

Deradicalisation and Integration Legal & Policy Framework

Finland/Country Report

WP4

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List of Abbreviations

EU European Union

CC Criminal Code of Finland

CSO Civil Society Organisation

GDPR General Data Protection Regulation

ECHR European Convention on Human Rights

FRA European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights

HDL Helsingin Diakonissalaitos, Deaconess Foundation

ISF Internal Security Fund

Mol Ministry of the Interior, Sisäministeriö

NAP National Action Plan for the Prevention of Violent Radicalisation and

Extremism 2019-2023

NBI National Bureau of Investigation, Keskusrikospoliisi

NRM Nordic Resistance Movement

PL Suomen perustuslaki, Finnish Constitution

RAN Radicalisation Awareness Network

REDI© Model for supporting resilience, democracy and dialogue against violent

radicalisation and extremism in educational institutions

SINE Suomen islamilainen neuvosto, the Islamic Council of Finland

SUPO Suojelupoliisi, Finnish Security Intelligence Service

THL Terveyden ja hyvinvoinnin laitos, National Institute for Health and

Welfare

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About the Project

D.Rad is a comparative study of radicalisation and polarisation in Europe and beyond. It aims to identify the actors, networks, and wider social contexts driving radicalisation, particularly among young people in urban and peri-urban areas. D.Rad conceptualises this through the I-GAP spectrum (injustice-grievance-alienation-polarisation) with the goal of moving towards measurable evaluations of de-radicalisation programmes. Our intention is to identify the building blocks of radicalisation, which include a sense of being victimised; a sense of being thwarted or lacking agency in established legal and political structures; and coming under the influence of "us vs them" identity formulations.

D.Rad benefits from an exceptional breadth of backgrounds. The project spans national contexts including the UK, France, Italy, Germany, Poland, Hungary, Finland, Slovenia, Bosnia, Serbia, Kosovo, Israel, Iraq, Jordan, Turkey, Georgia, Austria, and several minority nationalisms. It bridges academic disciplines ranging from political science and cultural studies to social psychology and artificial intelligence. Dissemination methods include D.Rad labs, D.Rad hubs, policy papers, academic workshops, visual outputs and digital galleries. As such, D.Rad establishes a rigorous foundation to test practical interventions geared to prevention, inclusion and deradicalisation.

With the possibility of capturing the trajectories of seventeen nations and several minority nations, the project will provide a unique evidence base for the comparative analysis of law and policy as nation states adapt to new security challenges. The process of mapping these varieties and their link to national contexts will be crucial in uncovering strengths and weaknesses in existing interventions. Furthermore, D.Rad accounts for the problem that processes of radicalisation often occur in circumstances that escape the control and scrutiny of traditional national frameworks of justice. The participation of AI professionals in modelling, analysing and devising solutions to online radicalisation will be central to the project's aims.

Executive Summary/Abstract

The focus of the report is at the macro level with some insights into regional and local levels for integration measures in Finland as part of the Work Package 4, Deradicalisation and Integration Legal and Policy Framework. The aim of the report is to give a conceptual account of how existing policies and laws address radicalisation, to pinpoint their most critical aspects and best practices, and finally to develop evidence-based policy and guidelines in Finland. The study is based, first, on desk research on legal and policy framework, which includes mainly the scholarly literature, legislative sources and Finnish news media sources. Second, we conducted five interviews with six persons representing experts in legislation, policymaking and violent radicalisation and relevant stakeholders in the field of de-radicalisation. Third, we undertook two case studies on Finnish de-radicalisation projects.

Finland is a unitary state, characterised by the Nordic welfare state model with a strong position for municipalities but with weak regional institutions. The Finnish Constitution highlights the role of basic rights. Legal positivism in the interpretation of the law and the principle of legality are typical features of Finnish legal practice. The ex-ante examination system of the constitutionality of new legislation or EU treaties is a distinctive feature. However, the position of case law has become stronger since the 1990s. Many of the traditional political division lines and minority groups have been recognised in the Finnish political and party system and constitution. However, the existing socio-economic and geographical cleavages, the pluralisation of society, and the emergence of issues thus far not recognised in the Finnish socio-economic, political and cultural framework have set new demands for the legal and political system.

Before the 2010s, violent radicalisation prevention work could only be found embedded in other policy documents, but the focus has since then moved from mere terrorism prevention to comprehensive de-radicalisation work done in multiprofessional cooperation with stakeholders at both national and local levels. The report presents two de-radicalisation projects in more detail, of which the first is a local exit work project and the other is a project provided by a national actor for spreading information and knowledge on violent radicalisation amongst social and health care sector workers.

We lay out policy recommendations that consist of securing the welfare services and recognising potential exclusion mechanisms and considering a combination of implicit and explicit de-radicalisation policies. First, trust in public authorities, including the police and the judicial system, is a factor of high importance and is part of implicit deradicalisation policy together with providing universal accessible education and social services. Multi-professional collaboration, the inclusion of stakeholders, the combination of national coordination and locally implemented prevention work and a pragmatic approach have been functioning elements in Finnish explicit deradicalisation policies. Violent radicalisation should be seen as both a social and a security issue, and excessive securitisation of the policies should be avoided. While projects can be useful in developing models and tools, in particular exit work which is now mainly done through project-based funding should be established and its funding arranged permanently to guarantee continuity. Third sector organisations can reach the grassroots level and individuals mistrusting public authorities, but their funding

must be secured. Information about all kinds of violent radicalisation should be openly available and public authorities should be educated on the topic. Finally, the role of international cooperation and learning from international examples is central.

1. Introduction

The focus of the report is at the macro level with some insights into regional and local levels for integration measures in Finland as part of Work Package 4, De-radicalisation and Integration Legal and Policy Framework. The aim of the report is to give a conceptual account of how existing policies and laws address radicalisation, to pinpoint their most critical aspects and best practices, and finally to develop evidence-based policy and guidelines in Finland. The report has four objectives: to be descriptive, explanatory, assessment and policy oriented. By radicalisation, the D.Rad project (see WP3.1 report on Finland, Horsmanheimo et al, 2021) has meant a process involving the increasing rejection of established law, order, and politics and the active pursuit of alternatives, in the form of politically driven violence or justification of violence (i.e., radicalisation here refers to violent forms of radicalisation). By de-radicalisation we mean processes countering such rejection at individual (micro), organisational (meso), or societal (macro) levels resulting in a shift from violent to nonviolent strategies and tactics.

The Finnish political culture is mainly described as consensual despite stark political divides in the past. The Finnish Constitution was originally written as a compromise between rivalling political interests and social groups in a country torn by the 1918 civil war. The constitutional reforms of the 21st century have strengthened the role of parliamentarism and basic rights. Legal positivism in the interpretation of the law and the principle of legality are typical features of Finnish legal practice, although the position of case law has become stronger since the 1990s. The most relevant legal framework regarding radicalisation includes freedom of speech, freedom of religion, ethnic agitation (see section 4), defamation of character and terrorism laws. Finland has nevertheless been notified by the European Commission that it should fully transpose EU law criminalising hate speech and hate crimes. With low levels of violent radicalisation, to date Finland has faced only one convicted terrorist crime. However, while the Finnish consensual political culture has acted as buffer against radicalising tendencies, its capacity to effectively deal with differences and controversies has been questioned (Saukkonen, 2013a).

In Finland, violent radicalisation was not a topic in public discussion before the 2010s. Only terrorism emerged as an issue to be prevented by the Finnish Security Intelligence Service (SUPO). In the context of low levels of political violence nationally, international cases alarmed Finnish authorities about the need for preventative work. The focus has moved from terrorism prevention by SUPO to comprehensive de-radicalisation work done in cooperation with stakeholders from public and third sector organisations. Finland is a case in point on implicit and explicit policies (cf. Ahearne, 2009). It emphasises welfare services as an implicit deradicalisation policy. The relatively new explicit de-radicalisation work can be described as pragmatic, leaning on collaboration between various public authorities and third sector organisations. It remains nevertheless relatively lowly funded, often with fixed-term projects, which poses a risk for the continuity of the policy.

The study is based partly on desk research on legal and policy framework, including mainly the scholarly literature, legislative sources and Finnish news media sources. Furthermore, we conducted five background interviews with six people representing experts in legislation, policymaking and violent radicalisation and relevant stakeholders in the field of deradicalisation. Four of the interviewees were willing to be named in the report: Pauli Rautiainen, Director of the Sorsa Foundation and from August 2021, Senior Lecturer in social law at the University of Eastern Finland; Anneli Portman, Senior Specialist at the Finnish

Institute for Health and Welfare (THL) and Saara Takkunen, Senior Planning Officer at the Finnish Institute for Health and Welfare; and Tarja Mankkinen, Development Manager of the Police Department in the Ministry of the Interior (MoI). Additionally, we undertook two case studies on de-radicalisation projects, the first of which (see section 6.1) is a local exit work project by a third sector organisation, and the other (see section 6.2) is a project for spreading necessary information and knowledge on violent radicalisation amongst social and health care sector workers provided by a national actor. The method of analysis has been qualitative content analysis, and the questions were guided by the aims of WP4.

This report is structured as follows: first we introduce the socio-economic, political and cultural context in Finland, then the constitutional organisation of the State and the relevant constitutional principles on D.Rad's field of analysis. Then we move to the relevant legislative framework in the field of radicalisation and relevant policy and institutional framework. Then we introduce two in depth case studies regarding counter-radicalisation and integration measures. Finally, we provide conclusions to the report.

