



Trends of Radicalisation

Finland/3.2 Research Report

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Table of Contents

List of Abbreviations	5
Acknowledgements	6
About the Project	7
Executive Summary	8
Introduction	10
Hotspots of radicalisation	11
Overview of chosen hotspots	11
Method and reason for choice of hotspots	11
Micro, meso and macro factors	14
Jokela school shooting	14
Micro Level: Personal Factors (Background of Individual Actors)	14
Meso Level: Social Setting Factors (Groups, Networks, Communities)	15
Macro Level: Institutional, Systemic and Structural Factors	15
The NRM - Helsinki Central Railway Station Square Assault	16
Micro Level: Personal Factors (Background of Individual Actors)	16
Meso Level: Social Setting Factors (Groups, Networks, Communities)	17
Macro Level: Institutional, Systemic and Structural Factors	17
Turku stabbing	17
Micro Level: Personal Factors (Background of Individual Actors)	17
Meso Level: Social Setting Factors (Groups, Networks, Communities)	18
Macro Level: Institutional, Systemic and Structural Factors	18
Facilitating factors	19
Jokela school shooting	19
The NRM - Helsinki Central Railway Station Square Assault	20
Turku stabbing	20
Motivational factors to be quantified in the I-GAP questionnaire	21
Jokela school shooting	21
The NRM - Helsinki Central Railway Station Square Assault	22
Turku stabbing	23
Conclusions	23
References and Sources	25
Annex: I-GAP Coding	31
Jokela school shooting	31

Injustice Coding	31
Grievance Coding	31
Alienation Coding.....	32
Polarisation Coding.....	32
The NRM - Helsinki Central Railway Station Square Assault.....	33
Injustice Coding	33
Grievance Coding	34
Alienation Coding.....	34
Polarisation Coding.....	35
Turku stabbing	36
Injustice Coding	36
Grievance Coding	37
Alienation Coding.....	37
Polarisation Coding.....	38

List of Abbreviations

I-GAP	Injustice-Grievance-Alienation-Polarisation
Mol	Ministry of the Interior
NRM	Nordic Resistance Movement
OTKES	Onnettomuustutkintakeskus, The Safety Investigation Authority Finland
SUPO	Suojelupoliisi, Finnish Security Intelligence Service
UN	United Nations

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About the Project

D.Rad is a comparative study of radicalisation and polarisation in Europe and beyond. It aims to identify the actors, networks, and wider social contexts driving radicalisation, particularly among young people in urban and peri-urban areas. D.Rad conceptualises this through the I-GAP spectrum (injustice-grievance-alienation-polarisation) with the goal of moving towards measurable evaluations of de-radicalisation programmes. Our intention is to identify the building blocks of radicalisation, which include a sense of being victimised; a sense of being thwarted or lacking agency in established legal and political structures; and coming under the influence of “us vs them” identity formulations.

D.Rad benefits from an exceptional breadth of backgrounds. The project spans national contexts including the UK, France, Italy, Germany, Poland, Hungary, Finland, Slovenia, Bosnia, Serbia, Kosovo, Israel, Iraq, Jordan, Turkey, Georgia, Austria, and several minority nationalisms. It bridges academic disciplines ranging from political science and cultural studies to social psychology and artificial intelligence. Dissemination methods include D.Rad labs, D.Rad hubs, policy papers, academic workshops, visual outputs and digital galleries. As such, D.Rad establishes a rigorous foundation to test practical interventions geared to prevention, inclusion and de-radicalisation.

With the possibility of capturing the trajectories of seventeen nations and several minority nations, the project will provide a unique evidence base for the comparative analysis of law and policy as nation states adapt to new security challenges. The process of mapping these varieties and their link to national contexts will be crucial in uncovering strengths and weaknesses in existing interventions. Furthermore, D.Rad accounts for the problem that processes of radicalisation often occur in circumstances that escape the control and scrutiny of traditional national frameworks of justice. The participation of AI professionals in modelling, analysing and devising solutions to online radicalisation will be central to the project’s aims.

Executive Summary

The aim of this report is to detect and review general trends of violent radicalisation through an inductive analysis of hotspots that epitomise them. The analysis identifies, contextualises and then quantifies distinct occurrences of physical or emotional violence that are characteristic of and central to the trends. The report does not aim to deliver a theoretical overview of all socio-economic or geopolitical shifts that shape the contemporary manifestations of violent radicalisation, nor does it attempt to produce an exhaustive catalogue of these manifestations. The main objective is instead to scrutinise specific, pivotal moments – hotspots of radicalisation – that represent a culmination of general radicalisation trends and provide meaningful insights into their rise and expansion. We have chosen three hotspots of radicalisation to present and analyse in this report.

The first hotspot is a school shooting in 2007 in Jokela that is one of the most researched cases of violent extremism in Finland. The perpetrator, who was a student at the school where he staged the attack, killed nine people including himself and injured 12 others. The shooting was interpreted as an individual tragedy caused by the shooter's personal problems and exclusion, even though the shooter himself stressed he was committing a terrorist attack and wished to start a revolution. The attack inspired similar attacks and threats at other schools. The offender acted alone but was connected to national and global online communities of people deeply interested in school shootings.

The second hotspot is an assault in 2016 committed by a neo-Nazi; a member of the Nordic Resistance Movement (NRM). The NRM was holding a demonstration in the centre of Helsinki when one of its activists kicked a passer-by in the chest, after the passer-by had reportedly said something negative about the NRM and spat towards them. The victim later died in the hospital. The case received extensive media attention and led to a legal process which resulted in the NRM being banned in 2020.

The third hotspot is a stabbing in 2017 in Turku. The perpetrator was a young Moroccan man who had applied for asylum in Finland and received a negative decision. Two people were killed and nine were injured, including the perpetrator. He claimed to be fighting for ISIL, which ISIL never confirmed. So far this is the only case for which someone has been convicted of terrorism in Finland in the 21st century.

In preparing this report, we conducted desk research using methods and data based on existing research, policy documents produced by investigation commissions and material from media sources. Furthermore, we found useful our interview with an anonymous expert in the field of (de-)radicalisation as background information conducted for Work Package 4 in the

same project. We coded the motives behind the hotspots and analysed them with a quantitative I-GAP tool which contains questions about four components: injustice, grievance, alienation and polarisation. The motives were identified from the point of view of the perpetrator in each hotspot, based on information such as their manifestos, interviews and secondary sources, thus complementing existing research based on a more contextual analysis.

The three hotspots analysed in this report represent wider violent phenomena in Finnish society. Jokela has been idolised by both Finnish and international school shooters since the attack; the NRM assault is connected to a wider culture of violence in the organisation and the extra-parliamentary far right; and the Turku stabbing is the only crime with a conviction for terrorism. Although the Turku stabber and the Jokela school shooter can be interpreted as lone actors in the sense that they did not have a clear background organisation, even they did not act completely on their own. The perpetrators analysed here were young men, and violent masculinity and misogyny played a central part in their ideology or motivation.

Analysing these hotspots shows how the interpretation of the violence is a political and value-laden choice, although not necessarily always a conscious one. What is labelled political violence or terrorism varies. Despite the Jokela perpetrator claiming that his actions were political terrorism, the shooting was largely discussed in the frame of bullying and mental health problems. In comparison, the later Turku and NRM cases were more readily interpreted as political violence and to many people were a wakeup call to the existence of political violence in Finland.

