

Global Insecurities: Challenges and the ways forward

Edited by

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First Edition

Science and Education Development Institute, Nigeria

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This first edition

Published 2021

Science and Education Development Institute, Nigeria

2 Church Avenue, Oke Eri Quarters Oba Ile

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ISBN: 978-978-54770-4-7

DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.4724071

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Acknowledgments

I'd like to use this opportunity to thank the editors, authors, and members of this organization's staff for their contributions to the successful completion of this book chapter. Despite the COVID-19 pandemic, you all saw fit to contribute to knowledge by spending your valuable time searching for kinds of literature, reading, and writing several drafts of the book.

You are all appreciated.

*

Preface

The phenomena of insecurity and its attendant consequences have badly affected and slow-down socio-economic development and political stability in some countries of West Africa. Nigeria is one of the notable countries that have been grappling with insurgency, banditry, and militant activities. The country is beset with a lot of security problems such as Boko Haram, militancy, kidnapping, ethno-religious conflicts, drug trafficking, arms smuggling, and other forms of criminality that erode the country's security. The various factors and/or actors that have exacerbated the fragile security situation in West Africa and Nigeria, in particular, are firmly rooted in the 'scarcely governed' nature of the country. The persistent security threats posed by the activities of different individuals and groups often take the form of banditry and cattle rustling which is now transforming towards reappraisal attacks and counter-attacks. Over the years, the security in the region has deteriorated due to certain changes in the ecosystem which affected peoples' livelihoods negatively. This exacerbates long-running competitions among farmers and herders as both groups began to mobilised various armed groups as 'vigilantes' for protection.

The involvement of local institutions/traditional rulers in the conflict has created an incentive to local actors, particularly community-based groups, thus, making the conflict difficult to contain. The main aim of the book is to reappraise the factors responsible for the growth of criminal activities related to banditry, kidnappings as well as negative consequences of the growing wave of insecurity on the education sector in the country. It thus seeks to explore the condition under which these crimes emanate in an attempt to advance a theoretically rigorous discourse on the emerging insecurity situation in Nigeria. It will therefore provide additional information that adds value to the performance of statutory functions of the security and intelligence community of Nigeria. The findings in various chapters should form the basis for policy formulation by governments that could address the short and long-term social, economic, and political impact of insecurity in the country.

The various chapters in this book *Global Insecurities: Challenges and the ways forward*, is the culmination of attempts to provide insights into the rampaging insecurity bedevilling the country. Cecilia in Chapter 1 intends to show how peace education could be used to address Rural and Urban violence in Nigeria. Likewise, Sadiq and Bonapugha in Chapter 2 interrogate the relationship between climate Change, Security, and sustainable development in North-East Nigeria. According to the authors, the trio has an intricate form of a complex relationship with forwarding and backward linkages leading to the current insecurity affair in Nigeria's North-east. Similarly, Precious Chapter further deals with the Farmer-Herder conflict as an instigating factor to food insecurity in Nigeria. Like Cecilia's approach to peace education, Stephanie in Chapter 4 expounded

another strategy of peacebuilding ‘the conflict-sensitive approach’ to deal with the recalcitrant youth as an aspect of community development project in the Itesiwaju community, Ibadan. In Chapter 5, Nwosu Nancy used a bottom-up approach towards effective parental training in addressing business insecurities among students in the Shomolu Local Government Area of Lagos State. In almost entirely different lenses, Ihuoma Okorie looks at how the menace of banditry could be approached from the theatrical perspective. According to the author in Chapter 6, there is the need for a fundamental re-think on the approaches adopted by the government in quelling the crisis of insecurity. The author makes use of the theory of participation and proposes that involving the communities affected through methodological conversation can help to alleviate the perennial crisis.

In Chapter 7, Ochigbo, Bala, and JustinaLere Charles-Zalakoro investigate the effect of insecurity in school on the academic performance of secondary school students in Benue State. Major findings in the analysis show that insecurity in schools in the state has significantly affected the academic performance of secondary school students. Similarly in Chapter 8, Kyangyaang and Aipe, believes that the current wave of banditry and kidnapping activities involving School pupils is a serious threat to the education sector and indeed the general public. Authors recommend that the government in those affected states should take measures to arrest the situation before it gets out of hand. Hembra, Ochigbo and Beetseh in chapter 9, looks at the activities of banditry and kidnapping from the prism of the threat it poses to national development. The trio thus advised the Nigerian Government to come up with poverty alleviation programmes and employment opportunities, targeting youths who are mostly involved in abductions and kidnappings out of economic frustration. Tunde and Danjibo in chapter 10 focus on the effect of the Farmer-Herder conflict on inter-communal relations in Barkin Ladi in Plateau State. While Adedeji et al in Chapter 11, discuss the challenges of insecurity within the Nigerian Educational System. Chapter 12 by Adams et al dealt with the effects of insecurity on the School System in Nigeria. In Chapter 13, Beetseh, Samaila, and Nongo analyze the effect of herdsmen, banditry, and kidnapping activities on food security in Nigeria. The authors further recommend ways to mitigate the effects of banditry and kidnappings through several programs. Lastly, Chapter 14 by Oni, Momoh, and Nwadioha studied Police brutality and its relations to the increase in insecurity in Nigeria. The authors argued that violation of human rights leads to insecurity in different forms such as torture to extract confession and information, illegal detention, kickback or bribery, corruption, intimidation, molestation, rape, extrajudicial killings, and disobedience of court orders. There is no doubt that these papers have touched on many sub-themes that are essential in the understanding of the current waves of insecurity in Nigeria. This book is a must-have for everyone interested in the ‘state of the nation’ on the insecurity situation in Nigeria. Scholars and researchers across disciplines of Arts and humanities would find this book useful because of the divergent issues addressed on the subject matter.

Moreover, the general public would benefit considerably from the discussions. Chapter 15 by Abubakar Sama'ila looks at the ungoverned spaces of the unsecured borderlands: trade relations and armed banditry in Sokoto-Zamfara-Katsina axis of Nigeria-Niger border. Kenni and others examined Nigeria's environmental vulnerability in Chapter 16. These authors emphasize the problems that exist in the environment, water, and soil, and link them to individual health. The stakeholders should make efforts to curb or reduce the danger, according to the findings.

By

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Chapter 1

An Exploration of Peace Education as a Panacea for Rural and Urban Violence in Nigeria

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Abstract

Violence is on the increase in both rural and urban settings in Nigeria. Men, women, adults, youths, and even children perpetrate violence with impunity in both public and private domains regardless of their ethnic and religious affiliations. Even though perpetrators of violence are arrested, prosecuted, and punished, violence is alarmingly on the increase. The fact that punishment has not been able to discourage people from perpetrating violence calls for the use of peace education to enlighten the mind of the people. Peace education, both formal and informal, teaches people to embrace the culture of peace and tolerance in human interactions, while it rejects the culture of violence. The paper advocates curricular review at primary and secondary levels of education in the country to include peace and conflict subjects. It also recommends the commencement of a compulsory course- "Introduction to Peace and Conflict Studies", at the tertiary level. Also, the paper recommends the use of entertainment education through video dramatizations and mass film viewing, as a strategy to curb rural and urban violence in the country.

Keywords: Violence, peace education, entertainment-education, panacea.

Introduction

Violence in human interaction has a long history. The Bible, in Genesis Chapter 4, captures the killing of Abel by his brother Cain. Violence, according to World Health Organization (WHO) (2002:13), can be described as "The intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another person or against a group or community, which either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, maldevelopment or deprivation". From this definition, violence can be broadly categorized into three: self-directed violence, interpersonal violence, and collective violence (WHO, 2002). Self-directed violence is perpetrated by a person against himself or herself. This occurs when a person intentionally hurts or kills himself or herself. This may be done by suicide or abuse of substances like hard drugs or excessive consumption of alcohol. Interpersonal violence is perpetrated by persons against other persons. This can manifest in form of family and intimate partner violence such as elder abuse, violence against children and women, and violence against men (Eboiyehi & Muoghalu, 2017), community, and workplace. Collective violence, on the other hand, refers to "violence committed by larger groups of individuals and can be subdivided into social, political and economic violence" (WHO, 2002:13). In essence, men women, and children experience violence in diverse forms and varying degrees.

Violence is a prevalent social problem in Nigeria and notable amongst this is the incessant violent and fatal assault by the Boko-Haram insurgency group which has drawn international attention to the country's insecurity plight. Other violent and criminal acts include youth violence, ritual violence, cult violence, sexual violence, intimate partner violence, robbery with violence, internet fraud, electoral violence, kidnapping, abduction, and human trafficking among others. Even though perpetrators of these vices are arrested, prosecuted, and punished by the justice system, these criminal acts continue to thrive. On daily basis, newspapers, both print and online continue to feature various incidents of violence across the nation. For instance, The Punch of October 31, 2019; Alaroye, November 5 2019 edition and The Sunday Punch of November 3, 2019, reported respectively, the following violent acts across the country:

- ❖ Gunmen kidnap another Edo judge, kill orderly-The Punch.
- ❖ Court stops rape victim's father from withdrawing case-The Punch.
- ❖ Motorist jailed 14 years for sodomising nine-year-old boy-The Punch.
- ❖ Court jails three internet fraudsters in Ibadan-The Punch.
- ❖ Abducted Enugu priest freed-The Punch.
- ❖ OlokadagbeTawakalituwonuigbo, lo bafipa baa laseponiluu Shao- "A commercial motor cyclist raped Tawakalitu"-Alaroye.
- ❖ Boko Haram scare: Don't dare to invade South-West, OPC, Agbekoya warn sect-The Punch.
- ❖ Niperu, awonomoegbeElukukolumosalasi won se eeyan meta lese-" Members of Eluku cult attacked a mosque and wounded three persons at Iperu"-Alaroye.
- ❖ Pirates attack Rivers passenger boats, kill two Sunday Punch.
- ❖ UNIBEN student shot dead at the carnival, school bans social activities-Sunday Punch.
- ❖ Environmental 'genocide' going on in Bayelsa -Commission- Sunday Punch

All these violent acts render rural and urban settings quite unsafe for everyone irrespective of ethnic and religious affiliation, age, gender, profession, and status. The thriving nature of these various forms of violent acts, despite punishments, demands a new form of deterrent intervention, hence the need for peace education.

Violence, an act that is carried out intentionally with the mindset to hurt or kill a person; can be perpetrated in any of these forms: physical, sexual, emotional, psychological, spiritual, cultural, verbal financial, and neglect (Violence Prevention Initiative,1992). All the nine violence typology mentioned above, which have lasting consequences on the victim, the perpetrator, and the society at large, are perpetrated in diverse forms in Nigeria. It should be noted that the nation parades "highly creative, energetic, and smart people who engage in all manner of enterprises, some positive but others negative" (Ololajulo, 2015:114). Some notable acts of violence are explained in the next section.

Cult violence is a vice that is thriving in educational institutions in Nigeria, despite concerted efforts by both states and federal government to get rid of this academic vice. Apart from the fact that cult groups such as "The Axe" "Eye Confraternity", "The

Black Bra” “The Red Rose” and others terrorize both teaching and non-teaching staff as well as fellow students, who are not members on campuses, they also engage in a war of supremacy among themselves. Their heinous acts often result in the death of members and non-members, damage of school and societal properties, a high rate of school dropouts and unsafe campuses (Ajayi et al., 2017). Apart from these, the cult members are always available to be recruited and used by greedy politicians to perpetrate violence before, during, and after elections.

Related to the above is robbery with violence and internet fraud, which have made Nigerian society quite unsafe for everyone. Almost on daily basis, people are robbed of their properties, injured, and killed, while some are abducted and even murdered by desperate wealth seekers. Worthy of mentioning is internet fraud by some greedy youths in Nigeria which have given birth to the new concept “Yahoo boy”. This vice, according to Ololajulo (2017:114) emerged because “a lot of youths, after failing to secure employment in the job market motivated by both the ‘big’ lifestyles of colleagues and a seeming national receptiveness of official corruption to join a growing gang of cyber fraudsters who consider themselves as earning a living by ‘working’ with their brains”. Presently, cyber fraud has graduated to ‘yahoo plus’, a concept for money-making rituals that involve the use of human parts or a whole human being. It is now very common to find mutilated human bodies in many towns and villages and hear or read of missing persons.

Also, violence for ritual purposes is now on the increase in Nigeria. The increase has made the home, school, community, church, and mosque quite unsafe for everyone. According to Nwolise (2013:11) “There are desperate and greedy wealthy seekers. This set of people do desperate things to get rich. They go into money rituals or join cult groups and can sacrifice their friends, brothers, mothers, and fathers to achieve their goals. They cause people to be kidnapped or murdered to acquire human parts”. It is now common to find mutilated bodies with missing vital parts like eyes, private parts, head, heart, and fingers.

Sexual violence is also rife in the country. This manifests in a woman or girl being physically forced to have sexual intercourse. It encompasses a wide range of acts including coerced sex in marriage and dating relationships, rape by strangers, sexual harassment, sexual abuse of children, forced prostitution, and sexual trafficking (WHO, 2002). All these forms of sexual violence are perpetrated by people in homes, educational institutions, and workplaces in both rural and urban settings in Nigeria with a sense of impunity.

Aim and Objectives of the Paper

The paper aims to advocate the use of formal and informal peace education to curb rural and urban violence in Nigeria. Specifically, the objectives of the study are to:

1. Recommend a curricular review of educational curricular at all levels of the educational to include designated subjects and courses on issues of peace, conflict, and violence.

2. Suggest the use of entertainment education through the use of community or mass viewing of films to discourage the use of violence in human interaction.

Significance of the Paper

Violence is on the increase in Nigeria although perpetrators are always punished by the justice system. Men, women, and children live in perpetual fear everywhere they are home, place of worship, workplace, church, and the street. To eschew violence from society requires the support of everyone. This is because violence to one is violence to all. This can be achieved when everyone uses every available opportunity to condemn the culture of violence while encouraging the acceptance of the culture of peace. Also, it should encourage peace practitioners and organizations like the SPSP to be more resolute in their attempt to rid society of violence through informal peace education. This is based on the conviction that punishment does not stop criminal activities but re-orientation. Finally, it should enable the Ministry of Education to realize the need to advocate a review of the educational curricula right from the primary school to the tertiary institution, to include peace education subjects and courses that will be so designated.

Peace Education

Human beings are gregarious, hence the need for interaction. In the course of interaction, peace, conflict, and violence can be easily generated. The engine room of peace, conflict, and violence is the human mind. The human mind needs enlightenment to choose peace instead of war or violence when a dispute arises. This idea is captured in the Bible thus “My people perish because of lack of knowledge...” (Hosea 4:6), Peace education is a veritable tool that is needed to imprint on people’s minds the need for peaceful coexistence among people of diverse race, culture, and religion. Peace education, according to United Nations Children’s Fund (2001) as cited by Olasehinde-Williams (2019:401) is:

The process of promoting the knowledge, skills, attitudes, and values needed to bring about behaviour changes that will enable children, youth, and adults to prevent conflict and violence, both overt and structural, to resolve conflict peacefully, and to create the conditions conducive to peace, whether at an intra-personal, inter-group, national or international level.

Since conflict is inevitable in human existence, peace education enables people to embrace the culture of peace. A culture of peace respects the sanctity of human life values human rights and justice and appreciates in totality ethnic, cultural, and religious diversity. Also, it rejects violence as a means of settling disputes, while it upholds tolerance, love, dialogue, and cooperation among people (Gumut, 2006).

Peace education can be taught formally and informally in the following settings as highlighted by Iroye, (2019). The family unit is the starting point and it is the setting where the child begins his life and interaction, and a suitable place to teach peaceful education. The major actors are the parents who have the responsibility to teach the child in words and conduct, the virtues of love, tolerance, friendship, dialogue,

amicable resolution of conflict, and universal brotherhood among others. Related to this also is the use of the traditional rulers and elders forum in the various communities to inculcate peace education. The importance of this forum cannot be overemphasized because there is a preference for it in conflict resolution among disputants. This forum stands out because restoration of harmony, and not inflicting punishment on the offender, is the focus (Mbagwu, 2016). This important medium of conflict resolution can also be used to teach some concepts of peace education. The religious organisation unit is another relevant forum that can be used to teach peace education." In Nigeria, religion plays a very key role within the political and economic terrain of the country. Thus, it is a viable instrument or medium in the teaching, projection, and impartation of peace education" (Iroye, 2019: 288). Further, the school system is also very useful in this assignment of re-orientation. school system, according to Iroye (2019:287) "draws diverse kind of individuals from various ethnic, social and religious backgrounds, it is a very good and impactful forum to disseminate peace education". However, the school system is yet to fully exploit all the available benefits (Osita, 2006; Iroye, 2019). Another school-based medium that can be exploited is the formation of peace clubs and their variants to provide peace education training for pupils and students (Iroye, 2019). In addition to these, this paper is proposing the use of two other methods. These are elaborated in the next section.

Formal Peace education

Education is that process of physical and mental culture whereby a man's personality is developed to the fullest (ObafemiAwolowo, 1981). It can be formal and informal. Formal education is provided in a classroom within a school system under the leadership of a teacher with a specific curriculum. (Ijitona, 2017). At the end of active exposure to learning, the examination is given and a certificate is awarded. In Nigeria, this education takes place at four levels: kindergarten, primary, secondary and tertiary level (National Policy on Education, 2013); peace education can be taught at all these levels except the kindergarten. Formal peace education is taught using the school system and its medium of instruction (Iroye, 2019) to impact the knowledge of peaceful co-existence with other people irrespective of their race, skin colour, culture, and religion among others. It also involves the teaching of harmonious relationships with the ecosystem and the use of non-violent means to resolve conflict. At the primary school level, and the first three years of the two-tier secondary education, the curricular of these subjects: Social Studies, Civic Education, Creative Art, and Music can be reviewed to include topics related to peace, conflict, violence, and environmental abuse. Also, at the senior secondary level, the curriculum of the now compulsory Civic Education should be reviewed to include more peace-related topics such as religious tolerance, ethnicity, cultural diversity, and conflict resolution techniques. Considering the rising trend of violence in the country, it is high time for new subjects titled "Peace Studies" to be introduced into the primary and secondary education curricula.

Tertiary education in Nigeria is provided in Universities, Polytechnics, Monotechnics, Colleges of Education and Technology, Schools of Health Technology, and the National Teachers Institute (National Policy on Education, 2013). The curricular of the

various institutions differ, but some general studies courses are designed to meet the specific needs of the students concerned. For instance, undergraduate students in universities are expected to offer General Studies courses such as African Cultures and Civilization, Man and His Environment, Government, Society, and Economy as well as History and Culture of Nigeria. Their counterparts in polytechnics and other allied institutions offer Citizenship Education, Sociology, Industrial and Labour Relations, Entrepreneurship Development, and some Use of English courses. Considering the prevalent nature of violence in the country, a peace and conflict course deserves to be urgently introduced into the curricular of these tertiary institutions. The topics to be featured in the new course should include the concepts of Peace and Conflict, Theories of Conflict, Terrorism and Insurgency, Religious conflict, Violence, and Alternative Dispute Resolution. At this juncture, it is apt to state that this school-based peace education can only be of benefits to Nigerian children and youths in schools. According to a UNICEF report published by The Pulse (2018), about 13.2 million Nigerian children are out of school, and it is described as the highest in the world. This population and other adults in some other places have to be incorporated into the peace education programme, hence the need for informal channels of peace education.

Informal Peace Education

Informal education takes place outside the school system and it is without a specific curriculum. It begins at birth and continues throughout life till death. The teachers are parents, elders in the family, and the community. Certificates are not awarded for informal education. Informal peace education is related to this in some areas. Informal peace education takes place in informal settings where people are gathered for work or pleasure (Gumut, 2006). Such places include the family setting, recreation parks, places of worship, market, shopping malls among others.

“Entertainment-education” (Green *et al.*, 2019) is an informal channel of peace education that can be used to curb rural and urban violence in Nigeria. It involves the use of video dramatizations and mass viewing of films on violence at video viewing centres or film houses. Entertainment-education is violence against women reduction strategy explored by Innovation for Poverty Action in rural Uganda in 2017 and 2019 respectively. This came into existence because violence against women is condoned in Uganda and victims as well as witnesses do not report to authorities. The effect of this on violence against women is that victims and witnesses are now coming out boldly to report various incidents of assaults to law enforcement officers. This is leading to the arrest of more perpetrators of domestic violence for prosecution and relevant punishment. The impact of this is two-fold. While punishment is serving as a deterrent factor, education is providing an opportunity for people to realise that violence is not the only way to settle marital disputes. Further, this has enabled more victims to benefit from the support services provided by the Ugandan government. Therefore, this paper is advocating the use of entertainment-education to curb rural and urban violence in the country. This can be done in two ways. In rural communities where few families possess television sets or have access to it, concerned individuals and corporate bodies like Society for Peace Studies and Practice (SPSP) and Institute for

Chartered Mediators and Conciliators (ICMC) can initiate and sponsor video or film viewing programmes in the evening of selected days free of charge regularly.

To ensure that there is a large turnout of people, a week or two of sensitization should be devoted to this. In urban communities, film houses and video viewing centres can be used for this after aggressive publicity. Also, halls and event centres of religious groups and communities can be used for such programmes

Recommendations

From the above discussion, it can be asserted that peace education, both formal and informal, is essential to illuminate the people's minds to accept the culture of peace and to reject the culture of violence in totality. Based on this, the following recommendations are made:

1. The educational curriculum should be prepared to respond to the needs and aspirations of the society that it serves. As a result, instructional curricular of the primary, secondary and tertiary levels of education in Nigeria should be reviewed. Peace education subjects and courses that would be so designated should be introduced at the primary and the secondary school levels. Also, at the tertiary level of the educational ladder, the "Introduction to Peace and Conflict Studies" course should be designed and included in the General studies courses to be offered compulsorily by all the students.

2. Likewise, corporate non-governmental organizations like the Society for Peace Studies and Practice (SPSP) Institute for Chartered Mediators and Conciliators (ICMC) and other organizations committed to the promotion of peace in the society should exploit the entertainment-education strategy. This strategy should assist viewers to change their attitudes towards violence and societal norms that encourage it.

3. Finally, violence affects every member of society either directly or indirectly. As such, all and sundry should use every available opportunity to encourage peaceful co-existence, love, tolerance, and dialogue in human interaction. Apart from this, defending or protecting victims of violence is an assignment that everyone should embrace warmly. When violence to one is perceived as violence to all, getting rid of violence will become an easy task.

Conclusion

In this paper, peace education-both formal and informal has been examined as a viable instrument to curb violence in both rural and urban settings. If the suggestions provided are implemented, violence will be reduced to the barest minimum in society. This will in turn ensure the safety of lives and properties.

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Chapter 2

Interrogating the Complex Relationship between Climate Change, Security and Sustainable Development in North-East Nigeria

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Abstract

New waves of multi-scale crises are altering the bio-geophysical properties of the Lake Chad Basin (LCB). Two of these challenges: climate change and security threats are causing radical changes in the political economy thereby undermining efforts at sustainable development. Though, the Federal Government of Nigeria has formulated policies to curb accelerants of these crises, yet, such measures do not address the root causes of these issues. Unfortunately, most of the policies formulated ignore their interrelatedness and interdependent nature. The dyadic relationship of these variables is investigated to explicate the constraints they pose to sustainable development. Overcoming the discontinuities between these three inversely related variables is the analytical fulcrum of this study. Using data derived from historical and secondary sources, the paper brings out their interrelatedness and impact on national integration. The key finding is that complexities exist at multiple levels between climate change and security at international, national, and local levels, thus, stifling sustainable development. For sustainable development, a mix of pathways and scales that do not only synergistically integrate these issues but stimulate favourable investment climate is promoted. A socially inclusive development, using agriculture as its springboard will catalyse a green industrial revolution, while, also spurring agricultural transformation of the region. It concludes that large scale bamboo cultivation in the Sambisa Forest and Lake Chad Basin comes with the co-benefits of not only dislodging Boko Haram insurgents from their stronghold but will earn carbon credit, improve environmental quality, act as watershed management, simultaneously promoting economic diversification and thereby attracting additional foreign exchange earnings in the post-fossil fuel era.

Keywords: Bamboo, climate change adaptation, conflict, security, sustainable development, violence.

Securitization of Risk

The concept of national security is changing from its traditional military role to a more encompassing non-military view. Climate change is credited with the reconceptualization of security and this is due, in large part, to its tendency of accelerating conflicts within weak states (Sahel Working Group, 2007; Oche, 2010; Onuoha, 2010; Busby, 2008; 2016). Climate change's intrinsic nature of being not just a multi-stressor but also as a transnational and crosscutting phenomenon is the major accelerant of this broadening of security's conceptual scope. However, the impact of climate change is not limited to its re-conceptualization of security alone but is

stepping up regional and local tensions. This, in turn, is undermining efforts to attain holistic national development in 'hot zones' around the world (Homer-Dixon, 1994; de Waal, 2007; Ki-Moon, 2007; Burke *et al.*, 2009).

In these 'hotzones', climate change is aggravating scarcity causing food shortages in weak states (Adejuwon and Odekunle, 2003, Department for International Development, [DFID], 2009; American Security Project, 2012). In the recent past, the phenomenon's secondary impacts have exacerbated existing tensions in a polity (Homer-Dixon, 1999; Barnett and Adger, 2007; Kuwali, 2008; Busby, Smith, and Krishnan, 2010; Hsiang, Burke, and Miguel, 2013). With the heightened tension of scarce resources, climate change is credited with being the cause of war in Sudan leading to the first climate war (Sahel Working Group, 2007). Accordingly, climate change is not just a multi-stressor but, more importantly, is a threat multiplier (Onuoha, 2010; Hendrix, 2014; Weaver, 2015; Busby, 2016) as well as a process impacting upon several channels to exacerbate or worsen already existing sources of conflict (Buzan, 1983; Hubert, 1999, Oche, 2010; Busby 2008).

In recognition of its crosscutting ramification, different measures have been adopted at national, regional, and international levels with differing outcomes. Even then, the ability of governments to address climate risk is dependent on existing socioeconomic and political conditions, together with the institutional capacity to cope with sudden changes resulting from short-term shocks such as floods, drought, wildfire, and long-term stress like desertification and decreased agricultural yields (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC], 2007, 2014; Hendrix and Salehyan, 2012; Hendrix, 2014).

With the surge in climate-related risk, the geopolitics of climate change is not only establishing linkages with security (Waever, 1995, Oche, 2009; Tir and Stinnett, 2012) but is with sustainable development imperative (Anyadike, 2009; Ozor, 2009; Sachs and Tabiana, 2014). However, the geopolitical consequences of climate change will not be determined by the geophysical changes alone, but by how it affects and interacts with local political, social, and economic conditions. According to the American Security Project (2012), a change in climate acts as an accelerant of instability around the world, heightening tensions related to water scarcity and food shortages, natural resource competition, underdevelopment, and overpopulation. As a result, near-term impacts of climate change are likely to have disproportionate effects on poor countries with weak governance structures, particularly in Africa and Asia.

This is particularly so in North-East Nigeria where the vagaries of climate change together with the political instability within the region have conspired to undermine efforts at sustainable development. Given the volatility of the region, the upsurge of climate-related risk is establishing linkages with security thereby stifling attainment of the Sustainable Development Goals. Though the government formulated policies to curb some of the accelerants of the crisis yet, such measures do not address the interdependence of these concepts. The goal of this paper is to explore the interrelatedness of this trilemma to ascertain how they impede sustainable

development. In so doing, the paper sheds new light on how climate change-related insecurity impacts achieving sustainable development in the North-East. It unpacks the linkages of these variables by explicating how sustainable development can be achieved within the tight confines of climate change-induced instability. In that way, it reconciles the complexities of reducing climate risk at the same time with maintaining a conflict-free environment wherein the North-East is properly integrated into the sustainable development agenda of the country.

The paper brings clarity to uncertainties surrounding Nigeria's quest to reduce the destabilising effects of violent conflicts while also rebalancing priorities towards an equitable and socially inclusive growth where issues of food, water, and energy poverty ravaging the people are addressed. This prompts the paper to ask: What are the drivers of unsustainable development practices in the North-East of Nigeria? What roles does climate change play in exacerbating violent conflicts in the region? What are the policy, regulation, and financing factors that can transform the climate change scourge into economic opportunity? How can the region transit from conflict-prone polity to where equitable solutions proffered meet the aspirations of society?

In answering these questions, the rest of the paper comprises four sections: Section two presents the conceptual and theoretical issues in this research; the third section discusses barriers to sustainable development in the North East, Nigeria. The fourth section establishes the missing links and nexus of the concepts while the conclusion/recommendation forms the fifth section.

Framing the Conceptual Nexus of the Key Variables

Within the academic circle, the concept of security is in flux. There are uncertainties on the definition as different views of security are floating around. Yet, all these rationalizations are competing for attention to winning the conceptual soul of security. Studies indicate the different dimensions of security are commonplace including human security, food security, water security, energy security, environmental security, and cyber security with these rationalizations broadening the concept from its narrow prism of traditional security (Buzan, 1983; Oche, 2010; Busby 2016). As a late, there is a semantic shift from its state-centric orientation towards a far more all-encompassing non-traditional security reconceptualization involving the environment, health, water, food, human rights, and development concerns (Busby, 2008; Oche, 2010; Saulter, 2014; Weaver, 2015). Whilst accolades are pouring within some circles for closing the conceptual gap, others decry these efforts at broadening the scope of security on grounds that it has enshrined the neo-liberalization of ecological reasoning through the securitization of risk (Latouche, 2003; Reid, 2010; Okoh, 2017).

To address these complexities, studies on security strived to ascertain whether climate change will exacerbate violent conflicts (Buzan, 1983; Busby; 2008; Hendrix, 2014; Weaver, 2015); or are window dressings of the real problem (Reid, 2010; Leff, 2015) hence their distinction is mostly anthropomorphic with state-centric, geophysical or technocratic-determinist vistas (Okoh, 2017). But as Busby (2016) asserts, interest in

the security reconceptualization of climate change serves to justify action in this space, either to address the security implications themselves or to trigger a broader commitment to mitigation. Whilst others hold it is an avenue for rebranding climate risk with security trimming to incite fear of an existential threat (Deudney, 1999; Salehyan, 2014) urging for the desecuritization of climate change risk given that its security implications are non-military (Waeber, 1995). They claim that eco-socialists have by this means created new avenues for hijacking the ongoing rationalization of ecological degeneration. De Waal (2008) believes disaster such as climate change when linked security fosters insidious disempowering effect making it possible for the narrative of calamity to reduce its survivors to the status of victims in need of succour in that way elevating external agents to the role of saviours. Environmental remediation, pollution mitigation, industry standards, and moral codes are typically relaxed on the pretext of the urgency of need and so there is a high incidence of profligacy, inefficiency, and profiteering.

Evidence from different studies is mixed since the causal chains complex of climate change and security is still poorly understood (Reid, 2010, Welsh, 2014; Salehyan, 2014; Busby, 2016). Despite the lack of conceptual certainty of the causal relations of the concepts, it is increasingly clear that climate change poses an immediate security danger through extreme weather events such as drought, desertification, rising sea level, wildfire, and soil erosion which are having a significant impact on living and non-living things. According to Busby (2016), a wide variety of climate security concerns exist and have been incorporated into national security planning documents with major investments pouring into climate-proofing infrastructure at local and international levels.

This ongoing re-characterization of climate change owes to its inherent nature as its impacts manifesting in a wide variety of ways. Because climate change has both long and short-term horizons, this attribute made its rationalization a complex issue. Though the issue of uncertainty of the changing climate is gaining less traction with the scientific community unequivocal of the existence of climate change (Sachs and Tabiana, 2014; IPCC, 2014). But the problems that may likely warrant immediate attention are near-term impediments since plans for long-term contingencies only look out to twenty and thirty years into the future. Not only that there is low political visibility of the phenomenon but the short-term horizon of decision-makers poses a tough task for those seeking to make a case for climate change as a national security risk.

Given the above, the nexus of climate change and security hotly contested. Some argue that ongoing rationalization of the security imperative of climate change has been hijacked to be the lingua franca of those seeking to liberalize ecological reasoning using sustainable development as its catch phrase (Latouche, 2003; Reid, 2010). Sustainable development is a tie to the neoliberal doctrine where there is an interface between the economy, development, and risk. So, the sustainable development concept mainly re-echoes the economic growth doctrine insisting societies must be regulated in a manner that the security of states and their human populations is

guarantee thereby increasing the ability of both human and non-human nature to be more resilient. Others believe such re-conceptualization of security only succeeded in shifting the object of concern from human life to the biosphere. Thus, incorporating every known species, as well as habitats of all kinds, vulnerable to the destructions wrought via economic growth (Reid, 2010). In this line of thought, it is human life, not the economy that must provide the conditions according to which people are entitled to increase their prosperity. The implication of such doctrine is not just for how problems are resolved but is with different ramifications for the very nature of security and how it is viewed within the development circle.

With this semantic shift, the object of development changed from human to environment. As human development is subordinated to climate security, the object of development ceases to be human but nature making it pliable to the neo-liberalization of life (Okoh, 2017). Evans and Reid (2014) in the book entitled *Resilient Life* amplified this asserting: if liberalism was traditionally premised upon the promise of security, neoliberalism seems to have disavowed the ideal of security and embraced endangerment as a necessary condition for life to flourish. Wisnov (2003) holds a similar view claiming the dominant form of modern development often implies neoliberal principles of growth and deregulation wrapped in a globalization package linked with exacerbating vulnerability to climate change. As such, the sustainable development practices fostered in the neoliberal doctrine contribute more to the root cause of vulnerability hence are responsible for human exposure to climate risks.

Securitization of risk with the reification of economic growth in the neoliberal reasoning seeks to secure the 'life-support systems' which people otherwise require to live well and prosper (Reid, 2010). For Reid (2010) the conceptualization of security when linked to human security amplify the need for building neoliberal systems of governance for monitoring the poor's use of ecological services to ensure they are sustainably managed. Whilst the poor, to be the agents of their change, must be subjectivized to make sustainable management decisions that respect natural resources and enable the achievement of a sustainable income stream. The upsurge in risk made it is important we mainstream climate change adaptation to Sustainable Development Goals at all levels. And where there is a disaster it is indicative of the failure of sustainable development (Latouche, 2003; Okoh, 2014). What this means is the level of development is not sufficient to ensure an adequate and sustainable response to climate change, consequently will have severe ramifications for national development. For sustainable development to take root the most attractive adaptation strategies are those delivering added developmental benefits in the near term, as well as reduction of vulnerability in the long term.

So, the concept of state security is changing from its narrow mooring in national security (military security) to a broad all-encompassing meaning involving different facets of life. In its current form, national security's reconceptualization emphasizes new and diverse enemies ranging from terrorism, extremism, fragile states, infrastructure collapse, pandemics, biodiversity loss, and natural disasters to foster an all-encompassing security nexus with climate change. Rather than the state and its

military capacity, these largely non-state transnational and social-ecological threats impact upon society and people's lives from the cellular to the planetary with national security expanded to embrace life in its totality (Welsh, 2014). With different rationalities of security floating around, different governments have embarked upon diverse strategies to chart a way out of the present environmental bind. Within the parameter of the roadmap charted to promote a sustainable future, one can say there is a high level of collaboration in what constitutes environmental security and human security within the rubric of sustainable development. This interface is replicated in almost all institutional governance structures for managing both human and non-human nature.

Theoretical Issues

Most theorizations of complex phenomena seek rigidity through a top-down 'command and control' approach (Ramalingam, et al., 2008). However, interactions between complex systems do not always follow linear paths since the world is dominated by unpredictable phenomena which do not have linear causality. A common feature of analysing these unpredictable phenomena is through deductive and inductive reasoning. The science of complexity is in direct contrast with these two standard methods of scientific inquiry: induction and deduction. Complexity theory is quite different from the two approaches for the mere fact it charts a middle ground between induction and deduction approaches. The theory provides scientists and thinkers with opposing paradigms to investigate a complex world. Complexity theory most especially the Complex Adaptive System (CAS) variant challenges both inductive and reductive methods of thinking about real-world problems. By using concepts related to the nature of complex systems, the nature of change, and the behaviour of intelligent actors, the theory provides a basis for guiding thinking in a way encompassing both reductive and inductive approaches together with their limitations (Ramalingam *et al.*, 2008).

Complexity theory comes closest to capturing uncertainties of climate risk as a paradigm shift in the social sciences replacing theories such as rational choice theory. Generally, the theory shifts the focus of explanation from individualistic to holistic accounts (Cairney, 2012) of a world filled with instability and fluctuations. Complexity theory provides a holistic lens for explaining and understanding policy processes, one which complements existing theories that seek to understand the implications of social complexity and interdependency in policy processes (Eppel, 2010). When used in policy research, complexity theory provides a method that works with multiple complex social systems and policy domains to understand and guide policy action. To analyse challenges in the North-East this theory comes closest to explicating complexities inherent in a multifaceted phenomenon. This is because the theory considers the dynamism, self-organization, adaptation, and emerging needs of the society. In using the complexity theory framework, the researcher acknowledges uncertainty, ambiguity, and paradox in many social policy problems in terms of the current structures and processes of government.

Constraints to Sustainable Development in the North-East

A plethora of issues has undermined sustainable development with climate stressor its major catalyst. Other constraints include:

Geophysical Circumstance of the Region

The North-East is in the Western Sudan savannah where climate change is a major issue of concern. The history of climate change in the region dates back to before the country became independent in 1960. Before independence, issues of changing climate in the region have been of great significance. Starting from 1900 rainfall patterns and trends of temperature showed both a rising and declining pattern (FGN, 2018). The rainfall trend in Nigeria between 1901 and 2005 generally has been declining (FGN, 2011). Within 105 years, the rainfall amount in Nigeria dropped by 81mm. One of the earliest concerns about changing climate was over the possible Southward shift of the Sahara Desert into Nigeria expressed in the 1930s (NSAP, 2012). The declining rainfall became worst from the early 1970s, and the pattern has continued to date. This period of drastic rainfall decline corresponds with the period of sharp temperature rise (NSAP, 2012). Different studies suggest the Lake Chad is shrinking losing over 90% of its initial size of 400,000 sq (UNOCHA, 2017; van de Wetering, 2018). Desertification in the region is one of the culprits moving southward at an alarming rate of 0.7 km per annum with the persistent problem crippling the socio-economic life of the region (Onuoha, 2016).

Rural Poverty

Rural poverty is high in the region with hunger and extreme poverty existing side by side with stupendous wealth. The massive oil wealth generated in the southern parts of the country has not translated to economic wellbeing for the North-East zone neither has it changed the standard of living of the people. The dwindling economic activities of Lake Chad also increased the incidence of hunger making the poor eke a living by hiring out their labour.

Free Market Economy

Nigeria runs a free market economy subject to vagaries and uncertainties of the market. Within the region, the economic lens is focused on competitive markets where individualistic consumers trade on private goods (Onuoha, 2016) with no connection to the people. In the region, those with personal stake are the dominant class and as such policy formulated by national and state governments are in the image of those who defend market principles.

Hold on Power

Power is central to both economic and political decisions on promoting sustainable development. In the economic arena of the North-East, power is a vital tool deployed by the powerful class to allocate scarce resources. Under conditions of complex interdependence such as we have in the region, policies formulated in the state reflect the interests of the major constituency exerting serious influence over the leaders. The weighting of these interests in determining national outcomes can foster sustainable development but it depends on power resources relevant to the issue area available to

the class involved. The use of power in the zone reflects asymmetrical interdependence: bargaining power depends on the impact of one's own decisions on others (a reflection of status) and favourable asymmetries in interdependence causing better default (no-agreement) positions in the state (Keohane and Victor, 2010). Resolution of conflicts overallocation of scarce goods and services is therefore vital to the government but taking such option is not entirely in the hands of the government.

Skewed Allocative and Distribution of Resources

The way and manner resources are allocated within the region amplify its political currency. Here, the allocation of resources is skewed towards a section of the society resulting in an allocative crisis. The discontented group who are marginalised can use either force or contest for public offices to secure political power critical for redistribution of goods and services or can through armed conflict seek to rebalance the distributive crisis.

Externality crisis

Climate change has an intrinsic transboundary nature where an environmental malady like pollution is the outcome of externalisation of cost (Okoh, 2017). Because climate change is an upshot of externality over misallocation of economic burden or the absence of such allocation, it will either create wealth for a select few or ingrain poverty for the vast majority. With different interests pulling at an opposing end, it is a recipe for the crisis, and where there is conflict; one may agree it is fundamentally an argument over action. Such action could be in the form of disagreement over the allocation of resources. Where externality crisis is prevalent, unending climate variability will manifest daily (Okoh, 2017) creating new avenues for conflict. Where markets fail to capture externality, the crisis of various dimensions will manifest posing new constraints to sustainable development.

Political Will

The region's economic fortune is a tie to fishing and agricultural activities in the Lake Chad Basin. With economic growth linked to the status of the basin generating near-term gains, there is a lack of political will to address issues of sustainability of the resource. The political class when they have the option of choosing between the country's economic wellbeing and non-human nature's health the latter ultimately loses out since there is a trade-off between near-term gains of economic development and long-term protection of ecological assets.

Paucity of Data

Poor data and information on climate change impacts are the banes of Nigeria's climate mitigation. The paucity of accurate data on adaptation needs and research of climate change in the region is rampant. Consequently, prospects for monitoring change in climatic conditions at local and national scales and across sectors are limit to the consideration of how the country reports statistics, including climate variation, environmental pollution, and policy signals that indicate plans for monitoring systems that are accurate and robust. More access to knowledge and information on agricultural adaptation, practices and inadequate climate change adaptation awareness at the local level also contribute to the maladaptation in the region.

Climate Change: The missing link in the National Security and Sustainable Development dyadic relationships

Climate change is a complex phenomenon requiring transdisciplinary tool of complexity theory to interrogate inversely related issues. From the perspective of a complex adaptive system, there are many connections and interactions within the various dimensions of climate risk affecting economic development and social change in the northeast region. These issues encompass education, health, and poverty, between poverty and vulnerability to disasters, between agriculture and famine, between climate change and food security, between growth and the environment. All these interconnections exist in multiple chains involving series of systems due to how climate change interacts with local, political, social, and economic conditions as much as with the magnitude of the climatic shift itself.

Historically, climate change is not a new phenomenon in the region but is part of the geophysical properties of the Sudan savannah (Federal Government of Nigeria [FGN], 2011; UNOCHA, 2017). Though threats from climate change scourge are recorded across different regions (DFID, 2009) but the North-East geopolitical zone is far more susceptible to climate risk (FGN, 2011). Desiccation of the Lake Chad basin through climate change is impairing efforts at resolving the humanitarian emergency. More the fact as shrinkage of Lake Chad made the region face one of the most severe humanitarian crises in modern time (van de Wetering, 2018). This crisis is affecting about 17 million people across north-eastern Nigeria, Cameroon's far north, Western Chad, and south-east Niger (UNOCHA, 2017; Okeke, 2018).

Climate change is fuelling tension creating fertile grounds for Boko Haram insurgency to proliferate while also acting as a catalyst for herders and local communities' conflicts (Sahel Working Group, 2007). Unfortunately, the region is one of the poorest regions in the world where food insecurity is causing a humanitarian crisis (Lanzer, Tatay, and Dewar, 2016; UNOCHA, 2018). According to UNOCHA (2017), a total of 17.4 million people are living in the affected areas with over 2.3 million people displaced and 10.7 million requiring urgent assistance while about 488,000 children are suffering from extreme malnutrition and 5.8 million people are coping with food insecurity. Large-scale population displacement; drought, desertification, floods, food insecurity; agricultural and fishing industries are impacts of climate change in the North East (DFID, 2009). As geophysical changes become more acute, the policy space is affected by the existential threat. Unarguably, the upsurge in climate change is causing millions of dollars as violent conflicts have pushed people from their homes stymieing their having access to basic and vital human needs and services (UNOCHA, 2017).

Nigeria like the rest of the countries in the region is confronted with the challenge of formulating policies not only to tackle rising insecurity from farmers'/herders' conflicts and extremists' activities but to ameliorate climate change impact which is also engendering severe economic stress. Resolving these interrelated issues entail carrying out far-reaching transformations of the socioeconomic and political milieu.

Again, this is the hinge on context, policies, and participation of stakeholders, amongst other issues. In the national policy arena, various programmes have been initiated to promote sustainable land management and enhance environmental sustainability in the context of national development. With the increase of climate change, the NASPA instrument was formulated to integrate some age-proven strategies of the poor with best practices of adaptation. But NASPA is fundamentally flawed as it does not address specific adaptation challenges of the poor in different regions (Okoh, 2014). Because of this, there is a lack of local anchorage hence no political lock-in of the roadmap making the gap between the rich and the poor in the region widen. Government's inability to bridge this widening gulf between these values marginalised a vital section of the society. Perhaps, more important than such inhibition is another significant consideration of it acting as a breeding ground for the crisis confronting the region. Partly, it is due to different change agents such as the Boko Haram insurgency and other extremists operating in different ways that are affecting different strata of the society.

