



Trends of Radicalisation

Turkey/3.2 Research Report

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About the Project

D.Rad is a comparative study of radicalization and polarization in Europe and beyond. It aims to identify the actors, networks, and wider social contexts driving radicalization, particularly among young people in urban and peri-urban areas. D.Rad conceptualizes this through the I-GAP spectrum (injustice-grievance-alienation-polarization) with the goal of moving towards measurable evaluations of de-radicalization programs. Our intention is to identify the building blocks of radicalization, which include a sense of being victimized; a sense of being thwarted or lacking agency in established legal and political structures; and coming under the influence of "us vs them" identity formulations.

D.Rad benefits from an exceptional breadth of backgrounds. The project spans national contexts including the UK, France, Italy, Germany, Poland, Hungary, Finland, Slovenia, Bosnia, Serbia, Kosovo, Israel, Iraq, Jordan, Turkey, Georgia, Austria, and several minority nationalisms. It bridges academic disciplines ranging from political science and cultural studies to social psychology and artificial intelligence. Dissemination methods include D.Rad labs, D.Rad hubs, policy papers, academic workshops, visual outputs, and digital galleries. As such, D.Rad establishes a rigorous foundation to test practical interventions geared to prevention, inclusion, and de-radicalization.

With the possibility of capturing the trajectories of seventeen nations and several minority nations, the project will provide a unique evidence base for the comparative analysis of law and policy as nation-states adapt to new security challenges. The process of mapping these varieties and their link to national contexts will be crucial in uncovering strengths and weaknesses in existing interventions. Furthermore, D.Rad accounts for the problem that processes of radicalization often occur in circumstances that escape the control and scrutiny of traditional national frameworks of justice. The participation of AI professionals in modelling, analyzing, and devising solutions to online radicalization will be central to the project's aims.

Executive Summary/Abstract

All four types of radicalization, namely jihadist, right-wing, left-wing and separatist, led to violent acts in the Turkish history. The violent attacks motivated by religious and right-wing sentiments dates back to the Ottoman period developments, which laid the grounds for divisions on the basis of religious and ethnic differences. D3.2 Turkey report addresses the trends of radicalization around two formative events, referred as the hotspots of radicalization: assassination of a journalist from the Armenian minority, Hrant Dink in 2007; and the attack on the members of the Alevi minority during a cultural festival in Sivas in 1993.

In D3.2 report chooses these two events as hotspots as they were part of the general trends of radicalization that led to specific events; preceded and succeeded by violent acts of similar nature. It argues that absence of a minority regulation regime which recognizes the ethnic and religious diversity led to downplaying of the assaults on the minorities by jihadist and right-wing radicalized groups; and the state institutions failed to pursue thorough investigations into the scope of these events which could otherwise prevented future events.

In both cases, the report finds that personal feelings of moral outrage and revenge play role within the wider radical milieu endorsed by vilifying media discourses, racial public opinion and an absence of state policies which recognize the different ethnic and religious identities explicitly and adopt policies of deradicalization. The acts were facilitated through the public officers' playing down the attacks on the minorities on various occasions; and failure to investigate into the neglect and misconduct of the public officers in due process. The coding of the motivational factors indicates that abstract feelings of injustice based on perceived threats to their values rather than personal safety nourished similarly abstract grievances and feelings of alienation. In both hotspots, the perpetrators were motivated by feelings that the foundational characteristics of the social fabric were threatened by the minorities and the state institutions did not take any measures to eliminate the threats. These feelings appear to have motivated a heightened sense of polarization, engulfing the divide between "us" and "them; and resorting to violence to eliminate the others.

Introduction

Forms of radicalization with violent outcomes have prevailed in Turkey since the inception of the republican period in 1923. The country emerged out of the World War I as the successor of the Ottoman Empire with its socio-economic and political legacies. The young republic's vision of the new nation entailed a secular public sphere in which the religious authority would be subjugated to the state control and the ethnic minorities would be relegated to the cultural sphere under the umbrella identity of Turkishness. The Lausanne Peace Treaty of 1923, as the founding agreement of the republic, recognized only the non-Muslim communities as the minorities, but did not create a minority regulation regime that would respond to the cultural or religious claims. Through the course of the years, several divisive issues consolidated into politicized cleavages around ethnic and religious identities and the permissible visibility of the religion in the public sphere. These conflicts attained violent character at certain historical junctures, sometimes through the intervention of the state institutions, particularly the military establishment. A quick glance at the Turkish political history reveals two aspects. All four types of radicalization with violent character, namely the jihadist, right-wing, left-wing and separatist, have existed in Turkey since the beginning of the republican era. Moreover, Turkey witnessed violent events related to all four types nearly in every decade, especially jihadist and right-wing radicalization.

The forms of radicalization based on religious or right-wing notions indeed precede the republican period. The westernization reforms initiated in the 18th century marked the beginning of the traditionalist-reformist division which consolidated further with the Tanzimat period of the 19th century. Reactions against the secularism principle which laid out the foundations of the new republic led to several uprisings motivated by overtly religious concerns (Berkes 1964). The Tanzimat reforms aimed to reform the dysfunctional state institutions along with proposing a new inclusive citizenship following the ethnic uprisings in the Ottoman Empire (Stamatopoulos 2006; Dressler 2015; Davison 2015; Inalcık 2019). The search for creating a nation as homogenous as possible against the background of the ethnic uprisings of the 19th century and the World War I during the early republican period did not leave any space for ethnic and religious claims. It also created a minority discourse, in which any ethnic demand would be denoted as suspicious and divisive. The absence of any official recognition of the cultural specificities of different ethnic or religious groups other than the general clauses of the Lausanne Peace Treaty which stipulate that the non-Muslim nationals would be under equal protection with all citizens (*Lausanne Peace Treaty* 1923) led to an obscure social setting of which right-wing groups abused in their attacks on the minorities.