Introduction

Radicalisation must not be understood in a socio-historical vacuum. The aim of this report is to focus on the specificities of political, economic and cultural development and tensions that structure a given region (in this case, Finland), by analysing three specific hotspots that still speak to processes of radicalisation today. Investigation of the hotspots was focused on general trends that led to these specific situations. In viewing these trends, we focused on macro, meso, and micro circumstances of the violent acts, outlined the climate that facilitated them, and situated them on the injustice-grievance-alienation-polarisation (I-GAP) spectrum, further developed in later reports of the De-Radicalisation in Europe and Beyond: Detect, Resolve, Re-integrate (D.Rad) project.

Our aim with this report is to detect and review general trends of radicalisation through an inductive analysis of hotspots that epitomise them. The analysis identifies, contextualises and then quantifies distinct occurrences of physical or emotional violence that are characteristic of and central to the trends. It was not the aim with this report to deliver a theoretical overview of all socio-economic or geopolitical shifts that shape the contemporary manifestations of radicalisation, nor have we attempted to produce an exhaustive catalogue of these manifestations. The main objective was to scrutinise specific, pivotal moments – hotspots of radicalisation – that represent a culmination of general radicalisation trends and provide meaningful insights into their rise and expansion.

Several aspects of the three hotspots of radicalisation are presented in the following order: first, an overview offers a summary of the hotspots. In the next section, we go through the methodology used in constructing this report and the reasons why these hotspots of radicalisation have been chosen to be analysed in this report. After that, an analysis of the micro, meso and macro factors at each hotspot provide an overview of factors driving and supporting radicalisation that correlate with each of the hotspots. These include personal factors, social setting factors and institutional, systemic and structural factors. Next, in the section on facilitating factors, we identify specific elements in the political and socio-cultural environment of the individuals responsible for the hotspots that facilitated the violent acts and made them possible or attractive. Finally, motivational factors, quantified with the I-GAP questionnaire will be specified and reflected in the last section.

The I-GAP spectrum used to assess the hotspots is a constructivist method of multifaceted assessment that allows the motives driving radicalisation to be traced. The motives are identified from the point of view of the individuals involved in the hotspot, based on manifestos, interviews and other statements the perpetrators have made. For each hotspot, we examined four aspects of radicalisation that motivated individuals to engage in violent extremism: The method grounds the hotspots in perceptions of injustice which led to grievance, alienation and polarisation (I-GAP), and finally culminated in the violent act. We combined the actor-oriented perspective of the I-GAP spectrum with contextual information on the Finnish cases.

Hotspots of radicalisation

Overview of chosen hotspots

The three hotspots open different perspectives to the study in a country with low levels of violent radicalisation, and they also highlight some particularities of Finland. The cases are presented in a chronological order. Overall, political violence and terrorism since the 1918 civil war and its aftermath in the first half of the 20th century have been rare in Finland. Because of low level of organised extremist violence, these hotspots were either isolated acts of violent extremism or were spontaneous. However, they do connect to wider ideological, religious or political motives and communities. In addition, these events have been of consequence in Finland and affected or motivated political and judicial decisions addressing gun legislation, civilian intelligence legislation and banning violent organisations.

The first hotspot is a school shooting in 2007 in Jokela, an agglomeration of about 6000 inhabitants. The perpetrator, who was a student at the school, killed nine people including himself, and injured 12 others. The shooting was interpreted as an individual tragedy caused by the shooter's personal problems and exclusion (Oikeusministeriö, 2009), even though the shooter stressed he was committing a terrorist attack and wished to start an *Übermenschen* revolution. The offender acted alone but was connected to national and global online communities of people deeply interested in school shootings.

The second hotspot is an assault in 2016 committed by a neo-Nazi; a member of the Nordic Resistance Movement (NRM). The NRM is a violent extra-parliamentary far right, and neo-Nazi organisation active in Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Finland (where it was banned in 2020), that aims for a Nordic state ultimately through violent revolution (Sallamaa, 2018, pp. 39-40). The NRM was holding a demonstration in the centre of Helsinki when its activist kicked a passer-by in the chest, after the passer-by had reportedly said something negative about the NRM and spat towards them. The victim later died in hospital. The case received extensive media attention and started the legal process which led to the NRM being banned in 2020 (Sallamaa & Kotonen, 2020).

The third hotspot is a stabbing in 2017 in Turku. The perpetrator was a young Moroccan man who had applied for asylum in Finland and received a negative decision. Two people were killed and nine were injured, including the offender. He claimed to be fighting for ISIL, which ISIL never confirmed (OTKES, 2018). So far this is the only case which has led to a conviction for terrorism in Finland in the 21st century.

Method and reason for choice of hotspots

The three hotspots were chosen to show the scale and nature of political violence in Finland in the 21st century and are representative of several veins of violent extremism. The choice of hotspots was based on existing research and a qualitative interview with an expert in the field of (de)radicalisation in Finland.

The first hotspot, the school shooting in Jokela in 2007, is analysed here because of its significance in inspiring similar attacks and threats in schools (Investigation Commission of the Kauhajoki School Shooting, 2010, pp. 43-6). The attack shocked Finland, since serious school violence had been considered something foreign and far away. The following year, there was a second school attack in Kauhajoki, and in 2019 a third one in Kuopio. The attack in Kauhajoki was in part inspired by the Jokela shooting (*ibid.*, p. 56-60). Numerous threats against schools were made after the shooting (Investigation Commission of the Jokela school shooting, 2009, p. 44).

A school shooting hotspot offers an interesting political violence perspective to the Finnish radicalisation and terrorism discourse. The overall low level of political and ideological violence in Finland ensured intensive media attention on the attack. Despite the perpetrator considering his actions to be political terrorism, the shooting was largely discussed as an individual tragedy and a result of the perpetrator's personal problems; the shooter's social exclusion and bullying have been central in understanding and explaining the event. In comparison, the two other hotspots analysed in this report were more readily viewed as political violence from the outset and made many realise it was possible for there to be political violence in Finland (see e.g., Tammikko, 2019, pp. 9-10, 20-21). Researchers have noted that defining a mass murder as either terrorism or an individual event could depend on many aspects, and that the Jokela case could have been more readily interpreted as terrorism if the perpetrator had been an immigrant or if the shooting had happened after the Norwegian Anders Behring Breivik case (Peltola, 2017). An unwillingness to consider violent attacks as terrorism in Finland prevails, because until recently, terrorism has been viewed as coming from the outside (Dahl, 2017). Some researchers raised concerns about securitisation in relation to defining the act as terrorism (e.g., Kiilakoski, 2009 pp. 27-28; Jukarainen, 2007 pp. 13-14).

