

The impact of cost reductions in renewables on the value of carbon capture and storage

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SUMMARY

A growing school of thought argues that the falling cost of renewables could remove the need for carbon capture and storage (CCS) in mitigation pathways. This view contrasts with much integrated assessment modelling which has highlighted a critical role of CCS. Using a global integrated assessment model, we explore how the value of CCS is impacted by cost reductions in solar photovoltaics, onshore and offshore wind. Cost reductions in these renewables erode the value of CCS by 15-96% across different energy system sectors. Renewables directly compete with CCS in electricity/hydrogen production, drive near-term emissions reductions through faster power sector decarbonisation and enable greater electrification of end-use sectors. All three channels erode the value of CCS in decarbonising energy systems. CCS is most valuable, and most resilient to low-cost renewables, in sustainable bioenergy and industrial applications, while the value of CCS in hydrogen and electricity generation is limited. This suggests that targeted, rather than blanket, CCS deployment represents the best strategy for achieving the Paris Agreement goals.

INTRODUCTION

The goal of international climate policy is clear – to limit warming to ‘well-below 2 °C’ and pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C¹. Despite this clarity, there remains widespread disagreement on the best means of achieving this goal. Many different technologies and strategies could be involved in reducing emissions, and most have their supporters and detractors. From hydrogen^{2,3} to demand reduction^{4,5}, CO₂ removal^{6,7} to bioenergy^{8,9} – debate continues on the relative merits of different proposed solutions to achieve the Paris Agreement goals. There is an urgent need for continued research to help policymakers understand which technologies are truly essential for decarbonisation, and which represent potentially costly or dangerous distractions to the task at hand. This can help policymakers design investment strategies which prioritise the most valuable technologies and therefore help achieve cost-effective and successful decarbonisation.

The exemplar amongst current debates concerns renewable energy, and whether it might render other low-carbon technology options, such as nuclear or carbon capture and storage (CCS), obsolete. Low-carbon scenarios demonstrate that renewable electricity will be the backbone of climate action, with a rapid expansion of clean electricity essential to reduce emissions¹⁰. In the IEA’s roadmap for achieving net zero by 2050, electricity generation more than doubles by mid-century due to electrification of end-use sectors, while the share of renewable electricity triples to 90%¹¹. This requires unprecedented deployment of variable renewable electricity in particular, with generation from wind and solar growing by 15- and 30-fold respectively by 2050.

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40 Historically, many low-carbon scenarios have suggested CCS will be a valuable complement to renewables
41 in reducing emissions^{12–16}. In the IPCC’s 5th assessment report (AR5) scenario database, the cost of limiting
42 warming to well-below 2 °C more than doubles if CCS is unavailable¹⁷. This substantial value arises in part
43 from the perceived versatility of CCS, which can be deployed in a range of energy system sectors. CCS is
44 an essential component of engineered CO₂ removal via BECCS¹⁸, can capture emissions from heavy
45 industry^{19,20} (particularly CO₂ released by chemical processes, which cannot be avoided by fuel-switching),
46 and has been proposed as a method for producing low-carbon hydrogen²¹ and electricity²². Integrated
47 Assessment Models (IAMs) in particular deploy large amounts of CCS – in scenarios which limit warming
48 to 1.5 °C with no/limited overshoot in the SR1.5 database, median CCS deployment reaches 8.5GtCO₂/y
49 in 2050, and over the century 790GtCO₂ is captured and stored²³, representing almost 20 years of current
50 CO₂ emissions²⁴.

51
52 The value of CCS as a low-carbon technology has been challenged in recent years. A growing school of
53 thought has suggested that renewables could provide all of the world’s energy needs by mid-century^{9,25–}
54 ³⁰, removing the need for CCS. The recent focus on net-zero emissions also presents challenges for CCS
55 deployment. CCS applied to fossil fuels may be low-carbon, but is not zero-carbon due to upstream
56 emissions and imperfect capture rates³¹. In a net-zero world, fossil CCS would therefore have to be paired
57 with CO₂ removal, which is a contentious and risky strategy⁶. In the Race to Zero³², CCS may therefore
58 struggle to keep pace with zero-carbon competitors. Concerns have also been raised around the feasibility
59 of large-scale CCS deployment^{33–36}, with CCS facing barriers such as limited CO₂ storage potential in some
60 regions³⁷ and challenges of resource availability^{33,38} (particularly in the case of BECCS).

61
62 Debate continues around the role of CCS in reducing emissions, and the extent to which renewables
63 render CCS obsolete. Energy systems which rely entirely on renewables face challenges relating to the
64 large-scale integration of variable renewables such as wind and solar^{39–41}. While solutions to these
65 challenges exist, concerns have been raised about the potential high cost of such systems. 100%
66 renewable energy systems may be technically viable, but they may not be the most cost-effective
67 mitigation strategy^{41,42}. Equally, given the scale of decarbonisation required and challenges in deploying
68 renewables at sufficient pace⁴³, CCS could provide a bridging role, helping reduce emissions from fossil
69 fuels while renewables scale up and supporting market development for key fuels like hydrogen⁴⁴. There
70 are also certain sectors where CCS is the only option for reducing emissions, particularly capturing process
71 emissions from industrial processes such as cement production⁴⁵. Prematurely excluding CCS as a low-
72 carbon technology could therefore prove counterproductive. While displaying lower deployment than
73 comparable IAM scenarios, the IEA’s Net Zero roadmap still sees a critical role for CCS, with 7.6GtCO₂/y
74 captured by 2050 across all sectors¹¹.

75
76 The debate on the relationship between CCS and renewables needs to account for real-world context,
77 where the fortunes of these technologies are markedly different. Renewables have experienced a decade
78 of unprecedented cost reductions and rapid deployment. The cost of electricity from solar photovoltaics
79 (PV) fell 85%, and the cost of onshore and offshore wind fell by 56% and 48% respectively over the last
80 decade⁴⁶. Installed capacity of solar, onshore and offshore wind has also grown rapidly, at 33%/y, 15%/y
81 and 27%/y respectively over the decade^{47,48}. A range of analyses have highlighted that energy system
82 models often overestimate the cost of renewables, with the greatest discrepancies observed in solar
83 power^{49–52}. This suggests that some contributions to the debate may be based on outdated evidence.

