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Terrorism in Contemporary Nigerian Society: Conquest of Boko-haram, Myth or Reality

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Abstract

Enough literature on the issue of terrorism is available and accessible. Most of these studies examine causes and consequences of terrorism. Moving beyond the conventional focus and analysis of terrorism in Nigeria, this paper looks at the core issue of terrorism in contemporary Nigeria, paying particular attention to the conquest of Boko-haram. Despite the news of defeating Boko-haram by the government and the security agencies, the group is still causing havoc and displacing many citizens; particularly in the North-Eastern part of Nigeria. The paper utilized documentary method of data collection and was anchored on routine activity theory. Amongst other factors, the paper argues that it is evident that Boko-haram exploits widespread youth unemployment, and a high prevalence of illiteracy in Nigeria to perpetrate their terrorist acts. The reasons ranged from the frustrations of the unemployed youths and school drop outs. The paper posits that unless something is done to control it, a better, safer and more prosperous society emerging in Nigeria will remain elusive. Thus, the study recommends the need to review and restructure current programmes to create jobs and economic empowerment in order to meet the employment need of the society. Also, there is need for the government to effectively censor religious activities. Since the inability of the government to censor religious activities in the country has rendered the authority ineffective to combat the rising wave of terrorism.

Keywords: Boko-haram, Indiscriminate violence, Myth, Reality, Terrorism, Unemployment.

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Introduction

Terrorist acts of Boko-haram group has become a challenge that is not only antithetical to the peaceful coexistence of Nigeria but the global world. Scholars, security experts and security agencies are concerned about the issue of Boko-haram terrorism and how to combat it. Despite all the military expenses, efforts and claims by the Buhari led government (May 29, 2015-date) that Boko-haram has been defeated, the group has continued to carry out further attacks especially in the North Eastern Nigeria. In the words of Aro (2013), since the end of the civil war, no calamity of enormous proportion has befallen Nigeria more than the Boko-haram insurgency. A report from Amnesty International (2017) noted that Boko-haram carried out at least 65 attacks causing 411 civilian deaths, and abducted at least 73 people in 2017. Sixteen women, including 10 policewomen, were abducted in June when Boko-haram ambushed an army-escorted convoy on the Maiduguri-Damboia road. In July, 2017, Boko-haram ambushed a team of oil prospectors in a village in Magumeri. Three oil workers were abducted and at least 40 other people were killed, including soldiers and members of the Civilian Joint Task Force. On 6th May, 2017, 82 Chibok schoolgirls, abducted in 2014, were released by Boko-haram fighters in an exchange deal; 113 girls remained in captivity. In November, six farmers in Dimge village in Mafa were abducted and beheaded (Amnesty International, 2018).

For Onuoha (2012), a particularly worrisome aspect of the evolving threat of the Boko-haram insecurity is the inclusion of suicide bombing amongst its violent tactics. Since it mounted the first suicide attack at the Police Headquarters in the Federal Capital city, Abuja, on 16th June, 2011, the sect has staged at least six other suicide bombings, with huge death tolls and destruction of property resulting from these attacks. For instance, a series of coordinated gun assaults and suicide bombing attacks by the sect on 20th January, 2012, in the city of Kano, the capital of Kano state, killed at least 211 people (Onuoha, 2012).

The actions of Boko-haram attacks have not only crumbled the Nigerian economy especially in North East, but also pose the biggest challenge to Nigerians. Accordingly, Boko-haram as observed by Anigboba (2013), remains arguably the biggest problem confronting Nigeria today, with consequences going beyond security into the political and socio-economic aspects of governance. This Islamist group from northeastern Nigeria has killed at least 3,500 people since 2009 when it first launched its Islamic insurgency to wrest power from the Nigerian government and create an Islamic state under the supreme law of Sharia. The group's active gnawing at the religious, ethnic, and regional fault-lines of Nigeria not only threatens the country's peace and unity, but holds serious transnational implications (Anigboba, 2013).

