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Published April 14, 2020 | Version v1
Dataset Open

Data for paper "Parametric analyses of attack-fault trees"

  • 1. LORIA, Université de Lorraine, Inria, CNRS
  • 2. École Centrale de Nantes, LS2N, CNRS, UMR 6004, Nantes, France
  • 3. Univ. Grenoble Alpes, CNRS, Grenoble INP, VERIMAG, 38000 Grenoble, France
  • 4. Formal Methods and Tools, University of Twente, The Netherlands
  • 1. Univ. Grenoble Alpes, CNRS, Grenoble INP, VERIMAG, 38000 Grenoble, France
  • 2. LORIA, Université de Lorraine, Inria, CNRS
  • 3. École Centrale de Nantes, LS2N, CNRS, UMR 6004, Nantes, France
  • 4. Formal Methods and Tools, University of Twente, The Netherlands

Description

This is the dataset for paper "Parametric analyses of attack-fault trees" published in the proceedings of the 19th International Conference on Application of Concurrency to System Design (ACSD 2019).

Notes

This work is partially supported by the ANR national research program PACS (ANR-14-CE28-0002), the ANR-NRF French-Singaporean research program ProMiS (ANR-19-CE25-0015), the PHC Van Gogh project PAMPAS, by STW under the project 15474 SEQUOIA, KIA KIEM project 628.010.006 StepUp, the EU under the project 102112 SUCCESS and ERATO HASUO Metamathematics for Systems Design Project (No. JPMJER1603), JST.

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Additional details

Related works

Is documented by
Conference paper: 10.1109/ACSD.2019.00006 (DOI)
Is identical to
Dataset: https://www.imitator.fr/static/ACSD19PAT/ (URL)

Funding

ProMiS – Provable Mitigation of Side Channel through Parametric Verification ANR-19-CE25-0015
Agence Nationale de la Recherche
PACS – Parametric Analysis of Concurrent Systems ANR-14-CE28-0002
Agence Nationale de la Recherche

References

  • Étienne André, Didier Lime, Mathias Ramparison and Mariëlle Stoelinga. Parametric analyses of attack-fault trees. In Jörg Keller and Wojciech Penczek (eds.), ACSD'19, IEEE, pages 33–42, June 2019