



Trends of Radicalization

Serbia/3.2 Research Report

July 2021

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Reference: D.RAD [D3.2]

This research was conducted under the Horizon 2020 project 'De-Radicalisation in Europe and Beyond: Detect, Resolve, Re-integrate' (959198).

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About the Project

D.Rad is a comparative study of radicalisation and polarisation in Europe and beyond. It aims to identify the actors, networks and wider social contexts driving radicalisation, particularly among young people in urban and peri-urban areas. D.Rad conceptualises this through the I-GAP spectrum (injustice-grievance-alienation-polarisation) with the goal of moving towards the measurable evaluation of de-radicalisation programmes. Our intention is to identify the building blocks of radicalisation, which include the person's sense of being victimised, of being thwarted or lacking agency in established legal and political structures and coming under the influence of "us vs them" identity formulations.

D.Rad benefits from an exceptional breadth of backgrounds. The project spans national contexts including the UK, France, Italy, Germany, Poland, Hungary, Finland, Slovenia, Bosnia, Serbia, Kosovo, Israel, Iraq, Jordan, Turkey, Georgia, Austria and several minority nationalisms. It bridges academic disciplines ranging from political science and cultural studies to social psychology and artificial intelligence. Dissemination methods include D.Rad labs, D.Rad hubs, policy papers, academic workshops, visual outputs and digital galleries. As such, D.Rad establishes a rigorous foundation in order to test practical interventions geared to prevention, inclusion and de-radicalisation.

With the possibility of capturing the trajectories of 17 nations and several minority nations, the project will provide a unique evidence base for the comparative analysis of law and policy as nation states adapt to new security challenges. The process of mapping these varieties and their link to national contexts will be crucial in uncovering the strengths and weaknesses in existing interventions. Furthermore, D.Rad accounts for the problem that processes of radicalisation often occur in circumstances that escape the control and scrutiny of traditional national frameworks of justice. The participation of AI professionals in modelling, analysing and devising solutions to online radicalisation will be central to the project's aims.

Executive Summary/Abstract

This research is part of the D.Rad project's Work Package "Task 3.2: Radicalization Trends." The report's main goal is to look at unique, key moments – or "hotspots" of radicalization – that reflect a culmination of overall radicalization trends in Serbia and provide valuable insight into their development and progression. Hotspots are typically premeditated, potentially scalable acts of violence, occurring within a wider pattern of comparable acts, and associated with or influenced by a radicalized group, network, or organization.

Report's findings rely on secondary sources, primarily media reports and materials published by actors and organizations on social networks.

Two particular "hotspots" have been selected for the purposes of this analysis:

(1) Storming of the Serbian Parliament in Belgrade on 7th July 2020, On Tuesday 7th of July, whereupon a wave of street protests was triggered by an announcement of president Vučić that a new possible Covid-19 related curfew would be imposed, resulting in an immediate public call to protest, crowd gathering in front of the Serbian parliament, and escalation into a storming of the building by the small group of protesters, consisting mostly of organized right-wing groups

(2) Microhydro pipeline sabotage in Rakita on 15th August 2020, regarding the direct action of several hundred locals and green activists in the remote village of Rakita, in order to remove the pipeline for the microhydro plant Zvonce, resulting in breaking the pipes and rendering them useless.

The analysis of the hotspots proceeds through discerning three levels. In micro level analysis, personal factors and background of individual actors are identified. In meso level, factors such as groups, networks and communities important for involved individuals, are discussed in wider social setting, including Srpski pokret Dveri (Serbian Movement Dveri), Srpska stranka Zavetnici (Serbian party Oathkeepers), "Nema predaje Kosova i Metohije" (No Surrender of Kosovo and Metohija) and "Narodne patrola" (People's Patrols) movements for the hotspot 1, and "Odbranimo reke Stare planine" movement (Defend the Rivers of Stara Planina) and Ekološki ustanak (Ecological uprising) coalition for the hotspot 2. In macro level, the attention is turned to wider institutional, systemic and structural factors, such as Kosovo issue, election alienation, refugee crises, anti-vaccination movement, Montenegro crises, radicalisation of community organizing, as well as anti-corruption and pollution-critical discourses.

Motivational factors pertaining to individual actors in the hotspots have been analysed and quantified through IGAP Coding, developed as a part of D.Rad project. In the hotspot 1, issues of polarization have been identified as most significant: the actors see themselves as defenders of traditional and national values, unlike the representatives of the government, which they see akin to national traitors. In the

hotspot 2, the actors are primarily driven by deep sense of injustice, often framed as injustice toward the nature, in context of econationalism.

In conclusion, the types of mobilisation seen in the hotspots are placed in wider social and political dynamics developing to this day. In the Storming of the Serbian Parliament, we have seen that the movements which mobilise primarily through the national question are able to seize an opportunity to present themselves as a major force in the spontaneous protests, while major political questions around which these movements mobilise and organise still remain open and volatile. The violence which we have witnessed in this hotspot can thus be replicated on a considerably larger scale. Second hotspot also carries the potential for escalation, as a number of other potential ecological critical issues carry great financial interests, both for the government of Serbia and private developers, such as proposed extraction of lithium ore by the Rio Tinto international mining corporation.

Introduction

This report is a part of the Work Package “Task 3.2: Trends of Radicalization” of the D.Rad project. Two specific “historical hotspots” have been chosen that still speak to processes of radicalization today. In the course of the report, I will outline the events which constitute the hotspots and elaborate why these particular hotspots were chosen based on the guidelines provided within the project. Further, I will analyse micro, meso and macro factors which are required to understand the events which have transpired in the hotspots and which connect them to specific individuals, social mobilisations on the ground and to the wider political trends. Due to the nature of the chosen hotspots, the analysis of the facilitating factors is not germane to the understanding of the events; I will analyse these factors in terms of means of financing the movements as described among the meso factors and in terms of means of channels of communication which these movements utilise for mobilisation. Situating the hotspots on the injustice-grievance-alienation-polarization (IGAP) spectrum has been carried out based on micro, meso and macro factors and in accordance with the guidelines provided, along with concise explanations for each chosen answer. In the conclusion, I will specifically point out why I perceive these hotspots as salient for comprehension of future radicalisation.