2. The Socio-economic, Political and Cultural Context

Historical cleavages in Finnish society have included those between urban and rural areas, the Evangelical Lutheran and the Greek Orthodox religion, the Left and the Right and the Finnish-speaking and Swedish-speaking populations (Allardt, 1985; Sjöblom, 2011, p. 243). The history of political violence dates back to the murder of Nikolai Bobrikov, the Russian Governor-General of Finland, in 1904, related to "Russification" measures of the era. Violent polarisation of society was particularly deep during the 1918 civil war between the "Reds" and the "Whites" (e.g., Tepora & Roselius, 2014) and the extreme right Lapua Movement in 1929–1932¹ (Koskelainen & Hjelm, 2016). In the second part of the 20th century and until recently, radical movements have included those on the left and right, and environmental and anarchist movements (Tammikko, 2019). Currently, radical extra-parliamentary extreme right-wing activism and radical Islamism are seen as the biggest threats of violent radical action, while other radical movements operate on a smaller scale (Sisäministeriö, 2021b).

After the beginning of conflicts in Syria and Iraq in 2012, the threat of violent radicalisation has increased (Tammikko, 2019). In 2015 the so-called "refugee crisis" activated especially farright movements (Sallamaa, 2018), which perpetrated attacks on asylum seeker centres (Kotonen & Kovalainen, 2021). Only one case has been judged to be a terrorist attack: a stabbing incident in which two people died and eight were wounded by a radical-Islamist asylum seeker in Turku in 2017 (Onnettomuustutkintakeskus, 2017). Moreover, three school attacks have been committed since 2007. While they were not considered as terrorist attacks at the time, the perpetrator of the 2007 attack was interested in extremist ideas and saw himself representing an Übermensch (see WP3.2 report on Finland, Lounela et al., 2021), and the second attack in 2008 was inspired by the first one. Overall, political violence is not reified in the Finnish political culture (see also Malkki, 2020, p. 30; Saukkonen, 2013a, p. 18).

Finland is a unitary state, characterised by a strong position for municipalities in the implementation of welfare services, but weak regional institutions (with ongoing political reforms). The Swedish-speaking Åland Islands (Ahvenanmaa) have an autonomic and

¹ Lapua Movement was a proto-fascist extreme movement that did violent acts towards communists and left-wing actors in 1929-1932. The movement also threatened the government with coup d'état twice (Koskelainen & Hjelm, 2016).

demilitarised position after the conflictual situation was solved in 1921 by the League of Nations. Multiculturalism of a particular kind is part of the constitution: Swedish is the second official language in Finland, the language of the administration and both languages are compulsory curriculum in Finnish schools. Swedish-speaking Finns are concentrated in particular regions, in the South and West Coast areas.

Regional differences in Finland have been described as small (Sjöblom, 2011). However, researchers inspired by the political ecology tradition of the 1950s-1970s identified a political "radicality axis" going from the north-west to the south-east (Koikkalainen, 2004), where on the "radical" north-eastern side of the axis, the focus was on the left wing of both socialist and non-socialist parties (Nousiainen, 1998, p. 54). The axis roughly follows the old frontier of Pähkinäsaari peace in 1323 dividing the Finnish territory between Swedish and Russian parts, which impacted the development of these regions for centuries. More recently, an OECD (2021) report found out that while trust for public institutions and administration remain high in Finland when compared internationally, it is lower in the north-east of Finland, and generally in the countryside and among those with lower education and lower-income households. Simultaneously, in the biggest cities, geographical segregation has somewhat increased during the 21st century (for the Helsinki Metropolitan Area, see Vaattovaara et al., 2018). Recent cases of violent radicalisation do not follow a clear geographical divide: reports by public authorities have described the action of the far right in all regions, noting particularly Southwest Finland and Eastern Uusimaa (Sisäministeriö, 2020b). Radical-Islamist activity mainly occurs in areas within the biggest cities (Malkki & Saarinen, 2019, p. 86). School shootings have taken place in low-inhabited, relatively rural municipalities (see Investigation Commission of the Kauhajoki School Shooting, 2010, pp. 106, 153).

Finland is characterised by the Nordic welfare state model. The welfare and safety conditions in Finland are ranked as second in the EU according to the European Social Progress Index, which is around 82 in all parts of Finland and almost 84 in Uusimaa, the maximum score being 100 (European Commission, 2020). In January 2021, the unemployment rate was 8.7% (Tilastokeskus, 2021). While the social security system mainly functions well, the existence of targeted social benefits can lead people with multiple problems to fall through the cracks of the system (Saari, 2015). Finnish public elementary school provides an equal opportunity to education for all children nationwide; while residential segregation has affected it to some extent, the institutional quality of schools in disadvantaged neighbourhoods remains relatively high (Bernelius, Huilla & Ramos Lobato, 2021). Most Finnish young people are doing well, but the gap between deprived and well-off young people deepens when the problems keep accumulating for a few (Moilanen, Airaksinen & Kangasniemi, 2019 p. 12). The COVID-19 pandemic has reduced young people's feeling of mental wellbeing (Harju, 2021).

The Finnish population has traditionally been relatively homogenous. Swedish is the other national language in Finland and 5.2% of Finns have Swedish as their mother tongue (Tilastokeskus, 2018). The Evangelical Lutheran church and the Orthodox church have a specific position (see section 4). Indigenous Sámi populations live in Sápmi, an area comprising parts of Northern Finland, Sweden, Norway, and Russia. Sámi activism has been increasing, mainly increasing awareness about past injustice, continuous inequality, racism, traditional way of life and livelihoods, and related questions of land use and autonomy in Sápmi. The Sámi have constitutional self-government in the Sámi Homeland (legally defined and covering the municipalities of Enontekiö, Inari and Utsjoki and the Lappi reindeer-herding district in Sodankylä) in the spheres of language and culture since 1996. The self-government

is managed by the Sámi Parliament, elected by the Sámi (Sámediggi, no date). Finland has received international criticism for not having ratified ILO's Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention 1989 (No. 169). While the ratification has been the topic of political debate throughout the 2000s, it has been postponed to one governmental period to another (Lehtola, 2015, pp. 46-51). In Finland, there are also traditional Roma, Tatar, Jewish, Ingrian Finn and Karelian minorities. Since the late 1980s, humanitarian and work- and family-related immigration to Finland have increased; due to a low starting point, the growth of the proportion of people with a foreign background has been significant (Saukkonen, 2013b, p. 13).

Finnish democracy is based on a multi-party system and proportional representation. Extremist movements have historically been excluded from politics, but other politicians and parties have been included decision-making (Saukkonen, 2013a, p. 18). The political culture is described as consensual, particularly after the 1960s due to the incomes-policy agreements of the era (Sjöblom, 2011, p. 243). The traditional political parties have reflected societal cleavages, with social-democratic and non-social democratic left-wing parties, agrarian and conservative right-wing parties, and Swedish-speaking, Christian democratic and green parties. There have been visible shifts in party politics in the 21st century. The most notable one is the 2011 election victory of the populist Finns Party, which politicised the EU membership and set itself as an alternative to the "traditional parties" (Arter, 2011; Palonen, 2020b) also aided by masculinity (Kovala & Pöysä, 2018). After the 2015 elections, it was one of the three government parties, but split due to a party leadership change. Its success has continued with its current radical right-wing leader Jussi Halla-aho: it was the second largest party in the 2019 parliamentary elections after the Social Democratic Party of Finland (Palonen, 2020a) and strengthened its position in municipal politics in the 2021 municipal elections, becoming the fourth largest party after the traditional three large parties, the National Coalition Party, the Social Democratic Party and the Centre Party. Simultaneously, the support for traditional parties has declined.

Many of the traditional cleavages and minority groups have been "embedded" and recognised in the Finnish political and party system and constitution (see also section 3). However, the existing socio-economic and geographical cleavages, the pluralisation of the society, and the emergence of issues thus far not recognised in the Finnish socio-economic, political and cultural framework set new demands for the legal and political system. For example, current research has highlighted Finland's racist and colonial elements (particularly vis-à-vis the Sámi population) (Keskinen, Seikkula & Mkwesha, 2021), which have mainly been bypassed in the Finnish narrative until now. Also, according to the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights' (FRA) "Being black in the EU" survey (2018), Finland was amongst the most racist countries in the EU. As Finnish de-radicalisation policies largely build on the implicit deradicalisation policies of the welfare state, mechanisms of exclusion and the position of vulnerable groups must be considered in the prevention work.

3. The Constitutional Organisation of the State and Constitutional Principles on the D.Rad Field of Analysis

Finland is a sovereign republic, an EU member since 1995 and closely involved in international cooperation. The Finnish Constitution partly builds on the legacies of the Swedish (Middle Ages–1809) and Russian (1809–1917) eras. It was originally written in 1919 after the civil war and reflects many central political cleavages of that time (e.g., between Finnish- and Swedish-speaking Finns, the Evangelic Lutheran and Greek Orthodox Churches, and republican and

monarchist ideals due to an unrealised project to establish a monarchy in Finland). Historically, Finland has fluctuated between parliamentary and (semi-)presidential systems (Sjöblom, 2011, pp. 242-243). The status of the President was particularly strong during Urho Kekkonen's presidency (1956–1981/1982), while the 1980s and 1990s marked a gradual change towards parliamentarism (Saukkonen, 2013a, p. 28). This led to a constitutional reform in 2000, through which basic rights gained more importance as well. A reform further weakening the role of the President came into effect in 2012. On a general level, the Finnish Constitution has been described as a combination of a legalistic tradition based on the respect of law and a certain level of flexibility (Saukkonen, 2013a, p. 16).

According to the Finnish Constitution (731/1999), the powers of the State in Finland are vested in the people, who are represented by the Parliament. Individuals have the right to participate and influence decision-making (PL, 14 §). The Courts are independent and hold the judiciary power, which is one of the core principles of the Finnish Constitution. The Supreme Court, the Courts of Appeal and the District Courts are the general courts of law. The Supreme Administrative Court and the regional Administrative Courts are the general courts of administrative law (PL, 3, 98 §). State administration consists of three levels: central government, regional and local administrations (PL, 119 §). Municipalities are central actors for people regarding public authorities since they provide most of the public services (Rautiainen, 2019, p. 109). The responsibilities of municipalities are large in international comparison, and this autonomy is universally applied irrespective of the size or location of a municipality (PL, 121 §; Jäntti, 2016, p. 170). Moreover, Åland has broad judicial autonomy (PL, 75 §).

