

Eu Social Cit

European Social Citizenship

Employment-related Social Citizenship and Its Resource-based Underpinnings: An Assessment of Country-year Data

Author

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EuSocialCit working paper

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Summary

This Working Paper explores social-rights realization in the realm of employment, empirically applying the resource-based framework of the EUSOCIALCIT research consortium. It does so by analyzing quantitative, aggregate country-year information about national-level employment-related social rights resources, outputs and outcomes from the Comparative Social Citizenship Database (CSCD). The particular focus is on material-economic and national-level policy-institutional measures in CSCD introduced in Eick et al. (2021a) for EU member states and other industrialized democracies between 1960 and 2018. The Working Paper analyzes these measures to clarify two fundamental parts of social-rights realization.

First, the Working Paper systematically tracks developments in key measures of employment-related *outcomes*, *outputs* and *resources* germane to employment-related social rights at the national level. The *outcomes* surveyed are rates of unemployment, employment, temporary-employment, part-time employment, long-term unemployment, and poverty. The *outputs* surveyed include policy spending and take-up measures with respect to unemployment insurance and active-labour-market policies, and spending measures with respect to family leave and early-child education policies. The *resources* surveyed include measures of aggregate-level normative resources (e.g. indices of benefit generosity for unemployment-related programmes and for parental-leave/ECEC programmes); of aggregate-level instrumental resources (e.g. union and bargaining power; worker legal rights; strike protection); and of aggregate-level enforcement resources (e.g. labour inspection rates). With respect to such measures, the paper explores how (EU) countries compare to one another and what over-time trends exist in such resources, outputs and outcomes. Do we see deepening social citizenship in Europe by these measures? The answer is, broadly, “yes”: the data reveal substantial deepening of many measures of Europe’s labour-related resources, outputs and outcomes since the 1970s.

Second, the Working Paper explores the hypothesized causal chains linking resources to outputs and to outcomes in the realization of social rights. Using basic statistical regression techniques, the focus is on whether and how measures of social-rights resources are empirically associated with (subsequent) measures of outputs and outcomes. This can involve direct associations, such as whether normative measures of unemployment protection actually appear to shape spending on or take-up of unemployment protection. But it can also involve indirect, or moderated, implications, for instance where instrumental resources like the strength of organized labour institutions may strengthen the link between benefit generosity (a normative resource) and spending or programme take-up (outputs). With respect to such analysis, the key question is how and whether key measures of resources undergird or spur key measures of social-rights outputs and outcomes. Do resources foster the realization of social rights in practice measured in outputs and outcomes? The answer again turns out to be ‘yes’. While there is a lot of variation with respect to which resource measures matter for which measures of outputs and outcomes – reflecting the imperfections of the measures, not just the differences in substantive implications of resources – we see that country-years marked by more substantial normative, instrumental and enforcement resources tend to be developing more substantial social-rights outputs and outcomes. And labor-focused resources tend to matter more to labor-focused outputs and outcomes than do more generic resources.

Employment-related Social Citizenship and Its Resource-based Underpinnings: An Assessment of Country-year Data

Project name	The Future of European Social Citizenship
Project acronym	EuSocialCit
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Lead partner	Copenhagen Business School
Work package	<p>EuSocialCit is an interdisciplinary research project aiming to support the EU in strengthening social rights and European social citizenship. It evaluates the current state of social rights in Europe and their relationship to social inequalities, gender inequalities, poverty and precariousness, and diagnoses the shortcomings of current policies and institutions at the level of individual countries and the EU.</p> <p>The EuSocialCit project focusses on three domains in which social rights are important: the empowerment of citizens (e.g. education and activation), fair working conditions and social inclusion. Each of these domains are respectively studied as part of WP3, WP4 and WP5.</p> <p>This report is produced as part of WP4 which is entitled “<i>Fair working conditions through labour market policy</i>”. This WP focuses on how the European Union and member state governments and social partners develop and deliver on social rights in relation to labour market policy (1), work-life balance (2), atypical work (3), and workplace health-and-safety (4). Its focus on labour market policies consists of a quantitative analysis of all EU countries, as in the present Working Paper, while the other three foci include in-depth case analyses on a selection of countries, representing different political economies within the EU.</p>

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1. Introduction

Social rights in the realm of employment are important to human flourishing in Europe and elsewhere, and central to the European Union political goals, particularly those set out in the European Pillar of Social Rights. Following a resource-based conception of social citizenship, employment-related social citizenship can be seen as manifested in the interlinked development of social-rights *resources*, *outputs* and *outcomes*. Here, social-rights resources are properties of individuals and their socio-economic and political settings that help those individuals realize their social citizenship, and can be subdivided into three kinds of resources: *normative resources* articulating what is legitimate and necessary; *instrumental resources* facilitating the actual taking-up and claiming of legitimate social rights; and *enforcement resources* facilitating the monitoring and sanctioning of social rights provision. Such resources are important manifestations of social rights, but they matter mainly to the extent that they undergird actual social-rights outputs and outcomes: outputs being actual regulatory of policy interventions providing social rights, such as social policy spending and actual take-up of social programmes; and outcomes being the manifestations of social and economic life that constitute the achievements of social rights, such as employment, wealth, wellbeing, economic equality and happiness (or their opposites). This resource-based framework may make sense in theory (Vandenbroucke et al. 2021) and in plenty of empirical illustrations (Eick et al. 2021a). However, understanding social citizenship requires subjecting the framework to more focused and systematic empirical exploration.

This report provides such exploration, focusing on social-rights realization in the realm of employment. It does so by analyzing quantitative, aggregate country-year information about employment-related social rights resources, outputs and outcomes from the Comparative Social Citizenship Database (CSCD). The particular focus is on national-level material-economic and policy-institutional measures in CSCD introduced in Eick et al. (2021a) – as opposed to ideational public opinion measures introduced in Eick et al. (2021b) and as opposed to individual, local or EU-level conditions – for all EU member states and other industrialized democracies between 1960 and 2018. Such a quantitative focus on macro-level, national and material measures captures only a quite limited part of social-right outputs, outcomes and, particularly, resources. Studies and journalistic reporting have identified a great many other features of citizen experiences, family situations, community developments, and local, national and EU bureaucracy, law and politics that all directly affect how easily (or not) individual citizens demand, gain-access to, and make use of particular social programs (Lowrey 2021; Sabel et al. 2017; Vandenbroucke et al. 2021). However, many of these important conditions do not lend themselves, as yet, to systematic comparison across time and space. The present study’s quantitative and macro focus exacts an analytical price, yielding limited and modest internal validity for some concepts relevant to a resource-based approach to studying social citizenship. But this price is worth paying for what the focus facilitates: broad and systematic exploration of trends, cross-country patterns and links between numerous measures of social-rights resources, outputs and outcomes in the labor-market realm.

That exploration is divided into two empirical-analytical steps. First, we systematically track developments in key measures of employment-related outcomes, outputs and resources germane to employment-related social rights. The outcomes surveyed are rates of unemployment, employment, temporary-employment, part-time employment, long-term unemployment, and poverty. The employment-related outputs surveyed are policy spending and actual take-up measures with respect to unemployment insurance and active labour market policies, and policy spending measures with respect to family leave and early child education policies to combine work with family. Most importantly, the resources surveyed include several measures of normative resources (e.g. indices of benefit generosity for unemployment-related programmes and for parental-leave/ECEC programmes); several measures of instrumental resources (e.g. democracy and transparency in policymaking; union and collective bargaining power; worker legal rights; strike protection; gender employment indices); and several measures of enforcement resources (e.g. non-corruption of judiciaries and labour inspection rates).

With respect to all such measures, the key descriptive questions for this paper are how (EU) countries compare to one another and what the over-time trends are in social-citizenship resources, outputs and outcomes. Most importantly, do we see deepening social citizenship in Europe by these measures? The answer turns out to be broadly, “yes”: the data reveal substantial deepening of many measures of social rights resources, outputs and outcomes in Europe since the 1970s.

Second and analytically more important, this study explores our hypothesized causal chain linking resources, outputs and outcomes observed at the macro-level and relevant to the realization of social rights. Using a range of basic statistical regression techniques, it focuses on whether and how our various measures of social-rights resources are empirically associated with (subsequent) measures of outputs and outcomes – motivating causal inferences as to how resources might affect social-citizenship outputs and outcomes. This can involve direct associations, such as whether normative measures of unemployment protection actually appear to shape spending on or take-up of unemployment protection. But it can also involve indirect, or moderated, implications, for instance where instrumental resources like the strength of organized labour institutions may strengthen the link between benefit generosity (a normative resource) and spending or programme take-up (outputs).

With respect to such analysis, the key question is how and whether macro-level measures of resources undergird or spur key measures of social-rights outputs and outcomes. Do resources foster the realization of social rights in practice measured in outputs and outcomes? And do resources focused on a particular aspect of rights – for instance labor-protection resources focused on labor issues, rather than general democratic representation relevant to social citizenship generally – matter particularly to the realization of the particular rights in question? The answer again turns out to be ‘yes’ to both questions. While there is a lot of variation with respect to which resource measures matter for which measures of outputs and outcomes – reflecting the imperfections of the measures, not just the differences in substantive implications of resources – we see that country-years marked by more substantial normative, instrumental and enforcement resources tend to be developing more

substantial social-rights outputs and outcomes. And labor-focused resources tend to matter more to labor-focused outputs and outcomes than do more generic resources.

The rest of this study develops these points in four steps. Section 2, summarizes the key theoretical expectations as to how social-citizenship resources shape social-citizenship outputs and outcomes with respect to labor markets and work. Section 3 then focuses on definition and descriptive analysis of the cross-country and over-time measures of employment-related outcomes, outputs and resources. Most importantly, Section 4 summarizes the quantitative exploration of how normative, instrumental, and enforcement resources shape outputs and outcomes. A final and brief Section 5 concludes.

2. A Resource-based Framework on Employment-related Social Citizenship

The central expectation of this paper (and EUSOCIALCIT generally) is that social citizenship can be seen as a process of social-rights realization rooted in power resources available to citizens. Such *resources* are ultimately experienced and used by individuals in their navigation of the economy and working life. In the present study's reckoning, however, such power resources are manifested in or rooted in individual, institutional and even ideational characteristics (legal, regulatory, policy provisions and widely-shared norms of justice and practice at local, national or higher levels of governance) that give individuals capacities to claim and receive social rights, manifested in social-rights policy *outputs* and ultimately in social-rights *outcomes*. Consistent with other EUSOCIALCIT conceptualizations of resources, I distinguish here three kinds of resources that can be expected to foster social-rights outputs and outcomes: (1) *normative resources* that involve legal or legislative or regulatory edicts or mandates, benefit "guarantees" or widely-held normative commitments; (2) *instrumental resources* that involve individual or legal-regulatory or institutional provisions promoting the capacity to actually claim or put into practice such normative standards or commitments; and (3) *enforcement resources* that involve individual or legal-regulatory or institutional provisions that monitor and compel actual social rights policies and citizen claiming access to such social rights policies. These conditions are conceptually distinct from social-rights outputs and outcomes. *Outputs* involve policy measures or practices capturing the claiming of social rights – manifested in actual take-up of legally available or policy-provided social benefits, and/or in actual spending on social-rights related programs. And *outcomes* involve features of social and economic life that manifest or are important gauges of human flourishing or suffering relevant to social citizenship – such as actual employment, poverty, happiness, etc.

For the present study, the focus is on social citizenship *with respect to labor markets and work*, and hence on aspects of (three kinds of) resources, of outputs and outcomes most relevant to labor markets and working life. With respect to outcomes, this includes particularly measures of (full-, temporary-, part-time) employment or (regular or long-term) unemployment, but also measures of workplace quality (workplace safety and labor standards, pay conditions, etc.). With respect to outputs, employment-related outputs include policies and regulations that measure take-up and implementation of social rights provisions, such as social policy expenditures in welfare-state programs related to work – such as employment protection legislation, unemployment insurance, active labor market policy (ALMP) take-up or spending measures. Finally, with respect to normative, instrumental and enforcement resources, one can imagine conditions that are general and provide capacities to employment-related or other social-rights realization (e.g. democracy) but also more focused resources specific to employment-related realization – such as the strength of labor or workplace representation. While these all represent expectations about which social-citizenship resources, outputs and outcomes are relevant to employment, we have no theoretical priors about the patterns of cross-issue, cross-country and/or over-time variation. The study leaves such issues, hence, as purely empirical questions to address in the next Section 3.




Figure 2.1: Social-rights Resources, Outputs and Outcomes

We do, however, have broad expectations about the interconnections between resources, outputs and outcomes. With respect to such labor-market and work-related social rights realization, the central explanatory expectation is that resources are key to causing or safeguarding social rights realization by virtue of influencing social-rights outputs and social-rights outcomes. Figure 2.1 clarifies graphically the key ways in which we expect such safeguarding to unfold.

2.1 Resources Influencing Outputs

First, resources can be expected to be important determinants of social-rights *outputs* relevant to labor markets and work – captured by arrow “a” in Figure 2.1. This is most obvious with respect to normative resources, where one can expect that legal, regulatory and legislative policy normatively mandating rights to people can be expected to mandate or facilitate the claiming of such rights. For instance, measures of unemployment-policy benefit generosity can be expected to spur a take-up of such policy benefits, translate into actual social policy spending on the policies in question. And more generous normative resources, conceptualized as such, should entail more social-policy spending (measured either as a share of GDP or as a share of unemployed or general population).

In addition to such obvious connections, we also can expect both instrumental and enforcement resources to be important determinants of output measures. For instance, whatever the policy generosity may be (a measure of normative resources), citizens living in settings with democratic governance or with strong labor representation (i.e. strong unions or works councils) can be expected to have more information and administrative and political help in actually knowing about and gaining access to a given social policy provision. And whatever the normative and instrumental resources, having legal provisions, state institutions or individual capacities to monitor and/or enforce individual social policy claims or to punish violations of legal standards can be expected to matter a lot to outputs. For instance, legal standards on (non-)compliance with standards or bureaucratic capacities for labor-standard inspections can be expected to foster more extensive social policy interventions key to labor-related social citizenship.

Furthermore, some resources can be expected to moderate the way other resources influence outputs. For instance, one can expect that more generous normative resources (e.g. higher unemployment replacement rates in unemployment legislation) translate into more substantial actual unemployment-program take up and spending to the extent that citizens have more substantial instrumental and enforcement resources (e.g. more labor representation institutions or bureaucratic/legal enforcement capacities). Figure 2.2 graphically illustrates such causal interaction between resources in influencing outputs. It should be clear, however, that this and all other hypothesized links between resources and outputs are all examples of Figure 2.1’s arrow “a”, where more normative, instrumental or enforcement resources should be associated with more extensive social-rights outputs relevant to labor markets and work.




