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Rahel Kunz

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With its working paper series "Glocal governance and democracy" the Institute of Political Science at the University of Lucerne provides the opportunity to present conceptual ideas, normative debates and empirical findings regarding current political transformations of the modern state system. The term "glocalization" addresses key transformations in respect to levels of governance and democracy – multiplication and hybridization. These features can also be observed in the processes of horizontal interpenetration and structural overlaps among territorial units (transnationalization), in new forms of steering with actors from the private, the public and the non-profit sector (governance), in the interferences among functional regimes and discourses and in emerging new communities and networks between metropolitan centres and peripheries on various scales. One of our core themes is migration and its consequences for development, transnational integration and democracy. A second field of research and discussion is governance and democracy in functionally differentiated and multi-level systems.

Contact:
Rahel Kunz is senior lecturer at the Institut d'études politiques, historiques et internationales (IEPHI) at the Université de Lausanne

University of Lucerne
Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences
Department of Political Science
Frohburgstrasse 3
Postfach 4466
6002 Lucerne

T +41 41 229 55 91
F +41 41 229 55 85
E-Mail: polsem@unilu.ch

Abstract

The recent debate about the 'diffusion of authority' in international governance relates to the ways in which the increasing involvement of non-state actors has shifted authority in the international system towards new sites and actors. Thereby, one actor that supposedly plays an increasingly important role in international affairs has so far not received much attention in this literature: diasporas or migrant groups. In the diaspora literature, on the other hand, not much has been written about the broader implications of such diaspora policies in terms of changing forms of governance and 'authority' in the international system. This paper addresses this blindspot between the IR literature on non-state actors and governance and the literature on diasporas, in order to situate the phenomenon of increasing diaspora activities in the debate on changing forms of international governance. Using a Foucauldian governmentality analysis to examine the broader implications of changing forms of governing diasporas in the Mexico-US context, this paper situates the current debate around the increasing involvement of diaspora and other non-state actors within the broader shift towards neo-liberal forms of governing. The main argument is that the construction of diasporas as agents and the increasing involvement of the diaspora, as illustrated in the case of Mexico, is an expression of broader transformations under way towards neo-liberal governmentality. This shift towards neo-liberal governmentality involves the responsibilisation and disciplining of civil society actors, such as the diaspora, while at the same time opening space for new forms of resistance and empowerment. This, it is argued, leads to the transformation of state-diaspora and more broadly state-civil society relations and a redrawing of public-private boundaries.

Zusammenfassung

Die Debatte in den Internationalen Beziehungen um die 'Diffusion der Autorität' in Prozessen der internationalen Gouvernanz dreht sich um die wachsende Involvierung von Nicht-staatlichen Akteuren und deren Auswirkung auf die Ausbreitung und Zerstreuung der Autorität im international System hin zu neuen Räumen und Akteuren. Eine Akteursgruppe hat in dieser Debatte bisher eher wenig Aufwerksamkeit erhalten: MigrantInnen- und Diasporagruppen. Im Gegensatz dazu, hat sich die Diaspora Literatur bis anhin nicht wirklich mit den breiteren Auswirkungen der Diaspora-Politik auf Transformationen von Gouvernanz und Autorität im internationalen System beschäftigt. Dieser Artikel beschäftigt sich mit dieser Forschungslücke zwischen der IB Literatur zu Nicht-Staatlichen Akteuren und der Diaspora Literatur, indem er das Phänomen der wachsenden Diaspora Aktivitäten in der Debatte um die ‚Diffusion der Autorität' situiert. Mit Hilfe einer Foucauldschen Gouvernmentalitäts-Analyse werden die Auswirkungen von neuen Formen der Gouvernanz von Diasporas im US-Mexiko Kontext untersucht. Dieser Artikel vertritt das Argument, dass die soziale Konstruktion von Diaspora als ‚Akteur', und die damit einhergehenden Diaspora-Aktivitäten Ausdruck einer Transformation der Gouvernanz hin zu einer neo-liberalen Gouvernmentalität darstellen. Dies impliziert eine intensivere Verantwortung und Disziplinierung für Diaspora Akteure und die Zivilgesellschaft allgemein, öffnet aber auch neue Räme für Widerstand und Empowerment.

Introduction[1]

Recent decades have seen the proliferation of research on non-state actor involvement in international governance. Thereby, the focus has been on questions related to new forms of governance and the changing nature of authority, as a result of increasing non-state actor involvement.[2] On the one hand, some authors proclaimed the 'retreat' or 'demise' of the state and the loss of power and authority to new (private) 'spheres of authority'.[3] On the other hand, it has been argued that non-state actors only take a peripheral role in international politics and are of minor importance in the international system[4] (Higgot, Underhill and Bieler 2000:1). Over time, the debate has become framed in terms of the 'diffusion of authority'. In this debate, the focus is directed towards the ways in which the increasing involvement of non-state actors has shifted authority in the international system towards new sites and actors (Hall and Biersteker 2002:5).

However, more recently, this way to frame current transformations of international governance has come under attack. Among the critics are researchers using a Foucauldian governmentality approach (Larner 2000, 2007, Lemke 2001, Lipschutz 2005, Sending and Neumann 2006). They argue that instead of conceptualizing the role that non-state actors play in global governance as an instance of transfer of power from the state to non-state actors, it is more useful to understand it as "an expression of a changing logic or rationality of government (defined as a type of power) by which civil society is redefined from a passive object of government to be acted upon and into an entity that is both an object and a subject of government" (Sending and Neumann 2006:652). Rather than focusing on the diffusion of power towards the private through the involvement of non-state actors, they suggest that we need to analyse how this new phenomenon has redrawn private-public boundaries and led to a re-definition of these domains. Thereby, the state and civil society no longer necessarily stand in opposition, but the involvement of non-state actors in governing can be seen as a *way of governing*. Thus, the aim is to study "the sociopolitical functions of governance in their own right and seek to identify their rationality as governmental practices" (Sending and Neumann 2006:652). These Foucauldian analyses have made an important contribution to re-conceptualising current transformations of international governance and the broader implications of increasing non-state actor activities. However, the literature on non-governmental actors in international governance has concentrated mainly on business actors, particularly multinational companies, civil society actors, such as NGOs, and on criminal actors, such as guerrilla groups and mafia organisations – although the latter less so.[5] One actor that supposedly plays an increasingly important role in international affairs has so far not received much attention in this literature: diasporas or migrant groups.