The second hotspot reflects far-right activism considered to be the most alarming threat of radicalisation in the recent decades in Finland (SUPO, 2021). This hotspot, an assault in the Helsinki Central Railway Station Square was a motivator in banning the NRM (Sallamaa & Kotonen, 2020). The influence and visibility of far-right extremism increased after the so-called 'refugee crisis' of 2015 including several petrol bomb attacks on reception centres around Finland. These attacks would have been interesting to investigate because their widespread emergence characterises the nature of far-right action at the time, but multiple, not-strictly organised actors would make it hard to analyse them in the framework of this report. Instead, we have analysed an aggravated assault by an activist of the Nordic Resistance Movement (NRM) which was the most organised extremist movement in Finland before it was banned in 2020 (Tammikko, 2019, p. 190). The NRM is a violent extra-parliamentary, revolutionary neo-Nazi organisation active in Sweden, Norway and Denmark and was in Finland. It had connections with other far-right groups and the parliamentary Finns Party (Sallamaa, 2018, pp. 39-40, 52-53.). The assault happened during a demonstration, having an impact in disbanding the NRM as an association in Finland. In contrast to the other hotspots, the crime was not pre-planned. Despite the spontaneous nature of the act, the case was connected to a wider culture of violence in the movement (Kotonen, 2020) and the judgement given for the assault was more severe than originally envisioned because the court considered a racist motive behind the act (Bjørge & Aasland Ravndal, 2020; YLE, 2018). After a three-year legal process, in September 2020, the Supreme Court decided to disband the NRM as an

association (Supreme Court, 2020:68), disbanding an association for the first after the 1970's in Finland (Kantola & Reinboth, 2020). The NRM cannot legally collect money for its activities anymore and its symbols cannot be used publicly. It appears that the disbandment had potentially de-radicalised at least some actors in the organisation (see e.g., Tammikko, 2019, pp. 112-113).

The third hotspot, the stabbing in Turku in 2017, was the first and only crime for which someone has been convicted for terrorism in Finland in the 21st century. Violent incidents by radical Islamic activists have been rare or on a small scale, especially compared to many other countries in Europe. However, radical Islamism has been a conspicuous topic in the Finnish radicalisation discourse (see e.g., SUPO, 2021; Mol, 2019). The attack in Turku was committed by a Moroccan asylum seeker whose asylum application was rejected. The perpetrator stated that the attack was committed in the name of ISIL, but the organisation never claimed responsibility for the act. It has been suggested that the survival of the perpetrator might have been a potential factor in ISIL not claiming the attack, as the perpetrator being alive could cause the organisation later harm (Rimpiläinen & Mansikkamäki, 2017). Despite this, in many ways the attack was compatible with other radical Islamic terrorist attacks committed in the name of ISIL in Europe.

The analysis of trends of radicalisation in this report consists of four principal stages. First, we identified hotspots central to the history of radicalisation in Finland. Second, we provided a multilevel analysis of the forces of radicalisation that are most intimately linked to the chosen hotspots. Third, we compiled a list of the hotspots' facilitating factors. Finally, we identified the motivational causes for the hotspots and quantified them by placing them on the I-GAP spectrum. This report has relied on desk research based on existing research, policy documents and material from media sources. Furthermore, we found our interview with an anonymous expert in the field of (de-)radicalisation, conducted for WP4 in the same project, to be useful background information for this report.

The I-GAP spectrum is used to assess the hotspots is a constructivist method of multifaceted assessment that allowed us to trace the motives driving radicalisation. The motives are identified from the point of view of the individuals involved in the hotspot, based on manifestos, interviews and other statements the perpetrators have made. For each hotspot, we examined four aspects of radicalisation that motivate individuals to engage in violent extremism: The method grounds the hotspots in perceptions of injustice, which lead to grievance, alienation and polarisation (I-GAP), finally culminating in the violent act. The actor-oriented perspective of the I-GAP spectrum is combined with contextual information on the Finnish cases. Coding the latest political violence in Finland using the I-GAP questionnaire posed several challenges. As mentioned previously, political violence has been rare in Finland, and the existing cases do not neatly fit the traditional type of organised political violence. The Jokela and Turku cases were premeditated, but the perpetrators did not have direct connections to violent organisations or communities offline. In the NRM case, the perpetrator had strong connections to the organisation, but the assault was not pre-planned. The questionnaire is not designed to consider all aspects of these types of acts. Data limitations placed certain restrictions on analysis of the motives and interests of the perpetrators.

Micro, meso and macro factors

Jokela school shooting

In November 2007, an 18-year-old upper secondary school student shot eight people and himself at a school in Jokela. He tried to set the school on fire but failed. The perpetrator had been planning the shooting for at least seven months. He wanted to kill as many people as possible and to create destruction and chaos (Investigation Commission of the Jokela school shooting, 2009, p. 115).

There is no clear information on whether the victims were chosen at random. All five male victims were about the same age as the perpetrator, whereas his female victims were two authority figures and one adult education student. Some researchers have brought up the question of whether the perpetrator chose his victims because of what he saw as their roles in the injustices he had suffered (e.g., Huisjen, 2007, p. 12).

The perpetrator wrote manifestos in both English and Finnish and posted them online before the shooting. He also wrote other documents in which he justified his actions by claiming they would make society better (Investigation Commission of the Jokela school shooting, 2009, p. 18). No offline organisation exists behind the perpetrator active in online communities deeply interested in school shootings. The case provides ample amounts of data, including the perpetrator's manifesto, and research available. The case has been studied widely and from many perspectives, exploring the role of media, media reactions to school shootings and journalist experiences of them (e.g., Hakala, 2012; Raittila et al., 2008; Koljonen et al., 2011; Backholm & Björkqvist, 2012), effects of media exposure on adolescents traumatised in a school shooting (e.g., Haravuori et al., 2011), psychological, psychosocial, and communal effects of school shootings (e.g., Oksanen et al., 2012; Nurmi et al., 2011; Suomalainen et al., 2011; Murtonen et al., 2011), and the social media discourse on school shooting videos (e.g., Lindgren, 2011).

Micro Level: Personal Factors (Background of Individual Actors)

The perpetrator came from a middle-class family. Before he started primary school, the family moved to Jokela, a small agglomeration in Southern Finland, from the capital Helsinki. The mother felt like the family never fully became a part of the local community, but there was no direct conflict and relationships with the community were formally in order (Oksanen et al., 2012, p.196).

The perpetrator was bullied at secondary school (age 13-16) and possibly at primary school (age 7-12) (Investigation Commission of the Jokela school shooting 2009, pp. 50-51). In his early teens, he did not have any friends. According to his mother, he was "soft" and lacked the physical and verbal toughness expected of boys and men. He did not fit the norm of young people in the small town (Oksanen et al., 2012, pp. 196-198) and was shy and lonely (Kiilakoski & Oksanen, 2011 p. 261-262). During upper secondary school (typically age 16-18) he was likely not bullied and had a small group of friends. The friends were worried about and challenged his enthusiasm for school shootings and similar acts (Oksanen et al., 2012,

pp. 199-200). The perpetrator had been prescribed medication to treat panic disorder and social anxiety (Investigation Commission of the Jokela school shooting, 2009, pp. 50-51). His parents tried to get him psychiatric help but were told his symptoms were not serious enough. In the months before the shooting, his grandmother who he was close to, died (Oksanen et al., 2012, p. 199).

He was interested in politics and improving society, but his interests became more extreme as time passed, and violence became justifiable as way to make a difference. He had been interested in capitalism and the USA, later communism, and in upper secondary school he became absorbed in totalitarian regimes, including North Korea and the German Third Reich, which further isolated him from other young people (Oksanen et al., 2012, p. 198). He had misogynistic views and fantasies of sexual domination, and presented women as subordinate (Kiilakoski, 2009, p. 45; Kiilakoski & Oksanen, 2011 p. 262-264). It was reported that he had despised single mothers and homosexuals, which may have motivated some of his murders (Oksanen et al., 2012, p. 202).