Figure 2.2: Resources Interact to Shape Outputs (and Outcomes)

2.2 Resources Influencing Outcomes

Second, resources can also be expected to strongly influence actual social-rights outcomes relevant to labor markets and work. The most obvious way this can be expected to be so is *via* – that is, mediated by – the outputs that can in turn be expected to influence outcomes. Such a link is captured in Figure 2.1, of course, by the arrow linking outputs to outcomes (line “b”). For instance, more substantial take up and spending on ALMP policies or on parental-leave programmes should increase employment participation (manifested in higher employment rates) or decrease (long-term) unemployment. To the extent that this is so, any resources that can be expected to spur such social-rights outputs (examples, again, of arrow “a” in Figure 2.1) can also be expected to increase employment participation and decrease unemployment (as it were, “a” + “b” in Figure 2.1). It is also possible, however, that even net of or separate from such mediated effects, resources might influence outcomes in other ways. Normative, instrumental and/or enforcement resources may *directly* affect a given policy output (see Figure 2.1’s arrow “c”), without mediation via outputs. For instance, a normative policy resource can directly inspire citizens to take actions to find suitable work, or impel citizens to demand higher working standards or fuller employment (both outcome measures) whatever happens with the actual formal policy take-up and spending associated with the normative policy resource in question.

More importantly and obviously, perhaps, resources can also be expected to *moderate* the extent to which social-rights outputs spur outcomes relevant to labor markets and work. For instance, one can imagine many ways that instrumental and enforcement resources can enhance the extent to which substantial social-rights outputs spur the relevant social rights outcome. Such would be the case when a worker making use of unemployment insurance benefits or training programmes also feels empowered to look for a job with the financial and cognitive cushion and sense of safety to search that such output provisions confer. This moderating effect is graphically captured by arrow “d” in our first Figure 2.1 above.




Figure 2.3: Resources Moderate how Different Outcomes Affect One Another

Finally, one can also expect resources to potentially moderate the ways in which some outcomes are related to others. For instance, one can expect resources that confer employment protections to workers – for instance protections for regular-contract workers or distinct protections for part-time and temporary contract workers – can moderate how employment participation (employment rates or temporary-work or part-time work contracts) might lower poverty levels. This dynamic is graphically summarized in Figure 2.3 above. All of these expected links between resources and outcomes, here, are in the direction of our hypothesis that more substantial resources should yield more positive social-rights outcomes (flourishing) and less or fewer negative social-rights outcomes (suffering/languishing) with respect to labor markets and work.

2.3 General and Labor-market-specific Hypotheses

A general hypothesis unites all the specific expectations sketched above: We expect that, *ceteris paribus*, the more or higher the normative, instrumental and/or enforcement resources in place for a given individual, group or country, the more or higher that individual, group or country should develop pro-social-rights outputs and pro-social-rights outcomes. This is a generic expectation that applies to all aspects of social citizenship – also beyond the labor-market focus of this paper. And it applies to generic features of normative, instrumental and enforcement resources – that is, such resources that confer broadly applicable capacities to claim or realize social rights generally, not just with respect to employment.

However, we also have a second, perhaps obvious hypothesis that normative, instrumental and enforcement resources closely tied to the issues of labor markets and work ought to be particularly

important in spurring pro-social-rights outputs and pro-social-rights outcomes with respect to labor markets and work. For instance, we may expect general democratic governance to constitute an instrumental resource that might spur the take-up and development of work-related social policy spending and improve the material outcomes, the flourishing, of people in labor markets. But we expect instrumental resources closer to the political and social contestation and agency of workers in labor markets and workplaces to be more important in spurring such take-up and development. The same can be said of the issue-focused measures of normative and enforcement resources.

Before turning to the empirical exploration of these hypotheses, it is important to note that the simple resource-based framework summarized here says nothing about the *origins* of resources. The focus is exclusively on the *consequences*, or causal implications, of social-rights resources for outputs and outcomes. This is important not least because so much research into social citizenship has focused in fact on such origins – for instance, to understand why some countries or groups develop more generous social policy benefits, regulations and legal systems compared to others. These are of course crucial questions to the development of social citizenship. Indeed, a full conception of social citizenship requires exploration of such roots of resources. And our own focus on how resources influence outputs and outcomes could, and as a broader research agenda should, also consider how there is feed-back and causation in the other direction – where outputs and outcomes influence rather than just reflect resources. However, for the present project and paper we bracket such issues, and focus our research designs on empirically isolating how resources influence outputs and outcomes in matters of labor markets and work.

3. Resources, Outputs, and Outcomes of Employment-related Social Rights

This study’s empirical exploration of employment-related social rights begins with an empirical survey of key, systematic measures of employment-related resources, outputs and outcomes in the national settings in Europe and other industrialized democracies since 1960. The data on which we focus are “macro-level” country-year metrics of resources, outputs and outcomes relevant to employment-related social rights, drawn from the Comparative Social Citizenship Database (CSCD). This database focuses on the country-year level of analysis as opposed to broader (e.g. Europe-wide) or more fine-grained (e.g. individual-, regional- or group-level) units of analysis. And the data measures on which we focus are objective-material conditions with respect to socio-economic position, policies, regulations, laws and institutional-organizational conditions, as opposed to ideational standards (i.e. based on aggregating public opinion patterns on, for instance, normative commitments or beliefs). The latter are also important, but these get airing in other reports (e.g. Eick et al. 2021b)

	Obs. (cnty-yr)	Mean	S.D.	Min.	Max.
Outcomes					
Unemployment rate (% labor force)	5,641	7.51	5.99	0	37.94
Employment rate (% labor force)	1,588	65.54	7.89	41.51	86.27
Part-time work (% total employment)	1,510	27.94	11.93	0.14	96.31
Temporary work (% total employment)	1,029	11.68	6.73	1	35
Long-term unemployment rate (% unemp.)	1,321	34.88	19.33	0.22	89.40
Risk of poverty rate	356	16.22	3.90	7.90	26.40
Outputs					
UI/ALMP total spending (% GDP)	1,043	1.46	1.13	0	6.15
UI: unempl. Compensation (% GDP)	1,087	0.86	0.78	0	4.54
UI: early-retirement (% GDP)	602	0.14	0.19	0	1.14
UI total (% GDP)	1,043	0.96	0.85	0	4.64
ALMP: training (% GDP)	1,024	0.16	0.17	0	0.93
ALMP: PES and admin. (% GDP)	1,015	0.12	0.09	0	0.49
ALMP total (% GDP)	1,007	0.52	0.45	0	2.71
Family assistance total (% GDP)	1,078	1.86	1.02	0	4.45
Family: early childhood educ.&care (% GDP)	1,057	0.45	0.42	0	1.91
Family: Family allowance (% GDP)	1,095	0.83	0.54	0	2.77
Family: Home help (% GDP)	698	0.11	0.14	0	0.65
Family: Maternity/paternity leave (% GDP)	1,028	0.28	0.27	0	1.64
UI take-up estimate	408	0.61	0.46	0.01	2.33
Resources					
<i>Normative resources</i>					
Generosity of unemployment assistance	1,013	8.70	3.49	0	14.27
Maternal/parent leave generosity	1,382	3.00	1.38	0	5.12
Empl Protect. Legisl. (for temp./part-time)	724	1.75	1.31	0.25	5.25
<i>Instrumental resources</i>					
Democracy (Freed.House/Polity)	8,197	5.78	3.44	0	10
Informational Transparency	5,343	49.70	16.56	2	88
Right to strike	2,862	1.68	0.86	0	3.50
Labor power index (union dens.&coll.barg.)	2,109	-0.05	0.93	-2.13	2.96
Worker Rights (CIRI right to strike/bargain)	6,593	0.91	0.66	0	2
Gender empowerment index	8,805	0.62	0.23	0.06	0.98
<i>Enforcement resources</i>					
Judicial non-corruption	8,911	2.31	0.84	0.46	3.86
Confidence in police	323	2.60	0.36	1.79	3.71
Labor inspection index	214	-0.01	0.81	-0.98	3.71

With respect to these particular material-objective and country-year data, this paper focuses on the most obvious and important measures of employment-related resources, outputs and outcomes.

These are summarized in Table 3.1 (see above). Some of these measures are relevant to social rights beyond the employment and labor market realms (e.g. democracy or judicial non-corruption) while others are more focused on such realms of social rights (e.g. labor inspection measures and labor power indices). The list of measures on which this paper focuses, of course, are only a subset of measures that matter to employment-related social rights and that are gathered in the CSCD (and elsewhere). For instance, while we focus here on employment-related outcomes like employment and unemployment rates, we ignore here other measures that certainly are important to employment-related flourishing – such as working hours, labor standards and workplace safety conditions. We are selective here in ways that we shall discuss in each subsection describing outcomes, outputs and resources, but in all cases are choices are driven by keeping the analysis tractable while focusing on key developments.

Our descriptive overview of the (selective) measures considers key patterns of cross-national and over-time variation in the measures – to leverage descriptive inferences as to *where* and *when* we see the most or least developed employment-related resources, outputs and outcomes relevant to labor markets and work. Our overview also considers how different measures within a given category of resources, outputs or outcomes relate to one another – for instance, how normative resources relate to instrumental and enforcement resources. We focus first on outcomes and move to outputs and then to resources – as it were, moving causally upstream to the hypothesized interconnections we shall study in Section 4. This ordering allows us to move from the most to the least familiar manifestations of social rights realization.

3.1 Measuring Employment-related Outcomes

To gauge the state of affairs with respect to employment-related social-rights outcomes we focus on country-year and material-based employment rates, unemployment rates, long-term unemployment rates, temporary employment rates, part-time employment rates, and risk of poverty. All but the last are explicit measures of the character and extent of employment status in a country's population, while poverty is key measure of material wellbeing orthogonal to such work status. And while all of these conditions might be related to one another in important ways they are all conceptually distinct. These selective measures obviously don't fully capture employment-related flourishing (or languishing), what can also be functions of conditions within a given category of employment – from working hours to workplace safety, let alone more subjective, ideational measures such as worker satisfaction in work. However, these are key material-based aggregate indices very familiar to scholars and policymakers studying social rights in Europe.

The cross-country patterns are summarized in Figure 3.1, showing the values for European Union member states in 2018 (or the latest year). The four panels ((a) through (d)) display such values in pairings of measures that are commonly related to one another conceptually. First, panel (a) shows the strong negative association between employment rates and unemployment rates, though that association is far from tight, reminding us that they pick up different aspects of labor market performance – most obviously where unemployment rates focus on those looking for work, not all those without work. The familiar empirical pattern, in any event, shows the Northern European

polities tending to have higher employment rates and lower unemployment rates than do the Western and certainly Southern European countries. But we see important outliers, such as Sweden having higher employment rates than one might predict based on the unemployment rate, and Italy having lower employment than its relatively modest open unemployment rate would predict.




Figure 3.1: OUTCOMES: Employment, Unemployment, Long-term unemployment, Temporary and Part-time Employment, and Risk-of-Poverty, 2018

Sources: CSD Database

Second, Figure 3.1’s panel b provides a snapshot of the most common faces of non-standard work contracts – rates of temporary work and of part-time work. And there we see (even) weaker association. The countries with the most frequent temporary work may also be those with the most part-time work, where Northern European member states tend to have more such non-standard work shares while Central and East European countries (CEEC) tend to have much less. But again, there are plenty of outliers reminding us that not all non-standard working patterns hang together – such as Southern European member states exhibiting more temporary than part-time work and the UK exhibiting more part-time than temporary work.

Third, while long-term unemployment rates and total unemployment rates as shares of the labor force are quite tightly correlated (not shown), panel (c) of Figure 3.1 summarizes how long-term unemployment % of the unemployed does not hang tightly together with unemployment rates (as a

% labor force). The relationship is again only weakly positive with some clear outliers (e.g. Spain's lower long-term unemployment than its relatively high general unemployment rate would suggest).

Finally, Figure 3.1's last panel d captures how the most obvious aggregate measure of employment-related suffering – unemployment rate – correlates only weakly with an encompassing measure of income-related suffering: risk of poverty rate (percentage of the population earning no more than 60% of median equivalised income after social transfers). All these patterns show that each measure of flourishing or languishing should be studied as conceptually and empirically distinct – rather than as proxies of general employment wellbeing or suffering.




Figure 3.2: Key Trends in Employment-related OUTCOMES
Sources: CSDC Database

With respect to our two measures of non-standard employment rates – part-time work (lower-left panel) and temporary work (lower-right panel in Figure 3.2) – the pattern is a clear trend of increasing non-standard work – a pattern unbroken by the global financial/debt crisis. But the cross-regional story in such trends are different for part-time than for temporary work, particularly in recent years: Most obviously, Southern polities have experienced the lowish levels of part-time work rates but the highest temporary work rates; and the Anglo countries have experienced the highest part-time rates and lowest temporary work rates.

These and other employment-related outcomes are often related to one another causally. For instance, a nation-state’s employment rate, (long term) unemployment rates, and nonstandard work contracts all have important implications for an individual’s and his/her family’s income, spurring chances of individual, family, and child poverty. Of course, the opposite causal direction is also possible, at least in longer-term relationships – as households in poverty likely have implications for schooling and working time and health that affect (temporary, part-time, full-time) employment. While such patterns are most directly manifested in individual-level data, they should also show up in the aggregate country-year data on which we are focusing here. Consider two examples, one within the employment realm and one between labor-market and other outcomes.

Figure 3.3 summarizes how temporary and part-time employment relate to long-term unemployment – something relevant to debate on whether nonstandard contracts, whatever their origins, might be conducive to labor market participation. The simple bivariate correlations suggest that such a connection is statistically meaningful for both measures of non-standard participation but more strongly negative for part-time work patterns (see the higher R-square in the right-hand panel). Supplemental analysis corroborates these patterns in a fuller regression context, with a range of substantive controls and country fixed effects (see Appendix Table A3.1).




Figure 3.3: How Temporary and Part-time Employment relate to Long-term Unemployment
Source: CSCD Database; Appendix Table A3.1

Figure 3.4., finally, shows how our key measures of aggregate employment patterns relate to the at-risk of poverty measure (i.e. % with incomes under 60% of national median) often discussed in European public policy and economic discussion. The employment-related outcomes are intrinsically important to flourishing, but they can also matter substantially to causally downstream income

patterns like such relative poverty rates. We see hints, for instance, that rates of non-standard contracts capture economic potential and activity that might lower at-risk-of-poverty rates – particularly part-time employment rates (R-square of .37) (Patterns are the same for other measures of poverty, such as simple relative poverty rates or poverty gap measures). Equally important are the descriptive patterns in Figure 3.4 supporting the strong expectations (backed by a lot of inferential research) that more labor-market participation ought to generate more income and fewer people/households without labor-market income. In our simple bivariate correlations we see that this appears particularly to hold for part-time employment rates and at-risk-of-poverty (R-square of .25 in the lowest left panel). Again, these patterns hold up to fuller regression analyses of these relationships, with substantive controls (see Appendix Table A3.2).