In D3.2 country report of Turkey we argue that absence of a minority regulation regime which recognizes the ethnic and religious diversity led to downplaying of the assaults on the minorities by jihadist and right-wing radicalized groups; and the state institutions failed to pursue thorough investigations into the scope of these events. Consequently, we see the resurgence of violent incidents perpetrated by radicalized groups as a continued trend. In this context, we focus on two formative events as hotspots of radicalization: assassination of the journalist Hrant Dink with an Armenian origin in 2007, and the violent attack on the Alevi minority in Sivas in 1993. These two hotspots indicate moments in the history of radicalization in Turkey which were preceded by violent attacks of similar nature; and, they might not be last of their kind. We analyze each event at micro, meso and macro levels along with the facilitating

factors that bind these events to our main argument mentioned above. The report ends with an assessment of the motivational factors to constitute the I-GAP coding.

Hotspots of Radicalization

Overview of Chosen Hotspots

On January 19, 2007, Hrant Dink, a journalist and editor-in-chief of the *Agos*¹ newspaper was murdered in front of his office in Istanbul, in broad daylight by a 17-year-old young man named Ogün Samast. He had been receiving anonymous threats since his article on the Armenian origins of Turkey's first female fighter pilot (Dink 2004a) and increasingly after his comments about the identity related issues of the Armenian diaspora (Dink 2004b) in which his criticism of the vindictive anti-Turkish element in the making of the diaspora identity was taken out of its context and presented as if they were his own opinions. Along with his newspapers articles, his published views as to whether the 1915 events should be defined as a genocide, he was prosecuted and convicted on the basis of Article 301 of the Turkish penal code for insulting Turkishness (*BBC News* 2006). On the day of his murder, Dink wrote about the extent of the threats to him and his family in the newspaper (Dink 2007). The Turkish court verdicts did not find any connection to an illegal organization, however, ruled that certain members of the law enforcement and the interior ministry were complicit in the premeditated murder by destroying and distorting the intelligence reports warning about the preparations to kill Dink (*Deutsche Welle* 2021). The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) ruled out that the Turkish state had failed to protect the life of Dink and pursue effective investigation in the aftermath of the assassination (Dink c. Turquie 2010). Dink assassination was preceded by several attacks on the non-Muslim minorities, the most infamous one being the 6-7 September riots of 1955 (Kuyucu 2005; Güven 2020). An Italian priest was murdered barely a year ago in Trabzon (Großbongardt 2006), a young man of Armenian origin was murdered while he was doing his military service in 2011 (Tarcan 2020). Dink's killing forms a formative event which highlights the context of right-wing radicalization in a historical perspective.

The Sivas massacre of 1993 forms another hotspot in a similar socio-historical continuum. On July 2, 1993, a jihadist mob gathered around the Madimak Hotel in the Sivas city center; and, burned the hotel down while the residents were trapped inside. The residents came to city for a religious-cultural festival in the honour of Pir Sultan Abdal, one of the most famous bards of the Alevi-Bektaşî tradition² (Koerbin 2011), who lived in the 16th century and widely believed to be executed by the Sivas governor for his criticisms of the Ottoman state administration (Erseven 2019). The festival in this regard symbolized both the desire of recognition and the justice claims of the Alevi minority going through revivalism since late 1980s (Çamuroğlu 2005; White and Jongerden 2003); the leftist-socialist opposition around the persona of Pir Sultan Abdal. Among the attendants, there were Alevi singers and artists as well as left wing

¹ *Agos* is a bilingual (Turkish-Armenian) daily newspaper established in 1996 by Hrant Dink and his colleagues to raise awareness about the problems and concerns of the Armenian community in Turkey. The newspaper is still active and making news on democratization and human rights along with the minority issues.

² The Alevis is an ethno-religious minority in Turkey. For the Alevi identity and the equal citizenship demands, please see (Aydın 2018; Dressler 2010; Göner 2005; Karakaya-Stump 2018; Koçan and Öncü 2004; Melikoff 1999; Shankland 2003).

intellectuals from both Sunni and Alevi origins. The most notable figure among the intellectuals was Aziz Nesin, who had translated Salman Rushdi's *Satanic Verses* to Turkish. The mob started to gather around the hotel after the Friday prayer, chanting 'Republic was established here in Sivas, it will be demolished here,' 'Secularism will go away, Sharia will come about,' 'Army of Muhammed is the fear of the seculars' (Gökdemir 2016). The security forces did not intervene in the first 12 hours of the events; and the fire brigade was obstructed by the mob (*Deutsche Welle* 2018). 33 residents, mostly of Alevi origin died at the hotel along with two hotel personnel and two of the perpetrators. The court trials took years. Public prosecutor accused Aziz Nesin for making an inflammatory speech and insulting Islam; and refused the existence of an organization. 38 people were convicted for attempting to abolish the constitutional order by the use of force according to Article 309 of the Turkish penal code, several perpetrators avoided arrest; and the case was closed in 2012 for prescription (*BBC News Türkçe* 2018). There was no significant investigation into the misconduct or neglect of the public officers; some of the defendant lawyers later were elected to the parliament, and, it later became clear that the Turkish state did not ask for extradition from Germany for the suspects fled out of the country (*Deutsche Welle* 2018). There had been several attacks on the Alevi minority by the ultra-religious groups before, most notable in 1978 and 1980 (Ertan 2019); and, targeting of the Alevi population continued since 1993.