Hotspots of radicalization

Overview of chosen hotspots

Hotspot 1. Storming of the Serbian Parliament in Belgrade on 7th July 2020

On Tuesday 7th of July, a wave of street protests was triggered by an announcement of president Vučić that a new possible curfew would be imposed, due to an increased number of COVID-19 related deaths. The curfew was supposed to last non-stop between 18:00 next Friday to 06:00 the following Monday. Vučić made the announcement on a press conference at 18:00, and swiftly afterwards opposition leaders denounced this measure as mistreatment of citizens (N1 2020). Several individuals including Damnjan Knežević, the leader of the “Nema predaje Kosova i Metohije” (No Surrender of Kosovo and Metohija) and “Narodne patrolne” (People’s Patrols) movements, made an immediate public call to protest. The crowd gathered in front of the Serbian parliament from 21:00 and after 22:00 the protest escalated into a storming of the building by the small group of protesters, consisting mostly of organized right-wing groups and their leaders (live recording available at Srbinfo.info, 2020c). Most prominent were Srđan Nogo (former Member of Parliament and former member of the right-wing political movement Dveri) and the members of the aforementioned right-wing radical groups, with Knežević being arrested immediately before the escalation. The damage was minimal and police forces swiftly regained control of the building. The police continued dispersing the protest with what was widely described as inappropriate force. The protests continued for days after with some different tactics employed on particular days, but the attempts to break into the Parliament and the strong escalation of police violence and repression of protestors remained as a recurring event. This was an escalation of police violence on a scale not seen in Serbia after 2000 and the fall of Milošević, with more than a hundred protestors held in custody (BBC News 2020a). The last protest in this series was held on 3rd of August, as the new Members of the Parliament were being sworn in, after the

elections held earlier that year, during which Srđan Nogo was also arrested and charged with inciting violent governmental change (Danas 2020).

Hotspot 2. Microhydro pipeline sabotage in Rakita on 15th August 2020

The “Odbranimo reke Stare planine” movement (Defend the Rivers of Stara Planina) has been fighting the construction of microhydro plants (MHP) in the region of Stara planina (South-East of Serbia) since 2017, employing both direct action and legal means. They rose to prominence due to specific direct actions in which they confronted private developers on the ground, sometimes leading to violent clashes and injuries. After a legal battle, a court injunction was won for closing the building site and cancelling the license of the most notorious MHP, Zvonce, but the developer has refused to dismantle the building site and has started an appeal. Odbranimo reke Stare planine organized event of “removal of the microhydro pipeline”, where several hundred people came to the remote village of Rakita, from all major cities in Serbia. As they did not have any mechanization, the removal of the pipeline itself turned out not to be possible, but they sabotaged the pipeline, breaking the pipes and rendering them useless for any further attempts to build the MHP on this site. This event also had a social aspect, with various gatherings and social events being organised.

Method and reasons for choice of hotspots

I will reflect on the method and reasons for choice of described hotspots, particularly regarding how they fit criteria proposed in the guidelines for this report of being (1) premeditated and (2) potentially scalable acts of (3) extremist violence within (4) a larger series or pattern of similar acts that are committed by radicalized individuals (5) clearly linked to or influenced by a radicalized group, network or organization.

Storming of the Serbian Parliament

The Storming of the Serbian Parliament was not premeditated and occurred as part of the spontaneous protest, triggered by the officials’ announcement on reintroducing curfew made on the very same day. However, as I will show in the analysis of meso- and macro factors, it involved structures of the Serbian far right which have, in the last several years organized premeditated protests and acts of violence. Their ability to organize in a short time and take over the spontaneous mass protest is a feat in itself, and an argument to the importance of this particular hotspot. The act of storming the parliament itself sublimates important crossroads of Serbian and world politics and speaks on the political ambitions of the far right in Serbia: with similar event being involved in the demonstrations on 5th of October 2000 which led to the overturn of Milošević’s government, the act of storming the Parliament has figured in post-2000 Serbia as a demonstration of power capable to topple the government. Later same year, we will see how the storming of the USA Congress building was performed with similar ambitions. In other words, what is played out in these events is the clear pretension to taking over the levers of state representative power, perpetuating the idea that they have been illegitimately taken over by the “establishment”, in spite of the purported will of the people.

Large scale right-wing protests in the previous two decades have mostly been linked to the issue of Kosovo. In 2004, after massacre of Serbian civilians in Kosovo, right-wing group-led protesters have set the Belgrade mosque ablaze, and in 2008, after Kosovo had declared independence, the government-organized mass protest in Belgrade erupted into violence, with attack on the USA embassy, again setting parts of its building on fire, with one casualty among

the protesters. (These events were considered as potential hotspots, but ultimately not included, as the groups, individuals and organization active in this period of time are no longer factors on the ground.) The groups which have stormed the Parliament in 2020 have also been loud on the issue of Kosovo, often announcing that they will defend the Serbian claim to this territory. As negotiations are in progress and the current centre-right government has been under pressure to sign a mutually binding agreement with Kosovo, under supervision of EU, such events could trigger similar, but considerably larger and radicalized, anti-government protests, and the leaders of the 2020 storming of the Parliament can be seen as leaders of these future possible unrests.

In the meantime, organizations and individuals which have led the storming of the Parliament building are involved in wider organizing of the far right in Serbia. Most prominent are protests against “migrants”, that is, refugees from the Middle East which are visible in Belgrade and some other cities in Serbia. The name of the organization, Narodne patrola, is a clear reference to independent policing proto-paramilitary structures, which is seen as the main purpose of the organization.

Microhydro Pipeline Sabotage

Microhydro pipeline sabotage in Rakita was organized as a premeditated act (Blic 2020b). Although it would be a stretch of terms to call this event violent, it shows a different pattern of organizing in Serbia which is susceptible to radicalization and a collective act of disturbance and potential future violent situations. Odbranimo reke Stare planine is seen as an organization fighting outside the system with the capacity to mobilize activists from the whole of Serbia. Their acts of sabotage on the ground and on the building sites have been noted before (Blic, 2018a, b, 2019, Filipov, Lj., 2019; Kurir, 2018; Novi Magazin, 2019). Beside direct actions, Odbranimo reke Stare planine has been a leading organizer in three protests rallies held in Belgrade, the last one taking place on the 10th of April 2021, with the number of participants ranging above 5,000 people. Several charismatic leaders of the movement have also emerged, basing their legitimacy on personal engagement with grassroots struggles, including Desimir Stojanov Desko and Aleksandar Jovanović Čuta, the latter also being present as a speaker in Belgrade protests.

As I will show, this event fits the pattern of similar grassroots direct actions, which are largely seen as anti-systemic, progressive and/or anti-capitalist. The initial model of these actions has been offered by “Združena akcija ‘Krov nad glavom’” (Joint Action “Roof over Your Head”) and Kolektivna odbrana stanara (Collective Tenant Defence), the former formed as a coalition of various left-wing movements and collectives and the latter as an offshoot of the anarchist organization “Anarhosindikalistička inicijativa” (Anarcho-Syndicalist Initiative), itself remembered for the attack on Greek embassy in 2009, where they have instigated a Molotov cocktail. These two organizations formed almost simultaneously in 2017 with the aim of providing peaceful passive resistance to forceful evictions, primarily in Belgrade. Združena akcija has, in the meantime, become an organization with branches in Novi Sad and Subotica, and it has also participated in public hearings on the new law which regulates evictions. The format of peaceful resistance protests, with the tendency to turn into or employ sabotage tactics, has also been seen in actions of several citizens’ initiatives in Belgrade, such as “Bitka za Košutnjak” (Struggle for Košutnjak), which successfully blocked the building site at the Košutnjak public park and “Savski nasip” (Sava Embankment), which protested against the

illegal building of summer houses on the Sava embankment in Belgrade, by blocking the connecting roads, which led to violent clashes with the residents,

In connection to the left-wing orientation of these movements, although many organizations from the Serbian left have participated in these coalitions (e.g., Partija radikalne levice – Party of the Radical Left), there is no workers' organizing or mobilization, and attempts to articulate class politics is non-existent or declarative at best. Moreover, the anti-capitalist messages are often framed as singling out particular "corrupt" projects or investments, thus reducing left politics to anti-corruption politics. In connection to the movements against microhydro plants, they are also framed in narratives of "green nationalism", with an emphasis on protecting Serbian nature and land, with the climate emergency being non-existent in the arguments.