Figure 3.4: How Employment-related Outcomes relate to Risk of Poverty

Sources: CSD Database; Appendix Table A3.2

3.2 Measuring Employment-related Outputs

Employment-related social-rights outputs are measures of actually-used or implemented policy, regulatory, legal or other efforts to provide social rights relevant to employment. At the national level, the most relevant are policy provisions are patterns of use with respect to explicit programmes to help workers, including policies fostering and securing employment, and assisting those facing unemployment, or improving the conditions and terms of workers within employment. We focus on output measures of *Unemployment insurance (UI)* and *active labor market policies (ALMP)* – the former involving insurance transfers and income supplements to the unemployed, and the latter involving training, relocation, and other services to promote employment. We also focus on policies addressing needs that indirectly promote labor-market participation by helping parents combine work with family – particularly *early childhood education and care (ECEC)* and *maternity/paternity and parental leave*. Our measures of these policies as social-rights outputs are not “mere” commitments to benefits – normative resources to which we move momentarily – but measures reflecting actual claiming, use and implementation of such benefits. Such policy outputs can be measured in many ways that take into account actual payouts and program participation – such as spending as a share of GDP or per head in the (target or general) population. We focus most on the former (spending as % GDP), the most salient metrics of policy outputs, keeping in mind that such measures pick up macroeconomic developments that swing free of normative commitments to social rights.




Figure 3.5 summarizes such UI/ALMP and ECEC/Parental-leave outputs for EU member states, based on averages for 2012-2017 (to smooth out the varying data coverage across sample country-years). The upper-left panel considers country outputs with respect to UI as opposed to ALMP spending. The upper-right panel considers ECEC as opposed to parental leave spending. And the lower panel considers the explicitly unemployment-related outputs (UI and ALMP) as opposed to the work-with-family outputs (ECEC and Parental leave). In all these portraits, such outputs are not closely correlated with one another. They are, as it were, conceptually and empirically distinct measures of social-rights outputs relevant to employment. As for the substantive comparison of EU member states, we do see a familiar pattern where outputs tend to be higher for Northern European polities and lowest for Southern and Anglo polities. But the outliers belie such simple categorization, with Spain and Ireland showing more substantial UI/ALMP commitment than one might expect.

Figure 3.6 shows snapshots of key over-time trends with respect to these output measures. The upper two panels show the trends in EU averages across the policy measures, revealing important differences. There's a secular decline in spending on unemployment assistance, except for a temporary spike with the onset of the financial and Euro crisis. This pattern is more pronounced for passive, transfer-oriented assistance of unemployment insurance (UI) than for ALMP. With respect to work-family policies, the programs most closely related to employment – the ECEC and leave provisions – remain only about a half of the total for family spending (the largest share being transfer-based family transfers). But the share has increased and overall leave and (particularly) ECEC spending has risen substantially since the 1980s. The lower two panels of Figure 3.6 show the patterns across EU regions with respect to UI/ALMP (lower-left panel) and ECEC/Parental-leave (lower-right panel). The pattern shows that for UI/ALMP (not so much for the family-policy provisions) there has been some meaningful program-output convergence between regions of the EU, by these measures.




Figure 3.6: Trends in UI/ALMP spending and ECEC/Mat.Pat.Leave spending (%GDP)

Source: CSCD Database

These key spending measures of outputs partly reflect take-up a given social-policy benefit, but measuring take-up directly is a key measure of social-rights outputs. Such take-up gauges the share of those eligible for a given social provision who actually make use of that provision. This gauging is hard to do, however, particularly at the country-level, due to the paucity of data on actual recipients/beneficiaries and target populations comparable over time and between countries. Recent OECD and EU data provide bases to generate “pseudo” coverage rates, focused on people receiving unemployment insurance and assistance benefits (mostly categorized as UI and a few as ALMP) as a share of “unemployed” (based on ILO definitions) (OECD 2021). These are “pseudo” take up measures, where the shares can exceed 100% because some measured recipients may not be registered as unemployed (and of course some “unemployed” may not be eligible for benefits). For instance, as the OECD reporting notes, “EU LFS data suggests that in 2012 about 23% of recipients of unemployment benefits were working, and 40% were jobless but not ILO unemployed. That is, a substantial part of UB recipient counts include individuals who are not actively looking for a job” (OECD 2021). Nonetheless, these measures capture take up that usefully supplement and can be compared to our spending-based measures of UI/ALMP outputs.




Figure 3.7: Regional trends in Estimated Take-up of UI/ALMP programmes

Source: CSCD Database

Figure 3.7 above shows the patterns of such take-up that we construe as “UI/ALMP Take up” since they involve some aspects of ALMP assistance beyond unemployment insurance. The patterns over time are important. First, we see that even this quite generous measure of participation rates (or take-up) is stable at around 60% of the target unemployed population – a quite modest share. This can reflect the great many obstacles to actually gaining access to programs – precisely why this report and broader project is focused on resources relevant to actual realization of social rights. Second, the regional differences are quite substantial and also stable over the modest 10-year period for which we have data: the take-up rates tend to be substantially higher for the West, North and Anglo EU member states than for the South and East regions. This is a familiar skew in social policy, of course, but it shows another face of how regional differences might be functions of resource conditions.

Before turning to such issues, we should note that there are institutional affinities, synergies and in any event interconnections among our various measures of employment-related outputs. We have already seen the modest such interconnections between our spending measures. But we can also consider possible correlation between our spending measures and our take up measures. Figure 3.8 considers such correlation, based on regression analyses of how our UI/ALMP Take-up measure might correlate with spending measures for UI/ALMP and their component subprograms of spending. The left-hand panel of Figure 3.8 displays the bivariate relationship between UI/ALMP take-up and spending, where we see the statistically and substantively significant positive relationship (R-square of .31). And the right-hand panel shows how such a positive relationship holds up to fuller analysis (with controls for trade openness, democracy, left government, unemployment rates, dependent population share, and EU membership) (See Appendix Table A3.3 for full results). The association is strongest for UI compensation, less for early-retirement programs and ALMP training programs (though there it's still a loosely positive correlation) – not surprising since most of the program participation counted are in the UI category. The strongest relationship, however, is the most encompassing – with UI plus ALMP program spending.




Figure 3.8: UI/ALMP spending and Estimated Take-up of UI/ALMP programmes

Source: CSCD Database; Appendix Table A3.3.

3.3 Measuring Employment-related Resources

Most important for our framework of social rights are the resources that foster the aforementioned social rights outputs and ultimately social rights outcomes. The three broad conceptual categories of resources on which we focus – normative, instrumental, and enforcement resources – each have a particular and complementary relevance to the realization of employment-related social citizenship. Using the aggregate country-year CSCD database, we can identify key measures that allow comparison across countries and time in normative, instrumental and enforcement resources. The measures represent work in progress, in that the many conceptual aspects of such resources are often hard to measure systematically. We have, however, identified manifestations of such resources that we regard as likely very relevant to employment and work – both resources relevant to social rights issues in general (including labor markets and work) and resources particularly, distinctly relevant to such labor markets and work. We expect all of these measures to be relevant, in particular, to the measures of employment-related outputs and outcomes discussed above.

Figure 3.9 provides descriptive overview of three key macro-level measures of employment-related *normative resources*. The first is the measure *generosity of unemployment assistance*, from the Comparative Welfare Entitlements Database (CWED). It is a composite of the generosity of unemployment programs, particularly relevant to UI but also ALMP, that combines information about replacement rates, eligibility criteria, waiting periods, duration and other features of welfare entitlements (Scruggs et al. 2017). This is a normative resource relevant to our UI/ALMP measures of unemployment program spending. The second normative resource is the *generosity of parental leave*, drawn from OECD data on the average length (in weeks) of maternity leave, parental leave and paid father-specific leave (OECD 2020b; cf. Nelson et al. 2020). This is a normative resource crucial to *parental leave* and a possible proxy for spending programmes and regulations associated with ECEC/Parental-leave generally. The third normative measure is *Employment Protection Legislation* (EPL), a composite of employment regulations relevant to protecting employment contracts for regular or temporary workers (we focus on EPL for temporary workers in our baseline presentation).




Figure 3.9: Selected Labour-market NORMATIVE RESOURCES (generosity measures, sample averages)

Sources: CSCD Database

The variation across countries and time in these measures is substantial and different across these three measures, as is clear from both panels of Figure 3.9. The left-hand panel, focused on the full sample means (1970-2012), shows how *generosity of unemployment assistance* shows cross-national variation in line with well-known North/West versus South/Anglo distinctions on UI and ALMP policymaking. And the *EPL* provisions show the converse but familiar skews – where South countries tend to have stronger employment protection than the North and West European member states. The variation with respect to *generosity of parental leave* is quite different, where countries like the Netherlands known for relatively generous UI/ALMP benefits commits to little in the way of paid parental leave. In any event, the *generosity of parental leave* normative resource is also available for CEEC countries and shows these to have the most generous commitments among EU regions. The right-hand panel, focused on the over-time trends, shows substantial increases between the 1970s and 1990s in the *generosity of unemployment assistance* and in *generosity of parental leave*, followed by a shift thereafter: for *unemployment assistance* there’s a stall and more recent reversal in such increases, and for *parental leave* there’s a stall until the post-2008 spike in average generosity. The story with respect to *EPL* is roughly the opposite, a significant secular decline in generosity of restrictions that gets halted in the mid-2000s and is followed post-2008 by a significant spike in restrictiveness of *EPL*.

Figure 3.10 provides an overview of selected macro-level instrumental resources relevant to employment-related social citizenship. These are all socio-political and institutional features of people living in a country that confer capacities on these people to demand and act-on or claim access to social rights – particularly to normative resources in the form of policy benefits, regulations, legal standards and legislation that shape employment access and quality. We focus on six such resources. The first two are the most generally or broadly relevant to rights realization broadly, including but beyond the employment realm and relevant to not only rights-claiming resources but many other capacities in policy-making: *democracy*, based on the Freedom House/Polity composite of quality of democratic representation and rule of law (Freedom House 2019); and *informational transparency*, the index on extent of free and independent media, budgetary transparency, and political constraints in governments (Williams 2015). The next three instrumental resources are more focused on rights in the employment realm: *Right-to-strike*, is a composite of legal-regulatory rights to strike for government and for market settings (based on Visser 2019); *labor-power index*, is a composite of labor representation and centralized wage bargaining (based on Visser 2019); and *labor rights*, a coding of worker rights of association and collective bargaining in workplaces (based on Cingranelli, Richards and Clay 2014). A final instrumental-resource metric is *gender empowerment*, a composite of measures manifesting political and economic representation of women (Coppedge et al. 2020). These measures are of course a mere fraction of conditions conferring instrumental resources on individuals in European and other polities, but they capture salient and theoretically relevant ones for the process of social-rights realization – importantly, a rights-claiming process that is distinct from, above-and-beyond any role the resource measures might also play in fostering political influence and policymaking. All these measures capture conditions that can be expected to give people footholds in various ways to learn about and claim social rights.




Figure 3.10: Selected labor-market INSTRUMENTAL RESOURCES (sample averages)

Sources: CSD Database

The left-hand panel of Figure 3.10 summarizes the cross-country variation in the country averages for the EU countries and years. The measures are positively correlated with one another (except *labor power* being negatively correlated with *informational transparency*), with East and South member states exhibiting lower instrumental resources than the North and West EU countries. As for the over-time variation, the right-hand panel summarizes how most measures exhibit increases in instrumental

resources, but two of three labor-focused measures – *labor power* and *worker rights* – show considerable decline in the sample periods.

Figure 3.11, finally, summarizes three country-year measures of enforcement resources. Such resources are more difficult to analyze since there are fewer systematic measures relevant to such enforcement – above-and-beyond the indirect relevance of aforementioned instrumental resources. Nonetheless, we focus on three measures that, while surely partial in their conceptual coverage, do capture different institutional realms of such functions: *judicial non-corruption*, based on the expert-coding of non-corruption of decisions handed down in a country’s judicial system (Coppedge et al. 2020); *confidence in police*, a survey-based country average (the only one used in this paper) from the World Values Survey/European Values Survey (WVS/EVS) of respondent confidence in one’s country’s police (World Values Survey Association 2015); and *labor inspections*, a composite of the number of labor inspections per 10,000 workers and inspections of workplaces per year (ILO 2020). These measures capture enforcement capacities for, respectively, the broad judicial system, policing, and labor standards – all relevant to employment-related social rights. The empirical patterns across countries (Figure 3.11’s left-hand panel) suggest familiar skews in judicial non-corruption and confidence in the police – to conditions close to familiar notions of state capacity. But the patterns show variation without any familiar regional skew (e.g. high for Germany, Spain and Romania, but modest for France and Sweden). The over-time trends (right-hand panel), meanwhile, show increasing enforcement with respect to judicial and police enforcement, but declining labor-inspection capacity.




Figure 3.11: Selected Labor-market ENFORCEMENT RESOURCES (sample averages)
 Source: CDCD Database

While this paper hasn’t the space to explore the origins of these and other normative, instrumental and enforcement resources, one can expect the different resources to be mutually reinforcing. In particular, normative resources can be expected to be spurred by many instrumental and enforcement resources, because these latter shape political capacities of citizens to claim legislated/legal/regulatory-policy commitment that our selected normative resources manifest. To explore such a possibility systematically, consider simple regression analysis of how key measures of instrumental and enforcement resources correlate with three normative resource measures – UI/ALMP benefit generosity, Parental leave generosity, and EPL. The models we considered take each normative resource, respectively, as dependent variables and then considers each respective

instrumental and enforcement resource as explanatory variables of interest, also controlling for age-dependency, left government, unemployment rate, trade openness. We do so in separate models (given varying sample size for each instrumental or enforcement resource), and where there are sufficient degrees of freedom and over-time variation in the samples we also consider country fixed effects.




Figure 3.12: How NORMATIVE RESOURCES reflect INSTRUMENTAL and ENFORCEMENT RESOURCES
Sources: CSCD Database; Appendix Tables A3.4a-A3.4c.

The results of the models are summarized in Figure 3.12 (above, based on regressions detailed in Appendix Tables A3.4a-A3.4c). Each panel corresponds to a different normative resource of interest, and each row gives the predicted effect for each instrumental or enforcement resource of interest is given by the symbols (with 95% confidence intervals), net of all controls (see Appendix Tables A3.4a-A3.4c for controls and model details). With respect to the generosity of UI/ALMP, the only statistically significant predictors are positive, as expected, and for two instrumental resources (*democracy* and *labor power*) and on enforcement resource (*labor inspections*) that are particularly relevant of course to unemployment-related policies, regulations or other normative resources. With respect to *generosity of parental leave*, the only significant predictors are *informational transparency* and *gender empowerment* – with the latter an obviously relevant resource related to women’s clear interest in policies combining work with family. With respect to *Employment Protection Legislation (temp)*, the pattern is the opposite: *informational transparency* and *gender empowerment* tend to predict lower or reduced EPL provisions. Without attempting a fuller analysis of the meaning of such relationships and origins of normative resources, the main point is the selected country-year measures reveal only partial support for the idea that instrumental and enforcement resources spur normative resources relevant to employment and work. But with respect to the unemployment/ALMP realm, key resources do appear to be important as explanatory correlates. And combined with the descriptive information in Figures 3.9-3.11, we see that somewhat declining commitments to recent UI/ALMP policy generosity (as key normative resource) might indeed reflect declining distinctly labor-related instrumental and enforcement resources. This may support our resource-based perspective, but it does not paint a rosy picture for Europe’s employment-related social citizenship.

