

## Confidence Building Measures between India and Pakistan 1998-2004 (Critical Analysis)

Muhammad Touqeer Akhter Nasir, Attaullah Jan, Farmanullah, Naheed Hussain, Qaim Ahmad

Article Info	Abstract
<p><b>Article History</b></p> <p>Received: May 06, 2021</p> <p>Accepted: August 15, 2021</p> <hr/> <p><b>Keywords :</b> CBMs, Lahore Accord, Indo-Pak friendship, Peace Talks, Kashmir Dispute</p> <p><b>DOI:</b> 10.5281/zenodo.5203271</p>	<p><i>India and Pakistan both are South Asian nuclear states, having a historical animosity that mainly stems from unresolved Kashmir issue. Both states realized the importance of peace therefore went for the negotiations after every battle. However, neither war nor negotiation could lead to the permanent solution. This article presents a critical analysis of the talks and negotiations held from 1998 to 2004 in order to restore peace and to resolve conflicts between both neighbors. The official documents i.e. declarations, agreements and recommendations of the CBMs have provided quite solid material for analytical discussion. Though a great desire of resolving all issues peacefully, including the issue of water and Kashmir through dialogue on both sides have been explored from this analysis, however the resilient elements prevail and deteriorate the peace process on both sides. The role of media has also been found negative in making public opinion. If the international law is implemented and the people of Kashmir are given their right of self-determination under the UNO resolutions both countries can live in peace and address their other issues</i></p>

### Introduction

Confidence Building Measures (CBM's) are actually the actions taken by two or more than two parties in a smooth running, sensitive or tense situation for holding peace and harmony. Commonly faith is developed that the concerned parties will obey the mutual agreements without any external agent. The exchange of cultural delegations, playing common games, combined demonstrations of folk music and poeticconcerts, peace talks, proper intimation before any military exercise, predefined deadly weapons tests or timelyinformed movements on border areas are the trust building steps which are supposed to be taken to maintain peace in the region. Mostly the parties, states or countries are mutually agreed on the issue of common interest which can develop more trust on each other (Kumar, 2012).

As for as the peace of Southern Asian Region was concerned, it was quite sure that, it was associated with the twins born in the month of August, 1947. The economic and political stability of the countries and the region, collectively or individually, was dependent on the peace talks, achievable, sustainable, institutionalized and effective cooperation and set of CBMs. The nuclear tests of 1998 vaporized all the previous effort to reduce the tensions but it reached at the dangerous flash point (Singh, 2004). The situation could be cashed by none state elements or the spark on the borders could result in another dangerous and deadly war like before as both the parties experienced three major and two minor adventures on the borders. It was the time to talk and reduce tensions which increased the rate of the pulse of the forces and resident living on both the sides of the borders. After all the discussions, fights or duels there was still a need of enforcing the existing CBMs and to have more practical and effective CBMs at all the governmental and national levels. The Atal Behari Vajpayee and Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif and General Pervez Musharraf tried their best to get proper solution for the burning issues like terrorism, Kashmir and reduction in nuclear weapons but both the hard liners nations did not show flexibility over the issues which made the Lahore Summit, Agra Summit and Islamabad Summit unachieved. Then the Kargil adventure spoiled all the efforts but again an effort was made by Atal Behari Vajpayee and General Pervez Musharraf with a great will of getting any proper solution but again reached at dead end (Chari, 2009). This paper is an attempt to investigate all the aspects of the CBMs during the second and third term of the Atal Behari Vajpayee.

### Historical development of CBMs

CBMs remained the mean for several hundred years to stop violence, avoid the conflicts and a smooth journey towards the peaceful settlements. We saw several CBMs in the world history from the World War II and onwards but its formal idea can be traced back to 1973 when Belgium and Italy drafted an agenda on cooperation and security in Europe. The United Nation used this phenomenon in military and non-military sense to reduce tension, fear and mistrust among the nations (Sing, 2016).

### Defining CBMs?

There is no consensus on the exact and formal definition of the CBMs one can easily describe it rather than to define it, it can be said that it is a series of actions, undertakings, agreements or talks among the previously disagreed parties for the construction of confidence and belief. It assured the stability and reduced the chances of surprise, war and unpredictability. CBMs can be multilateral, bilateral and unilateral which can minimize the stress among the states, nations or blocks of the countries (Devabhaktuni, et al, 1998). CBMs never solved the problem but these are investments to modify the relations to reach at ultimate solution.

#### **Kinds of CBMs**

Basically the CBMs can be classified as Military CBMs and Non-Military CBMs;

#### **Military CBMs**

Military CBMs covers the military intentions of the participating states and it stops them to do any adventure. Lessen the uncertainty of the military movements. It enables the states to revisit the matters with another eye in friendly environment which mostly includes the misunderstandings and misjudgments (Sanfilipo, 2000). After the reliable exchange of military inelegance the CBMs can be made more and more rich which can ultimately result into good environment instead of non-stoop tensions. India and Pakistan have signed different agreements on different occasions to make consensus on the basic principles of military movements and exercises and obviously to avoid any mishap.

On 31 December 1988 the Prime Minister of Pakistan Benazir Bhutto and her Indian counterpart Rajiv Gandhi signed an accord which states that no damage will be made by any state or country to the nuclear facilities as well as nuclear installations of other country. Similarly on 6th April 1991 an other agreement took place with India on advance notification of the military exercises and also the prevention of airspace violations by any of military aircrafts which also established a no fly zone (Malhotra, 2005). Even this agreement was ratified in 1992 but till now this agreement was never implemented by the both the states.