There are three fundamental values at the beginning of the Finnish Constitution (PL, 1.2 §): the inviolability of the human dignity, protection of individual freedom and rights, and promotion of the principle of justice in society. Not only rights, but also demands for equality and solidarity amongst members of the community form the basis for constitutional principles. The most important basic rights are equality before the law, the right to life, personal liberty, integrity, security and privacy, the principle of legality in criminal cases, the freedom of movement, religion and conscience, expression, assembly and association, and electoral and participatory rights. In addition to these political rights there are economic, social and civil rights such as the right to education, the right to social security, the right to one's own language and culture and the right to work and property rights (PL, 12-19 §). The national languages Finnish and Swedish, Sámi as indigenous people, Roma people's and other groups rights to language and culture, and the rights of people using sign language or in need of interpretation or translation aid owing to disability are mentioned in the Constitution (PL, 17 §). Children should be treated equally and be able to affect decisions regarding themselves (PL, 6 §). A core principle is the neutrality of the court system; no one should be treated differently due to things such as sex, age, origin, language, religion, conviction, opinion, health, disability or other reason. Equality between sexes is to be promoted in societal activity and in working life (PL, 6 §). Some rights can nevertheless be limited under special circumstances: for instance, one can limit the right to property or privacy and freedom of speech if it is necessary to protect other people's fundamental rights or if there is a weighty reason to protect general interests (Rautiainen, 2019, p. 80, 91).

Finland is a modern civil law country, where the legal code is a more important foundation for judicial decisions than case law. Legal positivism in the interpretation of the law and the principle of legality are typical features of Finnish legal practice and in the actions of public

authorities. A distinctive feature is a developed ex-ante examination system of the constitutionality of new legislation or EU treaties. The Constitutional Law Committee of the Parliament, which consists of MPs but operates upon legal advice by constitutional and European law experts, gives opinions regarding questions such as compatibility of a government Bill with the Constitution or with international human rights obligations. The decisions of the Committee are usually not questioned afterwards. However, the position of case law has strengthened since the 1990s, due to Finland's EU membership, a strengthening human rights mindset, and the fundamental rights reform in the 1990s, and factual arguments have gained importance at the expense of authoritative arguments (Raitio, 2012, pp. 1-3, 10). The disbandment of the Nordic Resistance Movement (NRM) in 2020 (Supreme Court, 2020:68) was quite exceptional in that it was argued to be against the Constitution and Associations Act (see Text Box 1).

Text Box 1: Disbandment of NRM

The Nordic Resistance Movement (NRM) is a violent extra-parliamentary far right, neo-Nazi and revolutionary organisation in Sweden, Norway and Denmark, and previously in Finland (Sallamaa, 2018, pp. 39-40). Before its abolition, NRM was clearly the most organised extremist movement in Finland (Tammikko, 2020, p. 190). The NRM was disbanded in 2020 on the grounds of continuous unlawful activities, that formed a significant part of its activities, and for the protection of public interest. There had been violent acts during the NRM's or its organisers' political or ideological events, and these had received appreciation rather than condemnation from the organisation and its members. In fact, a lethal assault in Helsinki Central Railway Station Square in 2016 started the legal process to ban the NRM (see WP3.2 report on Finland, Lounela et al, 2021). Also, non-violent activity of the NRM included racism and anti-immigration rhetoric, and other nationalist-socialist values such as Holocaust denial. The Supreme Court ruled that the NRM had not only violated the Associations Act with its unlawful activities, but also the Constitution through abuse of rights, and the provisions of European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). In addition, the Supreme Court found that NRM's activities were contrary to the public interest as established in law. NRM was disbanded as an association, as the rights of association and of speech are not absolute (Supreme Court, 2020:68).

To conclude, many traditional political cleavages (from the role of the church to language rights) are reflected in the Finnish Constitution (see also section 2), which was originally written as a compromise in a country torn by a civil war (see also Saukkonen, 2013a, p. 16; Sjöblom, 2011, pp. 242-243). The constitutional reforms of the 21st century have strengthened parliamentarism and basic rights. Recently, the COVID-19 pandemic has created public debate about the Constitution and the restriction of basic rights, which has divided legal scholars (Mölsä, 2021). Restrictions have been possible due to emergency legislation, which can nevertheless contradict the Constitution (Hallberg, 2010).

The Relevant Legislative Framework in the Field of Radicalisation

Freedom of speech is defined in the Finnish Constitution as the right to express, publish and receive information, opinions and other messages without anyone preventing it (PL, 12 §.). It

can be restricted in relation to other rights and laws such as ethnic agitation, defamation of character and the violation of freedom of worship (CC, 39/1889). The history of freedom of speech starts with the freedom of press in the Swedish era (Neuvonen, 2019). The left-wing press was under censorship under the Protection of the Republic Act after the 1918 civil war, and the complex relationship with the Soviet Union led to at least some self-censorship after the Second World War. Until the 1990s, freedom of speech was based on regulating communication instead of being seen as a basic human right, which changed with Finland's EU membership and other international treaties. The rapid change has caused the past legislation still affecting the current understanding of freedom of speech. This has caused challenges, strengthened in 2010s due to hate speech and fake media (ibid., pp. 91-100).

Hate speech is not a concept explicitly used in the legislative text. However, according to the part of the Criminal Code concerning ethnic agitation² (511/2011), someone who gives, spreads or upholds information, opinions or other messages to the public that threaten, speak ill of or insult some group on the grounds of race, skin colour, national or ethnic origin, religion or conviction, sexual orientation or disability or any other equivalent reason will be penalised. Moreover, defamation of character and illegal threats are penalised, and hate speech can also fulfil the criteria of harassment as meant in the Non-discrimination Act and in the Act on Equality between Women and Men (Knuutila et al, 2019, p. 11). The law on breach of the sanctity of religion (i.e., on religious insults) is rarely applied (Äystö, 2019). More generally, a hate crime is defined as any criminal act motivated by prejudice or hostility against groups of people that the victim represents (MoI). Finland has been called by the European Commission to fully transpose EU law criminalising hate speech and hate crimes (European Commission, 2021). Some cases from Finland have been presented in Text Box 2.

Text Box 2: Case Law on Ethnic Agitation and Defamation of Character

Several politicians, particularly from the Finns Party, have been charged with or convicted of ethnic agitation regarding their writings on immigration, certain ethnic groups or Muslims (e.g., Hakahuhta & Pinola, 2019). Members of the former NRM (see Text Box 1) carrying swastika flags at their march on Finnish Independence Day in 2018 were also charged with ethnic agitation (Kerkelä, 2021); while a lower court dismissed the charges, the process will continue at the Court of Appeal (Reinboth, 2021). An ongoing case concerns the writings of the former Christian Democratic Party's chairperson on homosexuality as a "shame", "sin" and not "a healthy variation of sexuality" (Gustafsson, 2021a).

A recent case causing a broad public discussion concerned a journalist vocal in addressing hate speech and fake news. On her private Facebook account, she referred to a municipal politician as a "Nazi clown", Nazi and racist (Reinboth, 2020; Supreme Court, 2021) after hearing that the politician—convicted of ethnic agitation for his anti-immigration and anti-Islam statements and charged with defamation of character in other, partly still ongoing cases (STT, 2020; STT, 2021)—planned to film an event organised by her (Reinboth, 2020). The journalist was convicted of defamation of character in lower courts but received a permission to appeal to the Supreme Court (Supreme Court, 2021).

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origin are enlisted in the law text.

² The Finnish expression literally meaning 'agitation against a population group' is officially translated into English as 'ethnic agitation', although several other grounds for applying the law besides ethnic

The Finnish state is formally neutral regarding all religions and churches. Yet, there are close institutional and legislative links between the State and the Evangelical Lutheran Church and the Orthodox Church of Finland. The Ministry of Education and Culture administers matters relating to the Churches and other religious communities and drafts legislation relating to them. The General Synod, the highest authority in the Evangelical Lutheran Church, makes decisions regarding doctrine, Church work, legislation, administration and finance. Although the national Parliament must ratify church law, it has no right to alter its content; proposals from the Synod can only be rejected or accepted altogether (Ministry of Education and Culture, no date a). Therefore, separation of the State and the Evangelic Lutheran and Orthodox Churches can be contested (Hjelm, 2020). Other registered religious communities are independent special legal subjects in the same manner as registered associations, and the register of religious communities is kept by the National Board of Patents and Registration (Ministry of Education and Culture, no date b). According to our interview with legal scholar Pauli Rautiainen, Finland regulates considerably the process of registering a religious community in comparison to other countries. In turn, this can affect the way in which unregistered, but de facto religious communities are treated in the face of law. Registered religious communities can apply for government aid (Opetus- ja kulttuuriministeriö, no date). Moreover, a court case in 2006-2008 concerned a mosque which had been attacked by farright actors spilling blood on it. While a lower court ruled that this constituted a religious insult, the Court of Appeal overturned the decision because the religious community was not at a registered one. Other court cases on religious insults have nevertheless been based on a broader definition of religion, not based on registration (Äystö, 2019).

The relation between Muslims (initially arrived in Finland as internal migrants of the Russian Empire) and the newly independent Finnish State was regulated as part of the legislation concerning the freedom of religion. In the post-Cold War era, Muslim organisations have increasingly been affected by the European and global mediascape framing Islam as a threat (Martikainen, 2019, p. 29). According to Tuomas Martikainen, both rationales were visible in the establishment process of the Islamic Council of Finland (SINE), an umbrella organisation of Islamic associations, in 2004-2007. During its first years, SINE was involved in arranging various events, but it is increasingly involved in collaboration with various religious and administrative networks (ibid, 2019, 34).