Micro, meso and macro factors

Micro Level: Personal Factors (Background of Individual Actors)

Storming of the Serbian Parliament

Damnjan Knežević

Damnjan Knežević (33 years old) (Srbin.info 2018a) is the most prominent leader of the group Narodne patrole and Nema predaje Kosova i Metohije. He was personally engaged in anti-government protests in front of the Serbian Parliament held every Saturday during several weeks before the storming of the parliament on 7th of July, in the aftermath of the 2020 Serbian parliamentary elections. After the announcement of probable reintroduction of the COVID-19 curfew, he was one of the personalities who issued a public call on his social media for the people to gather in front of the Parliament building. The violence during the protest, consisting of acts such as throwing rocks and bottles, as well as a few torches, at the police, was noted after 20:30, and Knežević was arrested by the police shortly after.

Knežević was a founder and former vice president of the far-right organization "Srpski sabor Zavetnici" (Serbian Assembly Oathkeepers) (BBC News 2020b). He left this organization at the end of 2014, disagreeing with it turning from a grassroots organization to a political party aiming at electoralism and citing opportunism of members joining the movement (Srbin.info 2014a, b). In order to promote this position, he established the organization Nema predaje Kosova i Metohije. In the meantime he has participated in numerous attempts of disrupting and deplatforming event and speakers on Serbian war crimes from the 1990s, such as the Srebrenica genocide (Božović 2019). Narodne patrole are Knežević's newest project, whereas Nema predaje organizes people's policing actions in order to curb what they see as violent presence of Middle East refugees in the Serbian urban areas. In his speeches, Knežević presents himself as a descendant of valiant Serbian traditions of defenders of the home and homeland, particularly emphasizing on the one hand Kosovo as a sacred land which needs to be defended notwithstanding personal sacrifices, and on the other gendered violence, that is, the purported danger that refugees in Serbia present towards Serbian women and girls (SRBIN info – kanal Centar, 2020).

Srđan Nogo

Srđan Nogo is a close collaborator of Knežević, but a more experienced politician. He was born in 1981 in Belgrade and graduated at the Faculty of Law of the University of Belgrade.

He was one of the founders and most prominent members of Dveri, initially a far right, clerical political organization, which gradually moved to conservative right-wing positions after entering parliament in 2016, with Nogo as one of the MPs. Although the deputy president of the parliamentary group and the Belgrade board of Dveri, Nogo was expelled from the party in February 2019, after a brief disciplinary procedure (Blic 2020a). Nogo was seen as an extreme right-wing politician in Dveri, but this primarily consisted of resorting to controversial and extreme rhetoric – for example, thinly veiled death threats toward government officials and brandishing a replica of a gallows during the anti-government protests in early February 2019 (Kurir, 2019, Blic, 2020a).

Nogo continued his career as independent political personality in Serbia, remaining an MP until 2020. He has issued statements against the migrant-related policies of Serbia and participated in COVID-19 and vaccination scepticism. Although his presence at 2020 protests and the storming of the Parliament provoked differing sentiments with parts of the crowd greeting him with boos and hisses, he was again a speaker at the anti-migrant protest of Narodne patrolne in October of the same year, which shows that there is a continuing collaboration between this right-wing grassroots movement and Nogo as a political figure.

Nogo's political positions feature conspiracy theories, anti-migrant and anti-Semitic sentiments, coronavirus conspiracies and denialism, commonplace anti-corruption rhetoric, and he presents himself as a Trump supporter (Afera, 2020).

Microhydro Pipeline Sabotage

Desimir Stojanov Desko

Desimir Stojanov Desko is an elderly resident of village of Rakita who rose to prominence during direct actions aimed at stopping construction efforts at the building sites of microhydro plants. Stojanov is the president of the official local community (Serb. *mesna zajednica*) Rakita and was injured in the incidents (Telegraf, 2018). Discussing his personal involvement, Stojanov has emphasized the personal tragedy in his family, having lost his son, who drowned in the river of Rakita, in 1984 (Blic, 2020a). This is the very river which is the object of microhydro plant and Stojanov points out that the building site has prevented him from honouring the memory of his son at the spot where his body was found, for the first time since the tragedy. Stojanov is also noted for his very emotional appearances in the media and across social networks, where he adopts the discourse of econationalism and primordial connection between the people and the rivers and the land.

Aleksandar Jovanović Ćuta

Aleksandar Jovanović Ćuta is publically presented as the informal leader of the Odbranimore Stare planine movement (Južne Vesti 2018) and is also the president of the non-governmental association "Nova Stara planina" (New Stara Planina), which acts as the formal representative of this grassroots movement in legal issues in which they are involved.

Although active in social struggles in the city of Pirot and the region of Stara Planina, Jovanović currently resides in Belgrade with his family. His connection to this region is based on the fact that he has spent his childhood in the local village of Temska, which is also one of the focal battlegrounds in the fight against microhydro plants, and his family from the father's side is also from this village (Južne vesti, 2018; Arandžević, V., 2021). Relatively little private

information is available on Jovanović, unlike other main actors of the hotspots analysed in this report.

Unlike Nogo and Knežević, Jovanović clearly distances himself from representative politics, employing the standard discourse of anti-politics and distancing himself from the official parties in the Serbian political landscape (Danas, 2021). However, Jovanović shows an understanding of the political issues that he is involved in as wider than regional and has often spoken about the need of different green activists and organizations from different parts of Serbia dealing with microhydro plants, but also other issues to collaborate and coordinate their actions, where he sees Odbranimo reke Stare planine as a kind of umbrella organisation which can provide logistical support. Jovanović has been arrested and detained several times, and part of this political legitimacy is also drawn from the victimhood discourse that he bases on these events (N1, 2021). Similarly to Stojanov, Jovanović also adopts econationalist rhetoric. His green politics is saturated with pathos and statements and terms such as “crimes against nature”, “crimes against the rivers”, where these crimes are seen as equal to crimes against humanity.