#### **Nonmilitary CBMs**

Nonmilitary CBMs can further be divided following types.

a **Economic CBMs** are most common and reliable tie among the communities as it's a world of economy. Economy across the border means easy access to markets and reasonable rates as compare to international market. In the case of neighboring states the abolition of tariff and custom duties plays important role. Pakistan has given the status of most favorite nation to India but even then the exports to India are 1.6% (Pandian, 2005) of the overall exports. If this relation is once maintained then there is a greater chance of sound friendship because both the nation will avoid any conflict to save the economic interests.

b **Political CBMs** Political CBMs are very common among the communities all over the world. Political CBMs can lay foundations of other trusts building steps. The Prime Ministers of both the countries have met many times inside the country of each other and also at neutral points formally and also informally. Shimla accord and tashkanddeclaration are the recent examples of successful meeting while Indus basin treaty and Liaqat Nehru pact can be quoted as successful political meetings from the past (Sen, 1994). Meetings in cricket stadiums or at international conferences are examples of informal meetings. Politicians can level the ground for trust more easily as they are always inside the society.

c **Cultural CBMs** to bring common people close to each other culture exchange programs are formulated. The delegations of poets, philosophers, actors and singers are exchanged for developing love among the nations. SAARC provided a chance to bring both the nations near to each other. The permission of broadcasting of Indian channels in Pakistan was also good example for building trust (Peace & Radicalization).

d **Environmental CBMs** In case of any manmade of natural disaster the neighboring country is supposed to help in earlier time deforestation, fire and pollution are manmade while floods, earthquake and droughts are natural disasters (Padder, 2012). After the 1947 the water resources and their utilization remained the unsolved problem even after the Indus Water Treaty both the countries are not satisfied. Information about coming disaster and its intensity can be shared with each other to save the both the communities.

#### **CBMs Tools**

Communication, Constraint, Transparency and Verification are basic tools to judge the CBMs where communication helps to reduce the stress and anxiety. Hotline between India and Pakistan was established in 1971 for army, in 1993 for Air Force and Navy for direct communication. Constraints are predefined limits from both sides which include the movements of armed forces, ammunition and military exercises (Qayyum, 2020). In 1992 an agreement was signed by both the countries to keep forces 5km away from the international border similarly Air Force can fly 10km away from the border. Transparency includes the exchange of data about the expenditures and intentions about further military development which shows the tendency of the state and the verification is inspection of all those agreements which is state is claiming to obey.

#### **Characteristics of CBMs**

As there is no proper and authentic definition of CBMs similarly its characteristics can include so many fields and aspects which vary from nation to nation and from area to area but import of all those needs short introduction here. **Mutuality** needs similar steps taken by both the parties with same velocity. **Incremental** needs growth in current relations and situation from easy to difficult and simple to complex. **Long term** means

there are many problems which needs proper time to be solved (Nischal, 2008). **Predictability** needs proper confidence from both sides there attitude and behavior should be according to expectations, unpredictability can halt the process of CBMs. **Transparency** from both the sides needs to be implemented for fair trial and future development in the relations, an accord was signed between India and Pakistan about the exchange of lists of nuclear installations and facilities in 1988 on 1<sup>st</sup> of January every year. The level of **reliability** depends on practical approach of both the parties, in the case of Indo-Pak relations both the parties have signed many accords but don't have trust upon each other these doubts reduces the level of reliability (French, 2019). **Consistency** in these relations is oxygen which adds more life and fresh blood, in 1992 an accord was signed between Pakistan and India to avoid attacks on Nuclear installations which is fully implemented which resulted peace in the region. **Local ownership** is another characteristic of the CBM's if the accord is implemented from the outside then both the countries will not own it with full zeal and zest, some accords were signed by the governments for mutual exports and imports but not fully implemented even businessmen from both sides are interested. Confidence building process is successful when its evenly distributed among **all the levels** of the society, *amankiasha* is a good step taken by civil society of Pakistan for exchange of delegations from both the sides (Behuria, 2010).

#### **Limitations and hurdles in implementing CBMs**

While discussing the scope of CBMs it is necessary to consider the main hurdles and limitations in the complete implementation. A strong and committed **political will** is always needed will consistently; with the change of governments the previously committed promises should be fulfilled. For the implementation of some CBMs sometimes **financial and human resources** are needed, proper dutiful and energetic people are always required to implement the CBMs. Seminars, conferences, joint ventures and demonstration are needed which obviously needs money and time which should be provided by both the states. The important hurdle in implementation is **adverse remarks** from any side, in the case of Indo-Pak relations a huge sum of community is consistently passing adverse remarks which shakes the confidence of the other nation. In 1965, 1971 and 1999 it was seen that the temperature of the civil society was at its peaks, it was more desired to kill the opponent instead of desire of proper solution for peace. Even when players and actors are entered in India they were threatened by the members of *ShevSehnaw* which is a big hurdle for implementation of CBMs (Ganguly, 2016).

#### **Challenges to Indo-Pak relations**

Although **water issue** has been solved in 1960 but with the passage of time new problems are being created from both the sides, Pakistan is depending on this water for irrigation, power generation and for the construction of dams so it concern is obvious. Again both the countries are in international court of justice spending heavily on the legal advisors but not reaching at mutual consensus. Any dialogue or CBM should be started with water issue. **Kashmir** is bone of contentions since creation of both the states. Many efforts were made to solve it, many countries came up to help out both the neighbors, many times UNO tried to play its role even many times both the countries tried to show muscles but issue is unsolved. To develop good relations Kashmir issue must be solved immediately (Misra et. al., 2016). It's a mind set in both the countries that a group, party or a person speaking against other country is hero. This mind set should be changed at all levels and at every cost, **hostile attitude** is a big challenge. Both the governments should facilitate the traders for smooth trading (Schrder, 2008), cross border **trade** is a great incentive for both the countries to level the ground for further discussions and it's an access to cheap and quality goods. The last challenge is **war against terrorism**, Pakistan is fighting its war with some internal and external factors and it is blamed by Pakistan that India is taking benefit from this situation by sending spies and other undercover mission, also influencing Afghanistan which is alarming for Pakistan similarly India is blaming Pakistan for creating unrest in India, some proves and press briefing were presented by both the sides but blame game is not the solution (Purandare, 2013).