Participating in online communities built around school shootings enabled him to adopt an aggressive, violent and misogynistic male role online and to live out possibly pre-existing narcissistic traits (Oksanen et al., 2012, pp. 200-202). Identifying with previous school shootings and other acts of violence became a part of his identity work (Kiilakoski & Oksanen, 2011 p. 264-265). In his manifesto, the shooter wrote that he was going to carry out a mass murder and political terrorism. He stated that his motives were political and therefore he wished his actions would not be called “a mere school shooting” (Kiilakoski, 2009, p. 26). He thought attacking a school would create the most publicity (Oksanen et al., 2012, pp. 201-202; Kiilakoski, 2009, pp. 11-12).

Meso Level: Social Setting Factors (Groups, Networks, Communities)

The perpetrator was an active member in Finnish and English online communities deeply interested in school shootings and uploaded videos on YouTube, receiving positive comments from other members of the online communities (Oksanen et al., 2012, p. 200). He informed other people of his actions on various internet forums (Kiilakoski & Oksanen, 2011, p. 255). He was inspired by some aspects of the Columbine school shooting (Larkin, 2009, p. 1317; Kiilakoski, 2009, p. 49). The perpetrator left a carefully planned media package full of influences from previous school shootings and terrorism, and references to them (Kiilakoski & Oksanen, 2011, pp. 256-257).

Macro Level: Institutional, Systemic and Structural Factors

School shootings, including the Jokela case, can be interpreted as the shooters following a cultural script that presents violence as a solution to personal problems. The script combines general cultural scripts on masculinity and violence, and more specific scripts on how school shootings take place (Kiilakoski & Oksanen, 2011, p. 248-251). The script is fundamentally gendered and portrays masculine rage and revenge (Kalish & Kimmel, 2010, p. 463). This applies to the Jokela case as well; the perpetrator did not fit the masculine ideal (Kiilakoski, 2009, pp. 46-47), and the attack can be interpreted as revenge of a young man who had failed

the expectations of masculinity (Oksanen et al., 2012, p. 203; see also Kiilakoski, 2009, pp. 43-47).

A core aspect of the cultural script of school shootings is the media spectacle centred around the shooter, which was also true in the Jokela case. Because of this, the shooter was able to get his message across, and because of social media, this happened at the exact moment he wanted it to (Kiilakoski & Oksanen, 2011, p. 256).

The NRM - Helsinki Central Railway Station Square Assault

In September 2016, an NRM activist jump-kicked a passer-by forcefully on his chest, which led to him falling to the pavement. The victim later died in hospital. The passer-by had reportedly said something negative about the NRM and spat towards them (Reinboth, 2018). The incident happened at Helsinki Central Railway Station Square where the NRM was holding a demonstration. The whole scenario happened in an instance and is visible on a security camera tape (Autio, 2016). According to the record of pre-trial investigation (Helsingin poliisilaitos, 2016), the police were not aware that the demonstration was being held by the NRM. During the demonstration, members of the NRM held its flags and distributed flyers.

The perpetrator was convicted for two years of imprisonment for aggravated assault in 2016. The Court of Appeal increased the term of imprisonment by three months for the crime's racist motivation since the victim had objected to the NRM's racist values. The reason the conviction was from assault rather than negligent manslaughter was because the victim had left the hospital early against doctors' recommendations and the penal grounds for a more serious conviction were not clear (Reinboth, 2018).

Micro Level: Personal Factors (Background of Individual Actors)

According to the information of the police, the perpetrator was a founding member of the NRM in Finland (Happonen, 2016) and has acted as a chairperson for the NRM financing organisation, the Nordic Tradition (Pohjoinen Perinne) (Jansson, 2017). The perpetrator had been convicted for multiple violent crimes before, and his earliest convictions were from when he was still a minor (Vainio, 2016).

According to the perpetrator, in an interview which he gave to a national socialist podcast called Studio 204 (2016), he had been a nationalist since he was a little boy. As a young teen, he found a Finnish website dedicated to national socialism, which affected his thinking considerably. In 2008, when he was 18 years old, the NRM was established in Finland. He said he had been hoping for an organisation of this kind to be established and he became active in it in 2010 (ibid.). However, this contradicts the police statement that the perpetrator was a founding member of the NRM. Nevertheless, it is clear he had an active role in the organisation from its early days. In the interview, the perpetrator also stated that he enjoys street patrolling and activism most in the organisation (ibid.). In the record of the pre-trial investigation (Helsingin poliisilaitos, 2016), the perpetrator did not comment on the attack, and neither did the other NRM members who were present at the time.

Meso Level: Social Setting Factors (Groups, Networks, Communities)

This attack, as well as other attacks by the NRM members, was reactive and spontaneous in nature and followed a provocation rather than being pre-planned. It was a continuation of a pattern of violence by the NRM, which allows violent self-defence even in minor cases (Kotonen, 2020, p. 62). In fact, the NRM awarded the perpetrator “for his courage and his loyalty to the organisation and his comrades and this was greeted by standing ovation by all participants” (Bjørgero & Aasland Ravndal, 2020, p. 44). This shows that the NRM saw the attack as justified.

The NRM is a militant group that has a highly hierarchical structure, whose members are rewarded by advancement up the hierarchy and are motivated by the idea of being a hero in the battle against the system (Aasland Ravndal, 2020, p. 2, 20, 26). The NRM aims for a violent revolution, and it offers physical and combat training to its members (Sallamaa, 2018, pp. 46-49). According to Mol (2020) the extra-parliamentary far right's violence is usually spontaneous street violence by individuals who are part of a larger network. People who are against the movement or its ideology are depicted as enemies towards whom violence is justified (ibid., p. 17).

Macro Level: Institutional, Systemic and Structural Factors

New far-right and anti-immigration organisations arose in Finland in 2015 at the time of the so-called ‘refugee crisis’ (Sallamaa, 2018). As hostile attitudes towards asylum seekers became more normalised in the public discourse, the NRM could become more visible than before and present itself as a respectable actor. In addition, the NRM had some connections to parliamentary politics through the Finns Party (ibid.), which shows how NRM’s values at least at that time were more mainstream.

Turku stabbing

The first and still the only crime producing a conviction for a terrorist attack happened in August 2017 when a young Moroccan man killed two people and injured eight others in the main market square in Turku. The attack was a typical kind of Jihadist terrorist attack of the time (Malkki & Saarinen, 2019, p. 104). The perpetrator acted alone (OTKES 2018, p. 21). While in the pre-investigation process, the perpetrator said he chose his victims at random (see e.g., ibid., p. 5), but at the court hearing, he claimed that he specifically selected women as his victims (Jansson, 2018a; see more in section 2e). Only two of ten victims were men who had tried to protect other people in the situation. The perpetrator was prepared to die himself, but he was only injured in the police operation (OTKES, 2018, p. 20, 72).