4. How Resources Shape Outputs and Outcomes


We now have the basis to take on the key analytical-empirical question for this paper: How do our measures of employment-related normative, instrumental and enforcement resources affect or at least have associations with our measures of employment-related outputs and outcomes? To answer this question, we fit regression models based on our country-year data. This allows us, in particular, to explore our expected answer that our measures of resources ought to spur our measures of outputs and outcomes and that the more labor-focused faces of resources ought to be particularly relevant to the labor-focused output and outcome measures. In line with our discussion in Section 2 above, our analytical focus is not only on direct relationships between resources on the one hand and outputs and outcomes on the other, but also indirect and moderated relationships – for instance, how resources might influence outcomes via outputs and how resources might moderate the ways that outputs affect outcomes. In the main text we shall discuss the relationships using graphical representation of the statistical results – relegating fuller statistical presentation to Appendix tables.

4.1 Do Resources Affect Outputs?

We first estimate how our various resource measures affect or are associated with our key measures of employment-related outputs: *UI/ALMP spending* and *ECEC/Parental-leave spending* measures, and our *UI/ALMP Take-up* measure. We focus first on the relationships between normative resources and spending outputs. Figure 4.1 provides a simple descriptive-statistic snapshot of the association between our two normative resource measures and their counterparts with respect to spending-based outputs.¹ This yields the positive patterns one would expect. The left-hand panel shows the bivariate positive relationship between *generosity of unemployment assistance* on the horizontal axis and *UI/ALMP spending (%GDP)* on the vertical axis, and the right-hand panel shows the somewhat weaker positive association between *generosity of parental leave* (horizontal axis) and *ECEC/parental-leave spending* (vertical axis). The bivariate patterns are similar if we focus on how generosity of unemployment assistance affects sub-categories of the spending counterparts (e.g. just unemployment insurance instead of UI/ALMP, or just parental leave instead of ECEC/Parental-leave). We show these simple patterns to give an idea of the association and of where EU member states fall in such association.

¹ Recall that Employment Protection Legislation has no spending-based counterpart in our country-year dataset.

a. Unemployment Assistance



b. Family ECEC and Matern./Parent. leave




Figure 4.1: Normative Resources (generosity of benefits) and Spending-based Outputs (counterpart program spending)

Sources: CSCD Database

A more rigorous test of the association between employment-related normative resources and spending outputs is summarized in Figure 4.2. The left-hand panel captures the effects of unemployment-related *generosity of unemployment assistance* on measures of unemployment-related spending, and the right-hand panel captures the effects of family-related *generosity of parental leave* on distinct measures of family-related employment policy spending. Each row summarizes the key result of a distinct dependent variable – seven aspects of unemployment-related spending programs (left-hand panel) and six aspects of family-related employment programs (right-hand panel). The Figure includes, hence, the results and confidence intervals for *generosity of unemployment assistance* (left-hand panel) and for *generosity of parental leave* (right-hand panel), leaving full results of models and their controls and country fixed effects to Appendix Tables A4.1 and A4.2, respectively. With respect to unemployment-related normative resources and spending outputs (left-hand panel), *generosity of unemployment assistance* is particularly positively associated with UI provisions, less so with ALMP-related provisions (though these also are positive coefficients). The strongest effect at the margin is *generosity of unemployment assistance* on the fullest combined *UI/ALMP spending*. With respect to family-related employment policies (right-hand panel), we see that *generosity of parental leave* provisions is significantly associated with particularly ECEC and (not surprisingly) parental-leave components of spending, and most strongly with the composites (including *ECEC/Parental-leave* spending). These provide significant support for our simplest of expectations, that normative resource measures should spur spending-based output measures with respect to both unemployment-related and family-employment-related social citizenship.




Figure 4.2: How Normative Resources Affect Outputs for Unemployment and family policy
 Sources: CSCD Database; Appendix Table A4.1 and Appendix Table A4.2.

Figure 4.3 summarizes the results for how our measures of employment-related instrumental and enforcement resources are associated with the same spending-based output measures. To keep the presentation digestible, we focus on the two main spending outcomes of interest: *UI/ALMP spending* (left-hand panel) and *ECEC/Parental-leave spending* (right-hand panel). Here, each row shows the results of separate regressions for each of the six instrumental resource measures or three enforcement resource measures discussed above (note that this is the opposite of the previous Figure, where each row denoted a distinct dependent variable). Figure 4.3 displays only the coefficients and confidence intervals for each respective instrumental or enforcement resource measure, leaving the full results again to appendices (Appendix Table A4.3 and A4.4). From the left-hand panel, we see that two of the six instrumental resources (worker rights, labor power) and all three enforcement resources (judicial non-corruption, confidence-in-police, and labor inspections) are significantly positive predictors of *UI/ALMP spending*. And all except *gender empowerment* are positively-signed. From the right-hand panel, we see that instrumental and enforcement resources are less substantively or significantly significant predictors of *ECEC/Parental-leave spending*: only *right-to-strike* and *judicial non-corruption* are statistically significant. On the whole, however, instrumental and enforcement resources – particularly those relevant to labor matters – are positively associated with spending-based outputs.




Figure 4.3: How Instrumental and Enforcement Resources affect Spending-based Outputs
 Sources: CSCD Database; Appendix Table A4.3 and Appendix Table A4.4

Recall from our discussion of a resource-based conception of social citizenship that we can also expect resource measures to interact with one another in their implications for outcomes – particularly where normative resources might be expected to spur spending-based measures to the extent that instrumental and enforcement resources give citizens footholds/capacities to claim benefits. We analyzed these possibilities. Figure 4.4 - 4.6 summarizes the results of such analysis.




Figure 4.4: How Instrumental and Enforcement Resources Moderate How UI/ALMP-related Normative Resource Affects Spending Output

Sources: CSD Database; Appendix Table A4.3 and Appendix Table A4.4

Figure 4.4 graphically displays the key results for *UI/ALMP spending*, focusing on how our normative resource measure (*generosity of unemployment assistance*) has implications for *UI/ALMP spending* that are conditional upon – that is, moderated by – instrumental and enforcement resources. We show only the results for examples where such moderation is statistically significant. That turns out to be the case for three of our macro-level instrumental resource measures (*informational transparency*, *labor power*, and *gender empowerment*) and one of our enforcement measures (*judicial non-corruption*). Based on models summarized in Appendix Table A4.5, the Figure displays how the effect of *generosity of unemployment assistance* (the marginal effect values given on the vertical axis) becomes more positive (that is, more strongly spurs actual spending outputs with respect to UI and ALMP) with higher/stronger instrumental and enforcement resources (values given on the horizontal axis). When the line *and* the confidence intervals are above the “0” line, the models suggest that the normative resource is statistically significant in spurring spending-related output.² Hence, throughout the sample variation in *information transparency*, the upper-left panel shows how *generosity of unemployment assistance* is associated with higher *UI/ALMP spending*. For the other panels, however,

² When the marginal-plot Figures’ schedule-lines *and* confidence interval-lines are below the 0-line, the marginal effect of generosity on spending is negative (more generosity predicts lower spending). And when confidence intervals are fully above or both below the zero-line, then the marginal effect is statistically insignificant.

such an association between the normative resource and spending-based output is statistically significant only for higher values of the key instrumental and enforcement measures: the upper-right panel shows that the link is statistically significant only when *labor power* is (roughly) above the sample mean; the lower-left panel captures how the link is statistically significant only when *gender empowerment* is above roughly the 15% percentile of its sample; and the lower-right panel shows that the link is significant only when *juridical non-corruption* is above about the 10th percentile.

Figure 4.5 clarifies the substantive meaning of these kinds of moderated effects, focusing on the results of how *labor power* tends to positively condition the effects of *generosity of unemployment assistance* on *UI/ALMP spending*.³ We can see that in country-years characterized by low levels of *labor power* – that is, low union density and centralized wage bargaining representation (taking “low” to mean the 10th percentile in the sample’s variation in *labor power*) – *generosity of unemployment assistance* does not significantly influence *UI/ALMP spending* one way or the other. But country-years characterized by high levels of such *labor power* (i.e. the 90th percentile in the sample distribution of *labor power*) tend to be places where higher *generosity of unemployment assistance* significantly positively spurs *UI/ALMP spending*. At such levels, the positive relationship is very strong, also substantively, with the full variation in *generosity* predicting an increase in *UI/ALMP spending* from 0% to 4% GDP (thinking in terms of the quite modest levels of such spending, that’s helping predict a move from the 1st percentile to the 96th percentile in *UI/ALMP spending*).




Figure 4.5: How Generosity Predicts UI/ALMP Spending at Low and High Labor Power

Sources: CSCD Database; Appendix Table A4.5

Figure 4.6 graphically displays the story of how *labor power* also positively moderates the modelled effect of *generosity of parental leave* on *ECEC/Parental-leave spending*. This moderation turns out to be the only statistically significant one in the full models (see fuller presentation in Appendix Table A4.6). The left-hand panel shows the results of how the *generosity* measure becomes statistically significant in spurring the spending-based output measure only when *labor power* is above the 19th percentile of its sample variation. And the right-hand panel shows how *generosity* indeed is not significant in its effect on *ECEC/ Parental-leave spending* when *labor power* is at the 10th percentile, but that it predicts a substantial increase in such spending when *labor power* is at the 90th percentile.

³ This is counterfactual modeling based on the relevant result (column 4) in Appendix Table A4.5.

In particular, should country-years be characterized by such high *labor power*, the full sample variation in *generosity* predicts an increase in *ECEC/Parental-leave spending* from 0% to about 1.25% of GDP) when *labor power* is at the 90th percentile (this being like moving from the lowest percentile to the 81st percentile in the variation of *ECEC/Parental-leave spending*).⁴




Figure 4.6: Labor-power Instrumental Resource Moderating How Normative Resources Affect Outputs

Sources: CSCD Database; Appendix Table A4.6.

A final aspect of our analysis of how resources affect outputs considers not the resource roots of spending-based outputs but how resources affect the one explicit measure of take-up that we have in our dataset: *UI/ALMP Take-up*. Our expectation remains that we expect our resource measures to spur such take-up, as an intermediate link underlying the positive relationships between resources and spending-based outputs. Figure 4.7 begins with a descriptive snapshot of the bivariate associations between selected normative, instrumental and enforcement resources on the one hand and *UI/ALMP Take-up* on the other. This provides information on the EU member-state positioning but also gives a first hint that the expected positive relationship is likely to hold tone. The strongest positive association is between the instrumental resource of *labor power* index (union density and collective wage coordination) and the weakest is for *generosity of unemployment assistance*.




Figure 4.7: Illustrating How Normative Resources affect Estimates of Take-up in Unemployment Assistance

Sources: CSCD Database

Figure 4.8, however, provides the more full-fledged exploration of our expectation. It shows the key results of multivariate statistical models of how all our selected measures of normative, instrumental

⁴ These results are based on model 4 in Appendix Table A4.6.

and enforcement resources are associated with *UI/ALMP Take-up*. Again, we present just the key results graphically, relegating the full results (e.g. controls for GDP growth, left party power, dependent population, trade openness, and EU membership) to Appendix Table A4.7. Here we see some systematic evidence that resources do indeed tend to spur take-up, as the coefficients for all the resource measures are positively signed. And they are statistically significantly positive for five of the six instrumental resource measures and two of the three enforcement resource measures. The punch line, hence, is that particularly instrumental and enforcement resources – and not so much the key normative resource measure (*generosity of unemployment assistance*) – appear to be important factors shaping *UI/ALMP take-up*.




Figure 4.8: How Resources Directly Affect Unemployment-insurance Take-Up

Sources: CSD Database; Appendix Table A4.7.

Figure 4.9, finally, considers whether such *UI/ALMP Take-up* really matters as a mediating condition linking resources to spending-based measures of outputs. It considers reduced-form models of the spending-based output models discussed above (see Figures 4.2 and 4.3)⁵ that allow us to again model the associations between all our resource measures on the one hand and the spending-based measure of *UI/ALMP spending* on the other. Here, however, we compare side-by-side the associations *without* and *with* control for *UI/ALMP Take-up*. This constitutes a simple mediation analysis of our resource-based framework. If our hypothesis is correct that resources have positive effects for both take-up and spending-based measures of outputs – that we have seen to be the case, broadly, in the analyses above – then we should see the positive association between resources and spending-based outputs to be larger WITHOUT than WITH control for the ostensible mediating *UI/ALMP take-up*. Figure 4.9 graphically shows such side-by-side comparison, displaying for a given resource measure the result WITHOUT control for take-up (the upper result) and WITH control for take-up (the lower result). As can be seen from Figure 4.9, the expected pattern does indeed emerge from this mediation analysis. Reflecting proportional to how much resources were shown to matter to *UI/ALMP take up* (as shown in Figure 4.8), we see that controlling for such take-up tends to reduce the predicted positive effect of our resource measures on our spending-based measure. We take such patterns as important evidence

⁵ Our take-up measure significantly reduces sample sizes and thereby makes fixed effects models less appropriate for meaningful comparison of the results with and without controls for *UI/ALMP take-up*. Full models not shown but available upon request.

that resources do spur spending-based measures of social-rights outputs in this employment realm, and that resources’ effects on take-up measures of outputs are part of the reasons why.




Figure 4.9: How UI/ALMP Take-Up Mediates How Resources Affect Spending-based Outputs

Sources: CSCD Database

4.2 Do Resources Affect Outcomes?

If employment-related resources have significant implications for both spending-based and take-up rate measures of employment-related outputs, then it stands to reason that they at least indirectly also thereby have implications for employment-related outcomes. Our final analysis of the implications of our country-level measures of resources for social citizenship focuses on these possibilities. However, we also consider empirically how resources can have more complex implications for employment-related outcomes, such as by moderating the way actual labor market outcomes relate to one another.

First and most importantly, recall from Section 2 that we expect normative, instrumental and enforcement resources to have both direct, mediated and moderating implications for outcomes. To see how this may or may not hold empirically, we focus particularly on how our various resource measures affect the key outcome of employment rates – with our Figure 2.1 now reproduced as Figure 4.10 focused on such issues. Here, normative, instrumental and enforcement resources can be expected to spur employment rates: (1) directly (causal-arrow “c”); (2) *via* resources’ undergirding of spending-based outputs like *ALMP-training spending* and *ECEC/Parental-leave spending* that plenty of research has found to help foster employment participation (e.g. Kluve 2010; Hemerijck et.al. 2016; Bakker and Van Vliet 2019) (causal-arrows “a + b”); and (3) by providing capacities and economic and

political footholds that intensify the extent to which these (and other) spending programs spur employment rates (causal arrow “d”).