84
85 On the other hand, CCS has in many ways suffered a ‘lost decade’, marked by limited deployment^{53,54} and
86 falling expectations⁵⁵ for the technology. The majority of CCS projects initiated in the past 30 years have
87 failed^{56,57}. As of 2020, carbon capture capacity was 38.5MtCO₂/y⁵⁸ – approximately 0.1% of global

88 emissions²⁴. Currently-planned projects, if all successfully deployed, would lead to 115MtCO₂/y being
89 captured by 2030⁵⁸ – less than 10% the level required in the IEA’s roadmap¹¹. Multiple progress
90 assessments have highlighted that CCS deployment is significantly behind the level required by many low-
91 carbon scenarios^{54,59}.

92

93 There is an urgent need to revisit this debate and explore how real-world developments affect our
94 understanding. If recent progress in renewables and the potential for significant further cost reductions
95 are taken into account, does this undermine the case for CCS, and if so, how? This study aims to enrich
96 the related literature by addressing this question. Using TIAM-Grantham, a global IAM (Experimental
97 Procedures), we assess the value of CCS to policymakers concerned with achieving cost-effective
98 decarbonisation. We do so on a sectorally-resolved basis, exploring the value of CCS in biomass
99 applications (electricity and fuels), hydrogen production, industrial decarbonisation and fossil-based
100 electricity generation. We explore whether cost reductions in wind and solar reduce the value of CCS, and
101 if so, how and in which sectors of the energy system. The results of the analysis demonstrate the value of
102 CCS in different energy system sectors, and how this value is affected by cost reductions in renewables.
103 This can aid policymakers in designing investment strategies which prioritise the most valuable low-
104 carbon technologies and help achieve cost-effective and successful decarbonisation.

105

106 RESULTS

107 Integrated assessment models overestimate the cost of renewables

108 Renewable generation technologies have demonstrated rapid cost declines in the past decade⁴⁶, and IAMs
109 have been criticised for failing to account for this progress^{49–52}. It is vital that models use up-to-date costs
110 as inputs^{60–63}. We conduct a recent literature review^{11,49,64–69} to establish updated cost trajectories for
111 solar PV, onshore and offshore wind, distinguishing between utility scale and decentralised installations
112 where relevant. These costs are compared to those provided by Krey et al.⁶⁰, which reports the techno-
113 economic assumptions of a range of well-known IAMs (Supplemental Note 1).

114

115 Cost assumptions for renewable technologies in IAMs are generally more conservative than projections
116 from the recent literature (Figure 1). In all three technologies reviewed, the global average cost in Krey et
117 al. is above the average cost from reviewed literature. The discrepancy is greatest in the case of solar PV,
118 where recent literature suggests that capital costs could fall below \$200/kW by 2050 – 80% lower than
119 Krey et al. In the case of onshore/offshore wind, IAM projections are within the uncertainty range of
120 reviewed literature – however the literature still indicates the potential for substantial future cost
121 reductions which exceed the level observed in Krey et al. The exact reasons for these discrepancies are
122 unclear, but may include the difficulty of assigning modeller time to documentation/validation of inputs
123 when the majority of funding is for applied research⁷⁰, and the challenge for academic institutions to keep
124 abreast of real market development.

125

126 Interest is growing in improving the transparency and credibility of input assumptions to large-scale
127 IAMs^{62,71–73}, and as such, updates to wind/solar costs may have occurred in some IAMs since the
128 publication of Krey et al. However, central messages about the relative importance of low-carbon
129 technologies, as summarised in reports such as AR5⁷⁴ and SR1.5⁷⁵, appear to be based in part on cost data
130 that is substantially outdated. There is therefore value in revisiting this issue and exploring how results
131 change when renewable costs are updated.






Figure 1 | Cost projections for wind and solar

Figure 1 presents the capital cost of (A) solar PV, (B) onshore and (C) offshore wind in Krey *et al* (2019), alongside capital costs as calculated from a literature review of recent sources. The average of the literature review is shown in yellow diamonds, while the envelope presents the 90th percentile confidence interval. All data represents global average capital costs.

133 We use the data in Figure 1 to construct three cost trajectories for wind and solar – high, medium and
 134 low. High wind/solar costs are represented by Krey et al., with medium costs represented by the mean of
 135 the literature review. Low costs are represented by the 10th percentile (Experimental Procedures). We use
 136 these cost trajectories to explore whether, and how, cost reductions in renewables erode the value of CCS
 137 in mitigation pathways.

138

139 [Cost reductions in renewables erode the value of CCS](#)

140 Cost reductions in renewables erode the value of CCS significantly in almost all energy sectors (Figure 2).
 141 As the cost of wind/solar falls, the value of CCS in different energy system sectors is reduced by between
 142 15 and 96% of its value under scenarios with high cost projections for wind and solar (Table 1). The only

143 exception is the use of CCS in bio-liquids production, where the value of CCS increases very slightly with
 144 falling renewable costs. By underestimating the contribution that wind and solar can play in mitigating
 145 climate change⁵⁰, IAMs may have overestimated the role and value of CCS in mitigation pathways.

Sector	2 °C	1.75 °C
BECCS (Total)	-26%	-15%
BECCS (Liquids)	+6%	+14%
BECCS (Power)	-36%	-16%
Fossil CCS	-71%	-61%
Hydrogen CCS	-96%	-84%
Industrial CCS	-35%	-31%

Table 1|The erosion in CCS value due to cost reductions in wind/solar generation

This table shows how the system value of CCS falls when moving from scenarios with high wind/solar costs to those with low costs. This is expressed as a percentage reduction in system value – for example, in 2 °C scenarios, the value of industrial CCS is 35% lower in scenarios with low wind/solar costs compared to scenarios with high wind/solar costs. Note that there is a small synergy between falling renewable costs and the system value of BECCS for liquids production (Supplemental Note 3.3).