Method and reasons for choices of hotspots

The Turkey country report D3.1 Mapping Stakeholders and Situations of Radicalization” finds that separatist radicalization poses the biggest threat, followed by the jihadist attacks, and, then the left-wing radicalization. However, D3.1 puts a caveat. Neither the Global Terrorism Database nor the official state documents refer to the violent attacks carried out by the radical right-wing organizations in the 2002-2020 period. D3.1 report, in this respect, warns that “As there are incidents in which attacks on the minority and oppositional groups are officially downplayed and the perpetrators remain unprosecuted, this raises doubts over the penetration of right-wing radicalization to law enforcement and party politics.” Violent acts committed by unknown perpetrators or organizations, however, rank as third in frequency. On another aspect, D3.1 also refers to the initial unwillingness of the state authorities to depict the jihadist organizations in Turkey's neighboring regions as terrorist organizations. As a result, in D3.2, we focus on the policy failures in taking effective measures to prevent violent radicalized events and penetration of radicalization to the law enforcement.

D3.2 intends to contextualize radicalization in its historical context through the analysis of its micro, meso and macro levels in a given country by identifying hotspots. The hotspots are defined as specific and pivotal moments that shed light on the general trends of radicalization. In this context, we depart from where D3.1 Turkey country report leaves. We explore the violent events which could have been prevented if the public officers had carried out meticulous investigations over the reports of potential violence on the relevant incidents. We further presume that once the violent attacks happened and the trials began, failure to conduct substantial inquiries into the alleged involvement of the public officers and eliminate the policies of downplaying the attacks on the minority groups is associated with the continuous trend of radicalization in Turkey. When the public investigation in a violent attack fails to uncover neglect or compromise in the law enforcement and/or rejects making inquiry into

possible institutionalized involvement by convicting a limited number of officers and acquitting the rest, it is not much likely to prevent future violent attacks.

In this report, we focus on two hotspots of radicalization: Assassination of Hrant Dink, a journalist from the Armenian minority in Turkey in 2007 by an ultranationalist young man, and the Sivas Massacre of 1993 during which a jihadist mob burned down the residents of the *Madımak* Hotel, who came to the city to attend an *Alevi* festival. We identify these two events as hotspots that shed light into the facilitating factors for the continued trends of radicalization as well as the micro-meso-macro factors. These two cases comprise formative events of right-wing and jihadist radicalization, which were preceded by attacks of similar nature, and later followed by other attacks on the ethnic and religious minorities largely due to the neglect and misconduct of the public officers and downplaying of the seriousness of the threats as an official policy. In this respect, the cases contribute to our understanding of the facilitating as well as micro-meso-factors of radicalization in Turkey within a socio-historical context.

Micro, meso and macro factors

In the following sections, we analyze each hotspot at micro, meso and macro levels along with the facilitating factors.

Assassination of Hrant Dink (2007)

Micro Level: Personal Factors

Hrant Dink was killed by Ogün Samast, born in 1990, a minor when he committed the murder. He is the youngest child of four children from a lower middle class family (Arsu 2007a). He dropped out his education when he was at the first grade of the high school. At the time of the event, he was living in Trabzon, a city in Turkey's Black Sea region with his family (*Habertürk* 2007). His acquaintances were reported to describe him as "aggressive and contentious", "impressionable and easily influenced" (Timur 2007). He was dismissed from the local football club for misbehaviour, arguably under the influence of his social environment according to the club coach (*Hürriyet* 2007). His uncle claimed that he was having quarrels at home lately about money issues, implying that he might have been paid to kill (Timur 2007). The newspapers during the early days of his capture pointed out to his links to the youth branch of the Great Union Party (*Büyük Birlik Partisi*), a party which blended ultranationalism with Islamist sentiments (*Sabah* 2007), though the party refuted any affiliation and the court trials did not find any formal links to any militant organization.

Samast was put on trial at the juvenile court. The court hearings were held closed to the press; and, we do not have access to the formal records. We collected his statements from various news resources in which either the journalists acquired Samast's testimonies in consecutive trials or the defendant lawyers recounted. As the trial took more than ten years, he gave various testimonies and changed his statements regarding his personal motivations for murder. What we can deduce from the newspaper reviews is that he had an ultranationalist ideology, he presumably acted with moral outrage and feelings of revenge. He was following the news vilifying public figures such as Hrant Dink and Orhan Pamuk who advocated for recognizing 1915 events as a genocide and accusing them of insulting Turkishness, which he claimed to feel as a personal insult to his own ethnic identity. He also claimed that he was not

politicized until he met Yasin Hayal, one of the key instigators, who fed him with the media coverage and nourished his feelings of revenge (*Takvim* 2014). This leads us to the supportive and complicit social environment which we will analyze at the meso level.