Meso Level: Social Setting Factors (Groups, Networks, Communities)

Storming of the Serbian Parliament

Dveri

Srpski pokret Dveri (Serbian Movement Dveri) is important as a primary organization which provided platform for Srđan Nogo and which enabled him to gain public prominence and circle of followers and like-minded people. Finally, he was a member of the parliament as a representative of this party, which has been crucial in his career. Dveri is a right-wing nationalist opposition political party, which was represented in the Parliament during the session from 2016 to 2020, and which now cooperates with mainstream anti-government opposition in Serbia: they were part of the “Savez za Srbiju” (Alliance for Serbia) coalition (from September 2018 to August 2020), they participated in the coordinated boycott of the 2020 elections and today they collaborate with Stranka slobode i pravde (Party of Freedom and Justice), which is increasingly seen as the main opposition party. However, Dveri were initially formed in 1999 as a Christian right-wing youth organization, primarily comprised of University of Belgrade students from the Faculty of Law, holding public debates on clerical-nationalist issues. Dveri gradually turned from grassroots organizing to representative politics, winning 4.34%, 3.58% and 5.04% of the popular vote in the parliamentary elections in 2012, 2014 and 2016, respectively. The move from a grassroots movement to a party organization has left many prominent members, but also sympathisers of the group estranged, including the founder Vladan Glišić and Srđan Nogo, who advocated for a more radical approach and was expelled from the party.

Zavetnici

First political organization that Damijan Knežević was publicly affiliated to was Srpska stranka Zavetnici (Serbian party Oathkeepers), a radical far-right, ultranationalist political party founded in Serbia in February 2012. Knežević was its member and vice-president until 2014. The party is intended as a parliamentary wing of the radical right-wing grassroots movement (Mulhall and Khan-Ruf, 2021, p. 109). It participated in the parliamentary elections in 2014 under a coalition called "Patriotic Front", which included former members of Dveri, but gained

only 0.13% of the popular vote. In the elections of 2020 its result increased to 1.43% (it is worth noting that this result was achieved in a situation of an organised boycott by most of the opposition political parties). Notwithstanding their pretensions to parliamentary representative politics, Zavetnici have also maintained their presence in the streets, being involved in various attempts to violently or forcefully intervene in public events in Belgrade since their founding, mainly connected to LGBT events, events which promote collaboration with Albanians and Kosovars, such as the “Mirëdita, dobar dan!” festival and commemorations of war crimes of the Yugoslav wars of 1990s.

Nema predaje Kosova i Metohije

After Damnjan Knežević left Zavetnici, he was a key actor in building the movement Nema predaje Kosova i Metohije. This movement was formed in 2014, and Knežević is publicly presented as the president of this movement. The movement presents the main source of Knežević’s political, logistical and symbolical resources. Nema predaje Kosova i Metohije also has its humanitarian branch “Srbi za Srbe” (Serbs for Serbs), which has substantial financial resources and uses it for aiding the Serbian population, mainly in Kosovo. In June 2019, in cooperation with other right-wing initiatives, Nema predaje Kosova i Metohije organized a rally against the recognition of Kosovan independence (BN, 2019), and it also participated in the rallies during 2020 in support of the rallies happening simultaneously in Montenegro, against the new Montenegrin law on religious freedom, which was widely seen as targeting the Serbian minority and the Serbian Orthodox Church in Montenegro (Srbin.info, 2018b).

It is, however, important to note that the strategy of the Nema predaje Kosova i Metohije movement is also being spread as a brand, and not solely as a well-defined organisation: various objects (T-shirts, flags, etc.) with the logo of the movement comprising of the map of Kosovo, the Serbian flag and the name of the movement, are produced and widely distributed, including through the shop of the Srbi za Srbe humanitarian organization. The ambiguous connection between the movement and the branded design itself allows for the movement to spread, appropriate various events where this emblem appears, but also fight any attempt to suppress this radical movement as an attack on Serbian national symbols. Such events were the attack on an Albanian-owned bakery in Borča, Belgrade, in April 2019, which was not claimed by the movement, yet the emblem was present and its presence was widely shared across social media platforms, as well as the protest of Belgrade students in June 2020, where the left wing of the student organizing (members of the “Zaustavimo iseljavanje studenata iz Studentskog grada” initiative — Stop the Eviction of Students from the Students’ City) asked for the flag to be removed and was verbally attacked and mobbed — in the aftermath of the event, the students’ organization of the Faculty of Law of the University of Belgrade issued an outraged statement, obscuring the fact that the emblem is not “just a flag”, but the logo of an extremist movement (Vučković, 2020). In February 2019 the state radio-television of Serbia (RTS) also blurred a T-shirt with this emblem, later being forced to issue an apology, with humanitarian organization Srbi za Srbi simply presenting this as a T-shirt with the map of Kosovo that they sell for collecting aid, again with no mention of the movement behind it (Telegraf, 2019b).

Narodne patrolne

In order to mobilize wider support around anti-migrant rhetoric, Knežević started Narodne patrolne, purportedly a civil policing initiative of the Nema predaje Kosova i Metohije movement,

which is primarily aimed at attacking refugees and feeding on anti-migrant sentiments, which are widespread in today's Serbia. Mobilization around Narodne patrolne has provided Knežević access to wider circle of followers and footing on the ground of several cities including Belgrade. They started their actions in 2020, organizing "night watches" in Belgrade and publishing videos of their actions on YouTube (BBC News, 2020b). The actions usually consist of intimidating refugees, starting conversations with them and explaining to them that they need to leave the city. They regularly publish unsubstantiated news that women are being attacked by refugees and that there are violent clashes between refugees themselves, which are allegedly hidden from the public. Again, the initiative feeds on its ambiguity: Knežević presents Narodne patrolne as a self-organized policing initiative and has publicly invited citizens in other cities in Serbia, such as Sombor, where he spoke at a public rally, to organize in this manner and become part of the initiative itself. In October 2020, diverting from the practice of surprise night patrols, Narodne patrolne organized a pre-announced public evening rally in central Belgrade, announced by Knežević on social media, in a public park near the Faculty of Economy, which is one of the sports frequented by refugees (Vlaović, 2020). The protest was framed as "cleansing the park from the refugees", which provoked outrage among parts of the public, and Srđan Nogo was one of the featured speakers.

Microhydro Pipeline Sabotage

Odbranimi reke Stare planine

Both Desimir Stojanović Desko and Aleksandar Jovanović Ćuta have been affiliated to the grassroots organization Odbranimi reke Stare planine, with the latter being official representative and usual spokesperson in media. Odbranimi reke Stare planine started off as a Facebook group in 2018, and Facebook page in 2019. Initially, it consisted of a self-organized group of citizens vehemently opposing derivational MHP, that is, hydroplants where the flow of the river is diverted into a pipeline, in order to achieve pressure adequate for production of electricity. Activists of this group claim that regulations on whether the ecosystems of rivers can withstand this derivation are widely disregarded and that the rivers of mountainous regions of southeast Serbia, which are of key importance for the wider ecosystem, are threatened. The protected natural reserve of Stara planina in epicentre of activities of the group, but they also have established connections with other regions in Serbia and provide mutual logistical help in organising. The Odbranimi reke Stare planine initiative has also been registered as an organization under the name Nova Stara planina. As they emphasize, they give equal importance to actions on the ground and to the legal struggles of importance for the movement (Odbranimi reke Stare Planine, 2020). They have raised money to establish collective legal defence funds in lawsuits against activists and locals which have taken part in peaceful resistance or sabotage actions, and they have filed lawsuits against developers and challenged their licenses for MHP constructions. As a result of their efforts, the city of Pirot, on whose territory the Stara planina region lies in, has revoked the licences for MHP constructions and has issued a moratorium on MHP constructions on Stara planina.