Changing climate acts as an accelerant of instability exacerbating tensions related to water scarcity and food shortages and natural resource competition fostering unsustainable practices. This is because over 80% of the population who depend on rain-fed agriculture are vulnerable to climate variability and change (DFID, 2009, FGN, 2011, 2018). With the high level of susceptibility to climate risk, the people are maximally exploiting forest resources to meet their dietary needs thereby making the region stand on the brink of natural and human-induced disaster. The exacerbation of insecurity issues like territorial integrity, critical infrastructure, national identity, protection of people, government's ability to govern, and military's readiness when they seek to defend national security are all complexly interrelated in the region. How people and government react to these issues is affecting national integration since socioeconomic conditions are either undermined or are causing failure to institute sustainable development. Climate change is a transboundary phenomenon par excellence constituting an indirect security threat to the region since conflicts over resources in the Lake Chad basin are on the rise (Onuoha, 2016).

With all these adverse attributes, climate change exacerbated systems failure owing to it being an independent variable with its impacts deeply interwoven with other variables that both increase and decrease security (America Security Progress, 2012, Busby, 2016). For instance, shrinking of the Lake Chad and desertification created a self-perpetuating crisis since there are no structures in place to prevent such a crisis. A self-perpetuating crisis manifesting in the northeast is extreme hunger and absolute poverty fostering unsustainable exhaustion of resources in the Lake Chad Basin.

Unsustainable utilization of resources through deforestation and overfishing has reinforced existing tensions leading to extreme climate events, health, water, and food poverty which further created inequalities in the region. Poverty is equally heightened by climate variation with all these crises occurring on a complex multi-scale. For instance, food shortages linked to climate change are engendering migration to water sources while population explosion in these areas is causing violent conflicts over

scarce resources further fuelling insecurity in the resource-rich areas. Correspondently, health-related challenges task government infrastructure exposing the people to further hardship and economic shock. Again, these places a further burden on the government budget because scarce resources are committed to tackling the phenomenon.

Climate change placed additional weight on government institutions where decisions are taken and on many organized and unorganized private sectors. Violent conflicts affect activities of Civil Society Organizations before it gets to the people who bear the burden of climate change. The exponential population in these areas tasked the capacity of existing institutions to cope in the process of stretching the weakened governance structures (Onuoha, 2016). Social and economic constraints associated with the scourge have not only increased the level of poverty but are making these areas prone to extremists' activities, herders, and farmers' conflict over farming and grazing land. While this is a domestic economic issue but it is equally a source of international crisis since the issue of water resources and agriculture are interwoven with the transboundary effects of the phenomenon. For instance, the multi-decadal megadrought experienced in the region in 1983 had wider consequences for water access, migration, food security, and agriculture production. Local changes in weather and climate affect security in the region which also depends on existing socio-economic conditions for sustainable development (Weaver, 2015). Disruptions of economic and political activities overburdened civil and military institutions with infrastructures like transportation, roads, bridges, markets, schools, hospitals, and communication networks are severely affected by geophysical changes as well as violent conflicts. The destabilising effects of these conflicts have overwhelmed the disaster-response capabilities of the government.

Unfortunately, agriculture bears the major burnt of system failure associated with climate change (Weaver, 2015; Busby, 2008). Agriculture plays a crucial role because over 80% of the population is engaged in agriculture-related activities (FGN, 2011). With climate change, smallholder farmers are experiencing decreasing productivity posing a serious drain on the economy. Over the years, crop yield and livestock have reduced drastically owing to desiccation (Adejuwon and Odewale, 2003) bringing about a loss of income (Okoh, 2014). Climate change's disruptive impact dramatically changed the dynamics of the uprising. Since socioeconomic challenges weigh down the deflated bureaucracy, most people lack adequate information on appropriate adaptation practices such as improved seedling, zero tilling, reforestation, and dry season farming (Sahel Working Group, 2007; Anyadike, 2009). Correspondently, information on credit, risk insurance, and property rights is inadequate.

Labour mobility is high with most people dependent on the welfare of things beyond the national borders of Nigeria. The humanitarian crisis associated with climate change made refugee flows and conflicts are correlated in a complex way. Lack of prompt policy intervention plays a crucial role in fuelling the crisis with migration acting as a breeding ground for violent extremists' activities (Sahel Working Group, 2007). The traditional security planning process cannot be applied in the complex

climate change policy-making space of the North East. This is due to the uncertain scenarios climate change poses which go beyond any standard security operation of government (Busby, 2016). Though the manifestation of climate risk is not a security risk but is an environmental policymaking problem. But with the cross-cutting impact affecting other development policies such as the Anchor Borrowers Scheme, Agriculture Transformation Agenda (ATA), and Economic Recovery and Growth Plan (ERGP), policies formulated are being short-circuited by the general insecurity in the region.

These concepts have international security colouration requiring both national and cross-border cooperation to redirect policy towards a common goal. Coordinating institutional framework for redistributing resources in the region is a precondition for sustainable development. The Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) plays a critical role in addressing this challenge by equitably managing the basin and other shared water resources of Lake Chad. Unfortunately, the LCBC geopolitical consequences make a political commitment for removing unsuitable practices weak. Given this, Nigeria's major challenge is no longer how to curb security challenges but reconciling competing needs in the manner the different goals of national security and environmental security are met. Protecting the regional ecosystem, reduce the risks of global climate change, improve physical security simultaneously improving livelihoods assets of the poor is important for Nigeria's sustainable development.

Conclusion and Recommendation

Climate change played into the security dynamics and is significantly exacerbating existing violent conflicts in the region. The want of a prompt social safety net as palliatives to ameliorate climate change catalysed the violent conflicts creating an amiable environment for Boko Haram insurgency and herders' conflicts to proliferate. In this clime, environmental security is closely linked to traditional security. Though different solutions have been fleshed out to reduce security challenges a carefully planned security strategy calls for solutions to alleviate poverty while also feeding the teeming hungry population. The envisioned measure requires tapping into the vast opportunities of decarbonisation at the international level. To this end, the biomass sector must be synergistically integrated into the plan to end violent conflicts inciting political instability in the region. One of the most promising areas relegated to the background is the cultivation of bamboo on a commercial basis. Bamboo cultivation on a commercial basis foot's government's North East instability bill guaranteeing water, food, and energy security, earning additional foreign exchange while also placing the country on a path of symbiotic relationship with nature. Bamboo is crucial for the transformation of the agricultural value chain in line with the Agricultural Transformation Agenda. Bamboo when efficiently cultivated in the Sambisa Forest will not only act as a food supplement but will generate additional revenue for the smallholder farmers.

The Sambisa Forest and the Lake Chad Basin provide vast swathes of land to catalyse a green revolution. In Lake Chad Basin, the cultivation of bamboo serves the dual

purpose of watershed management as well as for reforestation purpose. Large-scale bamboos if properly managed will improve the living standard of the people through the promotion of income-generating economic activities, build the resiliency of vulnerable class most especially women and children who are more exposed to the vagaries of climate change.

Large-scale cultivation of bamboos will reduce mala-adaptation when energy-saving devices such as clean energy stoves for women faced with health-related challenges associated with climate change are introduced in doing so end they're relying on traditional biomass sources for energy. In addition to their health benefit, bamboo will provide vegetative cover in areas where regarding has not been carried out and substantial protection of the river banks is lacking. The control measure using vegetative lining and buffer strips along river and stream banks will provide a natural self-regenerating cover to protect the banks from the erosive action of runoffs and desiccation. The use of bamboo is most economical here since protection is required over an extensive bank area of Lake Chad. Cultivation of bamboos would align national fuelwood consumption towards bamboos that are less carbon-intensive. Bamboo cultivation can be replicated in the Sambisa Forest covering a land area of over 518 square kilometres and is the main hideout of the extremists. The vast forest can drive green growth through planned cultivation of bamboo for both domestic and international markets with the co-benefits of improved environmental quality and can earn carbon credit. The cultivation will take advantage of the \$60 billion per year estimated total value of the bamboo and rattan market.

Climate change is now the new normal. Still, the phenomenon is not the main source of violent conflicts and instability in the Northeast. But it is an underlying factor affecting the long-term resolution of these conflicts. Addressing climate risk is therefore an integral part of overcoming security challenges of the region since it is establishing amiable conditions for terrorists groups and extremists to promote and execute their plans. To curb its adverse effect, change in the present value system to a climate regime where stabilizing stratospheric carbon emissions together with reducing inequalities is essential if the nation must maintain national security. But this laudable objective will continue to be a mirage if we look only to exogenous solutions to resolve the miasma of socioeconomic and bio-geophysical crises bedevilling the region.

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Chapter 3

Farmer-Herder Conflict and the Rising Trends of Food Insecurity in Nigeria: The Case of Benue State Nigeria

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Abstract

Nigeria as a country was a signatory to the Sustainable Development Goals, especially its goal two, where it is envisaged that by 2030, member states of the United Nations including Nigeria must have ended hunger, achieved food security, improved nutrition, and promoted sustainable agriculture. In line with this, the Federal Government of Nigeria put some efforts in place to boost agricultural productivity to have food security in Nigeria. Benue State which prides itself as the food basket of the nation is not exempted from the ugly trend of food scarcity. This is a result of the displacement of the farming population and communities due to clashes between nomadic herdsmen and rural farmers in the state. Renewed clashes over land between ethnic Tivs and nomadic Fulanis in Edo and Benue states also led to the displacement of an estimated 15,000 people since March 2012. The herdsmen and farmers' violent conflicts occurred in 14 out of 23 Local Government Areas of Benue State, known for a large quantity of production of food. The paper evaluates the nature and effect of the conflict and the impact it has on food productivity and security which includes low productivity of food that has led to the acute hunger in Benue State and Nigeria as a whole. Consequently, the work recommends among others that the ranching system, and grazing routes and reserves for herdsmen and pastoralists should be established, with enlightenment to all stakeholders concerned.

Keywords: food, conflict, insecurity, grazing, farmer-herder

Introduction

Nigeria as a country was a signatory to the Sustainable Development Goals, especially its goal two, where it is envisaged that by 2030, member states of the United Nations including Nigeria must have ended hunger, achieved food security, improved nutrition, and promoted sustainable agriculture (The Millennium Development Goal Report, 2015). Before this, Nigeria was ranked 91st out of a total of 104 countries on the 2015 Global Hunger Index and 153rd out of a total of 187 countries on the 2012 UNDP Human Development Index (Nigerian Bureau of Statistics Report, 2015).

In 2014, Nigeria could only produce 6,734,000 metric tonnes of rice, 10,790,600 metric tonnes of maize, 679,000 metric tonnes of soya beans, and 70,000 metric tonnes of wheat in contrast to 165,000,000 in 2011. Its exports and imports the previous year also revealed a wide gap. In 2013, the country exported 144MT of rice; 100MT of wheat, and 8,800MT of soybean, while it imported 2,187,370MT of rice; 4,358,863MT of wheat, and 12,757MT of soya bean (Food and Agriculture Organization 2017). According to

a report by the Benue State Ministry of Agriculture in 2013, Benue State produced 16,253,000 metric tons of maize, 6,905,000 metric tons of millet, 19,860,000 metric tons of sorghum, 39,779,000 metric tons of rice, 359,728,000 metric tons of cassava, 299,430,000 metric tons of yam and 11,023,500 metric tons of citrus in 2012. Furthermore, according to United Nations Development Programme (2016, p.6).

Though agriculture is a mainstay of the country's economy, employing approximately two-thirds of its total labour force and contributing 40 percent to its GDP, at least 7.1 million people face acute food insecurity and require urgent life-saving response and livelihood protection with about 44,000 people exposed to famine, Nigeria suffers a serious level of hunger.

This index facilitates the classification of Nigeria as one of the poorest countries in the world. This is a pointer to the testimony of our failure to achieve development policy as well as national food security.

Since the inception of the present Buhari administration, emphasis has been laid on diversification of the economy with a special focus on agriculture. One of the goals of Nigerian's agricultural development policy is to ensure that there is enough food reserve at household, state, and federal government levels to the forest all any threat to the level of food security. However, recent developments, especially the frequent clashes between herdsmen and farmers in the predominantly farming areas of the Middle Belt region which has destroyed lives and farmlands, have become a major threat to efforts to boost food production. There has been displacement of farming population and communities due to clashes between nomadic herdsmen and rural farmers in some parts of the country, particularly where large expanses of farmland have eaten up into traditional grazing routes of pastoralists, which has created tension and violent clashes between communities. Renewed clashes over land between ethnic Tivs and nomadic Fulanis in Edo and Benue States also led to the displacement of an estimated 15,000 people since March 2012. From Benue to Taraba, Nasarawa, and Plateau in the North Central region and Zamfara and Kaduna States in the North West, clashes between farmers and herdsmen have left in its trail heavy losses of lives and property (Eme, Onyishi, Uche & Uche, 2014). These losses of lives have adversely affected farming activities and other related businesses. This has resulted in a drastic reduction in farm outputs, a development that has heightened the fear of hunger. Already most farmers in the affected states have abandoned farms for fear of being attacked by the herdsmen (Agbota, 2017; Duru, 2018). Furthermore, for the predominantly farming communities of Benue and border communities of Nasarawa and Taraba States, farming is no longer business as usual. Several farmers have been displaced and dispossessed of their farms by armed men believed to be Fulani herdsmen. This is in corroboration of the fact that agricultural and development experts are unanimous in their predictions that the gains recorded in the agricultural sector of the economy, especially in the area of food production, may suffer a serious setback as a result of the negative effects of terrorist activities on farmers in Benue and neighbouring states.

Benue state that prides itself as the food basket of the nation is been faced with looming food shortage as prices of food stuff and other agricultural produces have skyrocketed as lamented by the Benue State Chairman of All Farmers Association of Nigeria, Aodonakuhe, who was quoted by Ezea (2018) thus;

Benue state, with the sobriquet 'food basket of the nation' is in the eye of the storm as herdsmen and farmers struggle over lands. The most painful aspect of the killings is that cattle now feed on farmers' seedlings stored in bans..... there is food insecurity due to the attacks. Prices of food items have astronomically jumped up.

Already, seven out of the 23 Local Government Areas (LGAs) in Benue State, namely Guma, Gwer-West, Agatu, Logo, Kwande, and the Northern part of Makurdi mostly affected by the rampaging herdsmen have a tale of woes to tell (Punch, August 6, 2017). A report by World Watch Research authored by Abdulbarkindo and Alupsen (2017) has it that fourteen out of the twenty-three LGAs of the state were affected by the conflict. According to the Benue State Emergency Management Agency (SEMA), there are about 80,000 IDPs across four camps located in Guma and Logo LGAs of the state (Prime Times, July 3, 2018). The effects of the sustained herdsmen war in the affected localities have led to farmers' reluctance to go back to their farms even as the current farming season is far gone. In Benue state, for example, women from Guma and Gwer West, Logo, Agatu Local Government Areas have stayed away from farms for fear of being killed or raped by the marauders (Duru, 2018). This is because between 2013 and 2016, the state government claimed that herdsmen killed over 1,878 comprising men, women and children in cold blood in 12 local government areas, with 200 still missing (Prime Newspaper June 2018; Akinloye, 2017). The Benue State government accused the Miyetti Allah Kautal Hore, a Fulani socio-cultural group for the violent clashes (Duru, 2018). However, the group through its national president has dismissed the governor's allegation and distanced itself from the killings (Uja, 2013).

Curiously, both groups are pointing accusing fingers, each blaming the other for the havoc being perpetrated in the farming communities. As the blame game continues, several reprisal attacks have continued to occur in the attacks, heavy casualties in human lives and properties are recorded on both sides. This either waters down the efforts put in place by both state and federal governments or both levels of government are just paying lip service to the menace of the incessant conflicts between farmers and herders. Some of the efforts of the Benue State government include the enactment of the Anti-Open Grazing Law prohibiting the opening grazing of animals and other live stocks. The federal government according to the Minister of Agriculture, AuduOgbe, is considering grazing reserves and ranches has been supported by Food and Agriculture Organization. On the other hand, the cattle breeders group known as Miyetti Allah Kautal Hore has vowed to resist the Anti-Open Grazing Law of Benue State, and continue with opening grazing system of cattle rearing (Ogbaji2018; Babalola, 2016).

Resultantly, there seems to be food insecurity in Benue State as the prices of food stuff and other agricultural produces have increased geometrically. For example, a market survey conducted by the researcher at the popular Wurukum, Railway, and Wadata markets in Makurdi Benue State reveals that prices of 1kg tuber of yam, 4kg grain of maize, 2kg container of tomato, and 1kg of beef that were been sold for N500, N500, N300 and N1000 respectively before the crisis, and are now sold for N1000, N700, N600 and N1200 in the same order (author's survey, July 2018). Furthermore, a survey conducted by Abul and Heidi (2018) for the World Bank and National Bureau of Statistics, Nigeria on Food Insecurity in Conflict-Affected Regions in Nigeria reported that the mean household in the North central region, which Benue State belongs is highly food insecure and the food prices are the most important source of food insecurity, and these are occasioned by herdsmen and farmers clash. Despite demonstrated efforts at building a conducive environment both for the farmers and herdsmen to avert the looming food insecurity in Benue State, the conflicts between the farmers and herdsmen seem to know no end. This paper is two main folds. First, to expose the nature and reason(s) of the conflicts between farmers and herdsmen in Benue state and the second is to evaluate the situation as it affects food security in Benue state and Nigeria as a whole. The contextual definition of some terms is imperative, hence the next section

Conceptual Clarifications

Conflict

Conflict is a pervasive element in our society. There is a possibility that it could occur at any time in our society. It can occur between persons, groups, organizations, and nations. Conflict also connotes different perceptions, which may not necessarily result in hostility. This way, conflict simply means a different perception or view of an issue or situation (Barash and Webel, 2002). According to Kataria (2007), conflicts may arise when the parties are like players, competing for the same prize such as power, position, authority, territory, or materials or disagreements about the rule of the game. Conflict can take a physical or violent dimension. It connotes hostility or physical confrontation (Jeong, 2000). When goal incompatibility or perception/value differences reach a crescendo, a manifestation of actual hostility or clashes is possible. To Anifowose (1982), is an acceptable weapon to ventilate anger and disagreements. There are some identified factors that enhance conflict behaviour in parties. These include misperception, impoverished communication, hostile attitudes, over sensitivity to difference, misjudgements, anarchic social situations and competitive spirit lead to distorted views that may intensify and perpetuate conflicts. (Kataria, 2007).

Lamb (2008); Nikolajera (2005); Morell (2009) and Anifowose (1982) have all identified the following to be different types of conflict:

1. Intra-Personal Conflict
2. Inter-Personal Conflict
3. Family Conflict
4. Inter-Group Conflict
5. Intra-State Conflict

6. Inter-State Conflict

7. **Global Conflict**

However, this paper focuses on the inter-group type of conflict which means the kind of disagreement or feud that takes place between two or more sectarian or religious groups, ethnic groups, communities, or interest groups.

From the foregoing, conflict can be seen as a manifestation of differences in opinions and perspectives which may or may not result in hostility and violence and can be carried out by individuals, states, ethnic, religious, and interest groups. The conflict between herders and farmers in Benue State can be situated as a kind of group conflict that has manifested in violence and hostility.

Food Insecurity

For the concept of food insecurity to be fully understood, it is pertinent for the paper to give the meaning of food security. Food security in its most basic form is defined as the access of all people to the food needed for a healthy life at all times. Furthermore, food security exists when all people, at all times, have physical, social, and economic access to sufficient, safe, and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for active and healthy life (Idachaba, 2006). To the World Bank (2006) food security is defined as access by all people at all times to enough food for an active healthy life. The centrality of the definitions lies in (a) the availability of food and (b) the possession of the ability for its acquisition.

Simply put, food insecurity is when food is not available and when there is no ability to acquire food. The Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) (2013) conceptualises food insecurity to be a situation that exists when people lack secure access to a sufficient amount of safe and nutritious food for normal growth and development and active and healthy life. It may be caused by the unavailability of food, insufficient purchasing power, inappropriate distribution, or inadequate use of food at the household level.

In another dimension, food insecurity represents a lack of access to enough food and can be either chronic or temporary. In chronic food insecurity, which arises from a lack of resources to produce or acquire food, the diet is persistently inadequate (Otaha, 2013).

Otaha (2013); Ojo and Adebayo (2012), and Eme, Onyishi, Uche, and Uche outline the major causes of food insecurity in Nigeria to include;

1. Gender Inequality
2. Policy Inconsistence and Corruption
3. Poverty and Hunger
4. Conflicts
5. Natural Disasters
6. Low Level of Technology
7. Disease burden including HIV/ AIDS

Again, the emphasis of this paper is to look at how conflict serves as a major cause of food insecurity. Conflicts here do not necessarily mean physical fighting of wars. It means a disarticulated country or society that is experiencing structural violence without an official declaration of war. Accordingly, Otaha (2013), sees ethnic or religious conflicts have devastating effects on economic activities especially food production in the areas that they take place. Furthermore, Eme, Onyishi, Uche, and Uche (2014) paint a picture of a violent conflict between the farmers and herdsman, and how it has negative implications and consequences on food production in Nigeria. They link food insecurity to the violent activities of the Fulani herdsman and Boko Haram insurgents in Borno, Benue, Taraba, and the Nassarawa States. The noticeable gap in the works cited and reviewed above is in the areas of failure of governments to proffer long-lasting solutions to this lingering crisis, especially the Benue State case, hence this paper.

Theoretical Framework

This paper adopts the theory of eco-violence in analysing the raising trend of food insecurity via the conflicts between farmers and herders in Benue State, from 2012 to 2017. The theory seeks to explicate the relationship between environmental factors, resources, and violent conflicts. (Soysa, 2002). Developed by Homer-Dixon, the theory holds that the decrease in the quality and quantity of renewable resources, population growth, and resources access, acting singly or in various combinations to increase the scarcity, for a certain population group. And this leads to agitation for the limited resources which often results in violent conflicts (Homer-Dixon 1999). Central to the postulation of the theory is the assumption that competition over scarce ecological resources engenders violent conflict.

The theory is suitable for the analysis of the conflict between herders and farmers in Benue State because basically, the conflict centres on the agitation for agricultural resources such as grazing land and crops by two main groups, i.e the pastoralists and crop farmers of different backgrounds, and this agitation has precipitated violence in Benue State. The utility of this framework can be found in the explanation for why competition and agitation over limited resources in communities can present potentially harmful consequences in establishing harmonious relationships and co-existence.

A Brief Overview of Farmer-Herdsman Conflicts in Benue State

The frequent clashes between herdsman and farmers in the predominantly farming areas of Benue State have destroyed lives and farmlands take root in the unhealthy agitation of grazing lands for the cattle by the herdsman on one side and farming land by the farmers on the other side. These deadly attacks in Benue State popularly known as 'Food Basket of the Nation' started in 2011 (Ezea, 2018).

It is important to establish the context of intergroup contact and interaction between the Tiv, asedentary group, and the Fulani, a nomadic pastoralist group in central Nigeria. Apart from this there are also contacts and interactions between the Fulani nomadic pastoralists and other ethnic groups such as the Agatus, Igedes and Idomas

in the southern district of the state. The Tiv is the largest ethnic group in Central Nigeria, numbering nearly five million, with concentration in Benue State, but found in considerable number in Nasarawa, Taraba and Plateau States (NPC, 2006).

The Tivs, like other ethnic groups in the state are predominantly peasant farmers who live on the land and find sustenance from it through its cultivation for food and income. As an agrarian state; most of its citizens practise peasant agriculture practice. On the other hand, Herdsmen (Fulani) are a pastoralist group who are by occupation traditional cattle herders. Their search for conditions conducive to raising their herds keeps them on the move from one place to another, and specifically to areas with pasture and water availability and no tsetse fly infestation (Ezea, 2018). The nomadic Fulani move southwards into the Benue valley with their cattle seeking pasture and water from the onset of the dry season (November to April) (Okpaga, 2002). This is because the Benue valley has two major attractive factors—water from the Benue Rivers and their tributaries, such as River Katsina-Ala, and a tsetse-free environment.

The return movement begins with the onset of rains in April and continues through June. Once the valley is saturated with heavy rain and movement is hampered by muddy areas threatening the very survival of the herds and shrinking passage due to farming activities, leaving the valley become inevitable. Herdsmen persistently engaged farmers in feud in recent times that have led to various casualties on both sides. While farmers accuse the herdsmen of farmland encroachment, the latter blame the farmers and members of their communities for rustling of their cattle (Ahmed-Gamgum, 2018). Intervention as a way of amiable settling of disputes between the duos often necessitate traditional rulers to adjudicate to ensure that whoever was found guilty paid compensation.

Today, farmer-herder conflicts have taken heightened dimensions as casualties have continued to rise. These conflicts have also constituted severe threats to the means of survival and livelihoods of both the farmers and herdsmen. In fact, it is a formidable challenge to economic development threat to food security and sustainable livelihood of the agrarian communities (Ukamaka, Danjuma, Mballe, Achinam & Mbadiwe, 2017). According to a report in Premium News, the attacks have resulted to more than 1500 dead since 2013 (Premium News, January 12, 2018).

There have been efforts put in place by both state and non-state actors in curtailing the conflicts. Apart from the traditional institution, the Benue State government in 2007 enacted a law popularly known as A Law to Prohibit Opening Rearing and Grazing of livestock, and provided for the Establishment of Ranches. Attacks and killings were going even after the enactment of the law by the state government, and have impacted on food security in the state.

Food Situation in Benue State

No doubt, Benue State is an agrarian state. This is because over 80% of its people who are rural-based dwellers are farmers who plant a variety of crops (Pine, 2010). The state lies within the lower Benue river basin within longitudes 7° 47' and 10° 0' East,

and latitudes 6° 25' and 8° 8' North of the Equator. With a total land area of 32,518sq km, the state is bound by Nassarawa State to the North, Taraba to the North-East, Cross River to the South, Enugu to the South-West and Kogi to the West. It also shares an international boundary with the Republic of Cameroon in the Kwande Local Government Area axis.

Benue State is synonymous to agriculture and food production in Nigeria. According to Pine (2010), the contribution of the state to the food needs of Nigeria has earned the state the status of the "Food Basket of Nigeria". This status is not unconnected with the human-friendly physiographic and climatological attributes the state possesses. The State is also endowed with favourable agro-ecological conditions and, the central location it occupies enables massive production of arable and plantation crops, livestock and fisheries (Ogiji, 2004). The state is also suitable for the production of most domesticated animals due to the fact that the state has a moderate climate. Grass pasture and other fodder as well as a wide variety of crops and crop by products for feeding livestock are available all year round. Pine (2010) divulges that Benue State was ranked among the top five States in the production of poultry, pigs, sheep and goats in 2005. This may not be unconnected to the fact that there is a total of 1,374 streams and at least 90 lakes and ponds large enough for fishing and other agricultural activities. This makes the state the food hub of the nation.

However, Benue State is currently experiencing food crisis. This crisis, according to Ezea (2018) is occasioned by the feud between the farmers and the herdsmen. He further avails that Benue, popularly referred to as the country's 'Food Basket', has not known peace till date because of herdsmen attacks. Farmers in the agrarian communities of the state have abandoned their farmlands and fled to safer climes because of herdsmen's attacks. According to Benue SEMA, 80,000 persons were registered as IDPs. They are today living as Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) at various IDP camps in the state. The persistent herdsmen attack on farmers in Benue State from 2011 to date, has, in no small measure, deprived the state of not just lives and valuable properties, but pose greater threats to the food security in the state and the country at large (Wantu, 2018).

The impact of the conflict on food production in the state can be seen in the level of progress in the implementation of the World Bank/FADAMA, Federal Ministry of Agriculture, and Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) interventions in the state. Food productivity has been dampened by the herders/farmers clash. From 2010, the World Bank in collaboration with the Federal and Benue State governments began the implementation of the FADAMA II. Additional Financing (FADAMA II-AF) project aimed at increasing production of certain crops (Ezea, 2018). The results of these laudable projects have not been felt due to the persistent clashes between the farmers and herdsmen. The attacks in Benue State were very devastating as about 300 rural farmers were killed. From Benue, it went to Enugu and don't forget that since the crisis in the North-East, Nigeria lost 27 per cent of its food output. For the past six and half years, Nigeria has been importing beans from Burkina Faso (Ogbaji, 2018).

As a result of the foregoing, many households in Benue State cannot boast of food availability, food accessibility and food affordability. Abul and Heidi (2018) report that the most important reason given for not buying food from the market is the sharp increases in food prices. Among households that do get their food from the market, price increases are reported to be the largest challenge while getting food from the market. In the North Central, where Benue State belongs the figure is 66 percent. Between 2015 and 2016, labour productivity (a rough indicator of wages) has decreased both in Naira and USD terms (NBS, 2017).

The case in does not differ from the above. The state is known to be a civil service state because of the low or no functional industries in the state. It also indicates a reason to believe that purchasing power has increased at the same pace as food inflation. Given that food inflation hits the poor and Benue State civil servants hardest, as they typically spend a large share of their income in food. The Prices of rice, for example, has been hitting historic highs of N21, 000 per bag (50kg), triggering a panic amongst the people across the country. Persistent increase in prices of other staple products such as fish, bread, meat, cereals, chicken, yam, onions, beans, vegetable oil, tomatoes, groundnut oil and others have aggravated the continued woes of the common man. Shortage of products and ever-increasing prices has created unsettling sentiments across communities, dampening the country's efforts to end poverty. There are estimates that more than 65 per cent of the Nigerian population is food insecure (Osagie, 2013).

Resultantly, in 2014, Nigeria could only produce 6,734,000 metric tonnes of rice, 10,790,600 metric tonnes of maize, 679, 000, metric tonnes of soyabean and 70,000 metric tonnes of wheat in contrast to 165, 000,000 in 2011 (United Nations Development Programme, 2016). With hundreds of thousands of Benue State citizens struggling to have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food which meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life, food situation can be said to be precarious.

Implication of the Farmer-Herdsman Conflicts on Food Security in Benue State
Farmer-herdsmen conflicts in Benue State have grown, spread and intensified over the past eight years and today pose a threat to food security in the state and Nigeria as a whole. Close to two thousand people have been killed, communities have been destroyed and so many farmers and pastoralists have lost their lives and property in an extended orgy of killings and destruction that is not only continuously destroying livelihoods but also affecting national cohesion.

As a way of negative impact, the conflicts have led to the destruction of farmland. For example in March 2016, about 59 persons were reported to have been killed, and farmlands destroyed following attacks in Benue communities of Ugondo, Turan and Gabo Nenzen in Logo Local Government Area of the state by suspected herdsmen (Punch, June 20, 2016). The resultant effect is seen in poor food production. For instance, Adams, Atelhe & Emmanuel (2017) in their study

states that the conflicts in Agatu in Benue state have degenerated to the mass movement of people from their original homes abandoning their farming activities.

Another impact of the conflict is the displacement of farming households. The attacks have forced members of the affected Benue communities to take refuge in the Internal Displaced People camps in the State, thus leaving their farming activities in pursuit of their safety and to the neglect of farming season. Accordingly, 80,000 IDPs are recorded in the camps located in Guma and Logo LGAs (Prime Times, July 3, 2018).

Fear factor is another impact the conflicts have left behind in Benue farming communities. The violence unleashed on the farmers has induced fear in the people. This has made the people to stay away from their farmland because of the fear of being attacked by the herdsmen. The few that summoned courage to go back to farming spend few man-hours on the farm. This cannot bring about the required food. One Aondona Kuhe who is a farmer in Guma LGA maintained that with the raining season setting in, there was no sign that the displaced farmers would return to their ancestral homes to continue with their farm works, noting that even if they finally return, they will not get seedlings to plant (Ezea, 2018).

Destruction of life and properties is one of the trails of the conflicts. According to eye witness account by one Agbo Inalegwu who is an indigene of Agatu LGA of Benue State, the herdsmen make the cattle to devour both farm crops, seedlings and harvested products, thus reducing drastically farm produce that are meant to be transported to the markets.

As a result of the foregoing, the phenomenon of rural-urban migration has become the order of the day as out of the 23 local governments in Benue State, namely Guma, Gwer-West, Agatu, Logo, Kwande, Ukum, Tarka and the Northern part of Makurdi are mostly affected by the rampaging herdsmen have tale of woes to tell. The effects of the sustained Fulani war in the affected localities have led to farmers' reluctance to go back to their farms even as the current farming season is far gone. For examples, the able-bodied young men did not have interest in Agriculture but prefer staying in the urban areas for petty businesses like Okada and so on.

A comprehensive approach to address the growing crisis associated with violent conflicts affecting pastoralists and farmers in Benue State is necessary.

Conclusion

The conflictual relationship between the herdsmen and farmers in Benue State is premised on the agitation for agricultural resources such as grazing land and water. This conflict has been expressed violently as lives, properties, livestock and other resources have been negatively affected. The resultant effect is in the displacement of farming households, thus paving way for food insecurity that is currently experienced

in the state and the country as a whole. The negative effects of these conflicts coupled with the impractical policies of the federal government regarding food production and importation, prices of essential commodities and food products have skyrocketed making them unaffordable to the common man.

Recommendation

Based on the findings, the following measures are recommended to resolve the conflict between the herdsmen and farmers in Benue State in order to boost agricultural productivity in the area to enable Benue State to be food secured and still claim the Food basket of the nation as it used to be:

1. Government should provide public enlightenment campaigns, seminars and symposia to sensitize the farmers and herdsmen on the devastating impacts of this conflict, and the need for the two groups to sheath their swords.
2. Conflict control strategies such as regular meetings and dialogue should be encouraged among the farmers and herdsmen by the community leaders to avert conflict.
3. There should be a revisitation to the grazing route system of pastoralism with the view of ensuring peace between farmers and pastoralists.
4. If the peculiarity of farming communities in Benue State cannot allow for grazing route system as advocated above, the Federal Government should adopt and embrace the ranching system of cattle rearing for the pastoralists.
5. Government should as a matter of urgency and policy prosecute people or groups of person guilty of heinous crime.

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Chapter 4

Conflict Sensitive Approach to Community Development Project: A Case Study of Itesiwaju Community in Akinyele, Ibadan Nigeria

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Abstract

Many community and social development projects do not adequately integrate a conflict sensitive approach to community development, thereby causing harm, minimising positive impacts and maximising negative unintended impacts in developmental context. In development projects conflict sensitive planning is key, however, most intervention exacerbate conflict as a result of poor planning-implementation and not acting upon the understanding of the interaction between the intervention and context. This study examines community electrification, health centre and classroom blocks project, situated at Itesiwaju community in Akinyele Local Government Area of Oyo State, the project was carried out by the community and social development agency, and was funded by the World Bank with state counterpart funding and community contribution. It was aimed at supporting community to tackle poverty and enhance livelihoods opportunities in poor rural communities. The study found out that a conflict sensitive approach in accordance with global practices in project implementation was not fully carried out; this has led to the abandonment of the completed health centre project, due to boundary conflict between Itesiwaju and lagelu community. This study draws on qualitative research through questionnaires, key informant and in depth interviews to examine conflict sensitive approach; to identify the challenges in planning and implementation process between the intervention and the community. The study also discovered certain contending issues that had the potential to generate conflict. These related to inability both on the part of the government, agency and community to agree on the modalities for take-off of the health centre project, also citing of project, lack of transparency among Community Project Management Committee (CPMC) members and choice of projects. It was observed that government role in providing hospital equipment's and personnel staff was part of the reason why the project is not functioning till date. The study found out that a conflict sensitivity approach is not only for conflict areas but rather should be mainstreamed to all humanitarian assistance and development intervention, in order to increase effectiveness for sustainable development.

Keywords: *Community, Social development projects, Conflict, Harm, Positive impacts*

Introduction

The concept of 'conflict sensitivity' refers to the ability to understand the interaction between particular developmental interventions and the wider context of conflict. Barbolet *et al.* (2005) describes conflict sensitivity as an approach which seeks to understand how the context affects the intervention, and how the intervention affects the context, in order to avoid negative impacts and maximise positive impacts.

There has been a growing understanding in recent years of the links between conflict, peace and development, and an increased focus on the role which official development co-operation can play in both ameliorating and exacerbating the root causes of violent conflict. According to Webel (2007, p.7) " Peace is not the mere absence of war, just as development will not take place in the absence of peace, While development is aimed at improving the living conditions of the people, promote peace and de-escalate conflict, often time intervention exacerbate conflict. Enyi (2014) asserts that development alone cannot be tied to economic advancement, but should rather be focused on the general well-being of the people. This is to say that development interventions that exacerbate conflict without positive impacts affects peace of the people over time.

Development interventions also have the capacity to contribute to peace, such as through fostering common interests among stakeholders, providing neutral spaces for interaction, or creating positive communication outlets and mechanisms for cooperation. By providing non-violent means to work together and to address contentious issues, development interventions have a valuable role in demonstrating alternatives to conflict (Bush, 2009).

Barbolet *et al.* (2005) asserts that a (peace and) conflict sensitive approach to development interventions must engage projects participants or beneficiaries at a minimum in the analysis and implementation phases to ensure the intervention considers and addresses conflict in all its nuances and intricacies. A conflict sensitive approach also involves gaining a sound understanding of the two-way interaction between programmatic activities and the wider context, and acting to minimize negative impacts and maximize positive impacts of intervention on conflict, within an organization's given priorities or objectives. Governmental and non-governmental actors alike increasingly recognize the need for conflict sensitive approaches to development and humanitarian assistance and are consequently attempting to develop the theoretical underpinnings as well as the structural prerequisites for integrating conflict-sensitive perspectives into development assistance. .

It is widely agreed that only coordinated and coherent responses, which explicitly address root causes of conflict and take account of the dynamics of accelerating and triggering factors, have the potential to make a long-term positive impact on violent conflict, the increased violent communal conflicts in Nigeria has affected development growth, hence the need to conduct conflict analysis in pre and post programmes/ projects in the country (IPCR, 2003).

The new support amongst policy makers for peace-building and conflict prevention is underpinned by the recognition that humanitarian assistance can exacerbate conflict. Accordingly, this has generated a rethinking of donor and NGO policies, with a deeper analysis of the links between aid and conflict, especially with regards to the unexpected negative consequences of relief assistance. This reassessment is partly led by increased awareness that relief assistance can cement divisions between conflicting groups, and may contribute to entrenchment of war economies and ultimately to the

prolonging of war. For instance, relief assistance, has been found to, frequently distorts social relations, entrenches inequalities, allows elite and/or armed groups to benefit disproportionately from unrest. This was starkly observed in Liberia during its civil wars and in Somalia where aid initially succoured warring factions before new policy frameworks were introduced which linked assistance to the achievement of stability (World Bank, 2008).

According to a Safer world study on the impact of EU engagement in Ethiopia found that EU-supported large-scale commercial farming enterprises deepened inequality, restricted access to vital resources and increased tensions between competing pastoralist groups and between pastoralists and the state (Nicol 2000). The tensions ultimately led to open conflict which has yet to be fully resolved; the failure of development to adequately prioritize conflict prevention has meant that potentially beneficial programs have created mistrust and disharmony and ultimately undermined the successful achievement of project objectives. Inadequately planned or inappropriate targeted programs can marginalize vulnerable groups, overlook underlying root causes of poverty and contribute to the risks of violent conflict (Safer World, 2000).

Consequently, many donors are attempting to revise their approach in favour of policy frameworks that emphasize structural stability, under which support for good governance, human rights and representative civil society is enhanced. The debate around the impact of development assistance and conflict has also led to a fundamental questioning of aid systems and the impact of global economic processes. Development has largely failed to reduce inequality or to deliver broad-based growth and this is leading to further consideration of the links between aid systems and conflict (World Bank, 2008).

Now, donors, government agencies, multilateral institutions and NGOs have embarked on initiatives to integrate conflict prevention into the range of development assistance instruments. The initiatives have resulted in both institutional changes and development of new policy and planning instruments. A number of countries have established departments or bodies specifically charged with conflict prevention. Even though progress has been made in taking forward donor policies in support of conflict prevention, through the establishment of new institutions and departments, there is concern over inconsistencies and incoherence within some donor governments.

This paper demonstrate that development project in non-violent communities has tendencies to increase negative impacts and minimise positive impact, be that as it may, boundary conflicts between Itesiwaju and Lagelu has interrupted the utilization of the completed development project. This shows that development assistance programs also have the potential to increase tensions and exacerbate conflict, even in relatively stable environments. Akinyoade (2019) emphasizes that interventions should be programmed in a manner that could minimise their negative and maximise their positive impacts. When this occurs the groups are put under intense pressure that often results to conflict disorders. Therefore conflict sensitivity to development

project and peacebuilding involves both immediate responses and long term preventive measures before, during and after a conflict (Iheanacho, 2014). Therefore, the essence of conflict sensitivity is to increase the effectiveness of assistance to development and to decrease potential violence, Conflict sensitivity applies to all types of work, across humanitarian, development and peace building sectors. Experience indicates that no intervention is neutral in a conflict context and to improve peace in development project Conflict sensitivity will impact positively.

Development and Conflict

Development in Nigeria has not been successful as expected, though development planning has been in practice since 1946 (Obikezie and Obi 2004). Development brings about change, and change is a catalyst to social and political rearrangement, as has been argued by scholars of development and conflict (Anderson, 1997; Bush, 1998; Smillie, 1998; Wood, 2001). While conflict is mostly depicted as if it is totally negative, this is not always the case, dependent on how it is handled, For instance, authors have suggested that conflict can be used constructively to explore different solutions to longstanding social problems, and stimulate creativity by recognising and sensitively bringing emotive and non-rational arguments into the open, while deconstructing long-standing tensions (International Alert, 1996: 3-4, cited in Faleti, 2006:36). As such, positively engaging with conflicts within communities can lead to positive developmental outcomes.

It is broadly recognized that stability and peace are prerequisites for poverty alleviation and a successful development process – and that sustainable development, when successfully pursued, reinforces human security, stability, and peace. Years of investment in development projects have been destroyed because of violent conflict, and decades of development gains can be wiped out by one civil war. Indeed many developing countries are fragile, though they may not be experiencing violent conflict, and the engagement of outside actors, even in seemingly-unrelated sectors, is likely to have a significant impact on the way a country's political, social, and economic tensions evolve or are resolved (Egunjobi, 2005; Albert, 2001).

As such, it is clear that the processes of development and conflict are intrinsically linked and that interventions aimed at supporting development or controlling conflict must take account of both dimensions. Development projects, when implemented well, can play a significant role. Creating and/or supporting spaces for deliberation and the involvement of civil society is vital to helping stimulate and smooth processes of social, political and economic change (Fung and Wright 2003).

Overview of Conflict Sensitive Approaches to Development

Conflict sensitivity is not just a checklist to determine the activities of organization or implementing partners in development project but rather, “an entire ethos as to how organizations, donor agencies could strategize, plan, implement and evaluate their work and projects” (Resource Pack, 2014). Conflict sensitivity, according to the FEWER *et al.* (2004) requires: understanding the context in which you operate, understanding the interaction between your intervention and the context; and acting upon the

understanding of this interaction, in order to avoid negative impacts and maximize positive impacts. Mainstreaming conflict sensitivity within development interventions is important in sustaining intervention in non-violent and violent regions, and requires incorporating conflict sensitivity into development planning and stages of the development programme/ project cycle (IPCR 2003). Though other scholars are of the opinion that the challenge has not been properly diagnosed, but need to act upon, as conflict is an inevitable phenomenon of human existence, Conflict sensitivity according to FEWER *et al.* (2004), Resource Pack explains that not only understanding of context and the interaction between intervention and context in project intervention but ability to act upon this understanding. Therefore, to mainstream conflict sensitivity to development, conflict sensitivity participation is required from the interventionist and the beneficiary, in order to avoid negative impact and maximize positive impacts (Resource Pack, 2004)

Community development interventions in Nigeria are carried out of the understanding that development is a fundamental requirement in conflict prevention, peace and security, poverty reduction, stress, frustration and ultimately aggression; it is also understood that development is a peace-generating factor that enhances human capabilities to meet daily needs. Development—both physical and human capital development—has the potential to translate into individual and group satisfaction and reduction of tensions and other factors that constitute or triggers conflict. Community development projects can lead to improved livelihood of persons and community.