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[1] This paper was written as part of a broader research project on „Migration Partnerships: A Tool for the Global Governance of Migration?" based at the University of Lucerne; funding by the Swiss Network for International Studies, the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, and the Federal Office for Migration is gratefully acknowledged. Thanks also go to Sandra Lavenex and Joachim Blatter, as well as to the participants of the ECPR workshop on ‚the Diffusion of Authority' in Lisbon (2009), and in particular the organisers Stefano Guzzini and Iver Neumann, for their very helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper.

[2] See for example: Rosenau and Czempiel (1992), Hall and Biersteker (2002).

[3] For example: Ohmae (1990, 1995) or Strange (1996).

[4] For example: Hirst and Thompson (1996), Keohane and Milner [eds] (1996).

[5] See for example: Cutler, Haufler and Porter [eds] (1999), Hall and Biersteker [eds] (2002), Higgot, Underhill, and Bieler [eds] (2000).

However, there is an emerging literature on diasporas and their involvement in international politics, based on the claim that "it is widely recognized that diasporas have an enhanced presence on the world stage today" (Vertovec 2006:3). The literature on diaspora policies analyses how different states are reaching out to their nationals living abroad, and the forms that diaspora involvement can take (e.g. philanthropy through remittances, knowledge and technology transfer, political engagement).[6] Yet, the main focus has so far been on sending states policies towards their diaspora and there is as yet not much written about the broader implications of such diaspora policies in terms of changing forms of governance and 'authority' in the international system, and in terms of the transformation of state-civil society relations.[7] This paper addresses this blindspot between, on the one hand, the IR literature on non-state actors and governance that generally neglects diasporas, and the literature on diasporas that neglects the broader implications of diaspora activities, in order to situate the phenomenon of increasing diaspora activities in the debate on changing forms of international governance. Based on the Foucauldian insights into current transformations of international governance mentioned above, this paper examines the broader implications of changing forms of governing diasporas in the Mexico-US context, situating the current debate around the increasing involvement of diaspora and other non-state actors within the broader shift towards neo-liberal forms of governing. The main argument is that the construction of diasporas as agents and the increasing involvement of the diaspora, as illustrated in the case of Mexico, is an expression of broader transformations under way towards neo-liberal governmentality. This shift towards neo-liberal governmentality involves the responsibilisation and disciplining of civil society actors, such as the diaspora, while at the same time opening space for new forms of resistance and empowerment. This, it is argued, leads to the transformation of state-diaspora and more broadly state-civil society relations and a redrawing of public-private boundaries. Thereby, the paper aims to contribute to a better understanding of the implications of diaspora policies in terms of the transforming relations between states and civil society and the redrawing of private-public boundaries in international governance, as well as to the governmentality literature through an application of this analytical framework to a concrete phenomenon.

The Mexican case is an ideal example to be studied, given the pioneering role of Mexican institutions, international organisation and NGOs in 'courting' the Mexican diaspora and the international prominence that some Mexican-born diaspora policies, such as the *Programa 3x1* have gained (see below). This paper draws on policy document analysis and expert interviews with officials from Mexican government institutions and from international and non-governmental organisations, as well as fieldwork research, conducted between 2005 and 2008. The paper proceeds as follows: the next section provides a short overview of the existing diaspora literature in order to situate the approach adopted in this paper. Section three sketches an alternative analytical framework based on a governmentality perspective, illustrated with examples from the case of Mexico. I conclude by exploring the broader insights of this case study for state-civil society relations and the reconfiguring of the public-private dichotomy.

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[6] See for example: Brinkerhoff (2008), de Haas (2006), Gamlen (2006, 2008), El-Cherkeh et al. (2006), Newland (2004), Østergaard-Nielsen [ed] (2003a), Van Hear, Pieke and Vertovec (2004), Vertovec (2005, 2006).

[7] Important exceptions include: Adamson and Demetriou (2007), Larner (2007), Ragazzi (2009) and Shain (1989).

Diasporas as actors in international governance?

In the IR literature, the terms 'private actors', 'non-state actors' or 'civil society' are often used as catch-all terms for the plethora of actors involved in world politics, such as Multinational Companies, NGOs or social movements. A number of categorisation attempts exist in the literature, and there is disagreement on the exact meaning of these terms.[8] Indeed, the ways in which we define and categorise actors influences the way in which we approach the study of their role. Hence, there has been a debate on whether the private/public separation conceptualising the public (the state) and the private (civil society) in a dichotomous way is problematic because it reduces the debate to an either/or outcome. Instead, some researchers have argued, that we need to analyse "the interaction among state and non-state actors, […] emphasising the mutual construction of these entities through time" in order to "transcend the crude dichotomy between state and non-state actors without thereby obscuring their distinct existence and internal dynamic" (Colàs 2001:9). Such an approach allows us to consider the power relations between the different actors. This is crucial to understand which actors do get involved in international governance, which roles they perform and what the broader implications are in terms of transformations of international governance (Graz and Nölke 2007:12). In addition, a Foucauldian governmentality approach also highlights the importance of the constitution and mobilisation of actors through discourse and policy-making, such as 'the diaspora'.

The term diaspora derives from the Greek "to sow or scatter from one end to the other" (Vertovec 2006:3). A diaspora is commonly defined as "a self-identified ethnic group, with a specific place of origin, which has been globally dispersed through voluntary or forced migration" (Vertovec 2006:3). We can distinguish between the diaspora as referring to a heterogeneous group of people that does not necessarily share the same interests and is not a priori an actor; and migrant organisations, referring to organised groups of migrants who share common interests and goals and undertake activities. Diasporas have been around for a long time and diaspora activities are not new and have played important roles throughout history. However, in recent years, in what Larner (2007:334) has referred to as the "'discovery' of expatriate populations", we have seen an increasingly prominent discourse that portrays diasporas as groups of actors, accompanied by a growing number of states and international organisations reaching out to diasporas, more migrants organising in groups, and a certain institutionalisation of diaspora activities (see Brinkerhoff [ed] 2008, Østergaard-Nielsen [ed] 2003a). The analysis in this paper focuses on this 'discovery' and its implications for international governance. Thereby, we need to be careful not to "naturalise the diaspora" (Larner 2007:333), but rather to analyse the ways in which 'the diaspora' is portrayed, constituted and the implications of the efforts to govern diasporas.