#### **A Historic Perspective CBM's between India and Pakistan**

##### **Karachi Agreement**

It was a pioneer CBM among both the nations on the issue of Kashmir and line of control in 1948 (Chaudhri, 1957), with the involvement of united Nations Organization (UNO) agreement was signed by the top military representatives but soon both the countries tried to drive the meaning of its own will from this agreement. A cease-fire line of about 800 miles was drawn which was modified in years of war i.e. 1965 and 1971.

##### **Liquate Nehru Pact 1950**

To solve refugees and minorities issues both the Prime Ministers (PMs) met 24<sup>th</sup> March 1948 then again in 1950 where it was agreed to protect the life and liberty of the minorities and equal economic (Syed, 1971) opportunities were provided to minorities in both the countries.

##### **Indus water treaty 1960**

Water is basic need of life and economy, it was seen that on the water issue both the nation were facing each other with high blood pressures, it was solved with the help of World Bank (WB) in the shape of treaty between President General Ayub Khan and Indian Prime Minister Pundit JawaharLal Nehru at Karachi in the year of 1960 which was also known as Indus basin treaty (Sen, 1994).

### **Tashkent Declaration and Rann of Kutch agreement**

In January 1966 after the war of 1965 the Tashkent Declaration was signed by President Ayub Khan and Prime Minister LalBahadurShastri which states that to bring the armed forces to the previous positions which were held on August 1965 (Rajan, 1966). It was agreed to release the prisoners of each other, the high commissioners will resume the duties and both the countries will try to live like good neighbors. It was a good agreement which resulted a deadly war in end (Jha, 1971).

Run of Kutch agreement was concluded in 1968 on the border issues of Sindh and Gujrat. This agreement reduced the chances of another fight but the issue of demarcation of Sir Creek is still unsolved (Ali, 1965).

### **Hotline linkage**

Direct communication known as 'Hotline' was established in December 1971 between Director General Military Operations but after few days the process was halted and restarted in 1990 to reduce border tensions. Similarly in 1993 this hotline was enriched by adopting the method for seminars and inviting a guest speaker from each country in Defense College.

### **Shimla Agreement**

After deadly war of 1971 Shimla Agreement was signed by President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Prime Minister Indra Gandhi and it was endorsed by national assembly of Pakistan on July 1972 and it was also approved by Indian parliament on August 1972 (Aggarwal, &Agrawal, 1995). It was agreed that both the countries will solve the issues bilaterally and the issue of war prisoners was also solved.

### **Indo-Pakistan commission 1982 and agreement of 1989**

The President General Zia ulhaq and PM Indra Gandhi agreed to form a commission in 1982 for the development of Trade, Tourism, Technology and Communication. It was hoped that the issue of prisoners will be solved permanently (Gul, 2007).

Indian PM Rajiv Gandhi and Pakistani PM Benazir Bhutto reached on an agreement in 1988 which was ratified in 1991 and implemented in 1992 which was related to the non-attacking and exchange of the lists of Nuclear Facilities (Saison, 1990).

### **Military CBMs in 1991 and 1992**

A military agreement was signed between India and Pakistan on April 6, 1991 (Kux, 1992), according to agreement an advance notification was required before any heavy military exercise, no of troops and distance from border was discussed for military exercises. Similarly in August 1992 an agreement about the movements of (Sen, 1994) Air crafts was signed and also another agreement was signed according to which both the countries will not try to get or produce chemical weapons.

After 1992 there was no significant CBM because of both the governments, politics in Pakistan was changing every third year and Indian government was not deeply interested in this period to develop any more relation (Dixit, 2001), situation on the borders was satisfactory up to some extent then both the nations took another turn of the history which was Nuclear Tests.

### **India and Pakistan in South Asian context**

Due to two neighboring and three times heavily fighting countries with nuclear weapons in pocket the South Asian region became explosive, both the countries Pakistan and India have not signed any treaty like NPT (Non-Proliferation Treaty) and mostly the nuclear facilities have not been visited by International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) (Hambin, 2020). When there were a list of serious disputes then how could peace of the countries and adjacent areas could be guaranteed?

### **Post Nuclearisation Scenario**

In October 1998 India and Pakistan discussed the possible solution to reduce the possibility of nuclear war in Islamabad but did not reach at any consensus (Yousaf, 2019), the USA and other influential countries continued their pressure to come into any reliable agreement. In February 1999 MoU was signed in Lahore from both the parties five out of eight clauses were addressing the nuclear weapons control system and other three were related to increase the level of cooperation and to examine the previously agreed MCBs (Rehman, Azam&Hussain, 2018)

### **CBM's During Atal Behari Vajpayee Second Tenure (1998-99)**

It was 1972 when Pakistan and India reached at some concrete decisions but that time was not suitable for both the sides, Pakistan was under pressure due to loss of Eastern area of the Pakistan and also about 90,000 (Diamond, 1998) soldiers were prisoners in Indian jails. Atal Behari Vajpayee came into power for the second time and he offered a "no first use" accord in the case of nuclear weapons but at that time situation was worst and Pakistan showed cold shoulders to this offer. Further negotiations were continued with greater pace in July 1998 at the eve of SAARC in Colombo. Then both the Prime Minister met in New York during UNO General Assembly session where they addressed media and gave a joint statement that a new era is going to start to resume talk on every issue (Ashraf, 2015).