Meso Level: Social Setting Factors

The court verdict, as mentioned before, states that the murder was an organized crime, Samast was not affiliated with any known militant organization, but a member of an armed group (*OSCE* 2019). He also claimed in his statements that he undertook the murder because the person who was originally chosen to carry the deed has backed out (*Takvim* 2014). His statements, the court verdicts and his young age make us think that he was loosely affiliated and presumably at the low levels of the hierarchy of the group responsible for the hotspot. The close social circle around him provides a different account.

His immediate contact, and the chief instigator according to the court verdict, Yasin Hayal, was convicted for bombing a McDonalds restaurant in Trabzon in 2004, and suspected of involvement in the murder of the Roman Catholic priest Andrea Santoro in the Santa Maria Church in Trabzon in 2006 (*Arsu* 2007a). The other member of the group, Erhan Tuncel, who stood trial with Hayal for the McDonalds bombing in 2004, claimed that he was later recruited by the police as an assisting intelligence source and warned the police authorities several times that Hayal was planning Dink's murder (*Adal* 2019). However, Tuncel was sentenced to 99 years for being a member of organized crime, involvement in the McDonalds bombing and being an accomplice in Dink murder.

The wider radical milieu points out to the radicalized ultranationalist networks in Trabzon. All suspects resided in the city; not to mention the Santoro murder and McDonalds bombing along with the lynching attempt of the leftist protestors (*Arsu* 2007b). The supportive and complicit social environment is not limited to one city. The reports published by the Hrant Dink Foundation, formed after the name of the Agos' deceased editor in chief, give a full account of the events leading to the murder and enable us to understand the role of media in nourishing the perceived feelings of injustice, grievance, alienation and polarization around Turkishness. The 10-year report points out to the steps through which that social environment was constructed through the media. Dink's article on the female fighter pilot's possible Armenian origins received widespread circulation in the mainstream media, with an emphasis that the pilot was Atatürk's adopted daughter and as if suggesting that such a personality might be ethnically Armenian was another way of insulting or at least depreciating Turkishness. Apparently, these suggestions hit the target because the Department of the Chief of Staff releases a public statement in response: "Sabiha Gökçen is at the same time a valuable and rationalistic symbol showing the place that Atatürk wanted the Turkish woman to have in the Turkish society. Regardless of its objectives, opening such a symbol to discussion is an attitude without any contribution to the national unity and social peace" (*Hürriyet* 2004). Dink's other article criticizing the vindictive elements in the identity formation of the Armenian diaspora, taken out of its context as if Dink was supporting such sentiments, received similar media attention. As a result, several different individuals and associations filed complaints to the courts, which led to Dink's conviction according to Article 301 of the Turkish penal code for insulting Turkishness. Protests in front of Agos newspaper's office and threat letters followed the court hearings and the supportive media narratives (*Bakırcıoğlu* 2017).

Macro Level: Institutional, Systemic and Structural Factors

Reports of the Hrant Dink Foundation, available excerpts from the court hearings, statements of the lawyers acting on behalf of the Dink family; and the extant research corroborate the combined role of institutional, systemic and structural factors. The controversy around the forced exile of the Armenians in 1915 and whether it forms a genocide occupies a remarkable place in the public opinion and party politics. The official narrative refers as the “Armenian issue”, defines it as a displacement of the Armenian groups collaborating with the Russian state during the conditions of World War I, refutes any deliberate involvement of the state authorities in the loss of lives during the deportation (“1915 Olaylarına Dair Türk-Ermeni Uyuşmazlığının Arka Planı” n.d.). This official standpoint has been consistently adopted by the main political parties as a general approach to the minority issues based on the Treaty of Lausanne 1923, the founding treaty which concluded the World War I and laid out the inception of the Turkish Republic. The articles from 37 to 44 refer to the “Turkish nationals belonging to the non-Muslim minorities”, without any mention of ethnic minorities (*Lausanne Peace Treaty* 1923). This stance produced the counter-narrative of the Armenian atrocities that took place the World War I especially after the ASALA attacks in 1970s. By 2000, the official discourse had become systematic, taking place in the curriculums at multiple education levels, establishment of various committees (Turan and Öztan 2018). We observe vilification of the minorities, particularly the Armenians, as the enemy-within at multiple levels during this period. Slander campaigns claiming that the Armenians supported the separatist violence of PKK received mass media appeal to the extent that the Patriarchate of the Armenian Church had to release a press communique refuting the claims (*Milliyet* 1994).

The debates and tensions in the public opinion became widespread particularly since 2000s when the issue became a matter of international relations. As more states and parliaments in Europe passed resolutions in recognition, the political parties reconstructed the controversy as another attempt against Turkey in the rising tide of nationalism of the period (Açar and Rûma 2007). The role of the mainstream media in reproducing the official discourses should also be underlined. Under these circumstances, establishment of the Agos newspaper by the Armenian intellectuals led by Hrant Dink was an attempt to go beyond the polarization and place the concerns of the Armenian minority within the wider democratization and human rights context in Turkey (Tchilingirian 2007). Dink posed criticisms also towards the Armenian church and the destructive sentiments in the identity formation of the Armenian community; and, invited the scholars advocating the official discourse to write at Agos (Turan and Öztan 2018, 320–22). Despite Dink’s open and reconciliatory position, some public officers apparently found his attempts to open the ‘Armenian issue’ into discussion as part of the human rights and democratization problems in Turkey as a threat to the official discourse. This, in return, turned out be a major facilitating factor which made the assassination as a “death foretold”.