The tasks of the Police are to safeguard justice and social order, national security, general order and maintenance of security, preventing, revealing and detecting crimes, and bringing crimes into consideration for charges to be laid. The Police work in collaboration with other authorities, communities and inhabitants to maintain security, and has international cooperation. The Police should respect fundamental rights and human rights when using their authority and act objectively, impartially and treat people equally, in the spirit of reconciliation, and according to the principle of least harm and proportionality. Also, the Police's task is to safeguard the freedom of assembly. It should ensure that the assembly's organiser and chairperson act according to the law, and if needed, act to secure order and safety during an assembly or a public event (Police Act, 872/2011). If the assembly puts people's safety in danger, causes significant damage to the environment or property, excessively disturbs traffic or a third party, or state visit or other international assembly or similar, the Police can move the assembly to another location (Assembly Act, 530/1999). While trust in the Police is high in Finland in international comparison (European Social Survey, 2011; OECD, 2021), recent research on the topic has pointed out critical issues such as ethnic profiling or the existence of a racist discussions in police officers' Facebook group (Himanen, 2021).

The Finnish Constitution recognises the right to private life, honour and domestic peace. Secrecy of correspondence is inviolable (PL, 10 §). According to the Data Protection Law, personal data can be handled for specified reasons only, such as the position or duties in the public community, business life, third party organisation or other similar. A valid reason can also be an authority's need for the data to protect public interest. The data should only be used when necessary and proportionally (Data Protection Law, 1050/2018). The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR, 679/2016) is valid in Finland, but not applied in cases of criminal affairs or national security. There is a distinct law for these matters, which is enforced to prevent, investigate, reveal crimes or bring crimes into consideration for charges to be laid by authorities (Law on the Processing of Personal Data in Criminal Matters and the Maintenance, 1054/2018). A reform of the intelligence legislation in 2019 required changes in the Constitution and provided more resources and authority for SUPO, the intelligence service (Tammikko, 2019). The political debate on the topic concentrated on issues such as whether the new intelligence laws were a threat to privacy (see WP3.1 report, Horsmanheimo et al, 2021), and how to ensure the supervision of intelligence officials (i.e., how to monitor those responsible for monitoring).

According to MoI (2020b), terrorism is always violent extremism, but not all violent extremism is terrorism. Terrorist crime is defined as a crime based on terrorist incentives, for instance an illegal threat, a serious theft offence, an intentional explosive crime, a serious firearms offence, a serious disturbing of telecommunications, human trafficking, kidnapping, use of chemical weapons, manslaughter, murder or involvement of radiological weapons done with terrorist motives. Also, preparation of a terrorist crime, leading of a terrorist group, giving education, funding terrorism and travelling for a terrorist crime are penalised. However, there needs to be evidence that the penalised act was used in a certain terrorist crime (Terrorist Crimes 17/2003). So far, the only convicted terrorist crime has been the stabbing in Turku in 2017 (see section 2). There have been some other arrests and investigations which have not led to convictions (Malkki & Saarinen, 2019; Manner & Teittinen, 2021). The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) prepared a report in 2021 about convictions for funding terrorist crimes in Europe and found that Finland was the only EU member state without any cases that led to conviction, although there had been a court hearing on the matter. There were multiple reasons for this, such as the late development of terrorist crime legislation, enhanced claims of intentionality in terrorist crimes, the low number of pre-trial investigations and hence lack of legal practice, the difficulties in collecting evidence especially from abroad and conflict zones, and the low number of experts in the terrorist crime investigation field (NBI, 2021).

Terrorist crime laws have been criticised in the mainstream media for being inadequate (Manner & Teittinen, 2021). For instance, a person was not charged with committing a terrorist crime even if they had received armed training from a terrorist organisation. This is due to the Finnish legislation that there needs to be evidence that this training was used in a certain terrorist crime which the Police could not prove. Currently, participation in a terrorist organisation's action is not penalised. The Ministry of Justice is planning to change this in 2021, but not every aspect of participation will be penalised. The participation needs to be essential for the terrorist organisation's illegal action. In addition, incitement and persuasion to recruit into a terrorist organisation will be made punishable, and the financing of an individual terrorist will become criminal when now it is only valid regarding terrorist groups. Additionally, for the police to start a pre-trial investigation, there needs to be enough evidence of the crime; without it the police cannot use coercive means such as wiretapping, reading messages or surveillance (Sippola, 2021).

While specific de-radicalisation projects and programmes exist in Finland (see section 5), the universal welfare state also prevents political tensions and extremism (Lappi-Seppälä, 2013b, p. 86). Much of the national legislation regarding it is implemented by municipalities. For instance, the Social Welfare Act aims to promote and uphold wellbeing, social security, reduce inequality, secure equal social services, and better cooperation between authorities (Social Welfare Act, 1301/2014). The Youth Act (1285/2016) requires the young to be guided to the services they need, and this is done in cooperation with youth organisations, local churches and other relevant communities. The Health Care Act (1326/2010) states that health care services should be available to all inhabitants equally. However, the services can vary between areas due to municipal differences, which can in practice cause inequalities (Mol, 2019, p. 27).

Participation and the right for individuals to have an impact on policies and the agency of public authorities concerning them are central in several policy fields. For instance, the Act on the position of rights of a client of social welfare (812/2000) states that when social services are implemented, the client's wishes, opinions, interests and individual needs, their native language and cultural background need to be considered and their conviction and privacy respected. Clients should be able to affect the decisions regarding themselves, and authorities conducting these tasks should be provided with sufficient assistance. Participation is also central in the recent Finnish Local Government Act (410/2015), which requires municipalities to provide participatory channels for the residents, and in Land Use and Building Act (132/1999) focusing on residents' rights to have an impact in their near environment. For an overview of the legal framework, see Annex 1.

5. The Relevant Policy and Institutional Framework in the Field of Radicalisation

As noted in the previous sections, the Nordic welfare state tradition combined with municipal autonomy and a primarily consensual political culture describe Finland. However, the last few decades have marked some changes. In party politics, the Finns Party has challenged the traditional parties (see section 2). Finnish society has become more pluralised, and the focus on fundamental rights has become stronger since the 1990s (see section 3). Institutions of municipal democracy have been complemented with initiatives to strengthen the participation of citizens, residents or clients, often at the local level (section 4; Meriluoto & Litmanen, 2019). The 2010s have also marked the increasing of hate speech, particularly in the online context (Knuutila et al., 2019; Malkki et al., 2021; see also section 4). Public authorities and stakeholders have had several projects on hate speech, which have provided information on good practices and legal measures, among others (MoI, 2021a; Ministry of Justice).

In criminal policies, Finland represents a Nordic tradition leaning on cooperation between the public authorities, municipalities, CSOs and companies. These policies are implemented through broad programmes networking the various actors. The aim is to tackle the background factors of criminality such as marginalisation, and different kinds of crimes (e.g. alcohol-related crimes, youth criminology, violence against women, racist crimes) are addressed with different measures. The welfare state and social policies have a central position in crime prevention, although they are seen as having an intrinsic value, not primarily framed as criminal policy (Lappi-Seppälä, 2013a, pp. 65-66). Generally, a prison sentence requires a serious crime, especially with first timers. Also, Finnish penalties are lower in international comparison

(Rikoksentorjuntaneuvosto, no date). These themes were also reflected in our interviews with Finnish experts on legislation and de-radicalisation.

Violent radicalisation was not a topic in public discussion in Finland until the 2010s, when violent extremism and terrorism became a more prominent issue in Europe. Previously, terrorism prevention work was done by SUPO, but radicalisation prevention action was only embedded in other policy documents. International cases alarmed the Finnish authorities concerning preventative work that was needed to cover radicalisation beyond preventing terrorist attacks. According to our expert interview with the Development Manager from Mol, Tarja Mankkinen, violent radicalisation has usually been seen as both a social and a security issue in the Finnish context. Getting the education sector and the social and health care sector to understand that they are part of the security work, and for police to realise that they are part of the social work was challenging. In 2021, the National Institute for Health and Welfare (THL) started a project to prevent radicalisation in the social and health care sector (see section 6.2).

According to Mankkinen, violent radicalisation was internationally seen from the perspective of radical Islamism in the post 9/11 era. In 2011, the Utøya attack in Norway, which is a Nordic welfare state like Finland, marked a change after which far-right violence was taken more seriously. As the establishment of the Finnish explicit de-radicalisation policies happened at that time, the definition of violent radicalisation has been broad from the beginning. International developments have affected violent radicalisation prevention work in Finland and there has been international cooperation in this field. The de-radicalisation models of European countries with a longer tradition have been considered when formulating the policies (MoI, 2019). Finnish authorities have been active in developing common policies and practices internationally and between the Nordic countries. Since 2011, Finland has been part of the EU Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN), which is a multi-professional network across EU members states that works to prevent and counter violent radicalisation.

Both the implicit de-radicalisation policies conducted as a part of the broader welfare policies and the explicit de-radicalisation work have primarily been preventive in Finland. Currently the preventive work emphasises young people and the prevention of recruitment into violent radical activities. According to Mankkinen, Finnish preventive work can also be characterised as pragmatic, meaning close contacts and low institutional barriers between the involved authorities and other actors, and the solving of issues as they arise without a high level of bureaucracy. Several of our interviewees considered social policies and the prevention of social exclusion as central in preventing violent radicalisation. However, according to Rautiainen, while penalisation has traditionally not been seen as an effective means to control political forces, public opinion seems to have taken a more punitive turn when it comes to certain crimes (such as terrorist crimes).

Mol conducts radicalisation prevention work and coordinates the cooperation between the various actors. The first National Action Plan for the Prevention of Violent Radicalisation and Extremism (NAP) was published in 2012, and it guides local and regional work on the topic (Mol, 2020a, p. 12). From the very beginning, NAP was designed to include all forms of radicalisation, not just radical Islamism.