Figure 4.10: How Resources Should Affect Outcomes of Employment-related Social Citizenship

Figure 4.11 summarizes the regression analyses testing connections (1) and (2). It displays the key regression results of models estimating employment rates as a function of each of our relevant measures of normative, instrumental and enforcement resources: all our measures of instrumental and enforcement resources, and our measures of normative resources most plausibly spurring employment rates, *generosity of unemployment assistance* and *generosity of parental leave*. While the estimations underlying these presented results include substantive controls for growth, left government, trade openness, dependent population and EU membership, the Figure only shows the main results for each resource measure.⁶ Importantly, we report two distinct specifications for each resource measure’s implications for employment rates: (1) the upper value for each row captures how each resource affects employment rate *without* controlling-away the relevant mediating role of the two spending-based output measures (*ALMP-training spending* and *ECEC/Parental-leave spending*); and (2) the lower value captures how each resource affects employment rate *with* controls for these two spending measures, thereby isolating the effect of a possible net direct effect on employment rate distinct from a mediated effect. Our expectation is that the resources should consistently have positive effects, and that those effects should be more strongly and significantly positive for the upper specification – the one that includes both “a + b” and “c” from Figure 4.10) – than for the lower specification isolating the net direct effect (arrow “c” in Figure 4.10).

The broad pattern is consistent with these expectations. For the upper specifications (without controlling away *ALMP-training spending* and *ECEC/Parental-leave spending*), all the resource measures are positively signed and for eight of the eleven measures is also statistically significant at the 95% confidence level: both normative resource measures; four of the six instrumental resource measures; and two of the three enforcement measures. For the lower specifications controlling-away the role of the two spending measures, we see as expected a substantial decline in the marginal effect of virtually all of the resource measures – such that these lose significance in several instances. This is a strong signal that the upper-specification pattern of resources spurring employment rates takes

⁶ The full results are reported in Appendix Table A4.8a and A4.8b.

place via the mediating role of spending-based output measures. That said, we also see a number of instances where there remains statistically significant net direct effect of resources for employment ratios: democracy, informational transparency, gender empowerment, judicial non-corruption, and confidence in the police.




Figure 4.11. How Normative, Instrumental and Enforcement Resources Directly and Indirectly Affect Employment Rates

Sources: CSCD Database; Appendix Figure A4.8a and A4.8b.

We can now clarify whether and how resources might also affect employment rates by enhancing, or positively moderating, the tendency of key activation-oriented spending-based output measures – *ALMP-training spending* and *ECEC/Parental-leave spending* – to spur employment ratios (arrow “d” in Figure 4.10 above). We do so by modelling the interactions between resources and a given spending-based measure in separate regression models (to avoid collinearity given limited degrees of freedom).




Figure 4.12: How Normative, Instrumental and Enforcement Resources Moderate the Effects of ALMP-training spending for Employment Ratios

Sources: CSD Database; Appendix A4.9.

In general, the patterns are in line with expectation, in that the interactions tend to be positive and in some instances are statistically significant. Figure 4.12 displays the key instances of such moderation where resources statistically-significantly moderate the effects of *ALMP-training spending* for employment rates: for *labor power*, for *female empowerment* and for *judicial non-corruption*.⁷ These marginal plots, again, show how the predicted marginal effect of *ALMP-training spending* (given on the vertical axis) is moderated across the full sample variation in the value of a given resource measure (given on the horizontal axis). The kernel density (given by the dotted-line schedule) shows the distribution of the resource measure in question. The upper-left panel displays how *labor power* positively enhances the tendency of *ALMP-training spending* to spur employment rates – where that tendency becomes statistically significantly positive “only” when *labor power* is higher than its 65th percentile of variation. The upper-right panel shows that the positive moderation is a tad stronger, where *ALMP-training spending* becomes statistically-significantly positive when *gender empowerment* is higher than its 58th percentile of variation. And the lower-left panel shows that *judicial non-corruption* also significantly positively moderates *ALMP-training spending’s* effects, though the latter remain statistically insignificant even at high levels of this enforcement resource.

Figure 4.13 summarizes the counterpart results for our analysis of how resources moderate the effects of *ECEC/Parental-leave spending* for employment rates.⁸ Here we again see that resources positively enhance the tendency of this second spending-based normative resource to spur employment rates (the only exception to this rule being for informational transparency). The significant moderation involves other resources, however. Again, one of the resources to significantly moderate

⁷ The full results on which these moderation plots are based are in Appendix Table A4.9.

⁸ The results are based on the models fully summarized in Appendix Table A4.10.

ECEC/Parental-leave spending's employment-enhancing effects is *labor power* – and the upper-right panel of Figure 4.13 suggests that such effects are statistically significant when *labor power* is above its 35th percentile of variation. But the other key significant interactions also involve the two other labor-focused measures of instrumental resources: *Right-to-strike* (upper-left panel) and *Worker rights* (lower-left panel). Both of these resource measures enhance tendency of *ECEC/Parental-leave spending* to spur employment ratios – statistically significant in this tendency when these two resources are higher than their 20th and 15th percentile of variation, respectively.




Figure 4.13: How Normative, Instrumental and Enforcement Resources Moderate the Effects of ECEC/Parental-leave spending for Employment Ratios

Sources: CSCD Database; Appendix Table A4.10.

These marginal plots capture how employment-related instrumental and enforcement resources tend to not only directly and indirectly spur employment ratios but also positively moderate the tendency of *ALMP-training spending* and *ECEC/Parental-leave spending* to foster higher employment rates. The final Figure 4.14 shows how strong those tendencies are relative to one another. It counterfactually models what the predicted effects are of the respective spending-based measures when *labor power* (a significant moderator for both spending measures) is at a low level (i.e. 10th percentile) and at a high level (i.e. 90th percentile). In both cases, we see that at such low levels of *labor power* the spending-based output measures tend to have statistically insignificant implications for employment rates. And we see that at high levels of such *labor power*, both spending-based measures tend to significantly spur employment rates. But we can see that in our data analysis the predicted spurring of employment is somewhat stronger for *ECEC/Parental-leave spending* than for *ALMP-training spending* -- something one can directly compare since both schedules span the full sample variation of the two spending-based measures (the horizontal axes) and display the range of predicted employment rates on the same scale (vertical axes).




Figure 4.14: How ALMP-training spending and ECEC/Parental-leave spending Predict Employment Ratios at Low and High Levels of Labor Power
 Sources: CSCD Database; Appendix Table A4.10.

Our final exploration of how social-rights resources shape outcomes considers how normative resources might moderate the way different employment-related outcomes relate to one another. Recall from our discussion surrounding Figure 2.3 in Section 2 how (general or non-standard-contract) employment rates might lower poverty levels, but that normative resources like employment-protection legislation may improve the quality of employment contracts that can then enhance such lowering. Recall also from our summary of employment-related *outcomes* that particularly employment rates and part-time/temporary shares of employment tend to be associated with lower poverty risks – another social-rights outcome of import. An important particular expectation is that our country-year normative-resource measure most relevant to the regulation of the *terms* of employment – employment protection legislation (EPL) for regular or temporary/non-standard contracts – might well moderate whether existing employment rates or non-standard employment shares of total employment do or do not lower poverty rates.

Our final two Figures summarize analysis of this possibility, based on regression analysis of how different kinds of EPL legislation might condition or moderate how employment outcomes affect poverty-rate outcomes. We focus on a key measure of poverty as our object of explanation – the EU’s *At-risk-of-poverty rate* (i.e. percent of population earning less than 60 percent of median income). And we explore how such poverty measures are affected by two key measures or aspects of employment outcomes: *employment rates* and *temporary and part-time employment* (the latter combining the measures of shares of such non-standard employment discussed in Section 3 above). And most importantly, we consider whether these employment-outcome measures have implications for poverty that are altered or moderated by two kinds of EPL legislation: EPL for regular workers/contracts, most relevant to the character of general employment; and EPL for non-standard contracts temporary contracts most relevant to the character of temporary/part-time employment. The results of this analysis are summarized in Appendix Table A4.11. But the main significant results are graphically displayed in Figures 4.15 and 4.16.

Figure 4.15 summarizes the significant interaction between *employment rate* and *EPL (regular work)* in shaping *at-risk-of-poverty*. In line with our expectations, the analysis reveals that EPL-regular-work

does tend to enhance the tendency of employment rates to reduce or be associated with lower poverty rates. The character of this dynamic is shown in two panels of Figure 4.15. The left-hand panel captures how the marginal effect of employment rate on poverty rates (on the vertical axis) varies depending on the value of *EPL (regular)* (on the horizontal axis). The downward sloping schedule (with continuously downward sloping confidence intervals) displays that the effect of employment rates on poverty becomes more and more negative as EPL for regular contracts becomes more stringent: *employment rate* becomes a statistically significant predictor of *at-risk-of-poverty* “only” when the index of employment protections for regular workers is higher than about the 25% percentile of the sample variation. The right-hand panel in Figure 4.15 captures what this means substantively. When employment protection regulations for regular workers are comparatively weak as a normative resource (at the samples quite low 10th percentile), then *employment rate* predicts virtually no shift in *at-risk-of-poverty* (given by the quite flat slope and by confidence intervals that are positively sloping in places). However, when such employment regulations are comparatively stringent (at the sample’s 90th percentile) then higher *employment rates* predict significantly and substantively lower *at-risk-of-poverty*: The full sample variation in *employment rate* predicts *at-risk-of-poverty rates* that go from about 25 percent of the labor force to about 7 percent of the labor force. Interestingly, our fuller statistical analysis (shown in Appendix Table A4.11) also reveals that *EPL (regular)* does not tend to moderate the links between *temporary/part-time employment* and *at-risk-of-poverty*. This is to be expected in so far as this EPL-regular index concerns the legal and regulatory safeguarding against unfair dismissal for regular-line workers – and hence included in the country-level *employment rate* measure but not the *temporary/part-time employment* measure.




Figure 4.15: How Employment Ratios Affect Poverty at Low and High EPL-protection (Regular Work)

Sources: CSCD Database; Appendix Table A4.11.

Compared to this pattern, we expect and find the opposite pattern in the moderating role of *EPL (temp./non-standard)* regulating temporary/non-standard work contracts (as opposed to regular contracts). And this is indeed what we find. With respect to the way *employment rate* is associated with lower *at-risk-of-poverty*, we find that *EPL (temp./non-standard)* does not statistically significantly enhance or otherwise moderate the poverty-fighting virtues of employment (results not shown here but summarized in Appendix Table A4.11). On the other hand, *EPL (temp./non-standard)* does significantly foster a more negative relationship between *part-time/temporary employment rates* and *at-risk-of-poverty*. Figure 4.16 -- our final figure -- summarizes the significant interaction between *part-*

time/temporary-work and EPL (temp./non-standard work) in shaping at-risk-of-poverty. Again, the left-hand panel models the full interaction, where the non-standard work contracts as a share of employment tend to significantly predict lower poverty only as the normative resource of employment protection with respect to such contracts becomes comparatively more stringent than about the 40th percentile of the sample variation. The right-hand panel, in turn, shows that at comparatively low (10th percentile) EPL (temp./non-standard) regulation, higher non-standard employment shares tend to predict no significantly different levels of at-risk-of-poverty. But at comparatively high EPL (temp./non-standard) (90th percentile), higher non-standard employment shares tend to predict significantly and substantially much lower levels of at-risk-of-poverty. In fact, this latter effect suggests more extensive poverty reduction due to non-standard employment shares when EPL (temp./non-standard) is stringent than due to employment rates when EPL (regular) is comparably stringent.




Figure 4.16: How Part-time/Temp. Rates Affect Poverty Rates at Low/High Levels of EPL (temp./nonstand.)

Sources: CSCD Database; Appendix Table A4.11.

5. Conclusion

This Working Paper has explored employment-related social citizenship by empirically applying a resource-based approach that understands social citizenship as claimed and realized by citizens navigating labor markets and the policymaking process. This view sees such realization as involving social-rights outcomes and outputs fundamentally rooted in power resources of citizens: normative resources, instrumental resources and enforcement resources that confer rights and capacities on citizens to claim and implement provision of social rights – distinct from any effects that such power resources might have for political influence and policymaking. Focusing on aggregate, quantitative measures at the level of countries, the paper has explored econometrically the character and interconnections between employment-related outcomes, outputs and resources in Europe and advanced-industrial democracies. As for the character and development of outcomes, outputs and resources, our exploration has been empirically open as to which European or other countries are expected to be most or least developed in social-rights realization, or to whether Europe has experienced rising or declining social-rights realization. As for the interconnections, however, the guiding expectation has been that even indirect, country-level measures of employment-related normative, instrumental and enforcement resources ought to substantially spur country-year measures of outputs and outcomes, particularly their functionally counterpart measures.

The key findings are two-fold. First, with respect to the descriptive exploration, the Working Paper has found that key aggregate measures of employment-related outcomes (e.g. employment rates, non-standard employment, poverty), outputs (e.g. spending-based measures of UI/ALMP and ECEC/Parental-leave efforts), and macro-level resources (e.g. generosity of unemployment assistance, labor power, democratic transparency, etc.) vary substantially over time and space. Across countries, familiar cleavages in European political economy hold tone – where the Northern member states tend to have the most developed or highest social-rights realization related to employment; Southern member states much less so. And over time, we see a mixed pattern, but after the post-2010 financial/debt crisis we have chronicled substantial increase of outcomes, outputs and resources constituting employment-related social citizenship.

Second and more importantly, the country-year quantitative exploration of interconnections reveals substantial support for the main expectation that normative, instrumental and enforcement resources are important to spurring and undergirding employment-related outputs and outcomes. With respect to the roots of employment-related outputs, normative measures – particularly generosity of unemployment assistance and generosity of parental leave – are strongly related to spending-based output measures of UI/ALMP and ECEC/Parental-leave (and many of their policy subcomponents). We also see that macro-level measures or proxies for instrumental resources – particularly labor power measures related to employment-related interactions – spur such spending-based outputs and also take-up measures with respect to UI/ALMP provisions. And less obviously, the tendency of normative resources to actually foster more spending-based outputs is enhanced by instrumental and enforcement resources. With respect to the undergirding of employment-related outcomes,

measures of normative-resource measures (again particularly generosity of unemployment assistance and parental leave) and of instrumental and enforcement resources tend to promote employment-related social-rights outcomes. The macro-level empirics suggest that this involves not only resources spurring spending and take-up outputs that in turn spur employment rates and lower long-term unemployment, but also involve direct links between resources and such latter outputs. Finally, the Working Paper has found evidence that resources matter to outcomes by enhancing the tendencies of spending-based outputs (e.g. ALMP training spending and ECEC/Parental-leave spending) to promote employment activation.