Micro Level: Personal Factors (Background of Individual Actors)

After the perpetrator arrived in Finland in May 2016, he lived in an asylum centre in Pansio. At the end of 2016, he received a negative decision to his application for asylum and appealed. The perpetrator had left Morocco in part because of family problems. His parents had separated when he was a child, and his father had been unable to take care of the family. Later, the perpetrator cut ties with his mother and father. In Morocco, he had participated in

action with local football hooligans, with whom he felt particularly insecure as in his words, he was afraid of being assaulted or even killed. Before arriving in Finland, he had stayed in several European countries without permanent habitation. During this time, he had had some minor difficulties with authorities and lost his identity documents. He applied for asylum with a fake, underaged identity, pretending he was four years younger than he actually was. According to the investigation report, the shortages in the EU asylum-seeking system enabled the abuse of the system (OTKES, 2018, pp. 21-22, 71).

In Finland, the perpetrator went to school and played sport. He made friends with other people with an immigrant background. As a person, he could be described as a leader type. First, he was mostly doing well despite a few exceptions, such as difficulties in dealing with disappointment regarding losses in sport. Some problems, such as suspicions of drug dealing, emerged when he was moved from accommodation for youth into an adults' residence in the asylum centre. Little by little, the perpetrator withdrew from his other activities and became absorbed in extremist thinking. Before the attack, he stayed in his friend's apartment where he isolated himself after the end of Ramadan, which was the most intensive time for his radicalisation (OTKES, 2018, pp. 22-23).

After a childhood in a religious family, the perpetrator had receded from religious habits for some time. Less than a year after arriving in Finland, he showed the first signs of interest in Islam, and also radical Islamism and Jihadism. He was curious to know about ISIL (OTKES, 2018, pp. 21, 23). According to Tammikko (2019, pp. 134-135), the perpetrator's practice of religion was spasmodic in nature. In religious circles he was not a visible person but rather retreated to pray privately. Before the attack, the perpetrator started feeling distressed about his radical thinking but could not find a way out of it (OTKES, 2018, pp. 23-24).

Meso Level: Social Setting Factors (Groups, Networks, Communities)

The perpetrator's friends and religious community did not agree with his radical religious views. When he started spending his time watching ISIL's propaganda videos and talking about the Jihadist ideology, they were worried and later started avoiding him (Rimpiläinen & Mansikkamäki, 2017). According to the information available, the perpetrator did not have any direct connections to ISIL or other organisations (Malkki & Saarinen, 2019, p. 105). During Ramadan, he met an extremist-orientated man nearby a prayer room. They shared approval of ISIL and its activities. They kept in touch for a while, and the man advised the perpetrator on radical Islamist questions and practical issues. It is still unclear whether this person had connections to ISIL (OTKES, 2018, pp. 23-24.). This person has not been found and he probably fled the country after the attack in summer 2017 (Rimpiläinen & Mansikkamäki, 2017). In terms of planning and implementing the attack, direct co-operators were not found in the police investigation, but there is no certainty whether private conversations online or offline had an impact on the crime (Malkki & Saarinen, 2019, p. 104).

Macro Level: Institutional, Systemic and Structural Factors

The perpetrator thought Western countries deserved punishment for the suffering they had caused to the Arab countries and Muslims (OTKES, 2018, pp. 23-24). He felt bitterness especially about the attacks on the Raqqa by the Western Alliance (Hjelt & Koskinen, 2018).

According to Tammikko (2019, pp. 31, 133), the perpetrator probably thought Finland was a state was taking a part in the Syrian war, although this was not correct. The perpetrator agreed with ISIL's hierarchical and misogynist ideology on gender (see e.g., *ibid*, p. 80). Before the stabbing, the perpetrator had written two manifestos in which he justified his actions with Jihadist ideology and aims, and he stated that his wish was to become a martyr. The manifesto was videotaped and published in a closed online communication group via Telegram (OTKES 2018, p. 5; Jansson, 2018b).

A day before the stabbing in Turku, a van attack was committed in Barcelona. ISIL publicly confirmed that it was behind the act (Töyrylä & Helin, 2017). The perpetrator had shown interest in the attack and talked about it to a friend (OTKES, 2018, p. 24). It has been estimated that the case was a factor for the perpetrator in making his final decision to attack in Turku (Tammikko, 2019, p. 134).

Facilitating factors

In this section, we identify specific elements in the political and socio-cultural environment of the individuals responsible for the hotspots that facilitated the violent acts. Facilitating factors in this context mean the circumstances that make the violent acts possible or attractive.

Jokela school shooting

There were numerous clues about the perpetrator's violent ideals and plans, but they did not lead to the attack being prevented. Before the shooting, the perpetrator had threatened other students saying that they were going to die in a "white revolution". Other students notified adults, and a youth worker met with the perpetrator three times and notified the school principal of the perpetrator's thoughts. This did not lead to further action (Investigation Commission of the Jokela school shooting, 2009, p. 18). Other students detected his online manifesto before the shooting and told a teacher. They were aware he had purchased a gun, which the perpetrator's parents did not know. The perpetrator had also written school essays on school shootings and terrorist attacks (Oksanen et al., 2012, p. 201; Kiilakoski, 2009, p. 53).

School shooters typically seek fame and notoriety with their attacks, and media often makes the attacks media spectacles, portraying the shooters as bullied victims who rise in revolt. Media attention and fame are a part of the cultural script of school shootings, of which the shooters are very aware of. This applies to the Jokela attack as well (Kiilakoski & Oksanen, 2011, p. 265).

The gun the perpetrator used was legally acquired, and he had no previous criminal history. He did not use drugs or alcohol (Oksanen et al., 2012, p.196), and had not been violent prior to the attack (Kiilakoski, 2009, p. 51). The perpetrator was prescribed SSRI medication but received no other psychiatric help, despite his parents trying to get it for him. Mental health services for youth were and still are fragmented and at an insufficient level (The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 2021, p. 7; Wahlbeck, 2007, pp. 89-90).

After the shooting, Mol updated and unified the guidelines on authorising handgun licenses, for example, stressing the importance of interviewing each new applicant. There was public discussion on whether Finnish gun legislation should be changed, and another school shooting in Kauhajoki in 2008 added to the pressure to tighten the gun legislation. In 2011, the legislation was reformed, making handguns more difficult to acquire and granting the police more extensive rights to obtain information about the applicants (Blencowe & Tebest, 2013). In 2013, preparation of an offence against life was criminalised, partly in response to school shootings (Kankkunen, 2013).

The NRM - Helsinki Central Railway Station Square Assault

In their notice to the police, the group of NRM demonstrators did not mention they were members of NRM nor that they were demonstrating on its behalf (Helsingin poliisilaitos, 2016), which affected the fact that police were not present at the demonstration. This information likely would have increased police's presence in the area since violent acts had been committed by the group previously (Kotonen, 2020). Still, it is impossible to know how the perpetrator would have acted had the police been present and supervising the demonstration.

At the time of the assault, the NRM was still a valid, unbanned association despite previous violent actions by its members. This assault might have been the motivation to begin the legal process of disbanding the NRM, which came into effect in 2020, because it led to the victim's death. However, even before the lethal attack, it was clear that the organisation was violent. The NRM has been known to have offered physical and combat training to its members (Sallamaa, 2018) and rewarding members for committing these violent acts (Bjørge & Aasland Ravndal, 2020), thus encouraging and enabling its members' violence.