The existing diaspora literature documents how migrant groups are involved in numerous activities in various policy areas, focusing on two main questions: a) Which roles do/should diasporas play? b) Why do states reach out to their diasporas while others don't, and how to explain the discrepancies in state policies, whereby some states attempt to

[8] See for example: Colàs (2001), Börzel and Risse (2002), Cutler, Haufler and Porter [eds] (1999), Graz and Nölke (2007), Higgot, Underhill and Bieler (2000), Arts, Noortmann and Reinalda [eds] (2001).

police or kill their diaspora (e.g. Libya or Russia), whereas others engage in courting them (e.g. Israel or Mexico)?[9]

Regarding the first question, there is a wealth of literature documenting diaspora activities and the different roles that migrants can play (Brinkerhoff [ed] 2008, Østergaard-Nielsen [ed] 2003a). Thereby, a normative distinction is commonly made between 'good' and 'bad' diaspora activities, as illustrated in "Diasporas good? Diasporas bad?" (Vertovec 2006), or "Diasporas: For Worse, or for Better?" (Brinkerhoff 2008:2). According to this literature, 'good' diaspora activities include: individual and collective remittances, their productive investment and the funding of development projects; migration management; the promotion of trade; the transfer of knowledge and technology to the countries of origin; migrants' contribution in the form of local knowledge and expertise, for example for development; migrant contributions to tourism revenues; migrant activities in disaster relief, conflict prevention, peace-building, or post-conflict reconstruction; the political activities of migrants in the country of destination, etc.[10] 'Bad' diaspora activities, on the other hand, include migrants' fuelling and funding of armed conflicts or terrorism, both in the countries of origin and destination, but also the 'failure to integrate' in the country of destination (Vertovec 2006:5).[11] The emphasis on the 'bad' activities of diaspora has grown with the securitisation of migration in the post-9/11 environment. But overall, the literature emphasises mainly the 'good' activities and potential of diasporas.

Related to the question of why states reach out to diasporas, some researchers argue that it is not possible to systematically compare different country strategies (De la Garza et al. 2000 quoted in Østergaard-Nielsen 2003b:23), while others have identified factors influencing sending country diaspora policies. A first approach highlights structural and historical elements, such as the sending country's position in the global capitalist system (Smith 2003), its emigration trajectories, and its type of political regime (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003b:23-25), or the political costs and size of diaspora (Levitt and de la Dehesa 2003). Thus, for example, it is argued that democratisation in a sending country might serve as an incentive for sending country political actors to reach out to the diaspora (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003b:24).

A second approach focuses on the state as an actor that decides whether or not to involve diasporas. Thereby, diaspora activities are framed in an instrumental way, whereby migrants are often portrayed in terms of resources to be tapped or "as assets that can be mobilised" (Brinkerhoff 2008:3).[12] Hence, this approach seems to reduce the involvement of non-state actors (e.g. the diaspora) to an issue of state action. Within this instrumental or strategic approach, we can identify two main arguments: efficiency and legitimacy.[13] They sometimes occur alongside or in combination, but can be distinguished for analytical purposes. The first is an interest-based argument, which suggests that action is driven by the

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[9] See Martínez-Saldaña (2003) and Shain (1989).

[10] See for example: Brinkerhoff [ed] (2008), de Haas (2006) El-Cherkeh et al. (2006), Gamlen (2008), Newland (2004), Østergaard-Nielsen [ed] (2003a), Vertovec (2005, 2006), and: http://www.diaspora-centre.org./DOCS/ct_2008_4.pdf; http://www.diaspora-centre.org./DOCS/PeacebuildingPaper.pdf; http://www.diaspora-centre.org./DOCS/Antony_s_Interview.pdf

[11] See also: Brinkerhoff [ed] (2008), Shain (1989), Van Hear (June 2003).

[12] On the instrumental account of diaspora policies see also Ragazzi (2009).

[13] See: Cano and Délano (2007), Brinkerhoff [ed] (2008), Gamlen (2006, 2008), Levitt and de la Dehesa (2003), Østergaard-Nielsen [ed] (2003a), Vertovec (2005).

desire to maximise the personal benefits based on specific preferences (March and Olsen 1998:949, Risse 2003:107).[14] Thereby, the delegation or outsourcing of certain governance functions to non-state actors are conceptualised as the result of a rational cost-benefit calculation by state actors. Thus, state actors will delegate certain tasks to non-state actors to increase efficiency, if they are considered as having comparative advantages, such as expertise, knowledge, financial resources or networks. Hence, the involvement of diaspora is understood in terms of their comparative advantages through the use of their resources, such as enhancing the efficiency of development through remittances and local knowledge, or to undertake lobbying activities in the country of destination. Thus, for example, Gamlen states: "migrant-sending countries' *interests* are served by better diaspora policies […] this is an empirically-based efficiency argument [...]" (2008:6).

The second argument is identity-oriented, whereby "the pursuit of purpose is associated with identities more than with interests, and with the selection of rules more that with individual rational expectations" (March and Olsen 1998:951). This suggests that the involvement of non-state actors is not based on a will to optimise or increase efficiency, but motivated by the will to follow certain rules and do what is socially acceptable (Risse 2003:107). Thus, the involvement of the diaspora can be guided by an attempt to provide increased legitimacy to a certain course of state policy, or to follow the norm within the international community that stipulates an increasing involvement of civil society actors. Thus, Østergaard-Nielsen (2003b:4) discusses the general responsibility of a sending country towards their citizens abroad, and Gamlen (2008:6) finds a "normative argument that migrant-sending states have an obligation to treat their diasporas fairly."

Both approaches have been critiqued in a number of ways. Larner (2007), for example, warns that this literature contributes to essentialising both the 'state' and the 'diaspora'. I would add that these approaches fail to see the broader underlying transformations at work that have led to the tendency of increasing involvement of diasporas and other non-state actors, and the contradictory implications of this involvement, beyond increased efficiency or legitimacy, in terms of the broader transformations of state-civil society relations. Hence, I suggest that we need to shift our attention towards the broader underlying shifts in governing which gave rise to this tendency of increased diaspora involvement, and towards the implications of these shifts. The next section aims to show that a governmentality analysis is better equipped for this.