Altogether, these patterns provide substantial support, if only at the macro-level, for our resource-based conception of social citizenship. As stated at the outset of this Working Paper, the limits of the analysis are important to keep in mind. The focus, here, has been on country-year quantitative data, an aggregate level of analysis, and that focus has been further limited to national social-rights realization rather than tracing of the potential social-rights promotion through EU-level regulatory or legal developments. And within these limits, the method of analysis has involved observational exploration, since the country-year data structure defies more fine-tuned causal identification of the social-citizenship implications of resources. Such a particular focus and method of inquiry surely glosses-over the true process of social rights realization at group or individual levels of interaction and work decisions in the European Union. However, within the basic constraints of our data and estimation approach, the reported patterns are clear-cut enough to support the view that social citizenship in the employment realm can usefully be understood as resource-based social-rights realization.

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Appendix: Regression tables supporting Figures in Sections 3 and 4

Table A3.1:

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Long-term Unemp. rate	Long-term Unemp. rate	Long-term Unemp. rate	Long-term Unemp. rate	Long-term Unemp. rate	Long-term Unemp. rate
Unemp. Rate	1.830*** (0.321)			2.203*** (0.186)		
Temp. empl. Rate		-0.074 (0.229)			-0.321 (0.310)	
Part-time empl. rate			-0.469*** (0.164)			-0.230* (0.133)
Democracy	-7.316** (3.132)	-12.132*** (4.330)	-6.650* (3.659)	1.287 (1.677)	0.661 (3.453)	-2.000 (2.750)
GDP growth	0.081 (0.172)	-0.096 (0.213)	-0.305 (0.208)	0.463*** (0.096)	0.034 (0.136)	-0.023 (0.130)
Left government	0.007 (0.020)	-0.002 (0.022)	0.014 (0.021)	0.009 (0.010)	0.001 (0.020)	0.003 (0.018)
Trade openness	0.047 (0.033)	0.012 (0.039)	0.019 (0.038)	-0.016 (0.018)	-0.014 (0.021)	-0.008 (0.022)
Depend. Popul.	-0.321 (0.327)	-0.201 (0.480)	0.185 (0.367)	-0.012 (0.219)	0.367 (0.309)	0.313 (0.280)
EU-member	14.118*** (4.731)	21.867*** (4.842)	19.516*** (4.556)	9.946*** (0.814)	12.231*** (1.468)	8.589*** (1.130)
Constant	93.774** (35.512)	149.509*** (47.396)	91.569** (42.826)	-5.565 (20.331)	-2.264 (35.475)	37.638 (26.280)
Obs.	1052	812	866	1052	812	866
R-squared	0.608	0.393	0.514	0.906	0.783	0.811
Country dummies	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes

OLS coefficients with country fixed effects and robust standard errors (clustered by country) in parentheses

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Table A3.2:

At-Risk-of-Poverty as Function of Employment-, Unemployment-, Temp.-employment and Part-time-employment Rates

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Risk of Poverty	Risk of Poverty	Risk of Poverty	Risk of Poverty	Risk of Poverty	Risk of Poverty
Employment rate	-0.234** (0.084)					
Unemp. Rate		0.284*** (0.086)				
Long-term unemp.rate			0.063** (0.024)			
Temp. empl.rate				-0.043 (0.106)		
Part-time empl.rate					-0.199*** (0.045)	
Part-time/temp.empl.						-1.776** (0.853)
Democracy	-1.906 (2.046)	-4.455*** (1.046)	-4.099*** (1.081)	-4.688*** (1.185)	-1.591 (1.236)	-2.669** (1.250)
GDP growth	0.062* (0.033)	0.125*** (0.037)	0.027 (0.036)	0.059 (0.040)	0.023 (0.039)	0.055 (0.039)
Left government	-0.001 (0.008)	0.007 (0.007)	0.007 (0.008)	0.007 (0.007)	0.002 (0.007)	0.005 (0.007)
Trade openness	-0.008 (0.007)	-0.006 (0.005)	-0.011 (0.007)	-0.011* (0.007)	-0.006 (0.005)	-0.014** (0.006)
Depend. Popul.	0.053 (0.155)	-0.074 (0.109)	-0.073 (0.122)	-0.077 (0.127)	0.202* (0.112)	-0.000 (0.127)
EU	1.024 (1.928)	2.643 (1.754)	2.917* (1.454)	4.089** (1.797)	2.404 (1.931)	3.852** (1.854)
Constant	47.437** (21.118)	58.978*** (13.146)	55.935*** (11.873)	63.725*** (11.874)	26.769* (13.711)	40.624*** (14.075)
Obs.	250	298	298	298	298	298
R-squared	0.344	0.472	0.424	0.388	0.503	0.439

OLS coefficients with country fixed effects and robust standard errors (clustered by country) in parentheses

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Table A3.3:
How UI/ALMP Take-up Rates Affect UI/ALMP spending outputs

	(1) UI: Compens.	(2) UI: Early-retire.	(3) UI Total	(4) ALMP: Training	(5) ALMP Total	(6) UI/ALMP Total
UI/ALMP Take-up rate	0.942*** (0.272)	0.082** (0.036)	0.981*** (0.308)	0.102 (0.062)	0.079 (0.122)	1.060*** (0.382)
Democracy	-0.183 (0.456)	-0.286 (0.206)	-0.202 (0.553)	0.100 (0.066)	0.329** (0.140)	0.125 (0.559)
Unemployment rate	0.077** (0.031)	0.003 (0.002)	0.085** (0.031)	-0.001 (0.005)	-0.012 (0.010)	0.073* (0.036)
GDP growth	-0.026*** (0.007)	0.000 (0.001)	-0.024*** (0.008)	-0.004* (0.002)	-0.011** (0.004)	-0.035*** (0.009)
Left government	0.001 (0.002)	0.000 (0.000)	0.002 (0.002)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.001)	0.002 (0.003)
Depend. Popul.	0.010 (0.016)	-0.005 (0.004)	0.003 (0.019)	0.009 (0.005)	0.029* (0.016)	0.031 (0.019)
Trade openness	0.002 (0.001)	0.001*** (0.000)	0.003* (0.002)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.001)	0.003 (0.002)
EU	-0.093 (0.207)	0.008 (0.028)	-0.087 (0.221)	0.145** (0.069)	0.449*** (0.155)	0.362 (0.297)
Constant	0.821 (4.374)	2.973 (2.090)	1.245 (5.194)	-1.387* (0.806)	-4.409** (1.953)	-3.142 (5.173)
Obs.	243	156	235	241	237	235
R-squared	0.477	0.412	0.486	0.386	0.375	0.511

OLS with robust-cluster standard errors (clustered by country) in parenthesis

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Table A3.4a

Generosity of Unemployment Assistance (Normative resource) as Function Instrumental and Enforcement Resources

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Democracy	1.71*** (0.574)								
Info. Transparency		0.006 (0.016)							
Right-to-strike			-0.488 (0.431)						
Labor power index				1.028** (0.440)					
Worker rights					-0.107 (0.349)				
Gender empowerment						-0.116 (0.308)			
Judicial non-corruption							1.098 (0.698)		
Confidence in police								-0.135 (0.149)	
Labor inspections									0.615* (0.293)
Unemployment rate	0.001 (0.048)	-0.007 (0.046)	0.046 (0.060)	0.019 (0.053)	0.000 (0.049)	0.044 (0.062)	0.041 (0.061)	-0.027 (0.099)	-0.045 (0.078)
GDP growth	-0.015 (0.019)	-0.021 (0.017)	-0.027 (0.020)	-0.031 (0.020)	-0.015 (0.015)	-0.030 (0.018)	-0.027 (0.020)	-0.076 (0.075)	0.112 (0.063)
Left government	0.001 (0.001)	0.002 (0.002)	0.001 (0.001)	0.002 (0.001)	0.002 (0.002)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.023** (0.008)	0.020 (0.021)
Depend. Popul.	-0.063* (0.031)	-0.085*** (0.028)	-0.071** (0.033)	-0.107*** (0.039)	-0.094*** (0.028)	-0.075* (0.041)	-0.067* (0.034)	0.103 (0.074)	-0.587** (0.258)
Trade openness	0.008 (0.008)	0.003 (0.010)	0.017** (0.008)	0.019** (0.008)	0.005 (0.010)	0.017* (0.009)	0.015* (0.008)	.050*** (0.016)	0.010 (0.014)
EU member	1.88*** (0.214)	1.48*** (0.204)	2.26*** (0.642)	2.01*** (0.294)	1.37*** (0.232)	1.47*** (0.233)	1.76*** (0.244)	-1.343 (1.146)	-1.985 (1.501)
Constant	-6.70 (6.376)	11.2*** (2.303)	10.9*** (1.832)	12.0*** (1.988)	12.1*** (1.345)	11.5** (4.187)	6.31* (3.372)	5.684 (6.117)	39.5** (13.290)
Obs.	749	636	794	792	617	794	794	84	26
R-squared	0.856	0.921	0.833	0.844	0.925	0.832	0.832	0.395	0.537
Country dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No

OLS coefficients with country fixed effects and robust standard errors (clustered by country) in parentheses.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Table A3.4b
Generosity of Parental leave (Normative resource) as Function Instrumental and Enforcement Resources

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Democracy	-0.067 (0.183)								
Info. Transparency		0.04*** (0.009)							
Right-to-strike			0.396 (0.278)						
Labor power index				-0.168 (0.221)					
Worker rights					-0.266 (0.168)				
Gender empowerment						0.46*** (0.129)			
Judicial non-corruption							-0.642 (0.433)		
Confid. In Police								0.048 (0.082)	
Labor inspection									0.168 (0.220)
Unemployment rate	0.030** (0.014)	-0.007 (0.013)	0.024 (0.016)	0.037** (0.016)	0.003 (0.014)	0.012 (0.016)	0.035** (0.017)	-0.061 (0.037)	-0.1*** (0.034)
GDP growth	-0.03*** (0.010)	-0.010 (0.007)	-0.03*** (0.011)	-0.03** (0.010)	-0.02** (0.009)	-0.02** (0.009)	-0.03*** (0.011)	-0.037* (0.021)	-0.05** (0.019)
Left government	-0.001 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.004 (0.004)	0.001 (0.004)
Depend. Popul.	-0.04** (0.014)	0.01* (0.007)	-0.03** (0.015)	-0.027* (0.014)	-0.007 (0.010)	-0.009 (0.012)	-0.04*** (0.015)	-0.053* (0.028)	0.066* (0.036)
Trade openness	0.01*** (0.002)	-0.000 (0.003)	0.01*** (0.002)	0.01*** (0.002)	0.01*** (0.002)	0.01*** (0.002)	0.01*** (0.002)	0.003 (0.004)	0.01* (0.005)
EU	2.69*** (0.066)	3.06*** (0.063)	2.1*** (0.443)	2.72*** (0.107)	2.56*** (0.056)	2.85*** (0.069)	2.58*** (0.102)	1.528** (0.579)	1.171** (0.545)
Constant	2.525 (2.197)	-3.6*** (0.805)	1.284 (0.993)	1.328* (0.726)	1.077 (0.651)	-3.34** (1.468)	4.39** (1.951)	3.717 (2.311)	-0.336 (2.258)
Obs.	1066	777	1145	1118	901	1145	1145	116	104
R-squared	0.853	0.922	0.850	0.861	0.868	0.860	0.847	0.343	0.468
Country dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

OLS coefficients with country fixed effects and robust standard errors (clustered by country) in parentheses.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Table A3.4c
 Employment Protection Legislation (Temp.Contracts) (Normative resource) as Function
 Instrumental and Enforcement Resources

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Democracy	0.095 (0.218)								
Info. Transparency		-0.03** (0.012)							
Right-to-strike			0.648 (0.435)						
Labor power index				0.109 (0.206)					
Worker rights					0.292 (0.209)				
Gender empowerment						-0.65** (0.239)			
Judicial non-corruption							0.303 (0.749)		
Confid. In Police								0.083 (0.066)	
Labor inspections									0.195 (0.250)
Unemployment rate	-0.023 (0.029)	-0.016 (0.029)	-0.024 (0.028)	-0.023 (0.028)	-0.024 (0.028)	-0.027 (0.027)	-0.022 (0.029)	-0.001 (0.037)	0.031 (0.026)
GDP growth	0.024** (0.012)	0.007 (0.011)	0.021* (0.011)	0.022* (0.011)	0.017* (0.010)	0.010 (0.009)	0.024* (0.012)	0.013 (0.026)	0.013 (0.014)
Left government	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.002)	0.000 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.008** (0.003)	0.009** (0.004)
Depend. Popul.	-0.06** (0.028)	-0.08** (0.030)	-0.06** (0.026)	-0.07** (0.030)	-0.06** (0.027)	-0.07** (0.026)	-0.06** (0.028)	0.043 (0.044)	0.004 (0.042)
Trade openness	-0.012* (0.006)	-0.009 (0.006)	-0.01** (0.007)	-0.011 (0.007)	-0.010 (0.006)	-0.008 (0.005)	-0.012* (0.006)	-0.003 (0.005)	-0.000 (0.005)
EU	-0.141 (0.167)	-0.238 (0.162)	-1.146* (0.584)	-0.104 (0.199)	-0.133 (0.166)	-57*** (0.149)	-0.087 (0.261)	0.704 (0.445)	0.004 (0.510)
Constant	3.414 (2.791)	7.61*** (2.061)	3.65*** (1.193)	4.61*** (1.539)	3.87** (1.444)	10.5*** (3.089)	3.383 (2.859)	1.324 (2.545)	0.703 (2.285)
Obs.	711	646	711	711	711	711	711	99	78
R-squared	0.839	0.864	0.844	0.840	0.843	0.854	0.839	0.228	0.248
Country dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No

OLS coefficients with country fixed effects and robust standard errors (clustered by country) in parentheses