146
 147 The value of CCS, and the extent to which low-cost renewables erode this value, varies substantially
 148 between different sectors of the energy system. In modelled pathways, bioenergy with CCS (BECCS) has
 149 the greatest value. BECCS is most valuable when deployed in the power sector, rather than liquids
 150 production (Supplementary Note 2.1). Industrial CCS is the second most valuable application, while the
 151 use of CCS in fossil fuel-based electricity generation and hydrogen production has much lower value in
 152 modelled scenarios, reducing mitigation costs by the order of only 1-2%.

153
 154 This merit order for carbon capture projects is also observed in the relationship between CCS and
 155 renewables. BECCS displays the lowest levels of value erosion, with its value falling by 15-30% under
 156 different temperature targets as the cost of renewables declines. The value of CCS in industry is reduced
 157 by approximately a third if cost reductions in wind/solar continue at rapid rates, compared to the more
 158 conservative projections from Krey et al. Meanwhile the value of CCS in electricity and hydrogen
 159 production, already low, is reduced substantially by low-cost renewables, falling by 61-96%.

160
 161 In modelled scenarios, cost reductions in renewables do erode the value of CCS noticeably. However, CCS
 162 retains value in reducing mitigation costs – particularly through use in industry and in combination with
 163 bioenergy to provide negative emissions. This suggests that targeted CCS deployment could remain a
 164 viable mitigation strategy.





Figure 2|Sectoral Value of CCS. (A) 2°C scenarios (B) 1.75°C scenarios.

Shows the value of CCS across the different sectors of the energy system, for three different wind/solar cost trajectories. The high-cost trajectory represents cost data taken from Krey et al., while the medium and low costs are the results of a literature review conducted by the authors. The sectoral value of CCS is measured by the increase in energy system costs that occurs when CCS is unavailable in each sector. This is expressed as a percentage increase from the default mitigation scenario, which is taken to be a scenario with full availability of CCS and with central cost projections for solar/wind generation (Experimental Procedures).

166 Channels by which low-cost renewables erode the value of CCS

167 We now explore the channels by which cost reductions in renewables erode the value of CCS. Exploring
168 the underlying mechanisms by which high-level results such as Figure 2 are produced can highlight policy
169 relevant insights from the analysis and can also help non-specialists to understand a complex model's
170 behaviour. This can improve the transparency and utility of models to policymakers⁷³. Supplemental Note
171 2 provides an in-depth exploration of energy transition dynamics.

172

173 BECCS

174 Many IAMs deploy large amounts of BECCS to help achieve long-term temperature goals⁷⁶. However, the
175 feasibility of BECCS remains uncertain, as successful BECCS deployment requires successfully upscaling
176 *both* CCS infrastructure and sustainable biomass supply^{38,77}. IAMs have been criticised for excessive
177 reliance on BECCS⁷⁸, and this analysis restricts the biomass potential to 100EJ/y to avoid unsustainable
178 levels of biomass consumption⁷⁹ (Experimental Procedures). BECCS deployment in modelled scenarios is
179 consistent with recent expert estimates of the feasible potential for BECCS⁸⁰ (Supplemental Figure 1).

180

181 The use of BECCS to generate electricity and fuels (both liquids and hydrogen) has the greatest value in
182 modelled scenarios. In 2 °C scenarios, mitigation costs approximately double in the absence of BECCS, and
183 in 1.75 °C scenarios costs almost triple. This high value should be understood in the context of BECCS being
184 the only negative emission technology (NET) represented in the analysis. With other NETs modelled, then
185 the value of BECCS would most likely be lower¹⁸. The value of BECCS in this analysis should therefore be
186 seen not as a direct requirement for specific biomass technologies, but a demonstration of the high value
187 of carbon dioxide removal (CDR) in modelled scenarios. In the main text we focus on the value of BECCS
188 as a group of technologies. Supplemental Note 2.1 discusses the relative value of BECCS across different
189 sectors, which reflects a trade-off between maximising the energetic and emissions value of biomass.

190

191 In modelled pathways, BECCS has value predominantly as a means of shifting mitigative effort into the
192 future (Supplemental Figure 2). BECCS allows TIAM-Grantham to overshoot a given carbon budget in the
193 near-term, compensating for this by negative emissions in the latter half of the century. This shifts
194 mitigation costs into the future, reducing overall system costs on a net present value (NPV) basis. Without
195 the flexibility provided by BECCS, there must be much greater near-term decarbonisation. The rate of
196 emissions reductions in the 2020s almost doubles from 2.4%/y to 4.3%/y in 2 °C scenarios without BECCS,
197 while in 1.75 °C scenarios the rate grows from 4.4%/y to 9.1%/y in the absence of BECCS.

198

199 This greater near-term action is driven by renewable electricity. A range of fuel-switching dynamics are
200 observed, including greater use of hydrogen, biofuels and solar thermal heating (Supplemental Figure 3).
201 However, all end-use sectors display faster electrification in the absence of BECCS (Supplemental Figure
202 4). In 2 °C scenarios, mid-century electricity demand rises by 12-16% in scenarios without BECCS,
203 compared to those with. The rate of electrification accelerates even further in 1.75 °C scenarios, with
204 electricity demand in 2050 rising by 36-42% in scenarios without BECCS. At the same time there is a faster
205 phaseout of unabated fossil fuels in the power sector (Supplemental Figure 4), with coal-fired generation
206 phased out by 2030, and unabated gas generation falling an additional 7-17% in 2 °C scenarios without
207 BECCS and falling an additional 10-62% in 1.75 °C scenarios.