The governmentality of diaspora activity

Although Foucault's governmentality concept is somewhat diffuse and has been interpreted in a number of ways, we can distinguish three broad meanings: the first is a generic term referring to the way of governing or the 'conduct of conduct' – also called 'governmental rationality'; the second is a historically specific version of the first; and the third refers to an analytical tool for examining the ways of governing or what Dean calls "an analytics of government"[15] (Dean 1999:20). The latter is used as an analytical framework

[14] See: Hall and Taylor (May 1996), March and Olsen (1989, 1998), Risse (2003).

[15] According to Dean, an *analytics of government* „examines the conditions under which regimes of practices come into being, are maintined and are transformed", whereby regimes of practice include ways of going about doing things, ways of thinking about things and institutional practices (Dean 1999:21).

in this paper in order to analyse one specific form of governing, i.e. neo-liberal governmentality.

As indicated in the composition of the word, governmentality focuses on the links between governining (gouverner) and modes of thought (mentalité) (Lemke 2001:2). Foucault devised this analytical framework to examine different forms of governing and their underlying rationalities, and he applied it to undertake a genealogy of the modern state – ranging from Ancient Greece through to neo-liberalism – aiming to show how the emergence of the modern sovereign state with its way of governing, was closely linked to the formation of the modern autonomous individual (Lemke 2001:191). Thereby, he proposes a new way to analyse 'government', as Rose and Miller state:

> [T]he question is no longer one of accounting for government in terms of the 'power of the State', but of ascertaining how, and to what extent, the state is articulated into the activity of government: what relations are established between political and other authorities; what funds, forces, persons, knowledge or legitimacy are utilized; and by means of what devices and techniques are these different tactics made operable. (Rose and Miller 1992:177)

Thus, a governmentality approach allows us to move away from the mainstream focus on the power of the state within the 'diffusion of authority' debate. The governmentality approach adopts a more complex understanding of power that does not conceive of authority as a "zero-sum" game whereby more authority of non-state actors means less authority for the state (Sending and Neumann 2006:652). Instead, power is understood as a decentered and productive force that cannot be 'possessed' and that has the capacity to produce particular social forms (Foucault 1978:119). Thus, "the distinction between the domain of the state and that of society, itself becomes an object of study, […] these differentiations are no longer treated as the basis and the limit of governmental practice, but as its instrument and effect" (Lemke 2001:201).

Based on Foucault's decentered understanding of the functioning of power, the concept of governmentality avoids essentialising the state, and shifts it focus towards the various sites where governing takes place and the institutions involved in governing and the power dynamics involved. As Alan Hunt states, "it is not only government that governs, but all sorts of levels or forms of social relations that are involved in governance" (Hunt 1994:50). Hence, a core advantage of the governmentality perspective is that instead of arguing that the state is losing the ability of regulation and control, it examines the qualitatively different ways of governing within the current era of neo-liberalism, i.e. the means through which policies are devised and implemented. The focus shifts towards the restructuring of the state and new governing techniques and "the neo-liberal agenda for the 'withdrawal of the state' can be deciphered as a technique of government" (Lemke 2001:201). Or, as Larner puts it: "while neo-liberalism may mean less government, it does not follow that there is less governance" (Larner 2000:11).

Drawing on Dean (1999:20ff), Lemke (2001:36) and Sending and Neumann (2006), this paper deploys a governmentality analysis composed of three dimensions: the first dimension relates to ways of thinking and speaking: the conceptual expressions of a particular way of governing and its specific ways of producing knowledge and truth. The second dimension refers to ways of acting within this particular way of governing, i.e. the institutional expressions and technologies of a particular way of governing. The third dimension regards ways of being: the formation of new forms of subjectivity within this particular

mode of governing. These three dimensions form the totality of a particular government rationality and are co-constitutive. Yet, for analytical purposes, they can be analysed individually. However, each government rationality goes hand in hand with specific forms of resistance. According to Foucault, “where there is power, there is resistance”, and “points of resistance are present everywhere in the power network” (Foucault 1978:95-96). Thus, the governmentality analysis in this paper also includes forms of resistance. Before embarking on the project of outlining such an analysis, it is useful to set the context within which we can situate new forms of governing diaspora: the shift towards neo-liberal governmentality.

Although Dean warns us that “there is more than one type of neo-liberalism“ (Dean 1999:58), I suggest that while neo-liberalism manifests itself in many forms, we can identify a number of key elements of neo-liberal governmentality which are relevant for the purpose of this paper. Generally speaking, the central features of neo-liberalism, conceptualised as a form of government rationality, i.e. “a novel set of notions about the art of government” (Gordon 1991:6), are a ‘marketisation’ of the state, whereby the state itself becomes subjected to market principles, such as competition, reward of entrepreneurial behaviour, and laws of supply and demand (Olsson 2003). Furthermore, over time, market rationality is “extended to all sorts of areas that are neither exclusively, nor even primarily, concerned with economics, such as the family, the birth rate, delinquency and crime” (Dean 1999:57), leading to a shift from a ‘society with markets’ to a ‘market society’. Thereby, market laws come to govern society and social relations become increasingly represented as relations of exchange (Olsson 2003).[16] As Larner states: neo-liberalism “involves forms of governance that encourage both institutions and individuals to conform to the norms of the market” (Larner 2000:11). For Foucault, this extension of market rationality to new areas of social life is not simply a form of repression, but produces new forms of social life and relations, based on an understanding of power as productive. Moreover, it also produces new forms of resistance and empowerment (see below).

These characteristics of neo-liberalism have created new models of development and welfare. Neo-liberal welfare models involve three key elements. Firstly, a shift from universal social welfare programmes towards individually targeted poverty reduction and welfare provision initiatives, in an attempt to do more with fewer resources.[17] Secondly, the new model is based on the increasing participation of civil society actors in the implementation of welfare and development programmes (i.e. outsourcing), which has triggered a proliferation of actors involved in governing within neo-liberalism. Thirdly, the model involves a growing responsibilisation of citizens for welfare and development. This means that individual subjects and collectives – such as families, associations, or communities – are rendered ‘responsible’ through “shifting the responsibility for social risks such as illness, unemployment, poverty, etc., and for life in society into the domain for which the individual is responsible and transforming it into a problem of ‘self-care’” (Lemke 2001:201). Thereby, the state becomes a facilitating state that enables the poor to become responsible for managing their own needs. Responsibilisation is based on the re-definition of civil society as both subject and object of governing (Sending and Neumann 2006:652) and a

[16] This tendency of market societies to “subordinate the substance of society itself to the laws of the market” (Polanyi 1944:75) was identified by Polanyi over 50 years ago, and has been called the “colonisation of the lifeworld” (Habermas 1985).