1993 Sivas Massacre

Micro Level: Personal Factors

The court identified Cafer Erçakmak as the leading perpetrator in his absence. Erçakmak was born in 1939, he was 54 years old during the event; and, was serving on the municipal council

from Refah Party, a party with an Islamist pedigree which had electoral victories in the local and national elections of the period and later closed by the constitutional court (Kamrava 1998; Öniş 1997; Güllalp 2001; Dikici Bilgin 2008). The journalists took his pictures while he was trying to prevent the fire brigade from saving Aziz Nesin from the ruins of the hotel. For years, he was presumed to have fled to either France or Germany, living in disguise among the conservative sections of the Turkish diaspora. It was revealed that he might have been living in Turkey in all those years or had returned to Turkey when he died from a heart attack in his own house in Sivas in 2011 (*Cumhuriyet* 2011). The newspapers unraveled that he got married in 1999 at a municipality building, registered his newborn child on his name and even got a driving license in 2000 (*Evrinsel* 2017). He had at least three children. Other than this information, we only know that he was sought internationally by Interpol; and nothing else about his personal background as he was never caught and never testified at court. According to the news coverage, he was instigating the mob by chanting “may our religious war be blessed by God” (*Gazamız mubarek olsun!*) (Öztürk 2018).

We collected the testimonies of the accused and statements of the defendant lawyers who were present during the hearings from the publications of the barr associations on the Sivas case. It should be noted that there very few testimonies and lawyer statements even in these publications as the focus was on the court verdicts. There is one particular testimony worth noting in terms of the personal level factors. Nevzat Aydın, who was 19 years old at the time, single, high school graduate and unemployed. He stated that he had seven siblings, her mother a homemaker and his father working at the repair division of the national railways, suggesting a working-class background. He claimed that he joined the mob after the Friday prayer when he learnt that an author named Aziz Nesin insulted Islam and was presently in Sivas. He admits that he joined the religious chanting of “Aziz the devil, the Governor should resign, Sivas will be the graveyard of Aziz” (Sarıhan 2002, 92–95). The public prosecutor and the defendant lawyers stated that the perpetrators were provoked by Aziz Nesin’s interview broadcasted on the TV channels and published in the newspapers (Merdol, Bektaş, and Sarigül 2004). As a result, it is possible to presume that the personal level factors might involve moral outrage and feelings of revenge. As to the place of the apprehended perpetrators within the hierarchy of the group, we do not have conclusive information.

Meso Level: Social Setting Factors

Throughout the court hearings, the defendant lawyers claimed that it was not an organized attack, but rather a spontaneous mass gathering instigated by the provocative speeches of the festival participants. Among the more than a hundred people put on trial, there were municipality personnel and legally registered members of the Refah Party (Merdol, Bektaş, and Sarigül 2004). Two perpetrators, Ali Kurt and Mevlüt Atalay, applied to become confessors claiming that jihadist organizations such as Turkish Hizbullah, Organization of Islamic Action and *Kaplançılar*, were involved in the organization of the violent attacks. A documentary reports that a smaller group came to the mosque before the Friday prayer, and mobilized the people towards the hotel and the local newspapers such as *Bizim Sivas* and *Hakikat* came with headlines around Nesin’s speech with a narrative that the religious values were insulted (32.Gün Arşivi 2019). Later, the public prosecutor also claimed that the radical milieu was formed around this massive outrage. The city Sivas had a polarized social context at the time. While there are Alevi settlements around the rural areas as part of the wider Sivas

province, the city center heavily voted for the Islamist Refah Party and the ultranationalist-Islamist Great Union Party in the elections of the period. The mayor of the city was also elected from the Refah Party. It should be noted that these two parties are legally registered parties, and the courts did not rule any organizational links to them. The fact that the mob continued to attack the residents of the hotel even after the security forces and the fire brigade intervened indicates that the radicalized networks were strong or confident enough to defy the law enforcement. The chief suspect, Erçakmak, turned out to be residing in the city center less than a mile from the police station and the Madımak Hotel further implying the supportive and complicit social surrounding. He legally married and got a driving license in his own name, which suggests that the public officers were aware of his residence in the city. The wider radical milieu and how the social setting enabled the mass killings provides further insight when placed in the larger institutional, systemic and structural factors.