Mol has established a national steering group to implement, improve and evaluate deradicalisation policies in Finland. The group includes police and crime officers, ministries, immigrant organisations, education specialists, municipal organisations, youth organisations, religious organisations, university researchers and other CSOs. Nevertheless, the third sector or CSOs primarily do the actual exit work funded by the Ministry. They have been considered to be more approachable, especially if the radicalised person has had bad experiences with the authorities or does not trust them (see section 6.1). In the Rajapinta project, MoI (2019) identified observations and recommendations for local collaboration on the referral mechanism of persons of concern. Multi-professional collaboration between various public authorities and third-sector organisations is done in so-called Anchor work through local Anchor teams. The aim of the work is to promote the wellbeing of adolescents, prevent crimes and offer de-radicalisation services without age limits (Moilanen, Airaksinen & Kangasniemi, 2019). The minimum standards for Anchor work are defined at a national level, although its organisation at the local level is specified locally.

As the emphasis of de-radicalisation work is in young people in 2021, the role of schools is underlined in the preventive work. Schools are part of the local multi-professional Anchor teams, and they have a central role in preventing radicalisation through inclusiveness, open discussion and teaching critical thinking (Opetushallitus, 2018). Saija Benjamin, Katja Vallinkoski and Pia Koirijärvi (2020) have published a REDI model advising teachers and other school staff to identify and address young people who show interest in radicalisation. Although young people are involved in prevention work, including its steering group, not everyone is reached: while socially active youth are present, marginalised young people often stay out. According to Mankkinen, the steering group on violent extremism and radicalisation is working on how to contact these people. Safe spaces, such as schools, are needed for youth to discuss issues related to extremist ideologies with adults.

The Police is involved in an ongoing multi-actor project regarding hate speech called Facts against Hate, coordinated by the Ministry of Justice, which is trying to improve the prevention of increasing hate speech (MoI, 2021a) and is part of the Strategy on Preventive Police Work (ENSKA). The project also aims for bringing minorities and the Police to closer cooperation and building trust between them. In addition, the NBI undertakes internet surveillance, and the Police is present on online platforms (Poliisi, no date b). Finland is part of EU the project for deleting terrorist propaganda online.

The NBI oversees exit work in prisons and in the organised crime scene, i.e., with people who are already relatively radicalised (Poliisi, no date a). The Deaconess Foundation (HDL) does exit work with a lower threshold, although they can also work in prisons (see section 6.1). In every prison, there are two specialists on radicalisation prevention work trying to identify radicalised people. Mankkinen notes a key difference in state treatment of prisoners from different religious backgrounds: while Evangelical-Lutheran priests are paid to visit prisons, Islamic imams are not, despite the freedom of religion inscribed in the law. MoI (2021b) has noted this shortcoming.

Different religious communities and organisations have a vital role in the de-radicalisation network, such as in the local multi-professional Anchor work aimed to promote the wellbeing of adolescents and prevent crime. The religious communities work closely with other actors in the Anchor network and have the knowhow of their cultures (Mol, 2019). For example, the Forum of Young Muslims (NMF) promotes locally the inclusion of young immigrants and Muslim youth in preventing violent extremism through the Muvenna project in Turku (Nuorten Muslimien Foorumi), and the Finn Church Aid's project Reach Out promotes cooperation between religious communities and authorities (Kirkon Ulkomaanapu). Additionally, Save the Children has a project called RadicalWeb that educates adults working with the young to recognise radicalisation on the internet (Pelastakaa Lapset). Mol (2021c) has a working group to enhance the feeling of security in religious communities (until the end of May 2021),

because security threats directed at religious communities' spaces and members have increased especially regarding Jewish and Islam communities. For the list of all institutions dealing with radicalisation and counter-radicalisation see Annex 2.

All the above mentioned are included in NAP, which MoI evaluates yearly. The evaluation is extensive and contains all aspects of NAP. According to the latest report (MoI, 2021b), the implementation of policies was successful, and measures were implemented extensively when considering the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic which partly seized activity in 2020. Few measures were not implemented; for instance, measures aimed at identifying and removing recruitment material were difficult and therefore did not proceed, nor did cooperation between authorities, parents and companies increase regarding the way terrorist organisations and extreme actors utilise computer games or mobile applications (ibid., pp. 31, 38). There were also a few measures that were not implemented in 2020 but will be in the upcoming years (2021-2023).

According to our interviews, the biggest problem in the Finnish context of preventive radicalisation work is funding, which has been relatively scarce. In addition, the policy has mainly consisted of projects, funded for a limited time, which makes it hard to establish them especially in the case of third sector organisation whose funding differs from state institutions. While projects can be used to develop new models and tools (cf. Kuokkanen, 2016), the continuity of exit work should be secured. Moreover, the Finnish consensus culture is not optimal for detecting radicalised forces, and there has been unwillingness to recognise violent radicalisation as a potential threat in Finland. This is also reflected in the research on the topic: according to Malkki (2020, pp. 29-31), while political violence has been condemned, there has been a tendency to underreact rather than overreact to it, possibly because of an unwillingness to undermine Finland's reputation as a safe Nordic country.

Finnish de-radicalisation measures are mainly implicit policy measures that seek to increase the well-being of all vulnerable groups rather than potentially radicalising ones: these range from access to welfare services and particularly education (increased to 10 years under the current government) to positive discrimination in support to neighbourhoods in Helsinki. Importantly, as pointed out in our expert interviews, one needs to be careful in defining radicalisation, since "radical" ideas (as opposed to those preserving the status quo) can be important for society's development; the aim is to prevent violent radicalisation and extremism. The list for best practices, interventions and programmes can be found in Annex 3 and policy recommendations in Annex 4.

6. Two In-Depth Case Studies

The chosen case studies represent central Finnish de-radicalisation projects, which nevertheless have different kinds of focus and organisations implementing them. They are ongoing projects, of which the first one is explicit exit work done by the Deaconess Foundation (HDL), a third sector organisation, and the other one is the National Institute for Health and Welfare's (THL) project that aims to develop knowledge and know-how on violent radicalisation and its detection among social and health care workers. The case studies are based for the most part on expert interviews.

6.1. The Deaconess Foundation (HDL)

HDL is implementing an exit project from August 2020 to (under present conditions) October 2021. The project is mostly funded by the EU's Internal Security Fund (ISF), of which Finland's share is coordinated by MoI. Also, MoI and HDL have used money to execute exit work. Long-lasting funding to secure the continuity of the action is still being sought, as the purpose is to create a permanent function to help people who or whose close ones are worried about their adoption of violent radicalised ideologies or action. The exit program is implemented at the local level, currently in the Helsinki metropolitan area, Turku and Tampere.

Implementation of exit work in Finland first started in 2018. HDL is the second institution which offers exit services. Compared to previously started NBI exit work, of which target group consists of members of criminal gangs and others already engaged with serious crimes (see section 5), people can get into HDL's prevention-oriented exit program with a lower threshold. HDL, a 150-year-old third-sector organisation, has a long tradition of working with socially marginalised people with a range of backgrounds and traumas, with inclusion, agency, trust as the guideline values of the operational strategy. HDL's exit work is based on the experience of working with violent radicalisation and issues related to it. International structures for this kind of action are already built and are being improved all the time.

The exit project consists of three focus areas: education of stakeholders, creation of operating model and client work at the grassroots level. The aim of the first focus area is to spread knowledge and understanding of the importance and substance of exit work. By widening stakeholders' expertise, it is possible to reach more clients. The second focus area, the model creation, refers to building permanent practice, which is shaped by co-learning with other EU member states. The last, the grassroots level task operates with violently radicalised people or ones at risk of violent radicalisation. Specialists in violent ideologies and psychological processes act as mentors and help people with both practical and mental issues after evaluation of a need for help. If HDL's workers themselves cannot help with all the problems, they guide people forward, for instance to social or mental health services. Voluntary participation is the core of the client work – neither the authorities nor anyone else can force anyone but can recommend starting the exit programme. There are no age limits, and people from all violent-ideology backgrounds can participate in the programme as long as it is safe for everyone, including the workers. The client work has gradually started; the aim is to reach about 20 clients during the project.

The strength of HDL as an exit work provider is its position as trusted third-sector organisation. HDL enjoys trust of other organisations and potential clients. The long cooperation between governmental institutions and CSOs has created a strong base from which to develop new practices. Partners and networks, as well as effective communication between them, are seen as important factors in HDL's work. HDL is part of a steering group, led by Mol, which coordinates and improves de-radicalisation work nationwide in Finland. HDL is also strongly connected with Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) at the EU level (see section 5). The advantage of HDL in dealing with potential clients, compared to the police or other authorities, is that the prejudices or bad experiences do not scare people away from the available aid – many people from the target group might have a bad image of state officials if they were born in a country with venal police. The flip side of working as a CSO compared to officials is that the law does not allow HDL the same mandate in relation to privacy and information exchange. Trust is a central in creating relations in client work. HDL also presses the importance respect

for human dignity despite of the background of the client. The client still has responsibility for their own acts – HDL complies with the law in matters related to the obligation to make notifications such as a child welfare notification.

A challenge for HDL as a provider of exit services, is to convince the political elite about the significance and effectiveness of the action to get funding for it. There is need to improve indicators to prove the usually qualitative rather than quantitative results of exit work. According to our interviews, the current government and MoI are strongly committed to improve programmes like HDL's exit work, but it can change if the political climate alters. HDL's exit work has not been directly opposed, despite the relatively heated public discussion concerning radicalisation, particularly in the case of the women who have returned to Finland from the al-HoI camp (see WP 3.1 report, Horsmanheimo et al, 2021). Finally, while the funding for HDL's exit work is currently secured and may continue after the ongoing project, a general problem related to project-based funding is the insecurity of the continuity of the action (see section 5).