Uzodike (2012), noted that Boko-haram group has carried out frequent attacks and bombings using suicide bombers in some cases. Targeted locations have included police stations, military facilities, churches, schools, beer halls, newspaper offices, and the United Nations building in Abuja. In addition, the group has assassinated Muslim clerics, traditional leaders and non-Muslims in the north for allegedly cooperating with state authorities (Agbibo, 2013; Human Right Watch, 2012). Sadly, Boko-haram's increasingly sophisticated and coordinated attacks have targeted Nigeria's ethno-religious fault lines and security agents (Forest, 2012; Mustapha, 2012). Adamu (2016) observed that

Boko-haram insurgency, which has claimed more than twenty thousand lives, with a further two million internally displaced persons, and crippled the socio-economic life of the people of the Northeast geo-political zone, has often been misunderstood. Beginning from 2009, the Boko haram insurgents have engaged the Nigerian government in a protracted war of attrition. The fundamental misunderstanding of the terror group and misinterpretation of its motive by the various interest groups and stakeholders have aided and abetted, if not strengthened the group and the result has been an intractability of the war.

Moreover, Zenn (2016), noted that Boko-haram is not only a threat to Nigeria but to the entire Lake Chad sub-region. While many researchers have conducted studies on Boko-haram, there is no study that have addressed the purported claim of the defeat of Boko-haram in Nigeria. This is the import of the present study. It is a cause for concern that despite the claims by the government, that “Boko-haram has been technically defeated” the group is still destroying lives and properties and poses a security threat to the entire Nigerian populace and security agents. This is underscored by the recent slaughter of Nigerian soldiers by Boko-haram in a community called Metele, Borno State. According to Vanguard Newspaper (2018), no fewer than 118 Nigerian soldiers of the 157 Battalion were massacred by Boko haram insurgents in Metele, Borno State. Another challenge is the reports which revealed that some members in the Nigerian security sector have strong links to the group. For instance, in February 2012, the commissioner of police in charge of criminal investigations in Abuja, “Zakari Biu”, was dismissed from the Nigerian Police Force for his alleged role in the escape of a Boko-haram principal suspect, Kabiru Sokoto. The suspect was accused of masterminding the bombing of St. Theresa’s Catholic Church in Madalla, Niger State, in which over 40 people died. The escape of the Boko haram’s kingpin, Mallam Kabiru Sokoto led to the suspension of Mr. Zakaria Biu, a Commissioner of Police and to the sack of the former Inspector General of Police, Hafiz Ringim (Elombah, 2012; Vanguard newspaper, January 21, 2012).

Historical Background of Boko-haram in Nigeria

Boko-haram, according to Popoola (2012), is a militant Islamic sect based in Northern Nigeria and was formed around 2002. Nwanze (2014), maintained that the militant group saw society, particularly the government of Mala Kachalla as irredeemably corrupt. Boko-haram includes members who came from neighboring Chad and Niger, who speak Arabic. The sect was able to attract more than 280,000 members across northern Nigeria and from Chad and Niger (Uwar 2011; Agbiboa, 2013). Agbiboa (2013) observed that Boko-haram’s membership comprises university lecturers, bankers, political elites, drug addicts, unemployed graduates, *almajiris*, and migrants from neighboring countries. Members are drawn primarily from the Kanuri tribe, which makes up roughly 4 percent of the Nigerian population, and is concentrated in the northeastern states of Nigeria, including Bauchi and Borno, as well as from the Hausa-Fulani which constitutes 29 percent of their population, who are spread throughout most of the Northern States.

Guided by the meaning of the name “Boko-haram” which is translated as “western education is sinful”, some people view their mission as reformist in nature. In 2004, after the group moved to Kanamma, Yobe State, they set up a base called 'Afghanistan' from where it attacked nearby police stations and killed police officers (Popoola, 2012). For

strategic operational reasons, Mohammed Yusuf extended the operations of the group to Maiduguri, Borno State in 2009, where they attacked and killed several political and religious leaders or their families, especially, those who had openly condemned or criticized their activities. From that moment, the group stepped up its operations and by 2011 several government officials as well as security operatives were killed (Popoola, 2012).

In 2011, the group struck other targets in the north including the Federal Capital Territory (FCT), Abuja, where they bombed the police headquarters and the United Nation's office. On November 4th, 2011, the group attacked Damaturu and Potiskum, in Yobe State respectively, which claimed the life of 65 people (Popoola, 2012). The devastating effect of the group's attack has thus forced several governmental ministries, parastatals, and corporate establishments, non-governmental to step up security measures in an attempt to protect lives and property (Popoola, 2012).