It was a really period of joy for those who wanted to see peace in the region as both the rivals reached at an agreement of starting Bus service between New Delhi and Lahore, Nawaz Sharif the Prime Minister of

Pakistan invited the Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee who accepted and travelled to Pakistan by Bus which covered about 260 miles to reach Lahore (Malik, 2019). The Prime Minister along with his delegation reached Lahore who was warmly welcomed and Atal Behari Vajpayee signed Lahore Declaration which made history in the relations of both the countries. Lahore declaration is unique in its nature as it was desired by both the countries, there was no pressure on both the states from inside or outside and both the states were acting freely and equally. On the same day Indian Prime Minister visited Meenar-e-Pakistan mausoleum of Allama Iqbal, Samadhi of Maharaja Ranjeet Singh and Gurudawara Dera Sahib situated in Lahore (Dixit, 2001). On 21st of February, 1999 a memorable reception of the Atal Behari Vajpayee was scheduled in the Governor House, finally the declaration was signed by both the countries. This day was largely welcomed by both the nations but there were some elements who disliked this meeting (Ahsan, 2003).

#### **Joint Statement**

The joint statement was issued with eight sections which included different fields. Section 1 & 2 included the brief review of the visit of prime minister in Lahore and the importance of mutual talks over the issues of concern. Section 3 included agreement on the periodic meetings of the both foreign Ministers of the countries to discuss major issues of mutual concern, which may include nuclear related issues too. Comprehensive consultation was also agreed on world trade organization (WTO) and its related issues (Chaudhary, 2003). This section also determined areas of cooperation for both the parties in Information Technology (IT) particularly for tackling the problem of Y2K. It was also promised to accelerate the visa process and to consider the cases on humanitarian grounds like the case of missing war prisoners or fishermen. Section 4 included commencement of periodic bus service between Lahore and New Delhi. Fishermen and some civilian prisoners were promised to release. Contacts in the field of sports were also promised to renew, the visit of Pakistan Cricket Team in 1999 was warmly welcomed. Section 5 included the foreign office who signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) to promote environment for peace and security in the region. Section 6 narrated that it's a part of confidence building measures which is due to self-confidence, it's not weakness. It was stated on the occasion that "friends can be changed but not the neighbors". Section 7 included invitation for return visit to India on mutually agreed dates and thanks giving statement were included in the last paragraph for this warm welcome and hospitality (Qamar, 2005).

#### **Lahore Declaration and MoU**

These were lengthy documents comprised of several sections, subsections and clauses, after going through the text of both the documents it is driven that mostly it was emphasized to pay attention to Nuclear weapon expansion and their command and control. MOU signed by the foreign ministers included that consultation would be made, and also dialogue shall be initiated on the issue of security, prosperity, disarmament and non – proliferation within the broader frame work of negotiations and all the nuclear issues must be discussed in peaceful environment. Trade, environment and tourism were secondary issues. In several sections it was agreed to notify about the ballistic missiles tests or reduce the risk of accidental use of nuclear weapons. Both the states agreed to set up comprehensive consultative mechanisms to timely monitor and ensure the effective implementation of the already agreed CBMs (Dixit, 2001). After nuclear tests International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank has imposed many sanctions on both the states as these tests were considered danger for the already unstable region where these two neighbors has fought three full fledged wars, so in this situation this declaration was appreciated by all over the world. Answering a question by Atal Behari Vajpayee I was extracted that India and Pakistan both the states are ready to give the native of Kashmir the right of self-determination according to UN resolution. Both the parties showed to implement the Shimla Accord with its spirit, it can be said that Lahore Declaration did not solve any dispute but it showed a gesture for further advancement and progress (Qureshi, 1999). The fruits of A.B. Vajpayee and Nawaz Sharif's meeting more than fulfilled the wishes of people who hoped for a smooth peace process for the ultimate end of hostility between both the states. In a joint declaration, both the leaders said that they "shared vision of peace and stability between their countries and of progress and prosperity for their people". About twenty seven years after the signing of Shimla Accord and only a year after the competing nuclear tests in 1998 shadowed by exchanges of deadly threats the signing of the Lahore Declaration and MoU to resolve all the burning issues bedeviling the mutual relations between two progressing nations through a comprehensive and integral dialogue process, was really a "defining moment in the history of South Asia" as stated by Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee at that occasion. PM Nawaz Sharif further urged the parties to go beyond the stated positions in solving the longstanding disputes. As a gesture of reconciliation A.B. Vajpayee visited Minar-e-Pakistan in Lahore and he expressed solidarity with a "stable, secure and prosperous Pakistan".

Critically this MoU could well be described as a "The Military Memorandum of Understanding" which wholly covered the issue related to military (Rashid & Halali, 2020). MoU was defining to keep away from the risk of conflict through a misunderstanding of military or any other dimension of the nuclear deterrent. It was also committed to provide an early warning of ballistic missile tests, to engage in consultations on all the security concepts and nuclear doctrines, to address each other of nuclear accidents in time and to confer with

each other state to reduce the possibility of nuclear war was impressive pragmatic recognition of the ground realities of the nuclear weapons of the both countries.

Very first blow to this peace process was the twisting statement by the foreign minister of India who tried to clear to the nation that it was not Kashmir dispute about which we made an agreement but it was only the Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK). It is easy to understand that it was a pressure from by some Indian traditional group who ever stroke the government when they are talking about relationships with Pakistan. Second blow was the Kargill conflict, this is not the stage to discuss who has started this conflict and who got the benefits but it is quite sure that this adventure buried the hope for the peace and security in the region (Zonnekeyn, 2000). The atmosphere was badly changed and the welcoming notes turned into threatening notes, the pens writing for the scope of mutual relations were changed to write the powers of the muscles from both the sides.