[17] For the case of Mexico, this has been documented for example by Luccisano (2002), Molyneux (20006) and Piester (1997).

re-drawing of private-public boundaries. This tendency is illustrated by notions of "entrepreneurial culture" and "active society" (Dean 1999:33), which express the tendency to responsibilise citizens for their own well-being. Yet, this tendency also opens new space for resistance and empowerment for individuals and collectives that are being responsibilised (see below).

Linked to this is the creation of neo-liberal subjectivities, another element of neo-liberal governmentality. These subjectivities can take a number of forms, such as "active or enterprising citizen or informed consumers" (Dean 1999:33). Neo-liberal governmentality presents "a map of this subject as an entrepreneur of herself or himself", whereby "the individual, composed of both innate and acquired skills and talents, invests in human capital to obtain both monetary earnings and psychic and cultural satisfactions" (Dean 1999:57). The next section applies this framework of analysis to the governing of diasporas in the case of Mexico.

Dimensions of diaspora governmentality in the case of Mexico

In what follows, I first outline some of the shifts that have taken place within the three dimensions identified above, which have come to form a new governmental rationality and analyse forms of resistance. It goes beyond the scope of this paper to undertake a detailed governmentality analysis. I conclude by examining how these shifts can be conceptualised as expressions of forms of neo-liberal governmentality and exploring some implications of this new governmentality in terms of broader state-diaspora or state-civil society relations. Elsewhere, I have argued that this is part of a Global Remittance Trend.[18]

1. Conceptual dimension: redefining migrants and the nation

The first dimension refers to the conceptual aspects and the production of knowledge in the governing of diaspora activities. In the Mexican context, a number of conceptual shifts related to migration, migrants and remittances were involved in the emergence of new forms of governing the diaspora. Firstly, there has been a shift in the representation of Mexican migrants from traitors to heroes. Traditionally, Mexican migrants were portrayed as traitors to the homeland, lacking patriotism because they were working for, and thus contributing to, the development and enrichment of the neighbouring enemy. Migration was seen as a sin or illness: "[los emigrantes estan] enfermos del pecado de la emigración"[19] (Alfonso Fabila 1932 quoted in Durand 2005:18). Return migrants were viewed with suspicion, marginalised in Mexican life and treated as outsiders. They were called *pochos*, a derogatory word referring to the fact that they had acquired a new accent and were using anglicisms (Gómez Arnau and Trigueros no date:287). Yet, around the 1980s, the representation of migrants experienced a major shift, culminating during the *sexenio* of Vicente Fox, who referred to Mexican migrant workers as the "23 millones de héroes, de queridos paisanos y paisanas, 23 millones de mexicanos que viven y trabajan en los Estados Unidos" (Fox 13 November 2001). Thus, migrants became the heroes of the nation.

Hand in hand with this first conceptual shift went a re-definition of the Mexican nation to transcend territorial confines in order to include Mexicans living abroad, which started at

[18] For a more detailed analysis see Kunz (2008).

[19] Translation by the author: "Migrants are ill with the sin of emigration."

the beginning of the 1990s (Goldring 2002:56). Thus, President Fox prided himself to be the first president "to govern for 118 million Mexicans" including 100 million in Mexico and 18 million living abroad.[20] These two shifts paved the way for the creation of migrants as a population group, and for new conceptualisation of migrants as entrepreneurs and agents for development, which constituted them as a new group of actors as well as an object of knowledge.[21] The portrayal of migrants as a group of (development) actors is not limited to Mexico; it has also been taken up in the international discourse. Thus, for example, the Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM 2005:23) argues: "The role that migrants play in promoting development and poverty reduction in countries of origin, as well as the contribution they make towards the prosperity of destination countries, should be recognized and reinforced".

A third conceptual shift refers to the re-framing of migration from a problem to an opportunity, as President Fox affirmed in one of his speeches: "la migración no es un problema, es una oportunidad para ambos países, para poner el futuro a nuestro favor"[22] (Fox 13 November 2001). Linked to this, there has been a shift towards accounting for remittances and framing them as a 'sector of the economy' alongside petrol and tourism, and as a 'motor for development' (Lozano Ascencio 2005:44). Again, this has also been taken up by the international discourse, with the World Bank claiming that remittances are "a powerful tool to reduce poverty if effectively harnessed" (World Bank 2005). This has turned remittances into an object of knowledge, and has created the basis for numerous interventions to get migrants to keep sending remittances.

These conceptual shifts point to the emergence of a new government rationality, whereby migrants have become conceptualised both as an object of knowledge as well as subject agents for development, which contributes to render them co-responsible for development and leads to the creation of new subjectivities (see below). These conceptual aspects are linked to an extensive 'courting the diaspora strategy', which involves acknowledging the efforts and achievements of migrants in official statements, the encouraging of diaspora activity and involvement in development and political processes (Goldring 2002). The institutional elements of this strategy are discussed in the next section.

2. Institutional dimension: courting the diaspora

The second dimension regards the institutional practices and technologies, linked to the new way of conceptualising migration, migrants and remittances described above. In this context, recent years have seen the emergence of a whole machinery destined to collect data about migrants, migrant organisations and their activities, both nationally and internationally. There is now a wealth of studies and surveys with information about migrant's

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[20] Translation by the author: "[G]obernamos para 118 millones de mexicanos", see: http://fox.presidencia.gob.mx/foxcontigo/?contenido=2422&pagina=18. See also the similar example of Kenya: the Kenyan president Mwai Kibaki appealed to all Kenyans abroad "to join us in nation-building" (Vertovec 2005:7).

[21] This representation of migrants as develompent agents has also become very popular within the international realm. However, with the securitisation of migration after 9/11, this representation has been challenged and in some contexts the framing has shifted towards representing migrants as 'terrorists'.