208

209 Wind and solar play a central role in electrifying end-use sectors and accelerating the fossil fuels in the
210 power sector if BECCS is unavailable, with deployment accelerating to provide the necessary clean
211 electricity supply (Figure 3). In the near-term, the additional demand for clean electricity is met
212 predominantly by solar PV, which provides over half of additional renewable generation in 2030. In the
213 longer-term, offshore wind emerges as a key source of low-carbon electricity, meeting 45-60% of the

214 demand increase in 2050. Cost reductions in renewables enable this highly electrified energy system to
 215 be achieved at much lower costs, which reduces the economic value of BECCS to policymakers.
 216

Sectoral Value of BECCS in 2°C scenarios

And the role of low-cost renewables in eroding it




Figure 3|The value of BECCS, and how cost-reductions in renewables erode this value

Shows the impact on the energy system when BECCS is no longer available in the energy system in 2 °C scenarios. The impact is presented as a causal chain, distinguishing between the impact on the power/fuels production sectors, the wider system consequences, and the role that renewables play in compensating for the lack of BECCS. For a comparable figure for 1.75 °C scenarios, see Supplemental Figure 6.

217 *Industrial CCS*

218 CCS can be applied to a wide range of industrial processes to reduce emissions from both fuel combustion
 219 industrial processes such as clinker production⁸¹⁻⁸⁵. TIAM-Grantham represents over 20 different
 220 industrial CCS technologies, including options in steel, cement and chemicals production and onsite
 221 generation via gas CHP plants (Supplemental Table 4).

222
 223 Without industrial CCS, there is greater use of electricity and hydrogen to reduce emissions, with a faster
 224 switch from fossil fuels to electrification in chemicals manufacture, from blast-furnaces to green hydrogen
 225 in steel production, and from onsite fossil generation w/ CCS to renewable electricity for heat and power
 226 provision. Electricity therefore plays a more substantial role in industrial decarbonisation, providing 85%
 227 of final energy by 2100, up from 70% in scenarios in which CCS is available (Supplemental Figure 11).

228
 229 Without CCS, the pace and extent of industrial decarbonisation is slower. In the mid-term (out to 2050),
 230 the availability of zero-carbon electricity and hydrogen is limited, and so fossil fuels continue to be used.
 231 CCS could capture emissions from transitional fossil fuel use while zero-carbon alternatives scale, and so
 232 the absence of CCS leads to higher industrial emissions in the mid-term. There are also higher long-term
 233 industrial emissions due to limited decarbonisation of the cement sector. Here CCS is the only option to
 234 deal with process emissions that represent ~60% of cement’s carbon footprint⁸⁶.

235
 236 To compensate for these higher industrial emissions, there is greater near-term mitigation in the end-use
 237 sectors of buildings/transport. This is predominantly driven by a faster scale-up of hydrogen in transport,

238 and faster deployment of district heating in the buildings sectors. As with BECCS deployment failure, there
239 is also greater near-term power sector decarbonisation. In 2 °C scenarios without industrial CCS, coal
240 generation in 2030 is reduced by 25% compared to scenarios with industrial CCS. In 1.75 °C scenarios,
241 fossil fuels are already being phased out of the power sector at very rapid rates, with a global coal
242 phaseout by 2030. However, there is a faster gas phaseout, with 2030 gas generation 15% lower in
243 scenarios without industrial CCS compared to those with.

244

245 This suggests that industrial CCS provides value through three channels:

- 246 1. CCS plays a significant role in cost-optimal industrial decarbonisation. In some sectors (chemicals
247 and steel) this role is transitional, with CCS reducing emissions from continued fossil fuel use
248 while the availability of zero-carbon electricity and hydrogen scales up to meet demand. In other
249 sectors such as cement manufacture, CCS has a long-term role due to its unique ability to abate
250 process emissions.
- 251 2. By facilitating deep mitigation in industry (particularly cement), industrial CCS allows the pace of
252 near-term mitigation in the end-use sectors of buildings/transport to be relaxed.
- 253 3. This deeper industrial decarbonisation reduces the pace of fossil fuel phaseout in the power
254 sector required.

255

256 As in the case of BECCS, low-cost renewables erode the value of industrial CCS by enabling cheaper and
257 faster electrification of end-use sectors (in this case predominantly industry) and accelerating the
258 phaseout of fossil fuels in the power sector. In the absence of industrial CCS, solar and wind provide much
259 of the long-term electricity generation required to electrify industry and the near-term generation
260 required to drive fossil fuels out of the power sector (Figure 4). Cost reductions in renewables allow this
261 to occur at a lower cost, thereby eroding the value of industrial CCS in modelled scenarios.

262

263 *Fossil CCS in electricity and hydrogen production*

264 In these sectors, CCS has value as a source of low-carbon energy. This value is the lowest of all CCS
265 applications and is also most sensitive to the falling cost of renewables, falling by 64-96% if wind/solar
266 continue their rapid cost reductions.

267

268 In modelled scenarios, the deployment of fossil CCS in the power sector is relatively low. Coal-fired CCS
269 generation is never deployed, and the deployment of gas with CCS is minimal. In 2°C scenarios, fossil CCS
270 provides 0.04-0.2% of electricity generation over the time horizon, while in 1.75 °C scenarios it is slightly
271 higher, at 0.2-0.4%. This limited deployment is reflected in the value of CCS in the power sector, with
272 mitigation costs in TIAM-Grantham only rising by <0.5% if this technology is excluded. Cost reductions in
273 renewables erode the value of CCS in the power sector by directly competing with CCS as a low-carbon
274 electricity source. In 2 (1.75) °C scenarios, moving from high to low wind/solar cost projections reduces
275 fossil CCS generation by 76 (41) %. By providing an alternative and cheaper source of low-carbon power
276 and directly reducing CCS deployment, low-cost solar and wind significantly erode the value of CCS in
277 modelled pathways.