Macro Level: Institutional, Systemic and Structural Factors

September 12, 1980 coup created a rupture in the Turkish political landscape by imprisoning thousands of people, closing the political parties and banning the top leadership of the main political parties. The military establishment permitted holding national elections in 1983 and 1987, though the elections were neither free nor fair. In the first one, the regime vetted only three parties to run; more parties were allowed to run in 1987 elections, but, several candidates were rejected (Ergüder and Hofferbert 1988). 1991 national elections, in this regard, was the first civilian election after the coup. Refah Party came as fourth; but already gaining ground at the local level with its grassroots activities (Gülalp 2001). The left-right polarization of the previous decades with its death toll and the military's using the political violence to justify the coup had made its mark on the society; and the rise of identity politics at the international level also influenced the national political landscape. Military had officially returned back to the barracks; but a military-bureaucratic tutelage prevailed through the establishment of the National Security Council (Cizre 2003). The new regime identified the left-wing movement and its Kurdish component as its ideological enemy which had widely appealed to the lower classes in the previous decade and enacted a state controlled Islamization project to pacify the discontented sections of the society, referred as the Turkish-Islamic synthesis (Kurt 2010; Oprea 2014). Specifically speaking, the new regime identified certain forms of Islamist movements as reactionary; but, adopted an official Islamization policy under its own control and on its own terms (Yıldız 2003). The extent of this state-led Islamization policy went as far as financing the imams to be sent to the Turkish diaspora in Europe by the Saudi funds (Mumcu 1987). The renowned journalist, Uğur Mumcu, who uncovered the details of these connections was murdered less than six months before the Sivas Massacre; and, the perpetrators remain unknown to this day.

Alevi revivalism emerged in these circumstances. There had been two mass massacres in Çorum and Maraş in 1978 and 1980 targeting the Alevi neighborhoods. As Ertan argues, the violent attacks in the late 1970s had a combined ideological and religious motivation as many Alevis, particularly the youth, joined the leftist organizations (Ertan 2019, 939). The enforcement of the state-led Islamization policies following these massacres, hence, increasingly polarized the Alevi identity (Boyras 2019, 773; van Bruinessen 1996, 8). Some authors emphasize the role of the Alevi diaspora living in Europe in endorsing Alevi revivalism due to the enabling political context in the Western European countries, especially Germany

(Massicard 2011; Demiray 2004; Özyürek 2013). Support of the leftist intellectuals to the non-orthodox interpretation of Islam in Alevism continued also in this period as can be deduced from the participants of the Pir Sultan Abdal Festival in 1993.

The social setting in Sivas, whose residents were overwhelmingly voting for ultranationalist and Islamist parties should be contextualized within this wider framework: the rise of the identity politics as a global trend, the controlled Islamization policy sanctioned by the military-bureaucratic establishment, increasing public visibility of the Alevi identity with the rise of Alevi revivalism; and the historical relations between the Alevis and the leftist politics. In this sense, vilification of Aziz Nesin, a self-declared atheist of Sunni origins, cannot be understood without the decades long prejudices to the religious acceptability of the Alevis in the Islamist imagery, the dominant political leanings of the Alevi community and the official ideology formulated after the 1980 coup. This makes it easier to understand the reluctance of the state security forces to interfere with the mob attack to protect the Alevis and the leftist intellectuals in the Madımak Hotel. With the same coin, it becomes possible to discuss why the public officers serving at various levels of ministry of interior affairs, Sivas municipality or the police and gendarmery forces were not investigated for their possible neglect and involvement in the incident from a different angle.

Facilitating factors

Two hotspots took place at different times, one in 1993 and the other one in 2007. However, there are similar facilitating factors rooted in the absence of a minority regulation regime which recognizes the ethnic and religious diversities as legitimate identities; downplaying of the nature of the events and failure to pursue thorough investigations into the neglect and misconduct of the public officers.

The main facilitating factors in the hotspot of the Assassination of Hrant Dink are related to political environment and the law enforcement bodies, ranging from the mainstreaming of the anti-Armenian narrative in the media and incorporating the official “Armenian issue” discourse to the curriculums and public policies as the state’s red lines, to downplaying the threats to the life of Dink, failing to take preventive measures against the radicalized ultranationalist networks, distorting and destroying intelligence reports, and the direct involvement of some public officers in the act. After the eruption of the media debate over Dink’s article on the Armenian origins of the female fighter pilot and whether it formed an insult to Turkishness or a threat to the national unity; and the press release of the Chief of Staff, the national intelligence agency along with the Istanbul governorate had a meeting with Dink to warn him about the potentially dangerous outcomes that might emerge in 2004 (Bakırcıoğlu 2017). Despite the increasing number of threatening letters and messages conveyed to Dink, his application to the law enforcement for protection, we do not find any information that measures taken against the threats. On the contrary, Dink was not provided security detail although he had publicized the situation. More importantly, many publications show that the intelligence reports about the assassination preparations were neglected, some officers might have even assisted the killer in collecting information about Dink’s daily routine (Göktaş 2009; Şener 2010; 2011; Çetin 2013; Turan and Öztan 2018). The court verdicts ruled the neglect and involvement of at least a number of public officers (Bakırcıoğlu 2017). These show how the offensive political discourse around the 1915 events and the “Armenian issue” at the macro

level combined with the radicalized milieu against the justice claims of the Armenian community at the meso level; culminated by the identity problems, moral outrage, and feelings of revenge in a young unemployed man at the micro level are facilitated by the neglect and compromise in the law enforcement to result in the murder of Hrant Dink.