Ekološki ustanak

Desimir Stojanov Desko, with his personal charisma, as well as sacrifice and victimhood narratives which surround him, and Aleksandar Jovanović Ćuta, with his leadership position, have played important personal roles in building wide coalition around ecological and green issues in Serbia. These coalitions have been fostered by joined mass protests in Belgrade,

where both Stojanov and Jovanović regularly appear and are welcomed by the crowds as speakers. Since 2019 Odbranimo reke Stare planine, with Aleksandar Jovanović Ćuta as representative, has collaborated with various green, leftist and ecological organizations throughout Serbia. These networks have proven resourceful in organizing activists and mobilizing them to visit rural areas where concrete struggles are taking place. There have been three major street rallies organized in Belgrade by different forms of this coalition — in May 2019 (under the slogan Kaži ne pokroviteljima nad zločina nad rekama Srbije — Say no to the sponsors of crimes against the rivers of Serbia; Telegraf, 2019a), June 2020 (under the slogan Naša voda, naš vazduh, naše šume, naša zemlja — Our water, our air, our forests, our land) and in April 2021. The last was named Ekološki ustanak (Ecological uprising) and the coalition around this event included forty-five organizations, which agreed to a list of 20 joint demands, which included the demand for abandoning derivation MHP, clean air regulation and stricter regulations for environmental protection (Glas Amerike, 2021; Južne vesti, 2021; Pravo na vodu, 2021; Radio Slobodna Evropa, 2021).

Macro Level: Institutional, Systemic and Structural Factors

Storming of the Serbian Parliament

Kosovo issue

The Kosovo issue is one of the most important political talking points in Serbia. Kosovo is widely seen as a territory which rightfully belongs to the Serbian nation — a discourse which has been legitimised through the actions of various Serbian governments since the mid-19th century — although the majority population has been ethnically Albanian and the active conflict itself has been pronounced throughout this period. After the Kosovo War in 1999, Serbia has lost effective control of this territory which was placed under an interim international administration under the auspices of the UN and NATO. During March 2004, mass unrest broke out in Kosovo, which resulted in the forcible expulsion of thousands of Serbian and other non-Albanian civilians from Kosovo. In 2008, Kosovo declared independence and the international community remains divided around this issue. Both of these events (in 2004 and 2008) unleashed violence in Belgrade and other cities across Serbia. The government of Serbia is has been engaged in prolonged and difficult negotiations with the Kosovan government since 2011, the course of which has fluctuated considerably and has proven to be an important factor in Serbia's internal political landscape.

Election alienation

During the administration of the Serbian Progressive Party, there has been a marked alienation of the population from the electoral processes, so that they are seen as a performance which has no capacity to bring about any substantial political change and due to the fact that the radical right-wing groups and their sympathisers are seen as excluded or ostracised from the electoral process. One of the most highly visible indicators of this alienation are regular post-election protests which challenge the entire institution of representative democracy itself. In this context, it is also important to note that almost all opposition parties engaged in a joint boycott of the 2020 parliamentary elections and have been participating in dialogue with the governing parties on election procedural reform with the mediation of EU bodies, albeit with no substantial success.

Refugee crises

In the wake of the refugee crisis in the Balkans, Serbia has mostly been a corridor-country, with refugees crossing the border from Macedonia into Serbia and from Serbia into Croatia and Hungary. Consequently of these countries beginning the implementation of pushback tactics under the directives of the European Union, the number of the refugees stranded in Serbia has been on the rise. Right-wing groups and parties in Serbia have been fuelled by the anti-refugee sentiment already present among the Serbian population. The question of the visibility of refugees in city centres and their reluctance to enter the state system of refugee camps have been important contributing factors in bolstering these sentiments.

Anti-vaccination movement

The anti-vax movement has been on the rise in Serbia since the 2010s, allegedly advocating for the rights of parents to choose whether their children should be vaccinated, spreading false information in connection with the side effects of vaccines and drawing on a tenuous interpretation of Orthodox Christian doctrines. The movement, has achieved high-profile visibility in public discourse due to public figures such as Jovana Stojković (who presents herself with the authority of a medical professional) and her organisation, “Živim za Srbiju” (I Live for Serbia). is widely held responsible for an epidemic of measles in Serbia in 2017–2018, resulting in 15 deaths according to official records (N1, 2019). It has also laid ground for a blossoming of Corona conspiracy theories, Corona denialism, vaccine hesitancy and distrust for the official epidemiological measures implemented by the authorities.

Montenegro crises

In December of 2019, the Parliament of Montenegro adopted the controversial Law on Religious Freedom, which was widely seen as targeting Serbian communities and the Serbian Orthodox Church as it challenged the legal rights of said church to many places of worship it had been actively using. This sparked a series of protests jointly led by the church officials and ethnically Serbian opposition parties’ officials and which led to the victory of the opposition parties at the parliamentary elections in August 2020, toppling the government of Milo Đukanović, who had been in power for the last three decades. This mobilisation partially carried out on an ethnic basis was also used as the mobilising factor of nationalist forces and groups in other parts of the region, primarily impacting Serbia, with the victory of the opposition in Montenegro being seen as the vindication of Serbian claims on this country.

Coronavirus Epidemic With the outbreak of the Coronavirus epidemic in Serbia in March 2020, the government imposed strict epidemiological measures which have actually been articulated as repressive policies, including the imposition of a state of emergency and a curfew, which at some instances lasted for several days without interruption. The government of Serbia was constitutionally obliged to hold parliamentary elections at the latest in June 2020. The restrictive measures and the state of emergency were suspended on the 6th of May 2020. This enabled the parties in power to carry out regular pre-election campaigns with little regard to the epidemiological risks which these activities carried. As the main wave of the Coronavirus epidemic in Serbia actually started only after the elections in June 2020, and having in mind that the Serbian officials disregarded the dangers of the Coronavirus both before March 2020 and after lifting the state of emergency, the actions of the government with regard to the Corona crisis have been widely seen by the Serbian population as haphazard, inadequate,

opportunistic and serving solely the interests of clinging on to power and not the interests of public health.

Microhydro Pipeline Sabotage

Radicalisation of community organising

Since 2017 and the establishment of organisations such as Zdužena akcija “Krov nad glavom”, Kolektivna odbrana stanara, Bitka za Košutnjak, Odbranimi reke Stare planine etc., there has been a marked radicalisation of tactics employed by community organising in Serbia, resorting to the well-planned and coordinated actions of peaceful resistance in events such as forced evictions, deforestation and constructions of derivational MHPs. These organisations have achieved significant victories, which have resonated in the public and vindicated these strategies. Examples of this are: the prevention of forceful evictions of the refugees of the 90’s wars from collective accommodation in Belgrade in July and August 2018 (Zdužena Akcija Krov nad Glavom 2018), the prevention of the construction of MHPs in Rakita in 2018 (Kurir 2018) and the stalemate of deforestation efforts in the Košutnjak park (Balkan Green Energy News 2020).