#### **CBM's During the Third Tenure of Atal Behari Vajpayee**

After the elections of 1999 in India, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) again came into parliament. Kargil adventure was, may be, one of the main causes which helped BJP to regain its power. The party showed her complete confidence on A.B. Vajpayee, so in October 1999 Vajpayee once again took oath as prime minister for 3rd time. In that much tense situation it was not easy to resume the talks between both neighboring states. Both the countries abstained from signing worldly acknowledged comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT), although international community had exerted pressure on both the nuclear states (Ali, 1999). The discussions at different levels bore sweet fruits after some time both sides of railway authorities showed their consent to try to continue train service "samjohata express" in April 2000 between the city of Lahore and Attari. Moreover in May 2000 the talks between Pakistan Rangers and Indian Border Security Forces took place in which it was agreed to take some concrete steps to end the incidents of unprovoked firing in the border areas and also agreed to formulate level grounds for proper rules and regulations to improve much delayed understanding between border security forces. These practical and fruitful efforts broke the shackles. Like earlier many efforts were made to restore the negotiations and to reach to an ultimate solution but in vein, new ruler came up with fresh blood and different ideology and approach but nothing was changed for the peace lovers of the region (Malik, 2013).

#### **The Musharraf-Vajpayee Summit**

The "new man in" was a commando, confident and courageous, he dared to face the public and made repeated offer to India. As it was one man show at that time so there were no restrictions for him he went till last end and even due to Kargil war it was not easy for both the states to re-start the halted process but this man made it. Musharraf's attitude attracted the attention from all over the world. Clinton, the US president in his statement in 2000 before his visit to South Asia called this region the dangerous zone due to Kashmir dispute and unpredictable behavior of both the nations. India released some political leader of All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC) to start negotiation but they emphasized to trilateral talks which included Pakistan (Malik, 2017). The first positive gesture from Pakistani side was unilaterally complete cease-fire on LoC, months later after satisfaction the Indian side also announced the same. During the Lahore Declaration the India government was very confident and she was taking bold and frequent steps but this time due to domestic reaction the Indian government was nervous to trust new man or not, so this time first step was taken by Pakistani government and obviously they took admiration from all over the world. Several statements issued by Pakistan government stating "at any place, at any time and at any level" made the things possible and reliable (Pattanaik, 2004).

Along with above discussed situation there were some other important factors which compelled the Indian government to resume the talks. For example;

- Indian government's desire to play key role economically in the Indian Ocean for becoming United State's strategic partner in the South Asian region.
- Pakistan's continued support all over the world to Kashmir struggle
- Inability of India to crush political and armed opposition completely in Kashmir by force
- Kashmir dispute was a hurdle in making India the permanent member of UN security Council

It was very interesting time that there was no any pressure from outside on Pakistan or India but still there was a wish of comprehensive talks. Things were in hand and situation was under control but there were "Home-grown compulsions" which brought both the nuclear countries on the table for the talks. In December 2000 Pakistan took some further steps to level the field for confidence building (Guptta, 2002). The initiative of Pakistan included;

- To control the things on LoC at maximum possible level
- Initiative to APHC leaders for consultation
- Call for final settlement of Kashmir dispute with the consultation of Kashmiri people

The response from APHC leaders was quite encouraging who desired to bridge the countries but a natural disaster struck the Indian region the sympathies from the president of Pakistan were sent along with the five aero-planes loaded with the relief goods. On May 23, 2001 the call "anytime, anywhere, at any level" was attended and an invitation was sent to Pakistani government (Guptta, 2002).

### **Representing Islamabad in Delhi**

Pakistani President Gen Pervez Musharraf visited India on 14 July 2001 on Indian invitation and received a very warm welcome by Indian government. The General inspected the inter-services Guard of Honor which was second time in the history of Indo-Pak relations after Muhammad Ali Bogra who received similar honor in 1953. Musharraf accompanied 19-members delegation including Foreign Minister Abdul Sattar (Krepon, 2008), Director Kashmir Affairs Mohammad Sadiq, Foreign Secretary and ISPR chief Major General Rashid Qureshi.

President General Pervez Musharraf in his statements on the arrival talking to media expressed similar wishes and gratitude as it was shown by A.B. Vajpayee during his visit in Lahore. He stressed on the peacemaking efforts and meaningful long lasting solution to disputes. He hoped on his arrival that his this visit will be fruitful for both the nations (Malik, 2013).

### **Agra Summit**

Both the leaders talked about the wide ranging issues of common interest, the two-days long Agra Summit included about five detailed one-on-one rounds and detailed discussions between foreign ministers (Akhter, 2009). The leaders did not find any political solution to Kashmir dispute. The cross border terrorism and Kashmir were the core issues and both the issues were interlinked, if the dispute between the neighboring countries is solved then cross border inference will be automatically ended. So many proposals were presented by the bureaucracy of the both sides and many solutions to Kashmir issue were discussed but no consensus was made then those proposals and discussions were never made public. Both the president and the foreign minister of Pakistan invited the counterpart for the return visit. Nothing was achieved in any field of life which discouraged the peace process which has thrown tons of mud on the relations of the countries (Baral, 2002).

Indian media was more active as compare to Pakistani media, number of interviews of the intellectuals and politicians were sent through air to Pakistan who were blaming Pakistan for not reaching at sensible solution, even the Indian PM and foreign minister did not show diplomatic behavior after this visit (Malik, 2017). Pakistani leadership and media was mostly silent as the results were not fruitful. Again the temperature on LoC was raised, the political leaders were again sent to jails which made the peace process more complicated.

Then the incident of September 11 made this situation worst, the confidence was already shaken which was further overtaken by the terrorist attacks in the United States of America. After the 9/11 the car bomb blast on 10<sup>th</sup> October side the assembly building in Srinagar and the 3<sup>rd</sup> December firing attack on Indian parliament gave opportunity to those who were already claiming not to talk to Pakistan, they coined this situation against Pakistan trying to make her terrorist state (Adnan, 2013). After propagating Pakistan as sponsor of this terrorism, the rivals took strict measures against the country of Pakistan and pressurized to ban some organizations working in Pakistan and also demanded some 20 men accused for terrorist activities in India. Pakistan and India were delinked by all the means, Rail, Bus and Air. Pakistan also leveled some allegations but mostly the government of Pakistan defended what Indian government alleged. Both governments almost doubled the defense budget, troops were moved to the border areas and both the nations were chanting the slogans to each the lesson to the neighboring state, situation went unpredictable but the joining the US war on terror by Pakistan in his own interests and in his strategic partner's interest the situation was defused (Chari, 2004).