Ekwueme, (2011) observed that Boko-haram is fast becoming Nigeria's version of Muslim extremists operating with impunity elsewhere, maiming and killing those they consider as infidels. In addition to the above assertion, Ekwueme further argued that the group's teachings resemble that of the Afghanistan Taliban. They believe that any teaching or education that does not conform to the tenets of Islam is sinful and should not be taught at all. They also believed that it was the influence of western education that is watering down Islamic teaching and weakening Islam itself.

Furthermore, Ekwueme, (2011) observed that the group exploited the country's dysfunctional school system that is plagued with numerous strikes by teachers, widespread youth unemployment, poverty and a high prevalence of illiteracy to lure and recruit its members. The group also exploits the absence of an effective security system in the country to carry out their gruesome activities. Taking advantage of these economic frustrations and corrupt leadership of the country, they were able to win many converts. Even highly educated and well-connected members of the society joined the sect, and because their teaching addressed the frustrations of the unemployed youths, some of them dropped out of school, left their homes and joined the group fully (Ekwueme, 2011).

The Guardian Newspaper (2011) expressed a similar view when it observed that Boko-haram is largely populated by young and often educated unemployed followers who are restless and disenchanted with a life of idleness and hopelessness. They are therefore, a ready and willing audience for a preacher who, pooh-pooing western education as valueless in this life and in the life to come, calls on his followers to reject it.

Methodology

Documentary research method was adopted in this study. Documentary research involves the use of secondary sources such as texts and documents as source materials: government publications, newspapers, certificates, census publications, novels, film and video, paintings, personal photographs, diaries and innumerable other written, visual and pictorial sources in paper, electronic, or other 'hard copy' form. Documentary research is one of the three major types of social research and arguably has been the most widely used of the three throughout the history of sociology and other social sciences (Ugwuoke, Ameh & Ogbonna, 2017). In this research method, data were collected through newspapers (Premium Times, Daily Trust, The Guardian, and Vanguard). The choice of

the named newspapers is because of their wide coverage of reportage in Nigeria and their online visibility. Other secondary sources include reports of Amnesty International, statistics and reports from Nigerian watch IFRA, University of Ibadan, textbooks, government publications, pictorials of sources, scholarly journals, reliable internet sources and official unclassified documents. The primary context of study was the activities of Boko haram in Nigeria and the claim of Boko haram defeat by the Nigerian army and the federal government of Nigeria. “Boko-haram attack 2015-2018” was the major search theme that was used during the data gathering.

Terrorism as a Global Problem

The last decade has seen a significant increase in both the level of conflict and the impact of terrorism around the world. In 2014, battle-related deaths reached a 25-year high and deaths from terrorism also peaked. However, while the impact of terrorism has been increasing slowly for most of the past 30 years, the number of battle-related deaths has fluctuated with the onset of different conflicts. Globally, bombings and explosions accounted for 54 percent of attacks in 2016. Armed assaults were the next most common form of attack in accounting for 18 percent followed by hostage takings and assassinations at 17 percent each. Facility or infrastructure attacks accounted for only 6 percent of all attacks. This shows that terrorism is not peculiar to Nigeria nor Sub-Saharan Africa. According to Global Terrorism index (2017), 10 countries most affected by terrorism are as follows: 1. Iraq; 2. Afghanistan; 3. Nigeria; 4. Syria; 5. Pakistan; 6. Yemen; 7. Somalia; 8. India; 9. Turkey and 10. Libya. According to the GTI report of (2017), nine of these countries featured on the previous year’s list with the only change being the inclusion of Turkey and the exclusion of Egypt. However, an examination of the longer term 14-year trend shows that only Pakistan, India and Afghanistan would have been ranked among the 10 countries most impacted by terrorism in 2002. In 2002, neither Libya nor Syria was included in the list and both had relatively low GTI rankings of 120 and 118 respectively. However, in 2016, their rankings were tenth and fourth respectively (GTI, 2017).

