I-GAP spectrum, the WNED as a means of primary prevention aims at addressing injustice and the subsequent issues of grievance, alienation, and polarisation before they even gain prevalence. Thus, they aim at the early prevention of radicalisation among young people in a broad approach, based on democratic culture and human rights, with the goal of avoiding social exclusion as best as possible.

6.2. Jamal al-Khatib – My Way

This initiative has a quite unusual history of origin. It started out with the idea of a young man who wanted to become active in preventing other young people from making the same mistakes that he did, namely entering the jihadist scene and adopting the jihadist ideology (Reichert and Lippe, 2019). He had been sentenced to a long prison term for several offenses and during that time started to write texts to stop other young people from joining the IS. He got in touch with youth social workers who helped him to compose autobiographical texts and write down more general thoughts. In the course of time, other professionals got involved and formed a transdisciplinary team. Then, in 2018, the association "TURN" (*Verein für Gewaltund Extremismusprävention*; Association for the Prevention and Extremism), was founded exactly for that purpose.

TURN started to produce short films based on the texts and to distribute them via online media. This prompted more youths with a Muslim background to get involved in the project; some were part of the jihadist scene, others were not. Using the method of narrative biography work, more texts were developed. The subsequent involvement of experts with an Islamic Studies background offered the opportunity to create authentic alternative narratives to jihadist propaganda. In the first phase, four short films were produced and conveyed through the narrator "Jamal al-Khatib". The interaction of youth social workers, experts in Islamic Studies, film producers, experts in digital management and, most importantly, young project participants turned out to be extremely fruitful. ⁵⁷

Jamal is a fictional character acting as the messenger in the videos. That way, the young persons involved in the project could be fully protected. Furthermore, a fictional character offers broader identification options. A wealth of texts was produced in many individual and group settings, which were combined and finally became the story of the character "Jamal al-Khatib".

The first season consists of four films. In the first, Jamal introduces himself and talks about his former affiliation with the jihadist youth scene. He reveals what motivated him to share his experiences with other young people and gives a preview of what can be expected from the next videos. The second episode is called "Home". Jamal elaborates on his childhood, his family, his refugee experience, and what it means to feel "at home", including facilitating and obstructive factors. He refers to current socio-political issues such as anti-Muslim racism, but also addresses fanatical, hermetically sealed world views associated with Jihadism. The third video, "Jihad an-Nafs" contains Jamal's personal explanation of "jihad", and why there is no room for group-based misanthropy or warmongering in his interpretation. In the fourth video,

⁵⁷ Source: https://www.turnprevention.com/jamal

"My Brother", Jamal uses the story of his best friend to explain why he renounced the jihadist scene and now actively takes a stance against it. He deals with questions of friendship and loyalty, and concludes that there is always a chance to question one's own convictions and to change one's path.⁵⁸

Based on the experiences and results of the first season, the association TURN has produced a second season in cooperation with the Federal Agency for Civic Education in Germany. The project was expanded to cover the entire German-speaking region, and its themes and content were to be broadened (Reicher and Lippe 2019: 68). The second season again consists of a series of videos that are narrated by Jamal. In the first episode, "My Story", topics such as experiences of marginalisation are addressed, while Jamal tries to change his environment and to live a good life. The second video, "Takfir" ("exclusion"), deals with issues of group inclusion and how exclusion might make a person more receptive of the offers of extremist groups. The third video, "Honour", addresses issues of group affiliation and how this concept was misused for manipulation in different environments (in prison, on the street, and in the extremist scene). Self-determination is Jamal's future goal while he tries to question the rules and ideas of different groups. "Shirk and Democracy" is the fourth video of the second season. It touches upon issues of democracy, which in the eyes of extremist groups is to blame for injustices and thus causes them to "shirk", as it is against the Quran. The final episode, "Resistance and BESA", is about solidarity. It uses the example of Albania, where many Jews found protection during the Second World War.