We observe a similar set of facilitating factors in the other hotspot. The parliamentary inquiry committee of the Turkish Grand National Assembly provided an initial report about the events of July 2, 1993 in Sivas. Accordingly, an intelligence report informing about “some people talking about organizing a protest against the governor and Aziz Nesin” arrived on the morning of the events (Seyfi 1993). The city governor, Ahmet Karabilgin, who was also targeted by the protestors for permitting the festival, claims that he warned the authorities, but those who ignored these warnings were not investigated later (Gençkal 2009). The president and the prime minister of the time downplayed the events in their public statements after the incident (*BBC News Türkçe* 2018). As mentioned before, the security forces waited for nearly twelve hours before intervening which suggests that it was not authorized for a long period of time. The lawyers of the families of the victims noted several irregularities ranging from the state authorities’ failing to issue extradition claims for the suspected perpetrators who fled abroad, chief suspect’s living unnoticed in Sivas until his death, the prosecutor perusal’s focus on the role of Aziz Nesin’s public statements rather than the organizers of the mob, to the lack of investigation in the involvement of the public prosecutors. They also claimed that the lawyers of the accused were later promoted to higher positions in the Constitutional Court and the Ministry of Justice as well as becoming members of the parliament (Mihyaz 2016).

Motivational factors and the IGAP Coding

The D3.2 Turkey report so far depicted and analyzed the two chosen hotspots in a socio-historical context and taking the micro-meso-macro factors into consideration along with the facilitating factors. In this section, we delve into the motivational factors on the basis of the research carried out for the report. What might be the motivations of the radicalized individuals in connection to the wider radical milieu and how can we quantify these factors? The D.Rad project aims to construct a scale, referred as the I-GAP, by focusing on the perceptions of injustice which led to grievance, alienation and polarization.

We coded motivational factors on a 1-5 scale regarding the two chosen hotspots by using the newspaper coverage, available court hearings, testimonies of the accused and the statements of the defendant and plaintiff lawyers. For both cases, our main limitation has been the way the trials and investigations are conducted lacking transparency and effective pursuit, which also form the facilitating factors.

Motivational factors related to the hotspot of assassination of Hrant Dink (2007)

In the hotspot concerning the right-wing attack on a leading member of the Armenian minority, we do not have any information regarding a personal injustice or unfair treatment. We presume that the actor put into action hateful ideology claiming that Dink’s statements insulted his ultra-nationalist feelings. The anti-Armenian discourse in Turkey is based on a historical construct arguing that Armenian atrocities against the Turkish population took place during the World War I and the Armenians betrayed by collaborating with the invading states. The Armenian

community in Turkey do not own big capital ventures which could be translated into redistribution claims. The act is not related to any recognition or representation issues as the perpetrators is from the majority ethnicity. The grievance factors are abstract in character based on a historical construct, not personal, voice an abstract complaint without expecting any one to deal with it and the prospects to address the grievance are not realistic. The more visible aspect of feelings of alienation are abstract as well, based on a perceived threat to the cultural values. However, the actor considers the political field as highly polarized, the insults attributed to Dink as unpunished, the anti-Turkish camp as categorically uncommunicable. The event took place during a period in which the incumbent government had initiated a selective de-radicalization period with cultural openings although the exclusionary institutions remained intact. Overall, the Dink assassination provides a context, in which we observe that a radicalized individual moves on the basis of a historical construct around the minority, feelings of moral outrage that a member of a “historically treacherous” group could criticize the minority policies of the state without any specific personal wrongdoing, based on abstract notions of grievance and alienation, however with clear indicators of polarization elements.

Motivational factors related to the hotspot of 1993 Sivas Massacre

The chief suspect in instigating and mobilizing the mob to gather around the hotel and set it alight was Cafer Erçakmak according to the court records. Erçakmak was never apprehended, we have very little information on his personal background. However, the attack constitutes an organized act with multiple actors, therefore, we based the motivational coding on the apprehended perpetrators. The motivational coding for the 1993 Sivas Massacre exhibits similarities with the Dink assassination as both attacks targeted minorities although one with jihadist motivations, the other with ultranationalist concerns. In this case, the feelings of moral outrage and revenge build on perceived threats to the religious values. The actor puts hateful ideology into action rather than a perceived sense of injustice. Despite the absence of an event that can be constructed as a historical narrative of wrongdoing, it seems that the very existence of a different interpretation of the religious norms and values are perceived as wrongdoing and threat to the actor’s existence. We deduce this factor also with respect to the targets of the protest. The mob chanted against the governor for allowing such a gathering to take place legally in their own city and cultivated anger on the basis of the leftist intellectual’s statements against Islam which was intertwined with the Alevi belief system considered an outright blasphemy. It was not related to any concerns of perceived bias or physical safety; however, it is possible to argue that the secular state policies against the forms of religiosity unsanctioned by the military-bureaucratic establishment might be perceived as systemic animosity.

Similar to the Armenian minority, the Alevis do not own notable big capital ventures, and we do not see any redistributive elements of the narratives. Issues of recognition or representation are not also applicable to the case directly. However, it was a period when the Alevi identity was becoming visible, more public figures owning up their sectarian belonging, and the rituals were becoming public for the first time. In this sense, issues of recognition and representation on behalf of the minority in question, might have led to grievance. The demand and the prospects to address the grievance are both abstract and unrealistic.

The alienation aspect, in our opinion, diverges from the motivations in the other hotspot. The perpetrators belong to the Sunni sect, and the Alevis are not recognized as a distinct religious

group. The official policy has been identifying the Alevis as a cultural group, and the worshipping places are officially treated as cultural convention centers to this day. However, the official state policy at the time of the incident also did not sanction public manifestations of religiosity and religious authorities other than that of the religious affairs department under state supervision. The actors might have felt alienated in such a socio-political setting and threatened as they perceived heterodox interpretations of Islam and anti-Islamic sentiments were gaining public visibility. This might have triggered the perceptions of polarization in the discourse of us vs them.