Anti-corruption

Anti-corruption is one of the main talking points in Serbian politics and is widely seen as the root of social issues. Therefore, practically all government decisions, including issuing licenses for various construction developments which are dubious from the standpoint of ecology, public health, quality of life, etc. are not seen as a structural problem integral to capitalism itself but as anomalies, issues of corruption which can be explained as being in breach of certain laws, regulations, etc. Consequently, the figure of the developer, which is usually a tangible person is the focal point for the channelling of social discontent. Examples of these can be seen in events such as the sabotage of the construction site in Rakita, but also in informal initiatives such as “Pravda za Stojanku” (Justice for Stojanka), that is, wide public support for Stojanka Stojanović, who became famous by killing a real estate developer in public in September 2011, considering him responsible for the destitution of her family.

Pollution

In light of the development of new industries in Serbia, such as the Chinese investment in the factory of car tyres in Zrenjanin and the announcement of the start of lithium ore extraction in western and southern Serbia by the Rio Tinto corporation, the compounded effect has brought Serbia into what is widely seen as an ecological crisis. In Belgrade, the government seems to have no solutions for waste disposal (with the main waste dump in being open, unprotected and subject to frequent ignition of flammable gasses), waste water disposal (the city being the only European capitol without a waste water processing plant), air pollution (many households still burning coal for heat) and public transport. The discourse of econationalism being on the rise, as well as concerns over health-related issues, the rising pollution in Serbia is one of the driving factors in articulation of new political alternatives. However, one should note that climate activism as such — that is, addressing the planetary climate crisis and issues of sustainability on a global level — is practically non-existent.

Facilitating factors

Storming of the Serbian Parliament

1 Financing: Movements described in the meso factors of this hotspot have managed to garner financial support from their donors through the humanitarian organisation “Srbi za Srbe” which operates as an ostensibly charitable organisation.

2 Communication: Movements described in the meso factors of this hotspot rely on securely encrypted communicational platforms, such as Telegram, which have widely enabled them to communicate and mobilise quickly and efficiently without governmental surveillance.

Microhydro Pipeline Sabotage

1 Financing: Movements and organisations which are part of the ecological coalitions described in the meso factors of this hotspot include various NGOs with stable project financing. Odbranimu reke Stare planine itself finances their activities through small donations. Both of these sources of income have proved reliable and efficient for the functioning of the described coalition.

2 Communication: The organising and mobilisation for Ekološki ustanak, that is the coalition of the ecological organisations including Odbranimu reke Stare planine is fully present and transparent on social media, and thus able to facilitate mobilisation on the ground. As a result, they have gathered huge amounts of support among the population of Serbia.

Motivational factors to be quantified in the IGAP Coding

Hotspot 1: Storming of the Serbian Parliament

In the Hotspot 1, Storming of the Serbian Parliament, in general, we can identify issues of polarization as most significant factors that have driven the actors, Damnjan Knežević and Srđan Nogo. This deep polarization is achieved between Knežević and Nogo, who see themselves as defenders of traditional and national values, acting as part of a movement which supports them and shares their values, and representatives of government, which they see akin to national traitors. In general, grievances and alienation are general and abstract, while sense of injustice is not perceived to arise from the issue of redistribution, but from injustices to the nation itself, as a again a form of abstraction.

Injustice:

Q1: 3 — The actual trigger was the unjust handling of corona crises, but the stakes there were relatively low (curfew). The dissatisfaction of Knežević and Nogo, paradigmatic of wider dissatisfaction of the actors of micro and meso level, is framed in abstract nationalism which cannot be considered primarily injustice-motivated in this context.

Q2: 4 — Knežević and Nogo perceive themselves as systemically excluded from the system of Serbian representative democracy.

Q3: 1 — Discussing motivational factors of Knežević and Nogo, one can argue that the issue of redistribution is marginal in articulating the violence in this hotspot.

Q4: 2 — Knežević and Nogo belong to the dominant in-group of Serbian society and their lack of recognition can only be interpreted through the marginal position of their political ideology.

Q5: 5 — Representation is a crucial motive of actors – Knežević and Nogo – as they claim that they are not adequately represented in bodies such as the Serbian Parliament.

Grievance

Q1: 2 — General grievance of Knežević and Nogo is rather abstract, although the trigger was connected to a specific curfew announcement.

Q2: 5 — Knežević and Nogo act upon a great accumulation of interconnected social issues and grievances.

Q3: 5 — Although there were attempts to martyrize the arrests made against Knežević and Nogo, as leaders of the action, there is not a single personal grievance motivating the participants.

Q4: 5 — Storming the Parliament is an expression of the absence of the addressee for the grievance.

Q5: 3 — If we identify the demand that a curfew should not be imposed, then this was accomplished. However, Knežević and Nogo have also used this event to put forward their wider agenda of gaining state power, which is out of rational reach.

Alienation

Q1: 1 — The sense of alienation is highly abstract.

Q2: 5 — Knežević and Nogo aim to become the dominant group in society and not be ostracised from it.

Q3: 1 — Knežević and Nogo feel alienated from the current regime, and not on any other social basis.

Q4: 2 — Knežević and Nogo feel alienated in the context of the current regime and its policies in regards to national and other burning issues.

Q5: 1 — Knežević and Nogo want to resolve their sense of alienation by taking the levers of power and changing government policy.

Polarization

Q1: 1 — Knežević and Nogo see themselves as acting as part of a movement, as described among the meso factors, which supports them and shares their values.

Q2: 5 — Knežević and Nogo perceive the government as national traitors completely opposed to their traditional values.

Q3: 5 — The dominant values of the actors Knežević and Nogo are essentially anti-establishment values and they perceive the government policy as directly denouncing these core values.

Q4: 1 — Political parties and institutions are perceived as being captured by forces which betray Serbian national interests.

Q5: 4 — Extreme right-wing ideology of this movement is not censored in the public sphere, Knežević and Nogo, as well wider membership of the movements, feel that their parliamentary representation is corrupt and prone to opportunism.

Hotspot 2: Sabotage

In the Hotspot 2: Microhydro pipeline sabotage, in general, the actors, Desimir Stojanov Desko and Aleksandar Jovanović Ćuta, are primarily driven by deep sense of injustice. This injustice is also framed as injustice toward the nature, but this framing does not render it more abstract or impersonal. On the contrary, framed in context of econationalism, this sense of injustice becomes even more visceral.

Injustice:

Q1: 1 — In Desimir Stojanov Desko and Aleksandar Jovanović Ćuta actions and rhetoric we perceive a highly developed sense of injustice as crucial for motivation in this event, as it is framed in the dichotomy between the state and developers versus the rural community defending nature.

Q2: 4 — Stojanov and Jovanović perceive rural communities and natural ecosystems as systemically disregarded by government decisions to authorise infrastructure developments.