This initiative is not just about producing videos and publishing these online, but about using the online space and the videos as a starting point for discussions and for political education. The initiators see the internet as an informal learning space for young people, where appropriate offers can be made that are geared to their everyday lives (Reichert and Lippe, 2019). TURN calls this "content-based online street work", which consists of online discussions via comments and personal messages. It facilitates entering into dialogue with the target group. The narratives in the videos serve as projection surfaces through which discourses are negotiated. According to Reichert and Lippe (2019), the four films of the first season received 200,000 views and 16,000 interactions online (until the end of 2018). TURN is also active in producing educational material, which is an offer to all practitioners in the educational system.

Topics regarding the I-Gap spectrum are at the very heart of the project. The development of the alternative narratives is based on the central idea that despite all the differences in radicalisation processes, there are also commonalities: Experiences of powerlessness and humiliation, alienation from larger society, and feelings of rage and injustice. This is exactly where, according to the authors, jihadist narratives tie in (Reichert and Lippe, 2019: 60).

7. Conclusion

to the legal and policy framework on radicalisation and counterterrorism, a fact proven by the very high number of legislative changes during the past two decades. The framework is rather complex and touches upon many policy areas, including public security, immigration, immigrant integration, and the governance of political and religious associations. Austrian

Generally speaking, the Austrian case can be characterised as rather dynamic when it comes

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⁵⁸ Source: https://www.turnprevention.com/materialien

legislation in the realm of extremism and terrorism has been strongly influenced by European legislation and socio-political events, such as the politicisation of refugee immigration and Islam, and the electoral success of rightist parties.

Constant areas of tension include the delicate balance between fundamental rights on the one hand and measures concerning counterterrorism and surveillance on the other. Regarding the latter, the multitude of reforms primarily introduce an expansion of surveillance measures and police investigative powers. Digital surveillance measures (telephone tapping, facial recognition, or video surveillance in public spaces) as well as options for the retention of data have particularly been expanded. These measures contradict the fundamental rights of respect for privacy and data protection.

Many of the legal and policy-related reforms have been initiated under the impression of the "summer of migration" of 2015 and subsequent right-wing mobilisations on the one hand and the comparatively high number of foreign fighters in the country on the other. The former heralded the arrival of many refugees with a Muslim background, which was rhetorically intertwined with attacks across Europe that were associated with the terrorist militia Islamic State. Finally, the terrorist attack in Vienna in November 2020 has boosted the political will towards reform anew. The analysis of the legal and policy framework has shown that legislative changes of the past seven years have an increasingly strong focus on Islam and have therefore been criticised for their discriminatory and sometimes symbolic character. We witness an ongoing politicisation of refugees and Islam, culminating in the bill for the Counterterrorism Act (TeBG) which introduced "Religiously Motivated Extremist Association".

In the area of prevention, there are numerous initiatives on different levels, targeting different groups. Primary prevention consists of encompassing programmes and approaches aimed at larger groups, with no pre-defined audiences. These attempt to prevent radicalisation before the process even starts, with the case study WNED being one prominent example. Secondary prevention measures address identified target groups or individuals, trying to help in difficult situations in order to avoid problematic action and the progress of radicalisation. Tertiary prevention programmes are aimed at individuals who have put their extremist views into action or who are or have been imprisoned or otherwise legally punished. We see quite innovative new approaches – illustrated by our case study Jamal al-Khatib – alongside existing measures that have been adjusted to new challenges. Yet, much still must be done regarding the provision of resources, networking, and the development of comprehensive strategies, especially as Austria is a relative latecomer in this field.