[22] Translation by the author: "Migration is not a problem, it's an opportunity for both countries, in order to turn the future to our favour".

lives, their living conditions in the countries of destination and their remitting activities. This information is distributed through national and international conferences, publications and expert meetings. Various actors are involved in this information collection and distribution exercise, both governmental and non-governmental, such as NGOs, IOs and researchers. This information collection and distribution contributes to render migrants visible and turns them into targets for specific policies. In the context of Mexico, the increasing institutionalisation of migrant organisations, the registration procedure established by the Mexican government through its consulates and the introduction of the *Matrícula Consular* have facilitated the collection of information about migrants and act to visibilise migrants.[23]

Anther institutional ingredient of this new government rationality is the explicit 'courting' strategy in order to gain migrants' economic and political support, which is generally defined as "institutionalised national policies and programs that attempt to expand the scope of a national state's political, economic, social, and moral regulation to include emigrant and their descendants outside the national territory" (Guarnizo and Smith in Goldring 2002:64). Yet, this is not restricted to the national level, but also takes place at the international level and involves international actors, such as International Organisations, Non-Governmental Organisations or International Financial Institutions.

In the case of Mexico, this strategy involved establishing institutions and programmes to offer services for Mexican migrants in the US, passing laws permitting double nationality, offering investment opportunities for migrants, etc.[24] Thus, for example, the *Instituto de los Mexicanos en el Exterior* (IME) was established in 2002 as part of the Mexican Department of Foreign Affairs, in order to strengthen the institutional capacity of the Mexican ‚courting' strategy.[25] The IME offers services to migrants in a number of areas, such as health, education, sport, culture, housing, community organisation, financial education, and development. An important part of its activity is to distribute information about its programmes and to get them involved in development initiatives. This is achieved through the regularly organised *Jornadas Informativas* for influential leaders of Mexican migrant communities in the US and Canada.[26] During these *Jornadas*, migrant leaders are informed about the different services of the IME and the different options for migrants wishing to donate or invest money in Mexico. The IME reaches out to migrants through the Mexican consulates in the US and Canada, which has led to an intensive cooperation with the consulates. In each consulate there is a representative of the IME to guarantee cooperation. The consulates are in direct contact with the migrants and they identify the community leaders to be invited to the *Jornadas* (IME official, Mexico City, 19.5.2005).

In the Mexican context, the courting strategy also involves encouraging migrants to organise and to institutionalise their associations in the forms of Home Town Associations (HTAs) and into Federations grouping all HTAs from a specific US state. As a conse-

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[23] The *Matrícula Consular* is an identity card for Mexican migrants living in the US. It is a useful instrument for migrants to identify themselves, independent of their legal status, and to obtain all sorts of services, open bank accounts and make remittance transfers. Yet, at the same time, it is also an instrument for governments to collect information about individual migrants, and keep track of them.

[24] Other migrant-sending countries have established similar institutions, such as the ‚ Diasporaministerium' in Serbia in 2004 (El-Cherkeh et al. 2006). See Ragazzi (2009:390) for more examples.

[25] See: http://www.ime.gob.mx/ime/antecedentes.htm

[26] See: http://www.ime.gob.mx/jornadas/jornadas.htm

quence of the active promotion of HTAs throughout the 1990s, the number of HTAs increased dramatically and HTAs increasingly federated, illustrating the self-governing of Mexican migrants. This has a contradictory outcome: while it is in some sense an achievement of the Mexican government objective to get migrants organised in order to pool and strengthen their political and economic resources to be tapped by the state, it has at the same time given migrant organisations more bargaining leverage and a stronger footing in the interaction with the Mexican government, see below (Burgess 2005:113, Goldring 2002:63). This highlights how the relations between the Mexican state and its diaspora have been transformed within this new form of governmental rationality.

Another important element of the institutional apparatus of this new government rationality is the *Programa 3x1*. This programme works as a matching-funds system, whereby Mexican migrant organisations in the US, so-called Hometown Associations (HTA), donate money and apply for additional funding from the three levels of the Mexican government to finance a development project in their community of origin.[27] This programme derived from migrant grassroots initiatives and was institutionalised by the Mexican federal government in 2002 (Fernández de Castro et al. 2006:6). The objective of this programme is to target poor communities most in need of basic infrastructure (SEDESOL 30 December 2007:3).

Three types of projects can be funded through the 3x1 programme: infrastructure projects, such as church renovation, the construction of roads, wells, schools, or the provision of electricity; socio-cultural projects, including the funding of community fiestas, community centres or scholarships); and so-called ‘proyectos productivos’, i.e. economic development projects, such as animal breeding and feedlot facilities, greenhouses for the production of flowers and vegetables, or water bottling and fruit canning facilities (García Zamora 2003). The move to include proyectos productivos into the 3x1 programme is quite recent and has given rise to a number of controversies.[28] The programme experienced exponential growth in recent years and has been hailed as an example of best practice and has been promoted and imitated in other countries, such as El Salvador (Fernández de Castro et al. 2006:5) or Norway.[29] However, commentators have warned about unwanted effects of such programmes, and voice doubts regarding their replicability in other places.

Through this programme, migrants who organise and collect remittances are rewarded with co-funding opportunities. The more organised they are, the more remittances migrants send, the bigger the reward. Migrant groups who are not organised and institutionalised are excluded from the *Programa 3x1* and do not have access to co-funding. Through these projects, migrants also gain an improved status, including increased recog-

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[27] The financing scheme includes the migrant contribution (25%), and contributions from the three levels of the Mexican government (25% municipal, 25% state and 25% federal). The programme is administered through the Mexican development agency SEDESOL (Segretaría de Desarrollo Social). The submitted project proposals are evaluated by a committee established by the state delegation of the SEDESOL, and accepted projects are managed by a committee, comprising representatives from the migrant organisation or participating citizens, the state office of SEDESOL, the state government and the municipal government (SEDESOL 2008:6). For more information about this Programme see: http://www.microrregiones.gob.mx/3x1/

[28] For a detailed analysis of such proyectos productivos see: García Zamora (2003).

[29] In 2002, only 20 HTAs participated in the programme, by the end of 2007, the number had grown to 857 HTAs and the the number of projects funded by the programme and the sums of collective remittances channelled through the programme had increased (SEDESOL 2008).

nition and negotiating power with the Mexican government, political influence in their home communities, etc. Successful HTAs receive visits by Mexican governors or even the Mexican president (see below).