The relations of both the states took a surprising turn when General Pervez Musharraf extended his hand at the inaugural session of SAARC summit (11<sup>th</sup> session) in Kathmandu on January 5 to 6, 2002. Informal meeting of the leaders and foreign minister hardly melted the ice but a month later on 27<sup>th</sup> Feb 2002 at Godhra railway station train was attacked in India and again the allegations were leveled by some Indians against Pakistan resulted further incensement in tensions in the relations of the neighboring countries. However India offered Pakistan in 2003 to recognize LOC (Iqbal, 2018) as permanent border between the two neighboring countries to resolve the Kashmir dispute forever but Pakistan rejected this offer but demanded the Kashmir issue be resolved through plebiscite of Kashmiri people according to UN resolution. After another horror episode in Pakistan India relations the situation went to normalization in April 2003. This time Pakistan took positive step to confidence building measure to improve the atmosphere. A very high level contact was placed which reached to its climax when Indian Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee visited Pakistan in January 2004. In a rally in Srinagar (Kashmir) on 18<sup>th</sup> April 2003 the Indian Prime Minister A. B. Vajpayee (Padder, 2018) had announced his willingness to extend a hand of friendship to Islamabad which was answered by Zafar Khan Jamali, the Prime minister of Pakistan, who invited his counterpart to visit Pakistan. India was always advocating resolutions of all issues between Islamabad and Delhi including the core issues like Kashmir through peaceful talks (Iqbal, 2018).

On 24<sup>th</sup> September 2003 the General Pervez Musharraf in his address in United Nations General Assembly again invited India to join Pakistani efforts for solving all the issues. At the same period Indian prime minister proposed hosting of a discussion in New Delhi on technical levels on 22<sup>nd</sup> October, 2003. A resumption of all civil aviation links, resumption cricket ties, holding visa camps, further increase in the capacity of the passengers from Delhi to Lahore bus service and also establishment of reliable links between the two countries

which was responded by Pakistan on 24<sup>th</sup> November 2003 agreeing on re-establishment of links and start of a new bus service from Muzaffarabad to Srinagar (Paul, 2002).

### **Islamabad summit**

PM A.B. Vajpayee visited Pakistan in January 2004 to attend SAARC summit (twelfth session) being held in Islamabad. General Pervez Musharraf and Indian prime minister met formally and talked about all the issues then issued a joint statement on 6<sup>th</sup> January 2004 that soon the process of peace talks will be resumed. Immediately after meeting and statement on 18<sup>th</sup> February foreign secretary met and took several rounds. The first round of talks under the began in May 2004 which was concluded in August same year but only a memorandum was signed for creation of peaceful and friendly environment. The issues like Siachin, sir creek, wuller, barrage, economy, drugs trafficking, terrorism (Suresh, 2015), economic and cultural relations were discussed. There were four rounds in four years. Then both the nations saw the achievements attained by these rounds like;

- Increase in number of goods tradable between both the countries
- Opening of terminals to facilitate traders.
- MonabarKhokarpar rail route was opened.
- To increase the capacity the frequency of bus service was increased.

These were the very strong and binding bonds between both the nations, all above opening and linkages actually link the people of the area which leveled the field to play for both the countries but again the situation was twisted and then number of years was passed and peace lovers did not see any progress (Paul, 2006).

### **Conclusion**

CBMs can be classified as unilateral, bilateral and multilateral CBMs. In the case of unilateral CBMs neither side need have to wait for any clearance or encouragement so unilateral CBMs can be very productive at first stage because it creates a sense of respect, responsibility and a necessary compulsion on the opponent party, group, state or country. However in the case of bilateral CBMs both sides are considered to regulate certain actions mutually and mostly with the same potency, while in the case of multilateral CBMs another party or parties may also play its card, for example in the case of SAARC, it was generally believed to have increasingly significant role in the building of confidence across the region of South Asia.

Although the history of CBMs in South Asia is very strange especially in the case of India and Pakistan it is always unpredictable and uneven. Many significant and memorable CBMs have been signed but after a slight tilt or a single stroke change the entire scenario. The major reason of failure of CBMs is the absence of “proper mechanism of monitoring and review” of the performance. The detailed discussion proved that the international situations directly impacted the relations and performance of both the countries similarly internal world is also keen observer of the relations of these two nuclear states of South Asia. CBMs signed in the shape of Tashkent Declaration in the year of 1966 is the bright example of prevention of full fledged war and amicable solution to huge problems which were surely leading to another war after war. The agreement of non-attacking on nuclear facilities of each other in 1988 is also being renewed of the 1<sup>st</sup> day of every January because of exchange of lists of Nuclear Facilities. The pre-notification of the test of ballistic missile was discussed in 1999 but in 2005 it was properly signed which shows the importance and positive attitude of both the nations.

There are some important reasons which compel both the neighboring countries to come close in positive manner. India’s compulsions towards CBMs are:

- A tension-free, reliable and permanent relationship with neighboring state would assist India to strengthen its concept of nationhood as a secular state.
- India is huge economy and huge democracy, but cannot take desirable share and status in the world economies due to engagement with its neighbor.
- After detailed analysis it was seen that with the bad relation India never got well wishes from its neighbor that makes India uncomfortable every day.
- India is trying to get in the race of sixth permanent member of UN Security Council, remaining problem for neighbors will never favor him to get desired membership.

Equally the country of Pakistan also has some almost same reasons to seek settlement with India.

- The concept of Islamic economic block can only be applicable if the relations with the neighbors are sound and predictable which will ensure law and order in country.
- India is big economy as compare to Pakistan, fighting with India always pushed back more than India to erect back to previous position.
- Stop being front line man of anyone else, grow up now and make your own decisions. Pakistan is leading Islamic nuclear state, get out of these silly disputes and lead the Islamic word from the front.
- Once country is safe then the Fruits of China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) could be eaten.