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Annexes

Annex I: Overview of the legal framework on radicalisation and deradicalisation

Legislation title (original and English) and number	Date	Type of law	Object/summary of legal issues related to radicalisation	Link/PDF
Symbole-Gesetz Symbols Act BGBI. I Nr. 103/2014	12/2014	Federal	Prohibits the use and dissemination of symbols of the Islamic State, Al-Qaeda and organisations close to these groups	https://www.ri s.bka.gv.at/el i/bgbl/l/2014/ 103
Änderung des Grenzkontrollgesetzes und des Staatsbürgerschaftsgesetzes 1985 Amendment of the Border Control Act and the Citizenship	12/2014	Federal	Enables authorities to check, as part of border controls, whether departing minors have their parents' consent to leave the country	https://www.ri s.bka.gv.at/el i/bgbl/l/2014/ 104
Act 1985. BGBI. I Nr. 104/2014			Austrians who have voluntarily and actively participated in combat operations abroad in the context of an armed conflict will have their citizenship revoked if they hold another citizenship	
Islamgesetz 2015 Islam Act 2015 BGBI. I Nr. 39/2015	03/2015	Federal	Determines relations between the state and Islamic institutions; the amendment act includes new measures aimed at curbing Islamic extremism.	https://www.ri s.bka.gv.at/el i/bgbl/l/2015/ 39
Polizeiliches Staatsschutzgesetz - PStSG sowie Änderung des Sicherheitspolizeigesetzes Police State Protection Act - PStSG and amendment to the Security Police Act BGBI. I Nr. 5/2016	02/2016	Federal	To provide effective protection against terrorist threats through reorganisation of the BVT, an extensive database was created and powers of observation for investigating authorities were expanded.	https://www.ri s.bka.gv.at/el i/bgbl/l/2016/ 5
Integrationsgesetz und Anti- Gesichtsverhüllungsgesetz sowie Änderung des Niederlassungs- und Aufenthaltsgesetzes, des Asylgesetzes 2005, des	06/2017	Federal	Ban of full-face coverings in public places; provides legal basis for prohibiting the distribution of radical campaign materials.	https://www.ri s.bka.gv.at/el i/bgbl/l/2017/ 68

Fremdenpolizeigesetzes 2005, des Staatsbürgerschaftsgesetzes 1985 und der Straßenverkehrsordnung 1960 Integration Act and Anti-Face Veiling Act, and Amendments to the Settlement and Residence Act, the Asylum Act 2005, the Aliens Police Act 2005, the Citizenship Act 1985 and the Road Traffic Regulations 1960				
BGBI. I Nr. 68/2017 Strafrechtsänderungsgesetz 2018	10/2018	Federal	Enables authorities to	https://www.ri
Criminal Law Amendment Act 2018		law	consider a wider scope of offenses as potential terrorist attacks, lowering	s.bka.gv.at/el i/bgbl/l/2018/ 70
BGBI. I Nr. 70/2018			the threshold regarding levels of bodily harm, damage to property, and data.	1.0
Vereinbarung gemäß Art. 15a B- VG zwischen dem Bund und den Ländern über die Elementarpädagogik für die Kindergartenjahre 2018/19 bis 2021/22	12/2018	Federal constituti onal law	Mandatory teaching of fundamental rights and the ban on headscarves in nursery schools	https://www.ri s.bka.gv.at/el i/bgbl/l/2018/ 103
Agreement pursuant to Art. 15a B-VG between the Federal Government and the Länder on elementary education for the nursery school years 2018/19 to 2021/22				
BGBI. I Nr. 103/2018 Änderung des	03/2018	Federal	Ban on headscarves in	https://www.ri
Schulunterrichtsgesetzes Amendment of the School Instruction Act		law	primary schools	s.bka.gv.at/el i/bgbl/l/2015/ 39
BGBI. I Nr. 54/2019				
Änderung des Sicherheitspolizeigesetzes, der Straßenverkehrsordnung 1960 und des Telekommunikationsgesetzes 2003 Amendment of the Security Police Act, the Road Traffic	05/2018	Federal law	Legalisation of state spyware; security agencies have access to video and audio surveillance of public spaces and facilities in order to prevent probable attacks; use of IMSI catchers; recording of vehicle information on public roads; obligatory	https://www.ri s.bka.gv.at/el i/bgbl/l/2018/ 29