Turku stabbing

Police received a tip about the perpetrator being radicalised, but the measures to address the situation were undeveloped at that point (OTKES, 2018, p. 72). The police play a central role in the multi-professional Anchor work, a programme to promote the well-being of adolescents and prevent crime at an early stage that also works against extremism (see Mol, 2019b). According to the security investigation report, Anchor work is under-resourced in many places, but it did have enough resources to work in Turku. This still did not lead to the attack being prevented (ibid., p 33). Cooperation and communication between various authorities and other actors in the field of de-radicalisation needed to be improved (ibid., p. 77). Since the attack, Mol and other actors have been developing case management (Mol, 2019a). The public pressure to reform the civilian intelligence legislation, which had already been in preparation, increased after the attack (Miikkulainen, 2017). The legislation was tightened in 2018.

The processing of asylum applications is slow, and the 'refugee crisis' still extended the waiting times, so applicants in an unstable situation are left with excessive amounts of spare time. There was no time limit for processing applications before July 2018 when it was set at six months. The resources are nevertheless not abundant, and there is limited ability to prevent the frustration of people waiting for their applications to be processed (ibid., p. 26). Asylum seekers receive a partly compensative reception allowance, which varies between €200 and

€300 depending on one's status (Finnish Immigrant Service, 2021). Asylum seekers are mostly excluded from municipal public services (OTKES, 2018, p. 75). According to the security investigation report, the residents' necessary needs, such as basic health care, are satisfied in asylum centres. The perpetrator had asked about the opportunity to talk with a psychologist, but after a meeting with a social worker and a doctor, his needs seemed to be satisfied (OTKES, 2018, p. 22).

Religious communities are integrated in de-radicalisation work in Finland, but they do not always have enough staff to respond to signs of radicalisation and the problems behind radicalisation (OTKES., p. 28). Religious groups' participation in de-radicalisation practices does not take away the aspect of securitisation of religious minorities, especially in the Muslim community, which impairs the sense of belonging and equal citizenship (Tammikko 2019, 194; see also Creutz, Saarinen & Juntunen, 2015).

Motivational factors to be quantified in the I-GAP questionnaire

In this section, we provide some background information to the I-GAP coding. For each hotspot, we have examined four aspects of radicalisation that motivate individuals to engage in violent extremism: injustice, grievance, alienation and polarisation. We analysed the hotspots from the point of view of the perpetrators, and various aspects have been quantified and coded numerically in light of the available data. As the focus of this chapter is on the cases following the perpetrators' own understanding and motivation, the analysis of the hotspots presented earlier help to balance the overview of the hotspots and provide necessary background information on the perpetrators' life experiences and the social and personal factors impacting their actions.

Jokela school shooting

In the Jokela case, the perpetrator's manifesto and his life experiences differ significantly. His manifesto concentrates on nihilistic visions of anger, death and destruction. He describes himself as intelligent and special and laments the society and the world being ruled by the worthless masses. He saw himself as a god-like *Übermensch* putting natural selection into action, echoing the thinking of the Columbine shooters (Kiilakoski, 2009, p. 26).

Online, he created an aggressive ultra-masculine identity. However, offline in his personal life, he was shy, suffered from social anxiety and had been bullied at school. Despite this, in his manifesto, he does not blame people for treating him badly at a personal level (Kiilakoski & Oksanen, 2011, p. 256).

Even though the perpetrator viewed his violence as political terrorism, the goals he mentions are abstract and non-reachable. He hoped his shooting might inspire others to commit similar acts and to start a revolution and a global war (Investigation Commission of the Jokela school shooting, 2009, p. 115). He mentions in his manifesto that the final solution to all the problems he listed would be the ultimate destruction of the whole of mankind.

As the perpetrator's manifesto was more an incoherent collection of nihilistic thoughts and abstract ideas than any concrete list of demands, some parts of the I-GAP questionnaire were more difficult to assess in this case than others. For example, the grievances the perpetrator mentions in his manifesto are abstract, such as natural selection not being realised in modern societies and democracy allowing the inferior masses to make political decisions. This performance of superiority can also be viewed as part of the cultural script of school shootings, which raises the question of how much these issues were a true ideological motivator for violence and how much of it was copying an existing pattern.

The NRM - Helsinki Central Railway Station Square Assault

The NRM encourages and justifies reactionary violence of its members and welcomes the attention these events bring it. Although the assault in question was not pre-planned, it connects to a wider culture of violence within the now banned organisation. The organisation is extremely hierarchic and builds on feelings of militant comradeship and brotherhood. The perpetrator explained his motives to the court by saying that the victim had threatened him verbally with violence which caused him to kick the victim to drive him away, and that his intention was not to cause injury (Jansson, 2017).

Not much information is available regarding the perpetrator's own thoughts; the only data available is an interview in a nationalist-socialist podcast Studio 204 (2016), and even in that the perpetrator could not discuss the attack directly because the trial was ongoing. However, he did discuss the reasons for being part of the NRM and his feelings about it. In the pre-trial investigation, neither the perpetrator nor his comrades wanted to comment on the attack. The attack being a continuation to the pattern of violence of the NRM makes it easier to analyse as some research has been conducted on the matter. Still, we cannot be completely sure what truly motivated the attack.

Due to the lack of information, the social background of the perpetrator outside the NRM could not be analysed in this report. He stated that he had been interested in nationalism since childhood, and at the age of 13 he found a national socialist website that helped form his thinking. There is no certainty of whether the perpetrator was one of the founders of the NRM or whether he joined the organisation after it was founded, but nevertheless he had been active in the movement from its early stages. The perpetrator had already committed violent attacks before the assault and had stated that his favourite type of NRM activism was actions in the streets. In an interview after the assault, the perpetrator recommended joining the NRM because being a member led to exciting experiences (Studio 204, 2016).

Because of the lack of data explaining the personal motives of the attacker, some parts of the I-GAP questionnaire were challenging to answer. Answering the questionnaire requires more data on the personal motives of the perpetrator than we had. Now, we had to rely more on considering the general values of the NRM in our assessments. For instance, the grievances behind the violence were probably more complex than the mere provocation that ultimately led to the attack.

Turku stabbing

In the Turku case, the perpetrator viewed Western societies as being morally degraded and despised what he saw as the oppression of Muslims and the Arab countries. His worldview was very polarised and black-and-white. For this reason, coding the case on the I-GAP questionnaire was easy regarding the questions about the perpetrator's essential worldview – in general, extreme ends of the coding scale represent well the perpetrator's radical views and abstract, unrealistic goals. Some challenges emerged with questions about particular issues such as redistribution, because the perpetrator had not specified his thoughts but rather despised the Western world as a whole. Because the perpetrator had been staying in Finland for a relatively short period, analysing his views of politics and politicians in the national context might not provide much detail on his political views as a whole.

At the court hearing, the perpetrator stressed his hatred of western women as one of the core motives behind the attack and his choice of victims. He claimed he was “at war with women” (Jansson, 2018a). According to him, women had been “annoying him” since he was a child, and this had even been a reason to move from one country to another (Nieminen, 2018).