A number of initiatives to promote the investment of remittances into small businesses in Mexico have also been established, such as the programme *Invierte en México*. Launched in 2003 by *Nacional Financiera* (NAFIN) in cooperation with the Multilateral Investment Fund of the Inter-American Development Bank and piloted in three Mexican states, the objective of this programme is to contribute to the development of the communities of origin by creating employment and economic growth. The conditions for participating in the project are to be a migrant of Mexican origin and to own the capital for establishing a business. Thus, only migrants with an entrepreneurial spirit who manage to save money can participate. This contributes to produce an entrepreneurial culture among migrants and the subjectivity of the entrepreneurial migrant (see below).

The technologies of courting in the Mexican context also include initiatives by NGOs and philanthropic organisations seeking ways to engage migrants as development agents. NGOs such as the *Fundación Solidaridad Mexicano-Americana A.C.*[30] and the *Fundación para la Productividad en el Campo, A.C.* (FPPC) have both collaborated with migrant organisations in the US to promote development in their home communities.[31] The Inter-American Foundation (IAF), an independent agency funded by the US government, provides grants to non-governmental and community-based organisation in the LAC region for innovative, sustainable and self-help programmes.[32] It has initiated a series of dialogues with immigrant groups in the US and their counterparts overseas, in order to increase productive investment of remittances, and it has co-supported development projects which are financed by Mexican migrants (Merz and Chen 2005:222). The US government also participates in the courting strategy by establishing partnerships with Mexican HTAs through USAID. US Banks also partner with HTAs when it comes to promoting the use of formal remittance transfer mechanisms and 'banking the poor'. The *Programa 3x1* has been turned into the 4x1 and 5x1 to include business partners, forming public-private partnerships (SEDESOL 2008:5).[33] For the 2008 period, SEDESOL has also set up a pilot project in cooperation with the Inter-American Development Bank: the *Projecto Piloto 3x1 BID*.[34] Local priests in Mexico have also started to engage in the courting strategy, organising the communities of origin and the migrants, and building trust between the two groups in order to harness the potential contributions of migrants and their remittances to the development of the community and the church. Among the most prominent example

[30] The *Fundación Solidaridad Mexicano-Americana A.C.* is a binational non-profit organisation that works to promote cultural, social, educational and entrepreneurial exchange between the two countries. It works to build new leaders among the migrants in the view of encouraging them to invest in their home country.

[31] Another important project, *Enlaces América*, a centre for advice and support of transnational Latino and Caribbean migrant organisations committed to building healthy communities both in the United States and in their countries of origin, was launched in 2002, but closed down in 2008.

[32] See: http://www.iaf.gov/

[33] The pioneer project was signed on 12 October 2005, involving First Data Corporation and its subsidiary Western Union as the first corporate entity to collaborate in the matching-fund programme with a contribution of 1.25 million US$, of which $250,000 is earmarked for projects in Zacatecas. See: http://www.federacionzacatecana.org/index.php?sectionName=home&subSection=news&story_id=292

[34] See: http://www.microrregiones.gob.mx/3x1/nota2.html and http://www.sedesol.gob.mx/index/index.php?sec=3001&len=1

of a catholic priest involved in promoting migration-linked development initiatives is Padre Marco Linares in the community of Atacheo in Michoacán (Hernández-Coss 2005).

This section illustrated some technologies that make up the institutional dimension of the new government rationality, both nationally and internationally. If we take the state as a starting point to analyse the governing of diaspora activities, we cannot account for the above mentioned institutions involved in governing.

3. Subjectivity dimension: creating the entrepreneurial migrant hero

The third dimension refers to subjectivity creation. According to Foucault, the production of new subjectivities happens both through disciplining, which acts to transform the thinking, acting and being of individuals through normalisation and punish-reward systems and through self-disciplining, whereby individuals train themselves and adjust their thinking and behaviour to conform to norms (Foucault 1980:39). This shift towards representing migrants as heroes and agents for development, and targeting them with courting initiatives and encouraging their institutionalisation and activities is linked to the creation of new subjectivities, i.e. the ‚entrepreneurial migrant' and the ‚migrant development actor'. These subjectivities are inherently gendered: in the context of Mexico, the entrepreneurial migrant remittance-sender hero is assumed to be male, based on a gendered dichotomy that opposes the male entrepreneurial migrant hero to the passive female non-migrant remittance-receiver.[35]

Specific projects initiated in the context of Mexico aim at strengthening an entrepreneurial culture and creating entrepreneurial migrant subjects: Mexican government programmes attempting to attract individual and collective remittances and to promote the productive investment of remittances such as the *Programa 3x1*, micro-credit programmes, but also projects aimed at 'banking the poor' to gain new customers among remittance senders (and receivers) serve to create entrepreneurial individuals. Similarly, the programme *Invierte en México* that limits participation to Mexican migrants with capital and an entrepreneurial spirit, also acts to (re-)produce the subjectivity of the entrepreneurial migrant. Another example are initiatives by OFAOs (*Oficinas Estatales de Atención a Oriundos)*, state-level centres located mainly in those Mexican states with a high number of emigrants (Gómez Arnau and Trigueros no date:284), promoting the productive use of remittances. According to an OFATE official, the explicit objective of such initiatives is to "crear una cultura empresarial" among migrants (OFATE official, Tlaxcala, 10.5.2005).

Through such projects, migrants and non-migrants are subjected to normalisation: migrants are expected to send individual remittances to their families and collective remittances to their communities, to initiate development projects and to invest their remittances in productive ways to establish businesses in Mexico, and to engage in pro-Mexican lobbying and political activism (in the US). Non-migrant women, on the other hand, are normalised into increasing their productivity as a counterpart of the remittances they are supposed to receive. These new subjectivities are grafted on, and simultaneously reinforce, a neo-liberal understanding of welfare based on the responsibilisation of individuals and groups for their own well-being (see above), whereby migrants' individual remittances allow families to pay for consumption as well as welfare services such as education,

[35] For more detailed analyses of the gendered subjectivity formation see Kunz 2010a and 2010b.

healthcare, etc., collective remittances serve to fund development projects for the community and non-migrant women provide productive input.