Regulations 1960, and the Telecommunications Act 2003 BGBI. I Nr. 29/2018			identity registration for the purchase of every SIM card; restriction of the secrecy of correspondence.	
Hass-im-Netz-Bekämpfungs- Gesetz – HiNBG Hate on the Net Combat Act – HiNBG BGBI I Nr. 148/2020	12/2020	Federal Law	Aims to prevent vicious insults, defamation, incitement, threats, and other illegal content on major online platforms	https://www.ri s.bka.gv.at/D okumente/Bg blAuth/BGBL A_2020 I_14 8/BGBLA_20 20_I_148.ht ml

Case Law

Case number	Date	Name of the court	Object/summary of legal issues related to radicalisation	Link/PDF
G 4/2020	11.12.2020	VfGH	Nullification of a law that had introduced a ban on headscarves in primary schools. The court argued, that the law violated the principle of equality and the freedom of thought, conscience, and religion pursuant to Art 9 ECHR, and the freedom of faith and conscience pursuant to Art 14 StGG.	https://ris.bka. gv.at/Doku- mente/Vfgh/JF T_20201211_ 20G00004_00/ JFT_2020121 1_20G00004_ 00.pdf
G 139/2019	11.12.2020	VfGH	The court proclaimed the constitutionally guaranteed right to self-determination, deriving it from the principle of equality in Art 7 B-VG and Art 2 StGG and the right to private and family life in accordance with Art 8 ECHR and the right to life in accordance with Art 2 ECHR.	https://ris.bka. gv.at/Doku- mente/Vfgh/JF T_20201211_ 19G00139_00/ JFT_2020121 1_19G00139_ 00.pdf
VfSIg 20.356/2019	11.12.2019	VfGH	Nullification of most parts of the Security Package 2018 in December 2019, arguing that data collection was "disproportionate" and a "serious interference" of secrecy interests as defined in the Data Protection Act (Datenschutzgesetz) and of the right to respect for private life under Art 8 ECHR. Additionally, regarding the application of spyware, the court argued that such measures were only permissible within extremely narrow limits.	https://ris.bka. gv.at/Doku- mente/Vfgh/JF T_20191211 19G00072_00/ JFT_2019121 1_19G00072_ 00.pdf
VfSlg 20.213/2017	29.11.2017	VfGH	Rejection of a motion by members of the National Council for the repeal of provisions of the Police State Protection Act regarding the investigative powers of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution and the Fight against Terrorism in the context of extended risk research and preventive protection against attacks that endanger the constitution	https://ris.bka. gv.at/Doku- mente/Vfgh/JF R_20171129 16G00223_01/ JFR_2017112 9_16G00223 01.pdf

VfSIg 19.657/2012	29.6.2012	VfGH	Telecommunications secrecy (Art. 10a StGG) protects confidentiality and therefore the content of written and oral communications via telecommunications networks (e.g. via telephone, internet). As is the confidentiality of letters the scope of protection of telecommunications secrecy only extends to content data, but not to other data such as master data, telephone numbers or metadata (e.g. static and dynamic IP addresses, time and duration of communication) etc.	https://ris.bka. gv.at/Doku- mente/Vfgh/JF R_09879371_ 11B01031_01/ JFR_0987937 1_11B01031_ 01.pdf
VfSIg 19.632/2012	14.3.2012	VfGH	CFR constitutes a standard of review in proceedings before the Constitutional Court within the scope of application of Union law	https://ris.bka. gv.at/Doku- mente/Vfgh/JF R 09879686 11U00466 2 01/JFR 09879 686 11U0046 6_2_01.pdf