The perpetrator's friends' religious thinking was less fundamental, and they were worried about his emerging radical views. The perpetrator was not happy with Muslims who did not follow his interpretation of Islam. Before the attack, he was alienated from others, and he eventually retreated into isolation voluntarily. It seems that his radicalisation happened fast, but it is not completely clear what the starting point was, and thus it is hard to define the exact duration of the process. At some point, the perpetrator tried to find a way out of his radical ideology, as it caused him anxiety, but he could not.

The manifesto of the perpetrator dealt mainly with religion and the experts has found similarities with ISIL rhetoric and the text, even if direct connections between the organisation and the perpetrator have not been proven. The perpetrator consumed ISIL propaganda and stated that his act was done in support of ISIL. He saw himself as a fighter for ISIL and wanted to become a martyr, but ISIL never claimed responsibility for the attack. The perpetrator was in contact with a man who supported and encouraged his extreme ideas (see section 2c), but the person's connections to ISIL are not certain. In some parts, answering the I-GAP questionnaire was challenging because of the ambiguity of this possible indirect contact to ISIL.

The perpetrator of the Turku stabbing never mentioned the uncertainty of his future in Finland, the negative decision about his asylum application, or other events in his personal life as reasons for his violence, even though experts have considered these factors influential in his radicalisation.

Conclusions

The three hotspots analysed in this report represent the scale and nature of violent extremism in Finland. While the Turku stabbing is the only crime for which someone has been convicted as a terrorist, the school shooting in Jokela and the assault by a member of NRM both have

political and ideological connections and motives despite their somewhat isolated or spontaneous aspects. They represent wider violent phenomena in Finnish society; Jokela has been idolised by both Finnish and international school shooters after the attack, and the NRM assault connects to a wider culture of violence in the organisation and the extra-parliamentary far right. Although the Turku stabber and the Jokela school shooter can both be interpreted as lone actors in the sense that they did not have a clear background organisation, even they did not act completely on their own. Even when the individual is radicalised not through active recruitment or by participation in an organisation in a traditional sense, but through consuming (mostly online) extremist material, it is important to note that they are not alone; they are very much part of communities online (e.g., Kaplan et al., 2013). Through our analysis, we hope to represent a culmination of general radicalisation trends and to provide meaningful insights into their rise and expansion.

In the Jokela and the Turku cases, the attacks were not complete surprises. In both, the perpetrators' friends were worried about them and tried to intervene and challenge their radical, violent thinking. Information about their radicalisation was available; in the Jokela case, the school principal, a youth worker and fellow students were aware of the perpetrator's violent ideals, and in Turku, the police were informed about the perpetrator's thinking becoming increasingly radical. However, the information did not lead to action. Subsequently, laws and policies have been changed to prevent such attacks in the future (as discussed in section 2c). In both cases, the perpetrators had mental health issues and did not receive the help they needed. The level of mental health services is insufficient in Finland, and especially children, young people and asylum seekers have difficulties accessing services (The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 2021, p. 7). In the case of the deadly NRM assault, the perpetrator did have a history of violent crimes, and the NRM was known for its extreme national socialist ideology and for providing combat training to its members, so the occurrence of a violent attack of some kind was not completely unforeseen.

Each perpetrator of violent attacks analysed in this report were young men, and violent masculinity and misogyny played a central part in their ideology or motivation. In the case of NRM, violent masculinity and militant brotherhood were a strong part of the organisation culture and ideology. The Jokela perpetrator had misogynistic ideas and portrayed violent masculinity online. The Turku attacker claimed in court that misogyny was a central motive in his violence.

Analysing these hotspots shows how the interpretation of the violence is a political and value-laden choice, although not necessarily always a conscious one. What is labelled political violence or terrorism varies. Despite the Jokela perpetrator claiming that his actions were political terrorism, the shooting was largely discussed in the frame of bullying and mental health problems. In comparison, the later cases Turku and NRM were more readily interpreted as political violence and to many, were a wakeup call to the existence of political violence in Finland.

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Annex: I-GAP Coding

Jokela school shooting

Injustice Coding

Q1. To what extent the hotspot is a response to injustice?	5
Comments to Q1	The perpetrator does not mention any specific injustices.
Q2. To what extent was the actor motivated by a real or perceived systemic bias or prejudice which leads to consistently unfair treatment?	5
Comments to Q2	The perpetrator saw society as a whole as ruined; no specific events are mentioned.
Q3. To what extent the injustice is linked to issues of redistribution?	1
Comments to Q3	
Q4. To what extent the injustice is linked to issues of recognition?	5
Comments to Q4	Fame and attention to the perpetrator and his manifesto was a central motive in the hotspot.
Q5. To what extent the injustice is linked to issues of representation?	3
Comments to Q5	The perpetrator thought he belonged to a small group of Übermensch who should rule the masses but had no specific political demands.

Grievance Coding

Q1. How specific is the experienced grievance?	1
Comments to Q1	
Q2. How extensive and diverse is the list of grievances?	5
Comments to Q2	In his manifesto the perpetrator lists what he sees as problems in the world, such as democracy, inferiority of mass humans and the society stopping natural selection from happening.
Q3. How personal is the grievance?	5
Comments to Q3	

Q4. How formalized is the demand to address the grievance?	5
Comments to Q4	No real demands.
Q5. How realistic are the prospects to address the grievance?	5
Comments to Q5	

Alienation Coding

Q1. How specific and central is the sense of alienation?	1
Comments to Q1	No precise mention of any specific form of alienation, even though the perpetrator was ostracized and bullied.
Q2. How voluntary is the process of alienation?	1
Comments to Q2	According to the perpetrator himself, he chose to turn away from the masses and to think for himself.
Q3. How complete is the alienation?	4
Comments to Q3	The perpetrator had ok relationships with his few friends and family, but ultimately considered himself special, different and an Übermensch. He talked about school shootings to his friends, but they were not interested in the subject. His online community did understand and share his interests.
Q4. How entrenched is the alienation?	2
Comments to Q4	The perpetrator planned the shooting actively for at least 7 months. He had been interested in violence and terrorism for longer and had also been participating in online communities
Q5. How reversible is the sense of alienation?	1
Comments to Q5	The perpetrator saw global war, enslaving or killing the masses or destroying the whole of humanity as answers.

Polarisation Coding

Q1. To what extent does the actor consider the political field to be polarized?	1
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Comments to Q1	The perpetrator felt he was a part of a small group of Übermensch, whose true role should be ruling the masses.
Q2. How high is the perceived level of the polarization?	5
Comments to Q2	The perpetrator did not see most of humanity as worthy. He says in his manifesto that most people should be killed or enslaved.
Q3. To what extent do the actor's opinions radically contrast with the institutions (political, religious, cultural) and policies that are currently in place?	5
Comments to Q3	
Q4. To what extent does the actor consider the political field to be polarized as compared with the social sphere?	1
Comments to Q4	The perpetrator did not have a specific political goal but thought that most people are part of unintelligent masses, and that democracy wrongly enabled these masses to make political decisions.
Q5. Did the actor consider their radical positions to have a clear outlet on the institutional, cultural, or political spectrum prior to the hotspot?	1
Comments to Q5	The perpetrator saw no chance of reforming the system without violence.