There are so many issues to be solved between these two nations but the important of all are three issues, firstly the Kashmir Dispute which is to be solved according to the UN resolution of self-determination, this dispute is gifted by the British since 1947, secondly both the states are not serious to give proper respects to the agreements, accords, declarations, CBMs and MoU and thirdly misconception about each other, just minutes after the incidents in both the countries especially in India the media is asking the questions about the involvement of Pakistan. Moreover defense days, independence days, songs about military and even in movies both the countries are making the neighboring country the enemy and terrorist, day to day both the nations are passing hatred to coming generation about the neighbor. We made our sports the wars and chanting very negative slogans against each other. Everybody can witness the waga border ceremony but after that ceremony when the neighbors are passing near to each other they are not asking for friendship but passing negative remarks.

CBMs are the only short-cut-solution to prevent war, and this time it is supposed that the war. Military CBMs can play vital role to control any adverse action or reaction. Many serious efforts were made by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif then by President Pervez Musharraf who went to new horizons for the peaceful and permanent settlements with A.B. Vajpayee but after A. B. Vajpayee history did not notice this much serious attitude from Indian government, being big country India have to come forward, India have to be at giving end to get permanent relationship with the neighbors otherwise both the nations will be more slow in the race with the world.

The US of America has deeply penetrated in the Indian and Pakistani armies. Previously, India was on Russian pole so the Americans were unable to develop deep contacts with the Indian Army. This prevention stopped them to influence the decision making mechanism of Indian Army. Now, things are have been changed as the USA, through its continuous supply of arms, weapons, transfer of technology, agreement, strategic partnership and joint military exercises has given the position to influence the Indian Army which can be used to change the Indian opinion about Pakistan. Similarly USA and Pakistan are on the same page which can level ground for comprehensive discussions and then possible solutions, USA can act like guardian or guarantor of such agreements.

To conclude CBMs are the tools to share love with the others. Its reality that the military is front line defense of the country so the CBMs should always be started from the guardian of borders but then these CBMs should be gradually shifted to all spheres of life at all levels to get level field to play. Writers, philosophers and media along with social media is a tool to spread awareness about CBMs. When a country have a power military establishment and sound track record of good will gestures then the results are obvious based on determination and will for peace.

## References

- Adnan, M. (2013). Pakistan's Domestic constraints viz-a-viz India in Lahore Declaration 1999, Agra Summit 2001 and Peace Talks 2004. *Journal of Political Studies*, 20(2), 179.
- Aggarwal, J. C., & Agrawal, S. P. (1995). *Modern History of Jammu and Kashmir: Ancient times to Shimla Agreement* (Vol. 1). Concept Publishing Company.
- Ahsan, T. (2003). History of the India-Pakistan Conflict.
- Akhtar, R. (2009). Should Pakistan sign the CTBT?. *Institute of Peace & Conflict Studies*. August, 24.
- Ali, I. (1997). CTBT, India and Pakistan. *Pakistan Horizon*, 50(1), 33-38.
- Ali, L. A. (1965). Towards the Tashkent Declaration.
- Ashraf, T. (2015). The Pakistan-India Conundrum: A Historical Survey. *Pakistan Journal of Social Sciences (PJSS)*, 35(1).
- Baral, J. K. (2002). The Agra Summit. *International Studies*, 39(3), 289-302.
- Behuria, A. K. (2010). 'Aman Ki Asha' in Pakistani Media: Requiem for a Peace Process? *India International Centre Quarterly*, 32(1), 25-36.
- Chari, P. R. (2004). *Nuclear CBMs Between India and Pakistan*. Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS).
- Chari, P. R. (2009). Reflections on the Kargil War. *Strategic Analysis*, 33(3), 360-364.
- Chaudhary, R. C. (2003). Speciality rices of the world: Effect of WTO and IPR on its production trend and marketing.
- Chaudhri, M. A. (1957). Evacuee Property in India and Pakistan. *Pakistan Horizon*, 10(2), 96-109.
- Devabhaktuni, S., & Rudolph, M. C. (1998). Key developments in the Indo-Pak CBM Process. *A Handbook of Confidence-Building Measures for Regional Security, Handbook*, (1).
- Diamond, H. (1998). India conducts nuclear tests; Pakistan follows suit. *Arms Control Today*, 28(4), 22.
- Dixit, J. N. (2001). India and Pakistan beyond the Agra Summit. *India International Centre Quarterly*, 28(3), 133-148.
- French, R. W. (2019). Constructing Cooperation: A New Approach to Confidence Building between India and Pakistan. *The Round Table*, 108(2), 121-144.
- Ganguly, S. (2016). *Deadly impasse*. Cambridge University Press.