Other relevant issues

	Constitutional provisions	Statutory law (statues, rules, regulations etc.)	Important case law	Comments/issues relevant to radicalisation
Freedom of religion and belief	Basic State Law 1867, on the General Rights of Citizens (Article 14- 17)			Protection of religious freedom regarding individual rights and religious societies. The state and its legal system must remain secular, act neutrally, and treat all religious societies equally. Issue example: implications of the possible introduction of the crime of "religiously motivated extremist links" in the Criminal Code, initiated in
Minority rights	Ethnic Groups Act			2020.
willofity fights	VoGrG (StF: BGBI. Nr. 396/1976) State Treaty concerning the Restoration of an Independent and Democratic Austria (StF: BGBI. Nr. 152/1955)			
Freedom of expression	Basic State Law 1867, on the General Rights of Citizens (Article 13)			Everyone has the right to express their opinions and ideas freely and publicly or to discuss them with others. The state can restrict freedom of expression when it endangers peaceful coexistence or security, or where the fundamental rights of others are violated (In Austrian criminal law, incitement to hatred amounts to a criminal offense under Section 283 of the Criminal Code). Issue example: repeated problems with national-

			socialist re-enactment through radical right homepages such as Alpe Donau
Freedom of assembly	Basic State Law 1867, on the General Rights of Citizens (Article 13)	Assembly Law (BGBI. I Nr. 63/2017)	Austrian citizens have the right to assemble and form associations. The exercise of these rights is regulated by special laws. The legislature may restrict the freedom of assembly only if it is in the interest of national security and public safety, the maintenance of order and the prevention of crime, the protection of health and morals, or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. Issue example: far-right extremism during Corona demonstrations in 2020 and 2021.
Freedom of association/ political parties etc.	Federal Act on the Financing of Political Parties (Political Parties Act 2012 - PartG) StF: BGBI. I Nr. 56/2012		Political parties can be founded relatively freely in Austria. To do so, a group of people must first adopt a statute. These must be published on the Internet and filed with the Federal Ministry of the Interior. Political parties must not violate the National Socialist Prohibition Law

Annex II: List of institutions dealing with radicalisation and counter-radicalisation

Name of the initiative	Scale	Agents	Area of competence and target groups	Link
WNED –Vienna Network Democracy Culture and Prevention (Wiener Netzwerk Demokratiekultur und Prävention)	Local	City of Vienna, including several municipal departments, network of practitioners, group of experts; schools, open youth care, collaboration with BNED	Awareness raising, training; children and young adults	https://kja.at/prae vention/netzwerk- deradikalisierung- praevention/
ZARA – Civil Courage and Anti-Racism Work (<i>Zivilcourage und Anti-</i> <i>Rassismus-Arbeit</i> , NGO)	National	Cooperation with several other NGOs in the field	Counselling, prevention and raising of aware- ness; Austrian society at large, multiplicators, persons affected by racism	https://www.zara. or.at/de
Dokustelle – Documentation and Counseling Centre Islamophobia and Anti- Muslim Racism (Dokumentations- und Beratungsstelle Islamfeindlichkeit und antimuslimischer Rassismus, NGO)	Mostly Vienna, reporting cases from other federal provinces	No partners mentioned in publications and on website	Documentation and reporting of incidents, raising of awareness, counselling, workshops, empowerment; persons subject to islamophobia and anti-Muslim rascism	https://dokustelle. at/
DÖW – Documentation Centre of Austrian Resistance (Dokumentationsarchiv des österreichischen Widerstands)	National	Republic of Austria, City of Vienna as funding bodies	Research and documentation, educational offers on i.a. Holocaust, Roma and Sinti, right-wing extremism, prevention of extremism and deradicalisation; Austrian society at large; students and journalists looking for information on resistance, antisemitism	https://www.doew.at/