As noted by GSDRC (2013), developmental policies and initiatives that succeed inadvertently reinforce human security, peace, and stability. Despite these clear and positive links, Schall and Becker (n.d.) noted that most development projects aimed at conflict prevention and management, and peace building in many parts of Africa largely do not take into account the conflict dynamics or the possibility of interventions having negative unintended consequences. This discussion is particularly relevant in the case of Nigeria. Much has been written, for example on Nigeria and Nigerian government's development intervention policies and programmes aimed at addressing the multi-dimensional levels of conflicts in the Niger Delta area – one of the most notorious conflict theatres in the country (Aghalino, 2012). For instance, the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) and the Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs are the latest in the history of establishment of interventionist agencies to pursue the development agenda of the region. Authors such as Okonofua (2011); Newsom (2011) and Nwanolue, Osegbue and Iwuoha (2013) argue that development interventions in the region have been a mixed bag. Though interventions have helped to foster development in certain areas, they have also inadvertently been a source of conflict, some hitherto unknown to the region including kidnapping, hostage taking and oil bunkering. The argument relates to the lack of due diligence in anticipating the impact of development projects on the peace and conflict environment.

The growth of any developing nation, region or community is hinged upon successful completion of infrastructural projects and social amenities needed for human survival both in the rural and urban community. In recent times project decision is done by others who don't live or know exactly what the people need, often times decisions are taken without the beneficiaries, that is why the failure of a public or private project has three repercussions if there is poor planning and implementation process it affects the economy and environment (Igwe, N. 2018) First is the waste of resources/ finances and human effort(s) used in its execution. Secondly is the denial of opportunity for other projects from coming on streams. Thirdly is the consequence on the mental psyche of the failure syndrome on the project participants and stakeholders (Ewurum, Eboh and Igwe, 2009). In order ensure effective intervention conflict-sensitive planning which incorporates the conflict analysis (the profile, causes, actors, and dynamics of a conflict situation) should be incorporated into traditional planning, so as to have a constructive impact on the context to avoid further deterioration and promote more peaceful and effective solutions. Though many various projects has been successful while some are left uncompleted due to challenges as a result of poor implementation plan and community participation (Ladele, 2017.) In Niger Delta region the causes of development conflict are rooted in the nature of the prevailing relationship among the stakeholders, the conflict management strategies, companies and its host communities (Ajayi, 2012).

Peace and conflict sensitivity theory, PCST, is a theory of impact measurement in the sub-field of intervention, peace and conflict in the field of peace studies. its core assumption is that the inevitable interaction between stages of an intervention and elements of a conflict context are never neutral but have measureable potential positive or negative impacts on the conflict situation (Akinyoade, 2019)

Itesiwaju Community Project

The Niger Delta region, development projects and other forms of community empowerment schemes are also increasingly becoming intervention and peace building strategies in other parts of Nigeria. It was in this regard that the Oyo State government in partnership with the World Bank through the federal government established the Community and Social Development Agency (CSDA) through an Act of the State House of Assembly in 2008 to drive its Community and Social Development Projects (CSDP) across communities – rural and urban – in various local government areas of the State. The broad mandate of the CSDP initiative is poverty reduction and socio-economic empowerment of individuals, groups and communities in Oyo State, though various projects has been successful while some are left uncompleted due to one challenge or the other and as a result of poor implementation plan and poor community participation (Ladele,2017).

Itesiwaju community is largely an agrarian community, in Akinyele Local Government Area, Oyo State, Nigeria, comprising of various settlers divided into seven zones namely, Yeosa, Oroge, Kusela, Otun-Elesin, Apon, Ile Ali and Olose. With boundary areas with Ido, Afijo, Lagelu and Ibadan South local government area of Oyo State. These areas have been bound together since the creation of the Landlords

Development Association in the 1980s. The mandate of the association is to develop their community and support the progress of their people, and is made up of the heads of households of each family, of which majority are men.

Table 1: Community Needs Assessment Exercise

Problem identified	Men	Women	Elderly	Youth	Vulnerable	Total	Position
No Health Facility	55	46	41	30	18	190	3 rd
No electricity	65	50	42	57	18	232	2 nd
Bad Raod	12	29	20	59	45	165	4 th
No primary school	49	36	36	56	74	251	1 st

Source: CSDA/Itesiwaju project file (Accessed 7/4/2017)

Results and Discussion

According to the responses generated through the (men) focus group discussion the project was completed in October, 2013 and handed over in January, 2014. Responses obtained from the project officers of community and social development agency through the Key Informant Interview said that the projects were selected through identification of poor communities and once community signifies interest the agency goes to sensitize the community, carry out needs assessment as stated above, In an interview with the general manager he stated the criteria for the project selection, through use of poverty map to determine the scale of poverty level of the area, the use of geographical target tool to ascertain if the area is within the geographical zone. The findings are also in line with the findings of other scholars concerning similar community development inspired organizations especially when such organizations are nongovernmental. Notable among such pundits are Dunham (1970), Crust et al (2010) and Fetting (2007). In fact, some of the approaches, particularly the use of poverty map, are mentioned by some of the above authors as means of assessing the level of infrastructural needs of target communities.

Table 1 shows the socio-demographic data on the population of study; forty questionnaires were distributed while thirty eight were retrieved by the researcher

Table 2: Demographic variables of the respondents

Variable (%)	Frequency	Percent
Gender		
Male	29	76.3
Female	9	23.7
Total	38	100
Age		
18-30	3	7.9
31-50	29	76.3
51 and above	6	15.8
Total	38	100
Education qualification		
Primary	3	7.9
Secondary	11	28.9
OND/NCE	9	23.7
HND/Bachelor degree	11	28.9
MSc and above	4	10.5
Total	38	100
Employment		
Government Worker	9	23.7
Farmer	7	18.4
Self Employed	11	28.9
Private Enterprise	3	7.9
Private Individual	4	10.5
Artisans	3	7.9
Student	1	2.6
Total	38	100

Source: field survey, 2017.

Table 2 presents the demographic variables of the respondents. From the table it is seen that out of the total respondents of 38, 29 representing 76.3 percent are males while 9 representing the remaining 23.7 percent are females. This suggests that the majority of the respondents are males; this is due to the fact that the head of household were men who are landlord. With regard to the age distribution of the respondents, 3 (7.9%) of the respondents fall within the age category of 18-30 years, 29 (76.35%) fall within the age category of 31-50 years while 6 (15.8%) fall within the age category of 51 and above. Similarly, Table 2 reveals that 3 respondents representing 7.9 percent of the total respondents have primary school leaving certificate, 11 representing 28.9 percent have secondary school certificate, 9(23.7%) have Ordinary National Diploma (OND) and National Certificate in Education (NCE), 11(28.9%) have Higher National Diploma (HND) and first degree certificate, while the remaining 4 (10.5%) have

Master’s degree and above. The education qualification of the respondents indicates that the minimum qualification of the respondents is primary school leaving certificate, suggesting that all the respondents can at least read and write. The table also shows that 9 (23.7%), 7(18.4%), 11(28.9%), 4(10.5%), 3(7.9%) and 1(2.6%) are government workers, farmers, self-employed, workers with private enterprise, workers with private individuals, artisans and students respectively.

Table 3: Problems of CSDPs in Itesiwaju community

	Frequency	Percent (%)
Problem over the determination of the project		
Yes	10	26.3
No	22	57.9
Don’t Know	6	15.8
Total	38	100
Problem over the planning of the project		
Yes	9	23.6
No	24	63.2
Don’t Know	5	13.2
Total	38	100
Problem over the implementation of the project		
Yes	13	34.2
No	19	50.0
Don’t Know	6	15.8
Total	38	100

Table 3 shows that 26.3% of the total respondents said there was problem in the determination of the project, 57.9% of the respondents said there was no problem, while 15.8% responded they did not know if there was conflict over the determination of the project. Similarly, 9 respondents said there was problem over the planning of the project, 24 said there was no problem over the planning of the project and the remaining 5 respondents responded they did not know whether there was problem over the planning of the project. With regard to problem(s) over the implementation of the project, 13 respondents representing 34.2 percent of the total respondents said there was/were problem(s) over the implementation of the project, 19 respondents representing 50.0 percent of total responses said there was/were no problem(s) over the implementation of the project and the remaining 6 respondents which represent 15.8 percent said they did not know if there was/were problem(s) over the implementation of the project.

So the sum total of the findings associated with this objective indicates that during the implementation of the project the people of Itesiwaju were carried along at every step of the way and all necessary socio-economic and environmental impact assessments were carried out, thereby ensuring a peaceful atmosphere during the implementation

process. The measures taken by CSDA to ensure a peaceful outcome of the projects implementation process had already been recommended by several experts on peace and conflict impact assessment theories. Such experts include, among others, Besancon (2005), Bornstein (2010).

Meanwhile, it should be noted that scholars, such as Jarikre (2015), have suggested that a crucial aspect of assessing the impact of poverty alleviating development projects should centre on determining the extent and ways such projects go in ensuring impactful contributions to the emplacement of peace in areas where the projects are erected. That is to say that, even where the projects are constructed in a post-conflict context, their existence should contribute to peace-building among the members of the hitherto contending forces with a given community. The researcher's assessment of the case of Itesiwaju met with the above standard the projects by CSDA was discovered as being helpful in fostering closer bond and peace among the people as they shared common facilities especially the school and electrification project. The contending issues and challenges that arise from CSDA intervention in Itesiwaju community, respondents were asked through both the questionnaires and the interviews to identify the challenges of the CSDA project in the community. Responses generated through the questionnaire are presented in Figure 1.




Figure 1: Identified conflict issues of CSDPs in Itesiwaju community

Figure 1 presents at a glance the respondents' response on the problems of CSDPs in Itesiwaju community. As seen in the figure, 56% of the respondents said there was problem in citing/location of the project, 33% of the total respondents said participation of the committee members was the contending issue/challenge faced by the project, while 11% said choice of the project was the problem encountered when initiating the project.

Conclusion

This paper has revealed that Community and social development projects require conflict sensitivity at all stages: in the pre-project, on-going and end-of project.

Conflict sensitivity awareness on the causes of historical, actual or potential conflict and on the likelihood of further conflict should be well integrated in project design. Ensuring having an analysis of the root causes of previous, existing or potential conflict will assist in effective interventions, outcome and positive result.

Conflict sensitivity and conflict analysis has not been properly mainstreamed in developments project in especially government interventions. This has, resulted in many abandoned and uncompleted projects in many parts of the Nigeria. In the case of Itesiwaju the completed health centre project has been abandoned and not in use over six years-following the land dispute between the neighbouring community and the government yet to send medical personnel and equipping the health centre for it to function, the community in a devastating state. Therefore, Government inability to provide promised resources and services can contribute to the outbreak of violence and citizens may see less benefit in participating in national institutions (McKechnie & Davies, 2013).

In conclusion, conflict sensitivity should be mainstreamed within an organization and agencies in project intervention in rural areas and communities at all of intervention. This will help to identify unintended consequences and possible conflict before, during and after any intervention, rather than treated as a separate project component. In the case of Itesiwaju community change in policy makers affected and disrupted projects and destabilise the context, which also left the boundary dispute unresolved and government not fulfilling their part as promised.

The need to carry out conflict sensitive approach in developmental project promotes resolving issues of community disputes and project implementation. To this point developmental partners and government agencies should mainstream conflict sensitive approach in their planning, implementation of project at community levels and should be properly done; through engaging all stakeholders in the project cycle stages, the lack of commitment and support of government has generated ill-feelings and distrust between communities, agencies and the government, therefore it is strongly recommended that the community and social development agencies and government project should mainstream conflict sensitivity in development interventions and be more committed to development projects by making sure that the end result is positive and sustained.

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Chapter 5

Parental factor as a determinant towards insecurities among Business Studies students in Shomolu Local Government Area of Lagos State

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Abstract

This study was to examine parental factor as a determinant towards insecurities among business studies students in Shomolu Local Government Area of Lagos State, Nigeria. The researcher adopted descriptive survey design. Three research question guided the study. The population of the study consist of all Junior Secondary School in Shomolu Local Government Area of Lagos State. Simple random sample size was used for sample size. The data for the study were collected through questionnaire which were validated by experts. The home is the first place of learning for the child. The quality of parents in the home determines the personality and achievement of the child. Insecurity is very rampant in the country which includes rape, cultist, kidnapping and thuggery affecting academic enabling environment making parental factor comes to play. Parental factor such as socio-economic status; parent level of income, family standard of living, family level of exposure and family size, it was concluded that parents are to checkmate their children co-curricular activities to avoid them from being instruments of insecurity by bandits, several gangs and government. Also, parental encouragement is needed to impart positive wits among students. Government should ensure conducive environment to enable parents support children and ensuring adequate security.

Key words: Business studies, determinants, insecurities and parental factor.

Introduction

The idea of the 6-3-3-4 educational scheme for Nigeria is aimed at producing a population which will become self-reliant early at the end of Junior Secondary School course so that the problem of unemployment and idea of school drop-out will minimized on time and business studies, does this. The economy cannot create desire jobs. Therefore, those living for themselves to become self-employed can make a business. Business studies prepare people to be able to make useful living for themselves. The introduction of business subjects at the Junior Secondary School levels in Nigeria is principally aimed at equipping the students with skills that will make them employable in the world of work (Esene, 2001). Business education curriculum planners in Nigeria except a junior secondary school students who go through the three years junior secondary school business studies programme to acquire "practical business and entrepreneurial skills and attitudes to prepare them for self-employment"[Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2012]. It comprises of Shorthand, Typing, Commerce, Economics and Book-keeping. It is a prevocational course taught

at Junior Secondary School level to make them ready for work. It is very important to students in readiness of the child interest to change desirable in behavior. It was identified that parental involvement in business studies makes a positive contribution of students' academic achievement affecting their academic self-concept which is considerable. Robert (2011) defined business education as a programmed designed to develop special competencies in marketable business skills and techniques.

Insecurities among students' is becoming rampant on daily basis creating a miasma of fear in parents decision making (Aribisala, 2021). Adelusi (2003) posited that inhibiting factor to the carrier choice of their children, especially when it is clear that the home is the first social group which the child comes in contact. Allport (1961) as cited in McKay (2018) observes that the influence have on the child's learning is the fundamental concepts of life. It is here that children learn to interpret realities and reduce insecurities. It has psychological, social and security needs for the growth and development of the child especially in the area of choosing a career. Harrison (2000) stated that of all the factors that influence career choice process, family members, particularly parents are the most influential determinant of career plans, aspirations and occupational expectation. Oladele (2004) stated that the child is born knowing nothing of the society. The home provides the biological traits, natural endowments, adequate security directing a human characteristics upon which all other attributes are built. Due to the level of insecurity in any form, adolescents must be guided in the choice of career.

Statement of the Problem

It is a great concern to educationists in general why students perform averagely low despite their unique ability in one area or the other. Over the years, the high level of insecurities in the nation has affected all sectors, especially educational institutions from primary level to tertiary level. This has created a gap which affects concentration during the class. Also, parental factor which fills the gap is being threatened with insecurity which is a great concern to all parties involved in the educational sector. Parents' socio-economic status, educational background and gender is a key determinant to reduce the tension created by the level of insecurity in the nation. It should be borne in mind that the poor academic performance of business studies is in relation to their parental factor and insecurity.

This study will look into the parental factor as a determinant towards insecurity among business studies students in Junior Secondary School in Shomolu Local Government Area of Lagos State, Nigeria

Purpose of the study

1. To determine the extent to which parent socio-economic status to influence insecurities among business studies students in Junior Secondary School
2. To examine whether parental educational and professional background affect students' career choice in the midst of insecurities in Junior Secondary School.
3. To determine the extent in which certain insecurities affect business studies students' in Junior Secondary School.

Research Questions

1. To what extent does parent's socio-economic status influence insecurities among Business studies students in Junior Secondary School?
2. To what extent does parental educational and professional background affect students' career choice in the midst of insecurities in Junior Secondary School?
3. To what extent does certain insecurities affect business studies in Junior Secondary School?

Significance of the Study

This study will be useful as a key towards survival of the nation which cannot over emphasized. It has been viewed as a vital tool of economic independence of all nations over the world. It will be of importance to parents, government bodies, UNICEF, security agents, Parents Teachers Association (PTA), students, curriculum planners of business studies, educational administration; to plan and execute their job effectively taken into consideration the variables found to be responsible for parental factor towards insecurities among business studies as a subject. Also, it will help curriculum planners to distribute available resources in manner that will benefit all classes of children irrespective of their family background.

Furthermore, it will enable parents identify every child as a unique character, not forcing them based on their socio-economic status, professional and educational background and gender. Lastly, the level of insecurity leading to kidnapping and killings of students has to be checked, Securities departments will benefit immensely for this study.

Literature review

Theoretical Framework

This study will be intellectually sound which includes scientifically base theoretical framework with which a systematic analysis will be carried out. Therefore, the following theories are adopted for this study: Parent attachment Theory and Maslow's motivational theory.

Parental Attachment Theory

Parental Attachment Theory was proposed by Bowlby (1980). The theory states that the child forms a strong emotional bond with another person (caregiver) during childhood with lifelong consequences. According to the theorist, sensitive and emotions are available in parenting helps the child to form a secure attachment style which foster a child's socio-emotional development and wellbeing. Less sensitive and emotionally available parenting or neglect of the child's needs may result in insecure forms of attachment style, which is a risk factor for many mental health problems. This theory is relevant to this study in view that the proponent provides clues suggestions for parents and guardians. Parents and guardians can now see the necessity of forming secure attachment bond with their children. Such bonds will enable the children to end up with parents will learn to understand biological and psychological needs behavior. In this way, parents may seek to avoid frustration that occurs when they expect things beyond the child's capability.

Maslow Motivational Theory

This is another important theory that is relevant to this study. The theory was developed by Abraham Maslow (1970) and popularized by many researchers. According to Maslow, motivation is constant and never ending, fluctuation and complex. He assisted that man needs to satisfy his needs. These needs, according to him are arranged in a hierarchical order starting from the basic or lower order needs to higher order needs vizly physiological, safety, belongingness, self-esteem, self-actualization and aesthetic needs. Security (safety) is very prominent solution to reduce the rampant insecurity in the educational institutions. The rate of insecurity confronting teachers and students such as thuggery, cultism, rape and kidnaping affecting sanity in the teaching and learning environment, that makes learners perform assigned tasks, and meeting predetermined standards. It energizes an atmospheric culture that regulates and sustain behavior among business studies students exhibiting purposeful behavior aimed at achieving set predetermined goals.

Methodology

A descriptive survey design was used for this study. The population for this study were junior secondary school students in Shomolu Local Government Area of Lagos State, Nigeria. The simple random selection was used. Questionnaire was used for data collection using a 4 point likert scale. The mean rating was used in which 2.5 and above was regarded as positive while 2.5 below was regarded as negative. This study was validated by researchers for face and content validity. The reliability of the instrument using Pearson Product Moment Correlation Coefficient and 0.85 was gotten. The questionnaire data were analyzed using percentage and mean rating to test items of the questionnaires.

Data Analysis, Data Presentation

100 questionnaires were administered out of which after diligent sorting, 90 copies were retrieved which were fully filled and returned. Therefore, the analysis is based on the 90 questionnaire filled and returned.

Table 1. Gender

Gender	Frequency	Percentage	Cumulative Frequency
Male	41	45.6	45.6
Female	49	54.4	100
Total	90	100	

Table 1 shows that 45.6% of the students were males while 54.4% were female. This revealed that both genders were represented.

Table 2. Age

Age	Frequency	Percentage	Cumulative Frequency
8-10	27	30.0	30.0
11-12	26	28.9	58.9
13 above	37	41.1	100

Table 2 shows that 30% of the respondents were between the ages of 8-10, 28.9% were between 11-12, while 41% were 13 above.

Table 3. Respondents Class

Class	Frequency	Percentage	Cumulative Frequency
JSS 1	27	30	30
JSS 2	30	33.3	63.3
JSS 3	33	36.7	100
Total	90	100	

Table 3 shows that 30% of the respondents were JSS1, 33.3% were JSS 2 while 36.7% were from JSS 3.

Table 4: Respondents School

School	Frequency	Percentage	Cumulative Frequency
St Luke Junior	20	22.2	22.2
Bishop Howells Junior	20	22.2	44.4
CMS Junior	16	17.8	62.2
Morocco Junior	18	20.0	82.2
Jibowu Junior	16	17.8	100
Total	90	100	

Table 4 shows that 22.2% of the respondents were from St. Luke's Junior and Bishop Howells Junior, 17.8 of the respondents were from CMS Junior and Jibowu Junior, while 20.0% were from Morocco Junior.

Table 5:

Research Number One: To what extent does parent's socio-economic status influence insecurities among Business studies students in Junior Secondary School?

S/N	Items	SA	A	D	SD	X	MEAN RATING	REMARKS
1.	Parent level of income	256	39	10	8	90	3.48	Positive
2.	Standard of living	172	81	16	12	90	3.12	Positive
3.	Family level of exposure	148	72	30	20	90	2.93	Positive
4.	Family size	92	57	56	20	90	2.48	Negative
5.	Level of feeding	84	51	74	15	90	2.49	Negative

Table 5 shows to what extent does parents' socio-economic status influence insecurities among Business studies students in Junior Secondary School. The following items are all positive; parental level of income, standard of living, family level of exposure, while the following are negative; family size, and level of feeding.

Table 6

Research Number Two: To what extent does parental educational and professional background affect students' career choice in the midst of insecurities in Junior Secondary School?

S/N	Items	SA	A	D	SD	X	MEAN RATING	REMARKS
6.	Educational level of the parent	184	66	26	9	90	3.17	Positive
7.	Family history	152	63	36	13	90	2.93	Positive
8.	Family ethnics	128	48	50	17	90	2.70	Positive
9.	Students' academic performance	104	51	56	19	90	2.56	Positive
10.	Family value	164	39	44	14	90	2.9	Positive

Table 6 shows to what extent does parental educational and professional background affect student's career choice in the midst of insecurities in Junior Secondary School. All items were positive which includes: educational level of the parent, family history, family ethnics, Students' academic performance and family value.

Table

Research Number Three: To what extent does certain insecurities affect business studies in Junior Secondary School?

S/N	Items	SA	A	D	SD	X	MEAN RATING	REMARKS
11.	Bullying	192	42	46	5	90	3.17	Positive
12.	Cultism	168	129	10	-	90	3.41	Positive
13.	Kidnapping	80	24	102	11	90	2.41	Negative
14.	Rapping	132	51	76	2	90	2.90	Positive
15.	Thuggery	104	75	78	-	90	2.86	Positive

Table 7 shows to what extent does certain insecurities affect business studies in Junior Secondary School. All items were positive indicating the insecurities occur among Business studies students in Shomolu Local Government such as thuggery, raping, cultism and bullying while kidnaping does not occur in the Local government.

Conclusion

The purpose of the study was to examine parental factors as a determinant towards insecurities among business studies students in Shomolu Local Government Area of Lagos State, Nigeria. The study was guided by three objectives and three research questions were formed to guide the study. The result of the findings shows that among several insecurities; the ones common in Shomolu Local Government Area, Lagos

State includes cultism, rapping, thuggery and bullying. The parents' socio-economic status and educational background is also a strong key towards parenting a child against insecurities.

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Chapter 6

Approaching Banditry from the Lens of Methodological Conversation: A Look at Theatre for Development and Participatory, Learning and Action

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Abstract

The challenges of global insecurity have been a bane on the development of societies. Ranging from wars to famines, disasters to mention but a few, the issue of global insecurity is one that has indeed, ravaged the global terrain. Particularly, in Nigeria, new threats such as terrorism and banditry have become so prevalent that it has become a development challenge especially in the areas affected. Therefore, a fundamental re-think is needed on the approaches adopted by the government in quelling this crisis. Using the theory of participation, this paper proposes that involving the communities affected through methodological conversation which focuses on a combo of Theatre for Development and Participatory Learning and Action, can help to alleviate this crisis. As a road map to bringing to the barest minimum, the crisis of banditry in the Nigerian society, this paper recommends the need to fully involve the people in the various communities with the help of facilitators, in the discussion of this pertinent issue. This is the only way for critical issues to be discussed and brought to fore as reasons and facts for the persistence of this anomaly will be exhumed through the methods that would be deployed thus, bringing a lasting solution to the menace called banditry.

Keywords: Challenges, Insecurity, Society, Nigeria, Banditry

Introduction

Global insecurity according to Adeoluwa, (2018) is a condition of no assurance of peace, harmony and understanding among international co-operators and players often borne out of ideological, philosophical and socio-economic differences. This paper captures it as a state of undue rivalry laced with attacks, human killings, cold wars, terrorism etcetera which has instilled fear in most humans about their safety. With particular emphasis on Nigeria, it is pertinent to state that insecurity has surged amid the pandemic causing millions of people to be exposed to the activities of bandits. In fact, bandits have emerged as the new bogeyman for insecurity in Nigeria, joining a growing list that includes Herdsmen, Kidnappers, Militants, cultists to mention but a few.

The pervasive armed banditry and its associated threats to human security in the North-west region of Nigeria have become a matter of public concern considering the number of lives that are lost as well as the number of people who are always displaced after any attack. Thus, banditry by all accounts is undermining security, peace and

development in the country particularly, in the Northwest region. Its prevalence therefore is a source of concern as their activities have become so disturbing in recent times. Hence, the need to devise possible means of bringing to minimal, this scourge that is ravaging the image of the country both within and without.

Banditry in Nigeria: History, Effects and Responses.

Banditry according to Okoli, (2019) banditry is a type of organized crime committed by outlaws typically involving threat or use of violence. In the context of this paper, it is defined as a negative activity which fosters insecurity and further hinders and hampers development. Particularly, Nigeria's Northwest is gradually becoming a major hive in banditry activities. This was succinctly captured by Samaila, (2019) who aver that it was a problem which initially appeared as localized disputes between herders and farmers over access to land. Unfortunately, he notes that this has morphed into an intractable crisis, posing a major threat to national security. Accordingly, he further explained that the level of rural banditry escalated between 2014 and 2019 attracting a lot of attention. This underscores the reason why Okoli, (2019) wrote that 'Banditry violence has affected populations living in Nigeria's Zamfara, Kaduna, Niger, Sokoto, Kebbi and Katsina States in the northwest'. About 21 million people living in these states has been exposed to insecurity from activities of bandits. Unconnected to the Boko Haram insurgency in the northeast, the banditry violence began as a farmer/herder conflict in 2011 and intensified between 2017 to 2018 to include cattle rustling, kidnapping for ransom, sexual violence and killings. The violence has affected about thirty-five out of 92 local government areas in four states. The discovery of goldmines and the activities of the illegal miners competing for the control of gold reserves have served to further intensify the existence and activities of armed groups in the northwest. By March 2020, more than 210,000 people have been internally displaced.

From the above, it is clear that bandits have become quite brazen in their operations as they attack communities courageously without any form of repellant from the nations security operatives. Some have assumed that the causes this, as some have assumed, boils down to lack of jobs for the teeming youths who later go about, seeking for ways to make ends meet.

Looking at the timeline of their operations, IRIN News, (2021) has it that on the 13th of June 2013, Bandits raided Kwasa-Kwasa village in Birnin Gwari District of Kaduna State, killing five people including two soldiers and three local vigilantes. Also, the Birinin Gwari District in Kaduna State witnessed an attack on the 8th of June 2013 where the bandits killed seven residents and further carted away over 300 cattle, according to the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA). The attacks displaced 3,000 residents who are now sheltering in a primary school. Again, on the 19th of May 2013, around 2000 residents of six nomadic villages in Faskari District, Katsina State , abandoned their homes after raids by gunmen in which four people were killed and scores of cattle's were stolen in the series of raids by cattle rustlers. Furthermore, the 5th of January 2013 witnessed another attack where thirty gunmen on motorcycles gunned down seven people in raids on Makera and Usi villages in

Birinin Magaji District, Zamfara State in retaliation for killings of their gang members. Even more, Dangulbi village in Dansadau District, Zamfara State witnessed an early morning raid on the 12th June 2012. On that day, scores of motorcycle-riding bandits shot dead 23 residents of in an early morning raid which the authorities described as a reprisal killing for the deaths of suspected bandits by the village vigilante group. Similarly, Dogon Dawa village in Birnin Gwari witnessed another attack on the 14 of October, 2012 following the killing of 20 people in an attack on district by bandits in retaliation for killings of suspected bandits of local vigilantes.

In fact, a report from the West Africa Network of peace building (WANEP), shows that from January to December, 2019, armed bandits were responsible for more than 1000 civilian deaths in the North West. WANEP, (2019) further account that the activities perpetrated by bandits in the North West, heightened the vulnerability of women and girls in the region as some of them were faced with early widowhood or death of their children while so many orphans were orphaned and forced to flee their villages for safety. Aside the afore-stated, the effect of this can also be felt in the area of education especially in the states affected. As regards WANEP, (2019) pontificates that education deprivation in the North West region has been exacerbated by armed banditry due to the mass displacements in affected communities which has further contributed to the high number out of school children in the region. This further causes serious damage to the affected children.

The above, it is clear that these bandits have targeted the educational institutions, assaulting schools, students and teachers, disrupting access to education. This reduces the enrollment probability of the children in such communities as parents may become unwilling to send their wards to school.

The most recent attack happened on the 11th of December, 2020 where armed men attacked the Government Science Secondary School for boys in Kankara (Katsina State, northwest Nigeria) and kidnapped an unknown number of students. Record has it that more than 300 students were rescued the following week. However, it is not clear whether all students have been released. In fact, Boko haram, who usually operate in Nigeria's Northeastern states, claimed the attack. It should be noted that attacks targeting students and schools constrain access to education and highlight the need for secure education facilities and protection for students in states affected by violence and conflict.

Aside the effect of the activities of bandits on education, it is equally imperative to state that farming, which is the main stay of most local communities, has been further affected. This in turn results to serious implications for food security. In addition to displacement, the violence has hampered agricultural activities and heightened the risk of acute food insecurity. Livelihoods have been disrupted, fear and insecurity among the population have increased, and IDPs and host communities are competing for scarce resources such as water, land and food. In fact, violence and fear of attacks in Knakara LGA, precisely on the 4th of December, 2020 resulted in more than 3400 people fleeing to Gatakawa, Zurunkutu and Dan Nakwaguzo villages, arriving in

Kankara town. This made the need for the need for shelter, sanitation kits, and food to grow in such towns. Particularly, the latest developments which happened between 11-17 January in Zamfara and Kaduna States have affected 1125 people (including fatalities) and led to new displacements. Over 600 of those affected are women and 248 children.

The most recent of the attacks was carried out on the 17th of February, 2021, in Niger state where bandits came in their numbers, kidnapping over hundred students including the teachers in a secondary school. The governments are still making efforts to secure the release of the students and teachers.

Truthfully, there have been series of responses from the government as regards the quelling of this menace. To begin with, Wodu, (2020) accounts that the Nigeria security forces initially responded to this issue by increasing the deployment of the military and police to the troubled zones. While the security forces have successfully pushed back bandit attacks, destroyed several hideouts, and killed or arrested hundreds of bandits, attacks have continued. Against this backdrop, the governors of Katsina, Sokoto and Zamfara agreed on a peace deal with the armed bandits in 2019. They felt it was the best way to achieve lasting peace. The agreement involved disarmament, the release of kidnapped victims and the amnesty for the bandits. But the agreements did not last because attacks have picked up again in 2020 and 2021.

Even more, In July 2019, some governors in the North-Western state decided to negotiate with a number of armed bandits operating in the region, to curb the menace and further boost internal security in the affected states. Despite its recorded successes evident in the drastic decline in attacks, renewed attacks have begun in states like Niger, Zamfara and Katsina. In as much as the government has tried in various ways to quell this crisis, this paper avers that the government must start by building trust with local communities, working with the community leaders. This lies in the fact that the resilience of armed bandits groups operating in the affected states in the face of the dominant military approach to quell the violent activities of the bandits makes the need for multi approach that includes dialogue; Not a dialogue for paying a ransom but one that can involve everyone in the community in the discussion that can bring a lasting solution to the issue of banditry. This can be achieved through the instrumentality of Theatre for Development as banditry is not a problem that will be solved through the barrel of a gun.

The Theory of Participation

Participation theory represents a move from the top-down strategies that dominated early development initiatives to more locally sensitive methodologies. Claridge, (2004) aver that the importance of participation grew out of the recognition that the world's poor have suffered as a result of development, and that everyone needs to be involved in development decisions, implementations and benefits

Participation according to Reed, (2008) is a process where public or stakeholder individuals, groups and members of the society are involved in making decisions that

affect them whether passively via consultation or actively via two-way engagement. Here, the publics are defined as groups of people who are not affected by or able to affect decisions but who engage with the issues to which decisions pertain through discussion. This form of participation and engagement isn't a bottom-up one way communication engagement which is initiated and led by stakeholders communicating with decision making bodies through grass root networks to persuade them to open their decision making process. It is not one where those leading the process consult with the people. This is because even though, the people are consulted, it remains a bottom up one way communication.

This paper therefore advocate for a bottom-up deliberation and/or co-production engagement which is initiated and led by the stakeholders and/or publics who engage in two-way discussion about the decision with other relevant publics and stakeholders as well as the people to arrive at a decision and community action plan. Accordingly, Austin, (2004) Bellard and Belsky, (2010) note that the bottom up deliberation method does not need to involve researchers or organisations with formal decision making power to make progress towards the goals of the community. Rather, the participatory action of the people themselves is of paramount importance. Hence, the ladder of participation shall be considered starting from the most important to the less important viz;

Self Mobilisation-----Interactive participation-----participation for material incentives-----participation by consultation-----participation by information giving---passive participation.

While the passive participation may yield little or no results, the participation that would lead to self mobilization is the one which this paper adopts. This is because people take initiative independent of any external force to change the system. Here, they may decide to make contact with outsiders but at their own will as they think out ways to do things that will benefit their community. This is the type of participation that this paper adopts. However, before, it gets to this stage, the people must be engaged in the process that will result to achieving this.

Approaching Banditry from the Lens of Methodological Conversation: Theatre for Development plus Participatory Learning and Action

Methodological conversation is the relationship between the systematic approaches in doing theatre for development for the purpose of efficacy. Abah, (2005) captures it as an exploration of how one may move between techniques and how one may combine tools to aid information gathering and analysis and the development of action strategies. It is of paramount importance to note that Methodological conversation is one which allows for dialogue in the community using various tools and methods. Thus, in order to bring to a minimal the problem of banditry, there is the need to deploy dialogue with the locals in the community. The art of thinking together, resulting to a dialectic exchange remains a vehicle for identifying the problems in the community as well as solving them. This is because resolution to problems allows for the true exploration of the problem coupled with the fact that solutions actually

emerges out of thinking together. This underscores the reason; Schein, (1993) submits that dialogue can speed up the process of change. Hence, the art of thinking together remains one of the great tools for solving issues in recent times. More importantly, dialogue allows for the involvement of the people and all stakeholders in the entire decision. Methodological conversation is therefore, a tool which gives everyone the opportunity to be part of the process that would alleviate the issues faced by them.

To this end, there is a merging of Theatre for Development as well as Participatory Learning and Action. In helping to quell the crisis of banditry, the technique of Theatre for Development and Participatory, Learning and Action can be deployed. One of the active tools with which to liberate voice is called drama and theatre for development (TfD). Accordingly, Abah, (2005) writes that Theatre for Development is the theatre practice addressing itself to the issues and concerns of the marginalized urban and rural poor. It has increasingly started to be used not only to talk about the marginalized but to also talk to authority and policy makers to sensitize them of the implications of policy decisions. Starting its life in the early 1980s in the Southern African countries, especially in Lesotho, Abah, (2005) explains that TfD has become a strong research as well as development communication tool all over Africa. It is a practice that has grassroots, appeal and applicability. This is because it taps its philosophy and material from the life of the people it deals with. Therefore, theatre for development is a theatre of action whose outputs result from participation. The approach of tapping from the people's art forms such as storytelling, dance, mime and combining all these with dialogue drama makes TfD a hybrid practice.

Toeing on the same line, Etherton (1988) hold the view that the practice of TfD is an unfinished theatre. Particularly, he notes that the un-ending nature of the performance as well as discussion in this theatre results from two factors. One is the new and changing perspectives which occasions new ways of seeing and therefore of calling events to question. The other factor is that as new perspectives emerge, the text of the drama must necessarily change. The changing fact of the issues under interrogation results in the changing text of the performance and a new tangent of discussion.

Therefore, it should be noted that what makes this negotiation so possible in TfD is that rather than look for a final product, that is finished piece of theatre and to possibly foreclose the argument by fixing solutions in fiction, it emphasises the process. The process is emphasised because it is when all the stakeholders take active part in making the theatre that new learning's take place. People write their stories in performance. It is the constant intervention of spectators (who are one and the same actors) that generates new insights and changes, perceptions on the issues under discussion. (Abah, 2005)

In order to achieve the new insights that TfD aims at, as it relates to the issue of banditry, and for the people to reclaim their voices, the stages in the TfD practice defines a movement of participation and critical analysis of their issues. To borrow Paulo Friere's words, pedagogy of the oppressed (Friere, 1970). The first stage in this pedagogy, according to Abah, (2005) is the community research. This is when both the

facilitators and the community members in a project location gather information on the stated research topic. The defining characteristic of this information is generated through visits to people in their homes, on the farms and meeting points where social activities take place. You talk and share information, observe people at their various activities and take part when it is permissible for you to do so. The home stead approach to community research is that which does not disrupt the community rhythm to satisfy the researcher. Instead, it follows the rhythm of life in the community. It is therefore not unusual for the researcher to participate in community activities such as singing and dancing, storytelling and farm work because some of these events are occasions where some of these philosophies are expressed. This shows that going into those communities will require the facilitators to live and co-exist with the people so that they can gain the trust of the facilitators and further open up to them concerning their biting issues.

The second and remaining stages in the process as stated by Abah, (2005) validate the information gathered and engage in the analysis. Very often, some key bits of the information are problematised in a skit. The response to the content and argument of the skit is the problematised in a skit. The response to the content and argument of the skit balloon drama may then open the process of analysis and prioritization of the most biting issues/problems which are then put at the top list. It is this ordered list of needs that are developed into a scenario and eventually performed as the community's own drama. The scenario building process is more than just putting a piece of drama together. Because every member of the community present contributes to the content and form of the drama.

What is normally regarded as community performance is a period in which the community will watch their story/performance and interview the facts of the presentation. Therefore, Theatre with emphasis on drama is used to bring to bare, the issues faced by the community members. Here, the community members are the ones to dramatise their issues. The essence of the drama according to Abah, (2005) is to recover voice, identity and memory of vibrant resource and strategy. It should not be an encounter of assumptions of talking for, or the pontification on behalf of the people who are at the core of this research. Consequently, we will listen to the voices of people in active rather than passive discussion of their own issues and of factors that inhibit them from playing their roles in helping to quell the problems dramatized.

The advantage of using TfD as a research tool lies in the fact that it is a non-formal means of engaging people in the discussion of sensitive and worrying issues. It therefore makes it possible for people to be less suspicious and to talk more easily. In bringing people together, it strengthens community feelings. Abah (2005)note that by using the indigenous forms as both entry points and in letting drama emerge from within the forms, TfD becomes an act in cultural validation. At the end of the day, community performance is a celebration of new insights and a forum for planning an action strategy. As the intervention is a way of exploring options and possible solution, community performance will very often, lead to the next logical stage of what to do about the problems that formed the subject matter of the drama. This is the

community action plan (CAP), when the members of the community will take it to heart to face the issues in their community. Thus, TFD is a tool which gives the Natives the authority to speak to their issues by devising strategies which can be used to minimize the occurrence of certain issues.

On the other hand, Abah, (2005) explains that Participatory learning and action (PLA) is an assemblage of tools and techniques which reconceptualises the traditional social science research methods and makes them more participatory in nature. In view of the above, the use of approaches such as transect walks, community map, timeline, pair wise ranking, to mention but a few, is imperative because the community members are involved in making, drawing and personalizing the experience. Participatory, learning and action which is one method used when methods are conversing, it is pertinent to state that PLA emerged out of the limitations of the top-down approach which often led to making faulty appraisals. Hence, there was the need to search for a means that truly brings out people's participation.

Accordingly, the three main divisions of PLA which can be deployed by the government as regards the issue of banditry are the space related tools, time related tools and the relationship tools. The space related tools that explores special dimension of a people's reality. In other words, it utilizes the different kinds of space to generate information and learning. Such tools include the transect work and the community map. A transect is simply defined as a path used by researchers to survey a place. It is one which enables them to see firsthand, a community through a worms eye view. However, it is pertinent to state that this research tool cannot work if the people of the community for whom the communicators went there are detached from the process. Their full involvement is required, if their issues are to be treated. To this end, Okwori, (2010) write that the first step to take while in a community is to locate a group of people from the community who are very familiar with their terrain. No one is exempted from joining as the facilitators would need all the available information they can get from the natives.

In the various communities where the issue of banditry is prevalent, facilitators can be hired by the government to conduct a transect walk with the members of the community. During the walk, the facilitators observe all the surroundings, taking detailed note of what they see. During the process, the facilitators can stop and ask questions at intervals about what they see or notice in the community. On their return, the facilitators, together with the people draw a transect on a sheet of paper or even on the floor, describing the various places they have seen. The people are the ones who would approve or disapprove the drawing as well as the contents and interactions of the section. This transect is a basis for generating information from the people concerning their community. How and when bandits started operating in the community can also be asked.

Still on the space related tools, the community map is one that is used to collect demographic and household information from the community people. Now, it should be known that most bandits are from the community they terrorize, therefore,

eliciting information from the community people via the use of the community map can help to know the members of each household, where they are as well as what they do. After drawing the map with the community members, it ought to be interviewed. This is with a view to getting to know more about the community. In fact, the absence of anything in the community should be a hunger for information.

As regards the time related tools, the timeline which is one among the tools used helps the facilitators as well as the community members to capture the chronology of events as recalled by the local people. Accordingly, Okwori, (2010) aver that it provides the historical landmark of the community. Specifically, he notes that 'The time related tool with specific emphasis on the timeline is used to understand from the community the historical perspective on current issues, to generate discussion on the changes with respect to the community and to build rapport with the villagers/community participants.

With this, the historical perspective as regards the issue of banditry can be brought to fore by the people themselves, especially the elderly in the community, who have sufficient history of the village. Banditry, could be one of the changes that their community have experienced hence, it could be discussed, paying particular attention to the changes that have occurred in their community and the reasons why some of the residents resorted to banditry. With this, the daily activities of the people is be explored. This is with a view to understanding who does what and for how long in the community.

Furthermore, the relationship tools study the relationship between various items discussed in the previous tools and the society. Firstly, the flowchart focuses on causal factors of a phenomenon, activity or problem and the effect thereof. Here, the causes of banditry could be discussed because the causes and effects as well as the understanding of the issue could be discussed, providing scope for analysis and subsequent action by local people. The relationship tools according to Okwori, (2010) is used to study and analyse problems in a wide range of areas and further identify the causes and effects of a problem in order to plan an intervention. Here, the participants, comprising the community members are asked to discuss the problem, paying attention to what they believed caused the problem, as well as its effects. The essence of this is to get to the root of the problem because often times, the community members are carried away by the effects of a problem which are merely symptoms. Truth is that without getting to the root of a problem, the problems will keep surfacing. Hence, together with the people, the facilitators would make sure that they probe and elicit information until they have exhausted their reasons. This is done so that in the intervention, the facilitators plan with the community members on how to go about the root causes of the issues and know specifically, what they need to tackle.

Pair-wise ranking remains another relationship tool that can be deployed when trying to get to the root of problems in a community. It is one which helps facilitators as well as the community members to arrive at the priorities and preferences of issues in the community. In pair wise ranking, two items, attributes, factors etcetera are compared

at the same time. The process of comparing is carried on till each item has been compared with the other. The frequency and the number of times each item have being preferred is ascertained through this process. This gives an idea of the preferences of the people. Hence, the more the frequency, the higher the preference. Thus, to determine the priority of the people from the list of choices, this method is deployed.

Even more, methodological conversation deploys the Participatory Narrative Inquiry. This method is carried out when community members come together to discuss their issues, and tell further tell their stories and voice out their problems together. They know the gaps in their community and are in the best position to tell where the problem is because problems could be generated as a result of long existing rife between tribes, clans, families and communities or even as a result of myth. The most important thing is putting an end to the problems or thinking of a possible means of proffering solutions to existing issues in the community. Therefore, participation is essential among the members of the community because when they participate, they feel the need for change. Aside the above, it also gives voice to the voiceless.