6.2. National Institute for Health and Welfare (THL)

THL is a research and development institute under the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health. According to the legislation under which it was established, its duties lie in the population's health and wellbeing. THL's violent radicalisation prevention project (Radik) will be active until the end of 2022. The project is situated in THL's unit of special services, and it is part of a new sector concentrating on prevention of violence. By the end of 2022, the project will have developed a web-based training programme and a tool to help the social and health care sector workers (altogether approximately 400 000 people) to recognise radicalisation, available for all nationwide. It will also produce new research-based information and evaluate the measures. The work is conducted at the national level due to the many small municipalities in Finland which do not encounter much radicalisation and have limited resources.

The Radik project is funded by the State, since THL is a public institution, and it is part of NAP (see section 5). While having its first project regarding explicit radicalisation prevention work, THL has considerable knowledge regarding other violent phenomena such as domestic abuse. The project is based on a study that found that social and health care workers need more knowledge regarding radicalisation as a phenomenon but also to recognise and deal with it. According to THL's experts, social and health care sector workers currently perceive radicalisation as an imminent violent threat. THL's Senior Specialist, Anneli Portman, argues that with the right information, social and health care workers can be in a key role in detecting violent radicalisation of, in particular, lone actors when they have the right knowledge. It is also crucial for them to have the knowledge since they are part of the multi-professional Anchor work.

The web-based training programme developed in the project will be available for all but is targeted at social and health care professionals. Having the programme online helps to spread the knowledge and provides flexibility. The programme aims to raise discussions around radicalisation in the workplace, according to Saara Takkunen, the Senior Planning Officer of Radik. The supporting tool, on the other hand, aims to create abilities to recognise violent radicalisation and to evaluate risks and the need for individual support. The interviewees reminded us that violent radicalisation does not have a set list of symptoms and tools to recognise radicalisation should never be used as mere checklists or to stigmatise marginalised groups. The aim of the supporting tool is rather to explain what things to look for, what the

protecting factors are, who the actors are that can be contacted to cooperate (besides the police) and so on. Other Nordic countries' examples were considered when creating the training programme and supporting tool.

The Radik project works in cooperation with multiple actors such as the cities of Helsinki and Oulu, the National Police Board, the NBI, the Criminal Sanctions Agency, MoI, the National Agency for Education, University of Helsinki, and THL's department of immigration. In other words, it involves various public authorities and experts in the field. On top of the formal cooperation work, the Radik project cooperates informally with multiple stakeholders, for instance with HDL's exit program experts. Information is acquired at the local, national, and international levels through the RAN and the Nordic Safe Cities network.

Many of the experts interviewed as a part of this study agreed that project-based funding is problematic, especially in the case of exit work. For the Radik project, two-year funding is deemed as being understandable since it produces tools and education material that will remain longer than that. However, updating the content of the material will be needed in the future, since violent radicalisation changes and develops over time, and for this the project, would need extra funding. Portman suggests that to enable the continuity of de-radicalisation policies in the future, one option could be regional bodies embedded in existing welfare areas, with professionals who could advise and guide with questions regarding radicalisation. Another option could be a national body responsible for radicalisation research and education, funded by the State. According to Portman, social and health care sector workers still lack information about radicalisation, indicating a lack of information about it in other sectors, too. Hence, accurate and current information about radicalisation as a phenomenon should be available to all. According to Portman and Takkunen, radicalisation should be discussed openly and addressed in a timely fashion so that the focus of the work can be in prevention. The issue of violent radicalisation is nevertheless not recognised enough in Finland because of the consensual political culture which prevents discussion about issues deemed to be difficult or controversial, and the idea of Finland being a safe country where bad things are not expected to happen.

7. Conclusion

In conclusion, Finland is characterised by the Nordic welfare state model with a strong position for both state institutions and municipalities. Basic rights are inscribed in the Finnish Constitution, and a distinctive feature of the system is the ex-ante examination of the constitutionality of new legislation or EU treaties. Legal positivism in the interpretation of the law and the principle of legality are typical features of Finnish legal practice. Finnish criminal policy can be described as socially oriented rather than punitive. While issues that are directly or indirectly related to radicalisation have been addressed as a part of the Finnish legal framework, Finland has been called by the European Commission to fully transpose EU law criminalising hate speech and hate crimes (European Commission, 2021; see section 4).

The explicit de-radicalisation policies in Finland have a comprehensive perspective and are based on multi-professional cooperation both on national and local level. This has been as beneficial to the policy's success given its multi-dimensional approach that has impeded some perils of demonisation through prevention policy (cf. Hickman et al, 2011). Our two case studies (section 6) highlight both levels' advantages. A central part of Finnish de-radicalisation policies can nevertheless be described as implicit. The institutions and policies of the welfare state and social inclusion are central in preventing violent radicalisation. Finland has free

comprehensive schooling, affordable health care and other benefits and support for those who need them. However, people in a marginalised position with multiple overlapping problems are more likely to fall through the cracks of the system (Saari, 2015). Moreover, while many traditional political divisions and minority groups are relatively well recognised in the Finnish political system and constitution, the system has been blind to certain exclusion mechanisms, and the pluralisation of society has opened up new issues (see section 2). Consequently, there are factors that can lead to certain people being more vulnerable to radicalisation if they feel excluded from Finnish society. For instance, a vulnerable group is undocumented migrants who do not have full access to Finnish health care (Keskimäki, Nykänen & Kuusio, 2014).

Trust in public authorities by all groups in society is crucial, and trust in the police and the judiciary are relatively strong in Finland (European Social Survey, 2011; OECD, 2021). The challenge remains that the Police should build trust among minorities who have bad experiences with police, for instance through Community Police Officers (see annex 3). Recruitment of police from migrant backgrounds was initiated in 2015 in Helsinki and nationwide (Vainio, 2015; Mol, 2018). Moreover, it is crucial that people feel equally treated in the judicial system. The victims of discrimination often perceive the existing redress mechanisms as burdening and difficult to grasp (Aaltonen, Heino & Villa, 2013). Discrimination, even if not done on purpose, might lead to radicalisation if discriminatedagainst people feel powerless in the system. Giving people non-violent options to make themselves heard reduces the risk of violence. It is important to acknowledge the existing discrimination and racism in Finland (FRA, 2018; Keskinen, Seikkula & Mkwesha, 2021), even in the work of public authorities, and to assess critically practices such as ethnic profiling (Himanen, 2021; Keskinen et al, 2018). Additionally, Finland has been advised to fully transpose the EU legislation criminalising hate speech and hate crimes (European Commission, 2021), which suggests that Finnish hate crime sanctioning is inadequate.

De-radicalisation work should have funding which goes beyond election terms. Even if the government has political will to implement de-radicalisation policies, the resources allocated to the work have been relatively small, with a focus on fixed-term projects, often conducted by third sector organisations. While CSOs and other third sector organisations have good reach to the grassroots level, making them important actors in the field, a more permanent form of government funding should be established to guarantee the continuity of the work. Qualitative indicators are needed to prove the significance and effectiveness of explicit de-radicalisation work of CSOs to persuade the funders.

Finland has a multilevel approach in its de-radicalisation and integration measures; both national and local levels have a role in it. The national actor Mol coordinates the system that then branches to the local level, to exit work, the multi-professional Anchor work and activities engaging the youth, but the interaction between the national and local levels is bidirectional. The focus on the local level also helps to consider the specific context when formulating the policies. Moreover, municipalities have a strong position in the implementation of the welfare services, making them crucial actors in implicit de-radicalisation policies. Possibly in future, regional welfare areas will become more central actors in the field due to an ongoing social and health care reform. The strength of minimum-budget multi-professional work has been in tackling the issue from its root causes and not promoting an approach which would paradoxically increase radicalisation through excessive securitisation or the stigmatisation of marginalised social groups.

While Finnish de-radicalisation policies have historically been implicit policies related to free and universal education and welfare services, the explicit work for preventing violent radicalisation focuses considerably on education regarding the phenomenon of radicalisation, which is still a difficult topic in public discussion and mainly connected to ideas of immediate violent threat. This might be due to the consensual culture of Finland, which may prevent the treatment of difficult issues, and to low levels of political violence during recent decades.

In the future, multi-professional preventative work will be developed further. Accurate information will be distributed to a range of actors, such as social and health care sector workers and school staff, who are crucial in preventing violent radicalisation. Radicalisation as a phenomenon should be better-known in a range of spheres of society, and current information should be available to the public. Moreover, exit services and other counter-radicalisation measures, still largely reliant on project funding, should become more established. Our interviews also suggested that perhaps the most efficient de-radicalisation policies would be those which ensure that participation and access in services and their planning and decision-making would also be within reach of the most vulnerable groups at risk of violent radicalisation.