Counselling Centre Extremism (Beratungsstelle Extremismus) run by BOJA (Austian Network of Open Youth Work)	Nation-wide, based in Vienna	Federal Chancellery as funding body; Family Counselling Centres across Austria, initiatives of open youth work across Austria, civil-society organisations	Counselling and support for relatives and multiplicators, helpline; policy recommendation, workshops; persons confronted with any form of extremism in their personal setting (relatives, teachers, social workers)	https://www.berat ungsstelleextremi smus.at/
Not in God's name (NGO)	Mostly Vienna	Funding by Federal Chancellery and other public agencies; cooperation with schools	Educational, integrative; sports activities, informal streetwork, social media campaigns; migrant children and youth	https://nign.eu/
TURN – Association for the Prevention of Violence and Extremism (Verein für Gewalt- und Extremismusprävention)	Mostly digital space	Network of youth workers, filmmakers, scholars of Islamic studies, social scientists, and young people who have left the jihadist subculture; young Muslims who want to take stance against jihadism	Delivering alternative narratives, community engagement and empowerment; Teachers, multiplicators, youth workers	https://www.turnpr evention.com/jam al
Mothers' School against Extremism	Different venues across Austria	Edith Schlaffer (sociologist), funded by Federal Ministry for Europe, Integration, and Foreign Affairs	Training in early detection of signs of radicalisation among children; worried mothers	https://wwb.org/
Next: No to Extremism	Province of Styria, city of Graz	Large network of public agencies and NGOs	Support of institutions dealing with the prevention of extremism, awareness-raising, provision of materials on extremism and hate speech, legal support on extremism and hate speech, workshops; Institutions facing	https://www.no-extremism.at/

			extremism prevention in their work, civil society, educators and teachers, lecturers, politicians and administrators	
BNED - Bundesweites Netzwerk Extremismusprävention und Deradikalisierung	Multilevel	Federal ministries, civil-society organisations, federal provinces, BVT	Networking, dissemination of information among network partners	n.a.
NEUSTART Probation Services (Bewährungshilfe)	National	DERAD, RAN; Federal Ministry of Justice as funding body	Integrative, inclusion and prevention, reintegration into society; juvenile detainees on probation or granted parole	https://www.neust art.at/at/de/
Social Network Conferences (SONEKO)	National	Neustart	Fostering networks on the individual level, elaboration of a plan and control of compliance; youth detainees (pre-trial and upon release)	https://www.neust art.at/at/de/unsere angebote/nach haft/sozialnetz_ko nferenz.php
Kompass	National	Neustart, BVT; cooperation with Exit Europe	Individual counselling for persons who voluntarily want to leave an extremist scene and ideology; offenders and non- delinquents	https://www.neust art.at/at/de/index. php
Exit Programme for Violent Extremists, followed by Exit Europe	Multi-agency approach in an international setting	BM.I, BNED; BVT, governmental and non-governmental actors; in the second phase consortium partners in H2020 project	Integrative, awareness raising; Religously motivated extremists, jihadists; local exit practitioners, EU- wide communities, exit candidates, policy makers	https://www.bmi.g v.at/210_english/s tart.aspx

DERAD – Prevention of Extremism, Dialogue and Democracy (Extremismusprävention, Dialog und Demokratie, NGO)	International, national, local level	Federal Ministry of Justice as funding body, RAN	Deradicalisation programmes and support for prison detainees, follow-up support for persons convicted of relevant crimes, educational measures for judicial guards, workshops, consulting; prison detainees while in	https://www.derad .at/
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Sources: Haselbacher, Mattes and Reeger, 2021; RAN network online database; Tamas 2020; Mandl and Katona 2018; Websites of the actors.