From the above explications, it is clear that PLA is a cavalcade of tools designed to be learned and used by ordinary villagers in the analysis of their problems. It also helps them in arriving at action strategies to solve their problems. In practice, it combines both visual and oral methods to interrogate the community issues. Tfd on its own part is a performative means of concretizing community issues as the body, words and objects (props) in space define, analyse and strategize for action. Therefore, Tfd can operate from and with PLA and that PLA can spring from TFD. Thus, a symbiotic relationship which in practice can support enlightenment, conscientisation and action for change does exist and can be used to solve certain issues in the community and society at large.

Conclusion

Security is a collective responsibility of all citizens. Nigerians must therefore grow above sentiments, arguments and criticism and rise in support of the government to ensure that banditry becomes history. The resort to shallow and poorly conceived peace deals is one method that have always been futile. Therefore, this study proposes methodological conversation which is a combination of PLA and TFD to build pictures of issues of problems and of life stories. PLA generates participation through the space related tools, the time related tools and the relationship tools while Tfd generates involvement through performative forms of forum theatre, of intervention and processing/ facilitation.

Methodological conversation is therefore a tool and strategy that can be deployed for the people and by the people. This lies in the fact that it taps its raw materials from the life experiences of the people with whom it is engaging and further gives the community members the authority to hear themselves expressing their own issues in their own words and voices. In all, tackling banditry from the lens of methodological

conversation is one viable way of restoring normalcy to the areas affected. Nigeria belongs to everyone hence, the need to deploy novel ways to salvage the problem of banditry together.

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Chapter 7

Effect of Insecurity on Academic Performances of Secondary Schools Students in Benue State

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Abstract

The aim of this study was to investigate the effect of insecurity in school on academic performance secondary schools' students in Benue State. The target population of this study is the SSSII students in all secondary schools in Benue State. A sample of 265 students was selected using Taro Yamane formula. This study used a survey research design. Two research questions and two hypotheses were formulated to guide the study. Means and standard deviations were calculated to answer the research questions and independent samples t-tests were used for testing the hypotheses. Major findings revealed that factors that constitute insecurity among secondary school students in Benue state that influence academic performance. Seven question items were presented to the respondents in the study, all the question items were accepted based on 2.50 decision point set in the study. The responses obtained indicate that there are factors that constitute insecurity and influences academic performance in Benue secondary school. How insecurity affects academic performance of secondary school students in Benue state. 5 question items were presented to the respondents. All the question items were accepted based on 2.50 decision point set in the study. The accepted question items include insecurity causes closure of Schools from academic activities; loss of interest due to insecurity among others. The obtained responses indicate that insecurity has significant effects on academic performance among secondary schools' students in Benue schools. Based on the findings of the study, the following recommendations were they are efforts should be made by owners of schools as well as stake holders in education to ensure that school in Benue State are fenced and protected to ward off intruders from the school premises so that students can have a sense of security which will allow them to concentrate and improve on their academic performance.

Keywords: Effect of insecurity, Academic performance, secondary school students and Benue State

Introduction

Education goes beyond literacy alone because for an individual, education means the provision of opportunity for him to realize his potentials, goals, and abilities in life. Education includes the acquisition of functional skills, moral identity, and ambition to succeed in life and thereby improve the society. Eunice and Zita, (2013), see education as having two ideas implicit in the world. One is that leading out into new knowledge and experience, the other is that of feeding and thereby growing and developing.

Education is the fulcrum that propels meaningful development to any nation. There is no nation that can achieve any development when the type of education given to the people at all levels especially at the higher level is that which makes the individual become a nuisance not only to himself but also to the society. This is because education is seen as the key factor for national development and empowering the citizens to master their environment in order to compete for survival, (Mbachu, 2013). Mbachu (2013) agrees that education has to be a powerful instrument and of good quality to enable the recipient grow into a functional member of his family and of his nation. It is obvious that several third world countries are enmeshed in poverty, disease infestation, unemployment, and harsh economic conditions.

The importance of education has been adequately discussed in many fora and in different literature (Nwanne-Nzewunwa, 2009; Ojukwu and Nwanma, 2015 and Ojukwu and Onuoha, 2016; Ossat, 2012). It is in realization of the importance of education of the child that the government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria in its 1999 constitution made a declaration of the right of every Nigerian child to education, irrespective of gender, tribe, religion or race. It makes sense to state that the lofty vision of education as enunciated in the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria would be realized in a serene and conducive school environment. According to Lehr (2004), the noble goals of education can never be achieved in a vacuum. They would be achieved in a conducive and peaceful school environment. If there is a feeling of insecurity within and outside the school environment, both students and teachers are likely to be deterred and this may inhibit academic performance of the students.

Matters of insecurity are topical issues in today's Nigeria education. Insecurity in tertiary institutions is a social problem that cannot be over-emphasized because of its far-reaching implications and dire consequences on education, the economy and society in general. It is an issue that should be seriously tackled as Nigerians endeavour to forge a strong, just, democratic and egalitarian society. Although the issue of insecurity has attracted much public interest over the years, interest in solving the insecurity equation appears to be waning and even when the issue is addressed, little emphasis seems to be paid on the gory socio-economic, political and spiritual implications. (Blomberg, Hess and Orphanides (2004).

Insecurity according to Abubakar, 2004; Ezeoha, 2011 Akinola, 2006; Ndoma-Egba, 2014) is a major challenge confronting humanity today. Challenges of insecurity are so pervasive that it dominates the news items in every mass communication media throughout the world. For instance, the whole of the Arab world has known no peace since the Al-Qaida group led by Osama Bin Ladin bombed the United States of America's World Trade Centre on the 11th of September 2001, wars and threats of wars are common features in most of the developing nations of the world. The pervading threats of wars are not limited to international level but also manifests in various forms of intra-national wars.

Although insecurity has manifested in Nigeria since the colonial era, reaching a very high pitch during the nation's civil war between 1967 and 1970, the level of insecurity

being experienced in the country since 1999 is not only unprecedented in the history of the nation, but takes diverse forms. For example, in Southwestern Nigeria, insecurity manifests in form of armed robbery, kidnapping for rituals, communal clashes and armed struggles between members of the National Union of Road Transports Workers (NURTW). In the South-south and Southeast regions, insecurity manifests in form of oil bunkering, pipe-line vandalization, kidnapping for ransom, communal clashes and armed struggles for political independence (via Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra [MASSOB]). Insecurity in the three northern regions of the country manifests mostly in form of ethno-religious clashes, the most prominent of which is the activities of a religious fundamentalist group generally known as 'Boko Haram' (Western Education is forbidden).

The concept of insecurity connotes the state or quality of being insecure. Security in simple terms means protection of lives and properties from destruction. According to Onifode, Imhonopl and Uorim (2013) security is the dynamic condition which involves the relative ability of a state to counter threats to its core values and interest and their primary beneficiaries are the citizens. In addition, sharing the view Abraham Maslow, Onifode, Imhonopl and Uorim (2013) stated that an insecure person perceives the world as a life-threatening jungle, feels unsafe, unhappy, rejected, hostile, and pessimistic, shows a sign of tension, conflict and guilt, and tends to be neurotic and generally egocentric. It therefore seems that when a student studies in an environment that is characterized by insecurity, the student may suffer socially, mentally and emotionally and it makes sense hypothetically to state that all these are likely to affect not only his behavior and psychosocial adjustment but may also affect his academic performance.

According to Ojukwu and Nwanma (2015), insecure school environment, including the dilapidated conditions and teachers' negative attitude to condone and accept the emotional needs of students, which will lead to undue influences and clashes of a local community interfering with school business. Also, they stated that in insecure school environments the psychological problems of the students are never met or carelessly handled, there are always segregations in the school community along religions, tribal and sectarian lines as students may ignore teachers' directives and may also challenge the teachers on certain concepts and school properties may likely be deliberately damaged by the students to show their disapproval of managements decisions (Ojukwu and Nwanma, 2015).

Academic performance entails that students are required to maintain a satisfactory academic record and meet the obligations of the courses they are enrolled (Ojukwu, and Nwanma 2015). Academic performance is the outcome of education, the extent to which a student achieved the educational goals. Put in another way, good academic performance is the personal comportment and commitment of the student to actualize his/her academic purposes which may include concentrating on one's studies, having confidence to success oriented academic activities in school and so in other to maximally actualize his life career or dream (Olofintoye, 2005).

Good or bad academic performance can make or mar the goals of a student's life as well as the national goals and development. A good academic performance would bring about the motivation and enthusiasm the student needs to attain a high academic standing when compared with his/her mates. It brings about resilience and makes the student success-oriented (Morgan, 2002).

Objective of the Study

The objectives of the study were to:

1. Determine the factors that constitute insecurity of the secondary schools' students in Benue State that may influence academic performance.
2. Determine the effect of insecurity of the school on the academic performance of secondary school students in Benue State.
3. Determine the statistical significance of the difference between the places of insecurity of secondary schools in Benue State.
4. Investigate the statistical significance of the difference between male and female students' academic performance due to insecurity of the secondary school students in Benue State.

Research Question

The following research questions were raised to guide the study.

1. What are the factors that constitute insecurity of the secondary schools' students in Benue State that may influence academic performance?
2. How does the insecurity of the school affect academic performance of secondary school students in Benue State?
3. What is the statistical significance of the difference between the places of insecurity of secondary schools in Benue State?
4. What is the statistical significance of the difference between male and female students' academic performance due to insecurity of the secondary school students in Benue State?

Null Hypotheses

Insecurity of school does not significantly affect the academic performance of secondary school students in Benue State.

1. There is no significant difference between the performance of students affected by insecurity and those not affected among secondary schools in Benue State.
2. There is no significant difference between male and female students' academic performance due to the insecurity of school in Benue State.

Methodology

This study used a survey research design. Area of study is Benue State. The target population of this study is the SSS II students in all secondary schools in Benue State. A sample of 265 students was selected using Taro Yamane formula. The instrument for data collection was a researcher constructed questionnaire by the researcher titled 'Effect of insecurity in school and academic performance secondary school's students in Benue State (EISAPS). The questionnaire was constructed on a four (4) point rating scales and will anchored on a continuum of strongly agree, agree, disagree and

strongly disagree with corresponding responses of 1,2,3 and 4 respectively. The research instrument was validated by three experts. The researcher personally administered the questionnaire to the respondents. Mean and Chi-square statistics were used for data analysis.

Results and Discussion

Research Question 1: what are the factors that constitute insecurity of the secondary schools' students in Benue State that may influence academic performance?

Table 1: Factors that may influence academic performance

s/no	Items	SA	A	D	SD	Mean	Decision point
1	The manipulation of students for selfish gain by the teachers and other can causes insecurity	88	163	3	8	3.26	Accepted
2	The attitude of the people towards the students within the school location causes security	53	175	24	9	3.04	Accepted
3	The persistent failure of school management to address the basic academic needs of the students	31	209	13	10	2.99	Accepted
4	The teaching and management approach of the school by the authority constitute insecurity	59	168	16	17	3.03	Accepted
5	The rate of employment and poverty among the Benue populace constitute insecurity among schools	33	189	28	8	2.96	Accepted
6	The porousness of the school environment to external forces constitute insecurity	49	171	19	22	2.95	Accepted
7	The discipline approach by the teachers make the students feel insecure within the schools.	20	168	51	19	2.73	Accepted

Table 1 presents the frequency and the mean of the participants' response on factors that constitute insecurity among secondary school students in Benue state that influences academic performance. Seven question items were presented to the respondents in the study, all the question items were accepted based on 2.50 decision point set in the study. The responses obtained indicate that there are factors that constitute insecurity and influences academic performance in Benue secondary school.

Research Question 2: How does the insecurity of the schools affect academic performance of secondary school students in Benue State?

Table 2: How insecurity of the schools affect academic performance of students

s/no	Items	SA	A	D	SD	Mean	Decision point
1	Insecurity within the school can cause the closure of the school from academic activities	49	99	95	17	2.69	Accepted
2	Due to insecurity students may lose interest in academic activities	49	102	51	58	2.55	Accepted
3	Absent from school due to insecurity causes poor academic performance among students	20	168	51	19	2.73	Accepted
4	The persistent closure of schools due to insecurity has significantly affect students' academic performance	25	194	21	20	2.86	Accepted
5	The attack in area where school are located due to insecurity affect students' performance	14	151	78	17	2.62	Accepted

Table 2 presents the frequency and the mean of the participant response on how insecurity affects academic performance of secondary school students in Benue State. Five question items were presented to the respondents. All the question items were accepted based on 2.50 decision point set in the study. The accepted question items include insecurity causes closure of Schools from academic activities; loss of interest due to insecurity among others. The obtained responses indicate that insecurity has significant effects on academic performance among secondary schools' students in Benue schools.

Testing of hypotheses

Hypothesis 1: There is no significant difference between the performance of students affected by insecurity and those not affected among secondary schools in Benue State.

Table 3: Significant differences between the performance of students affected by insecurity and those not affected among secondary schools in Benue State.

Variables	N	Mean	Std. Dev	T	df	Sig (P-value)
Schools not affected with insecurity	139	41.22	13.03	4.43	238	.000
Schools affected by Insecurity	101	33.50	13.69			

Table 3 presents the t-test result on the significant difference between schools not affected by insecurity and schools affected by insecurity in secondary schools Benue state. The hypothesis was rejected since the p-value of 0.00 was less than the 0.05 significant level. Therefore, there is a significant difference in the performance of students affected by the insecurity in the state.

Hypothesis 2: There is no significant difference between male and female students' academic performance due to the insecurity of school in Benue State.

Table 4: Significant differences between male and female students' academic performance due to the insecurity of school in Benue State

Variables	N	Mean	Std. Dev	T	df	Sig (p-value)
Male performance	130	42.98	11.9	1.05	268	.291
Female performance	140	41.36	13.1			

Table 4 presents the t-test result on the significant difference between male and female students affected by the insecurity in secondary schools in Benue. The hypothesis was accepted since the p-value of 0.291 was greater than the 0.05 significant level. Therefore, there is no significant difference between the performance of male and female students affected by the insecurity.

Discussion

Major findings showed that insecurity in school in Benue State significantly affects the academic performance of secondary school students in Benue State while smoking of Benue hemp, hard drugs, student's, cult, violent activities, kidnapping, armed robbery, parent's confrontation of teachers, sexual harassment, rape, using of guns and bullying of junior by senior students among others are major factors that constitute insecurity of the school in Benue State. As a result of the insecurity of the school in Benue State, students become afraid of school as they feel insecure and hence, they skip school, miss lessons which eventually affect them during examinations. Besides, they lose interest in school and academic activities which eventually lead to truancy and boys leaving school to take up trading while girl's

dropout and settle for marriage. It was also revealed that there is a significant difference in insecurity of the school in Benue State between schools located in urban and rural areas while insecurity of the school in Benue State has significant effect on the academic performance of male and female students. This similar to Ojukwu (2017) Effect of Insecurity of School Environment on the Academic Performance of Secondary School Students in Imo State and Nwakpa (2015) The Effect of Insecurity on Quality Tertiary Education in Nigeria which also reported on effects of insecurity on schools.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the results from this study have extended and called for more research regarding insecurity and the school in Benue State vis-vis students' academic performance. Students' poor academic performance has for some time been attributed to factors such as teacher's ineffectiveness, poor intelligent quotient of the students, and poor mental alertness of the students among others with less or no reference to the effect of insecurity of the school in Benue State and its related factors. However, in the global search for the poor academic performance of Nigerian secondary school students in Benue State, educators and psychologists have realized that many students perform poorly in their academic work not because they do not possess the mental ability to do well but because they have been affected by other factors. Hence, this study investigated the effect of insecurity of school in Benue State on the academic performance of secondary school students in Benue State. Major findings showed that insecurity of the school in Benue State significantly affects the academic performance of secondary school students in Benue State while smoking of Benue hemp, hard drugs, student's, cult, violent activities, kidnapping, armed robbery, parent's confrontation of teachers, sexual harassment, rape, using of guns and bullying of junior by senior students among others are major factors that constitute insecurity of the school in Benue State. As a result of the insecurity of the school in Benue State, students become afraid of school as they feel insecure and hence, they skip school, miss lessons which eventually affect them during examinations. Besides, they lose interest in school and academic activities which eventually lead to truancy and boys leaving school to take up trading while girl's dropout and settle for marriage. It was also revealed that there is a significant difference in insecurity of the school in Benue State between schools located in urban and rural areas while insecurity of the school in Benue State has significant effect on the academic performance of male and female students.

Recommendations

Based on the findings of this study, efforts should be made by owners of schools as well as stake holders in education to ensure that school in Benue State are fenced and protected to ward off intruders from the school premises so that students can have a sense of security which will allow them to concentrate and improve on their academic performance.

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Chapter 8

Herdsmen, Banditry and Kidnapped activities: A threat to secondary school in Nigeria

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Abstract

Nigeria is beset with a lot of security problems such as Boko Harm, militancy, kidnapping, ethno-religious conflicts, drug trafficking, agitation for resource control, communal riots, arms smuggling, and criminality that erode national security. No country can survive economically, socially and politically in a climate of insecurity. This paper examines the activities of Herdsmen, Banditry and Kidnapped in Nigeria. The paper has introduction, theoretical framework of Frustration aggression theory, herdsmen, banditry and kidnapped activities on secondary schools in Nigeria, some selected records of herdsmen, banditry and kidnapped activities in schools, conclusion and suggestions such as the study therefore believes that the problem of insecurity in North West and parts of states deserves serious governmental attention. The current efforts of various state governments are welcome, but such efforts will not be successful without genuine stakeholder participation and involvement and Federal government which has exclusive role on providing effective security by ensuring providing adequate security personnel with full training and working tools and also should make room for the inclusion of all layers of stakeholders. In evolving developmental plans for the region, efforts should be made to check the rising cases of benefit capture, whereby the real trickledown development benefits are captured by vested interest and elites while the people are left out. Available development agencies for the region should be strictly monitored to stem the rising case of corruption that has always been the hallmark of such agencies. Doing these will help to build the capacity of every stake holder, as well as engaging them in meaningful developmental activities.

Keywords: Herdsmen, Banditry, Kidnapped, Security and Secondary School.

Introduction

The herdsmen conflict has remained a dominant feature in all the states in the North-Central. Land remains a scare resource in the zone, worsened by increasing demand resulting in frequent clashes between herders and host communities; most of whom are farmers. Rural-banditry and cattle-rustling are rife in the zone, characterised by armed assaults, rape, kidnapping, organised attacks and reprisals on villages and communities. Protracted disputes over supremacy and rights to chieftaincy stools are also rife in the geo-political zone; often degenerating into indigene-settler conflicts. Urban gangsterism and frequent clashes between these gangs over territories and illegal tolling were found in all the capital cities of the six states.

Over the years, several African nations especially West Africa has experienced series of inter and intra communal clashes and conflicts which are premised on environmental land resources conflict, socio-cultural and identity-related differences among other factors. These conflicts are often products of a direct effect of an arbitrary demarcation of Africa lands without taking into cognizance the differences along environment, cultural and linguistic identities. Several Literatures by scholars like Abbass, 2012; Audu, 2013; Ofem and Bassey, 2014; Nzeh, 2015; Doyin, 2017 and Beetseh, 2018), has largely focuses on the issues of conflict but few have offered an alternative solution to the issues raise. It is in the light of the above that this paper is out to address the gap in the literature of herders, banditry and kidnapped activities in Nigeria.

Over the last decade, reporting of herder violence has increased exponentially. Conflict between Fulani herdsmen and farmers is one of Africa most persistent security problems and has left thousands of people dead in recent decades. The largest spike in reporting, occurring between 2013 and 2014, may be as a result of an increased number of incidents, increased awareness on the issue, or both. It may likewise be attributed to the 2014 presidential elections and the increased Boko Haram activity during this period. In any case, the increasing number of articles covering this issue signifies the growing urgency of this conflict (Blench, 2010). The prevalence of conflict in the country has become a major concern for the well-meaning Africa considering the impact on the peace, security as well as the economy of the nation. Destruction of lives and properties has almost become an everyday affair. These happenings have created a fearful atmosphere that discourages investors both domestic and foreign. By and large the economy of the nation is threatened. It is in the light of above this paper is out to addresses the herders, banditry and kidnapped activities in Nigeria (Beetseh, 2018).

The importance of education has been adequately discussed in many fora and in different literature (Nwanne- Nzewunwa, 2009; Ojukwu and Nwanma, 2015 and Ojukwu and Onuoha, 2016; Ossat, 2012). It is in realization of the importance of education of the child that the government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria in its 1999 constitution made a declaration of the right of every Nigerian child to education, irrespective of gender, tribe, religion or race. It makes sense to state that the lofty vision of education as enunciated in the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria would be realized in a serene and conducive school environment. According to Lehr (2004), the noble goals of education can never be achieved in a vacuum. They would be achieved in a conducive and peaceful school environment. If there is a feeling of insecurity within and outside the school environment, both students and teachers are likely to be deterred and this may inhibit academic performance of the students.

Matters of insecurity are topical issues in today's Nigeria education. Insecurity in tertiary institutions is a social problem that cannot be over-emphasized because of its far-reaching implications and dire consequences on education, the economy and society in general. It is an issue that should be seriously tackled as Nigerians

endeavour to forge a strong, just, democratic and egalitarian society. Although the issue of insecurity has attracted much public interest over the years, interest in solving the insecurity equation appears to be waning and even when the issue is addressed, little emphasis seems to be paid on the gory socio-economic, political and spiritual implications. (Blomberg, Hess and Orphanides (2004).

Banditry refers to the incidences of armed robbery or allied violent crimes, such as kidnapping, cattle rustling, and village or market raids. It involves the use of force, or threat to that effect, to intimidate a person or a group of persons in order to rob, rape or kill (Okoli and Okpaleke 2014). Economic or political interests motivate banditry. The former refers to banditries motivated by the imperative of material accumulation while the latter has to do with those driven by the quest to rob, to assault or to liquidate a person or a group of persons based on political or ideological considerations. Various forms of banditry have been identified in literature. Table 1 highlights these categories of banditry in an attempt to propose a typology of the phenomenon.

Insecurity according to Abubakar, 2004; Ezeoha, 2011 Akinola, 2006; Ndoma-Egba, 2014) is a major challenge confronting humanity today. Challenges of insecurity are so pervasive that it dominates the news items in every mass communication media throughout the world. For instance, the whole of the Arab world has known no peace since the Al-Qaida group led by Osama Bin Ladin bombed the United States of America's World Trade Centre on the 11th of September 2001, wars and threats of wars are common features in most of the developing nations of the world. The pervading threats of wars are not limited to international level but also manifests in various forms of intra-national wars.

Bandits armed with assault rifles attacked a secondary school in Nigeria's north-western Katsina state late on Friday, police said, and two local people told Reuters hundreds of students were missing. The gunmen stormed the Government Science secondary school in Kankara district at about 9.40pm, and police at the scene returned fire, allowing some students to run for safety, police spokesman Gambo Isah said in a statement. Police said they were working with the army and air force to determine how many pupils were missing or kidnapped, and to find them. One officer was shot and wounded in the exchange of fire with the gang, they said.

Theoretical Framework

Frustration aggression theory

The original formulation of the frustration aggression hypothesis by Breuer and Elson (2017) stated that "the occurrence of aggressive behavior always presupposes the existence of frustration and, contrariwise, that the existence of frustration always leads to some form of aggression". What is especially noteworthy in this definition is that, unlike the use of the word in everyday language, frustration here is not understood as an emotional experience but as "an interference with the occurrence of an instigated goal response" (Breuer and Elson (2017). Put differently, frustration is defined as an event instead of an affective state. The arguable benefit of characterizing frustration

through observable qualities of events or environmental characteristics is that it allows description and testing of its causal effects, such as those on aggression, objectively instead of relying on subjective self reported introspection. This basic yet somewhat counterintuitive ascertainment is important as it is also implied in later modifications and reformulations of the frustration aggression hypothesis. A basketball player who yells at the referee after his team loses by a buzzer beater that was pre-ceded by an uncalled foul, a person who loudly insults an instruction manual after 2 hours of failure in constructing a newly purchased IKEA wall closet, or a toddler who throws a tantrum when she notices that her favorite toy has been placed out of reach on the kitchen table are all everyday examples of the link between frustrating events and aggressive responses.

Frustration aggression theory, more commonly known as the frustration aggression hypothesis, ranks among the most seminal and prolific theories in research on aggression. From its beginnings in the late 1930s until today, it has been applied and studied in a variety of areas, including clinical and social psychology, ethnology, sociology, criminology, and medical research. While frustration aggression theory has also been used to explain the behavior of animals, the present chapter will focus exclusively on applications in the study of human behavior. Given the scope and targeted readership of this handbook and the origin of the theory, the focus will be on the social sciences, specifically psychology. Within the discipline of psychology, frustration aggression theory has been used in a variety of domains, ranging from self-regulation (Harrison, Genders, Davies, Treasure, and Tchanturia, 2011) and imitation learning to developmental organizational and media psychology (Breuer, Scharkow, and Quandt, 2015). There is, overall, ample empirical evidence for the link between frustration and aggression. However, the original theoretical explanation for this relationship has developed and become more refined over the decades, and competing theoretical considerations have emerged.

Looking at the original definition by Dollard and colleagues, one might criticize their claim to universal validity. Taken verbatim, “the occurrence of aggressive behavior always presupposes the existence of frustration” suggests that aggression does not occur without any form of prior frustration, and the assertion that frustration “always leads to some form of aggression” implies that aggression is a certain outcome of any frustration.

Herdsmen, Banditry and Kidnapped activities on secondary schools in Nigeria

According to Human Right Watch Report (2021) there were chaotic scenes at the school on Saturday as desperate parents and security personnel gathered to search for about half of the school’s 800 students who were still missing, one parent and a school employee told Reuters. Katsina, the home state of Nigeria’s president, Muhammadu Buhari, is plagued by violent bandits who regularly attack local people and kidnap for ransom. Attacks by Islamist militants are common in north-eastern parts of the country. Violence and insecurity across Nigeria have enraged citizens, particularly after scores of farmers were killed some beheaded by Islamist militants in the north-eastern Borno state late last month.

According to Mbah (2021) dozens of schoolchildren, teachers and their relatives have been abducted by gunmen in central Nigeria after an attack on a boarding school, the latest in a rising wave of mass abductions and attacks that have beset the country. A spokesperson for the Niger state government said 27 students, three teachers and a dozen family members of school staff, 42 people in total, were taken. Earlier reports had indicated hundreds were missing from the school of about 1,000 students.

Heavily armed gunmen dressed in military uniforms overran the all-boys Government Science College (GSC) in Kagara Town, Niger state, between Tuesday night to Wednesday morning, 16-17 February 2021 killing at least one student. The attack is thought to have been carried out by suspected armed groups known as “bandits” that have terrorised north-west and central Nigeria in recent years. The groups have launched marauding attacks from forest havens which span across north-West Nigeria into neighbouring Niger, terrorising vulnerable rural communities left helpless by a dearth of security.

Killings, sexual violence and mass kidnappings for ransom have risen sharply, including on schools. The state governor on Wednesday ordered the closure of all boarding schools in areas at risk from bandit attacks. A spokesperson for the Nigerian president, Muhammadu Buhari, who is increasingly vilified for rising insecurity forcing him to recently replace all the armed forces chiefs, said: “Our prayers are with the families of the victims of this attack. Following these reports, the president has directed the armed forces and police to ensure immediate and safe return of all the captives.”

The attack in Niger follows a similar attack in December when about 300 schoolboys were abducted in Katsina, north-west Nigeria, sparking outrage at rising insecurity in recent years. The boys were later released, while the government denied widespread reports that the gunmen, who were associated with Boko Haram, were paid a ransom. The frequency and ease with which armed groups have staged attacks in north-west Nigeria have caused growing dismay. Despite several air raids and army operations, the groups remain a potent threat in many parts of northern Nigeria. Some local governments have signed controversial and obscure “peace deals” with the groups, with some admitting to having paid or offered assistance to insurgents. Yet attacks have remained commonplace.

Earlier this month, bandits abducted more than 20 passengers from a bus in the town of Zungeru, 50km from where the schoolboys were taken on Wednesday. In a video released by the gunmen according to local reports, distressed victims are surrounded by assailants with a rocket-launcher and rifles, and are made to plead with the government to pay 500m naira (\$1.3m) in ransom.

In recent years, attacks have also increased over Nigeria’s porous border with Niger, with refugees fleeing further and further into the country. The lack of rural security and the protection offered by a vast and mineral-rich forest has provided the conditions

for armed groups to thrive. While “banditry” encompasses a range of criminal activity allied to various non-ethnic and ethnic factors, many of the recent large-scale armed attacks are suspected to have been carried out by Fulani assailants. According to Amnesty International, 1,126 people were killed by bandits between January and June last year.

The threat from banditry has grown complicated by increasing associations with jihadists, still waging an 11-year insurgency in the country’s north-east. Many fear jihadists are increasingly active in north and central Nigeria, courting associations with thriving armed groups. In December, Boko Haram claimed responsibility for the abductions in Kankara. While the attack was carried out by bandits, the association between the two armed groups caused widespread alarm. In April 2014, Boko Haram kidnapped 276 girls from their school dormitory in Chibok, in north-eastern Borno state. About 100 of the girls are still missing. The group has also carried out kidnappings of other school children as well as thousands of people across north-east Nigeria (Table 1).

Table 1 Some selected records of Herdsmen, Banditry and Kidnapped activities in Schools

Name	Date	Location	Deaths	Notes
Yobe State school shooting	2013-07-06	Mamudo government secondary school	30	Suspected Boko Haram terrorists killed at least 41 children and one teacher
Federal Government College Buni Yadi Attacks	2014-02-25	Federal Government College Buni Yadi, Yobe State	59	Islamist gunmen killed 59 students at a boarding school in Yobe State.
2014 Kano Booming	2014-06-23	Kano, Nigeria	200+	Dozens of people were killed in a bomb blast at Kano State School of Hygiene. The blast was attributed to militant group Boko Haram by the locals.
Katsina State	12/12 2020	Kankara	800	800 schoolboys were abducted in Katsina, north-west Nigeria
Abuja, Nigeria	17 Feb 2021	Abuja, Nigeria	42	Armed men have kidnapped at least 42 people, including 27 students, from a secondary school in central Nigeria’s Niger state, according to officials.
Niger State	17 Feb 2021	Government Science College (GSC) in Kagara Town	42	27 students, three teachers and a dozen family members of school staff, 42 people in total, were taken. Earlier reports had indicated hundreds were missing from the school of about 1,000 students.

Source: Human Right Watch Report (2021) and Mbah(2021)

Conclusion

Nigeria national security ambience has been quite tense and volatile over the years. While the North East is still under the siege of Boko Haram, the North West is steadily sliding into the morass of rural banditry. Just like Boko Haram insurgency, rural banditry in northwestern Nigeria has metamorphosed from a sporadic onset to a rapid upsurge in the recent years. Again, quite like the insurgents, the bandits have become not only stationary but also sedentary in the frontiers and hinterlands of the North West. The consequence has been massive plundering and carnage, which has plunged the region into a sort of humanitarian eschatology. This study sought to explore the threat of rural banditry in Northwestern Nigeria against the rising incidence of the menace in that context. The study observed that Herdsmen, Banditry and Kidnapped in the areas have festered under a socio existential condition characterized by spatiotemporal governance deficits. The existence of scarcely governed hinterlands, borderlines and forestlands, as well as poorly regulated mining and transhumance sectors, has created an enduring atmosphere of criminal opportunism in the focal area. The situation has been complicated by the incidence of arms proliferation arising from the under controlled local and transnational arms markets. Consequently, there has been a high incidence of village raids, highway robberies, kidnapping and cattle rustling in the area with attendant human security implications. Mitigating this challenge has been quite herculean.

Suggestions

The paper has the following points to be used to address the issues of insecurity in Nigeria:

1. The study therefore believes that the problem of insecurity in North West and parts of states deserves serious governmental attention. The current efforts of various state governments are welcome, but such efforts will not be successful without genuine stakeholder participation and involvement.
2. Federal government which has exclusive role on providing effective security by ensuring providing adequate security personnel with full training and working tools and also should make room for the inclusion of all layers of stakeholders. In evolving developmental plans for the region, efforts should be made to check the rising cases of benefit capture, whereby the real trickledown development benefits are captured by vested interest and elites while the people are left out. Available development agencies for the region should be strictly monitored to stem the rising case of corruption that has always been the hallmark of such agencies. Doing these will help to build the capacity of every stakeholder, as well as engaging them in meaningful developmental activities.

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Chapter 9

The Perceived Effect of Banditry and Kidnapping on National Development in Nigeria

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Abstract

Nigeria as a nation is beset with a lot of security problems such as banditry and kidnapping. The paper establishes the fact that the activities of banditry and kidnapping has poses a threat to national in Nigeria. The paper has introduction, theoretical framework of Frustration aggression theory, banditry and kidnapping in Nigeria, causes of banditry and kidnapping in Nigeria. effect/consequences of banditry and kidnapping in Nigeria, conclusion and suggestions such as the Nigerian Government shall come up with poverty alleviation programmes and employment opportunities, targeting youths who are mostly involved in abductions and kidnappings out of economic frustration, such as unemployment, poverty alleviation programmes should also be directed towards addressing high incidence of poverty among women and children who are vulnerable segment of the population mostly kidnapped by terrorists or insurgents and trapped by organised criminals, ending up in abduction for force labour, effectively combat kidnapping, the government shall also fight insurgency because the various insurgent groups in the northern and southern parts of the country are all resorting to kidnapping of innocent population in their efforts to further their causes, anti-terrorism programmes should be made side-by-side with anti-banditry and kidnapping programmes in Nigeria, foreign governments should also participate in the war on banditry and kidnapping in Nigeria because the activity is a transnational crime usually involving movement out of the country, non-governmental organisations should also be part of the war on banditry and kidnapping in Nigeria and neighbouring states, through awareness creation programmes, the law enforcement agents, such as the police as well as other agencies meant for anti-human trafficking shall also intensify surveillance on the fight against banditry and kidnapping. They shall be receiving special trainings on how to identify victims of banditry and kidnapping and be able to take them from the kidnappers without them being hurt and constitutionally, there is need for severe penalties against kidnappers. This might serve as deterrence for those already involved and those willing to be involved.

Keywords: Perceived Effect, Banditry, Kidnapping and National Development

Introduction

Banditry refers to the incidences of armed robbery or allied violent crimes, such as kidnapping, cattle rustling, and village or market raids. It involves the use of force, or threat to that effect, to intimidate a person or a group of persons in order to rob, rape or kill (Okoli and Okpaleke 2014). Economic or political interests motivate banditry.

The former refers to banditries motivated by the imperative of material accumulation while the latter has to do with those driven by the quest to rob, to assault or to liquidate a person or a group of persons based on political or ideological considerations.

Kidnapping is one among the current major social problems that are negatively affecting the free movement of people and the socio-economic development of the country. Kidnapping which is mostly common in the southern parts of the country is now very popular in the Northern parts of the country due to different dimension of armed conflicts such as ethno-religious conflicts, farmers-herders conflict, Boko Haram insurgency among others. Most of the conflicts that have resulted to the proliferation of the evil known as kidnapping in Nigeria are mostly instigated by "entrepreneurs who are gaining from the conflicts either directly or indirectly. The menace of the proliferation of kidnapping has brought along with it problems of insecurity of lives and properties and a general fall in the number of economic activities as a result of the fear of the unforeseen. The acts known as kidnapping is considered by Okoli and Orinya, (2013) as organized crime. Kidnapping varies from country to country; therefore, the term is uncertain and devoid of any straight jacket definition. That is, it depends on who is defining it and from what perspective and for what purpose. They viewed kidnapping as unlawful seizure and detention of a person by force against his/her will.

Kidnapping can be defined as the act of seizing and detaining or carrying away a person by unlawful force or by fraud, and often with a demand for ransom. For an act to be deemed kidnapping, it must involve coercive movement of a victim from one place to another, detention or seizure of that person be it a child or an adult. Kidnapping is usually motivated by financial gain or political benefit. Thus, opportunist or regular criminals as well as political opponents can resort to kidnapping in order to illegally obtain economic benefits or have their demands granted. In many cases, kidnapping is a 'business' involving a demand for ransom which may vary considerably, depending on the victim's personal status. Kidnapping is on the increase in Nigeria. In Nigeria there are more than 1,000 kidnapping incidents reported in a year, and there are undoubtedly many that are unreported.

According to Tolu and Abe (2011:238), national development is the 'the overall development or a collective socio-economic, political as well as religious advancement of a country or nation'. It refers to a phenomenon that embraces a whole nation. National development therefore can be described as the overall development or a collective socio-economic, political as well as religious advancement of a country or nation. This is best achieved through development planning, which can be described as the country's collection of strategies mapped out by the government.

Theoretical Framework

Frustration aggression theory

Frustration aggression theory: This theory as propounded by Breuer and Elson (2017) stipulates that aggression is as a result of frustration which results from an

individual's inability to attain their goals. Accordingly, insurgency is the product of aggressive behaviour which results from issues such as poverty and unemployment among others. Applying this to the study, banditry and kidnapping in the country has resulted in abject poverty, unemployment, environmental degradation, injustice, absence of infrastructure, ethnic conflicts, and militancy.

Banditry and Kidnapping in Nigeria

Kidnapping in Nigeria started in the Niger Delta region because of resource struggle, and environmental damage occasioned by crude oil exploration in the area. Moreover, kidnapping remains one of the elements of militancy in the Niger Delta. From the Niger Delta region, kidnapping has spread across the Nigeria. Banditry and kidnapping in Nigeria is usually for either financial or political benefit. Victims were originally foreign oil workers, but today many are locals, often employees of international oil and oil service companies, and not necessarily wealthy; anyone whose family might pay a ransom can be targeted.

In January 2012, kidnappers abducted a US citizen from his vehicle in the Delta and killed his security guard. In April 2012, criminals kidnapped a US national in Imo State and a Spanish citizen in Enugu State in separate incidents. In May 2012, criminals kidnapped an Italian national in Kwara State. On the 7 May a Lebanese national was kidnapped in Kaduna State and his Lebanese colleague was mercilessly killed during the abduction. More on the kidnapping incidences in Nigeria, it was also reported that two engineers (one British and one Italian) were killed by their captors in March 2012 when Nigerian security forces, with support from Britain, attempted to rescue them. They had been held by elements of the Islamic fundamentalist group Boko Haram for ten months.

Aside from Niger Delta militants, Boko Haram members equally kidnap foreign nationals for ransom. On 14th April, 2014 the sect kidnapped 250 female students from Government Girl's Secondary School Chibok Borno State. Boko Haram kidnappings in Nigeria targeted Western nationals, Christians and government officials. It is active in the northern states, primarily Kano, Katsina, Yobe, Bauchi and Borno.

According to According to Human Right Watch Report (2021) there were chaotic scenes at the school on Saturday as desperate parents and security personnel gathered to search for about half of the school's 800 students who were still missing, one parent and a school employee told Reuters. Katsina, the home state of Nigeria's president, Muhammadu Buhari, is plagued by violent bandits who regularly attack local people and kidnap for ransom. Attacks by Islamist militants are common in north-eastern parts of the country. Violence and insecurity across Nigeria have enraged citizens, particularly after scores of farmers were killed some beheaded by Islamist militants in the north-eastern Borno state late last month.

According to Mbah (2021) dozens of schoolchildren, teachers and their relatives have been abducted by gunmen in central Nigeria after an attack on a boarding school, the latest in a rising wave of mass abductions and attacks that have beset the country. A

spokesperson for the Niger state government said 27 students, three teachers and a dozen family members of school staff, 42 people in total, were taken. Earlier reports had indicated hundreds were missing from the school of about 1,000 students.

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Killings, sexual violence and mass kidnappings for ransom have risen sharply, including on schools. The state governor on Wednesday ordered the closure of all boarding schools in areas at risk from bandit attacks. A spokesperson for the Nigerian president, Muhammadu Buhari, who is increasingly vilified for rising insecurity forcing him to recently replace all the armed forces chiefs, said: “Our prayers are with the families of the victims of this attack. Following these reports, the president has directed the armed forces and police to ensure immediate and safe return of all the captives.”

The attack in Niger follows a similar attack in December when about 300 schoolboys were abducted in Katsina, north-west Nigeria, sparking outrage at rising insecurity in recent years. The boys were later released, while the government denied widespread reports that the gunmen, who were associated with Boko Haram, were paid a ransom. The frequency and ease with which armed groups have staged attacks in north-west Nigeria have caused growing dismay. Despite several air raids and army operations, the groups remain a potent threat in many parts of northern Nigeria. Some local governments have signed controversial and obscure “peace deals” with the groups, with some admitting to having paid or offered assistance to insurgents. Yet attacks have remained commonplace.

Earlier this month, bandits abducted more than 20 passengers from a bus in the town of Zungeru, 50km from where the schoolboys were taken on Wednesday. In a video released by the gunmen according to local reports, distressed victims are surrounded by assailants with a rocket-launcher and rifles, and are made to plead with the government to pay 500m naira (\$1.3m) in ransom.

In recent years, attacks have also increased over Nigeria’s porous border with Niger, with refugees fleeing further and further into the country. The lack of rural security and the protection offered by a vast and mineral-rich forest has provided the conditions for armed groups to thrive. While “banditry” encompasses a range of criminal activity allied to various non-ethnic and ethnic factors, many of the recent large-scale armed attacks are suspected to have been carried out by Fulani assailants.

According to Amnesty International, 1,126 people were killed by bandits between January and June last year.

The threat from banditry has grown complicated by increasing associations with jihadists, still waging an 11-year insurgency in the country's north-east. Many fear jihadists are increasingly active in north and central Nigeria, courting associations with thriving armed groups. In December, Boko Haram claimed responsibility for the abductions in Kankara. While the attack was carried out by bandits, the association between the two armed groups caused widespread alarm. In April 2014, Boko Haram kidnapped 276 girls from their school dormitory in Chibok, in north-eastern Borno state. About 100 of the girls are still missing. The group has also carried out kidnappings of other schoolchildren as well as thousands of people across north-east Nigeria.

Causes of Banditry and Kidnapping in Nigeria

The causes of banditry and kidnapping in Nigeria are many and different because the crime takes place for various reasons. However, the two underlying reasons for which banditry and kidnappings occur in Nigeria are political bargaining and economic gain. However, beyond these two reasons, persons are kidnapped and abducted by criminals for various reasons, such as for adoption, illicit intercourse, marriage, prostitution, ransom, revenge, sale, selling body parts, slavery, unlawful activity, murder and for other purposes. According to Abdulkabir (2017) the following are Causes of Banditry and Kidnapping in Nigeria. They are as followed:

Poverty and Unemployment:

In Nigeria and many other developing countries of Africa and Asia, political factors, poverty, unemployment among the youths are also playing fundamental role in the rise of kidnapping. In criminal kidnapping, the intention is to obtain a ransom from the family or business of the victim.

Political Weapon:

On the other hand, in political kidnapping, the main aim is to further the political aims of a particular political group or movement. In this case, a ransom is usually demanded to obtain money for the group to fund their activities. In addition, religious and other political extremists use kidnapping as political weapons and as a means of financing their activities.

Perceived Economic Deprivation and Greed

Economic deprivation and a sense of desperation have planted the seeds of banditry and kidnapping as a way of getting money in poor communities. It can then become a way of life, even when legal options become available. The disparity between rich and poor is growing, and thanks to the internet and global media, everyone can see how the rich are living. It fuels resentment and a desire for a bigger share.

Effect/Consequences of Banditry and Kidnapping in Nigeria

According to Bello and Jamilu (2017) the following are the effect/consequences of banditry and kidnapping in Nigeria.

Psychological Trauma:

Concerning child kidnapping, not only does forceful removal of a child from his/her family traumatizes the victim, it also unsettles the lives of his/her parents, family, and community. Victim's families often talk about their inability to settle while knowing that their family member was somewhere else and of feeling constantly depressed and ill. Some victim's relatives become dependent on pills and alcohol, feel suicidal, are unable to function properly, feel helpless, feeling as if they have lost their children forever.

Sexual Abuse and STDs:

Child sexual abuse as a result of kidnapping also exposes child to the risk of contracting sexually transmitted diseases. Another guised form of sexual molestation of kidnapped children is that the abducted under age victims are often subjected to forced marriage with older men. The child brides are married to older, more sexually experienced men with whom it is difficult to negotiate safe sexual behaviours.

Financial Effect

Aside from psychological trauma on the victim and the victim's family, kidnapping is also accompanied with huge economic or financial loss for the victims and their families.

Conclusion

Although kidnapping in Nigeria started in Niger Delta, today, it is prevalent across all the geopolitical zones. In Nigeria, criminal gangs kidnap foreigners to seek for ransom in order to finance their violent movement. Opportunist criminals also commit kidnapping for ransom. In the Northern parts of the country, Boko Haram and other gang gangs are reported to have committed large scale kidnapping. The causes of banditry and kidnapping in Nigeria include poverty, greed, unemployment etc.