The NRM - Helsinki Central Railway Station Square Assault

Injustice Coding

Q1. To what extent the hotspot is a response to injustice?	1
Comments to Q1	According to the perpetrator himself, he attacked the passer-by because they insulted his movement's values and allegedly threatened with violence, although there might be other reasons we are not aware of.
Q2. To what extent was the actor motivated by a real or perceived systemic bias or prejudice which leads to consistently unfair treatment?	2

Comments to Q2	Injustice stemmed from an isolated event spontaneously but was connected to defending a wider ideology.
Q3. To what extent the injustice is linked to issues of redistribution?	1
Comments to Q3	
Q4. To what extent the injustice is linked to issues of recognition?	2
Comments to Q4	The perpetrator wanted to show others that no one should mock his movement's ideology or values or otherwise they would be punished as well.
Q5. To what extent the injustice is linked to issues of representation?	1
Comments to Q5	

Grievance Coding

Q1. How specific is the experienced grievance?	1
Comments to Q1	
Q2. How extensive and diverse is the list of grievances?	1
Comments to Q2	The perpetrator acted from a "duty" to defend his group when the passer-by allegedly attacked it.
Q3. How personal is the grievance?	2
Comments to Q3	The perpetrator saw the violence as a "duty" to defend his group when the passer-by allegedly attacked it, but the assault is connected to a wider ideology and a culture of violent reactionary self-defence.
Q4. How formalized is the demand to address the grievance?	2
Comments to Q4	NRM demands that white Nordic people should join them in violent revolution to form a white Nordic state.
Q5. How realistic are the prospects to address the grievance?	5
Comments to Q5	

Alienation Coding

Q1. How specific and central is the sense of alienation?	1
Comments to Q1	There is no expressed feeling of alienation.

Q2. How voluntary is the process of alienation?	1
Comments to Q2	The perpetrator chose to join NRM and become active in it.
Q3. How complete is the alienation?	
Comments to Q3	There is no information about the perpetrator's family or friends, if they are part of the movement or share some of his values or not.
Q4. How entrenched is the alienation?	4
Comments to Q4	The perpetrator became interested in neo-Nazi thinking already at the age of 13. According to the police's information, the perpetrator might have been one of the founders of the Finnish chapter of the NRM when he was 18 years old, or possibly joined a few years later.
Q5. How reversible is the sense of alienation?	1
Comments to Q5	The perpetrator said in an interview that he had been a nationalist from when he was a little boy and became nationalist-socialist when he found a website that formed his ideological stances at the age of 13. He felt that nationalist-socialist values are the right ones. He finally found his group when he saw that NRM was founded in Finland in 2008 when he was 18 years old.

Polarisation Coding

Q1. To what extent does the actor consider the political field to be polarized?	4
Comments to Q1	NRM is a marginal actor and the demands of revolution and a Nordic state are extreme even compared to other far-right groups, but the NRM had some connections to the parliamentary Finns party's more radical wing, and there is some support for racism in the Finnish society.
Q2. How high is the perceived level of the polarization?	4
Comments to Q2	The perpetrator "disciplined" the passer-by who was against NRM's racism. Overall, the polarization of values was a motivator for the

	attack, and the NRM is hostile towards other ethnicities and religious groups.
Q3. To what extent do the actor's opinions radically contrast with the institutions (political, religious, cultural) and policies that are currently in place?	4
Comments to Q3	NRM aims for revolution and Nordic-wide state built on neo-Nazi values, which is a very extreme goal, but the NRM had some connections to the parliamentary Finns party's more radical wing
Q4. To what extent does the actor consider the political field to be polarized as compared with the social sphere?	3
Comments to Q4	There is no information about the perpetrator's view on this. There are some beliefs inside the NRM about a Jewish conspiracy that the elite is seen as a part of. However, there are also some connections between the NRM and the Finns Party's more radical wing.
Q5. Did the actor consider their radical positions to have a clear outlet on the institutional, cultural, or political spectrum prior to the hotspot?	4
Comments to Q5	Neo-Nazism is not represented in party politics, but there are racist etc. values represented by including but not limited to the Finns Party.

Turku stabbing

Injustice Coding

Q1. To what extent the hotspot is a response to injustice?	4
Comments to Q1	The perpetrator felt that the western world had oppressed Muslims and the Arab world.
Q2. To what extent was the actor motivated by a real or perceived systemic bias or prejudice which leads to consistently unfair treatment?	4
Comments to Q2	The perpetrator felt the whole Western system was oppressing Muslims.
Q3. To what extent the injustice is linked to issues of redistribution?	2

Comments to Q3	The perpetrator does not mention any concrete aspects related to redistribution. Part of the larger Jihadist agenda is to fight for the caliphate.
Q4. To what extent the injustice is linked to issues of recognition?	4
Comments to Q4	
Q5. To what extent the injustice is linked to issues of representation?	4
Comments to Q5	

Grievance Coding

Q1. How specific is the experienced grievance?	1
Comments to Q1	
Q2. How extensive and diverse is the list of grievances?	1
Comments to Q2	The perpetrator thought that the Western countries and their moral decay had negatively influenced Muslims.
Q3. How personal is the grievance?	5
Comments to Q3	
Q4. How formalized is the demand to address the grievance?	5
Comments to Q4	
Q5. How realistic are the prospects to address the grievance?	5
Comments to Q5	
Q1. How specific is the experienced grievance?	1

Alienation Coding

Q1. How specific and central is the sense of alienation?	4
Comments to Q1	The perpetrator felt alienated as a fundamentalist Muslim.
Q2. How voluntary is the process of alienation?	2
Comments to Q2	After his childhood the perpetrator left the religious traditions of his family and in Finland, he found religion again. Friends of the perpetrator were not radicalized and were even worried about the extremist thinking of the perpetrator. After the radicalization had already started, the

	perpetrator met a man who pushed him to continue as a radical Islamism supporter.
Q3. How complete is the alienation?	5
Comments to Q3	The perpetrator saw the whole Western system as problematic and ruined. He had left his friends and family in Morocco, and his new friends distanced themselves from him because of his extremist views. He was not an active member in his religious community but mostly prayed on his own. There is no evidence of connections to ISIL.
Q4. How entrenched is the alienation?	1
Comments to Q4	The perpetrator was radicalized for about 6 months before the attack. He did not plan the stabbing itself for very long.
Q5. How reversible is the sense of alienation?	2
Comments to Q5	The perpetrator saw a holy war as an answer. Before the attack he tried distance himself from the extremist ideology and even disposed of his mobile phone to achieve this, but could not, and in the end saw violence as the only way.

Polarisation Coding

Q1. To what extent does the actor consider the political field to be polarized?	3
Comments to Q1	The perpetrator wanted to fight for Muslims, but he felt that many people from his religious group do not take religion seriously enough. Islam as a religion does not encourage violence, but extremist ISIL does.
Q2. How high is the perceived level of the polarization?	5
Comments to Q2	The perpetrator was against the Western world as a block completely.
Q3. To what extent do the actor's opinions radically contrast with the institutions (political, religious, cultural) and policies that are currently in place?	5
Comments to Q3	
Q4. To what extent does the actor consider the political field to be polarized as compared with the social sphere?	1

Comments to Q4	The perpetrator saw the political field of Finland as part of the western moral decay.
Q5. Did the actor consider their radical positions to have a clear outlet on the institutional, cultural, or political spectrum prior to the hotspot?	1
Comments to Q5	