Annex III: Best practices/interventions/programmes

Digital space or supranational level

Name	Institution(s)	Aim	Source and literature
Jamal al-Khatib	TURN – Association for the Prevention of Violence and Extremism (Verein für Gewaltund Extremismusprävention)	Delivering alternative narratives online, community engagement and empowerment; aiming at young people who sympathize with jihadist worldviews, teachers, multiplicators, youth workers	https://www.turn-preven-tion.com/jamal; scientific project report: https://www.e-beratungsjour-nal.net/wp-con-tent/up-loads/2019/05/reicher_lippe.pdf
Decount	ISF-co-funded EU project; Institute for the Sociology of Law and Criminology (IRKS), Austrian Institute for International Affairs (oiip), BOJA, Neustart, Derad, the Ministry of the Interior	To prevent teenagers and adolescents from becoming radicalised; Website offering materials on radicalisation and extremism prevention; Video game through which processes of radicalisation can be re-enacted plus a guide for its use in youth centres and schools for teachers	https://www.ex-tremismus.info/
Mothers' School against Extremism – Parenting for Peace	Women without borders	Training in early detection of signs of radicalisation among children aiming at worried mothers	https://wwb.org/

National level

Name	Institution(s)	Aim	Source and literature
BNED - National Network for Prevention and Countering Violent Extremism and De-Radicalisation (Bundesweites Netzwerk Extremismusprävention	Seven federal ministries, several NGOs and civil-society organisations, federal provinces, BVT, Austrian Association of Cities and Towns, Austrian Association of Municipalities	Central strategic and policy-advisory body for the nationwide discussion of extremism prevention and deradicalisation in Austria; networking, dissemination of information among network partners; The network is tasked with a) bundling individual measures for extremism prevention and de-radicalisation; b) promoting professional and interdisciplinary exchange on nationwide measures; c) identifying suitable inter-	

und Deradika- lisierung)		vention measures (such as an exit program); and d) drawing up recommendations for action, strategies, action plans, etc. on current topics	
Exit Programme for Violent Extremists, followed by Exit Europe	BM.I, BNED; BVT, governmental and non- governmental actors; in the second phase consortium partners in H-2020 project	Integrative, awareness raising; religiously motivated extremists, jihadists; local exit practitioners, EUwide communities, exit candidates, policy makers	https://www.bmi.g v.at/210_eng- lish/start.aspx
Kompass	Neustart, BVT; BM.I in cooperation with Exit Europe	Individual counselling for persons who voluntarily want to leave an extremist scene and ideology; offenders and non-delinquents. The aim of the project is to help religiously or politically radicalized persons to turn away from extremist and violent thinking and to encourage the clients to accept human rights and democratic values and to help them in changing their previous behavioural patterns. Kompass is currently in a pilot phase.	https://www.neust art.at/at/de/index. php
Social Net- work Confer- ences (SONEKO)	Neustart	Fostering networks on the individual level, elaboration of a plan and control of compliance; aiming at youth detainees (pre-trial and upon release)	https://www.neust art.at/at/de/unsere _angebote/nach_ haft/sozialnetz_ko nferenz.php; evaluation report: https://www.irks.at /assets/irks/Publik ationen/Forschun gsbericht/Endberi cht_Begleitforsch ung_2017.pdf
De-radicalisa- tion in prisons	DERAD – Prevention of Extremism, Dialogue and Democracy (Extre- mismusprävention, Dia- log und Demokratie, NGO)	Deradicalisation programmes and sup- port for prison detainees, follow-up support for persons convicted of rele- vant crimes, educational measures for judicial guards, workshops, consulting; prison detainees while in prison and af- ter release	https://www.derad .at/
Counselling Centre Ex- tremism (Beratungs- stelle Extrem- ismus)	BOJA (Austrian Network of Open Youth Work); Federal Chancellery as funding body; Family Counselling Centres	Counselling and support for relatives and multiplicators, helpline; policy recommendation, workshops; persons confronted with any form of extremism in their personal setting (relatives, teachers, social workers)	https://www.berat ungsstelleextremi smus.at/