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Table A4.1

UI and ALMP spending (Spending-based Outputs) as Functions of Generosity of Unemployment Assistance (Normative resource)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	UI: Compens.	UI: Early retire.	UI Total	ALMP- Training	ALMP- Search/ Administ.	ALMP Total	UI/ALMP
Generos. Unemp.	0.147***	0.015	0.158***	0.050**	-0.026**	0.035	0.243**
Assistance	(0.050)	(0.019)	(0.051)	(0.019)	(0.011)	(0.047)	(0.091)
Unemployment rate	0.082***	0.006*	0.085***	0.007	0.001	0.014	0.091**
	(0.025)	(0.003)	(0.025)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.009)	(0.035)
GDP growth	-0.038***	0.005***	-0.036***	0.000	-0.003***	-0.002	-0.047***
	(0.011)	(0.001)	(0.011)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.005)	(0.013)
Democracy	0.351	-0.063	0.293	-0.044	0.107***	0.134	0.265
	(0.235)	(0.118)	(0.208)	(0.039)	(0.033)	(0.092)	(0.217)
Left government	0.001	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.002*
	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Depend. Popul.	0.017	-0.017**	0.009	0.006	-0.002	0.001	-0.014
	(0.013)	(0.006)	(0.011)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.015)
Trade openness	-0.011**	-0.003***	-0.013***	-0.002	0.000	-0.003	-0.020***
	(0.004)	(0.001)	(0.004)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.006)
EU	-0.323**	0.086**	-0.283**	0.027	0.091**	0.059	-0.167
	(0.152)	(0.038)	(0.135)	(0.040)	(0.034)	(0.084)	(0.181)
Constant	-4.652**	1.409	-3.685**	-0.187	-0.627*	-1.283*	-2.346
	(1.921)	(1.203)	(1.713)	(0.311)	(0.302)	(0.724)	(1.607)
Obs.	705	414	705	654	647	654	706
R-squared	0.817	0.790	0.847	0.701	0.651	0.789	0.772
Country dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

OLS coefficients with country fixed effects and robust standard errors (clustered by country) in parentheses
 *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

Table A4.2

ECEC and Parental-leave spending (Spending-based Outputs) as Functions of Generosity of Parental Leave (Normative resource)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	ECEC	Parental Leave	Family allowances	Family Home-care	Total Family	ECEC/ Parent-leave
Generos. Parent-leave	.113* (.041)	.05* (.021)	.066 (.043)	.038 (.04)	.169* (.063)	.146** (.044)
Child population	-.046** (.014)	-.006 (.006)	.022 (.023)	-.004 (.006)	-.034 (.021)	-.05** (.018)
GDP growth	-.006 (.003)	-.006 (.003)	-.018* (.007)	-.001 (.002)	-.036*** (.008)	-.012* (.005)
Democracy	.019 (.076)	.002 (.041)	-.063 (.142)	-.011 (.027)	.072 (.178)	.028 (.094)
Left government	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (.001)	0 (0)	0 (.001)	0 (0)
Depend. Popul.	.005 (.009)	0 (.002)	-.007 (.013)	-.009* (.004)	-.008 (.011)	.006 (.009)
Trade openness	.002* (.001)	0 (.001)	.002 (.002)	-.001 (.001)	.007** (.002)	.002 (.001)
EU member	-.168 (.13)	-.081 (.04)	-.239 (.118)	-.137*** (.022)	-.289* (.134)	-.223 (.122)
Constant	.765 (.896)	.152 (.442)	1.848 (1.646)	.762 (.388)	2.443 (2.098)	.785 (1.06)
Observations	801	816	866	541	845	756
R-squared	.84	.846	.757	.703	.892	.877
Country dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Standard errors are in parentheses

*** $p < .001$, ** $p < .01$, * $p < .05$

Table A4.3

UI/ALMP spending total (Spending-based Outputs) as Function of Instrumental and Enforcement Resources

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Democracy	.272 (.287)								
GDP growth	-.063*** (.01)	-.032*** (.007)	-.058*** (.012)	-.065*** (.012)	-.038** (.011)	-.044*** (.01)	-.065*** (.011)	-.038 (.02)	-.069** (.019)
Left government	.002 (.001)	0 (.002)	.001 (.001)	.001 (.001)	.001 (.001)	0 (.001)	.003 (.002)	.006 (.003)	.006 (.003)
Depend. Popul.	-.006 (.024)	-.004 (.014)	-.067*** (.013)	-.101*** (.017)	-.033* (.016)	-.048* (.019)	.012 (.028)	.025 (.029)	-.008 (.023)
Trade openness	-.004 (.004)	-.004 (.003)	.005* (.002)	.008* (.003)	-.004 (.003)	.003 (.002)	0 (.002)	-.001 (.004)	0 (.004)
EU member	-.046 (.107)	-.004 (.069)	-.828* (.398)	.187* (.083)	.009 (.074)	.017 (.049)	1.221*** (.295)	1.123** (.329)	.12 (.273)
Info. Transparency		.016 (.009)							
Right-to-strike			.483 (.25)						
Labor power index				.685** (.198)					
Worker rights					.067 (.063)				
Female empow.						3.394** (1.214)			
Judic. Non-corrupt.							1.29*** (.308)		
Confid. in Police								1.114 (.579)	
Labor inspections									.131 (.151)
Constant	-.912 (3.145)	.499 (1.207)	3.659*** (.822)	5.926*** (.905)	2.983*** (.804)	.464 (1.822)	-4.215* (1.645)	-3.522 (1.822)	1.11 (1.331)
Observations	919	938	1532	1472	1121	1532	936	119	158
R-squared	.702	.748	.539	.582	.686	.546	.298	.285	.136
Country dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Standard errors are in parentheses

*** $p < .001$, ** $p < .01$, * $p < .05$

Table A4.4

ECEC/Parental-leave spending (Spending-based Outputs) as Function of Instrumental and Enforcement Resources

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Democracy	0.004 (0.109)								
Info. Transparency		0.006 (0.008)							
Right-to-strike			.29*** (0.104)						
Labor power index				-0.052 (0.108)					
Worker rights					-0.040 (0.076)				
Female empowerment						1.776 (1.206)			
Judic. Non-corruption							0.265 (0.318)		
Confid. In police								0.74** (0.270)	
Labor inspections									-0.026 (0.099)
Child Popul.	-0.07*** (0.019)	-0.06** (0.027)	-0.07*** (0.016)	-0.07*** (0.017)	-0.07*** (0.019)	-0.05*** (0.018)	-0.07*** (0.017)	-0.045 (0.035)	0.019 (0.070)
GDP growth	-0.02*** (0.005)	-0.02*** (0.006)	-0.02*** (0.005)	-0.02*** (0.005)	-0.02*** (0.005)	-0.02*** (0.005)	-0.02*** (0.005)	-0.04*** (0.012)	-0.011 (0.014)
Left government	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.003** (0.001)	0.001 (0.002)
Depend. Popul.	0.010 (0.009)	0.011 (0.013)	0.011 (0.009)	0.011 (0.010)	0.009 (0.011)	0.009 (0.010)	0.010 (0.010)	0.018 (0.027)	0.023 (0.018)
Trade openness	.003** (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	.002** (0.001)	.002** (0.001)	.002** (0.001)	.002** (0.001)	.003** (0.001)	0.002 (0.002)	0.003 (0.003)
EU member	0.091 (0.071)	0.171* (0.100)	-0.37** (0.176)	0.090 (0.071)	0.091 (0.063)	0.22** (0.093)	0.152* (0.088)	0.280 (0.227)	0.255 (0.308)
Constant	1.362 (1.231)	0.629 (0.872)	.89*** (0.317)	1.24*** (0.378)	1.51*** (0.413)	-0.565 (1.343)	0.433 (1.169)	-1.614 (1.282)	-0.893 (1.624)
Obs.	826	702	838	832	812	838	838	116	98
R-squared	0.845	0.851	0.852	0.846	0.849	0.849	0.847	0.277	0.119
Country dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No

Standard errors are in parenthesis

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Table A4.5

How Instrumental and Enforcement Resources Moderate the Effects of Generosity of Unemployment Assistance (Normative resource) for UI/ALMP spending (Spending-based Outputs)

	(1) UI/ ALMP	(2) UI/ ALMP	(3) UI/ ALMP	(4) UI/ ALMP	(5) UI/ ALMP	(6) UI/ ALMP	(7) UI/ ALMP	(8) UI/ ALMP	(9) UI/ ALMP
Generos. Unemp.	.181	.025	.161	.155*	.34	-.624	-.403	1.46***	-.112
Assist.	(.679)	(.19)	(.2)	(.062)	(.167)	(.335)	(.224)	(.335)	(.08)
Democracy	.214								
	(.553)								
Generos. X Democ.	.006								
	(.071)								
Info. Transparency		-.044*							
		(.017)							
Generos. X Info. Transp.		.005							
		(.002)							
Right-to-strike			-.223						
			(.791)						
Generos. X Strike-right			.047						
			(.074)						
Labor power index				-.832					
				(.553)					
Generos. X Lab.power				.16*					
				(.062)					
Worker rights					.549				
					(.516)				
Generos. X Work.rights					-.032				
					(.065)				
Female empowerment						8.7**			
						(2.919)			
Generos. X Fem.empow.						.996*			
						(.382)			
Judic. Non-corrupt.							-2.424*		
							(.92)		
Generos. X Jud.Non-corr.							.202*		
							(.077)		
Confid. in police								4.326**	
								(1.135)	
Generos. X Conf.police								-.47***	
								(.114)	
Labor inspections									.515
									(1.135)
Generos. X Lab.insp.									-.024
									(.108)
Unemployment rate	.091*	.138***	.088*	.1**	.085*	.09*	.103**	.105***	.114***
	(.035)	(.026)	(.036)	(.029)	(.034)	(.035)	(.031)	(.025)	(.013)
GDP growth	-.046**	-.044**	-.045**	-.053**	-.049**	-.045**	-.046**	-.029	-.10***
	(.014)	(.013)	(.013)	(.015)	(.014)	(.014)	(.014)	(.018)	(.022)
Left government	.002	.001	.002	.002*	.002	.002	.002	.004	.005
	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.003)	(.004)
Depend. Popul.	-.014	.006	-.013	-.033*	-.002	-.011	-.011	-.007	-.078
	(.015)	(.016)	(.015)	(.014)	(.015)	(.013)	(.015)	(.022)	(.04)
Trade openness	-.02**	-.015*	-.02***	-.01	-.019**	-.021**	-.019**	.005	.01**
	(.005)	(.006)	(.005)	(.005)	(.006)	(.006)	(.005)	(.004)	(.003)
EU	-.169	-.556**	-.464	.026	-.271	-.236	-.448*	.521	.024
	(.183)	(.17)	(.533)	(.12)	(.133)	(.188)	(.208)	(.257)	(.291)
Constant	-1.849	1.057	.677	1.445	-1.512	7.803**	8.035*	-12.7**	4.851
	(4.955)	(1.717)	(2.16)	(.88)	(1.621)	(2.598)	(2.981)	(3.842)	(2.81)
Observations	706	614	721	711	705	721	721	89	77
R-squared	.772	.855	.773	.799	.779	.776	.778	.632	.727
Country dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Standard errors are in parentheses

*** $p < .001$, ** $p < .01$, * $p < .05$

Table A4.6

How Instrumental and Enforcement Resources Moderate the Effects of Generosity of Parental Leave (Normative resource) for ECEC/Parental-leave spending (Spending-based Outputs)

	(1) ECEC/ Par.-leave	(2) ECEC/ Par.-leave	(3) ECEC/ Par.-leave	(4) ECEC/ Par.-leave	(5) ECEC/ Par.-leave	(6) ECEC/ Par.-leave	(7) ECEC/ Par.-leave	(8) ECEC/ Par.-leave	(9) ECEC/ Par.-leave
Generosity of Parent.- Leave	0.268 (0.578)	0.419* (0.222)	0.017 (0.115)	0.15*** (0.039)	0.051 (0.075)	-0.474 (0.448)	-0.179 (0.312)	0.589 (0.457)	0.55*** (0.080)
Democracy	0.076 (0.288)								
Generos. X Democ.	-0.012 (0.058)								
Info. Transp.		0.016** (0.007)							
Generos. X Info. Tran.		-0.004 (0.003)							
Right-to-strike			-0.053 (0.132)						
Generos. X Strike-right			0.064 (0.052)						
Labor power index				-0.26*** (0.061)					
Generos. X Labor pow.				0.08*** (0.025)					
Worker rights					0.22** (0.103)				
Generos. X Work.rights					0.053 (0.036)				
Female empowerment						0.106 (1.686)			
Generos. X Fem.empow						0.669 (0.481)			
Judic. Non-corrupt.							-0.438 (0.295)		
Generos. X Jud.non-corr.							0.089 (0.088)		
Confid. in police								1.336* (0.767)	
Generos. X Conf. police								-0.121 (0.162)	
Labor inspections									0.874* (0.474)
Generos. X Lab. Insp.									-0.208* (0.117)
Child population	-0.05*** (0.018)	-0.05* (0.026)	-0.05*** (0.015)	-0.05*** (0.015)	-0.05** (0.020)	-0.03** (0.015)	-0.05*** (0.016)	-0.013 (0.033)	0.12*** (0.040)
GDP growth	-0.01** (0.005)	0.01** (0.005)	0.01** (0.005)	-0.01** (0.005)	-0.01** (0.005)	0.01** (0.005)	-0.01** (0.005)	-0.04** (0.015)	0.016* (0.009)
Left government	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.003*** (0.001)	0.001 (0.002)
Depend. Popul.	0.006 (0.009)	0.010 (0.013)	0.008 (0.009)	0.010 (0.009)	0.005 (0.011)	0.005 (0.009)	0.008 (0.009)	0.014 (0.028)	-0.001 (0.017)
Trade openness	0.002* (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.002* (0.001)	0.002** (0.001)	0.002* (0.001)	0.002 (0.001)	0.002* (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	-0.002 (0.002)
EU	-0.219* (0.125)	-0.073 (0.180)	-0.38** (0.180)	-0.175 (0.108)	-0.164 (0.108)	-0.110 (0.123)	-0.234* (0.122)	0.136 (0.194)	0.038 (0.170)
Constant	0.301 (3.003)	-0.375 (0.747)	1.13*** (0.358)	0.93*** (0.314)	1.44*** (0.307)	0.734 (1.733)	2.579** (1.046)	-4.389 (2.755)	-2.99** (1.237)
Obs.	756	642	768	762	742	768	768	102	85
R-squared	0.877	0.881	0.880	0.886	0.883	0.883	0.879	0.438	0.603
Country dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Standard errors are in parenthesis
 *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Table A4.7