Suggestions

The paper made the following suggestions in order to address the banditry and kidnapping correlates and by implication to provide the opportunity for reducing banditry and kidnapping in Nigeria. The suggestions will task government, foreign governments, NGOs, communities, families and the vulnerable groups in devising various measures toward fighting banditry and kidnapping.

1. The Nigerian Government shall come up with poverty alleviation programmes and employment opportunities, targeting youths who are mostly involved in abductions and kidnappings out of economic frustration, such as unemployment.
2. Poverty alleviation programmes should also be directed towards addressing high incidence of poverty among women and children who are vulnerable segment of the population mostly kidnapped by terrorists or insurgents and trapped by organised criminals, ending up in abduction for force labour.

3. To effectively combat kidnapping, the government shall also fight insurgency because the various insurgent groups in the northern and southern parts of the country are all resorting to kidnapping of innocent population in their efforts to further their causes.
4. Anti-terrorism programmes should be made side-by-side with anti-banditry and kidnapping programmes in Nigeria.
5. Foreign governments should also participate in the war on banditry and kidnapping in Nigeria because the activity is a transnational crime usually involving movement out of the country.
6. Non-governmental organisations should also be part of the war on banditry and kidnapping in Nigeria and neighbouring states, through awareness creation programmes.
7. The law enforcement agents, such as the police as well as other agencies meant for anti-human trafficking shall also intensify surveillance on the fight against banditry and kidnapping. They shall be receiving special trainings on how to identify victims of banditry and kidnapping and be able to take them from the kidnappers without them being hurt.
8. Constitutionally, there is need for severe penalties against kidnappers. This might serve as deterrence for those already involved and those willing to be involved.

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Chapter 10

The Effects of Farmers-Herders Conflict on Inter-Communal Relations in Barkin Ladi Local Government Area of Plateau State, Nigeria

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Abstract

Inter-communal relations are important aspect of inter-communal living because they build trust and foster cooperation, leading to development in the society. It is, however, unfortunate that relations are always affected in the event of any conflict. Recent developments in Barkin Ladi Local Government Area (LGA) have shown a spiral decline in inter-communal relations with an attendant increase in the spate of conflict between farmers and herders. The preponderance of the latter developments has led to some gruesome and devastating effects on lives and property of the belligerent parties. This paper, therefore, examines the effects of this conflict, at this point, not only on lives and property, but also on the relationship between the conflicting parties. Four critical spheres of inter-communal relations – inter-marriage, inter-communal trade, mix settlements and joint celebration of festivities, were examined and the study found that inter-communal marriage and festivities hitherto in practice between these communities have stopped. The study also revealed that some trade practices that used to take place at the interior quarters of the community no longer exist and this has resulted into a more segregated form of settlement in the locality. This paper, therefore, concludes that a genuine desire for peace in the community will require a concerted effort at restoring inter-communal relations in spite of the loss suffered in the course of the conflict, as this could build trust and restore peace in the community.

Keywords: Inter-communal relations, cooperation, society, conflict, farmers and herders

Introduction

There is no gainsaying that most contemporary communities in Nigeria are plural, comprising people of different cultural, traditional, religious, occupational and historical backgrounds. The reasons for such mixed settlements could be trade relations and search for conducive environment that suits a group's vocation. It could also be an aftermath of colonial land partitioning which the colonialists did for ease of administration. Mixed settlement could also be a consequent of inter-communal disputes. This occurs when a group is pushed out (as a result of war or conflict) from one community and settles at the fringes of the inhabitant of another community. However, the plurality of a society does not automatically translate to a society that is prone to conflict. Conflict inciting factors such as goals incompatibility and perceived marginalisation of one group by the other have to come into play before such plural societies could be conflictual (Ojiji, 2016).

Historically, plural African communities are replete with both cooperation and conflict. The prime promoter of cooperation is the general African value of 'hospitality'. According to Columbus (2014) this value prompts Africans to easily accommodate strangers to the extent of providing cultivable land for them with the hope that when they would be leaving, they would revert them back to the owners. Another reason for this practice of accommodation and cooperation was the economic benefits derivable and the peaceful ambience it tends to foster. Essentially, plural societies depict accommodation and cooperation in several ways in the course of their interaction. It was common to behold cases of inter marriages between members of different groups; habitation in close proximity to the point of mutually relishing cultural foods. Increasingly, it was common to see them engaging in inter-group or inter-communal trade (Blench, 2003 and Gatawa, 2013) and jointly celebrate each other's festivities - either cultural or religious.

Observably, contemporary reality shows that these relationships are waxing cold. Harmonious coexistence among hitherto peaceful plural societies such as Barkin Ladi has become a mirage. This is exemplified in the farmers-herders and other forms of conflicts that have doted the Nigerian Landscape. Researchers such as Blench (2003) and Abbass (2012) have posited that the farmers-herders conflicts erupt as a result of the depletion of resources needed by the farmers and herders communities to sustain their livelihood. However, others such as Gefu and Kolawole (2002) and Williams (2005) perceive that the multiple usage, which these resources are put into, put pressure on the resources. Given that the resource is depleting but its users are on the increase, it therefore resulted to scarcity, hence some users conceived the need to eliminated other resource users from the community so as to free some resources and reduce scarcity and pressure (Gefu and Kolawole, 2002 & Williams, 2005 & Higazi, 2011). Resource scarcity could be caused by varied factors, which include population increase, which reduces the share of available resource per capital. Another factor capable of causing scarcity is climate change (Homer-Dixon, 1994), which reduces the quality and quantity of available resources such as land.

The devastating effect of this conflict has led to the loss of lives and property. This study, however, looked into how farmers-herders conflict in Barkin Ladi has led to the deterioration of different aspects of relationships and how these various aspects of relationship could be turned around to serve as solution to the mistrust and broken relationships resulting from the conflict. The scope of the study was from 2001-2017 and was restricted to Barkin Ladi Local Government Area. It is pertinent to note, however, that despite an avalanche of research on farmers-herders conflict in Nigeria, little attention, seems to be focused on the impact of such conflict on inter-communal relation. Many of such had focused on the causes of the conflict while a few others focused on the effects of the conflict on cattle and human lives, farms and houses. This study fills this gap by looking at a rarely charted territory of how farmers-herders conflicts have affected inter-communal relation in Barkin Ladi Local Government Area of Plateau State.

Methodology

This study adopted a case study research design and used both primary and secondary sources of data. It evaluated the consequences of the actions, reactions and the relationship between the belligerent groups against the backdrop of the indicators of inter-communal relation as adopted from the work of Gatawa (2013). The study area was Barkin Ladi Local Government Area, one of the 17 Local Government Areas in Plateau State (Figure 1). Created in 1976, the Local Government Area has an estimated population of 179, 805 (National Bureau of Statistics, 2012). The study focused on the population of farmers and herders in Barkin Ladi area as the study population and adopted purposive and random sampling techniques. The sampled population included 25 respondents, which comprised 12 key informants, 5 In-depth Interviews and 8 respondents in a Focus Group Discussion. Data was collected with the help of a structured interview guide, which ensured that responses bordering on the indicators of inter-communal relations were elicited. Data elicited was analysed thematically.




Figure 1: Map of Barkin Ladi

Source: Adapted from Maciak, Barbara, Babaniyi, Olu and Combating Childhood Communicable Diseases (CCCD) Staff (1991). Facility Assessment Survey Barkin Ladi.

Theoretical Frameworks

This study adopted two theories - the Frustration-Aggression theory and the Environmental Scarcity theory - to explain farmers-herders conflict in Barkin-Ladi. John Dollard et al espoused the former in 1939 whereas Thomas F. Homer-Dixon espoused the latter in 1994. The Frustration-Aggression theory, however, was later expanded and refined by Miller-1941, Berkowitz-1962 and Yates-1962 (Faleti, 2016). However, the most cited version of the theory in recent and current research is the one espoused by Berkowitz (Breuer & Elson, 2017). In its original form as hypothesized by Dollard et al (1941), this theory contends that the existence of aggression presupposes that there was frustration. It also portrayed the reverse to be true. That is, frustration leads to aggression. However, in restricting the boundary condition of the hypothesis, Berkowitz opined that frustration in itself does not automatically lead to, neither is it the only source of aggression. Rather, there must be the impact of mediating factors such as 'negative affect' before aggressive inclinations can be developed by the victim of frustration. Berkowitz further opined that there could be other sources of aggression such as insult and anxiety. The mediating factors, according to Berkowitz cited in Breuer & Elson (2017), are the proximate causes of aggression. They include anger, sadness, contempt, disgust, and other forms of emotion distress. Frustration in general term could occur when people are denied access to what they believe ordinarily ought to be their entitlement. It could also occur when people's gains are far lower than what their expectations were. Faleti (2016) puts it thus; frustration is the difference between "expected need satisfaction" and "actual need satisfaction." He further posited that where expectation does not meet attainment, there is likelihood or tendency for the aggrieved party to confront anybody they feel was responsible for hampering the attainment of their desired goals.

Frustration-aggression theory explains the farmers-herders conflict in Barkin Ladi LGA in the sense that, both parties feel that due to their type of occupation and long stay in Barkin Ladi, land resource in the area is their entitlement. The farmers feel that by virtue of being the first Barkin Ladi immigrant they own the land, therefore, there should be no further cut on the limited available resource, which the land itself offers. They feel that Fulani herders' encroachment on their land is a hindrance to benefiting from the land resources, hence, their aggressiveness towards the Fulani herders. The Fulani on the other hand feel that the Birom farmers have become barriers to accessing pastureland and water points, hence their aggressiveness.

Similarly, the Environmental Scarcity theory states that Environmental Change, solely, or in combination with Population Growth and Unequal Resource Access, cause(s) conflict in the society. Environmental Change, according to Homer-Dixon (1994), is the change in the quality and quantity of renewable resources such as arable land, water, fisheries, and forest. He further posited that when these resources are limited, conflict among their major users is bound to ensue because each group would want to amass the available limited resources to the exclusion of others. Homer-Dixon termed conflicts that arise from resource scarcity as 'Simple-scarcity Conflict' or 'Resource War'.

Most herders in Barkin Ladi are migrants from the northern part of Nigeria who moved to the southern part of the country due to harsh and unfriendly environmental changes affecting the north because of desert encroachment and acute rainfall (Blench, 2003). The Middle-Belt has therefore become a settlement harbour for the herders.

Causes of the Farmers-Herders Conflict in Nigeria

There have been several cases of farmers-herders conflict across various states and locations in Nigeria. These conflicts have become threatening to Nigeria's unity such that the relationship between farmers and herders across the various parts of the country is degenerating to carnage. Lives and property have been lost due to this conflict. Nzeh (2015), however, posited that prior to the prevalence of the conflict, the Fulani herders had a peaceful and symbiotic relationship with the farmers. He further stated that the reason for this symbiotic relationship was that there was sufficient land for both farmers and herders, given the subsistent nature of farming and few numbers of cows. Their cordiality was protracted until when factors such as population growth, resource scarcity, change in farming techniques and change in crop production (from food crops to cash crops), which were non-fodder producing crops, became prominent. Nzeh (2015), nevertheless, asserted that, before the farmers-herders conflict became this frosty, there were some rare cases of cattle encroachment on farms, which were usually resolved amicably by the imposition of fine against the culprit(s).

Among several causes of farmers-herders conflict, Adisa and Adekunle (2010); Abbass (2012); Nformi *et al.* (2014) and Abdulsalam *et al.* (2015) found that land related causes accounted for the highest percentage of the conflict. Moreover, Merietus and Olarewaju (2009) were more factual when they reported the incidents of land-related conflict in Benue State. They opined that, land-related matters accounted for the highest percent (42.9%) of conflict in the state, followed by political (32.08%) and chieftaincy matters (28.3). Corroborating this assertion, Conroy (2014) opined that social, political, and economic dimensions of land-related conflicts are very important to note for a proper analysis of the conflicts. He then attributed land scarcity, competition, and conflicts in Nigeria to colonial land partitioning between the North and the South.

On the contrary, Ofuoku (2009) and Ofuoku & Isife (2009) cited land-related competition as one of the minor causes of farmers-herders conflict. They opined that the major causes of the conflict are the destruction of crops and cattle rustling. On a different note, Gefu and Kolawole (2002) and Williams (2005) discovered that it is the varied usages that land (as a resource) is put into that causes conflict and not necessarily its scarcity. They opined that land is the major factor of production for farmers, fishermen, pastoralist, hunters, industrialists, *et cetera*. Hence, different types of conflicts involving these varied resource users ensue - for example farmers-herders conflicts, fishermen-farmers conflicts and fishermen-herders conflict.

Contradicting the findings of Ofem and Inyang (2014), which depicted that pastoralists farmland encroachment is the cause of farmers-herders conflict, Nformi, *et al.* (2014) and Muhammed, Ismaila and Bibi (2015) discovered that expansion of farmland by farmers, instead, led to the encroachment of grazing routes. Nformi *et al.* (2014) further opined that some time past, the Fulani considered any land that was not cultivated as potential pastureland, nonetheless, with the expansion in agriculture, pasture land became scarce, thereby compelling the pastoralists to encroach farms that were cultivated on purported Fulani grazing routes.

A form of ethnic dimension to the farmers-herders conflict was revealed by Conroy (2014). He found that the different practices of land tenure system by the farmers and herders communities are the causes of their conflict. He opined that, the Herders view land as a common resource, which cannot be personalised. On the other hand, the farmers practice private land tenure system, which frowns at encroachment. These contradicting conceptions and practices of land tenure systems are, according to Conroy, the reasons for farmers-herders conflicts.

Gefu and Kolawole (2002); Shettima and Tar (2008); Ofuoku (2009); Nyong (2010); Abbass (2012); Odoh and Chigozie (2012); Adisa (2012); Nformi (2014) and Mwamfupe (2015) disclosed that population explosion and urbanisation are some of the major causes of farmers-herders conflict in Nigeria. They maintained that population explosion leads to more demand for food and farm produce, hence, more demand for land by the farmers to increase yield, consequently, farmers encroach livestock route in their bid to enlarge their farm size. It therefore, leaves the herders with no choice than to lead their cows into routes (farms) they believe were meant for livestock.

Closely related to the issue of population is urbanisation. This is mostly caused by population growth. Urbanisation in this context simply means the taking over of hitherto farmlands and grazing land by modern houses and industrial buildings in a bid to transform village settlements to urban areas. This process seems benign but the consequence is that it reduces the quantity and quality of land available to the farmers and the herders (Homer-Dixon, 1994).

Segun and Jegede (2013) are of the opinion that a mono-causal explanation cannot suit the analysis of ethnic or communal violence. Thus, they adopted an 'eclectic approach' in the analysis of Jos conflicts. The findings of this study depicts that dispute over ownership of Jos, ethnicity, political factors, religious factors and youth unemployment are the causes of violent conflicts in the area. They maintained that the use of an eclectic approach is important because it buttresses the fact that its solution does not lie in one-all-important factor but in the combination of solutions to the varied factors that caused the conflict.

Contrary to the findings of some scholars (Blench, 1984, Abbas, 2012, Odoh and Chigozie, 2012 and Nzeh, 2015), Higazi (2011) is of the opinion that farmers-herders conflict, precisely the case of Jos, was not a function of arable land scarcity but a

struggle for political dominance. Higazi (2011) posited that ethnic and religious discrimination in allocating political positions meted out to the 'Jasawas' – Hausa Settlers, and fear of cultural and religious domination on the part of the indigenes were the major causes of conflict recurrence in Jos.

According to Blench (2004) and Higazi (2011) the spread of religious and ethnic conflict from the capital city, which resonated in rural areas, was the causal factor of farmers-herders conflict. They further posited that in two separate incidents in 2002 and 2010, conflict from the central town of Jos trickled down to the villages, thereby affecting the Fulani in the villages. They then submitted that the aftermath of those incidents prompted reprisal attacks and counter attacks.

The debate about the causes of farmers-herders conflict in Nigeria or precisely Plateau State could go on without end. One thing is, however, certain. Its effect is taking a toll on the country and its citizens. Recent cases of the farmers-herders conflict in Barkin Ladi, Bokkos and Riyom in Plateau State; Logo in Benue State; Nimbo in Enugu State and the alleged setting of fire on the farm of Chief Olu Falae (*Vanguard*, 22nd January, 2018), indicate a new twist to this menace. It also affirms the fact that the conflict is becoming a threat to the country as a whole (Oyeyipo, James & Sanda, 2015). More recent cases include Zamfara and Taraba killings and cattle rustling, the alleged attacks on a woman and her 200 acre of farmland in Ondo (*Vanguard*, 29th March, 2018). Others are the alleged destruction of a cassava farm worth over N6.8 million in Ogun (*Vanguard*, 5th & 25th January, 2018); kidnapping in Igangan in Oyo state, farm destruction in Ondo state by suspected herders in Ondo State; (*Punch*, 12th December, 2020 & *Vanguard*, 19th January, 2021) just to mention but a few. These cases pose great threat to the peaceful co-existence of the different ethnic nationalities in Nigeria at large.

Migration and Practices of the Fulani Herders in Nigeria

The Fulani herders bear different names such as *Fula*, *Fellalh*, *Peuls* and *Fulbe*. However, the Hausa and the British call them *Fulani*. They, nonetheless, refer to themselves as the Fulbe (Abdulrahman et al, 2015). They are pastoral group that herd their flock in savanna regions such as the Middle-Belt of Nigeria. This is, nevertheless, not to generalise that the Fulani are the only herders in Nigeria. There are other herding communities such as the Kanembu, the kwoya, the Manga, the Shuwa, the Yedina and the Uled Suleiman, but the Fulani are the largest herding community with the largest ownership of livestock. They account for about 90% of the nation's stock and have an estimated population of 18.7 million (Blench, 2010; Eniola, cited in Abbass, 2012; Majekodunmi, Fajinmi, Dongkum, Shaw & Welbum, 2014; and Muhammed, Ismaila & Bibi, 2015).

It is believed among some Fulani, as documented by Muhammadu Bello (the second Sultan of Sokoto) in his book "*Infaq a Mairisu*", that the Fulani have Canaanite origin and descended from an Arab missionary by the name Uqba bin Nafi. Bello further revealed that the reason why the Fulani are not as fair-skinned as their ancestor is because he got married to a black woman, whence came the Fulani (Abdulrahman et

al., 2015). Okere, cited in Abdulrahman *et al.* (2015) affirmed that the Fulani's ancestors were miscegyne, meaning, they are products of crossbreeding between a Negro group and nomadic Berber herdsmen of the Sahara.

Lush pasture land and receptive environment in Nigeria attracted some of the Fulani herders (mostly the Adamawa Fulani) into the country via northern Cameroon to Borno. Their time of immigration, however, was in the 16th or 17th centuries (Blench, 1994 and 2003 & Abdulrahman *et al.*, 2015). According to Yakubu, cited in Abdulrahman *et al.* (2015) these Fulani herders came in from Futa Toro through Borno, from where they dispersed to other places like Adamawa. Bruce, cited in Blench (2004) further traced their journey (in 1900) to Tafawa Balewa in Bauchi State and then to Plateau State via Gindiri in Mangu Local Government Area of Plateau State. They then moved further to Barkin Ladi. Meanwhile, there were some groups of Fulani herders who migrated to places like Niger, Kano, Katsina and Sokoto States while others migrated from other places and settled in Plateau State. These groups were largely drawn by the development in trade routes and communication in Plateau state (Blench, 2004).

The Fulani herders are categorised into two, namely; Fulbe Na'i and Fulbe Sare, meaning, village and town Fulani (Okere cited in Abdulrahman *et al.*, 2015). However, Blench (2003) referred to the town Fulbe as 'Fulbe Wuro'. The 'Village Fulani', according to Okere, are those who do not acculturate, while the 'Town Fulani' acculturate. Similarly, Stenning, cited in Abdulrahman *et al.* (2015), classified them into four categories. This includes the ruling dynasty in Northern Nigeria; the settled Fulani who combine herding and other types of works; the semi-sedentary group who combine herding of cattle with farming and lastly those who depend solely on their cattle for subsistence and livelihood.

A more conventional categorisation of the Fulani in Northern Nigeria is the *Fulanin Gida* and the *Fulanin Daji*, meaning 'Settled Fulani' and 'Wondering Fulani' respectively. The house Fulani are those who have adopted sedentary life style while the bush Fulani are the nomadic. The latter group does not stay in a particular place to ply its trade, rather, it moves from place to place in search for pasture.

It is pertinent to note, as stated by some scholars (Abbass, 2012; Okoli and Atelhe, 2014; Mead cited in Abdulrahman *et al.*, 2015), that the Fulani society holds cattle and the unity of its members in high esteem. Cattle is highly estimable because it determines a person's amount of wealth and social status. Unity among them entails that they help members in need to overcome difficult challenges as a mark of solidarity. The essence of this practice is to elicit the same kind of reaction not only from those who had benefited from such gesture but also from anyone who wants to uphold the unity of the community. Defaulters to uphold the unity of the community are always punished by ostracism, ex-communication or censure ship (Abdulrahman *et al.*, 2015). This is aptly depicted by a Fulani proverb that says *Ko meemi kine fuu meemi gite* (whatever affects the nose, affects the eyes also) (Leger and Mohammed,

2000). Hence, a Fulani is expected to rejoice with those who are rejoicing and commiserate with those who are mourning.

The prime place of unity among the Fulani also manifests itself in the way they resolve conflict. Instead of allocating such power to an individual or a particular group, they rather allow all members of the society to participate (Sa'ad cited in Abdulrahman *et al.*, 2015). The major instrument or mechanism used in resolving conflict in the Fulani community is the instrument of *Pulaaku* (Sa'ad cited in Abdulrahman *et al.*, 2015). This could take the form of ostracising an erring member of the community. It means that the whole community will treat such an individual as an outcast. If, however, *Pulaaku* was meant for another community, it could take the form of severing trade relations and other social activities with such community. The major components of *Pulaaku* are discussed in details below.

Pulaaku

Aside laws that guide the conduct of humans in societies, values also influence their activities. According to Abdulrahman (2015), *Pulaaku* is an important code of conduct of the Fulbe that could be explored in both the prevention and resolution of conflict. One would want to surmise that laws are put in place in order to help achieve societal values. *Pulaaku*, in this respect, is a societal value that is held in high esteem among the Fulani. Aside serving as a code of conduct, *Pulaaku* is also an instrument used by the Fulani community to prevent and manage conflict. However, argued Abdulrahman, this same instrument could be seen as a double-edged sword, because it could also be used to perpetrate or perpetuate conflict.

Pulaaku is a community base instrument of conflict resolution, moral guide, code of conduct and tradition that comprises many tenets depicted or covering all its components (Ezeomah, 1988; Sa'ad, 1999; and Stenning, 1959 cited in Abdulrahman, 2015). These major tenets and their meaning include:

- | | |
|--|--|
| 1. <i>Fulfulde</i> : Fulani Language | 7. <i>Ndottaku</i> : honour that is accumulated with age |
| 2. <i>Semteende</i> : shyness/ reserve | 8. <i>Endam</i> : kindness |
| 3. <i>Munyaal</i> : patience/ endurance | 9. <i>Neddaaku</i> : dignity, care and forethought |
| 4. <i>Hakkil</i> : intelligence/ forethought | 10. <i>Ardunag</i> : leadership |
| 5. <i>Ngoru</i> : bravery | 11. <i>Daraja</i> : prestige |
| 6. <i>Marugo</i> : owning cow | 12. <i>Dewal</i> : service and obedience |
- (Abdulrahman, 2015)

In addition, Abdulrahman (2015) opined that aside comprising code of conduct and values, *Pulaaku* also comprises symbols, which constitute its principles. He further posited that these compositions of *Pulaaku* are hardly understood by an outsider but well understood by an insider. According to him, *Pulaaku* involves respect for nature and animals. Highly embedded in the sub consciousness of the Fulani, because of its nature of transmission (through socialization), *Pulaaku* is very hard to change. It is also motivated by a sense of shame. This entails that they (the Fulani) show respect to

anybody they come across. For example, women give a lot of respect to their husbands

Puulaku Tenets	Meaning	Accompanying proverb	Proverb interpretation	Conventional meaning
Semteende	shamefulness or to be reserve	<i>Koo moye dura Ai yeeso muuAum</i>	Let everyone take care of what is in front of him	everyone should mind his business
<i>Munyal</i>	patience, tolerance or perseverance	<i>No ndiyam luggiri fuu woodi njaareendi</i>	No matter how deep a body of water is, there is fine sand at the bottom	only patience can help one to overcome a protracted suffering
<i>Endam</i>	kindness and affection	<i>KoAo Aum ndiyam ndoggoojam</i>	A visitor is like run-off water	the need to be kind to all visitors, knowing that their stay is always transient
<i>Neddaaku</i>	dignity or self-respect	<i>Ndikka toraaki e wujjuki</i>	It is better to beg than to steal	
<i>Ngorgu</i>	manliness or bravery	<i>GiAAo cokkon colli doole yaaca gi e</i>	, he who goes after birds' nests must be prepared to tread on thorns	life is not a bed of roses

and men in general. Women and children always kneel while greeting men.

Table 1: The four basic tenets of *Pulaaku*

Source: Leger and Mohammed (2000)

However, according to Nwahib (2014) *Pulaaku* consist of four basic tenets (Table 1). These include *Munyal*, *Semteende*, *Hakkile*, *Sagata/Tnaade* - courage and hardwork. In the same vein, Leger and Mohammed (2000) went further by drawing from the rich proverbs of the Fulani to buttress the values of *Pulaaku*. According to them there are about fifteen (15) major components of *Pulaaku*, however, they decided to mention five key components, each accompanied by proverb(s) to affirm their existence.

As earlier stated, *Pulaaku*, as an instrument of conflict resolution could be directed at an individual or a community within or outside the Fulani community. Whether the situation is targeted at the former or the latter, the procedure for its execution is the same. If an individual erred and were to be punished according to the doctrine of *Pulaaku*, it will require the distribution of Kola nut to communicate the execution of *Pulaaku* against such a person. It then means that no member of the community will relate with such a person. In fact, according to Abdulrahman (2015), if such a person gets into the gathering of other Fulani, the gathering will immediately disperse and the victim disserted. Meanwhile, those same set of people that dispersed will

immediately regroup at another location within the view of the victim. This is to communicate to him that his presence among them is forbidden at that particular time. Additionally, people are also not allowed to transact business or engage in any form of relations with such a person. In a similar way, when *Pulaaku* is declared against any community, all ties with such communities will be severed, most especially, trade ties.

Migration and Practices of the Birom Farmers

The major inhabitants of Barkin Ladi are the Birom people, whose pattern of language is of the Niger-Congo, and same as that of the Fulani. According to Gunn (1953) and Ames (1972) this group had been called different names such as Burum, Burrumawa, Burmawa, Berom, Birom, Kibbo, Kibyen and Shosho. Some authorities in Birom history posited that, the name 'Birom', spelled with "I", against the one spelled with "E", means the unclothed people, and is the correct spelling of the name of the ethnic group. According to these authorities some traditions stipulate that the migratory trend of the Birom people was from the South West, near the forest-country, up north to the present west of Plateau.

Tribal traditions say that they once lived much further down to the south or south-west nearer forest-country, that they left there for a no known reason and moved northwards, settling on the plains of Jemaa on the west of the Plateau. This "forest-country may have been somewhere down towards the Benue and, if so, the arrival of the Jukuns or the expansion of their Empire may have been the reason for the migration of this tribe from there to the plains of Jemaa (Ames, 1972:62).

Ames' account contravenes the generally held tradition of the north-south movement of most tribes in the country. However, according to Gunn (1953), this is just the tradition of the origin of the people of Riyom as against other groups. This tradition further states that, they broke into two - the civilised and uncivilised. The civilised were those who used to wear clothes while the uncivilised were those who roam unclad. While the uncivilised moved northward and settled along the fringes of Plateau, and now constitute the people that moved into Plateau, the civilised moved westward. According to Ames (1972), the uncivilised first settled at Oshono and later moved to Rirom (Riyom), from where they moved simultaneously to places like Vom, Haifam (Heipang), Kwi and other places. However, as stated earlier, there are some Birom groups, such as the Ngel, Udu (Du), Rop (Ropp) and the Kuru, whose traditions do not fit into this migratory trend of the larger Birom. In essence, the various groups that formed the Birom ethnic group have different tales of their migration to their present habitat. According to Gunn (1953), the major factor that binds these different groups is language. He stated that they understand each other despite the fact that there is little variation in their tones.

In a Birom settlement, family is the unit of social organisation. It was headed by the oldest man in the family known as *Da Lo* (Gunn, 1953) while the unit of political organisation is the village. The head of the village was a chief who commanded the respect of all the elders in the village. His position was usually hereditary, which is normally from the family of the founder of the village (Ames, 1972). The head of the

whole town is both the spiritual and executive head of the town known as “*Gwom*.” As the spiritual head, he controlled their rituals called *Kwit* and commanded tribal wars as an executive head. The *Gwom* also punished (by imposing fine on) those who infringe the law of the land. This made him the guardian of the laws of the land. The *Gwom* and the elders sometimes settled civil cases, but some cases were rather referred to people that have reputable skill and are fair arbitrators in the matters concerned.

The Birom people hold farming in high esteem, obviously, because it serves as their main source of food throughout the year. According to Ames (1972), family members use to store harvested crops in hut for the food supply of the family – extended family. He further stated that the major food supply of the whole family is the biggest huts in a compound which belonged to the head of the family. Everybody would work at the farm of the head of the family, afterwards, they go on to cultivate their own farms. Otherwise, they would get the labour they needed through a Hausa communal system known as *gayya* (Gunn, 1953). He further stated that this system could fetch them about 50 hands simply by entertaining the labourers with *siring* (beer). Produce stored in the smaller huts, which belonged to the other members of the family would be the first to be consumed before the one belonging to the head of the family, which was usually the last. To ensure bumper harvest, this people performed farm-related rituals (*Kwit*) at different stages of farming, which is indicative of the premium attached to farming by the community.

The system of farming in Birom land was rain-fed and based on the availability of land. Where there was sufficient land they engaged in shifting cultivation but where there was no sufficient land, cultivation could go on for fifteen years at a stretch without shift (Gunn, 1953). It is worthy of note, as stated by Gunn (1953) that, only few (less than one percent) of the grains of the Birom man used to go to the market for sale. However, he would sell most of his root crops. This notwithstanding, what he would release for sale in totality would not be more than two percent of his total farms produce (Gunn, 1953). This is just to buttress that cash crop was just a small quantity of farm produce. This also means that the Birom engaged in subsistence agriculture.

Apart from grains (fonio, tamba, sorghum, maize and millet) other crops commonly grown by the Birom people included Irish and sweet potatoes, cocoyam, yam and variety of vegetables. All this would later reduce with the introduction of new farming technique by the immigrant Hausa. The newly introduced system ensured cultivation throughout the rainy and the dry seasons. This also meant the introduction of new crops such as sugar cane and large-scale potato, and maize cultivation by the Hausa immigrants. The introduction of these new crops, however, did not come without consequences. Chief among the consequences were the straining of relationship between farmers and herders. This is because fodder-producing crops like fonio and sorghum were no longer cultivated in large quantity resulting from their substitution with non-fodder-producing crops. Another consequence is that, ponds that were previously abandoned by the indigenous people, which had been put to use by the Fulani herders as cattle water point became sources of dry season water.

In a similar vein, Gunn (1953) stated that land in Bachit area of Barkin Ladi was either farmed, fallow or 'uncultivable'. All farmed and fallow lands were personally owned while 'uncultivable' lands were nominally the chief's property and could be used by any member of the village. The ordinary members of the society obtained farmlands through heredity as they get married. Farmlands could also be obtained through sale and purchase, temporary lease or pledges. In a situation of dispute over the ownership or transfer of ownership of land through land purchase, the chiefs in court usually weigh the amount paid on the land in order to ascertain if the owners of the land actually sold or pledged it out. Where the amount is discovered to be small, they adjudge the case as ordinary land leasing which could be redeemed. Nevertheless, it would be considered completely sold off where the amount is high.

Concerning the administration of justice, a collection of kin-groups executed criminal cases such as murder, manslaughter and attempted homicide. Cases of private reprisal was condoned in cases of assault, provided it would not lead to the breach of peace in the community. Lynching was the punishment for burglary, but they, at times, would sell the culprits into slavery or make them slaves under the supervision of the *Gwom* (Gunn, 1953). Other crimes and their punishments included indemnities as punishment for injury to livestock, slave trading for slander and resistance to authority, and lastly, reprisal by *Gwom's* men (loyalists) for act of riot against the throne. Cases of disputes were first taken to the *Da Lo*, thereafter, they would be appealed before *Gwom*, then to *Da Gwom* and finally the *Da Gwom Riyom* or *Da Gwom Foron*. The hierarchy for appeal was the same as the political units of organisation in Birom kingdom; save for the addition of the position of the *Da-Manjei* (Ward Head), which according to Davies, cited in Gunn (1953), was a recent development.

Effects of Farmers-Herders Conflicts on Inter-Communal Relation in Barkin Ladi

The farmers-herders conflicts in Barking ladi have, in different ways, affected the lives of people living within the Local Government Area and by extension, some Local Government Areas bordering Barkin Ladi. For the purpose of this study, attention is narrowed to four major areas of inter-communal relations that the conflicts have affected. These include trade, marriage, settlements and festivities (Table 2).

Inter-Communal Trade

The officials of Miyetti Allah Cattle Breeders Association of Nigeria (MACBAN) in Ropp and Gashish districts voiced out the following submissions as the effect of farmers-herders conflict on inter-communal trade. According to them, herders could no longer go to a settlement where farmers are the majority for business transaction. Likewise, the farmers could not do the same at the herders dominated areas. These areas, as stated by the Farmers' head of Ropp district and a Youth leader respondent, are termed 'no-go areas'. According to the Youths leader, if somebody should attach monetary benefit worth millions of naira to the task of visiting some of these 'no-go areas', he would still not be able to chart such territories. He further averred that, "such 'no-go areas' still exist" (Excerpt from an interview with a youths' leader, Mr. Mark David, 23/05/17). Example of these areas include Mahanga and Bisichi in

Gashish and Foron districts respectively (for the herders); Kwok and Rakum in Ropp district (for the farmers). According to the MACBAN official from Gashish, inter-communal trade witnessed setback in places like Gashish district for about two years. Similarly, the chairman of farmers Association in Heipang further posited that “During the conflict, trade between us grounded to a standstill.”

The conflict also affected the labour and service rendered to the Fulani by Birom young men. Sequel to that, it is currently very rare to find Birom young men rearing cows for the Fulani or farming for them, in spite of the remuneration attached to it. A respondent posited that “during this conflict, you hardly see any Birom man going to a Fulani man to do any of the labouring works - rearing, mason, carpentry or farming...” this means that the Birom do not want to have anything to do with the Fulani even when retraction would affect their livelihood.

Another trade-related effect of farmers-herders conflict in Barkin Ladi LGA is that it led to separation, not only in terms of transaction but also in terms of market location. The Fulani and the Birom established separate markets due to the conflict. Gashish district portrays a cogent scenario. A respondent from Gashish posited that, “...they have their own market, we have our own market.” He was referring to the Fulani herders while also painting a picture of the extent to which they have separated. The Birom farmers held their market at the Barkin Ladi central market in Barkin Ladi town, Ropp district while the Fulani herders held their market at Mahanga, Gashish district. In addition, respondent II in the Focus Group Discussion affirmed “...there were places where they established their separate market. Efforts were made at bringing back the markets as a single one but they were futile.” (Excerpt from the focus group discussion with the Birom farmers, 23/05/17). However, in Fan, as revealed by the traditional ruler of that district, local markets were no longer in existence. This could also be traceable to the aftermath of the conflicts between the Birom farmers and the Fulani Herders.

Inter-Communal Marriage

Aside trade, another aspect of inter-communal relation affected by this crisis is inter-communal marriage. Places affected were Fan district and Ropp district. Inter-communal marriages were relatively obtainable in these places prior to the conflict. However, the conflict has drastically reduced the rate of inter-communal marriage. According to the district head of Ropp, though not all communities witnessed or practiced inter-communal wedlock, nevertheless, the few places that practiced it no longer do. The youth leader earlier referred to, nonetheless, recounted an abnormal scenario where a Fulani lady insisted that she must marry a Birom boy. However, her parents disapproved of their union, hence they relocated to Abuja where they had their marriage solemnised.

In a further revelation, a Local Council representative stated that “back then, there were intermarriages... but the thought of this does not even occur during the crisis.

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Table 2: Effects of Farmers-Herders Conflict on Inter-Communal Relations in Barkin-Ladi LGA

	Gashish District	Heipang District	Fan District	Foron District	Ropp District
Inter-marriage	-Now rarely obtainable and one sided.	Not obtainable because the herders have been displaced from this district.	-It was discontinued.	-One-way-traffic form of marriage.	-It was discontinued.
Inter-communal trade	-Two years halting or dragging in trade.	- Throughout the duration of the conflict trade grinded to a standstill -Separation of market.	-Local markets could no longer hold except the one in town.	-No more inter-communal trade because of segregated settlement.	-There are 'no go' areas for the herders. This include places like kwok and Rakum. -Low market turn out at the central market.
Mix settlement	-Farmers were greatly displaced. '-No go' areas hindered interaction.	-Herders have been displaced. -The whole district is a 'no go' area for the Fulani.	-Herders have been sent packing. -The whole district is a 'no go' area for the herders.	-Herders have been greatly displaced. -Herders' could only be found just in a hamlet - Bisichi.	-Farmers' have greatly been displaced in some area.
Joint celebration of festivities	-Joint participation and invitation to marriage have stopped. -Dusk to dawn joint celebration has stopped.	No more joint celebration because Fulani can no longer be found in this district.	Since the herders no longer reside here, there is no longer joint celebration.	No more joint celebration because the herders, being suspicious of the farmers, have fled the district.	-Elaborate celebrations are no more -Situations where they invite each other for marriage or religious or cultural festivities have stopped.

Source: Researcher's computed field data (18/05/2017 to 23/07/2017)

There was no space for courting not to talk of marriage.” He further summarised the extent of their division thus: “You would not be seen together because everybody would be in his community. Everybody has his side. There is a division already because of lack of trust. There is no intermarriage; no trust, there is no trade and commerce” (An interview with Mr. Dauda, a Local Government member of staff, 3/07/17).

Inter-Communal Settlement

The conflict equally displaced the Fulani from three of the five districts in the LGA. This means that there are no Fulani settlements any more in three of the five districts in Barkin Ladi LGA. The affected districts, according to the MACBAN secretary of Barkin Ladi LGA are Foron, Fan and Heipang districts. The MACBAN secretary further posited that the only activity they could carry out in those places is grazing of cattle, but would have to leave in time, if not, something bad could happen to them. Similarly, the Birom, on the other hand, have been displaced from parts of Gashish and Ropp districts. The respondent from the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) posited that the conflict has led to a situation whereby Christians would have to vacate any place they realised that the Muslims are dominant to a place where Christians are the majority. Likewise, the Muslims do the same by moving to a place where the Muslims are the majority. This has led to a segregated form of settlement between the predominantly Christian Birom farmers and the Muslim Fulani herders. The traditional ruler of Fan District succinctly puts it thus:

...you will discover that at the end of it, it took a dimension of ‘between Christians and Muslims’ so that even if you go to B/Ladi town, Hausas are different from Fulani but they are staying together. Even if you are a Yoruba man in B/Ladi and you are a Muslim, you can stay among them, there is no problem but if you are a Yoruba man and you are a Christian, you stay where the Christians are staying. Here, we don’t have any problem with you (An interview with the District Head of Fan, 7/6/17).

In the same vein, the respondent from Jama’atu Izalati Bid’ah Wa Iqamatis Sunnah (JIBWIS) and Jama’atu Nasril Islam (JNI) averred that:

We have, formally, ‘no go areas’... You see, areas where Moslems’ houses were burnt, they sold them to Christians. Where Christians’ houses were burnt, they sold them to Moslems... though up till now, the Fulani don’t go to areas where the Biroms are (An interview with a JNI/JIBWIS official, 30/05/17).

Joint Celebration of Festivities

There used to be joint celebration of festivities, a situation where the Fulani Muslims will join their Birom Christian neighbours whenever they celebrate Christmas and vice versa - whenever the Fulani celebrate any of their Eids Festivals. Accordingly, the traditional ruler of Heipang posited thus:

Well! In the time past, far beyond... the Fulani man always has this *Cambun Nama*: It’s the way they make their meat. They will do it and invite you to their place. I remember

when I was in the village, we trek two or three kilometres to get to their houses simply because they invited us for Sallah... If you have a Hausa man that is a friend, he will invite you or he send something to you as a Sallah gift (An interview with the District Head of Heipang, Paul Tadi Tok, 05/06/17).

Similarly, in a Focus Group Discussion conducted among the Birom farmers, respondent III posited that at least, there use to be exchanges of gifts - food and other items, whenever a side is observing its religious festivity. He however revealed that, at present, the Birom farmers would collect and eat the food given to them by the Fulani herders but the Fulani herders rarely eat what the farmers present to them. They would rather throw it away. The Local Council respondent then averred that "as a result of the crisis, every party does its own thing by itself." Concordantly, the traditional ruler of Ropp district equally averred that

...if you invite some, they come; Christmas celebration, they come. If we are doing any festival, they come. But now, when things became tense, you cannot even celebrate anything because there was no peace (An interview with a Local Government member of staff, 03/07/17).

Conclusion

Just as it is commonplace to state that farmers-herders conflict has led to the loss of lives and property, it is also correct, as discovered by this study, to state that farmers-herders conflict has greatly affected relations in Barkin Ladi. All the indicators used in capturing inter-communal relation have shown a negative change brought about by this conflict. It is, nonetheless, suggestive that separation of market between the belligerent parties could be the practice of a cultural trait (*Pulaaku*) mentioned earlier. Aspects of inter-communal relation affected by the conflict include inter-communal trade, the practice of inter-communal marriage and nature of settlement. In addition, resentment seems to be a direct plague of the conflict and there is no longer love lost between the belligerent parties. Mutual hate and suspicion has hindered both parties from participating in the religious or tribal festivities of each other, whereas, this practices were obtainable in the period prior to the conflict.

Recommendations

- Conflicting parties should make deliberate and concerted effort towards the full restoration of inter-communal trade between them. Pursuant to this, they could revive such trades that existed at the interior areas of the community.
- Furthermore, dealing in a commodity should not be the exclusive preserve of a particular community. Both communities should involve themselves in all spheres of transaction to encourage closeness and sense of joint participation.
- There is need for parties concerned to establish their settlements, not just in proximity but also intertwining. Aside fostering inter-communal trade, proximate living will promote good neighbourliness and joint sense of responsibility to the community.

- A major unifying factor, which this conflict has obviously impeded is inter-marriage. If properly promoted, it will mean that both communities will have their daughters in the community or houses of the other party. This will make it very difficult to launch an attack on the other community because doing so will amount to attacking their daughters and their children.
- Similarly, the leaders of the Fulani herders should be ready to let go of their daughters in marriage to the Birom farmers and should encourage their people to do the same in the interest of peace.
- The institutions and agencies saddled with the responsibility of conflict resolution in the area need to harmonise the cultures and traditions of both parties and put them side by side the constitution of the country in order to resolve the conflict.
- Effort at resolving this conflict would entail that the issue of farm destruction by cattle have to be resolved. When such destruction occurs, each row of farm, depending on the type of the crop, should be valued and the culprit be made to pay the damage in full.
- The Fulani should have a particular land demarcation. This will ensure that they do not go into other people's portion of land to cause destruction. On the other hand, the Birom should not go close to the herders' cows. If the herders do not touch people's farm, then the farmers too should not harm their cattle.
- Lastly, when herbicides are applied on a land, preparatory to farming activities, there should be an indicator in form of a flag to show that herbicides have been applied on the farm, or the land should be fenced. This will avert a situation where cattle feed on fumigated grass. And once such flags are hoisted, nobody should remove them. This practice can avert the case of "cattle poisoning".

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Chapter 11

The Challenges of Insecurity within Nigerian Educational System: Role and Responsibility of the Government

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Abstract

In recent times, Nigeria Educational System has come under various violent attacks resulting in insecurity of lives and properties. The concern, however, is to identify the key role to be played by government for general improvement of education and preparing the education sector for the challenges of the new millennium. The paper's major claim is that government must continue to play the leading role both in education and security. Recommendations were therefore made to support this claim.