The ranking of both countries has been deteriorating since 2011, following events that coincided with the Arab Uprisings. It likely highlights a lack of institutional resilience in both countries in their ability to absorb sudden internal and external shocks. More broadly, the examples of Syria and Libya reflect a trend whereby all ten countries, with the exception of India, have seen substantial increases in their GTI scores since 2002. By contrast, India’s score has remained steady for the last ten years and reflects the country’s long history of being persistently affected by terrorism-related violence. In 2002, these ten countries combined witnessed 245 terrorist attacks with 60 percent of these attacks occurring in one country “India”. However, by 2016, both the number and the spread of attacks in these countries had dramatically increased to 8,226 attacks; an increase of nearly 25 percent. In illustrating the size of this increase, Libya experienced the fewest attacks in this cohort with over 330 attacks in 2016. Yet this figure alone is higher than the total number recorded for all ten countries in 2002. The rise in terrorism in these ten countries is reflective of a global trend. Six of these countries were involved in internal conflict, which has facilitated and led to an increase in terrorism. With the exception of India, each of these countries has a single terrorist group that is responsible for the majority of deaths. Some groups, such as Boko-haram in Nigeria, actually pre-date the rise in terrorism.

However, other countries, such as Yemen, have been impacted by events which have led to the rise of terrorist groups. In other countries, such as Libya and Syria, terrorism has followed the destabilization of the government, while in others, such as Afghanistan and Iraq, terrorism has resulted from a foreign power invasion.

Countries involved in conflict are more susceptible to terrorism in part because of the lack of a fully functioning state. Terrorism is also one of many tactics employed by insurgencies and paramilitaries in a civil conflict. For example, terrorist groups like ISIS, Boko-haram and the Taliban all carry out conventional military attacks in the context of their respective conflicts as well as undertaking extensive terrorist activities. While there can be large differences in the political stability and general security environment between conflict and non-conflict countries, there is little difference between the mixture of who and what is targeted by attacks. This trend has remained fairly constant since 1985 (GTI, 2017).

Trends and Patterns of Boko-haram Attacks

Scholars have expatiated the activities and modus operandi of Boko-haram, famous amongst them is Alex (2016), who stated that the activities of Boko-haram is vicious and volatile in nature. Worthy of note among such disruption is the attack by Boko-haram on UN Aid convoy (Premium Times, 2017); gruesome murder of Ms Khorsa, a mid-wife with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) who was murdered by the Boko-haram insurgents, the murder of the 25-year-old mid-wife came barely a month after Boko-haram released photos and audio recording of Ms Khorsa and two other female aid workers begging the Nigerian government to quickly come to their rescue (Premium Times, 2018).

These activities, according to Alex (2016), has exacerbated intra-Muslim tensions and worsened Muslim-Christian relations in Northern Nigeria. Despite different operations and security campaigns by the Nigerian government and security agencies, Boko-haram has remained resilient, dogged and adaptive. In early 2013, Nigeria and neighbouring militaries dislodged Boko-haram from the North-eastern Nigerian towns it controlled. This achievement made the Nigerian government under the President Buhari led administration to announce in December, 2015, that “Boko-haram has been technically defeated”. The “technically defeated” Boko-haram responded with a new wave of rural massacres and suicide bombings and attacks on several Nigerian Army ‘battalions’ and ‘Divisions’; famous among such attacks on Nigerian Army ‘battalions’ and ‘divisions’ is the attack on 157 Battalion Metele, Borno State where 118 Nigerian soldiers lost their lives (Premium Times, 2018); attack on the military base in Zari village of Maiduguri where 46 Soldiers and 2 Officers were killed and 19 others wounded (Premium Times, 2018).

Boko-haram presents itself as the victim of state aggression and the voice for large and aggrieved Muslim worshippers in Northern Nigeria. When Boko-haram re-emerged in 2010, the sect was bent on challenging the Nigerian state and local politicians for control of North-eastern Nigeria, starting from prison breaks in September 2010, Boko-haram waged a guerrilla campaign in the North-east, assassinating politicians and policemen, robbing banks, raiding police stations and breaking into prisons. Its violence crippled commercial activities in Maiduguri. The group killed Christians and sought to enflame Christian and Muslim tensions. In 2011-2012, Boko-haram repeatedly claimed

responsibilities for the bombing of churches, including in sites of recurring Muslim-Christian conflict such as Kaduna and Plateau (Alex, 2016).