4. Resisting the courting

The new government rationality outlined in the previous sections has met with various forms of collective and individual resistance. Thereby, migrants have chosen non-compliance, i.e. not to conform to the norms that they are subjected to, or subversion, i.e. undermining the functioning and purpose of existing courting strategy as forms of resistance. Thus for example, migrants from the state of Tlaxcala in Mexico, are resisting the pressure to get organised and send collective remittances (Marchand, Kunz et al. 2006:69; Revilla López 2005:72). In an explicit refusal to become 'agents for development' and to trust government authorities and cooperate with them, migrants from Tlaxcala are reluctant to send collective remittances, to get organised in HTAs and to participate in migration-linked development initiatives such as the *Programa 3x1*, despite numerous efforts by governmental and non-governmental actors to 'court' them.

Migrant groups from the state of Puebla have engaged in another strategy of resistance. They have openly blamed political authorities and the PRI (Partido Revolucionario Institucional) as partly responsible for creating a situation that drove them to migrate to the US to find a better life, and therefore said that they had little interest in cooperating with state authorities. Thus, they chose not to participate in the 3x1 programme and to channel their remittances in other ways. Research has shown that the general politicization of this programme has prompted resistance by a number of migrant groups who oppose corruption and resist attempts by local politicians to claim credit for getting the migrants to send collective remittances (Rocha Menocal no date:6). The case of the migrants from Puebla shows how migrants resist the responsibilisation tendency, and use their strengthened voice to express their discontent with the political situation in their home state. Thus, migrants can gain empowerment through their increased leverage gained through this new governmental rationality.

Migrant organisations have also used their increased visibility gained through the conceptual and institutional elements outlined above, in order to express their needs and concerns and start making demands. For instance, they take advantage of their attributed status as agents for development and use their strengthened authority in negotiations with Mexican government institutions, in order to push through their specific needs. This has been the case in the context of the *Programa 3x1*. Burgess (2005) reports how migrant organisations have resisted attempts by the Mexican municipal or state governments to outsource their responsibility in terms of infrastructure development to 'migrant development actors', and how they have started to demand transparency, accountability and the fighting of corruption (Burgess 2005:116, 122).[36] In her study of migrant organisations from Zacatecas, Jalisco and Michoacán she observed that:

> [H]TA members have expressed concerns over the new role given to municipal governments. First, they are wary of absolving local authorities of the responsibility for providing basic services. Second, they resist efforts to shift control of project resources and implementation to the municipality. […] Some HTAs also protested the frequent, ad hoc, use of state government

[36] See also Goldring (2002) for another study of migrant involvement.

> funds to cover shortfalls in the municipalities' contributions to the program. (Burgess 2005:116)

What this illustrates is how migrants have collectively started to use the leverage gained through organising, triggered by the courting strategies, to take advantage of their new status. Hence, in some cases, instead of becoming docile and useful agents for development, they have started to make demands related to government transparency, accountability and corruption. They have also gained increasing awareness of their rights and strengthened their political voice.[37]

Conclusion

This paper has identified the rationality and technologies that characterise the governing of the Mexican diaspora and their implications in terms of subjectivity formation and resistance. The findings demonstrate the shift towards a neo-liberal governmentality that transforms state-diaspora relations, such as the increasing participation of diasporas in the provision of welfare and development. While this paper concentrates on the case of Mexico, research by Larner (2007) and Ragazzi (2009) seems to demonstrate that findings of this paper might be relevant beyond Mexico.[38]

The increasing role played by the diaspora has contradictory implications. On the one hand, they become the 'objects' of governing through the courting strategy. On the other hand, their involvement turns migrants into 'subjects' of governing and conveys them with certain participation and decision-making power. However, this involvement has a "price-tag" (Lemke 2001:202): the migrants have to assume responsibility for their activities and the implications and become co-responsible for development in Mexico. This can be seen, for example, in the fact that community members in Mexico have started to turn towards migrants from the community for help, instead of addressing their demands to the Mexican government.

The broader implication of the responsibilisation of diasporas and citizens more broadly for their own welfare within neo-liberal governmentality is a certain de-responsibilisation of the state in terms of welfare provision. Thus, there is a risk that the responsibility for the consequences of neo-liberal policies, such as privatisation, cuts in social spending, export-oriented development is passed on to civil society actors and the individual citizen. Furthermore, there is also a danger of diverting attention away from changing state intervention, as has been noted by Goldring (2002): "State intervention is rendered less visible through policies that emphasize local cost-sharing and responsibility and claim to reverse state paternalism" (2002:69). This illustrates how the boundaries between the public and the private are being redrawn and these very notions are being redefined. For example, responsibilities traditionally understood as belonging to the public realm, such as providing welfare, have become shared responsibilities between public and private actors, such as the diaspora. Hence, using a governmentality analysis, we can show how the construction of the Mexican diaspora as an actor (for development) is neither a loss of state power through diffusion of authority, nor business as usual. Rather, it is part of a new form of governing.

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[37] For a gender analysis of resistance strategies see Kunz 2010a and 2010b.

[38] See for example Larner (2007) or Ragazzi (2009).

A number of issues would need further research, such as the consequences of the changing state-diaspora relations for other members of civil society and in terms of the relations between diaspora and other civil society groups. Thus, for example, it has been shown in the literature and confirmed by my own fieldwork in Mexico that the increasing importance given to diaspora has led to the marginalisation or exclusion of other parts of civil society, such as the communities of origin. Thus, migrants are turned into important actors for development and their opinion and participation is privileged over that of non-migrants. This also been criticised in an evaluation of the 3x1 Programme that regrets the "lack of formal inclusion of citizen groups within benefited communities into the decision-making processes", and states that "the biggest challenge of the 3x1 programme remains to involve citizens/organisations within the local communities where the development projects are being carried out much more fully and explicitly" (Rocha Menocal no date:6, 13). Despite being absent from decision-making, the community often nevertheless has to contribute to the development projects established through the 3x1, either in the form of labour, voluntary community work, or through financial contributions, which might be paid through individual remittances of the community members (Frías et al. 2006). Thus, we can see that this new form of governing diasporas involves complex inclusion/exclusion and stratification processes within civil society. The context-specific gender implications of these processes would also need to be analysed more carefully. Another issue that has been left out of this analysis regards the implications for changing forms of citizenship as part of this form of governing diasporas. Last but not least, a more reflexive study of the ways in which researchers and academics contribute to the construction of migrants as would be beneficial.

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