Keywords:

Introduction

Education is a public good that should be directed at uplifting the social, economic, political, scientific, technological and cultural life of a nation and developing the talents of individual citizens. Education is a social process for building of an all round human personality for the development of a democratic culture and for inculcating in citizens the sheer value necessary for the common life of the people. Bako (2007).

Olugbako and Asagba (2014) however opined that education is not only a public good but also a human right that is essential for exercise of all other human right and a panacea to global security challenge. It suffices to say that the higher a nation places education, the stronger the nation's security. Hence, education contributes to the security of a nation.

These personal and national aspiration may not be achieved in the face of dominating current debates of global insecurity which Nigeria is not left out. This menace of insecurity has distorted and will continue to plague human right to development in every continent of the world if not checkmated.

Insecurity, according to Ubong (2014), refers to whenever people have a feeling of self doubt or vulnerability and susceptibility to injury or harm or even threat of a corporate body such as the threat the nation of Israel is made to feel by Iran and other neighboring countries. In simpler words, insecurity is an emerging or existing threat to one's comfort, physical, psychological, emotional well being and related others.

Insecurity has equally been expressed as an antithesis of security which has attracted common description as unsafe, danger, hazard, uncertainty, want of confidence, state of doubt, inadequately guarded or protected, instability, trouble, lack of protection and others. Achumbe et al (2013) and Onifade et al (2013). Notwithstanding other definitions of insecurity, this paper conceived insecurity as a situation where human and national security is jeopardized by external and internal forces, interests and natural disasters.

It is argued that the current challenges of insecurity in Nigeria educational system is stemmed from many factors such as opined by Crane (2007) who suggests that the inability of the Federal Government of Nigeria to deliver basic services to citizens is a prime cause of insecurity along side the religion fighting and violent attack in the Niger Delta. This view is upheld by Igbuzor (2011) who sees the state of insecurity in Nigeria as a function of government failure. Among other factors that have hitherto promoted insecurity as revealed by literature are:

1. Unemployment
2. Bad governance
3. Lack of quality education
4. Lack of inadequate basic infrastructure
5. Corruption and corrupt practices of government officials
6. Perceived victimization and marginalization
7. Ethnic superiority and religious conflicts
8. Disconnection between the people and the government
9. Inequalities and absence of fairness and justice
10. Domination and exploitation

Selected Previous Attacks on Schools

Lately, the incidence of insecurity in Nigeria schools and perhaps other countries in the world has become an issue of global and serious concern and has continued to attract research interest. The school system has come under series of violent attacks ranging from kidnappings to suicide bombings, raping and robbery, ritual killings, insurgencies, increasing violence between herdsmen and farming communities, banditry in the North to Nigeria Delta militancy and other.

The year 2014, when the Boko Haram militants invaded and abducted 279 secondary school girls at Government Girls College, Chibok in Borno State, marked a period of disaster in terms of insecurity in our schools and this has continued till date. In a paper presented at a conference by Chinedu et al (2018), an attempt was made to serialize some of those attacks on schools as follows:

- 1) On 14th April, 2014, 279 secondary school girls at Chibok Girls College in Borno State were abducted.
- 2) On 19th February, 2018, 10 female students were abducted at Government Girls Technical College, Dapchi in Yobe State.
- 3) 5 secondary school teachers were abducted at gunpoint in River State.
- 4) Teachers and students at Lagos Junior Model College, Igbonla were kidnapped.

- 5) On 6th of July, 2013, 41 students and a teacher were shot dead at Government Secondary School in Yobe State.
- 6) On 29th of September, 2013, students of Gujibs College in Yobe State were attacked.
- 7) On 28th of February, 2014, Federal Government College BurniYadis was attacked. 54 boys lost their lives and 24 halls were burnt.
- 8) On 2nd of March, 2016, 3 students of private secondary schools, Babington Macaulay Junior Secondary School at Ikorodu, Lagos State were abducted.
- 9) On 13th of January, 2017, 10 students and a staff of Nigerian Tulip international college, Isheri in Ogun State were abducted.
- 10) On 16th of June, 2017, 2 teenage suicide bombers detonated bombs in the university of Maiduguri. 3 people died including one professor.
- 11) On 25th of May 2017, gunmen attacked Lagos State Model College, Igbonla, Epe. 6 students were abducted.

Most recently in February 2021, students in a school at Kagara in Niger State were abducted. The unfortunate victims of all these attacks are students, teachers, and school administrators; thus truncating their studies. Parents were forced to keep their children away from school, schools were closed down, enrolment in schools became low, new schools were prevented from being open, psychological consequences on youths led to drug abuse, alcoholism and occult activities, child abuse, maligned and maladjusted youth among others.

This paper was written as a contribution to advocating against the menace of insecurity in our education system by examining how the government would play a leading role in curbing insecurity.

Present and Future Role and Responsibility of the Government

Education is a collaborative enterprise that involves the government, the parents, local communities, and national and international agencies and NGOs. Umar (2001). However, this paper attempts to examine the government as playing the key role or leading role by demonstrating of sufficient political will and deep commitment to the provision of education to all people through careful planning with due regards to quantity and quality. Attempts have been made in the past, for example, the creation of an act by the National Assembly to prevent, prohibit and curb the act of terrorism. These attempts however have either not been well implemented or have not produced the desired effects, therefore current upsurge in insecurity call for more reforms on alternative reform strategies.

Otite (2012) opined and submits that the state of insecurity in Nigeria could be attributed to lapses on the part of security agents of the state. Nigerian government as a state has a fundamental function to secure the lives of her citizens and make them live amicably. Any nation that cannot provide security puts a security threat to her people.

The government must play the key role of improving security and charting a new course in the twenty first century as described in the recommendation.

Recommendation

1. There should be the provision of moral leadership that will ensure equal opportunity for all, eschew corruption and ethnic chauvinism.
2. There should be an elimination of the fences that negate national cohesion and unity.
3. Leaders should consider detribalizing Nigeria.
4. Government should see a sustained commitment to education and see education as a public good.
5. Government investment in the public section should be improved especially by creating a special fund for security in the education sector.
6. Government should be more proactive and forceful in combat against terrorism, banditry, and others.
7. Government should create more employment opportunities for the youth.
8. There should be a reform of the school curriculum towards security consciousness.
9. Government policy makers should set achievable goals are objectives that will stimulate all sector's growth.
10. Government should establish a security based research institute that will work with existing security agencies.
11. Government should form a platform that allows for partnership with all the stakeholders in education and security.

Conclusion

The overview of insecurity as it affects Nigeria's education system and the role and responsibility of the government have stressed the importance of education and security in a way that both can influence each other positively. Hence, education should be made responsive to the National goal of security and overall economic and development.

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Chapter 12

The Effects of Insecurity on School System (Secondary Schools) in Nigeria

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Abstract

This paper aims to reiterate the effect insecurity has on the Secondary School System in Nigeria. Over the past 15 years, the Nigeria School System has been under attack leading to kidnappings and killings of students and school administrators. Measures have been taken to curb these attacks but unfortunately, instead of the attacks to mitigate, they are still frequent and the psychological effect on innocent students is alarming (there have been about 4 different abductions in the past 3 months). To safeguard the educational system from collapse, the issue of insecurity in secondary schools and Nigeria must be dealt with efficiently. This paper examines the various effects that insecurity has had, is having, and will have on the secondary school system. If these incessant attacks are not proactively dealt with, it will portend a longer term danger to the quality of labour force and human capital needed to drive a sustainable economy. This paper, therefore, focuses on the issues of school threats and examines the effects of those threats.

Keywords: Insecurity, kidnappings, attacks psychological effect, secondary school system, Nigeria

Introduction

No nation can develop when there is a high level of insecurity in society. The far-reaching effects of insecurity are evident in most communities in Nigeria; they are less developed and backward. This is because insecurity in recent times has been one of the major issues bedeviling the majority of the Nigerian communities. The 2014 Global Report on security indicated that Nigeria is one of the crime-ravaging countries in the world. The report rated Nigeria high on the following critical variables: unlawful possession of arms, forgery, receiving stolen properties, false pretence, burglary, theft, Boko Haram, armed robbery, kidnapping, attempted murder cases, manslaughter etc. (Amirize, 2009).

The importance of education has been adequately discussed in many fora and indifferent literature (Nwanne Nzewunwa, 2009; Ojukwu & Nwanma, 2015 and Ojukwu & Onuoha, 2016; Osanti, 2012). It is in the realization of the importance of education of the child that the government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria in its 1999 constitution made a declaration of the right of every Nigerian child to education, irrespective of gender, tribe, religion, or race. It makes sense to state that the lofty vision of education as enunciated in the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria

would be realized in a serene and conducive school environment. According to Lehr (2014), the noble goals of education can never be achieved in a vacuum. They would be achieved in a conducive and peaceful school environment. If there is a feeling of insecurity within and outside the school environment, both students and teachers are likely to be deterred and this may inhibit the academic performance of the students.

According to Akintunde and Musa (2016), an insecure school environment affect the learning of children. Situations of insecurity trigger traumatic disorder and toxic stress that affect learning negatively. General school attendance and enrolment are equally affected as parents pull their children out of schools while in some extreme cases, insecurity has led to the closure of schools. For instance, Borno State schools were shut-down in major towns as a result of insurgency (Ameh, 2015). These attacks on schools usually lead to vandalization and outright destruction of school facilities which discourage the establishment of new schools. Consequently, government resources are depleted as funds meant for other developmental projects are channeled to tackling the aftermath of attacks. In the end, educational attainment in terms of quality of graduates and manpower suffers which impinges on overall national development aspirations.

Given the importance of secondary school education and human capital towards sustainable socio-economic development, there is the need to deploy extraordinary measures to tackle the spate of attacks on school facilities in Nigeria. Securitization remains a veritable option as the security architecture of the nation seems to be overwhelmed by the ongoing insecurity challenges. Securitization is a process by which state actors can transform subjects into matters of security concern that enable extraordinary measures to be taken. This implies that ostensibly non-security issues may be transformed into urgent security concerns which are therefore portrayed as existential threats to a referent object by a securitizing actor who thereby generates endorsement of emergency measures beyond rules that would otherwise bind. (Faist, 2005; Huysmans, 2006; Naujoks. 2015)

Causes of Insecurity in Nigeria

Many factors have been postulated as causing unrest in Nigeria. Some writers put their blames on the government while some others pass the bulk on parents. Other writers hold the youths as being responsible while others settle on the combination of these factors. Putting all these factors together will provide some of the following as responsible factors for the general state of insecurity in Nigeria:

1. Porous borders - the free flow of migrants from other countries to Nigeria through our borders allow criminals to enter the country without check.
2. The proliferation of Arms and Ammunition: Several arms hauls have been ceased at our air and ports, some in very large quantities. This is not good for the country. These arms and ammunition end up in the hands of criminals who apply the same in their nefarious activities in the country thereby making life insecure for the people of their locality.
3. Illegal Armed groups - Illegal importation of arms and ammunition has made possession of arms by individuals and groups very easy. We can name groups like

Niger Delta Militants, Oodua Peoples Congress, 'Bakassi Boys', MASSOB that possess arms and ammunition.

4. Oil Bunkering - Nigeria is one of the largest oil producing nations suffers from the activities of illegal oil bunkering. This activity is promoted by the spate of insecurity in the country. This is back-up with criminals who are ready to die in Nigeria water-ways. This therefore makes the coastal areas of our oil producing states unsafe.
5. Labour activists - Early in 2012 the Nigerian Labour Congress call for a nation wide strike as a result of increase in price of fuel by government. They accused the government of insensitivity to the suffering of the people as well as ignoring the insecurity challenges in the country. Peaceful protests by Labour and other civil society groups have severally been high-jacked by miscreants and inflicted pains on people and made life in our cities insecure.
6. Kidnapping - this is another visible sign of insecurity in the country. The perpetrators of this crime do not spare any one in this new wave of crime that seems to have supplanted armed robbery and other non-contact crimes. Since this act began in Nigeria, aged, children, male and female have been kidnapped for ransom. This has made life unbearable to the citizens.
7. Militancy - According to criminal law, militancy is violence, illegal force or the illegal use of unjustified force or the intimidating effect created by the threat of this act. This word became pronounced in Nigeria when the Niger Deltans took up arms against government exploitation and environmental degradation of their area due to oil exploration and exploitation. This does not only exist in the Niger Delta area. Other parts of the country have witnessed militants who commit atrocities worse than the youths of Nigeria Delta whose area is given the 'brand name'.
8. Fear and Distrust on Government - What the current trend of violence is imprinting on the psyche of Nigerians is that the government security apparatus is incapable of guaranteeing the safety and security of its people. This has, therefore, impact on the general human security of the people as the situation promotes fear, limits the peoples' ability to develop economically.
9. Unemployment - The rise in Crime wave in Nigeria since the mid-1990s was as a result of unemployment, economic decline, and social inequality, which are abetted by inefficient and corrupt police and customs forces (Robert Stock (2008 Encarta Entry). The idle minds became devil's workshop. These people who are mostly youth are easily recruited into militant groups and trained in to rob, kill, kidnap, smuggle, hijack to mention but a few. Accurate unemployment rates are difficult to obtain and generally mean little in a society where many who work are marginally employed and where begging is a socially accepted occupation.
10. Religious fanaticism/extremism - Religious fanaticism and extremism have been among the major cause of insecurity in Nigeria. The recent incidences of attack on churches and Christians in Northern part of the country by Moslem extremists have rendered several states in the north unsafe for life and properties.
11. Wrong Political Ambition - The desire for a political office not evil but to nurse negative reasons for that ambition can result to one doing anything to attain it. Ben Okolo writing from ^Johannesburg, South Africa observed that "the current crisis

which started in Bauchi and has engulfed other states in the north has elements of theocratic ambitions in it". The perpetrators of the violent activities in parts of the country are operating with a hidden agenda. They have the intention of enthroning their own type of government which is selfish, criminal and unpatriotic as Nigerians. With such ambition they can try to make the country ungovernable or insecure.

Timeline of School Attacks in Nigeria

1. JULY 29, 2009: Maiduguri, Borno: Success international private school, Maiduguri – Four buildings, including two blocks of three classrooms each were set on fire by suspected Boko Haram members.
2. SEPTEMBER 14, 2010: Maiduguri, Borno: Maiduguri, Borno: Boko Haram insurgents set ablaze 36 classrooms and offices at Yerwa Primary School, Maiduguri. A school guard told Human Rights Watch he recognized the attackers as then current and former students of the school.
3. APRIL 2, 2012: Daura, Yobe: Men suspected to be Boko Haram insurgents raided Government Senior Secondary School, Daura, stealing computers, power generators, and the school bus before setting fire on 2 blocks of 6 classrooms, principal's office, books and certificates.
4. FEBRUARY 22, 2012: Maiduguri, Borno: Bundum Primary School, Maiduguri – Some classrooms and a store set ablaze overnight by unknown men suspected to be Boko Haram members. Residents said there was a similar incident at Kulagumna Primary School along Ali Kotoko area of the metropolis on Tuesday. Abba Ganaram Primary School, Maiduguri, Borno state – burnt during the night by suspected Boko Haram insurgents.
5. FEBRUARY 28, 2012: Maiduguri, Borno: Gomari Costain Primary School and three other schools in Maiduguri – Gunmen detonated a bomb that destroyed all of the schools' buildings. No casualties were reported.
6. MARCH 1, 2012: Maiduguri, Borno: Success International School, old Maiduguri – Suspected Boko Haram burned down two buildings in the school overnight.
7. MARCH 7, 2012: Gombe state: A school in Gombe state, near the sect's spiritual home in Maiduguri, was set ablaze overnight. Residents said the school was burned in a town near the border with Yobe state.
8. APRIL 14, 2012: Maiduguri, Borno: Two primary schools in Maiduguri metropolis: Kulagumna Primary school and Gamboru II Primary and Junior Secondary School were burned to the ground overnight.
9. JUNE 18, 2012: Damaturu, Yobe: Boko Haram insurgents struck six churches, five primary schools, a police station and a police outpost in Damaturu Yobe state during a battle with government forces. A top member of the sect, Habibu Bama (a former Nigerian soldier) died from injuries sustained in the battle..
10. JULY 22, 2012: Damaturu, Yobe: Commissioner of Police revealed that the Yobe Children's Academy, the oldest private school in the state had been burned down. A school staff member told Human Rights Watch that a teacher working late in the school was killed. 30 classrooms were also razed.

11. AUGUST 19, 2012: Damagun, Yobe: Police said that a section of the Central Primary School in Damagun LG was gutted by fire from targeted explosions.
12. AUGUST 21, 2012: Goniri, Gujba Local Government Area, Yobe: Gunmen stormed Goniri village in Gujba LG, killing 2 residents and then burning down classrooms at a primary school, the Lower Sharia court, and a police outpost, confirmed State Police PR officer, who suspected Boko Haram..
13. SEPTEMBER 4-5, 2012: Damaturu, Yobe: Police said that two primary schools, a fire station, an electoral office and two religious affairs buildings were also burnt in the northeastern city of Damaturu, which had been hard hit by Boko Haram.
14. SEPTEMBER 30, 2012: Zaria, Kaduna: A bomb blast and gunfire shook an area around an Islamic boarding school in the city of Zaria, leaving two Boko Haram Islamists dead and three others wounded.
15. OCTOBER 1, 2012: Mubi, Adamawa: At least 26 students of the Adamawa State University, the Federal Polytechnic, and the School of Health Technology, both in Mubi, Adamawa State were killed around 10pm Monday night by gunmen suspected to be Boko Haram.
16. OCTOBER 18, 2012: Potiskum, Yobe: Twenty-three killed in coordinated bomb and gun attacks by Boko Haram in Potiskum. Several government buildings and schools including Sabon Layi Primary School, Nahuta Primary School, and Best Center Vocational Training School were burnt in the attacks.
17. OCTOBER 23, 2012: Potiskum, Yobe: Government Day Junior Secondary School, Potiskum was set on fire overnight by men suspected to be Boko Haram insurgents. 25 classrooms, library, textbooks, generators, school furniture, science laboratory kits, files, registers and all records were burnt to ashes in the attack.
18. NOVEMBER 4, 2012: Fika, Yobe: Gunmen armed with explosives attacked a police station, a primary school and two cellphone towers in a town in Fika, on Sunday, setting them ablaze, JTF and residents said.
19. MARCH 12, 2013: Kano, Kano state: Gunmen struck Dan Maliki primary school while pupils were in class. Three teachers and the headmaster were wounded. The Police in Kano state confirmed the incident.
20. MARCH 13, 2013: Maiduguri, Borno: Unknown assailants burnt Gwange III Primary School, two days after Gwange I Primary School was set ablaze.
21. MARCH 18, 2013: Maiduguri, Borno: Four school teachers including two female teachers and two other people were yesterday morning killed when some gunmen launched multiple attacks on four schools in the troubled city of Maiduguri. The schools attacks, according to sources, include Mafoni Day Secondary School, Yelwa Central School, Shehu Sanda Kyari Secondary School and Ali-Alaskiri Primary School.
22. MARCH 24, 2013: Biu, Borno state: Godiya Primary School; Lajada Private School; and Standard Private School in Biu, Borno state were burnt as soldiers and gunmen believed to be members of the Boko Haram were locked in a gun battle.

23. APRIL 9, 2013: Maiduguri, Borno: Two teachers killed at home in Maiduguri, while 4 officials of the Borno State Schools Feeding Committee were killed during an inspection tour of schools in Dikwa, Borno state.
24. JUNE 16, 2013: Damaturu, Yobe: Gunmen, suspected to be Boko Haram members, killed seven students and two teachers of Government Secondary School, Damaturu Yobe State capital.
25. JUNE 19, 2013: Maiduguri, Borno: Suspected Islamist militants in north-east Nigeria killed at least nine students who were writing exams at Ansarudeen School, Maiduguri.
26. JUNE 24, 2013: Gamboru, Borno: Gunmen attacked and killed nine students in the town of Gamboru, Borno state on their way to take their exams.
27. JULY 6, 2013: Mamudo, Yobe: Up to 30 people, including at least 22 students, were killed in their dormitories in Mamudo town, Yobe state.
28. SEPTEMBER 21, 2013: Maiduguri, Borno: 4 killed and scores of students injured by gunmen suspected to be Boko Haram at Success Private School, old Maiduguri.
29. SEPTEMBER 28, 2013: Gujba, Yobe: On 28 September 2013, gunmen reportedly killed at least 50 students during an attack on the College of Agriculture Gujba in Yobe state.
30. JANUARY 9, 2014: Gwoza, Borno: A member of the House of Representatives, Peter Biye Gumtha, representing Gwoza/Chibok/Damboia said the attacks were launched by eight insurgents. Many primary schools and other public buildings in his constituency, were also burnt. The gunmen also destroyed 90,000 packets of chalk, pens and exercise books procured at N38 million for distribution to schools in my constituency," he further said.
31. FEBRUARY 11, 2014: Konduga, Borno: Gunmen attacked Konduga about 40 kilometers from Maiduguri, along Maiduguri-Bama Road. They destroyed Abba Ashigar School of Business and Administrative Studies, and many other buildings in the town with explosives. They also abducted 20 female students from the school, five female street traders, a medical doctor and carted away drugs and medical equipment.
32. FEBRUARY 24, 2014: Buni Yadi, Yobe: Gunmen suspected to be Boko Haram members attacked and killed dozens students of Federal Government College Buni Yadi, Gujba Local Government Area of Yobe State. Yobe state Police Commissioner, Sanusi A Rufai confirmed that twenty nine male students were killed and twenty four structures that include the Administration block, students hostel and staff quarters were burnt down.
33. FEBRUARY 26, 2014: Shuwa, Adamawa: Suspected members of Boko Haram terrorist sect attacked a number of villages in Madagali and Michika LGAs in Adamawa State. In Shuwa, three catholic churches were set ablaze, as well as a primary school. The Saint Joseph Minor Seminary (secondary school). Local residents say three bodies were recovered from the seminary.
34. APRIL 14-15, 2014: Chibok, Borno: Suspected Boko Haram insurgents on Tuesday abducted no fewer than 200 girls at the Senior Secondary School, Chibok, Borno State, following a violent attack in the town.

35. MAY 2, 2014: Gwoza, Borno: Two suspected members of Boko Haram were killed on Thursday during a foiled attack on Government Secondary School, Ville in Gwoza Local Government Area of Borno State. The gunmen reportedly arrived behind the perimeter fence of Government Secondary School, GSS, Ville, and packed their car hidden in the bush. But some vigilant students in the school spotted them and immediately raised alarm for others to take to their heels, while the soldiers stationed in the school began to engage them in a shoot-out.
36. JUNE 23, 2014: Kano, Kano state: A suicide bomber blew himself up alongside seven others Monday afternoon, while 20 sustained life threatening injury at Kano School of Hygiene Technology located along Gida Murtala--BUK road. The victims of the Monday afternoon blast were new intakes of the school undergoing screening exercise.
37. JULY 28, 2014: Kano, Kano state: A woman suicide bomber blew herself up outside a Kano university after police prevented her from carrying out an attack, injuring five officers.
38. JULY 30, 2014: Kano, Kano state: Another female suicide bomber targeting Polytechnic students struck again in Kano, killing two students and injuring at least seven others.
39. JULY 31, 2014: Limankara, Gwoza, Borno: More than 100 trainee police officers went missing days after Boko Haram fighters sacked the Mobile Police Training Academy in Limankara, Gwoza last Wednesday.
40. SEPTEMBER 17, 2014: Kano, Kano state: 13 students died and scores of others were injured as suspected Boko Haram insurgents bombed and shot into lecture halls at the Federal College of Education, Kano.
41. OCTOBER 29, 2014: Mubi, Adamawa: Islamist Boko Haram militants seized control of the northeast Nigerian town of Mubi, killing dozens of people and forcing thousands to flee, witnesses said. The insurgents also stormed a university in where they killed a lecturer and his entire family.
42. NOVEMBER 10, 2014: Potiskum, Yobe: At least 26 students were killed by a suicide bomber at a school assembly in north eastern Nigerian town of Potiskum.
43. NOVEMBER 12, 2014: Kontagora, Niger: A suicide bomber, a female, attacked the Federal College of Education, Kontagora, Niger State some 150 kilometres (90 miles) from the state capital, Minna. An account said no fewer than 10 persons died in the attack, others said only the female suicide bomber died while two others were injured and were receiving treatment at Kontagora General hospital.
44. NOVEMBER 24, 2014: Damasak, Borno: During an attack on Damasak, Borno state, Boko Haram insurgents locked the gates Zanna Mobarti Primary School with over 300 pupils inside. More women and children abducted from the town were also brought into the school.
45. DECEMBER 1, 2014: Damaturu, Yobe: Damaturu, the Yobe state capital, one of the troubled states in the northeast came under heavy fire as military and the dreaded Islamic sect, Boko Haram exchange shooting. Members of the sect started shooting around Bukar Abba University, along Gujba road where a

- heavy fight ensued between them and the military. No one was killed at the university.
46. DECEMBER 21, 2014: Gwoza, Borno: Militants with Nigeria's radical jihadist group Boko Haram have killed more than 50 elderly people from several villages in the Gwoza area in the country. Residents who were too old to flee the area recently dominated by Boko Haram were gathered and taken to two schools, where they were executed by firing squad.
 47. JANUARY 3, 2015: Babangida, Yobe: Boko Haram, on Saturday night attacked Babangida town, the headquarters of Tarmuwa local government area of Yobe state, engaging security forces in a gun battle at the local government secretariat, the Government Lodge and the boarding primary school, "all of which the terrorists have the intention of destroying."
 48. MARCH 15, 2015: Damasak, Borno: Boko Haram insurgents who had occupied and detained at least 300 pupils and over 200 more women and children at the Zanna Mobarti Primary School, Damasak, Borno state since November 24, 2014, escaped with at least 400 of the captives when security forces from Chad and Niger expelled the insurgents from the town.
 49. MAY 8, 2015: Potiskum, Yobe: A suicide bomber suspected to be a member of the Boko Haram sect, armed with Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) and AK47 rifle on Friday launched an attack on the College of Administrative and Business Studies (CABS) Potiskum in Yobe state. Potiskum is Northwest and about 100km from Damaturu, the Yobe state capital. The bomber stormed the school around 8:00am and started shooting sporadically at the gate before entering the school shooting at students and teachers alike.
 50. JULY 31, 2015: Dikwa, Borno: The Nigerian Army uncovered at the abandoned Dikwa College of Education, Dikwa Borno state, a chemistry laboratory which the terrorist group, Boko Haram, had turned into an improvised explosive devices factory. Some of the equipment recovered from the laboratories include a welding machine and mine detector.
 51. MARCH 2, 2016: In Lagos State, 3 students of a private secondary school, Babington Macaulay Junior Seminary, Ikorodu were abducted by unknown gunmen.
 52. JANUARY 13, 2017: Ten students and staff of Nigerian Tulip International College in Isheri, (formerly Nigerian Turkish International College) Ogun State were abducted.
 53. JANUARY 16, 2017: Two teenage suicide bombers detonated bombs in the University of Maiduguri which killed 3 people including a Professor.
 54. MAY 25, 2017: a group of gunmen attacked Lagos State Model College, Igbonla Epe and abducted 6 students despite the perceived security in the school.
 55. FEBRUARY 19, 2018: In what seems like a repeat of the Chibok girls` attack four years earlier, 111 school girls from the Government Girls Science and Technical College Dapchi, Yobe State were abducted. Even though most of the girls have been released, this particular case showed failure of the existing security architecture to proactively secure the volatile area as Dapchi which is very close to Chibok in the north-eastern part of Nigeria.

All these attacks indicate vulnerability of schools which may escalate further into a bigger security and education challenge if not arrested. According to available reports, the number of school enrolment in the areas prone to these attacks have already diminished as a result. Table 1 and Figure 1 show the percentage change in enrolment between 2012 and 2016.

Table 1: Percentage change in the enrolment by level of school for the years 2012 to 2016

PERCENTAGE CHANGE					
PRY 1-6	-	5.081390512	-1.365444146	-1.390098297	0.584242097
JS 1-3	-	16.88739821	0.556513428	-0.367606875	-3.43267008
PRY 1-JS3	-	7.146505636	-0.998690295	-1.191918296	-0.200813805
SS 1-3	-	4.399092796	-16.67990151	14.40784123	-8.870697772

Source: Federal Ministry of Education, Nigeria Education Indicators publication, 2016




Figure 1 shows the percentage change in school enrollment (2012-2016). It is easily observed that all the respective enrollment levels have been on continuous fall from 2013 up to 2016. Even though the enrollment level of senior secondary showed a positive change in 2015, it became negative by 2016. Generally, there seems to be a decrease in the number of school enrollment within the period above as indicated by the negative growth in all the enrollment data. This scenario is unhealthy for the achievement of the sustainable development goals which impinge on human capital development.

Conclusion

The importance of education, especially secondary education, to national development cannot be over-emphasized. Education is a tool of empowerment in a highly competitive and dynamic socioeconomic global environment. Investment in education is an important key towards the achievement of a stable society. The state of education in Nigeria has continued to be at the centre of national discourse. The motivation for this paper lies in the fact that there is lack of an engaging advocacy towards the issue of school security in Nigeria. We argue that security issues around

the educational environment should become a subject of discursive representation where actors or agents and audiences share knowledge about the seriousness of threat to our educational system and general acknowledgement of urgent need to mobilize available resources to curtail this ugly development.

The recurrence of school attacks suggest that earlier measures implemented did not achieve much towards ameliorating the menace. We argue that if this monster is allowed to continue to exist, the peace and future of Nigeria may not be guaranteed. Accessible and affordable education can even serve as a panacea for school attacks as most of the perpetrators are largely uneducated and therefore unenlightened about the protracted effect of their actions. The long term effect of unchecked school insecurity might be the total collapse of the educational system.

Stakeholders, politicians, the media and the parents should raise alarm about the looming danger of school insecurity. This is required in order to draw the attention of the government, security agencies and educational policy makers on the need to apply extra-ordinary measures to tackle the threat of school insecurity. These extra-ordinary measures might be multidimensional and involves the deployment of special school military personnel to schools, the establishment of special security post in every school, the allocations of more funds to education sector to help in the acquisition of cutting-edge security gadgets to forestall attacks, the deployment of state of the art information and communication systems as well as other modern technologies for easy detection and prevention of impending attacks. There should be a compulsory subject on school security particularly in the primary and secondary schools which will help educate school children on security issues as it concerns them. This will trigger an advocacy system that will put pressure on the government to deploy extra-ordinary measures (like that of Boko Haram) towards the prevention of incessant school attacks.

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Chapter 13

The effect of herdsmen, banditry and kidnapping activities on Food Security in Nigeria

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Abstract

Herdsmen, banditry and kidnapping have become a major household name in Nigeria and any part of the world. Crisis in any part of the country tends to affect food security by creating shortages, which disrupt both gross domestic product (GDP) and net domestic product (NDP) of the country. Food crops cannot be planted, weeded or harvested in a crisis area where there are herdsmen attacks. The herdsmen invade farm land belonging to farmers there by creating scarcity of land for the cultivation of food crops which in turn threatens food security of the country. The constant crisis has threatened the security of the State, reduced its economic productivity, and deepened food crisis in Nigeria. While there have been several crises between the Fulani herdsmen and the farmers for more than two decades, the escalation reached another level in 2014 with the Fulani herdsmen killing 1,229 people in comparison with 63 deaths in 2013. With more than 500 deaths by July 2016 and January 2018 more than 73 persons were given mass burials in Benue State alone out of the killings that were not known. The crisis is targeted to take over lands and Islamize the nation. The crisis has been commonly credited to Fulani herdsmen expanding from the traditional grazing routes into the agricultural land which in turn always results into crisis over access to pasture. The escalation of the crisis has made many Nigerians and international observers including the United States to consider Fulani herdsmen as the second most dangerous group in Nigeria after Boko-Haram group. Therefore, there is a need for the critical assessment of the underlying factors responsible for the escalation of crisis between the Fulani herdsmen and farmers to untangle the various important but crisis narratives that have been used in explaining the reason behind the recent escalation of the crisis. The paper seeks to explore ways of resolving crisis there by creating food security. The paper finally suggested that Farmers should be assisted with productive resources and training by extension services to reduce vulnerability and protracted crisis in the farming communities and government should adopt the modern way of cattle rearing which is ranching among other things, the Nigerian Government shall come up with poverty alleviation programmes and employment opportunities, targeting youths who are mostly involved in abductions and kidnappings out of economic frustration, such as unemployment, poverty alleviation programmes should also be directed towards addressing high incidence of poverty among women and children who are vulnerable segments of the population mostly kidnapped by terrorists or insurgents and trapped by organised criminals, ending up in abduction for forced labour, effectively combat kidnapping, the government shall also fight insurgency because the various insurgent groups in the northern and southern parts of the country are all

resorting to kidnapping of innocent population in their efforts to further their causes, anti-terrorism programmes should be made side-by-side with anti-banditry and kidnapping programmes in Nigeria, foreign governments should also participate in the war on banditry and kidnapping in Nigeria because the activity is a transnational crime usually involving movement out of the country, non-governmental organisations should also be part of the war on banditry and kidnapping in Nigeria and neighbouring states, through awareness creation programmes, the law enforcement agents, such as the police as well as other agencies meant for anti-human trafficking shall also intensify surveillance on the fight against banditry and kidnapping. They shall be receiving special trainings on how to identify victims of banditry and kidnapping and be able to take them from the kidnappers without them being hurt and constitutionally, there is need for severe penalties against kidnappers. This might serve as deterrence for those already involved and those willing to be involved.

Key words: herdsmen, farmers, banditry, kidnapping and food security.

Introduction

Herdsmen, banditry and kidnapping has been major problem since the Nigeria returned to civil rule in 1999 after 16 years of persistent military dictatorship Peace has remained elusive in the country. It is expected that democratic governance would give rise to political stability, national cohesion and ethno-religious tolerance, but these have not been achieved. Instead of peace and national cohesion, insurgency has remained an abiding feature of state society relations. Insurgency has posed serious security challenges for the nation as it affects foreign as well as indigenous investments, thereby hampering economic growth and leaving the country to face escalating unemployment, loss of lives and properties. This and other social maladies present a negative image on the country and undermine the national security. No country weather developed and developing can thrive economically, socially and politically in an environment of insecurity. That is why the issue of insurgencies as a threat to national security and development should be given serious attention (Okoroafor and Ukpabi, 2016).

Violent conflict and crisis in Nigeria, like other parts of the world, have created a rift in human relations, caused serious threat to food security, among many other effects (Basil, 2018). Crisis is inevitable as long as we live together, especially in a multi-ethnic, cultural and religious community like Nigeria. However, violence leaves us with various forms of retardation and underdevelopment resulting from the destruction of lives, farmland and property. The menaces of violent crisis conflict have been on the increase in some most Nigerian cities in the last two decades (Adisa, 2011a). Most of these conflicts are generally regarded as ethno-religious bigotry and antagonism.

According to Adisa (2011b), the conflicts in most part of Nigeria especially the Fulani herdsmen and farmers clash are largely uncalled for. Farmers can no longer farm peacefully because of Fulani herdsmen. These Fulani herdsmen and farmers clash have pitched Christians and Muslims against each other. The conflict has had devastating effects on inter-group relationships especially in Nasarawa Egor in

Nasarawa State and Agatu L.G.A of Benue State. Apart from the loss of lives, farmlands, food produce and property, it has profound influence on residential relationships, leading to new trends in the polarization of communities. This is evident in a physical manifestation of mono religious areas in Nasarawa and Benue States, with Christians and Muslims living in dominant religious clusters (Ofem and Bassey, 2014).

Over the last decade, reporting of farmer-herder violence has increased exponentially. Violence between Fulani herdsmen and farmers is one of Nigeria's most persistent security problems and has left thousands of people dead in recent decades. The largest spike in reporting, occurring between 2013 and 2014, may be as a result of an increased number of incidents, increased awareness on the issue, or both. It may likewise be attributed to the 2014 presidential elections and the increased Boko Haram activity during this period. In any case, the increasing number of articles covering this issue signifies the growing urgency of this crisis (Blench, 2010). The prevalence of crises in the country has become a major concern for the well-meaning Nigerians considering the impact on the peace, security as well as the economy of the nation. Destruction of lives and properties has almost become an everyday affair. These happenings have created a fearful atmosphere that discourages investors both domestic and foreign. By and large the economy of the nation is threatened. In explaining the political situation in the country; three terms need to be clarified. They include: crises, crises and violence. A crisis is the aftermath of crises and violence.

Herder-Farmer crises in Nigeria occur as a result of resource scarcity; there exists a growing scarcity of arable land and water sources that are equally essential to sustain crop cultivation and cattle herds. Farmers encroach on grazing routes, and have expropriated land designated to grazing reserves, while herders often destroy crops, pollute water sources and trespass on farms to feed their cattle. This is further exacerbated by the growing population of farmers, herders and their herds, increasing scarcity of arable land due to droughts, impending desertification of the sahel-savannah, land degradation, and cultural differences among ethnic groups that predominantly farm or graze cattle (Fiki and Lee,2005).

Many Nigerians however attribute the violence to ethnic incompatibility. Nigerians have become accustomed to headlines that read, "Fulani herdsmen attack Guma and Logo and 120 persons were killed. As Nigerians, we are also familiar with reports of incessant "clashes between the majority Muslim north and Christian south." Although these narratives are not completely false, as evidenced by the fact that a majority of clashes occur in the most diverse middle belt states, Plateau, Taraba, Ekiti, Kogi and Benue, etc they are oversimplified narratives of deeper issues, such as increased insecurity following the emergence of Boko Haram, increased access to arms and automatic weapons, and also the exploitation of farmer-herder violence by Boko Haram terrorists (Blench and Dendo, 2003 and Rashid, 2012).

Banditry refers to the incidences of armed robbery or allied violent crimes, such as kidnapping, cattle rustling, and village or market raids. It involves the use of force, or

threat to that effect, to intimidate a person or a group of persons in order to rob, rape or kill (Okoli and Okpaleke 2014). Economic or political interests motivate banditry. The former refers to banditries motivated by the imperative of material accumulation while the latter has to do with those driven by the quest to rob, to assault or to liquidate a person or a group of persons based on political or ideological considerations.

Kidnapping is one among the current major social problems that are negatively affecting the free movement of people and the socio-economic development of the country. Kidnapping which is mostly common in the southern parts of the country is now very popular in the Northern parts of the country due to different dimension of armed conflicts such as ethno-religious conflicts, farmers-herders conflict, Boko Haram insurgency among others. Most of the conflicts that have resulted to the proliferation of the evil known as kidnapping in Nigeria are mostly instigated by "conflict entrepreneurs" who are gaining from the conflicts either directly or indirectly. The menace of the proliferation of kidnapping has brought along with it problems of insecurity of lives and properties and a general fall in the number of economic activities as a result of the fear of the unforeseen. The acts known as kidnapping is considered by Okoli and Orinya, (2013) as organized crime. Kidnapping varies from country to country; therefore, the term is uncertain and devoid of any straight jacket definition. That is, it depends on who is defining it and from what perspective and for what purpose. They viewed kidnapping as unlawful seizure and detention of a person by force against his/her will.

Kidnapping can be defined as the act of seizing and detaining or carrying away a person by unlawful force or by fraud, and often with a demand for ransom. For an act to be deemed kidnapping, it must involve coercive movement of a victim from one place to another, detention or seizure of that person be it a child or an adult. Kidnapping is usually motivated by financial gain or political benefit. Thus, opportunist or regular criminals as well as political opponents can resort to kidnapping in order to illegally obtain economic benefits or have their demands granted. In many cases, kidnapping is a 'business' involving a demand for ransom which may vary considerably, depending on the victim's personal status. Kidnapping is on the increase in Nigeria. In Nigeria there are more than 1,000 kidnapping incidents reported in a year, and there are undoubtedly many that are unreported.

Insecurity, according to Ubong (2016), refers to whenever people have a feeling of self doubt or vulnerability and susceptibility to injury or harm or even threat of a corporate body such as the threat the nation of Israel is made to feel by Iran and other neighboring countries. In simpler words, insecurity is an emerging or existing threat to one's comfort, physical, psychological, emotional well being and related others. Insecurity has equally been expressed as an antithesis of security which has attracted common description as unsafe, danger, hazard, uncertainty, want of confidence, state of doubt, inadequately guarded or protected, instability, trouble, lack of protection and others. Achumba, Ighomerecho and Akpor-Robaro (2013) and Onifade, and Imhoropi (2013). Notwithstanding other definitions of insecurity, this paper

conceived insecurity as a situation where human and national security is jeopardized by external and internal forces, interests and natural disasters.

Food security as a concept originated only in the mid-1970s, in the discussions of international food problems at a time of global food crisis. The initial focus of attention was primarily on food supply problems - of assuring the availability and to some degree the price stability of basic foodstuffs at the international and national level. That supply-side, international and institutional set of concerns reflected the changing organization of the global food economy that had precipitated the crisis. A process of international negotiation followed, leading to the World Food Conference of 1974, and a new set of institutional arrangements covering information, resources for promoting food security and forums for dialogue on policy issues (ODI. 1997).

The issues of famine, hunger and food crisis were also being extensively examined, following the events of the mid-1970s. The outcome was a redefinition of food security, which recognized that the behaviour of potentially vulnerable and affected people was a critical aspect.

A third, perhaps crucially important, factor in modifying views of food security was the evidence that the technical successes of the Green Revolution did not automatically and rapidly lead to dramatic reductions in poverty and levels of malnutrition. These problems were recognized as the result of lack of effective demand.

“Food security is a situation that exists when all people, at all times, have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life” (FAO. 2002).

This new emphasis on consumption, the demand side and the issues of access by vulnerable people to food, is most closely identified with the seminal study by Amartya Sen. Eschewing the use of the concept of food security, he focuses on the entitlements of individuals and households.

The international community has accepted these increasingly broad statements of common goals and implied responsibilities. But its practical response has been to focus on narrower, simpler objectives around which to organize international and national public action. The declared primary objective in international development policy discourse is increasingly the reduction and elimination of poverty. The 1996 WFS exemplified this direction of policy by making the primary objective of international action on food security halving of the number of hungry or undernourished people by 2015.

Essentially, food security can be described as a phenomenon relating to individuals. It is the nutritional status of the individual household member that is the ultimate focus, and the risk of that adequate status not being achieved or becoming undermined. The latter risk describes the vulnerability of individuals in this context.

As the definitions reviewed above imply, vulnerability may occur both as a chronic and transitory phenomenon. Useful working definitions are described below.

Food security exists when all people, at all times, have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food which meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life. Household food security is the application of this concept to the family level, with individuals within households as the focus of concern (FAO. 2002).

Background

For a few years, there has been a raging battle between Fulani herdsmen and farmers of Nigeria's middle states of Benue, Jos and Taraba. This conflict if left to mutate can discourage tourists from visiting the different amazing destinations situated in this region. Benue State is regarded as the food basket of the nation. It is an agrarian state because of the fertile soil and this makes agriculture very important for their livelihood and survival, and has inevitably attracted Fulani herdsmen to Benue and other Middle belt states. So, the farmers rue the wanton ravaging of their lands as it destroys of their source of livelihood. At the end, it becomes a battle for survive (Akinkuolie, 2018).

Fulani herdsmen are popular for being cattle rearers who makes it essential for them to navigate their prized cows, from one location to another in search for food and water. As a result of this regular search, it may lead to the invasion of other people's farms by the herdsmen. The Fulani Herdsmen crisis remains a major issue in Nigeria. So far, thousands have been killed and many more have been expelled from their homes, and the Nigerian government does not appear willing to initiate any forceful action against them. Rather, they are requesting for pieces of land from states in order to provide the rampaging herdsmen with permanent feeding ground. They are largely nomads who go through towns with their cattle. In Nigeria, the Fulani and the Hausa people dominate the northern states, with a population of well over 30 million. Notably, people of the Fulani tribe rarely ever use artificial birth control methods and, as a result of this, the tribe is very fertile, hence their vast population and their presence in almost every state across the country. Due to the peculiarity of the activities of the herdsmen, they move from one place to another in search of pasture. In this process, the herdsmen have reportedly encountered cattle rustlers and made complaints to the relevant authorities who fail to investigate the issue, hence their purported reason for carrying arms about. During their journey, they frequently trespass farmlands owned by locals in their host communities, destroying crops and valuables. Attempts by farmers to prevent them from causing havoc are met with stiff and violent resistance. Most times, the farmers are overpowered, injured and killed, while others are evicted from their homes. Sometimes, the herdsmen are accused of taking these opportunities to steal, rape, raze houses and kill innocent members of the communities they pass through (Akinkuolie, 2018).