	across Austria, initiatives of open youth work across Austria, civil-society organisations		
Report Racism and/or Hate on the Net	ZARA – Civil Courage and Anti-Racism Work (<i>Zivilcourage und Anti-</i> <i>Rassismus-Arbeit</i> , NGO	Helping people to be heard and report racist incidents, hate on the net and/or cyber-bullying	https://www.zara. or.at/de/beratung/ melden
Lectures at Schools	DÖW – Documentation Centre of Austrian Resistance (Dokumentationsarchiv des österreichischen Widerstands)	Teacher training and political education in schools, focusing on racism and anti-semitism, adolescence, and pathological group formation.	
#wirmüssen- reden (#we need to talk)	Dokustelle – Documentation and Counseling Centre Islamophobia and Anti- Muslim Racism (Dokumentations- und Beratungsstelle Islamfeindlichkeit und antimuslimischer Rassismus, NGO)	Countering the criminalization of Muslim communities and people who are read as Muslim in Austria. The campaign aims at breaking down prevailing discourses and at highlighting anti-Muslim racism.	https://dokustelle. at/bildungsarbeit- projekte/wirmuess enreden

Sub-national/Regional level

Name	Institution(s)	Aim	Source and litera- ture
Next: No to Extremism	Large network of public agencies and NGOs in the province of Styria and the city of Graz	Support of institutions dealing with the prevention of extremism, awareness-raising, provision of materials on extremism and hate speech, legal support on extremism and hate speech, workshops; Institutions facing extremism prevention in their work, civil society, educators and teachers, lecturers, politicians and administrators	https://www.no- extremism.at/
Not in God's Name	Not in God's Name, funding by Federal Chancellery and other public agencies; coop- eration with schools	Educational, integrative; sports activities, informal streetwork, social media campaigns; migrant children and youth	https://nign.eu/

Local level

Name	Institution(s)	Aim	Source and literature
WNED -Vienna Network Democracy Culture and Prevention (Wiener Netzwerk Demokratiekultur und Prävention)	City of Vienna, including several municipal departments, network of practitioners, group of experts; schools, open youth care, collaboration with BNED	Awareness raising, training; children and young adults	https://kja.at/prae- vention/netzwerk- deradikalisierung- praevention/
Werkstatt.Wien (Workshop.Vi- enna)	Municipal Department 17 "Integration and Diversity", City of Vienna	Education platform offering lectures, discussions and best-practice examples on political-religious extremism, deradicalization and prevention aiming at multipliers in the field of community work, police, educators	https://www.wien. gv.at/menschen/in tegration/daten- fakten/toolbox-in- tegration.html
Networking Platform / Afghan and Chechen Communities	Municipal Department 17 "Integration and Diversity", City of Vienna	Empowering communities by developing networks and dialogue with the authorities and with institutions like the municipal departments of the City of Vienna, health institutions, the police, educational and labour market institutions; development of networks and dialogue with wider society, e.g. neighbourhood associations; to offer training and information on relevant topics for daily life; to develop projects that will further the societal inclusion of communities; workshops for teenagers with a focus on democracy, non-violence and leisure activities	https://www.wien. gv.at/english/so- cial/integration/

Sources: Haselbacher, Mattes and Reeger, 2021; RAN network online database; Tamas 2020; Mandl and Katona 2018; Websites of the projects/actors.

Annex IV: Policy recommendations

The following recommendations are based on the expert interviews and the literature review, most of all the reports of the independent investigative commission (Zerbes et al. 2020 and 2021).

De-radicalisation work should be restructured. This includes:

- o The training of practitioners and professionalisation
- The development of tools of analysis for risk assessment
- o The establishment of operational case analysis
- The institutional restructuring of the BVT
- o The provision of sufficient financial resources

Responsibilities of institutions dealing with de-radicalisation should be clearly defined and the cooperation between institutions should be strengthened. This includes:

- The building of mutual trust
- The introduction of case conferences that can be re-activated spontaneously during probation
- The establishment of an efficient analysis and information processing system accessible to all stakeholders in the form of a common database

Measures and approaches should be more nuanced following an integrated approach. This includes:

- The development of de-radicalisation measures that focus explicitly on right-wing extremism
- The development of approaches that focus on rural and peripheral regions
- The development of measures that include schools, communities and local level stakeholders (broad primary prevention)