In July, 2014, the focus of Boko-haram's brutality shifted. Intensifying its bid to neutralize the Civilian Joint Task Force and exploiting its increasing seizure of Nigerian military equipment, Boko-haram began incorporating towns into captured states and territories, starting with Damboa, Borno State. In August 2014, Shekau announced the establishment of a "State among the states of Islam" in Gwoza, Borno State, Mubi, headquarter of Adamawa's North senatorial district, and other considerable territory in Borno and Adamawa States with some holding in Yobe State. In terms of recruitment pattern, Boko-haram has been accused of recruiting its member's aside Nigeria, from Niger, Cameroon and Chad. Alex (2016), opined that Boko-haram reportedly paid Nigerian youths to join, dispatching preachers to Cameroon who sought followers - a combination of money and religious appeals. By 2013, Boko-haram had a presence in Cameroon, conducting raids and kidnappings. Boko-haram had seemed weaker in Chad until 2017.

Consequences of Boko-haram Attacks in Nigeria

A lot of resources have been channeled towards countering the acts of terrorism by Boko-haram. The resources allocated fighting insurgents could have been used in building infrastructure, promoting the general welfare of Nigerians and providing a good platform for the socio-economic development of Nigeria. This has in no small way affected the socio-economic, political and security development of Nigeria. The worst undoing is that these acts of terror by Boko-haram have made investors skeptical to invest in Nigeria and citizens are scared to go to work (Olawale, 2016). Obi (2015) observed that the activities of the Islamic sect had led to loss of lives and properties in the country especially in the Northern part of Nigeria. Some of these activities include bombing, suicide bomb attacks, sporadic shooting of unarmed and innocent citizens, burning of public places such as police stations, churches and kidnapping of school girls and women, etc.

Olawale (2016) and Udama (2013) identified the following consequences of Boko-haram attacks in Nigeria:

- **Loss of Lives and Properties:** Over 2 million Nigerians in the North East have been displaced by Boko-haram attacks. This includes over 800,000 children while thousands of lives have been lost, government, corporate and private properties lost in billions of Naira. This has come with the task of rebuilding the affected communities in a post Boko-haram era. Relatedly, Udama, (2013) asserts that the human costs in terms of lives and properties can hardly be valued and quantified since the upsurge of the violence began.
- **Socio-Economic Stagnation:** For states affected by Boko-haram attacks in North Eastern Nigeria, social and economic activities were paralyzed for several months; schools were shut down and pupils withdrawn, businesses were shut down and economic movement in the region became extremely difficult. The violence has stagnated socio-economic activities, since peace is paramount to economic growth. **Also, Boko-haram** attacks breed tension in Nigeria, state of emergency/curfew is often declared in the affected areas of the nation (Olawale, 2016). Udama, (2013) observed that Boko-haram has disrupted and offset the normal social life and

number of lives have been lost. The group activities have displaced people from their usual bases to different unintended locations. The mass movement of people creates refugee problems with substantial costs to the individual, host communities and the government. Also, extreme violence repels rather than attract business investors. Boko-haram attacks have paralyzed the economic activities especially in the northern parts of the country where these incidents are prevalent, thereby worsening the already bad situation.

- **Political Effect:** According to Nigeria Watch report (2017), Boko-haram insurgency has promoted anarchy by causing confusion and widespread panic among people in Nigeria. The civil rights of individuals and even their more basic civil liberties as guaranteed by the constitution has been jeopardized. While the Islamic sects unleash terror on the people, the activities of the security agents have become deplorable as well, hence the abuses of people's liberty have become rampant. They have deployed an unconventional and extra-judicial method of shoot at sight which is usually adopted by the government to tackle widespread public disturbances and terrible crimes. The security agents stop people at will, restrict people's movement by the day and especially at night and kill anyone at the least suspicion. The sect's activities have spread fear across the length and breadth of not only northern Nigeria but the entire country especially among the political elites. Given the ethnic sensitivity of the country, it has pushed further its political polarization and raised the existing suspicion and distrust especially between the north and south (Nigeria Watch, 2017).

Theoretical Framework

The routine activity theory serves as the framework for this study. Routine activity theory (RAT) is an approach in criminology developed by Cullen, Henson, Reyns, and Wilcox. The nexus of RAT is that it centres on the required social conditions that facilitate or promote delinquent and criminal conducts. This approach which was first proposed by Lawrence Cohen and Marcus Felson in 1979 was similar to the strain theory which was an attempt to proffer an explanation for the escalating American crime rate during the 1970s. These criminologists thus contended that with greater individual wealth and a corresponding more involvement in social activities necessitated by rapid social changes, the chances of personal victimization resulting from changes, the chances of personal victimization resulting from household thefts were more likely to increase. Specifically, Cohen and Felson subscribed to the view that the interplay between the three variables of motivated offenders, suitable targets and the absence of capable guardians was the major determinants for delinquent and criminal conducts.