Before now, the herdsmen have been known to wreak havoc in certain communities in Nigeria, but now, the rate at which they commit these crimes has increased

exponentially. According to statistics provided by the Institute for Economics and Peace, 1,229 people were killed in 2014, up from 63 in 2013 and Benue State seems to be the hardest hit in recent times. Barely five days to the end of Governor Gabriel Suswam's administration in May 2015, over 100 farmers and their family members were reportedly massacred in villages and refugee camps located in the Ukura, Per, Gafa and Tse-Gusa local government areas of the state. According to reports, in July 2015, suspected herdsmen attacked Adeke, a community on the outskirts of the state capital, Makurdi. Last December, six persons were killed at Idele village in the Oju local government area. A reprisal attack by youths in the community saw three Fulani herdsmen killed and beheaded.

In February this year 2018, as a result of a clash between herdsmen and farmers in Benue State, 40 more people were killed, about 2,000 displaced and not less than 100 were seriously injured. Most recently, more than 92 Nigerians were massacred by suspected Fulani Herdsmen in Benue and Niger states. Also, before this time, there have been reported attacks by the Fulani Herdsmen in southern states of the country, including Enugu, Ekiti and Ondo states (Nigerian Pilot Newspaper, 22 November, 2012.). Concerns have been raised as to the true identity of those behind the attacks. Many with dissenting views believe they may be members of the Boko Haram sect, masquerading as Fulani Herdsmen. A few others, including the Nigerian military, have said they are herdsmen from other parts in West Africa and not Fulani. While the latter may be admissible due to porous Nigerian borders and poor immigration surveillance, especially in northern parts of the country, it is very difficult to correlate the activities of Boko Haram terrorists to those of the Fulani Herdsmen. Boko Haram has utilised explosives carried by suicide bombers or hidden in a target, but accounts by victims of the herdsmen crisis have shown that the Fulani Herdsmen are mainly concerned with gaining greater access to grazing lands for livestock. In fact, following the February attacks in Benue, the leadership of the Fulani group openly admitted that the attacks were carried out by its members (Ajayi, and Allagenyi, 2001).

Theoretical framework

Structural functional theory

The structural functional approach provides a useful framework for categorizing and comparing data. It was not very useful for analyzing or predicting change; the issue of why, how, when, and in what direction, political development occurs. This issue of development, or change, is, of course, crucial for the Third World. Structural functionalism is a tradition of social analysis that sees society as a mosaic of functions and structures that perform them. For example, in order to survive, a society needs to educate its children, produce goods, govern its affairs and provide security for its members. These are functions and they necessitate a number of structures such as schools, industries, parliaments, courts, armed forces, etc to perform their roles. Understandably, when these structures perform their roles or functions properly, there is order in society and in fact, society inherently moves in the direction of order and stability. Consequently, from a structural-functionalist perspective, peace is achieved where existing social structures perform their functions adequately, supported by the requisite culture, norms and values.

In broadening the definition of peace, Fayeye (2011) had earlier outlined two dimensions of peace. The first is negative peace, that is the absence of direct violence, war and fear of the individual, nation, region and indeed at the international levels; the second dimension is positive peace that is the absence of unjust structures, unequal relationships, justice and inner peace of the individual. In sum, we can conceive peace to be the absence of fear, conflict, anxiety, exclusion, deprivation or suffering and violence. It is primarily concerned with creating and maintaining a just order in society.

Fayeye (2011) Peace and indeed peace theory is intimately connected not only with conflict theory, but equally with development theory. Therefore, a peace research must be one that looks into the conditions past, present and future for the realization of peace which is intricately connected with conflict research and indeed development research. Violent conflicts, whether social, political or environmental have seriously contributed to the crisis situation in terms of loss of human and material capital. This theory has however found it suit on this paper as the structure of government has fail in it responsible of maintaining peace.

Nigerian herdsmen, banditry and kidnapping crisis

The activities of herdsmen-farmer, banditry and kidnapping seem to have continued unabated leading to loss of both lives and properties. Once the news breaks in the media, others anticipate similar attack and tend to fortify themselves in readiness. From, Kwara State to Kogi State, Benue, Enugu, Nassarawa, Kaduna, Taraba, Kebbi, Kaduna, Delta, Ekiti, Oyo and Niger States among others have their pockets of ordeals to tell on Herdsmen-farmers conflicts in Nigeria. The Agatu killings in Benue State, Nimbo in Enugu state and Southern Kaduna where many were killed and properties worth millions destroyed are part of the complexities of Herdsmen-farmers conflicts in Nigeria. Little wonder that Global terrorism index ranked Herdsmen as the fourth deadliest militant group in the world with a record killing of 1229 people in 2014 (Eyekpimi, 2016).

February 18th, 2016 Agatu, Benue State May 5th, 2016 Agatu Benue State April, 12th 2016 Taraba State April 19th, 2016 Delta State April 21st, 2016 Lagelu LGA of Ibadan, Oyo State April 25th, 2016 Nimbo, in Uzo Uwani LGA, Enugu June 16th, 2016 Ussissia, Community, Ndokwa East LGA, Delta State June 20th, 2016 Logo LGA, Benue state Table 2.1 (Eyekpimi, 2016). According to dw.com 2020, Boko Haram has admitted to killing scores of rice farmers in northern Nigeria. The terror group said the attacks were carried out in retribution for farmers cooperating with the Nigerian military. The Boko Haram jihadi group on Tuesday claimed responsibility for a brutal massacre of farm workers in northeast Nigeria over the weekend as the death toll rose to 76.

The grim search for bodies continues after gunmen on motorbikes attacked the area outside Borno state's capital, Maiduguri, on Saturday, slaughtering dozens of laborers in rice fields near the village of Zabarmari. It was initially unclear which Boko Haram faction was behind the assault, but the main group loyal to shadowy leader Abubakar

Shekau said in a video Tuesday it was "responsible for what happened around Maiduguri in recent days... especially in Zabarmari." Shekau, in a three-minute video, said his group killed 78 farmers because "the farmers arrested and handed one of its brothers to the Nigerian Army.

What is expect from government

The Fulani Herdsmen, banditry and kidnapping have unabatedly continued to wreak havoc, mostly in the middle belt area of the country. The inability of the Nigerian Police to contain them may spell greater doom for lives in susceptible areas. Some days ago, Ventures Africa reflected on what the silence of President Muhammadu Buhari on the herdsmen crisis could mean. Nigeria needs to take the bull by its horn, else, the Fulani Herdsmen who are deemed only less deadly than Boko Haram, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS or ISIL), and al-Shabaab in the entire world may be Nigeria's worst nightmare. Other economic impacts include: impeding trade practices, reduction in crop yield, displacement of farmers, loss of lives and properties, loss of products in storage and destruction of public and private buildings...Here are some of the attacks by Fulani Herdsmen compiled from various news headlines, (Abbas, 2009). For instance, in:

The effect of herdsmen, banditry and kidnapping on Food Security in Nigeria

According to Ofem and Basse (2014) and Bilis (2018) recurring issue of crisis between Fulani herdsmen and farmers banditry and kidnapping in some parts of Nigeria remains one of the major threats to food security in the country. The recent abduction of former Minister of Finance, Chief Olu Falae, purportedly by Fulani herdsmen with whom he was reported to have been having squabbles over farm issue, has once again brought to the fore concerns over constant hostility between Fulani herdsmen and farmers across the country. Sadly, this perennial feud could have serious implication for food security in the country. Just recently, an alarm was raised on how the encroachment of farmlands by herds of cattle will, in no small measure, affect the output of crops coming from the north; the region relied mainly upon for the provision of foodstuffs and fruits in the country.

In Jigawa State alone, more than 70 cases of conflicts have been recorded since the beginning of the 2015 farming season. These cases bordered on encroachment into farms by cattle and farmers' misuse of cattle routes. The situation is not different in Nasarawa and Benue States, the food baskets of the nation as Fulani herdsmen persistently engage farmers in feuds that often result in serious casualties on both sides. While farmers accuse the herdsmen of farm land encroachment, the latter blame the farmers and members of their communities for rustling of their cattle.

In time past, herdsmen and their farmers used to have a reasonably symbiotic relationship. While the cattle served as means of transportation for daily goods as well as manure to fertilize the fields for farmers; the herdsmen in turn obtained grains and other farm produce from the farmers. But later, as the expansion of farming activities, which invariably led to a huge demand for farmlands, drastically reduced supply of grazing land, flocks of cattle frequently encroached upon already cultivated fields to

the chagrin of farmers. This, indeed, is a major source of unending friction between the two. Unfortunately, the friction, if not properly checked could have adverse effect on food security in the country.

According to Haruna (2020) the attack Saturday in a rice field in Garin Kwashebe came on the same day that residents were casting votes for the first time in 13 years to elect local councils, although many didn't go to cast their ballots. The farmers were reportedly rounded up and summarily killed by armed insurgents in retaliation for refusing to pay extortion to one militant. The attackers tied up agricultural labourers working in rice fields and slit their throats near Maiduguri, the capital of Borno state, reports say. This is one of the worst attacks in recent months in a region where the Boko Haram and the Islamic State West Africa insurgent groups are active. This attack leads to 45 farmers losing their lives in November 29, 2020 and other banditry and kidnapping activities that go's on the high ways. This has a negative effect on agriculture.

However, pastoralists and agriculturalists conflicts are not the only challenges affecting crop outputs and the provision of food security in the country, other factors include environmental degradation in form of soil erosion and overgrazing; climate change (which has caused shifting weather patterns is increasingly viewed as a current and future cause of hunger and poverty because it leads to increasing drought), flooding, and changing climatic patterns requiring a shift in crops and farming practices that may not be easily accomplished.

The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization estimates that about 805 million people of the 7.3 billion people in the world, representing a ratio one in nine, suffered from chronic undernourishment in 2012-2014. Among all the hungry people, 791 million live in developing countries, representing 13.5 percent, or one in eight, of the population of developing counties. By implication this herdsmen/farmers crisis will aggravate into food insecurity in the country.

Challenges/solution to herdsmen, banditry and kidnapping Crises in Nigeria

The high level of crises in Nigeria today has made it so imperative to interrogate the socio-economic and political condition in the country with a view to ascertaining the factors that cause insecurity in Nigeria with a bid to fashioning out a way out of the condition of insecurity in order to enthrone an atmosphere of sustainable peace in the country. The level of insecurity is so high to the extent that the American government cautioned its citizens not to travel to visit 20 states in Nigeria, citing armed robbery, kidnapping and terrorism among others, as reasons for the advice. The recent killings in Benue, Taraba, River and even the herd's men threat to Ekiti state are clearly sings of insensitivity to governance by the present government. The president is expected to fight the Fulani herd's men the way he did to IPOB and Boko Haram in the north. The slow action of the president to 73 persons kill in Benue State shows secret ethnic cleaning. The present government has shown it inability to management crises as couldn't fight the threat from Miytti Allah. When there is governance, the people are sure of security (Abass, 2012). The clashes between herdsmen and farmers in some

states in Nigeria, especially in Benue, Taraba and Kaduna states should not be allowed to generate further by incitement and intemperate statements. The committee set up by the government to solve this problem must come out with a holistic solution which will deal with the problems of encroachment into farmlands, incitement and credible plans to integrate the herdsmen fully into the Nigerian society (Akinkuolie, 2018, Ajayi, and Allagenyi,2001).

The grazing of animals on cattle trails in the 21st century is to say the least antiquated. The focus should therefore be on modernization of cattle rearing which will maximize the benefits therein in terms of job creation, food security, and eventually end the vexatious farmer's/ herdsmen conflicts. India, China, USA, Pakistan and countries with large populations depend on milk and dairy products to fight hunger, malnutrition, unemployment and promote social harmony. India is a good example with an annual production of 163 million metric tons of milk which is about 10% of world's output. In India, cattle are reared within the confines of village communities, and farmer's cooperatives, mainly for milk production and rarely for the meat. The attachment to the cattle in India is so strong that it is called mother, which in a sense is true because the cow provides food and nourishment for the country's huge population. The European dairy farm model is also within confined paddocks which in most cases are not much bigger than a football pitch. The animal fodder is grown on location or in other farms which specialize in growing hays, grains and other animal feeds? (Rashid, 2012). The milk produced in these farms are collected, pasteurized and packed in local dairy plants for local and worldwide consumption as infant foods, cheese, yoghurt, butter and other dairy products. The average milk yield per cow in Europe is between 40-50 liters per day as compared to the paltry 1-2 liters yield of the Nigerian cow due to poor feeding, poor health and stress on the grazing trails. The milk producing years of a cow is about 5-7 years, after which it is culled for the meat. The profit in the industry is derived mainly from the dairy products which by some estimates could be in excess of 15,000 USD per milking cow per year. In Nigeria, cattle are reared mainly for the beef and minimally for the milk, which takes away the bulk of the profit in the business. The focus should therefore be on milk production which would contribute substantially to the national economy and at the same time stop the perennial conflicts between herdsmen and farmers in the country. The establishment of ranches and grazing lands may seem attractive and a simple way out of the herdsmen/ farmers clashes. The constraints of land and land ownership in tribal areas are also a big challenge. Ranches are established in countries with huge pastoral lands, like in the lush Pampas of Argentina, grass lands, which alone covers over 700,000 square kilometers of land mass or about 80% of Nigeria's entire territory. It is the same with the Prairies of USA/ Canada and the mighty Eurasia Steppes in Russia, which is about 17 times the size of Nigeria. The Indian and European models are therefore best suited for the Nigerian situation. Dairy farming however requires special skills and a certain level of education, which the itinerant herdsmen do not possess for now.

However, their native and rustic skills should be a useful asset which would accelerate their integration into modern animal husbandry methods. The education of the

nomadic herdsmen should therefore be given priority as the first and most important step in the conversion and integration process. The existing nomadic educational system is not good enough. It must be modernized with added agricultural technical skills which would be useful in the field. The Federal Government should take the lead in establishing the proposed dairy plants in states which are ready to accept them. The private sector and foreign investors will thereafter follow the footsteps of the government and key into the programme. The tension in the country is now so high that grazing should be limited to states which are more receptive to the Fulani people or are of predominantly Fulani ethnic group, such as Adamawa, Kebbi, Sokoto, Zamfara, Bauchi and Jigawa states. The eventual success of the ventures would attract more states and investors to the project. For now, grazing trails should not be imposed on states which are still hurting from the clashes and those adverse to it.

Tackle Desertification

According to research findings a sandy desert occupies about 35 to 40 percent of the land mass of frontline Nigerian States of Borno, Yobe, Jigawa, Kano, Katsina, Zamfara, Sokoto and Kebbi. Over the years, the desert has consumed different parts of the region due to deforestation and pastoralism. This has encouraged many Fulani herdsmen to move from their base in these states, southwards. The middle belt and other parts of Nigeria are bearing the brunt. To forestall this continued migration, the government needs to encourage reforestation and irrigational farming (Abbas, 2009, Herdsmen and Farmers Conflicts in North-Eastern Nigeria (Rashid, 2018).

Bridge the Indigenes - Settler differences

When the Fulani's find themselves in the farmer's territory despite spending decades in the middle belt region, they are still regarded as settlers by the indigenes. This difference should be bridged through regular meetings, social gatherings, festivals and sporting events.

Ranching Zone

This is a key factor the government, herdsmen and farmers have to agree on. A large expanse of land set aside solely for grazing should be declared as ranching zone (Figure 1). This should be established across the six geopolitical zones of Nigeria. It will go a long way in reducing the tension between the farmers and the herdsmen.

Fulani and their cow grazing on a farm land



Figure 1: Fulani and their cow grazing

Source: <https://guardian.ng/opinion/herdsmen-farmers-clashes-problems-and-solutions>

Conclusion

This paper focuses on the effect of herdsmen, banditry and kidnapping on food security in Nigeria. Herdsmen/farmers banditry and kidnapping crises disrupt government activities and cause panic to the public. Furthermore, the use of police and courts to resolve crises between Fulani herdsmen, banditry and kidnapping by government has been ineffective. This has contributed to the frequency of the crises especially since early 1980s sequel to the democratic dispensation. All these have exacerbated chronic insecurity that have encouraged the crises parties to take responsibility for their own security and to defend themselves, which is a threat to the sustainability of the federation.

Suggestions

The following suggestions are made for proper crises resolutions between the Fulani herdsmen and farmers. Experts should be assembled to map out the duration, strategy and timelines for the transition plan. As there is no miracle model for solving the problems, the plan should simultaneously pursue a number of models including:

- international Modern ranching can be pursued as one of the possible models in areas with lower population densities in the North East (Sambisa Game Reserve in Borno State) and North West (GidanJaja Grazing Reserve in Zamfara State); Semi-intensive systems of animal husbandry should be pursued accompanied with requisite investment in infrastructure, training, extension, marketing and animal health service delivery in conjuncture with the private sector;
- The traditional form of pastoralism should continue for a period to be agreed upon with some improvements (in the form of coordinated mobility between wet and dry season grazing areas and effective management of farmers and pastoralists relations);
- iv. Use of and development of grazing reserves to target pastoralists with large stocks where skills for pasture production, large milk production, etc can be promoted.

Development of integrated crop-livestock systems with farmers and pastoralists being encouraged to keep some animals in their farms.

- In order to meet the feeding needs of herds, alternative low water and drought resistant grasses should be produced, in response to the impact of desertification on fodder production.
- There is need for viable NGOs on farmer-herdsmen crises management, especially in the areas of awareness, education, prevention, and amelioration. Furthermore, nongovernmental organizations should support livestock-centered livelihoods including cattle herding, not only in crises mitigation but also in the support of grassroots innovations and in influencing favourable national policies.
- Government should be firm and fair in its resolution and implementation of decisions. Traditional and local leaders should be well involved in finding solutions to herdsmen-farmer crises. The committees proposed above must have representatives of the local leadership.
- The atmosphere between farming and pastoral communities is extremely bitter and negative. Support should be provided for creative writers in Nollywood, Kannywood, radio and television to create new narratives showing how the interaction between the two groups could be peaceful and mutually beneficial. Above all, the National Orientation Agency (NOA), as an institution with presence across the 774 Local Government Areas (LGAs) of the country, should provide these critical services.
- In addition to the search for improving security in the zone through the use of security forces and mobilizing the civil population, some policy decisions are required. The military should be encouraged to pursue the path of ranching as it has already decided to. The Sambisa Grazing Reserve (4800 ha) is an ideal and symbolic place to take-off by establishing a ranch run by the military. It would significantly improve the security situation in the zone and encourage cooperation between pastoralists and the military. In the North West, the military should also be encouraged to create ranches in the GidanJaja Grazing Reserve (565,000 ha) for the same purpose of improving security and cooperation with pastoralists.
- The programme for the country's transition to modern forms of animal husbandry must be accelerated and funded. The national stock would require rapid improvement and modernisation to meet market demands for meat, milk, hides and other products from the industry:
 - Commercial ranches should be established in some of the sparsely populated zones in the North East and North West;
 - The business community should be encouraged through policy measures to invest in the establishment of modern dairy farms;
 - Sensitisation
 - programmes should be undertaken on the values of livestock improvement and breeding centres for the production of quality heifers to improve pastoral stock should be developed all over the country.
- Efforts should be made towards modeling best practices of pastoral-farmer relations as evident in countries such as Chad, Ethiopia and Niger, where the existence of institutionalized and functional mechanisms for pre-empting and resolving conflicts between farmers and pastoralists enable them to live in peace.

- The Nigerian Government shall come up with poverty alleviation programmes and employment opportunities, targeting youths who are mostly involved in abductions and kidnappings out of economic frustration, such as unemployment.
- Poverty alleviation programmes should also be directed towards addressing high incidence of poverty among women and children who are vulnerable segment of the population mostly kidnapped by terrorists or insurgents and trapped by organised criminals, ending up in abduction for force labour.
- To effectively combat kidnapping, the government shall also fight insurgency because the various insurgent groups in the northern and southern parts of the country are all resorting to kidnapping of innocent population in their efforts to further their causes.
- Anti-terrorism programmes should be made side-by-side with anti-banditry and kidnapping programmes in Nigeria.
- Foreign governments should also participate in the war on banditry and kidnapping in Nigeria because the activity is a transnational crime usually involving movement out of the country.
- Non-governmental organisations should also be part of the war on herdsmen, banditry and kidnapping in Nigeria and neighbouring states, through awareness creation programmes.
- The law enforcement agents, such as the police as well as other agencies meant for anti-human trafficking shall also intensify surveillance on the fight against herdsmen, banditry and kidnapping. They shall be receiving special trainings on how to identify victims of herdsmen banditry and kidnapping and be able to take them from the kidnappers without them being hurt.
- Constitutionally, there is need for severe penalties against herdsmen, banditry and kidnappers. This might serve as deterrence for those already involved and those willing to be involved.

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Chapter 14

Insecurity: Police Brutality and Human Rights Violation in Nigeria.

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Abstract

The study examined Insecurity: Police Brutality and Human Rights Violation in Nigeria. Three (3) specific objectives and three (3) research questions were raised to guide the study. The study employed a descriptive survey method. Questionnaire was the instrument used for data collection. The total population for the study is three hundred and ninety- six (396) staff of Auchi polytechnic. The entire population was selected for the study. A proportionate stratified random sampling technique was adopted to ensure that the entire element (stratum) that constituted the population is represented in the study. The study revealed that Police brutality that violate human rights and lead to insecurity manifest in different forms such as torture to extract confession and information, illegal detention, kick-back or bribery, corruption, intimidation, molestation, rape, extra judicial killings and disobedience of court orders. Poverty, Illiteracy, ignorant, lack of diligent prosecution of violators, ethnic/ religion sentiment and attitude of government in power are the major challenges facing human rights enforcement in Nigeria. The government should be sincere in the fight against corruption and human rights violation by ensuring that some miscreants and unscrupulous elements within the Nigerian Police Force are punish appropriate for crime committed to serve as deterrent to others.

Keywords: Insecurity, Police Brutality, Human Rights Violation, Nigeria.

Introduction

There is no doubt that the spate of insecurity and police brutality in the country is alarming. There are several security challenges due to police brutality which cut across the nooks and crannies of the country. The most recent one the “ENDSAR” protest due to the breach of human rights by the Nigeria police force. Onifade, Imhonopi and Urim (2013) assert that the challenges of insecurity have assumed formidable dimensions forcing the country’s political and economic managers and indeed the entire nation to the rue, the loss of their loved ones, investment and absence of safety in most parts of the country. The rate at which innocent blood is wasted on a daily basis and the display of bottled-up frustration by the citizens remains a cause for concern (Adegoke,2014). Nwaze (2011) explains that the rate of blood shed during the Nigeria civil war is a Child’s play compared to police brutality. The role is emphasized in the 1999 constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria that “the security and welfare of the people shall be the primary purpose of the government. The government shall delegate the duty of maintenance of internal security to the Nigeria

police. The Nigeria police are by law saddled with the responsibility of preventing and detecting crime, preserving peace and order and enforcing all laws and regulations. They are expected to perform these roles efficiently and effectively. But today, the majority of the people are of the opinion that the Nigeria police falls below standards of performance (Adegoke,2014).

Odekunle(2014) argued that there is no need to prove the non-performance of the Nigeria police in the present condition. Rather, what is needed is the identification of the major inadequacies, problems and obstacles that are responsible for the situation. The Nigeria police are part and parcel of the civil society. Therefore, aside from other numerous problems which have incapacitate their performance over the years, they have human problems that not only aggravate its material insufficiencies, but are also of tremendous adverse import on its general performance from one day to the next. Poor funding for major development of the force such as training, logistics, arms and ammunitions etc. and under-utilization of funds are cogs in the wheel of adequate police performance. Morality among the police is not a virtue(Adegoke,2014).Alemika (1999) cited in Adegoke, (2014) discuss that corruption and extortion among the police is a serious issue because they are expected to be moral as law enforcement agents. In the quest of officers to meet up with mate in the society they ended up slaughtering efficient and effective performance of duty on the slab of corruptions and extortions.

Statement of the problem

Human right issues have become important subjects in Nigeria today. These rights include: freedom from unlawful imprisonment, torture, execution or unfair and unequal treatment, etc. The scope of the rights is civil, political, economic, social, legal, environmental or cultural rights. They are universal, inalienable, indivisible, non-discriminatory and fundamental to human existence (Anatsui and Azeez, 2011). An attempt to violate these rights brings about insecurity like in the case of “END SARS” protest. The police force is one of the institutions created to mediate in the process of social change, especially in situations of the gross violations of the rights of citizens and the question of the legitimacy of state apparatuses. The roles of the police in the maintenance of law and order have been increasingly overreaching, in the process of law enforcement the rights of citizen have been duly violated through violent brutalities and repression to the extent that the Nigeria’s internal security mechanism is seeking for how best to solve these hydra-headed monsters (Oromareghake, Oluka and Adishi, 2018). However, there is hardly any country or a place on the earth surface where police brutality and human rights are not being grossly violated with impunity. It is against this background that study attempts to investigate Insecurity: Police Brutality and Human Rights Violation in Nigeria.

Objectives of the study

The objectives are:

- a. To ascertain the forms of Police Brutality that Violate Human Rights and Causes Insecurity in Nigeria
- b. To determine the extent Police Brutality Violate Human Rights and Causes Insecurity in Nigeria

- c. To identify the challenges faced in the Enforcement of Human Rights in Nigeria by Police Force

Research questions

The following research questions were raised to guide this study

- a. What are the forms of Police Brutality that Violate Human Rights and Causes Insecurity in Nigeria?
- b. To what extent Police Brutality, Violate Human Rights and Causes Insecurity in Nigeria?
- c. What are the challenges faced in the Enforcement of Human Rights in Nigeria by Police Force?

Literature Review

Section 214 of the Constitution of Federal Republic of Nigeria 2011 as Amended, specifically established the Nigeria Police Force and ascribe to it the function of maintenance of public order and public safety as it may consider necessary. Adebayo (2009) pointed out that the police force is a public institution charged with the responsibilities of protecting and safeguarding the life and properties of citizens within the territorial boundaries of a nation. All over the world, the importance and relevance of the police institution have been recognized. This recognition is predicated on the need to secure society's interest in terms of rights, duties and obligations. Berk (2004) affirms that the role of the police within a democratic environment be hinged upon a mutually reinforced attributes of legitimization and popular empowerment which would promote the actualization of popular interest and aspiration. However, the role of the Nigeria police within this context has unfortunately been predicated upon the violation of law and order, crudity, corruption and fragrant disregard to the rule. Indeed, the actions of the police in different parts of the nation has been characterized by brutality, ineptitude, corruption, and all sorts of social vices that contradicts all known principles of a democratic system of government. The main role of the police is to protect and safeguard the lives and properties of the citizens within the territorial boundaries of a country. This recognition is predicated on the need to secure, protect and safeguard lives and properties of the citizens that should not be arbitrary and its exercise must be circumscribed by set of rules with respect to its limits that is in tandem with public perception, legitimacy principles and democratic tenet. In doing this, it is deemed useful to involve human rights applicable operational principles, particularly under democratic governance. This operational principle entails that the police must recognize that ultimate authority on key security matters must rest with elected representatives and that security organization operates in accordance with international human rights instruments and constitutional laws. In addition, the security of lives and properties must be managed using disciplinary approach and that civil society must have the means and capacity to monitor security forces and provide constructive input into the political debate on security policy (Oromareghake, Oluka and dishi, 2018).

The violation of human rights indeed characterized the operations of the form of extra judicial killings, summary execution of suspects, torture to extract confession and

information, illegal detention, kick-back, disobedience of court orders intimidation and all manners of abuse. The integrity of the police has been eroded. The Nigerian people have no confidence on the police especially in regards to protecting their lives and properties. Meanwhile, the police are the most visible government agent through whom citizens often access the character of a government and political system. This is so because the police are the guardian of the status- quo, the first point of call when a crime is committed or about to be committed, the gate-way to the criminal justice system, that the decision of a police man on the street or in the course of discharging his duty either closes or lubricates the criminal justice system. The actions and behaviours of the Nigerian police reflect the political character of society as well as what those in power are willing to tolerate and condone. The constant violation of human rights and maintenance of repressive attribute has a negative impact on the survival of Nigeria nascent democracy (Oromareghake, Oluka and Adishi, 2018). Nigerian Police Force (NPF) is the internal key law enforcement agency in the country. Unfortunately, it has to contend with a lot of allegations and counter-accusations of disrespect for human rights. Aborisade (2017) opines that officers of the NPF right from its establishment in 1930 till date have been involved in unprofessional, corrupt, and criminal conducts. Some have also distinguished themselves in an exemplary manner, working in difficult and dangerous conditions. According to Olusegun (2017), the Nigerian Police Force (NPF) is tasked with law enforcement but the methods often adopted by officers of the force have led to the humiliation of fundamental human rights of citizens in most cases. Instances abound where the police have adopted both lethal and uncivil force to either quells a protest, arrest or generally enforce the law

The main function of the Nigeria police force is to protect and safeguard the lives and properties of the citizens within the territorial boundaries of a country. This recognition is predicated on the need to secure, protect and safeguard lives and properties of the citizens that should not be arbitrary and its exercise must be circumscribed by set of rules with respect to its limits that is in tandem with public perception, legitimacy principles and democratic tenet. In doing this, it is deemed useful to involve human rights applicable operational principles, particularly under democratic governance. This operational principle entails that the police must recognize that ultimate authority on key security matters must rest with elected representatives and that security organization operates in accordance with international human rights instruments and constitutional laws (Nevbouser, 2009).the constant violation of human rights and maintenance of repressive attribute has a negative impact on the survival of Nigeria nascent democracy. The violation of human rights indeed characterized the operations of the form of extra judicial killings, summary execution of suspects, torture to extract confession and information, illegal detention, kick-back, disobedience of court orders intimidation and all manners of abuse. The integrity of the police has been eroded. The Nigerian people have no confidence on the police especially with regard to protecting their lives and properties (Anatsui and Azeez, 2011).Nigerian Police force is now agent of brutalization, insecurity and violation of human rights.

Elizabeth (2010) cited in Anatsui and Azeez(2011) posits that a 'Right' is called freedom and benefit or entitlements that are guaranteed to people naturally and are supported by law. Humanrights attach to all persons equally by virtue of their humanity irrespective of their race, nationality, membership, of any particular social group. They specify the minimum conditions for human dignity and a tolerable life. Mridushi, (2010) cited in Anatsui and Azeez (2011) opines that they are neither created nor abrogated by any government and are rights of all human beings. It entails both rights and obligations which are ascribed "naturally" meaning that they are not earned and cannot be denied on the basis of race, creed, ethnicity or gender. They include the right to life, liberty, freedom of thought and expression, equal treatment before the law and so on. These rights are often advanced as legal rights and protected by the rule of law. However, they are distinct from and prior to law and can be used as standards for formulating or criticizing both local and international law. The fundamental human rights of every Nigerians are embodied in the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, Chapter IV Section 33 - 43. The citizen's Forum for Constitution Reform (CFCR), 2004 added more fundamental human rights to existing. These include rights to education, right to health, right to clean and healthy environmental, spousal right, right to work under safe and healthy condition right to culture, right to mothers, etc (Anatsui& and zeez, 2011).These rights are fundamental, universal indivisible, independent and interrelated. The scope of human rights cut across all sphere of life which includes: civil right, political economic, social, cultural, legal, environmental, religious etc.

Universal nature of human rights means that human rights cannot be denied on the basis of race, creed, ethnicity or geographical boundary. Various rights that cannot be violated under any circumstances are listed in the International Human Rights Documents. The 1993 World Conference on Human Rights affirmed the crucial connection betweeninternational peace and security; the rule of law and human rights placing them all within the larger context of democratization and development. The wide spread ratification ofinternational human rights agreements is taken as evidence that these are internationally shared values. According to Michell, (2003), when human rights norms are in place, certain requirements are imposed on government. It requires that the conduct of government and military forces must comply with these standards. It also legitimizes the complaints of individuals in those cases where fundamental rights and freedom are not respected. Such rules constitute a standard for the conduct of government and the administration of force. They can be used as universal and non-discriminatory guideline for formulating or criticizing law and as rules for proper conduct.

Methodology

This study employs a descriptive design to assess Insecurity: Police Brutality and Human Rights Enforcement in Nigeria. The area of the study in this research work is Auchi polytechnic .Some staff in Auchi polytechnic were selected and used in this study. The population of the study therefore is three hundred and ninety-six (396) (Auchi Polytechnic Staff Directory, 2019).The entire population of three hundred and

ninety-six (396) were therefore selected and used as sample size in the study. A proportionate stratified random sampling technique was adopted to ensure that the entire element (stratum) that constituted the population is represented in the study. That is, respondents irrespective of the departments will be represented in this study. According to Aina (2004) proportionate stratified random sampling ensure greater representativeness of the sample relative to the population and guarantees that minority constituent of the population is represented in the sample. The research instrument used in this study is the questionnaire. The questionnaire. The questionnaire is made up of two parts. The first part consists of biographical data such as occupation, age, education qualification, sex etc. The second part contains structured statements aimed at eliciting data on Mass Media, Police Brutality and Human Rights Enforcement in Nigeria. The data obtained from the copies of questionnaire retrieved from the respondents was analyzed using simple percentage and frequency counts to answer the research questions. The formula for the analysis is presented as follows:

$$\frac{\text{No of Responses}}{\text{Total No of Respondents}} \times 100$$

Result and Discussion of Findings

Table1: Returned Rate of the Questionnaire

Departments	No. Of Questionnaire Administered	No. Of Questionnaire Returned Completed	%	No. Of Questionnaire Loss And Uncompleted	%
Library	35	33	8.3	2	0.5
Sciencelabouraboratory technology	80	64	16.2	16	4.0
Civil engineering	48	39	9.9	9	2.3
Agricultural and Bio-environmental science	26	26	6.6	--	--
Bursary	128	92	23.2	36	9.1
Works & maintenance	79	76	19.2	3	0.76
Total	396	330	83.3	66	16.7

Source: Field study, 2021.

Table1 shows the returned rates of the questionnaire administered to the respondents. It is obvious from the table that the total of 396 copies of the questionnaire were administered and 330(83.3%) was returned completed. While, 66(16.7%) were loss. This study recorded a high returned rate. This high returned rate was achieved because the researchers personally and also employed some research assistants to administer and retrieved the questionnaire which invariably resulted in this high response rate.

Table 2: Gender Distribution of the Respondents

Gender	No. of Respondents	Percentage
Male	152	46.1
Female	178	53.9
Total	330	100

Source: Field survey, 2021.

Table 2 reveals the gender distribution of the respondents with female 178 (53.9%) and male 152 (46.1%). This implies that the majority of the respondents used in this study are females.

Table 3: Educational Qualification of the Respondents

Marital status	No of Respondents	Percentage
SSCE	134	40.6
NCE/ND	120	36.4
HND/BSC	46	13.9
PGD	8	2.4
MSC	18	5.5
Ph.D	4	1.2
Total	330	100

Source: Field survey, 2021

Table 3 shows the Level of the respondents. SSCE have the highest number of respondents with 134 (40.6%), followed by NCE/ND with 120 (36.7%). Others are HND/BSC with 46(13.9%), MSC with 18(5.5%), PGD 8(2.4%) and Ph.D 4(1.2%).

Table 4: Age Distribution of the Respondents

Age	No of Respondents	Percentage
18 - 25	161	48.8
26 - 33	73	22.1
34- and above	96	29.1
Total	330	100

Source: Field survey, 2021.

Table 4 reveals the age distribution of the respondents. Respondents within the age bracket of 18 - 25 with 161 (48.8%) are of the majority. Followed by respondents within the age bracket of 34 and above with 96(29.1%). While respondents within the age bracket of 26-33with 83 (23.4%) came last. From the above analysis, the majority of the respondents used in the study are relatively young.

Table 5: Forms of Police Brutality that Violate Human Rights and Causes Insecurity in Nigeria.

Forms	A		D		UD		Total	
	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%
Extra judicial killings	311	94.2	19	5.8	--	--	330	100
Summary execution of suspects	167	50.6	100	30.3	63	19.1	330	100
Torture to extract confession and information	279	84.5	14	4.2	37	11.2	330	100
Illegal detention	298	90.3	22	6.7	10	3.0	330	100
kick-back/bribery/corruption	288	87.3	12	3.6	30	9.1	330	100
Disobedience of Court Orders	189	57.3	77	23.3	64	19.4	330	100
Intimidation/molestation/rape	281	85.2	23	7.0	26	7.9	330	100

Source: Field survey, 2021

Table 5 shows that most of the respondents agreed to the following as major Forms of Police Brutality that Violate Human Rights and Causes Insecurity in Nigeria. Extra judicial killings with 311(94.2%), Illegal detention with 298(90.3%), kick-back/bribery/corruption with 288(87.3%), Intimidation/molestation/rape with 281(85.2%), 279(84.5%) Torture to extract confession and information with 279(84.5%) and Disobedience of court orders with 189(57.3%).

Table 6: The Extent Police Brutality Violated Human Rights and Cause Insecurity in Nigeria

The extent police brutality violated human rights	A		D		UD		Total	
	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%
Very high extent	287	87.0	13	3.9	30	9.1	330	100
High extent	264	80.0	32	9.7	34	10.3	330	100
Low extent	111	33.6	87	26.4	137	41.5	330	100
Very low extent	68	33.6	128	38.8	134	40.6	330	100
None	54	16.4	146	44.2	130	39.4	330	100

Source: Field survey, 2021

Table 6 reveals the extent police brutality violated human rights and caused insecurity in Nigeria. A majority of the respondents agreed with 287(87.0%) that police brutality

violates human rights and caused insecurity to a very high extent. While, 264(80.0%) also agreed police brutality violated human rights and caused insecurity in Nigeria

Table 7: The challenges faced by Nigeria Police Force in the Enforcement of Human Rights

Challenges	A		D		UD		Total	
	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%
Lack of diligent prosecution of violators	282	85.5	48	14.5	--	--	330	100
Poverty	312	94.5	18	5.5	--	--	330	100
Attitude of government in power	246	74.6	75	22.7	9	2.7	330	100
Illiteracy /ignorant	291	88.2	39	11.8	--	--	330	100
Ethnic/ religion sentiment	279	84.5	51	15.5	--	--	330	100

Source: Field survey, 2021

Table 7 shows the challenges faced by Nigeria Police Force in the Enforcement of Human Rights. Most of the respondents used in this study agreed that poverty is one of the major challenges faced in the enforcement of human rights in Nigeria with 312(94.5%), followed by Illiteracy /ignorant with 291(88.2%). Others are Lack of diligent prosecution of violators 282(85.5%), Ethnic/ religion sentiment with (84.5%), Attitude of government in power with 246(74.6%).

Conclusion

Police brutality violates human rights and lead to insecurity. Police brutality manifest in different forms such as torture to extract confession and information, illegal detention, kick-back or bribery, corruption, intimidation, molestation, rape, extra judicial killings and disobedience of court orders. All these can lead to insecurity in the country. Oromareghake, Oluka and Adishi (2018) reported that violation of human rights indeed characterized the operations of the form of extra judicial killings, summary execution of suspects, torture to extract confession and information, illegal detention, kick-back, disobedience of court orders, intimidation and all manners of abuse. The integrity of the police has been eroded. The authors further added that the Nigerian people have no confidence on the police especially in regards to protecting their lives and properties. The Police force is supposed to be the most visible government agent through whom citizens often access the character of a government and political system. This is so because the police are the guardian of the status- quo, the first point of call when a crime is committed or about to be committed and the gate-way to the criminal justice system. Alemika (1999) cited in Adegoke, (2014) discuss that corruption and extortion among the police is a serious issue because they are expected to be moral as law enforcement agents. In the quest of officers to meet up

with mate in the society they ended up slaughtering efficient and effective performance of duty on the slab of corruptions and extortions.

Police brutality violates human rights to a very large extent which lead to insecurity. The end result of the various forms of police brutalities and human rights violation is insecurity. Berk (2004:28) affirms that the role of the police within a democratic environment must be hinged upon a mutually reinforced attributes of legitimization and popular empowerment which would promote the actualization of popular interest and aspiration. However, the role of the Nigeria police within this context has unfortunately been predicated upon the violation of law and order, crudity, corruption and fragrant disregard to the rule. Indeed, the actions of the police in different parts of the nation has been characterized by brutality, ineptitude, corruption, and all sorts of social vices that contradicts all known principles of a democratic system of government.

However, poverty, Illiteracy, ignorant, lack of diligent prosecution of violators, ethnic/ religion sentiment and attitude of government in power are the major challenges facing human rights enforcement in Nigeria. Nzarga (2014) reveals that illiteracy/ lack of adequate training, lack of diligent prosecution of violators, poverty, ethnic/religious sentiments, esprit de corps and attitude of concerned authorities are some of the factors responsible for the aggravation of Human Rights violations in Nigeria.

Recommendations

The following recommendations are hereby made:

1. Civil society groups should not relent in the orientation, enlightenment, mobilization and aggressive campaign against police brutality and ensure that all citizens' fundamental human rights are protected and respected by the Nigerian Police Force in order to prevent insecurity in the country.
2. The government should be sincere in the fight against corruption and human rights violation by ensuring that some miscreants and unscrupulous elements within the Nigerian Police Force are punish appropriate for crime committed to serve as deterrent to others
3. Government in power should put the necessary machinery in place to improve the economy of the country in order to liberate the majority of the people from the shackles and grip of penury.
4. There is need for adequately training and retraining of men and officers of the Nigerian Police Force on security best practice and how to strictly observe and respect the basic rights of people in the execution of their duties.
5. The government should try as much as possible to improve the remunerations and allowances of the officers and men of the Nigerian police force to reduce bribery, kick-back all forms of corrupt practices.

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Chapter 15

The Ungoverned Spaces of the Unsecured Borderlands: Trade Relations and Armed Banditry in Sokoto-Zamfara-Katsina axis of Nigeria-Niger Border

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Abstract

Nigeria-Niger borderland had been known as a relatively one of the most peaceful border areas in Africa. Recently however, the area became a theater of conflict in form of insurgency, cattle rustling, kidnapping facilitated by the proliferation of small arms and light weapons. Researches indicate that armed bandits who perpetrate violence in Nigeria's north-west seek sanctuary along the border with Niger as base where they get new recruits. However one major challenge which has not been well addressed in the literature is paucity of information on the correlation/Nexus between the violence in Nigeria's north-west on one hand and the volume of border trade among the communities proximate to the border. More problematic is the complex nature of the violence as it escalates from armed conflicts between mainly Fulani nomads and rural communities and a phenomenal expansion of cattle rustling. Sokoto-Zamfara-Katsina axis of Nigeria's border with Niger Republic is the most porous border Nigeria has with its neighbors, with large volume of the trade between the two countries taking place informally. Paradoxically, Nigeria's border closure since August, 2019 has witnessed an upsurge in violence committed by large-scale criminal gangs, cattle rustling, kidnapping for ransom, armed robbery, pillage, and attacks on gold miners and traders in the area. The involvement of local institutions/traditional rulers in the conflict have created incentive to local actors, particularly community-based groups including Lakuruje, Miyetti-Allah Cattle Breeders Association of Nigeria (MACBAN), vigilante groups Yan Sakai/Yan Banga in responding to the violent threats. As these groups are mobile, the conflict became difficult to contain and thus, spill across the ungoverned spaces thereby making the borderlands unsecured.

Keywords: Banditry, Border trade, Nigeria, Niger, Trans-border crimes

Introduction

The phenomena of cross-border crimes such as armed banditry, insurgency, sectarian militancy and small arms proliferation have constituted critical security threats which badly affect and slow-down socio-economic development and political stability in West Africa. The various factors and/or actors which exacerbate the fragile security situation in the region since the early 1990s must be fully understood in order to mitigate the adverse effects on the economy and society of the region. The persistent security threats posed by the activities of different individuals and groups that engage

in movement across the borders require an in-depth investigation with a view to understanding the nature and dimension of the challenges.