278

279 Blue hydrogen is produced by converting methane into hydrogen and CO₂, capturing and storing the CO₂
280 produced²¹. In modelled scenarios, blue hydrogen has value as a bridging technology, enabling the scaleup
281 of hydrogen markets while the availability of green hydrogen remains low due to limited availability of

Sectoral Value of Industrial CCS in 2°C scenarios

And the role of low-cost renewables in eroding it




Figure 4|The value of industrial CCS, and how cost reductions in renewables erode this value

Shows the impact on the energy system when industrial CCS industry is unavailable. The impact is presented as a causal chain, distinguishing between the impact on the industrial sector, the impact on other energy system sectors, and the role that low-cost wind/solar generation plays in eroding the value of CCS. For a comparable figure covering 1.75 °C scenarios, see Supplemental Note 2.2

**In 2°C pathways, only scenarios with medium or low wind/solar costs see renewables displacing coal generation. In scenarios with high wind and solar costs, there is coal-to-gas switching instead.*

282 surplus renewable electricity for electrolysis. In both 2 and 1.75 °C scenarios, blue hydrogen produced by
 283 methane reforming with CCS is the predominant near-term source of hydrogen production, but then is
 284 scaled back as electrolysis takes over. As a bridging technology, blue hydrogen demonstrates substantial
 285 transition risk, with the potential for significant asset stranding as CCS is phased out in favour of
 286 electrolysis if too much capacity has been installed on the way up the bridge. This poses a challenge to
 287 blue hydrogen investment strategies.

288
 289 Cost reductions in renewables erode the value of CCS in hydrogen production by making electrolysis a
 290 more competitive route for hydrogen production. This reduces the scale of CCS deployment in hydrogen
 291 production, with deployment falling by 60-90% as wind/solar costs fall. Cost reductions in renewables also
 292 reduce the cost of deploying additional electrolysis if CCS is unavailable in hydrogen production. As a
 293 result, low-cost renewables severely undermine the value case for CCS in hydrogen production, reducing
 294 its system value by 87-96%.

295
 296 This exploration of the channels by which renewables and CCS interact demonstrates that achieving deep
 297 decarbonisation without CCS requires greater reliance on renewable electricity to reduce emissions. Cost
 298 reductions in renewables erode the value of CCS by three different dynamics. In some sectors (CCS in
 299 electricity/hydrogen production), low-cost renewables directly outcompete and displace CCS. In other

300 sectors (industry and BECCS), CCS and renewables are not direct competitors, but cost reductions in
301 renewables enable faster power sector decarbonisation and greater electrification of end-use sectors,
302 which can compensate for deployment failure in CCS. However, even in the event of significant cost-
303 reductions in renewables, CCS maintains considerable value in these sectors.

304

305 The impact of discount rate variations and CCS cost on results

306 Equity considerations should be central to the assessment of mitigation pathways^{87–89}. In central analytical
307 scenarios, a discount rate of 5% is applied to all future energy system costs. To assess how different
308 perspectives on intergenerational equity affect results, these scenarios were reproduced using lower
309 discount rates of 3% and 1% (Supplemental Note 3). The relationship between the value of CCS and the
310 cost of renewables is robust to variations in the discount rate. However, the value of some CCS
311 applications is highly sensitive to the discount rate applied. The value of BECCS falls by two-thirds when
312 moving from a discount rate of 5% to 1%, while the value of industrial CCS remains robust to variations in
313 the discount rate. This suggests the value of BECCS may be overestimated by scenarios with high discount
314 rates of 3.5-5%⁹⁰, which display a structural disposition to delay near-term action in preference for late-
315 term CDR.

316

317 Previous analysis has found that CCS deployment in the power sector is sensitive to its investment cost⁹¹.
318 Using three different cost trajectories for CCS (Experimental Procedures), we explore how cost reductions
319 in CCS affect the results. The sensitivity of system value to the cost of CCS varies substantially across
320 different CCS applications (Supplemental Figure 15). The greatest sensitivity is observed in fossil CCS for
321 electricity generation, whose value varies by $\pm 60\%$ across different CCS cost trajectories. The next most
322 sensitive sectors are CCS for hydrogen production and bio-liquids production, where the value of CCS
323 varies by 20% as CCS costs vary. The value of CCS in industry and bio-electricity is least sensitive to
324 variations in CCS capital costs, with system value changing by only 1-2%.

325

326 DISCUSSION

327 The notion of technology value is becoming increasingly critical, as policymakers with limited time and
328 resources must now make decisions around the role, value and hence prioritisation of different low-
329 carbon technologies. Alongside other areas for improved IAM analysis including greater representation of
330 societal transformations⁹² and new scenario frameworks⁹³, better understanding of the value of different
331 low-carbon technologies and interaction between potentially competing technologies is essential. Here
332 we perform a detailed investigation into how cost reductions in onshore wind, offshore wind and solar PV
333 erode the value of CCS in different energy system sectors. As well as exploring high-level IAM results, we
334 assess the underlying channels by which CCS has value, and by which renewables can erode this value.
335 Greater exploration of model behaviour and the role of key techno-economic assumptions in governing
336 model results can improve both model transparency and legitimacy, helping ensure results are of greatest
337 utility to policymakers.

338

339 Using this approach, we demonstrate that cost reductions in renewables erode the value of CCS in
340 mitigation pathways by 15-96% across different sectors of the energy system. It is essential that debates
341 around the value of different low-carbon technologies use best available evidence on technology costs.
342 This is particularly true in the case of wind/solar, where costs continue to fall rapidly. By underestimating
343 the pace of technological progress in renewables, IAMs may overestimate the value of CCS in achieving
344 deep decarbonisation. Despite challenges in doing so, models can, and should, do better in keeping
345 abreast of technological developments. This has implications for a range of scenarios and models in the
346 literature which have been criticised for failing to account for technological progress in renewables^{49–52}.

347
348 Our results also show that it is unhelpful to explore the value of CCS as a single, catch-all technology, as
349 in previous studies^{12,13}. CCS can be deployed in diverse contexts, and its value, and the resilience of this
350 value to low-cost renewables, varies substantially across energy system sectors. Our analysis
351 demonstrates that key to the question of technology value is the concept of substitutability. When one
352 low-carbon technology can be readily substituted by another, then its value is likely to be lower, and it
353 will also be more sensitive to cost reductions in the competitor technology. This is the case for CCS in the
354 power sector and in hydrogen production, where renewable electricity is a direct competitor. Here the
355 value of CCS is limited and is also substantially eroded by cost reductions in renewables. The economic
356 case for CCS deployment in these sectors is therefore minimal, particularly if the cost of renewables
357 continues to fall. Our analysis highlights that this value is also most sensitive to uncertain CCS costs, which
358 could further undermine the value if sufficient cost reductions are not achieved. Other work has
359 highlighted substantial challenges to the energetic case for CCS in the power sector⁹⁴, as renewables
360 exhibit much better returns on energy invested. Considering the energetic and economic challenges
361 summarised here, CCS deployment in the power sector appears to be a technology of very limited value
362 in achieving deep decarbonisation.