In the same vein, Schaefer (2003) noted that the routine activity approach contends that criminal's victimization is increased when motivated offenders and suitable targets converge. Using the above viewpoints, the unemployed and mostly uneducated and unskilled youths who are gullible to be lured and recruited by the Boko haram are the motivated offenders. This is because, the new members are promised so many things and they believe the deceit of the recruiters to engage in terrorism activities. The new members who are been recruited are hungry, ideal and unemployed who can be easily be bought over with the promise of the slightest material gains or acquisitions. The leaders of

this sect, are also motivated because of their opinion that democratic governments are irredeemably corrupt and that nothing good can come out of western education.

The suitable targets are the public spaces in Nigeria which are porous and secured and can easily be bombed by this sect. Most Nigeria public spaces lacks adequate surveillance and security. This is because of lack of modern closed-circuit television (CCTV), police patrols, stop and search points etc. According to this theory, the absence of capable guardian in this context connotes the insufficient troops deployed in the area of Boko-haram attacks, absence of enough patrols and the failure to respond quickly breed ground for Boko-haram attacks in Nigeria. The abduction of Dapchi girls on the 19th of February 2018 is an evidence that Boko-haram has not been defeated and this case further buttresses the theory under review as the absence of capable guardian, causes and breeds criminal activities. In the words of Dori (2018), the peace in Dapchi was rudely disturbed just before the evening Maghrib prayers, when the terrorists descended on the town in an openly brazen manner driving through the town in a convoy of vehicles. Reports after the event suggest that the terrorists were unchallenged when they operated in the town for hours carting away food and other commodities.

The Purported Claim of Boko-haram Defeat

There have been several claims that the Boko-haram has been defeated in Nigeria, especially in the Buhari APC led administration. One may equally ask “How many times will the Nigerian army kill the Boko-haram leader “Shekau”? It has been on the news on several occasions that “the Nigerian army has killed the Boko-haram leader on several and different occasions”. After which Shekau will send in a video message claiming responsibility of attacks. Is Shekau undying? On the second claim that Boko-haram has been defeated, on the contrary we still see and hear about attacks almost on a daily basis especially in the North-Eastern part of Nigeria. So how can a defeated Boko-haram be putting up several attacks almost on a daily basis with almost the same force and alacrity as in 2015, and we claim that they are defeated, what are the bases for such defeat? Below is a review of selected attacks by Boko-haram since 2015 when the government claimed to have defeated Boko-haram.

Insight of Boko-haram Attacks in Nigeria

Documenting incidence of Boko-haram attacks is an uphill task. This is because the number of reported casualties are hugely inaccurate. However, the authors attempted compiling an informative diary of boko-haram attacks within 2018, with peculiar emphasis on North-East Nigeria.

Table 1. Documented Insight of Boko-haram Attacks in Nigeria from 2015-2018

S/ No	Date	Details/ Causality	Source
1	18/11/2018	118 Nigerian soldiers of the 157 Battalion Metele, Borno State were slaughtered by the Boko-haram insurgent	Vanguard Newspaper, 2 nd December, 2018)
2.	09/09/2018	Ms Khorsa, a mid-wife with the International	Premium Times online news,

		Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) was murdered by the Boko-haram insurgents.	19 th September, 2018
3.	7/09/2018	Nigerian Soldiers repel Boko-haram attack in a “fierce battle”; The battle occurred in Damasaki, Borno State.	Premium Times online news, 12 th September, 2018
4.	2 nd /09/2018	46 Soldiers and 2 officers killed, 19 wounded at the military base in Zari village North of Maiduguri in an attack by the boko-haram insurgents.	Premium Times online news, 2 nd September, 2018
5.	28/07/2018	“17 Soldiers killed, 18 others injured and equipment stolen in multiple Boko-haram attacks on military formation in Yajiwa axis of Damboa local government area of Borno State	Premium Times online news, 28 th July, 2018
6.	26/07/2018	The Nigeria Army on Thursday 26 th July 2018, repelled an attack by Boko-haram insurgents who attempted to invade Jatana town in Kaga local government area of Borno state.	Premium Times online news, 27 th July 2018
7.	22/07/2018	“Many killed as soldiers repel Boko-haram in Sasawa community in Yobe state.	Premium Times online news, 22 nd July 2018
8.	13/07/2018	The Boko-haram attack on 81 Division Task Force Brigade in Jilli, near Geidam, Yobe State, left 3 Nigeria army officers and 28 soldiers dead.	Premium Times online news, 19 th July 2018
9.	15/07/2018	“23 Nigerian Soldiers, 8 trucks missing after Boko-haram ambushed a military convoy at Boboshe village in Bama local government area”.	Premium Times online news, 15 th July 2018
10.	23/06/2018	“Boko-haram kills 4, injuries 6 in Konduga local government”.	Premium Times online news, 23 rd July 2018
11.	20/06/2018	“Boko-haram attacks Borno town in 11 gun trucks”.	Premium Times online news, 20 th June 2018
12.	12/06/2018	“Boko-haram attacks Kaya village in Adamawa State and destroyed 13 houses during the attack.”	Premium Times online news, 12 th June 2018
13.	30/05/2018	“No life lost in Boko-haram attack in Anno village, near Maiduguri.	Premium Times online news, 30 th May 2018
14.	27/04/2018	“Four killed, many injured in Boko-haram attack in Maiduguri, in an (IDP) camp in Judumin area”.	Premium Times online news 27 th April, 2018
15.	9/04/2018	“Boko-haram attack on University of Maiduguri foiled”.	Premium Times online news 2018. 9 th April, 2018
16.	2/04/2018	“15 killed and 55 injured as Boko-haram attacks Maiduguri”.	Premium Times online news 2018. 2 nd April, 2018

Source: authors compiled (2019).

Conclusion and Recommendations

From the cases x-rayed above, it is obvious that Boko-haram has neither been “conquered”, “defeated” nor “technically defeated”. The sect is still carrying out volatile activities not only against the masses but against the Nigerian military and the police, who have recorded enormous casualties despite the claim by the Nigerian government that the Boko-haram has been defeated. This challenge has led to serious infrastructural damage in the areas of education, health and social welfare facilities, poor economy, particularly in affected areas, while millions are left homeless. The loss of lives, loss of government owned and private properties, failure of sustainable development initiatives by citizens and the government, loss of prospective foreign investments are a few of the fallouts of the Boko-haram insurgency in Nigeria. Indeed, with the above listed 49 recent attacks by the Boko-haram on both the military and civilian in Nigeria, from 2015 to 2018, the Nigeria military cannot absolutely say that Boko-haram insurgent has been defeated in Nigeria.

We recommended that if the battle against Boko-haram is to succeed, it must not just involve military success but also an effort to address socio-economic problems and engage in rapid transforming religious landscape in Northern Nigeria. Accordingly, there is need to review the current techniques of fighting terrorism by the security agencies and improve its counter-terrorism approaches. This could be done by providing more sophisticated equipment to the Nigerian military and other security agents. Since current government developmental programmes have not met the employment need of the society, there is need to review the current programmes in a way that they can create sustainable jobs and encourage economic empowerment, because economic deprivation and frustration leads to radicalism. Similarly, there is need for the government to effectively censor religious activities. This is because the inability of the government to censor religious activities in the country has rendered the authority ineffective to combat the rising wave of terrorism. Furthermore, there is need to engage all the stakeholders and the youth to negotiate ethnic and cultural differences, this will help restructure the country in a way that rancour and acrimony can reduce among the people. It is important to note that growing sentiments of discrimination among the people can lead groups to look to more conservative, and eventually, extremist ideologies. Consequently, since there is still a slow pace of literacy level in the present laws and practices guiding the education system, the present laws and practices should be reviewed in a way that literacy level in Nigeria can be improved. In particular, there is the need to explore the extant laws and the extent to which they are being enforced with a view to establishing their efficacy. Finally, there is a need to start the fight against corruption from the institutional level, since corruption encourages terrorism. Fighting corruption from the institutional level allows the understanding of the root causes of corruption and the machineries that breed corruption. By doing so, we will be able to know the best ways to manage and block the loopholes that breed about corruption.

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