Annexes

Annex I: Overview of the Legal Framework on Radicalisation & Deradicalisation

title (original and English) and number	Date	(i.e. statute, regulation, rule, etc)	Object/summary of legal issues related to radicalisation	Link/PDF
for Minorities and the National Discrimination Tribunal (660/2001)	1 September 2001		Prevention of ethnic discrimination, advancement of good ethnic relations, securing ethnic minorities and foreigners rights, surveillance of discrimination and reporting of human trafficking.	https://www. finlex.fi/fi/lak i/ajantasa/2 001/200106 60 English translation: https://finlex .fi/en/laki/ka annokset/20 01/en20010 660 20081 109.pdf
	1 January 2001	statute	The purpose of this Act is to promote a client orientation and confidentiality of the client relationship, as well as the client's right to good service and treatment in social care.	https://finlex .fi/fi/laki/aja ntasa/2000/ 20000812
Act on Exercise of Freedom of Expression in Mass Medi a (460/2003)	,		This Act provides more specific provisions for the exercise of freedom of expression protected by the Constitution in mass media. In the application of this law, communication should not be interfered with more than is necessary, taking into account the importance of freedom of expression in a popular rule of law.	https://www. finlex.fi/fi/lak i/ajantasa/2 003/200304 60 English translation: https://www. finlex.fi/fi/lak i/kaannokse t/2003/en20 030460.pdf
Assembly Act (530/1999)	1 September 1999		The purpose of this Act is to safeguard the exercise of the freedom of assembly provided for in the form of government and to guide the organisation of general meetings and public events with the necessary ordinal provisions.	https://www. finlex.fi/fi/lak i/alkup/1999 /19990530 English translation: https://finlex .fi/en/laki/ka annokset/19 99/en19990

				530_20020 824.pdf
Associations Act (503/1989)	1 January 1990	statute	The Association can be allowed to establish a common purpose for the purpose of common implementation. The purpose must not be against the law or good manners. The association is governed by this law.	https://www. finlex.fi/fi/lak i/smur/1989 /19890503 English translation: https://www. prh.fi/en/yh distysrekist eri/act.html
Church Act (1054/1993)	1 January 1994	statute	The Evangelical Lutheran Church's own organ, the General Synod uses the highest authority to make decisions in the Church. It deals with doctrine and Church work as well as legislation, administration and finance. All proposals from the Synod can only be rejected or accepted altogether by the Parliament.	https://www. finlex.fi/fi/lak i/smur/1993 /19931054
Criminal Code (39/1889)	1 January 1891	statute	Finnish Criminal Code	https://www. finlex.fi/fi/lak i/smur/1889 /188900390 01 English translation: https://finlex .fi/en/laki/ka annokset/18 89/en18890 039_20150 766.pdf
Data Protection Law (1050/2018)	1 February 2019	statute	Data protection law enacts how personal data should be handled and data's freedom of movement. Personal data can be handled for specified reasons only.	https://www. finlex.fi/fi/lak
Ethnic agitation (511/2011)	13 May 2011	statute	Spreading or upholding information, opinion or other messages for the public that threatens, speaks ill or insults some group on the grounds of race, skin colour, national or ethnic origin, religion or conviction, sexual	https://www. finlex.fi/fi/lak i/alkup/2011 /20110511

Finnish Constitution (731/1999)	1 March 2000	statute	orientation or disability or any other equivalent reason will be penalised. The Finnish Constitution	https://finlex .fi/fi/laki/sm ur/1999/199 90731 English translation: https://www. finlex.fi/fi/lak
Freedom of Religion Act (453/2003)	1 August 2003	statute	The Act safeguards the exercise of the freedom of religion provided for in the Constitution. In addition, the Act	finlex.fi/fi/lak i/ajantasa/2
			provides for the establishment of a registered religious colony and the grounds for activities.	003/200304 53 English translation: https://www. finlex.fi/en/l aki/kaannok set/2003/en 20030453.p df
General Data Protection Regulation E U (679/2016)	25 May 2016	regulation	The protection of natural persons regarding the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data.	http://data.e uropa.eu/eli /reg/2016/6 79/oj
Health Care Act (1326/2010)	1 May 2011	statute	The purpose of the Act is to promote and maintain the health, well-being, working and functional capacity and social security of the population; to narrow health disparities between populations; to implement equal access, quality and patient safety of the services needed by the population; the client focus of healthcare services; and strengthens the playing field in primary care and enhancing cooperation between healthcare operators, different sectors of the municipality and other actors in the promotion of health and wellbeing, social and social and social in organising health care.	https://www. finlex.fi/fi/lak i/alkup/2010 /20101326 English translation: https://www. finlex.fi/en/l aki/kaannok set/2010/en 20101326 20131293.p df

Land Use and Building Act (132/1999)	5 February 1999	statute	The objective is to ensure that the use of land and water areas and building activities on them create preconditions for a favourable living environment and promote ecologically, economically, socially and culturally sustainable development. The Act also aims to ensure that everyone has the right to participate in the preparation process, and that planning is high quality and interactive, that expertise is comprehensive and that there is open provision of information on matters being processed.	finlex.fi/fi/lak i/ajantasa/1
Law on the Processing of Personal Data in Criminal Matters and the Maintenance (1054/2018)		statute	GDPR is not valid in cases in which the authorities need to prevent, investigate, reveal crimes or bring crimes into consideration of charges.	https://www. finlex.fi/fi/lak i/alkup/2018 /20181054 English translation: https://finlex .fi/en/laki/ka annokset/20 18/en20181 054.pdf
Local Government Act (410/2015)	10 April 2015	statute	Law on Finnish municipalities, which also regulates local democracy and participation.	https://www. finlex.fi/fi/lak i/ajantasa/2 015/201504 10 English tran slation: https://www. finlex.fi/fi/lak i/kaannokse t/2015/en20 150410.pdf
Non- Discrimination Act (1325/2014)	1 January 2015	statute	The purpose of this Act is to promote equality and prevent discrimination, and to enhance the legal protection of the person who has been subjected to discrimination.	https://finlex .fi/fi/laki/sm ur/2014/201 41325 English translation: https://www. finlex.fi/fi/lak i/kaannokse t/2014/en20 141325.pdf
Party Act (10/1969)	1 February 1969	statute	The purpose of this Act is to set guidelines for how a political party is established.	https://www. finlex.fi/fi/lak i/ajantasa/1 969/196900 10

				English translation: https://finlex .fi/en/laki/ka annokset/19 69/en19690 010_19920 653.pdf
Police Act (2011/872)	1 January 2014	statute	The tasks of police are to safeguard justice and social order, national security, general order and maintenance of security, as well as, the prevention, revealing, detection of crimes, and to bring crimes into consideration of charges.	https://www. finlex.fi/fi/lak i/smur/2011 /20110872 English translation: https://www. finlex.fi/fi/lak i/kaannokse t/2011/en20 110872_20 131168.pdf
Social Welfare Act (1301/2014)	1April 2015	statute	The aim of the Act is to promote and uphold wellbeing, social security, reduce inequality, secure equal social services, and better cooperation between authorities.	https://www. finlex.fi/fi/lak i/alkup/2014 /20141301
Terrorist Crimes (17/2003)	1 February 2003	statute	Terrorist crime is defined as a crime that is based on terrorist incentives. This can mean an illegal threat, serious theft offence, intentional explosive crime, serious firearms offence, serious disturbing of telecommunications, human trafficking, kidnapping, use of chemical weapons, manslaughter, murder or involvement of radiological weapons etc. done with terrorist motives, a preparation of a terrorist crime, leading of a terrorist group, giving education, funding terrorism and travelling for a terrorist crime.	https://www.finlex.fi/fi/lak i/ajantasa/1 889/188900 39001?sear ch%5Btype %5D=pika& search%5B pika%5D=te rroris%2A# a24.1.2003- 17 English translation: https://www.finlex.fi/fi/lak i/kaannokse t/1889/en18 890039.pdf
Youth Act (1285/2016)	1 January 2017	statute	This Act provides for the promotion of youth work and activities and youth policies, as well as the related responsibilities and cooperation of the State Government and Municipality, as well as state funding.	https://www. finlex.fi/fi/lak i/alkup/2016 /20161285

National Case Law

Case	Date		Object/summary of legal issues related	Link/PDF
number		the	to radicalisation	
		court		
Disbandment	22	Supreme	"The Supreme Court held that, in the	https://korkei
of association	September	Court	main, the activities of the association had	noikeus.fi/en/
S2018/698	2020		involved such essential unlawfulness and	index/ennakk
			violations of the public interest that a	opaatokset/s
			caution was to be deemed an insufficient	<u>hortsummari</u>
			remedy; hence, an order for the	esofselected
			disbandment of the association [NRM]	<u>precedentsin</u>
			was issued."	english/2020/
				kko.html

Other Relevant Issues

	provisions	(statues, rules, regulations etc.)	Important case law	Comments/issues relevant to radicalisation
Freedom of religion and belief		Freedom of Religion Act (453/2003)		The Act safeguards the exercise of the freedom of religion provided for in the Constitution. In addition, the Act provides for the establishment of a registered religious colony and the grounds for activities.
Minority rights	PL 17 §	Act on the Ombudsman for Minorities and the National Discrimination Tribunal (660/2001)		Sámi, as an indigenous people, and Roma and other groups have a right to uphold and develop their language and culture.
Freedom of expression	PL 12 §	Act on using freedom of speech in mass communication (460/2003)		Freedom of speech is defined as a right to express, publish and receive information, opinions and other messages without anyone preventing it. The freedom of speech can be restricted in relation to other rights and laws.
Freedom of assembly	PL 13 §	Assembly Act (530/1999)		The Act safeguards freedom of assembly.

Freedom of association/political parties etc. Hate speech/ crime	PL 13 §	Party Act (10/1969), Associations Act (503/1989) Ethnic agitation	NRM was disbanded on the grounds of continuous unlawful activities (against the Constitution and the Associations Act). Hate speech or hate
		(511/2011), Discrimination (885/2009)	crimes are not judicial concepts.
Church and state relations	PL 76 §	Church Act (1054/1993)	Evangelic-Lutheran (and Orthodox) Church have a special position.
fSurveillance laws		Law on the Processing of Personal Data in Criminal Matters and the Maintenance (1054/2018), Police Act (2011/872)	GDPR is not valid in cases in which the authorities need to prevent, investigate, reveal crimes or bring crimes into consideration of charges.
Right to privacy	PL 10 §	General Data Protection Regulation EU (679/2016), Data Protection Law (1050/2018)	Everyone has a right to privacy. Personal data can be handled for specified reasons only.