363
364 On the other hand, our analysis suggests that priority areas for CCS deployment are for provision of CDR,
365 and to capture industrial emissions, particularly process emissions from cement production. These are
366 areas where CCS provides a unique function, and the direct substitutability with renewables is low. Low-
367 cost renewable electricity cannot abate process emissions in the industrial sector, or directly lead to CDR.
368 As a result, CCS has greater system value in these sectors, and, while cost reductions in renewables do
369 erode this value noticeably, it is more robust to technological progress in wind and solar than the value of
370 CCS elsewhere.

371
372 The heterogeneous value of CCS across different applications suggests that targeted, rather than blanket,
373 support for CCS represents the best climate policy. We note that CCS deployment in industry/BECCS could
374 in principle be entirely decoupled from fossil fuel consumption, with CCS facilitating removals and
375 capturing process-based emissions even in a 100% renewable energy system. Targeted CCS deployment
376 could therefore occur alongside an aggressive fossil fuel phaseout, rather than being seen as inherently
377 supporting continued fossil fuel consumption.

378
379 In contrast to wind and solar, which have a proven track-record of rapid deployment and significant cost
380 reductions over the past decade, CCS faces significant barriers to achieving large-scale deployment³³⁻³⁷.
381 Experience of the past three decades^{56,57} and current investment plans⁵⁸ suggest a non-negligible
382 possibility that CCS will fail to be deployed at scale. This again highlights the value of targeted, rather than
383 blanket, support for CCS. Our analysis demonstrates that cost reductions in renewables can increase
384 resilience to CCS deployment failure. In some sectors (fossil generation and hydrogen production),
385 renewables can directly replace CCS, while in other sectors (industrial CCS and BECCS), renewables can
386 insure against deployment failure by driving faster power sector decarbonisation and greater
387 electrification of end-use sectors. Policymakers can use low-cost wind and solar to build resilience against
388 CCS failure, by providing policy frameworks which prioritise renewables over fossil CCS in
389 hydrogen/electricity generation, by seizing the opportunity presented by low-cost renewables to drive
390 fossil fuels out of the power sector, and by supporting electrification in the end-use sectors of transport,
391 buildings and industry. This can reduce the value of CCS in mitigation pathways, and thereby build
392 resilience to potential CCS deployment failure.

393

394 This analysis focuses on the economic value of technologies in reducing CO₂ emissions. However,
 395 technologies have numerous other social and environmental impacts, which should also be accounted for
 396 by policymakers when assessing the relative merits of different technologies. Impacts of central concern
 397 include the land/material requirements for a given technology, the health impacts, and the potential for
 398 technologies to support economic activity²⁷. In each of these dimensions, CCS and renewables could have
 399 very different effects. We review existing literature on these wider sustainability considerations (Table 2).
 400

Impact Variable	CCS	Wind/solar generation
Land requirements	Can have high land requirements, particularly if dedicated biomass crops are used for BECCS ^{77,95,96} . With an ecologically constrained biomass potential (as assumed in this analysis), land requirements are reduced as some of the biomass can be sourced from residues ^{79,97} .	Minimal land requirements compared to alternative power generation technologies ^{9,27,98}
Material requirements	Has significant water requirements which could pose a barrier to deployment ³³ , and continued fossil fuel utilisation leads to large non-renewable resource requirements ⁹⁸ . Dedicated biomass crops can have largescale fertiliser demands ^{77,95} .	Requires rare earth metals and minerals in excess of most alternative generation technologies ^{98,99} . Current and future supply of critical minerals falls short of the level needed to rapidly accelerate renewables deployment ⁹⁹ , and so expanding and diversifying supply chains will be essential. Increased recycling rates and material efficiency can also reduce this footprint ¹⁰⁰ .
Health Impacts	Biomass/fossil combustion for energy production results in PM ₁₀ and PM _{2.5} formation ¹⁰¹ . Fossil fuel extraction can also lead to toxic substances released into the biosphere ¹⁰² .	No particulate formation from electricity generation. Toxic metals can be released during use or end-of-life stage of solar PV ¹⁰³ .
Ability to create jobs	CCS requires expertise in process and industrial engineering, which can be a source of high quality employment for localities ¹⁰⁴ . CCS is a design-intensive, providing a large number of local jobs in infrastructure deployment ^{105,106} . CCS could help facilitate a just transition by reducing job losses in the fossil fuel industry ¹⁰⁷ .	Studies suggest that the job-creation potential of renewables could more than offset job losses in the fossil fuel sector ^{9,27,108} . Solar PV is a manufacturing-intensive technology with a global supply-chain, and thus fully capturing the job-creation potential in any given locality could prove challenging ¹⁰⁶ . Wind turbines are relatively easy to manufacture, and so localisation of production may be more achievable. However, the capabilities required for design and system integration of wind turbines are high, and so it may be harder to capture this element of the value chain ¹⁰⁶ .

Table 2 – The wider implications of CCS and renewables

Summarises recent research on the land, resource, health and employment impacts of CCS and wind/solar.

401 Ultimately, the wider implications of both CCS and solar PV deployment will be project- and context-
402 specific and should be accounted for by policymakers. However, the literature suggests that CCS is more
403 likely to transgress sustainability boundaries around land, material and health impacts than renewables.
404 Potential sustainability concerns around CCS deployment again suggest that CCS should be prioritised for
405 use-cases where substitute technologies are lacking or limited (sustainable biomass with CCS and
406 capturing process-based emissions), rather than areas where low-cost renewables represent a feasible
407 alternative (fossil-based hydrogen/electricity generation). Further work could account for a wider range
408 of societal goals in the valuation of technologies and explore how the results change under broader
409 perspectives¹⁰⁹.