UI/ALMP Take-up as Function of Normative, Instrumental and Enforcement Resources

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Generos.unemp. assistance	0.002 (0.03)									
Democracy		0.29** (0.12)								
Info. Transpar.			0.002 (0.01)							
Right to strike				0.088 (0.18)						
Labor power index					.19*** (0.07)					
Worker rights						0.204* (0.12)				
Female empow.							.36*** (0.12)			
Judic. non corrup.								.44*** (0.16)		
Confid. in Police									0.9*** (0.29)	
Labor inspections										0.177* (0.09)
Unemp. rate	-0.024 (.014)	-0.02* (0.01)	-0.014 (0.01)	-0.02* (0.01)	-0.014 (0.01)	-0.018 (0.01)	-.03** (0.01)	-.02** (0.01)	-0.02* (0.01)	-0.017 (0.01)
GDP growth	0.011 (.009)	-0.007 (.006)	-0.007 (.006)	-0.008 (.006)	-0.01* (.004)	-0.005 (.006)	-0.009 (.006)	-0.006 (.006)	-0.018 (.015)	-0.007 (.006)
Left government	0.001 (.001)	0.001 (.001)	0.001 (.001)	0.001 (.001)	0.001 (.001)	0.001 (.001)	0.001 (.001)	0.001 (.001)	.002** (.001)	0.001 (.001)
Depend. Popul.	-0.009 (.011)	.03*** (.012)	.04*** (.013)	.03*** (.011)	0.018 (.011)	0.03** (.011)	.03*** (.008)	0.019 (.012)	0.016 (.014)	.05*** (.017)
Trade openness	0.001 (.002)	-0.000 (.001)	0.001 (.001)	0.000 (.001)	-0.000 (.001)	-0.000 (.001)	0.000 (.001)	0.000 (.001)	-0.001 (.001)	0.002 (.001)
EU	0.54** (.221)	0.236 (.228)	0.146 (.185)	0.125 (.289)	0.127 (.188)	0.210 (.212)	0.170 (.206)	0.340 (.229)	0.53** (.216)	0.385* (.191)
Constant	0.919 (0.713)	-3.9*** (1.338)	-1.410 (1.304)	-1.1** (0.515)	-0.178 (0.528)	-1.0** (0.466)	-4.1*** (1.221)	-1.9*** (0.656)	-2.9** (1.147)	-2.1** (0.863)
Country dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
Obs.	199	339	170	339	328	339	339	339	52	131
R-squared	0.316	0.211	0.160	0.176	0.326	0.201	0.247	0.271	0.435	0.395

Standard errors are in parenthesis

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Table A4.8a
Employment Rate as Function of Normative, Instrumental and Enforcement Resources

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
Generos. Unemp. assist	.868* (.43)										
Generos. Par-leave Democracy		1.736* (.762)	5.98** (2.113)								
Info. Transpar.				.278** (.092)							
Right-to-strike					2.658 (1.924)						
Labor power index						2.169* (1.071)					
Worker rights							-.055 (.95)				
Female empow.								6.102* (2.325)			
Judic.non-corrupct									7.51*** (1.86)		
Confid.in police										11.6** (3.272)	
Labor inspections											1.254 (.853)
GDP growth	.128 (.144)	.076 (.148)	.114 (.11)	.123 (.097)	.105 (.107)	.098 (.108)	.093 (.109)	.143 (.103)	.082 (.101)	.04 (.194)	.161 (.101)
Left government	.002 (.015)	.012 (.016)	-.002 (.014)	.003 (.016)	.002 (.014)	-.004 (.014)	.002 (.014)	-.007 (.012)	.007 (.014)	.02 (.016)	.017 (.019)
Depend. Popul.	.006 (.278)	.208 (.282)	.222 (.267)	.263 (.273)	.161 (.257)	.047 (.249)	.23 (.263)	.202 (.226)	.042 (.245)	.102 (.286)	.441* (.179)
Trade openness	.011 (.037)	.016 (.017)	.011 (.016)	.017 (.017)	.023 (.016)	.018 (.018)	.02 (.017)	.016 (.015)	.02 (.015)	.026 (.023)	.02 (.028)
EU	8.1*** (1.917)	-12*** (2.491)	8.4*** (2.258)	-8.51** (2.417)	-11*** (2.558)	-11*** (2.061)	-9.9*** (2.23)	-9.8*** (2.278)	-7.06** (2.304)	-7.8*** (2.116)	-8.06** (2.729)
Constant	62.5*** (14.4)	57.1*** (15.14)	1.567 (28.4)	37.16* (16.24)	58.6*** (13.8)	70.2*** (13.15)	60.2*** (13.88)	5.835 (23.25)	41.9** (15.03)	31.933 (16.32)	49.0*** (9.7)
Observations	659	771	862	715	869	856	861	869	869	110	113
R-squared	.304	.329	.363	.354	.322	.351	.307	.398	.419	.45	.457

OLS coefficients. Robust standard errors (clustered by country) are in parentheses: *** $p < .001$, ** $p < .01$, * $p < .05$

Table A4.8b:
Employment Rate as Function of Normative, Instrumental and Enforcement Resources and Spending-based Outputs

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
Generos. Unemp Assistance	.623 (.488)										
Generos. Par-leave		-.651 (.733)									
Democracy			4.489* (1.859)								
Info. Transpar.				.242* (.096)							
Right-to-strike					2.656 (1.943)						
Labor power index						1.51 (1.133)					
Worker rights							-1.002 (.89)				
Female empowerment								5.002* (2.141)			
Judic. Non-corrupt.									6.14** (2.113)		
Confid. in police										9.59** (2.96)	
Labor inspections											1.142 (.875)
UI/ALMP spending	10.945 (6.65)		10.62* (5.101)	12.83* (5.496)	13.49* (5.14)	10.76 (5.321)	13.99* (5.266)	9.709 (4.937)	6.953 (6.165)	5.568 (5.397)	7.118 (7.058)
EC/EC/Par.-leave Spending		7.94*** (1.325)									
GDP growth	.103 (.131)	.18 (.115)	.117 (.107)	.14 (.086)	.118 (.102)	.114 (.104)	.127 (.105)	.144 (.097)	.092 (.101)	.003 (.184)	.175 (.093)
Left government	.002 (.015)	-.008 (.011)	-.003 (.014)	.002 (.015)	-.001 (.014)	-.004 (.014)	.001 (.014)	-.007 (.012)	.004 (.014)	.013 (.02)	.01 (.018)
Depend. Popul.	-.088 (.288)	-.052 (.169)	.081 (.272)	.067 (.292)	-.014 (.26)	-.039 (.269)	.058 (.271)	.078 (.238)	-.017 (.248)	.056 (.291)	.367 (.184)
Trade openness	.016 (.038)	.007 (.013)	.018 (.017)	.022 (.016)	.029 (.016)	.024 (.018)	.027 (.017)	.021 (.016)	.023 (.016)	.031 (.024)	.02 (.029)
EU	-9.7*** (2.305)	-10*** (1.679)	-10*** (2.249)	-10*** (2.438)	-13*** (2.516)	-12*** (2.217)	-12*** (2.147)	-11*** (2.31)	-8.5** (2.661)	-8.9*** (2.409)	-8.9** (2.715)
Constant	68.*** (14.65)	71.6*** (9.131)	21.94 (26.34)	47.93* (17.76)	65.6*** (14.26)	72.8*** (14.35)	68.*** (14.07)	20.822 (20.07)	49.** (15.56)	39.* (16.39)	52.*** (9.903)
Observations	659	771	862	715	869	856	861	869	869	110	113
R-squared	.35	.57	.403	.415	.391	.391	.377	.431	.434	.457	.487

OLS coefficients with robust standard errors clustered by country (in parentheses).

*** $p < .001$, ** $p < .01$, * $p < .05$

Table A4.9

How Normative, Instrumental and Enforcement Resources Moderate Link Between ALMP-training (Output) and Employment (outcome)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
	Empl. Rate	Empl. Rate	Empl. Rate	Empl. Rate	Empl. Rate	Empl. Rate	Empl. Rate	Empl. Rate	Empl. Rate
ALMP-training (%GDP)	-31.326 (119.8)	5.608 (53.33)	15.192 (14.4)	6.721 (5.31)	20.392 (16.3)	-161.6* (59.98)	-109.9** (37.43)	25.75 (45.69)	6.032 (7.076)
Democracy	2.482 (1.486)								
ALMP-train. X Dem.	4.4 (12.162)								
Info. Transparency		.256* (.116)							
ALMP-train. X Inf. Trans.		.102 (.704)							
Right-to-strike			3.091 (2.245)						
ALMP-train. X Strike			-.58 (7.034)						
Labor power index				.915 (1.323)					
ALMP-train. X Lab.pov.				6.971* (3.267)					
Worker rights					-1.752 (1.92)				
ALMP-train. X Wrk.right					-2.591 (9.623)				
Female empowerment						2.938 (1.49)			
ALMP-train. X Fem.emp.						18.31** (6.458)			
Judic.non-corruption							3.918* (1.865)		
ALMP-tr. X Jud.noncor.							32.26** (10.025)		
Confid. in police								8.405* (4.01)	
ALMP-train. X Conf.pol.								-5.232 (16.26)	
Labor inspections									-1.02 (1.947)
ALMP-train. X Lab.insp.									11.388 (7.471)
GDP growth	.127 (.264)	.289 (.252)	.163 (.244)	.154 (.239)	.249 (.272)	.286 (.25)	.063 (.215)	.102 (.273)	.281 (.331)
Left government	-.003 (.022)	.002 (.021)	-.002 (.023)	-.01 (.02)	.005 (.022)	-.019 (.017)	.001 (.021)	.014 (.025)	-.025 (.027)
Depend. Popul.	-.054 (.281)	.066 (.238)	-.119 (.26)	-.207 (.276)	-.044 (.281)	.129 (.189)	-.104 (.251)	-.157 (.285)	.467 (.243)
Trade openness	.02 (.019)	.028 (.017)	.032 (.017)	.025 (.018)	.031 (.019)	.023 (.016)	.016 (.017)	.034 (.021)	.049 (.024)
EU	-10.5*** (2.342)	-10.4*** (2.333)	-13.6*** (2.316)	-12.3*** (2.249)	-12.2*** (2.059)	-10.6*** (2.171)	-7.7** (2.77)	-10.6*** (2.386)	-9.4*** (2.401)
Constant	48.336 (24.029)	46.717* (18.586)	69.90*** (14.365)	81.72*** (14.728)	74.06*** (13.861)	37.432* (16.314)	61.88*** (15.338)	52.629** (17.993)	46.241** (12.587)
Observations	872	865	872	872	865	872	872	573	160
R-squared	.401	.439	.408	.422	.39	.489	.478	.477	.56

OLS coefficients. Robust standard errors (clustered by country) are in parentheses

*** $p < .001$, ** $p < .01$, * $p < .05$

Table A4.10

How Normative, Instrumental and Enforcement Resources Moderate Link Between ECEC/Par.-leave (Output) and Employment (outcome)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
	Empl. Rate	Empl. Rate	Empl. Rate	Empl. Rate	Empl. Rate	Empl. Rate	Empl. Rate	Empl. Rate	Empl. Rate
Generos. Parent-leave	-19.13 (30.815)	32.41*** (7.69)	-4.296 (4.489)	4.796*** (1.284)	-2.812 (3.222)	4.075 (31.232)	-14.33 (7.484)	-13.246 (9.543)	.592 (1.639)
Democracy	1.292 (2.119)								
Gen.P.-leave X Dem.	2.615 (3.129)								
Info. Transpar.		.403** (.123)							
Gen.P.-leave X Inf.T.		-.369** (.112)							
Right-to-strike			-1.744 (2.113)						
Gen.P.-leave X Strike			4.752* (1.963)						
Labor power index				-2.211 (1.857)					
Gen.P.-leave X Lab.Pow.				2.907* (1.184)					
Worker rights					-4.318 (2.302)				
Gen.P.-lve X Work.Right.					5.523** (1.852)				
Female empowerment						3.543* (1.452)			
Gen.P.-leave X Fem.emp.						.166 (3.303)			
Judic. Non-corruption							2.82 (2.185)		
Gen.P.lve X Jud.Noncor.							5.64* (2.113)		
Confid. in police								.75 (3.638)	
Gen.P.-leave X Conf.pol.								6.704 (3.282)	
Labor inspections									4.295* (1.965)
Gen.P.-leave X Lab.insp.									-4.122 (2.17)
GDP growth	.198 (.262)	.246 (.264)	.214 (.241)	.103 (.249)	.147 (.272)	.226 (.252)	.107 (.22)	.211 (.277)	.221 (.332)
Left government	-.019 (.017)	-.015 (.014)	-.008 (.015)	-.011 (.017)	-.016 (.016)	-.023 (.016)	-.008 (.018)	-.007 (.016)	-.03 (.028)
Depend. Popul.	-.044 (.161)	.152 (.14)	-.049 (.143)	-.06 (.154)	-.036 (.148)	.027 (.133)	-.217 (.148)	-.175 (.162)	.552* (.219)
Trade openness	.002 (.014)	.01 (.013)	.015 (.014)	.018 (.015)	.014 (.015)	.005 (.012)	.019 (.013)	.021 (.017)	.025 (.026)
EU	-10.2*** (1.933)	-10.1*** (1.814)	-12.0*** (1.651)	-10.5*** (1.613)	-11.5*** (1.734)	-11*** (1.814)	-8.4*** (1.878)	-10.6*** (1.835)	-8.99** (2.418)
_cons	57.935* (23.842)	31.984* (12.25)	74.51*** (8.131)	71.11*** (8.348)	77.59*** (8.369)	35.918* (16.142)	68.10*** (10.361)	73.43*** (11.623)	45.29*** (10.951)
Observations	829	826	829	829	815	829	829	561	153
R-squared	.568	.595	.571	.586	.567	.587	.628	.619	.553

OLS coefficients. Robust standard errors (clustered by country) are in parentheses
 *** $p < .001$, ** $p < .01$, * $p < .05$

Table A4.11

How Normative, Instrumental and Enforcement Resources Moderate Link Between
ECEC/Par.-leave (Output) and Employment (outcome)

	(1) At-risk-of- poverty	(2) At-risk-of- poverty	(3) At-risk-of- poverty	(4) At-risk-of- poverty	(5) At-risk-of- poverty	(6) At-risk-of- poverty
EPL (regular)	-.582 (.936)	18.956* (6.956)	-2.664 (7.841)			
Employment rate		.377 (.251)			-.064 (.161)	
EPL (reg.) X Empl.rate		-.288** (.101)				
Part-time/Temp. emp.			-.422 (.774)			.252 (.22)
EPL (reg.) X Part/Temp emp.			.092 (.31)			
EPL (temp./non-stand.)				.912 (.703)	8.715 (5.956)	8.439** (2.796)
EPL (temp.) X Empl.rate					-.127 (.087)	
EPL (temp.) X Part/Temp emp.						-.304* (.115)
GDP growth	-.044 (.094)	.054 (.06)	-.007 (.074)	-.028 (.091)	.066 (.06)	.055 (.052)
Left government	.006 (.014)	.005 (.013)	.005 (.013)	.001 (.014)	.003 (.014)	.004 (.013)
Depend. Popul.	.03 (.175)	.156 (.167)	.105 (.187)	0 (.177)	.115 (.157)	.015 (.175)
Trade openness	-.013 (.01)	-.006 (.007)	-.017 (.011)	-.014 (.008)	-.009 (.007)	-.029** (.008)
EU	4.458* (1.894)	2.053 (1.345)	3.633 (2.123)	3.971 (2.044)	.523 (2.139)	2.975 (2.013)
Constant	12.296 (9.444)	-18.433 (17.248)	19.686 (20.224)	11.669 (9.721)	13.598 (12.943)	6.731 (10.858)
Observations	164	163	164	164	163	164
R-squared	.192	.428	.279	.236	.405	.416

OLS coefficients. Robust standard errors (clustered by country) are in parentheses

*** $p < .001$, ** $p < .01$, * $p < .05$