Annex II: List of Institutions Dealing with Radicalisation & Counter-radicalisation

		Type of organisation	Area of competence in the field of radicalisation& de-radicalisation	Link
Criminal Sanctions Agency, Rikos- seuraamuslaito s	National	Criminal Sanctions Agency	Development of de-radicalisation practices in prisons	https://www.rikosseuraamu s.fi/en/index.html Project: https://www.rikoss euraamus.fi/material/attach ments/rise/julkaisut- muut/t6tkkckKt/RISE_VER AD_Loppuraportti_Julkinen .pdf
Deaconess Foundation Diakonissalaitos (HDL)		Third sector organisation	Exit work	https://www.hdl.fi/en/
Finn Church Aid,	Local	Third sector organisation	Reach Out project	https://www.kirkonulkomaa napu.fi/en/

IZ:l	ı	Π	Ī	
Kirkon ulkomaanapu				
Finnish Institute	National	State Institute	Radik project	https://thl.fi/en/web/thlfi-en
for Health and	ivaliorial	State Histitute	i vadik project	1111/611/WED/UIIII-EII
Welfare,				
Terveyden ja				
hyvinvoinnin				
laitos				
Finnish Security	National	Agency of the	Terrorism	https://supo.fi/en/frontpage
Intelligence	INational	Ministry of the	prevention	Intips://supo.ii/eri/irontpage
Service,		Internal Affairs	prevention	
Suojelupoliisi		ilitelliai Alialis		
(SUPO)				
Helsinki Safe	Local	Municipal	Promotion	https://www.hel.fi/turva/en/c
Cities Network,	Lucai	•	of safety and the	ooperation/
Turvallinen		actors network	sense of security	<u>ooperation/</u>
Helsinki -			in Helsinki;	
verkosto			enabling of	
A C I VOSIO			a compilation of	
			common views on	
			phenomena that	
			endanger safety	
			in Helsinki;	
			identification	
			of signals that	
			endanger	
			safety; planning	
			of preventive	
			action	
Ministry of	National	Ministry	Administration	https://minedu.fi/en/frontpa
Education and	i talionai	iviii iioti y	of matters relating	
Culture,			to the Churches	<u>90</u>
Kulttuuri- ja ope			and other	
tusministeriö			religious	
			communities and	
			drafting	
			of legislation	
			relating to them	
Ministry of the	National	Ministry	Responsibility of	https://intermin.fi/en/frontpa
Internal Affairs,		,	radicalisation	<u>ge</u>
Sisäministeriö			prevention work	
			in Finland,	
			coordination of	
			Anchor work	
Ministry of	National	Ministry	Work against	https://yhdenvertaisuus.fi/e
Justice,		,	discrimination	n/frontpage_
Oikeus-			and hate speech;	7 - 57 -
ministeriö			• · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	https://oikeusministerio.fi/e
			projects (Facts	n/project?tunnus=OM043:0
			against	0/2019
			Hate; previous	
			projects on the	
			topic)	
L	l	l	11/	

National Agency for Education, Opetushallitus National Bureau of Investigation, Keskusrikos- poliisi		Agency Police department	Work against radicalisation at schools; REDI project Exit work for criminals in organised crime	https://www.oph.fi/en/statist ics-and- publications/publications/bu ilding-resilience-support- democracy-education https://poliisi.fi/en/national- bureau-of-investigation
Police, Poliisi	National	Police	Prevention of violent radicalisation in cooperation with other stakeholders	https://poliisi.fi/en/frontpage
Save the Children, Pelastakaa Lapset	National	Third sector organisation	RadicalWeb project to educate adults working with the young to recognise radicalisation on the internet	https://www.pelastakaalaps et.fi/kehittamis-ja- asiantuntijatyo/digitaalinen- hyvinvointi-ja-lapsen- oikeudet/radicalweb- hanke/
Young Muslims Forum, Nuorten Muslimien Foorumi	Local	Third sector organisation	Muvenna project; local promotion of the inclusion of young immigrants and Muslim youth to prevent violent extremism in Turku	https://nmf.fi/projektit/muve nna/

Annex III: Best Practices/Interventions/Programmes

National level

	Institution(s)	Aim		Evidence of
				effectiveness / literature
Facts against Hate,		The objective of this training		
Online training on	Interior with the			RN:ISBN:978
1 . ,	Police University		<u>erio.fi/en/p</u>	<u>-952-324-</u>
and encountering	College and the	of equality, hate crime and	roject?tun	<u>632-4</u>
clients	National Police	minorities as well as the	nus=OM0	Ongoing
	Board	values and ethical	43:00/201	project
		guidelines of the police and	<u>9</u>	
		their application to the daily		
		work. Its aims also include		
		lowering the threshold of		
		communicating with		
		minorities and supporting		
		police officers in working		
		with them.		

National action plan for the Prevention of Violent Radicalisation and Extremism 2019– 2023	Interior	evaluation of preventing radicalisation and extremism for the years 2019-2023.	/URN:ISB N:978- 952-324- 627-0	http://urn.fi/U RN:ISBN:978 -952-324- 319-4 Ongoing project
RADIK project	National Institute for Health and Welfare	To increase know- how and recognition of violent radicalisation and its prevention amongst health and social sector professionals. To create a supporting tool and web-based training programme and increase knowledge on the matter.	https://thl.f i/fi/tutkimu s-ja- kehittamin en/tutkimu kset-ja- hankkeet/ vakivaltais en- radikalisoit umisen-ja- ekstremis min- ennalta- ehkaisy- sosiaali- ja- terveystoi messa- radik-	project

Sub-national/Regional level

	Institution(s)	Aim	Source	Evidence of effectiveness / literature
1.				
2.				

Local level

	Institution(s)	Aim	Source	Evidence of
				effectiveness
				/ literature
Anchor	Ministry of the	Anchor activities aim to address	http://urn.fi/U	http://urn.fi/U
work	Interior, National	emerging problems with a low	RN:ISBN:97	RN:ISBN:97
	Police Board,	threshold. The members of the	8-952-324-	8-952-324-
	police	Anchor team receive information	632-4	<u>632-4</u>
	departments,	about the situation and events in	www.ankkuri	
	social services,	their area and can thus quickly	toiminta.fi	
	health care and	intervene in any problems. Anchor	https://julkais	
	youth services	teams also have local networks,	ut.valtioneuv	
		which ensures smooth	osto.fi/bitstre	
		communication between all those	am/handle/1	
		working with young people. This	0024/161483	
		enables them to intervene in new	/SM_16_19_	
		and changing situations.	<u>Ankkuritoimi</u>	
			nnan kasikir	
			a.pdf?seque	

			nce=4&isAllo	
			wed=y	
Community	Helsinki Police	The community officer activities	http://urn.fi/U	http://urp_fi/LL
Police	Department,	were launched in Helsinki as the		RN:ISBN:97
Officers	Preventive			
Officers		police realised that while the police		8-952-324-
	Action Unit	heard nothing of minority groups'	<u>632-4</u>	<u>632-4</u>
		concerns from the field, this did not		
		mean that such concerns did not		
		exist. The minorities simply did		
		not dare, or did not know how to		
		bring them to the attention of the		
		police. As a result, the police started		
		to work on interaction and building a		
		relationship with minority actors.		
		Rather than being limited to people		
		with different linguistic and cultural		
		backgrounds, this work also		
		included young people and groups		
		with different extremist ideologies.		
Exit work	Deaconess	The exit project consists of three	https://www.	Ongoing
	Foundation	focus areas: education of	hdl.fi/exit/	project
	(HDL)	stakeholders, creation of operating		
		model and client work. The aim of		
		education is to spread		
		knowledge and understanding the		
		importance and substance of exit		
		work. The model creation refers to		
		building permanent practice, which		
		is shaped by co-learning with other		
		EU member states. The client work		
		offers mentoring for		
		voluntary, violently radicalised		
		people or ones at the risk of violent		
		radicalisation.		
RADINET	Vuolle			https://vuolle
project	Setlementti	developed an organisation-based,		oulu.fi/radine
		nationwide client service		<u>t-hanke-</u>
		model of Exit work for radicalised	<u>yhteistyo/asi</u>	
		individuals who want to break free	<u>antuntijuutta-</u>	<u>tuloksellisest</u>
		from violent extremist thinking and	<u>ja-</u>	<u>a-</u>
		action. The project prepared a		<u>jarjestotoimin</u>
		framework for now ongoing exit	ehittamistyo-	<u>nasta/</u>
		project of HDL.	<u>ia-</u>	
			hankkeet/rad	
			<u>inet-hanke/</u>	

Annex IV: Policy Recommendations

- Multisectoral and pragmatic cooperation and communication between public authorities and different administrative levels, which also includes the central stakeholders and experts, is efficient in preventing violent radicalisation.
- A framework where guidelines are set at the national level, but the implementation of de-radicalisation policies is conducted locally is effective in considering the local context.

- Sufficient funding for de-radicalisation work over election terms is central
 to ensuring the continuity of the policy. Project-based funding can be used in
 developing policies and models for further work, but not in permanent activity such
 as exit work.
- Third sector organisations reach the grassroots level and people with a low level of trust for public authorities; however, the continuity of their funding (which is often project-based) needs to be taken into account.
- Diverse stakeholders need to be involved in the preventive work. This also concerns youth participation in initiatives focusing on young people.
- International cooperation and learning from international examples are central in the development of de-radicalisation policies.
- Social and security perspectives should be integrated, and excessive securitisation avoided. The role of prevention is central in de-radicalisation policies.
- The role of welfare services is of high importance as a part of the preventive work.
 No one should be excluded from them. Exclusion mechanisms of society and ascending phenomena need to be recognised.
- Trust in society and public authorities, including the judiciary system and the police, are central in the prevention of violent radicalisation.
- There should be sufficient education and training for public authorities to recognise all kinds of violent radicalisation and its risk factors. Openly available information about radicalisation should be provided. The difference between violent radicalisation and non-violent radical social movements should be noted. Tools to recognise risk factors for violent radicalisation should be developed, but not used as a mere checklist or in a stigmatising way.

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