410
411 Further work could also expand this analysis to assess how the value of CCS is affected by cost reductions
412 in other key low-carbon technologies such as battery storage¹¹⁰, electrolysis¹¹¹ and high-temperature
413 electric heat¹¹², all of which will be essential in moving to a fossil-free energy system. By performing a
414 detailed analysis on the relationship between CCS and renewables, this study has been able to explore
415 the underlying model dynamics in detail, but could be complemented by analysis which considers a larger
416 number of uncertainties concurrently^{113,114}. As well as expanding the technological scope of analysis, it
417 would be beneficial to explore how results depend on a wider range of uncertain factors, including future
418 demand growth¹¹⁵, variations in socio-economics¹¹⁶ and deviations from cost-optimality¹¹⁷. The factors
419 assessed here (cost of renewables, cost/availability of CCS, discount rate and temperature target) have
420 been identified by the authors as salient uncertainties in the relationship between CCS and renewables,
421 which can address the needs of IAM stakeholders making contemporary policy decisions¹¹⁸, but other
422 factors could also prove influential in scenario production¹¹⁹. Whilst our approach sets out a clear story of
423 the relationship between CCS and renewables, it is not necessarily the only story¹²⁰. We therefore
424 encourage further research into this critical area, using a range of models and futures analysis methods¹²¹.
425 The transparency with which we describe underlying model dynamics should, however, help guide
426 decision-making in further CCS investment in light of costs reductions in renewables, as well as help to
427 provide ex-post validation of them in light of real-world developments^{117,119}. Finally, variations in the
428 spatiotemporal resolution of analysis are critical in modelling high penetration of renewables
429 appropriately^{122–124}. This analysis uses a global model with a long-term time horizon and could be
430 complemented by additional analysis using high-resolution energy system models. These factors mean
431 that the value of CCS as presented in this analysis should be seen as an upper estimate, which would be
432 reduced when the broader sustainability agenda²⁷, more granular modelling^{28–30}, consideration of other
433 competing technologies^{110–112} and representation of limits to CCS deployment^{33–37} are accounted for.

434
435 CCS has in many ways suffered a ‘lost decade’, marked by limited deployment⁵⁸ and falling expectations⁵⁵
436 for the technology. Despite this, CCS remains valuable in meeting the goals of the Paris Agreement, and
437 demonstration and deployment should be welcomed. However, not all forms of CCS should be supported,
438 with our analysis suggesting that targeted CCS deployment in particular sectors, complementing
439 renewable energy as the primary form of decarbonisation, can provide the best value case for CCS
440 investment and avoid transgressing wider sustainability boundaries. This will require targeted
441 demonstration projects in the near-term to accelerate appropriate CCS deployment. Previous
442 demonstration projects have been poorly coordinated⁵³, and a similar lack of coherency is currently
443 observable, with many CCS projects still focused on power sector CCS⁵⁸, despite the limited value case for
444 this technology. This risks squandering a critical decade for CCS on applications for which there is a weak
445 or non-existent rationale.

446
447 This analysis highlights that the falling cost of renewable electricity erodes the value of CCS substantially
448 by directly competing with CCS, driving faster power sector decarbonisation and facilitating greater

449 electrification of end-use sectors. Nevertheless, CCS remains valuable in industry and bioenergy
450 applications if we are to reduce emissions in a least-cost manner. Policymakers must therefore redouble
451 their efforts to develop and deploy CCS in these applications as soon as possible.
452

453 EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES

454 Resource Availability

455 *Lead Contact*

456 Further information and requests for resources and materials should be directed to and will be fulfilled
457 by the Lead Contact, Neil Grant (n.grant18@imperial.ac.uk).

458 *Materials Availability*

459 This study did not generate new unique reagents.

460 *Data and Code Availability*

461 All data presented in this paper is available in the Supplemental Data, and also at the following DOI:
462 10.5281/zenodo.5521118.
463

464 TIAM-Grantham

465 The integrated assessment model used in this study, TIAM-Grantham, represents all major processes
466 governing the operation of the energy system. TIAM-Grantham is a least-cost optimisation model,
467 calculating the portfolio of technologies which meet future energy service demands at minimum cost,
468 subject to user-defined constraints such as cumulative carbon budgets. The analysis assumes partial
469 equilibrium within energy markets, allowing demand to respond endogenously to changes in energy
470 prices. In this analysis, TIAM-Grantham is run with perfect foresight.
471

472 TIAM-Grantham is a bottom-up technology-rich model^{125–127}, representing over 30 different CCS
473 technologies (Supplemental Table 1). This detailed representation of energy conversion technologies,
474 coupled with the least-cost optimising solution method, makes TIAM-Grantham ideally suited to exploring
475 the sectoral value of CCS in mitigation pathways. A literature review was undertaken to ensure that the
476 costs of relevant technologies were up to date (Supplemental Tables 2-4).
477

478 The critically important notion of technology value has not been firmly defined in the literature and here
479 we set out our own definition. We take a global perspective, examining how global energy system costs
480 change when the cost and availability of different technologies are varied. We also take a long-term
481 perspective, considering the present value of the energy system over the remainder of this century.
482 Discount rates of 1, 3 and 5% are applied to future energy system costs. The system value of a technology
483 is defined as the increase in net present energy system costs to meet a given emissions target that occurs
484 when that technology is unavailable. In this sense we closely follow other analysis^{12,13,17,128}.
485

486 IAMs have come under increasing pressure to improve transparency around the role of model inputs and
487 structure in driving results^{129,130}. A variety of solutions have been proposed, including open-source
488 modelling¹³¹, model diagnostics^{132,133}, and publication of model inputs⁶⁰. In this analysis we publish all
489 relevant input assumptions and model outputs to improve transparency (Supplemental Tables 2-4 and
490 Supplemental Data), as well as conducting a detailed exploration of the underlying dynamics, which can
491 help end-users understand model behaviour.
492

493 IAMs have also been criticised for exhibiting structural bias against complete energy system transitions¹³⁴,
494 due to the common assumption of constant elasticity of substitution (CES) in underlying model structure.
495 TIAM-Grantham does not use CES functions and therefore can model complete substitution of