Conclusion

The D3.2 Turkey report contextualized the trends of radicalization in Turkey in a socio-historical framework around the two hotspots in which a member of an ethnic minority was targeted by right-wing radicalization and jihadist radicalization targeted a religious minority. The two events are chosen as hotspots as they constitute formative events which were preceded by similar attacks and later succeeded by other right-wing and jihadist incidents. In both cases, the report finds that personal feelings of moral outrage and revenge play role within the wider radical milieu endorsed by vilifying media discourses, racial public opinion and an absence of state policies which recognize the different ethnic and religious identities explicitly and adopt policies of deradicalization. The acts are facilitated through the public officers' playing down the attacks on the minorities on various occasions; and failure to investigate into the neglect and misconduct of the public officers in due process. The coding of the motivational factors indicates that abstract feelings of injustice based on perceived threats to their values rather than personal safety nourished similarly abstract grievances and feelings of alienation. In both hotspots, the perpetrators were motivated by feelings that the foundational characteristics of the social fabric were threatened by the minorities and the state institutions did not take any measures to eliminate the threats. These feelings appear to have motivated a heightened sense of polarization, engulfing the divide between "us" and "them; and resorting to violence to eliminate the others.

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Annex: I-GAP Coding

Assassination of Hrant Dink (2007)

Injustice Coding

Q1. To what extent the hotspot is a response to injustice?	1
Comments to Q1	He claims that Dink's statements insulted Turkishness and his ultranationalist feelings
Q2. To what extent was the actor motivated by a real or perceived systemic bias or prejudice which leads to consistently unfair treatment?	3
Comments to Q2	Neither. Not applicable
Q3. To what extent the injustice is linked to issues of redistribution?	1
Comments to Q3	Even the right-wing media does not refer to any economic privileges granted to the the Armenian minority. They are usually artisans and small shop owners.
Q4. To what extent the injustice is linked to issues of recognition?	1
Comments to Q4	
Q5. To what extent the injustice is linked to issues of representation?	1
Comments to Q5	

Grievance Coding

Q1. How specific is the experienced grievance?	1
Comments to Q1	A perceived accusation "The Armenians betrayed Turks during the World War I". They are treacherous.
Q2. How extensive and diverse is the list of grievances?	1
Comments to Q2	The claimed grievance of Armenian atrocities during the World War I and collaboration with the Russians
Q3. How personal is the grievance?	5
Comments to Q3	
Q4. How formalized is the demand to address the grievance?	4
Comments to Q4	The state did not eliminate the Armenians (?)

Q5. How realistic are the prospects to address the grievance?	5
Comments to Q5	

Alienation Coding

Q1. How specific and central is the sense of alienation?	3
Comments to Q1	
Q2. How voluntary is the process of alienation?	1
Comments to Q2	
Q3. How complete is the alienation?	3
Comments to Q3	
Q4. How entrenched is the alienation?	4
Comments to Q4	
Q5. How reversible is the sense of alienation?	4
Comments to Q5	

Polarisation Coding

Q1. To what extent does the actor consider the political field to be polarized?	1
Comments to Q1	
Q2. How high is the perceived level of the polarization?	5
Comments to Q2	
Q3. To what extent do the actor's opinions radically contrast with the institutions (political, religious, cultural) and policies that are currently in place?	3
Comments to Q3	
Q4. To what extent does the actor consider the political field to be polarized as compared with the social sphere?	1
Comments to Q4	
Q5. Did the actor consider their radical positions to have a clear outlet on the institutional, cultural, or political spectrum prior to the hotspot?	5
Comments to Q5	

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Injustice Coding

Q1. To what extent the hotspot is a response to injustice?	1
Comments to Q1	
Q2. To what extent was the actor motivated by a real or perceived systemic bias or prejudice which leads to consistently unfair treatment?	3
Comments to Q2	
Q3. To what extent the injustice is linked to issues of redistribution?	1
Comments to Q3	
Q4. To what extent the injustice is linked to issues of recognition?	1
Comments to Q4	
Q5. To what extent the injustice is linked to issues of representation?	1
Comments to Q5	

Grievance Coding

Q1. How specific is the experienced grievance?	1
Comments to Q1	
Q2. How extensive and diverse is the list of grievances?	1
Comments to Q2	There is not a single event in which the Alevis could be vilified concretely against the Sunnis
Q3. How personal is the grievance?	5
Comments to Q3	
Q4. How formalized is the demand to address the grievance?	3
Comments to Q4	
Q5. How realistic are the prospects to address the grievance?	5
Comments to Q5	

Alienation Coding

Q1. How specific and central is the sense of alienation?	3
Comments to Q1	

Q2. How voluntary is the process of alienation?	1
Comments to Q2	
Q3. How complete is the alienation?	2
Comments to Q3	
Q4. How entrenched is the alienation?	5
Comments to Q4	
Q5. How reversible is the sense of alienation?	1
Comments to Q5	

Polarisation Coding

Q1. How specific and central is the sense of alienation?	3
Comments to Q1	
Q2. How voluntary is the process of alienation?	1
Comments to Q2	
Q3. How complete is the alienation?	2
Comments to Q3	
Q4. How entrenched is the alienation?	5
Comments to Q4	
Q5. How reversible is the sense of alienation?	1
Comments to Q5	