- Gul, N. (2007). Pakistan-India Peace Process 1990-2007: An Appraisal. *Pakistan Horizon*, 60(2), 47-64.
- Gupta, R. (2002). Agra Summit: A Foreign Policy Perspective. *Journal of Peace Studies*, 9(5).
- Hamblin, J. D. (2020). Aligning missions: nuclear technical assistance, the IAEA, and national ambitions in Pakistan. *History and Technology*, 36(3-4), 437-451.
- Iqbal, K. (2018). Pakistan's gracious approach towards Jadhav. *Defence Journal*, 21(8), 10-12.
- Jha, D. C. (1971). Indo-Pakistani relations since the Tashkent declaration. *The Indian Journal of Political Science*, 32(4), 502-521.
- Khalid, H. (2014). Role of peace journalism in Indo-Pak relations: A case study of Aman Ki Asha. *NDU Journal*, 28, 1-22.
- Krepon, M. (2008). Looking Back: The 1998 Indian and Pakistani Nuclear Tests. *Arms Control Today*, 38(4), 51.
- Kumar, A. (2012). Confidence Building Measure between India and Pakistan. *Academic Discourse*, 1(2), 1-9.
- Kux, D. (1992). *India and the United States: estranged democracies, 1941-1991*. Diane Publishing.
- Malhotra, I. (2005). The Musharraf Visit in Perspective. *India International Centre Quarterly*, 32(1), 25-36.
- Malik, M. S. (2019). Pakistan-India Relations. *Strategic Studies*, 39(1), 59-76.
- Malik, M. S., & Cheema, P. I. (2017). Agra Summit and Media Coverage: An Analysis. *Journal of Political Studies*, 24(1).
- Malik, M. S., & Cheema, P. I. (2017). Agra Summit and Media Coverage: An Analysis. *Journal of Political Studies*, 24(1).
- Malik, Q. M. (2013). CTBT: A critical evaluation from a Pakistani perspective. *Strategic Studies*, 33(3-4).
- Mishra, A., Kumar, G. N., Rao, B. V., Chowdary, D. D., Ghosh, P. K., Yadav, A., & Satpati, L. N. (2016). INDIAN JOURNAL OF POWER AND RIVER VALLEY DEVELOPMENT. *Ann Arbor*, 1001, 48106.
- Nischal, T. S., & Kumar, A. (2008, October). Natural Gas Scenario In India-The Recent Upswings, Concerns And The Way Forward. In *SPE Asia Pacific Oil and Gas Conference and Exhibition*. OnePetro.
- Padder, S. (2012). The composite dialogue between India and Pakistan: Structure, process and agency. *Heidelberg Papers in South Asian and Comparative Politics*, (65).
- Padder, S. (2018). Seventy years of India-Pakistan relations. In *Partition of India*. 261-273. Routledge India.
- Pal, S. (2006). India and Pakistan on SAFTA: Indian Viewpoint: Address by Satyabrata Pal, High Commissioner of India in Pakistan. *The Pakistan Development Review*, 45(3), 463-469.
- Pandian, S. G. (2005). Energy trade as a confidence-building measure between India and Pakistan: a study of the Indo-Iran trans-Pakistan pipeline project. *Contemporary South Asia*, 14(3), 307-320.
- Pattanaik, S. S. (2004). Indo-Pak relations and the SAARC summits. *Strategic Analysis*, 28(3), 427-439.
- Paul, T. V. (2002). Kick-Starting India-Pakistan Negotiations Constraints and Opportunities; Strategic Insights: v. 1, issue 10 (December 2002). *Strategic Insights*, v. 1, issue 10 (December 2002).
- Peace, B., & Radicalization, C. (2010). Tourism as a CBM in J&K. *India International Centre Quarterly*, 32(2), 78-87.
- Purandare, V. (2013). *Bal Thackeray & The Rise of the Shiv Sena*. Roli Books Private Limited.
- Qamar, A. (2005). Trade between India and Pakistan: Potential items and the MFN status. *State Bank of Pakistan Research Bulletin*, 1(1), 51-52.
- Qayyum, S. (2020). Coordinated Border Management (CBM), *the dynamics of change in the pakistan-afghanistan region: politics, integration and reformation in the borderland 2019 & 2020*, 58.
- Qureshi, A. H. (1999). Extraterritorial shrimps, NGOs and the WTO Appellate body. *International & Comparative Law Quarterly*, 48(1), 199-206.
- Rajan, M. S. (1966). The Tashkent Declaration: Retrospect and Prospect. *International Studies*, 8(1-2), 1-28.
- Rashid, Z., & Hilali, A. Z. (2020). Geo-Politics of Most Favoured Nation (MFN) Status under the WTO and Future of Trade between India-Pakistan. *Liberal Arts and Social Sciences International Journal*, 4(1), 54-65.
- Rehman, S., Azam, A., Hussain, W., & Ahmad, K. M. (2018). The Confidence Building Measures Between India & Pakistan: A Constructivist View. *The Nucleus*, 55(3), 108-114.
- SanFilipo, J. R. (2000). *A primer on the occurrence of coalbed Methane in low-rank coals, with Special reference to its potential Occurrence in Pakistan* (No. 2000-293). US Department of the Interior, US Geological Survey.
- Schrder, W. U. (2008). Energy Realpolitik: Towards a Sustainable Energy Strategy. 804-859.
- Sen, S. R. (1994). Unfinished Task of Partition. *Economic and Political Weekly*, 2664-2666.
- Singh, S. K., & Peiro, A. B. (2004). Confidence Building Measures between India and Pakistan. *Himalayan and Central Asian Studies*, 8(4), 40.
- Singh, Y. P. (2016). *Islam in India and Pakistan-A Religious History*. Vij Books India Pvt Ltd.
- Sisson, R., & Rose, L. E. (1990). *War and secession: Pakistan, India, and the creation of Bangladesh*. Univ of California Press.
- Suresh, D. (2015). India-Pakistan Relations. Available at SSRN 2673658.

- Syed, A. H. (1971). Indo-Pakistan Relations: A General Survey. *Pakistan Horizon*, 24(2), 13-17.
- Yusuf, M. W. (2019). The Pulwama Crisis. *Arms Control Today*, 49(4), 6-11.
- Zonnekeyn, G. A. (2000). The Status of WTO Law in the EC Legal Order. *Journal of World Trade*, 34(3).

---

**Author Information**

---

**Mr. Muhammad Touqeer Akhter Nasir**

PhD Scholar, Pakistan Study Center, University of Peshawar.

**Dr. Farmanullah**

Assistant Professor, Pakistan Study Center, University of Peshawar.

**Mr. Qaim Ahmad**

Assistant Professor, GDC Shewa (Swabi)

**Mr. Attaullah Jan**

PhD Scholar, Pakistan Study Center, University of Peshawar.

**Ms. Naheed Hussain**

Assistant Professor Pakistan Study, Government Girls Degree College No.1 Hayatabad, Peshawar, Pakistan

---