496 technologies in the energy mix. In all sectors, alternative low-carbon technologies to CCS are represented
497 that can entirely displace fossil fuel consumption, except in the case of cement, where all deep
498 decarbonisation measures modelled (alternative cement chemistries, greater biomass utilisation or use
499 of CCS) involve some continued fossil fuel consumption.
500

501 Scenario Design

502 Mitigation scenarios presented apply cumulative CO₂ constraints to limit end-of-century warming to one
503 of two long-term temperature goals, 2 and 1.75 °C. Carbon budgets from 2018-2100 are 1170GtCO₂ and
504 800GtCO₂ for 2 and 1.75 °C targets respectively⁷⁵, which are associated with a 66% probability of achieving
505 this temperature threshold. While significant benefits of limiting warming to 1.5 °C have been
506 demonstrated in the literature, 1.5 °C scenarios are not assessed. This is because our analytical method
507 involves taking a central mitigation scenario and further constraining it by limiting CCS availability. In a
508 scenario design which has stringent limits on the feasible scale of negative emissions, 1.5 °C scenarios are
509 already near the threshold of feasibility. Further constraining 1.5 °C scenarios lead to TIAM-Grantham
510 being unable to solve, and so meaningful information on the value of CCS cannot be extracted. We focus
511 instead on the temperature goals of 1.75° and 2 °C, for which information on the value of CCS can be
512 extracted.
513

514 Our scenario design encompasses variations in the cost of renewables, CCS costs, and CCS availability. All
515 scenarios included use demographic and socio-economic drivers aligned with the Shared Socioeconomic
516 Pathway SSP2¹³⁵ and include a limit on biomass utilisation of 100EJ/y, a sustainable biomass potential for
517 which there is high agreement in the literature⁷⁹.
518

519 We use three levers to create a scenario set exploring the value of CCS given cost reductions in
520 renewables. We first vary the sectoral availability of CCS, precluding deployment in a certain sector – for
521 example in industry. By calculating the change in total energy system costs relative to a mitigation scenario
522 with full technology availability, we can calculate the system value of CCS on a sectoral basis.
523

524 Second, we vary the cost of renewables, using three different cost trajectories constructed on the basis
525 of the literature review (Supplemental Note 1). This allows us to understand how the value of CCS is
526 eroded by cost reductions in wind/solar. The cost of energy storage technologies will be crucial in enabling
527 intermittent renewables to displace conventional power systems²⁸⁻³⁰. In this analysis, PV and wind
528 generation is accompanied by the deployment of battery storage, based on detailed power sector
529 assessments of the storage requirements for high penetrations of renewables¹³⁶, with cost projections are
530 taken from recent literature¹³⁷. Further work could explore how additional cost reductions in storage
531 could further erode the value of CCS across different energy system sectors.
532

533 Third, we conduct sensitivity analysis into how future cost reductions in CCS affect its value. The central
534 analysis in this work assumes that the incremental cost of CCS declines by 40% over the century due to
535 technological learning. We construct two alternative cost trajectories – an advanced progress scenario, in
536 which incremental costs falls 70% over the century, and a frozen progress scenario in which there are no
537 cost reductions in CCS technologies. We model these cost reductions as an exponential cost decline over
538 time¹³⁸. In this way we follow the same rates of technological progress as assumed by other work in the
539 literature exploring the role of CCS in mitigation pathways¹⁴.
540

541 Analysis is repeated for both long-term temperature goals, and for three different discount rates. These
542 variations allow us to explore the sectoral value of CCS for a given long-term temperature goal (LTTG),
543 wind/solar cost trajectory, CCS cost and discount rate (Equation 1).

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$$\begin{aligned}
 & \mathbf{Value}_{Sector_{\alpha}, LTTG_{\beta}, WS_{\gamma}, CCS_{\delta}, DR_{\epsilon}} \\
 &= \mathbf{SystemCost}_{NoCCS in Sector_{\alpha}, LTTG_{\beta}, WS_{\gamma}, CCS_{\delta}, DR_{\epsilon}} \\
 &- \mathbf{SystemCost}_{FullTechPortfolio, LTTG_{\beta}, WS_{\gamma}, CCS_{\delta}, DR_{\epsilon}}
 \end{aligned}$$

where:

- ❖ α represents the sector under consideration (e.g., hydrogen production)
- ❖ β represents the LTTG under consideration
- ❖ γ represents the cost trajectory for wind and solar PV
- ❖ δ represents the CCS cost trajectory
- ❖ ϵ represents the discount rate applied

This is expressed as a percentage increase of the mitigation cost in our reference mitigation scenario, which is a scenario with the same LTTG, but with central wind, solar and CCS cost projections and a full technology portfolio. Combining these assumptions gives a set of over 250 scenarios, which form the basis of the analysis (Table 3). Individual scenarios can be identified by a combination of these assumptions.

Long-Term Temperature Goal	Sectoral Availability of CCS	Wind/Solar Cost Trajectory	CCS Cost Trajectory	Discount Rate
2 °C 1.75 °C	Full technology portfolio			
	No BECCS in all sectors			
	No BECCS in power sector	High Costs	High Costs	1%
	No BECCS in liquids production	Medium Costs	Medium Costs	3%
	No CCS in fossil power sector	Low Costs	Low Costs	5%
No CCS in hydrogen production				
No CCS in industry				

Table 3 | Scenario Design Framework

Table describes the main parameter variations which create the set of scenarios which are used in the analysis. CCS and discount rate variations are applied separately, creating a set of $2 \times 7 \times 3 \times (3+3) = 252$ scenarios, which form the basis of the analysis.

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AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS

N.G. developed the initial research hypothesis and experimental design, performed the modelling, produced the figures and wrote the manuscript. A.G. contributed to the research hypothesis and experimental design and supported in writing the manuscript. A.H and T.N. provided advice on experimental design, research direction and reviewed and revised the manuscript.

DECLARATION OF INTERESTS

None to declare.

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