Q3: 4 — The issue of redistribution is one of the key motivational factors as development projects being contested are seen as a mechanism of unfair and corrupt capital accumulation.

Q4: 4 — Resorting to the acts of sabotage is significantly motivated by the fact that the voices of the activists such as Stojanov and Jovanović — who perceive themselves as representatives of poor or rural communities — are marginalised in society.

Q5: 3 — Stojanov and Jovanović have no ambition to participate in representational politics, but are keenly interested in building their platform through the justice system.

Grievance

Q1: 5 — This hotspot is connected to a specific, localised grievance — the destruction of the Rakita river.

Q2: 2 — Stojanov and Jovanović are motivated solely by ecological grievances, although they do see them as part of a wider systemic issue.

Q3: 2 — Stojanov (and conditionally Jovanović) and the crux of movement membership are locals, personally attached to Rakita and its river (particularly Stojanov), and wider mobilization is performed to support them.

Q4: 1 — Jovanović has used Odbranimo reke Stare planine to pursue concrete legal action and has expected the government to remove the pipeline.

Q5: 1 — From the point of view of the government's ability to respect the court ruling and remove the pipeline, this is highly resolvable.

Alienation

Q1: 2 — The sense of alienation is linked to a loosely defined social stratum, primarily linked to a local identity.

Q2: 5 — Stojanov and Jovanović see themselves as unjustly marginalised.

Q3: 1 — Stojanov and Jovanović feel alienated from the decision-makers, but receive a considerable degree of solidarity from the rest of Serbia's population.

Q4: 2 — The sense of alienation has arisen with the introduction of MHPs and the decision-making processes out of reach of the local population.

Q5: 1 — Stojanov and Jovanović demand a concrete change in government policy that will resolve their alienation.

Polarization

Q1: 1 — Stojanov and Jovanović see themselves as acting as part of a movement, as described among the meso factors, and feel supported by vast swathes of the population.

Q2: 3 — Stojanov and Jovanović, as well as wider circle of activists of Odbranimo reke Stare planine see ecologically destructive infrastructural developments pushed forward by the government as structural corruption deeply seated within the system, but they still believe the problem is addressable without high polarisation. This is typical of anti-corruption politics.

Q3: 4 — Stojanov and Jovanović, as well as wider circle of activists of Odbranimo reke Stare planine perceive the acts of the government as in direct opposition to their values, but they do see a recourse in the judicial branch of government.

Q4: 4 — Stojanov and Jovanović do not side with specific parties but among their partners are entities such as "Ne davimo Beograd" (Don't Let Belgrade D(r)own), which articulate ecologically driven politics for the purposes of elections and which have formally taken part in Ekološki ustanak.

Q5: 5 — Framing this issue in terms of anti-corruption politics, there is a clear idea that representation can be achieved. The main recourse remains through the judicial branch of government.

Conclusions

In this conclusion, I will use the space provided to point out to certain dissonances between the micro level on one side, and meso and macro levels on the other, as pertaining to motivational factors the hotspots, and to show how the patterns of radicalisation that we have seen in the described hotspots can be replicated in the future on a wider scale in Serbia.

Concerning Storming of the Serbian Parliament, we have focused on motivational factors of the micro level, that is, selected personalities of Damijan Knežević and Srđan Nogo. The issues of perceived social injustice and redistribution do not figure as important factors. However, one should note that the movements that Knežević and Nogo lead recruit members from the working class, and that the underlying dissatisfaction of these people attracted to right-wing ideologies by default stems from issues of redistribution.

Concerning Microhydro pipeline sabotage, also focusing on motivational factors of individual actors, we have emphasized that their motivation is not connected to the demands of representation. This, however, stands in dissonance with some movements included in Ekološki ustanak, such as, but not solely, Ne davimo Beograd. Especially after municipal elections in Zagreb, Croatia in May 2021, and the resounding victory of the movement

“Možemo” (We can), running primarily on green municipal agenda, these currents in meso level are gaining ground in the movement,

In the Storming of the Serbian Parliament, we have seen that the movements which mobilise primarily through the national question have seized an opportunity to present themselves as a major force in the spontaneous protests which were triggered by the mishandling of the Corona crisis. However, major political questions around which these movements mobilise and organise are of a far greater importance in Serbian political life and they still remain open: the refugee crisis and most prominently, the questions of Kosovo’s independence. The violence which we have witnessed in this hotspot can thus be replicated on a far more considerable scale if these aforementioned triggers are activated. The success of these movements to position themselves as the leaders of the spontaneous protests in 2020 has considerably elevated the symbolic capital that they possess, bolstered their capacity for mobilisation and widened their pool of supporters, which has during the last several months also become recognisable in the form of the label “New Age Četnici” (New Age Chetniks) and mass Telegram groups operating under this label.

The type of mobilisation that we have seen in the second hotspot, titled Microhydro Pipeline Sabotage, also carries the potential for escalation. The protest named Ekološki ustanak held in Belgrade in April 2021 addressed a number of other potential ecological disasters that this coalition aims to tackle. Unlike MHPs, which are relatively small-scale developments, other issues raised by the leaders of the initiatives carry much greater financial interests, both for the government of Serbia and private developers. The most imposing of these is the proposed extraction of lithium ore by the Rio Tinto international mining corporation, primarily in the basin of the river Jadar in Western Serbia. As it is widely known, the extraction of lithium ore, even when performed according to the highest standards is an extremely destructive process for the ecosystem and poses a grave danger in terms of pollution. Rio Tinto and the developments in the Jadar region are today widely seen as the new frontline of this struggle and radicalisation on this issue may far outweigh anything hitherto witnessed in the case of MHP sabotage in Rakita and Stara planina.

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Annex: I-GAP Coding

Hotspot 1. Storming of the Serbian Parliament in Belgrade

Injustice Coding

Q1. To what extent the hotspot is a response to injustice?	3
Comments to Q1	The actual trigger was the unjust handling of corona crises, but the stakes there were relatively low (curfew). The wider dissatisfaction of the actors of micro and meso level is framed in abstract nationalism which cannot be considered primarily injustice-motivated in this context.
Q2. To what extent was the actor motivated by a real or perceived systemic bias or prejudice which leads to consistently unfair treatment?	4
Comments to Q2	The right-wing nationalists perceive themselves as systemically excluded from the system of Serbian representative democracy.
Q3. To what extent the injustice is linked to issues of redistribution?	1
Comments to Q3	The issue of redistribution is marginal in articulating the violence in this hotspot. However, one could argue that the underlying dissatisfaction of the people attracted to right-wing ideologies stems from issues of redistribution.
Q4. To what extent the injustice is linked to issues of recognition?	2
Comments to Q4	Actors in this hotspot belong to the dominant in-group of Serbian society and their lack of recognition can only be interpreted through the marginal position of their political ideology.
Q5. To what extent the injustice is linked to issues of representation?	5
Comments to Q5	Representation is a crucial motive as participants claim that they are not

	adequately represented in bodies such as the Serbian Parliament.
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Grievance Coding

Q1. How specific is the experienced grievance?	2
Comments to Q1	General grievance is rather abstract, although the trigger was connected to a specific curfew announcement.
Q2. How extensive and diverse is the list of grievances?	5
Comments to Q2	Actors in this hotspot act upon a great accumulation of interconnected social issues and grievances.
Q3. How personal is the grievance?	5
Comments to Q3	Although there were attempts to martyrise the arrested leaders of the action, there is not a single personal grievance motivating the participants.
Q4. How formalized is the demand to address the grievance?	5
Comments to Q4	Storming the Parliament is an expression of the absence of the addressee for the grievance.
Q5. How realistic are the prospects to address the grievance?	3
Comments to Q5	If we identify the demand that a curfew should not be imposed, then this was accomplished. However, actors in this hotspot have also used this event to put forward their wider agenda of gaining state power, which is out of rational reach.

Alienation Coding

Q1. How specific and central is the sense of alienation?	1
Comments to Q1	The sense of alienation is highly abstract.
Q2. How voluntary is the process of alienation?	5

Comments to Q2	Actors in this hotspot aim to become the dominant group in society and not be ostracised from it.
Q3. How complete is the alienation?	1
Comments to Q3	The actors feel alienated from the current regime, and not on any other social basis.
Q4. How entrenched is the alienation?	2
Comments to Q4	The actors feel alienated in the context of the current regime and its policies in regards to national and other burning issues.
Q5. How reversible is the sense of alienation?	1
Comments to Q5	The actors in this hotspot want to resolve their sense of alienation by taking the levers of power and changing government policy.

Polarisation Coding

Q1. To what extent does the actor consider the political field to be polarized?	1
Comments to Q1	The actors see themselves as acting as part of a movement, as described among the meso factors, which supports them and shares their values.
Q2. How high is the perceived level of the polarization?	5
Comments to Q2	The actors in this hotspot perceive the government as national traitors completely opposed to their traditional values.
Q3. To what extent do the actor's opinions radically contrast with the institutions (political, religious, cultural) and policies that are currently in place?	5
Comments to Q3	The dominant values of the actors are essentially anti-establishment values and they perceive the government policy as directly denouncing these core values.
Q4. To what extent does the actor consider the political field to be polarized as compared with the social sphere?	1

Comments to Q4	Political parties and institutions are perceived as being captured by forces which betray Serbian national interests.
Q5. Did the actor consider their radical positions to have a clear outlet on the institutional, cultural, or political spectrum prior to the hotspot?	4
Comments to Q5	Extreme right-wing ideology of this movement is not censored in the public sphere, the members of the movement feel that their parliamentary representation is corrupt and prone to opportunism.

Hotspot 2. Microhydro pipeline sabotage in Rakita

Injustice Coding

Q1. To what extent the hotspot is a response to injustice?	1
Comments to Q1	There is a highly developed sense of injustice as crucial for motivation in this event, as it is framed in the dichotomy between the state and developers versus the rural community defending nature.
Q2. To what extent was the actor motivated by a real or perceived systemic bias or prejudice which leads to consistently unfair treatment?	4
Comments to Q2	The activists of Odbranimu reke Stare planine perceive rural communities and natural ecosystems as systemically disregarded by government decisions to authorise infrastructure developments.
Q3. To what extent the injustice is linked to issues of redistribution?	4
Comments to Q3	The issue of redistribution is one of the key motivational factors as development projects being contested are seen as a mechanism of unfair and corrupt capital accumulation.
Q4. To what extent the injustice is linked to issues of recognition?	4
Comments to Q4	Resorting to the acts of sabotage is significantly motivated by the fact that the

	voices of the activists — who perceive themselves as representatives of poor or rural communities — are marginalised in society.
Q5. To what extent the injustice is linked to issues of representation?	3
Comments to Q5	Actors in this hotspot have no ambition to participate in representational politics, but are keenly interested in building their platform through the justice system.

Grievance Coding

Q1. How specific is the experienced grievance?	5
Comments to Q1	This hotspot is connected to a specific, localised grievance — the destruction of the Rakita river.
Q2. How extensive and diverse is the list of grievances?	2
Comments to Q2	Actors in this hotspot are motivated solely by ecological grievances, although they do see them as part of a wider systemic issue.
Q3. How personal is the grievance?	2
Comments to Q3	The crux of the actors are locals, personally attached to Rakita and its river (such as Desko Stojanov), and other activists are primarily coming to support them.
Q4. How formalized is the demand to address the grievance?	1
Comments to Q4	Odbranimo reke Stare planine has pursued concrete legal action and has expected the government to remove the pipeline.
Q5. How realistic are the prospects to address the grievance?	1
Comments to Q5	From the point of view of the government's ability to respect the court ruling and remove the pipeline, this is highly resolvable.

Alienation Coding

Q1. How specific and central is the sense of alienation?	2
Comments to Q1	The sense of alienation is linked to a loosely defined social stratum, primarily linked to a local identity.
Q2. How voluntary is the process of alienation?	5
Comments to Q2	Actors in this hotspot see themselves as unjustly marginalised.
Q3. How complete is the alienation?	1
Comments to Q3	The actors feel alienated from the decision-makers, but receive a considerable degree of solidarity from the rest of Serbia's population.
Q4. How entrenched is the alienation?	2
Comments to Q4	The sense of alienation has arisen with the introduction of MHPs and the decision-making processes out of reach of the local population.
Q5. How reversible is the sense of alienation?	1
Comments to Q5	Actors in this hotspot demand a concrete change in government policy that will resolve their alienation.

Polarisation Coding

Q1. To what extent does the actor consider the political field to be polarized?	1
Comments to Q1	The actors see themselves as acting as part of a movement, as described among the meso factors, and feel supported by vast swathes of the population.
Q2. How high is the perceived level of the polarization?	3
Comments to Q2	Activists of Odbranimu reke Stare planine see ecologically destructive infrastructural developments pushed forward by the government as structural corruption deeply

	seated within the system, but they still believe the problem is addressable without high polarisation. This is typical of anti-corruption politics.
Q3. To what extent do the actor's opinions radically contrast with the institutions (political, religious, cultural) and policies that are currently in place?	4
Comments to Q3	Activists of Odbranimu reke Stare planine perceive the acts of the government as in direct opposition to their values, but they do see a recourse in the judicial branch of government.
Q4. To what extent does the actor consider the political field to be polarized as compared with the social sphere?	4
Comments to Q4	The activists do not side with specific parties but among their partners are entities such as "Ne davimo Beograd" (Don't Let Belgrade D(r)own), which articulate ecologically driven politics for the purposes of elections and which have formally taken part in Ekološki ustanak.
Q5. Did the actor consider their radical positions to have a clear outlet on the institutional, cultural, or political spectrum prior to the hotspot?	5
Comments to Q5	Framing this issue in terms of anti-corruption politics, there is a clear idea that representation can be achieved. The main recourse remains through the judicial branch of government.