Nigeria's North-West geo-political zone is gradually becoming a major regional theatre of violence and appears to be as dangerous as Northeast where Boko Haram terrorists have wreaked havoc in the past twelve years. The conflict in the Sokoto-Zamfara-Katsina axis initially appeared as farmer-herder disputes over access to land, has now been transformed into full pledge conflict involving many actors with various interests thus posing national, regional and international security (International Crisis Group, 2020:2). The area has been beset by the violence between herders and farmers, was now compounded by an explosion in criminal activity and infiltration by jihadist groups into the region as reported in some media (Africa in Transition, 2020:2; Daily Trust, September, 2020). Over the years, the security in the region has deteriorated from long running competition over land and water resources between predominantly Fulani Herders and mainly Hausa farmers. Both groups have overtime mobilized various armed groups (*Yan Sakai/Yan Banga, Yan Lakurue*) often referred to as "vigilantes" and "bandits" for protection. Studies on armed banditry in the region have shown that the conflict is multi-faceted and can be divided among three major categories, which overlap in certain ways (International Crisis Group, 2020:5). The first category includes violence pitting mainly ethnic Hausa sedentary farmers and vigilantes acting on their behalf against predominantly Fulani roving herders. Nigerian authorities refer to the latter generically as "bandits". These militias operate in a largely decentralised manner under local commanders' autonomous control. They are motivated first and foremost by fighting on behalf of herders in their disputes with farmers, but many rogue elements have taken up criminal activities as well. The second category involves violence committed by criminal gangs involved in large-scale cattle rustling, kidnapping for ransom, armed robbery, pillage, and attacks on gold miners and traders. The authorities sometimes also refer to these gangs too as "bandits". Large volume of literature erroneously believed that the conflict has followed the traditional line of farmer-herder conflict where Fulani pastoralist encroach into farmlands through the use of sophisticated weapons and the violence erupts. For instance Olayaku puts it in this way:

The attacks by Fulani herdsmen have in recent years taken more sophisticated dimensions with the use of new types of weapons and communication devices. In consequence, the sedentary agrarian communities have resorted to self-defense through local vigilante groups...This has further aggravated violence, with destruction of lives and properties (Olayoku, 2014:1).

Evidence on ground however suggests the contrary. The geographical and historical trajectories of the region, being strategically located along the Sahel, provides easy ground for the growth of trade among the communities straddling Nigeria-Niger border areas. Due to porous nature of the borderlands, trade in small arms and light weapons among well organized syndicate led to the proliferation of armed gangs operating from ungoverned forest areas connecting the borderlands, engaging in cattle rustling, kidnapping for ransom and armed robbery (See for instance, Ayissi,

and Sall, 2005). The breakdown of authority at the local and state levels has created the enabling environment for the emergence of a complex informal security sector in the region. The emergence of competing and rival armed and criminal gangs in the region in the name of vigilantism and reprisal attacks has created ungovernable space. In as much as armed banditry has created condition of unsecured borderlands, the activities of vigilante groups in countering the bandits further intensified the role of criminal groups in creating their own governance structures. This makes movement along the traditional trade corridor trade corridor extremely dangerous. This invariably created condition that crippled the local economies of the neighboring border communities with food production, pastoralism, animal husbandry and cross-border trade dropping considerably (WANEP, 2020:7).

Given this situation, it is possible therefore, to expect the prevalence of informal institutions taking over the control of trade routes in the region thereby determining cross-border trade relations among communities living along the border areas. The Nigeria's North West border with Niger republic, as indicated in number of studies, is one of the porous border areas Nigeria had with its neighbors as it cut across well established historical, ethnic, political, and cultural linkages that also predated colonial rule (Asiwaju and Barkindo, 1993). The region had been and is to date heterogeneous with varied ecological/geographical zones inhabited by various political communities with different socio-cultural and linguistic orientation (Yaqub, 2011:201). In contemporary times however, cross-border interactions in this region has been essentially economic. The post independence period, particularly the era of oil boom in Nigeria, saw an intensification of cross-border activities (Balami, 2006: 11). The commodities that are traded across Nigeria-Niger borderlands include foodstuffs, grains, livestock, petroleum products, drugs, arms, currency, vehicles, and some re-exports (Golub, 2012:2). For many decades these economic ties between these border communities display an over whelming dependence upon the Nigerian economy (Leena & Melly, 2018:12). This dependence is manifested in the thriving cross-border trade. It is therefore clear that the major security concerns in the zone emanate from the cross-border flow of people and goods that are occasioned by the trade.

Forces and Drivers for armed Banditry in Nigeria's North-west

Prominent among these conditions are the scarcely governed hinterlands, forestlands and borderlines of the region. The northwestern hinterlands are marked by extremely dispersed rural settlements, separated by rangelands and farmlands that are susceptible to violent contestations (cf. Gaye 2018a). They are also interspersed by diverse forested landscapes, some of which are dotted by wetlands, rocks and caves. They are equally far separated from the centers of governance at the local and state levels. Most importantly, they are grossly under-policed to the point that makes them conducive to all forms of jungle criminality. Most attacks occur in remote villages, close to forested regions in the north-west where there is little security presence. These activities terrorize the local population and deprive them of their food and livelihoods (FATF-GIABA-GABAC 2016, 12). At some points, the forests are coterminous with the multiple porous borderlines in the frontiers of the region. The porosity of the borderlines is nearly total. They are ill delineated, under-policed and thus, grossly

under governed (Asiwaju, 2006). The consequence of this is the free-flow of illicit activities, often facilitated by criminal state and non-state actors (Barkindo & Lipede, 2007). These activities include smuggling, human and substance (including drugs) trafficking and a host of transnational organized crimes. The point being emphasized in the foregoing is that the peculiarity of the northwestern countryside and frontiers has made them liable to opportunistic exploitation by criminal gangs. The challenge has been complicated by the enormous landmasses of the region.

The discourse on the drivers of rural banditry in northwestern Nigeria will not be complete without a mention of the issue of arms proliferation. There has been an incremental influx of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALWs) into Nigeria from the Sahel since the fall of Ghadaffi's regime in Libya (Okoli and Lenshie 2018). These arms and weapons end up in the hands of terrorists, militants and bandits, who use them to terrorize individuals and communities. From the foregoing, it is evident that the incidence of rural banditry in northwestern Nigeria is symptomatic of a combination of factors. Thus, there is an avalanche of 'ungoverned', 'under-governed' and 'ungovernable' spheres within the territorial domain of the focal area. However, beyond this narrative is the salient question of state's functionality in relation to security and territorial governance (Okoli and Ugwu, 2019). The government at all levels has exhibited a woeful lethargy in dealing with national security emergencies. Essentially, therefore, while the menace of rural banditry subsists, the government has persistently failed to muster requisite political will and commitment to tackle the situation (Abubakar Liman, 2019).

Consequent upon changes in the management of border areas in the post-cold war and post 9/11 and the response of extremist networks in the Sahel, Nigeria border areas in the Sahel appears to become a theater of conflict among various competing militant groups. There are three competing narratives regarding the causes and nature of the problem of armed banditry and other related security challenges in the Sahelian region of the borderland. Some view the conflict as one of the effects of climate change, particularly decreasing amounts of rainfall, on the "scarcity" of arable land and pastures (Egwu, 2015:31). The drop in rainfall over the years translates into the scarcity of water, which in the context of a rapid population growth rate places pressure on land, and fuels intense conflicts between pastoralists and farmers whose livelihoods and survival are based on access to land. Another school of thought associates the growing insecurity with state failure due to corruption, the collapse of institutions of governance, de-industrialization, growing poverty, and a culture of impunity that pervades state and local governance which in turn affected borderland communities negatively. The latter can be explained in terms of porous borders and the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in the region (OECD/SWAC, 2020). Proponents of this view believed that arms have found their way into the region from the Maghreb following uprisings in North Africa and countries of the Sahel, including post-Ghaddafi Libya. Another line of thought has to do with conspiracy theories of insecurity in Nigeria. The narrative that is gaining wider currency in both policy and public circles is the view that the escalation of rural banditry is the handiwork of the

political opponents of the ruling party, who lost out during the 2015 and 2019 elections (International Crisis Group, 2020).

Going through the above would further led credence to the fact that border porosity has led to increase in different forms of crime which has undermine social and economic activities along most of the borderland communities in West Africa (Fall, 2005). It further heightened suspicion between countries, especially where the perpetrators of such criminalities could not be easily traced. The growing rate of cross-border crimes such as cattle rustling, kidnapping and armed banditry has recently become a nightmare across different parts of West Africa, especially Nigeria. In areas like Sokoto Zamfara and Katsina, which fall into frontline states in border regions of Nigeria and Niger Republic, acts of banditry of various proportions has become common and daily reality. Bandits in these areas in connivance with their counter parts in the Neighboring countries engaged in such acts of banditry and kidnapping. There is every reason to believe that some bandits in the area have some connections with some international terrorist networks. Aljazeera for instance has reported that the killing of 23 soldiers by bandits in Shimfida area of Jibia in Katsina state, and the death of five children from a bomb in Yammama village in the same state on 18 July seemingly lends credence to assertions that certain elements of the bandits are either linking up with other NSAGs in the northeast, or these NSAGs in the northeast are operating independently in the northwest (Al Jazeera 20/07/2020). Recently too, 8 Assistant Supritandant of Police (ASP) who were on a mission for security operation from Borno were abducted along Katsina-Zamfara axis on 16 November, 2020 (BBC Hausa Service, 16/11/2020). These and many happenings in the region presuppose an element of terrorists' networks involvement that operates across international boundaries.

Security reports indicate that the breakdown of authority at the local level has created the enabling environment for the emergence of a complex informal security sector in the border areas; competing rival armed and criminal gangs operate freely in the border villages and in some cases took sanctuary across borders (Oral Interviews, June, 2020). These forms of arm banditry seriously affect the livelihoods of the population living proximate to the borderland. It equally limit the special function of borderland areas as point of contact and absorber of inter-state conflict and diplomacy and it also crippled the local economy of the areas with food production, pastoralist and animal husbandry dropping to its lowest level. Areas mostly affected by these crimes are the Sahelian border regions of frontline countries of Niger Republic whose citizens in connivance with Nigerians were allegedly perpetrating such violence. For instance, the internal conflict in some parts of northern Nigeria tends to spread across state borders because armed groups relocate/migrate to other countries when defeated by counter insurgency efforts as seen in some parts of Sokoto, Zamfara and Katsina states. Insurgents in these areas relocate to some parts of Niger border areas when they were attacked by Nigerian armies (International Crisis Group, 2020). It is usual at this juncture to reappraise the following questions; what are the factors responsible for the growth of criminal activities related to banditry and the motives of various actors through ever changing strategy across the borderlands?; What are the

negative consequences of the growing wave of insecurity along the border areas on the trade relations amongst the communities proximate to Nigeria-Niger boundary? What is the role of local institutions/authorities/vigilantes in either containing the insecurity situation or otherwise? This article seeks proper answers to the afore-stated analytical posers in an attempt advance a theoretically rigorous discourse on the emerging banditry along Nigeria-Niger borderlands.

Contextual and Conceptual Framework

Borderlands are both melting pots and security hot spots often neglected in the development strategies of postcolonial states (Barkindo and Lipede, 2007). They are also an arena for cross-border crime and represent a dynamic place of historically fostered cultural and socio-economic exchange at the same time (Ashafa, 2011:10). The concept of boundary as defined by American Heritage Dictionary (2011) is the line or frontier area separating political divisions or geographic regions. It is an imaginary line which marks the legal termination of one state or political unit which has an international status or role and the commencement of the territory of another state or political unit (Yaqub, 2011:202). Thus, border, boundary and frontier are terms which are often used interchangeably to convey the idea of limit even though the context in which they are used may indicate slightly different connotations. In this paper we will refer to them in the context in which they are employed in the geographic and related literatures. In this respect, boundaries are intricately and inseparably linked with the concept of the 'region' in Geography. Interestingly, this paper views the concept of border in line with functional integration perspective. In this respect the word 'border' is an empirical concept that emphasizes cooperative aspects of international behaviour created around beneficial politics of reasons and rationality rather than politics of exclusiveness, conflict and irrationality. The hope of functional integration strategies, as adopted in the article, are the accumulations of large variety of functional organizations linking communities and their interests across borders. This will help in the transformation of both national attitudes and institutions of nation-states to the institutionalization of cross-border groups in the efforts to ensure the security of the functional territorial state or region. Closely related to this, are the concepts of complementarity and transferability. These two concepts are depended upon the functional territoriality. This is because when nations are close to each other physically, they are likely to interact and perceive their mutual importance. According to Starr and Most;

If a nation is close to a large number of other nations, it is faced with potentially high risk that it may be threatened or attacked by at least one of its neighbors, for example. At the same time that proximity thus creates risk situations, of course, it may also provide potential opportunities for international interactions. If two nations are distant from each other, it is probable that they will have a low level of trade (Starr and Most, 1976: 584).

Starr and Most have demonstrated that there is a co-variation between border and conflict at one level of analysis and at the other, between border and alliance formation. Proximate nations would be perceived more threatening than those which

are distant. According to this argument therefore, nations like Nigeria, which possesses many proximate neighbors are provided with many targets or opportunities in which they might utilize their power without being greatly affected by distance. At the same time however, such nations are also confronted with great risks and uncertainty because they must protect themselves against many potential opponents and security threats along the borderlands. Notwithstanding, nations generally tend to ally themselves most frequently with other nations with which they share some type of common border. With regard to Nigeria's North-west border, international cooperation activities, such as mutual dependence pacts or the more comprehensive agreements is aimed at promoting subregional and regional integration and trans-border security cooperation in the affected border areas. More relevant and concrete perspective has been presented by scholars such as Lancet (2001); Onovo (2004); and Ige (2004). These scholars provided security option of interagency cooperation in the fight against trans-border crime. To them, the combine efforts of Nigerian Police Force, The Nigerian Immigration Service, the Nigerian Custom Service, the State Security Service, the Nigerian Prisons Service, the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency, the National Agency for Food, Drug Administration and Control is expedient in controlling trans-border crimes.

Trans-border crimes which are a common security challenge in Africa often develop across artificial international boundaries (Pasass, 2002). This is particularly true in Africa, where transnational conflicts/crimes involving non-state actors have become much more frequent than inter-state wars since the end of the Cold War. Not only in Africa, Europe too, had witnesses certain changes in its post cold war border policies. Within the EU, important changes are the result of policies of deepening integration, which have promoted institutional de-bordering and more extensive cross-border communication (Jussi, 2018:2). Since 1960s African borders have become synonymous with political disorders for many reasons that involve both state and non-state actors (Ashafa, 2018:9). Thus, the porosity of many African borders facilitates the circulation of fighters, weapons and amplifies the geographic spread of such illegal movements and conflicts. Across the region, violent organizations use border regions as bases from which military operations can be conducted and new recruits can be found. Recent studies (Kuna & Ibrahim, 2015; OECD, 2020), indicate that the nature of conflicts along West African borders is changing dramatically and most of these conflicts are gradually involving non state actors thereby spreading to other regions across international borders. Another study further concludes that 'multiple clusters' of high intensity violence have formed in the sahel, where they are spilling over into neighboring countries (OECD, 2020:15). The conclusion in most of these studies is very important in understanding the contemporary dimension of cross-border crimes along Nigeria-Niger borderlands. For instance, the internal conflict in some parts of northern Nigeria tends to spread across state borders because armed groups relocate/migrate to other countries when defeated by counter insurgency efforts as seen in some parts of Sokoto, Zamfara and Katsina border areas. Insurgents in these areas relocate to some parts of Niger border areas when they were attacked by Nigerian armies (International Crisis Group, 2020).

As much as artificial boundaries are seen as an instigator of transborder crimes, globalization equally complements the role of boundaries as a link between countries, individuals and communities. The scenario here is that through trade human communities are building a common destiny (Wilson and Hastings, 1998:1). Therefore, in concrete terms, globalization is the intensification of cross-border trade and increased financial and foreign direct investment flows among nations, promoted by rapid advances in liberalization of communication and information technology. Based on an expansion and deepening of market competition, globalization is synonymous with an irresistible process of economic, political and cultural change that is sweeping all national boundaries and protectionist tendencies before it. Most importantly, today, globalization of trade, technology, transportation, communication information and financial systems provides new opportunities for criminal enterprises to operate across national borders. One of the characteristics of globalization had been significant population movements driven by a mix of push and pull factors that range from ethnic conflict, environmental degradation to the desire for economic betterment. The growth of ethnic networks that operates across borders in many countries of West Africa, have proved valuable in increasing criminal activities. In Nigeria for example the recent security insurgency in the country has been attributed to porous borders that allow criminal elements in and out of the country.

Methodology

a) The study Area

Nigeria, a Sub-Saharan West African State, has a land area of 923,768 square kilometers with 5,000 kilometres of international borders (Osuntokun, 2008) drawn through extremely diverse geographical and cultural zones. Of these borders, Nigeria shares 1,500 kilometres with Niger Republic to the north, 1,000 kilometres with Benin Republic to the west, and 75 kilometres with Chad to the northeast, almost all the boundary with Chad are on the ever-shifting Lake Chad. It shares 1,700 kilo metres with the Republic of Cameroon to the east, and 700 kilometres along the Atlantic coast with Equatorial Guinea to the south. The southern boundary connects the country with the world via the Atlantic Ocean. Nigeria, like most African and Third world countries, borders were created by the European imperialists by the division of the conquered states at Berlin Conference in 1884.

The concept of North-West, where Sokoto-Zamfara-Katsina border axis falls, is not a recent etymological idea in the history of Nigeria, as a nation-state. The concept had been used between 1967 and 1976 in reference to North-Western-State with headquarter at Sokoto, when Nigeria practiced twelve states federal structure. However, the current usage of the concept was recommended by the 1994-1995 Constitutional Conference of Nigeria in which the North-Western Zone is one of the six geo-political zones of the country. It comprises seven states of Northern Nigeria such as Jigawa, Kano, Katsina, Kebbi, Niger, Sokoto and Zamfara. Therefore, Sokoto-zamfara-Katsina border axis refers to not only the communities internal to Nigerian frontier but also the immediate communities of Niger Republic external to Nigeria. In

this context, the border frontier for consideration stretches from Gudu in Tangaza Local government (Sokoto State, Nigeria) eastwards to Zurmi local Government (Zamfara state) thence to Jibia (Katsina State).

b) Process of data collection

The data for this research was drawn from both primary and secondary sources. Primary data was generated from a field survey carried out in three states in the North-west part of Nigeria plagued by incidents of armed banditry and cattle rustling. Primary source used include oral information (interviews) obtained from people living along Nigeria-Niger border areas as well as those who are stakeholders and/or victims of banditry along the border. The categories of people interviewed include; farmers, cross-border traders, Fulani pastoralist, village heads, government officials and administrators. In addition to oral interviews designated questionnaires were issued out to about twenty members of the groups identified above. Analysis of data is based on the historical approach which is a descriptive and analytical method of findings from the library and interviews. However, the multidisciplinary approach is used to complement the historical approach. This would further validate and strengthened some of the data collected from the field. In some few cases, Key Informant Interviews were conducted with individuals who are active participants in cross-border trade in the region.

Ungoverned Spaces and Banditry in Nigeria-Niger borderlands

The borderlands of Sokoto-Zamfara-Katsina axis are mostly surrounded by forests from where bandits launch their attacks on outlying towns, highways, and villages proximate to the international boundary. The Rugu, Kamara, Kunduma (in zamfara and Katsina States) and Sububu, Dajin Tureta and Gudu-Tangaza (Sokoto State) forests have become major hideouts for criminals with little or no government presence. Worse still, with a fragile state system and waning public confidence in police and state security institutions, the allegiance of defenseless rural communities is gradually shifting toward informal, armed groups and local vigilantes (Oral Interviews, July, 2020). There are widespread allegations of corruption against state security operatives, police, judges, village heads, and even some vigilante groups. The public institutions responsible for offering protection and delivering justice are unable to bring bandits to justice due to inadequate resources and widespread extortion. The bandits are so brazen that they notify villages ahead of attacks, and impose illegal tolls on farmers seeking to gain access to their farms (Daily Trust, May 2019). Various state governments in the North-west are also secretly negotiating with the armed bandits and have done prisoner swaps with them. The swaps have involved the release of arrested armed bandits in exchange for tens of persons kidnapped by the bandits (Oral Interview, July, 2020). Recently an American was kidnapped from Niger republic but was relocated across border to Nigeria but was later rescued by U.S rescue mission with the assistance of its Nigerian counterparts (BBC Hausa Service, Interview with Hon. Isah Kurdula, Member, House of Reps, 03/11/2020).

The irony is that despite enormous amounts being invested in military and security operations, the security situation seems to be deteriorating. In some border villages,

vigilantes cutting across border settlements formed joint security operation to protect themselves. This in most cases lead to reprisal attacks whenever 'members' of the bandits killed or attacked. Although most of the bandits operating in the north-west are Fulbe, a significant proportion comes from other ethnic groups cutting across communities proximate to Nigeria-Niger borderlands. The Miyetti Allah cattle-breeders association, (MACBAN) has shown their grievances that they are the ones mostly affected by the activities of the bandits and that hundreds of their members have been kidnapped. They alleged that they have lost 30% of cattle in Nigeria to the crises (BBC News, 2020). According to them, the attackers in Nigeria's north-west are foreign herders from neighbouring countries. In response to the banditry activities, the military launched Operation Sharan Daji in early 2016 and the police are instrumental in facilitating peace dialogue but some respondents claimed security agents were said to be benefitting from violence. According to Nagarajan (2020), there are three main community militia groups with some mutual membership and interaction: *yan banga* (which had existed before the conflict); *yan sakai* (those who act in response to violence); and CJTF (set up by the previous state government in response to *yan sakai* human rights violations committed).

Series of security operations were introduced between January and April 2019 by the Nigerian Army, such as *Operation Harbin Kunama*, *Operation Diran Mikiya*, and *Operation Puff Adder*, were carried out in the bid to tackle banditry in the Northwest. However, the armed bandits seem to be expanding the scope of their operations beyond their traditional zone of Katsina and Zamfara, now into the neighboring states of Sokoto, Kebbi and Niger states. On April 11, 2019, the Governor of Katsina state, Aminu Bello Masari, spoke of how bandits were taking over parts of the state, killing people and destroying property with impunity. This necessitates the formation of joint security operations amongst states in the region. These operations however appears to have been inefficient because security in northwest Nigeria has deteriorated especially in the outer of 2020. This was aggravated by the failure of an amnesty programme and peace deal inaugurated by the governors of Katsina, Zamfara and later Sokoto states. Having granted amnesty to bandits with some of them partially surrendering their weapons on 6 December 2019, the violence was expected to reduce as negotiations continued. However, the two most powerful banditry groups headed by (Buharin Daji and Dogo Gyedi) and other groups did not participate in the peace pacts (Oral Interview, May, 2019). It was reported that the peace deal appeared to grant more concessions to the Fulanis while overlooking Hausa, also stirred up Hausa/Fulani ethnic conflagrations, and increased tensions between Hausa vigilantes and Fulani herders who are now all loosely been labelled as 'bandits and kidnappers' by some parts of the population. (Salkida 16/10/2019). Furthermore, in furtherance to the efforts to mitigate the security challenge governors of the neighboring states from the two countries engaged in cooperation to tackle issue of banditry across borders of the two countries. Consequent upon various correspondences, the governor of the Maradi in Niger, Zakari Oumoru, hosted a cross-border meeting in Niger with the Nigerian governors of bordering Katsina, Sokoto, and Zamfara states to focus on cross-border crime, particularly banditry, kidnapping, and cattle rustling. The governors of the four states signed a memorandum of

understanding, which pledges closer cooperation against cross-border crime. Also present were representatives of the Nigerian security services based in the three Nigerian states (Campbell, 2019). The joint meeting further identified Porous borders between Nigeria and Niger as factor that aided illegal movements of people and goods across both countries which contributes to insecurity along the boundary.

The intensity of the attacks on the border villages mostly located within the Nigeria's north-west territories have led to the increasing migration into the neighboring villages in Niger republic where the victims felt secured. Many locals from some villages in Sabon Birni Local Government Area of Sokoto State that were attacked by bandits had to flee the country to neighbouring Niger Republic to escape further attacks. After arriving Gidan Runji in Niger Republic in large numbers, the fleeing villagers dispersed into villages on the border of Nigeria and Niger Republic, where they are living with either relations or Good Samaritans (BBC News, July 5, 2020). According to oral sources, the people of these border villages abandoned their homes after witnessing the burial of 16 victims of the attacks at a neighbouring village. Thus people were traumatized and were frightened by what happened to in other villages where the attacks took place and decided to leave. Among the villages affected are Dadin Kowa, Rora, Magira, Asha Ban Za, Katsallen Tanko, Katsallen Kafe, Koshin Ruwa, Garin Mallamai and Dama, all in Sabon Birni LGA. Majority of the displaced persons who arrived Gidan Runji are being hosted by their relations or good people in villages on the Niger-Nigeria border (Oral Interviews, July-October, 2020). Other victims also fled to Gidan Runji from Gidan Buzu in Isa LGA of Sokoto and some of them could not even thinking of going back to their respective villages in the near future.

The Spate of banditry and the formation of Informal security architecture

Reports by UNHCR indicate that the activities of bandits in the North-western Nigeria have forced an estimated 23,000 persons from the area to seek safety in neighbouring Niger Republic just in one month. The agency said the number of fleeing refugees from the region to Niger Republic has increased to more than 60,000 since the influx began in April 2019 (Premium Times, May, 2020). According to the report more than 40,000 Nigerians had migrated to Niger as a result of killings and kidnap for ransom crises in Nigeria. Most of the victims came from Sokoto, Zamfara and Katsina states of Nigeria. Many of these victims sought refuge in Maradi, the second largest city in Niger. Consequent upon banditry at the border region in Nigeria, an additional 19,000 Niger nationals have become displaced inside their own country. Accordingly, the humanitarian agency is said to be concerned about, "the influx of the refugees mainly desperate women and children, following the deteriorating security and attacks inside Nigeria's Katsina, Sokoto and Zamfara states, also the risk of armed incursions spilling over into Niger." (Ibid.). Banditry along border towns forced people to fled relentless attacks by armed groups in the Sokoto, Zamfara and Katsina states of Nigeria. Most found refuge in Niger's Maradi region. Some 95 per cent of the refugees have come from Nigeria's Sokoto state, rest are from Kano, Zamfara and Katsina states (Premium Times, May, 2019).

Further reports indicate that a close to 7,000 refugees were relocated for safety in villages 20 kilometers away from the border, where water, food, shelter, access to health and other essential assistance can be provided to to ease the pressure on host communities in border areas, where basic infrastructure and services are lacking (Daily Trust, 2019) . Consequent upon these security threats along the border areas a Joint Security team from Sokoto, Northwest Nigeria have met with their counterparts in Niger Republic to discuss further modalities to enhance and promote joint military/security inter border relations among the security agencies of both countries (Daily Trust, May, 2019). The Joint Security team from Sokoto comprised representatives from the Nigerian Army, Nigerian Police, State Security Services, Nigerian Immigration Service, Nigerian Custom Service and Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps. The team met with its counterparts in Dakana, Niger Republic. Security threats along the international boundary between Niger Republic and Nigeria had necessitated the establishment of a joint military border patrol in September 2018. The main objective of the joint security venture was to checkmate the menace of cross border armed banditry and other criminalities across the nations' common porous borders.

An increase in violent crimes in the northwestern Nigerian states of Katsina, Sokoto and Zamfara has triggered large scale displacements and population movement within the states as well as across the international border to Niger Republic (IOM, 2019). As per a rapid assessment conducted In Katsina, Sokoto and Zamfara states, an estimated 66,900 people have been displaced within the states and are in urgent need of humanitarian assistance (IOM, 2019:2). The State of Zamfara has the highest number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) at 38,113. Major local government areas affected are, Gusau, Maru, Bukkuyum, Anka. The State of Katsina has the next highest number of IDPs at 16,257. The assessment carried out in Sokoto state recorded over 12,527 individuals as displaced within the state because of the recent hostilities perpetuated by the armed group ravaging the region. All the LGAs in Sokoto state bordering Zamfara state, namely: Dange Shuni, Goronyo, Rabah, Sabon-Birni, Kebbe, Isa, Tangaza and Tureta LGAs were reported to have been affected by this security challenge. As per the assessment, Sabon Birni LGA in Sokoto has the highest number of affected persons at 10,000, followed by Rabah with 2,300 individuals. According to reports by IOM Niger, as many as 20,000 Nigerians have fled to Niger from the affected states. Most have made their way to border localities of Madarounfa, Guidan Roudji, Guidan Sory as well as to Gabi and N'Gnelwa townships in the Maradi region (IOM, 2019:2). Most of the IDPs that arrived in Niger reported to have taken illegal routes to enter the country.

The spate of insecurity created by armed banditry in north-west led to the formation and eventual transformation of vigilante groups. One major characteristic of these groups is that they are formed to protect their immediate communities from the attacks of the bandits. Most of the members of the groups do not possess any security training. What they know best is how apprehend an accuse person and subject him to torture or even killings. Our informants explained that nearly all communities in the affected areas have formed vigilante groups to provide security because of the

inadequacy of the police to protect them. Respondents were also of the view that, the police, and in some places the army, were reluctant to responding to reports of bandits attacks. Thus, most communities in the most prone areas have vigilante groups. For some border communities such as and Gidan roundji in Sabon-Birni (Sokoto State), a way out was building partnership with those communities of the other side of the border to form inter-border vigilante groups to reinforce security. Of course there are negative perceptions on the way vigilante operates. In some parts of Zamfara and Sokoto states, there were allegations of extra-judicial killings of pastoralists and banditry suspects; confiscation of livestock; burning and looting of pastoral households and force evictions perpetrated by vigilante (Momale, 2015:100). Similar cases were also reported for Katsina, though to a lesser extent. For farming communities however, perception about vigilantes varied. Generally farmers had more positive perceptions for vigilantes than pastoral groups. The reason being that in most cases livestock retrieved from the bandit will not get to the rightful owners. The misappropriation of the trust given to the vigilantes was largely due to the habit of some bad eggs among them who took it to be a “money making venture”. Lack of funding and working tools had seriously undermined the activities of vigilantes in the region. Misappropriation of public funds in the name of security votes by the respective states government had made it seemingly impossible to provide funds for the sustenance of the activities of vigilantes. Even the working tools that they are supposed to use in countering bandits such as local gun, machetes, knife, daggers as well as means of transportation has to be provided, in most cases by the community. Therefore, village heads have to mobilize members of the community to raise funds for the vigilantes.

The operation of informal security institutions in Nigeria had been necessitated by the inefficient and ineffective formal security institutions in Nigeria. For instance, recent study indicates that there are about 377,000 policemen for about 170 million Nigerians (Ogbozor, 2016:2). Sadly enough more than half of these policemen are attached to politicians and other top government officials. This invariably means that the ratio is one poorly motivated police officer to over 500 disgruntled and discontented Nigerians. This ugly situation has created an avenue for the formation and proliferation of different informal security outfits to fill up the vacuum left by the Nigerian Police Force. The vigilante group of Nigeria is the oldest and largest informal security outfit in Nigeria with a total of 3.2 million members across different States and Local Governments in the country (Daily Trust, January, 2016). There are basically four types of vigilante groups in Nigeria, viz; neighbourhood watch, ethnic, religious and state sponsored vigilantes all of which were financially and technically incapacitated.

Cross-border Inter-community Trade and Security threat

Smuggling, illegal entry, arm banditry, car theft, cattle rustling and terrorism, amongst others, are clearly issues that have been at the centre of inter-state relations between Nigeria and its neighbours. At the same time, these issues also question ‘the adequacy of Nigeria’s border control posts’ to security threats (Mohammed, 1992). The Nigerian government has at various times sought to address the porous borders

of Nigeria's international borders. As far back as 1980s, the Aniagolu Tribunal of Inquiry identified 'the inadequacy of Nigeria's border control posts' as one of the remote causes of religious riots in Kano in 1980 (Mohammed, 1992). It recommended the establishment of more border posts and check points. Despite the increase in the number of border posts and security check points over the years, particularly in Sokoto, Zamfara and Katsina states, which the government considered at that time as priority states of customs border posts, the reality is that criminal activities at cross border areas have remained issues of serious concern in Nigeria-Niger relations.

Since 2009, acts of terrorism have been perpetrated by the Jama'atu Ahlissunnah Lidda'awati wal Jihad (People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad"), also known as Boko Haram. Boko Haram has launched violent attacks on diverse government and civilian targets. Many people have been killed by the group and about a million more internally displaced and now living in Internally Displaced Camps (IDPs). One of critical issues of concern is the sophisticated arms and weapons used by its militants in attacks in northern Nigeria. Onuoha (2013) argued that the Boko Haram insurgency in northern Nigeria (especially the northeast zone) has been exacerbated by Nigeria's porous borders. Findings show that insecurity and terrorism have seriously impacted on inter-communal relations across borders of Nigeria and its neighbours (UNDP, 2016). The manifestations of this include: the imposition of more restrictions on movement of people by security forces of neighbouring countries; inter-community suspicion because of fear of infiltration of Boko Haram; and increased tension between communities in the border areas (Wapmuk, 2018:186).

As part of the concerted efforts to address the security challenges posed by Boko Haram, Nigeria and Niger met under the auspices of the Nigeria-Niger Joint Commission for Cooperation. The sixth session of the High Authority of the Nigeria-Niger Joint Commission for Cooperation, held in Niamey, the capital of Republic of Niger, on 18th October, 2012, agreed on joint patrols along the borders of both countries. The two countries also agreed to equip their National Boundary Commissions with requisite logistics to ensure fast re-demarcation of the Nigeria-Niger International boundary. Then President Goodluck Jonathan led the Nigerian delegation as co-chair of the session. A communiqué was issued at the end of the session, in which the two Heads of States expressed worries over the danger of terrorism in the region and emphasised the need to jointly tackle the security challenge in the sub region which is a big threat to peace and stability in the West African sub-region. While then Nigerian's Foreign Affairs Minister. Dr. Nurudeen Muhammad signed on behalf of Nigeria, Mr. Mohamed Bazoum, Senior Minister, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Cooperation, African Integration and Nationals in Diaspora signed for the Republic of Niger.

The recent insecurity in the North-West region which had been continuation of the already existing security threats as pointed out above, impacted negatively on the inter community trade along the border areas. Given the fact that farming is the mainstay of the local economies of the sahelian region, the disruption in farming due

to bandit attacks affect agricultural productivity with serious implications for food security (FAO, 2020). Majority of the farming communities were forced to abandon their farms especially areas in proximity to the forest areas, as bandits exploited these locations to attack communities. Few farmers who stayed behind were subjected to taxation by the bandits before accessing their farms. The dwindling agricultural production in the region resulted into unprecedented rise in foodstuff prices not seen over decades. In some border areas bandits forced farmers to pay between N100, 000-N5, 000,000 Nigerian currency, to access their farm lands. This ultimately affected the volume of foodstuff being traded across the border of the two countries (IOM, May, 2020). Reports indicate that farming activities in Zamfara and Katsina States were restricted to few areas thus resulting in a decline in food production by 60% (WANEP, 2020). In Sokoto and Kebbi States, significant number of rice farmers was affected with farmlands abandoned as a result of bandit attacks. However, the dwindling income of local farmers and other vulnerable groups especially women, also affect their capacity to sustain their participation in cross-border trade (Oral Interviews, July-October, 2020).

Similarly, the flow of illicit firearms in communities of North-West region as explained above has increased bandits' attacks on communities which discouraged investment and triggered economic crises for individuals and communities. The conflict is causing a spill-over effect on the neighbouring country Niger, hindering inter-community and cross-border trade. For instance, number of major local markets such as Jibia (Katsina state), Iella (Sokoto State) and Shinkafi (Zamfara State) markets have been seriously affected due to incessant attacks. These markets are very strategic to both countries as they served as melting pot for cross-border traders. The strategic nature of these border markets made them attractive to major merchants from across other countries in the region for foodstuff including maize, millet, guinea corn and beans (Sama'ila, 2019:2). However, the proximity of these markets to the border made them vulnerable to attacks. Victims of kidnapping are usually taken in captivity into ungoverned border spaces in Niger republic and vice-versa (Oral Interviews, July-October). Thus traders began to avoid frequent use of these routes for fear of being kidnapped. This had an adverse effect on cross-border trading activities, as market sales/supplies in these regional border markets declined (need for a chart). For instance, a revenue officer in Katsina State had revealed that 'trailers of foodstuff at the market reduced from eight (8) trailers weekly to half a truck in two months', while the revenue earning reduced from 500,000 naira to less than 100,000 naira (WANEP, 2020). According to the 2019 report on food insecurity and market by Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWSNET, 2019), Shinkafi market, a major cross border market in Zamfara State, functioned between 30 to 40 percent within the reviewed period, while Dandume market in Katsina State functioned lower by 15 to 25 percent relative to normal trading projections.

Impact of border closure

Cross-border trade between Nigerian and her ECOWAS neighbours has not been a regulated trade, but has facilitated the movement industrial goods to countries of the ECOWAS sub-region. Some of the borderland markets are periodic in their operations

and attract many traders from the border and hinterland communities (Usman & Sama'ila, 2019:2). Majority of the borderland communities have close cultural and historical links to each other. The markets provide the communities with vast opportunities for economic or commercial exchanges and a forum to discuss peculiar issues that are important to the development of cultural practices and traditions on both divides of the border. Some of the important and notable markets are mainly located on the side of the Nigerian border and they include Maigatari, ZangonDaura, Jibia, Illela, Kamba and a host of others. Most of the essential manufactures originate from Nigeria being the most industrialized and economically strong member of ECOWAS. Nigerian products have ready markets whenever traders take them to the border markets and others in the interior of Niger Republic. Local products feature prominently in the border markets hence supplies of livestock and legumes from Niger Republic are brought to the markets destined for the interior of Nigeria. The presence of traders of diverse ethnic, linguistic and religious affiliation gives the border markets their international outlook.

The border closure which has been imposed by government before the Covid-19 has been officially justified on the basis of the ECOWAS protocol and sovereign national (economic) interest. Border closure according to some analysts; violate the provision of ECOWAS protocol on free trade. The policy has virtually been economically harmful to Nigeria's neighbours especially Benin and Niger Republics (BBC Hausa Service, 18th August, 2020). The irony of the border closure and later the lockdown has together added to the food crisis in Nigeria because the agricultural sector has not been able to meet the food need of the country. Food items like rice, vegetable oil, fish, *garri* (mashed dry cassava), maize, millet and sorghum other popular food varieties are virtually out of reach of many families. People are frustrated by soaring inflation of food prices which keeps increasing by the day, and that forces many families to go hungry. It is reported that in July inflation related to the prices of food stands at 15.48% (AIT, 19th August, 2020). Lack of cash or savings in banks is very common among the poor which makes it difficult to buy food under the harsh restriction of movement because of border closure and Covid-19. Between 2007 to the present, deposits in Nigerian banks according Soludo (2020) have drastically reduced from an average of \$2500 to \$1,300 which because of the depreciation of the naira is equals to about N300, 000.00 to N500, 000.00 respectively (AIT, August, 2020). There were obvious mixed reactions on the issue of border closure. While some applaud government decision on the basis of economic and security crises, others see unilateral border closure as an action that goes against all commercial treaties signed under the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Some further argue that, the action casts a shadow over a historic free-trade agreement, signed by 54 out of the 55 African countries that reached a key operational threshold just five weeks earlier. Nigeria's border closure has done little to tame the activities of bandits who operates freely across the borders of the two countries. Cattle rustling, kidnapping and other related trans-border crimes appeared to have increased significantly between May 2019 and June, 2020.

It might also be worth mentioning that there has been an increase in the activities of the Boko Haram terrorist group, banditry and other criminal activities in recent times around the country, despite the closure of Nigeria's land borders. This brings to question the security merit of the border closure, while it should spark a more holistic conversation on border control measures, taking into cognisance the endless informal border entry points across the country, where smuggling still thrives. We can perhaps come to a reasonable conclusion that the land border closure policy is not a sustainable measure for economic growth, neither does it solve the adduced problems of insecurity in the medium and long terms (Premium Times, July, 2020).

Impact of COVID-19

COVID-19 border policies have further create problems for African cross-border trade. Border closure in many countries in West Africa has interrupted progress towards economic integration. Most border closures have been imposed with little clear knowledge of what is happening on the ground. For instance, border restrictions on travel can be particularly costly for livestock producers practicing transhumance seasonally moving livestock between grazing grounds. This occurs between Sahelian countries including Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger and Nigeria (IFPRI, 2020:1). Beyond their immediate economic costs, these measures threaten the basic mode of operation of pastoral agriculture.

Similarly, the introduction of exceptional measures on border closure provides a breeding ground for the abuse of power. In many border areas of Nigeria-Niger, it is common practice for law enforcement officials to set up checkpoints along trade corridors to collect bribes. As recent measures have slowed down road transport in West Africa, this predatory behavior has increased in intensity. Furthermore, the report from IFPRI (2020) indicates that most of these measures were imposed with little warning, taking local populations by surprise and leaving them to contend with the fallout. With informal trade interrupted, many people have had little opportunity to find alternative livelihoods. For many families, the absence of income for even several consecutive days can have devastating effects on poverty thereby creating room for banditry (Oral interviews, July-October, 2020).

COVID-19 according to many experts is a serious health crisis which has already been declared a pandemic by the World Health Organization. It is a catastrophe that has added to the existing social, economic and political problems in Africa. The pandemic has complicated the social and economic predicaments of many countries across the globe. The vast majority of the population in Nigeria's North-west lives in abject poverty with more than 60 per cent living below US Dollar per day without easy access to health services and facilities (Editorial Note, *Africa Focus*, 2020). Nigeria's border closure and the Covid-19 lockdown have contributed to the upsurge of banditry in Nigeria's north-west. Cutting down the major source of people's income must have increased the chances of participating in criminal activities such as banditry. Chukwuma Soludo (2020), a onetime governor of Nigeria's Central Bank, is one of the notable scholars who put up strong arguments against the imposition of lockdown in Africa because of the counterproductive effects on the economy and

society in most of the African countries. Lockdown 'template' was adopted from the West which consists of 'a coterie of defensive measures' some of them include border closure, opening of isolation centers, imposing 'stay at home' orders or lockdown, social distancing, introduction of welfare package in form of palliatives for the vulnerable people; and a stimulus package to cushion the effects of the pandemic on the economy.

In Nigeria and indeed for most part of Africa, it is impossible to determine the length of time require for lockdown to be effective checking the spread of Covid-19. Almost 80% of the population depends on income generated on daily toil for sustenance or what is called from 'hand to mouth'. Thus, prolonged lockdown only created opportunities for extortion by security officials of the violators of lockdown orders, especially for traders along the borders. Furthermore, the impact of lockdowns in most of the regional and border markets between Nigeria and Niger had counterproductive effect because of some peculiarities of the socio-economic across the two countries. Petty traders, commercial drivers for urban and rural transport, artisans, the small-holder farmers were hard hit by the lockdowns. The lockdowns have badly affected the supply of manufactured products to the markets along the border areas. During the peak period of the lockdown, the rainy season farming on the lowland *fadama* (the vast flood plains) was used for cultivation of some cereals and vegetables in the northern part of Nigeria and the neighbouring areas of Niger Republic. While food supplies to the border areas of Niger was not completely stopped its transportation into the remote areas was not all that easy because of insecurity along the border perpetrated by the bandits in the midst of the pandemic and the unpatriotic corrupt behavior of some security personnel.

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Chapter 16

Global Environment Insecurity: The Case of Nigeria

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Abstract

Various countries around the world are experiencing instability. Each country has its own set of circumstances. Efforts are being made all over the world to limit or stop them. Nigeria, as a developing nation, is not exempt. Efforts are also being made to lessen the danger. This paper aims to identify one of the areas in which Nigeria is severely impacted, namely environmental insecurity. The articles collected from the internet were used in this review paper. Over 100 references were found, but only a few that were important to this project were used. There is no question that environmental insecurity exists in the areas of air (epidemics, noise, ozone depletion, and climate change), water (oil spills, plastic waste, freshwater contamination, and acid rain), and soil (land degradation, erosion, deforestation, desertification, biodiversity). For Nigeria to be environmentally stable, the approved blueprint of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (SDG) must be strictly pursued.

Keywords: Global, insecurity, degradation, climate change, health effects, SDGs

Introduction

Over time, the scope of global instability has broadened. Today, it encompasses a wide range of interconnected global problems that have an impact on survival. It includes ethnic, religious, and ideological conflicts, trade and economic conflicts, energy supplies, science and technology, food, and threats to human security and state stability posed by environmental degradation, infectious diseases, and climate change (Buzen et al., 1998).

The World Conference on the Changing Atmosphere: Implications for Global Security (UNCED/UNEP/WMO, Toronto, June 1988) issued a statement highlighting how the global atmosphere's continuing alternation threatens global security, the global

economy, and the natural environment through (a) climate warming, rising sea levels, altered precipitation patterns, and changed frequency. It goes on to say that these improvements will: (a) jeopardize human health and well-being; (b) jeopardize global food security, especially for many vulnerable regions, by increasing soil erosion and increasing shifts and uncertainties in agricultural production; (c) alter the distribution and seasonal availability of freshwater resources; (d) increase political instability and the potential for international conflict; (e) jeopardize prospects; and (g) alter yield, productivity and biological diversity of natural and managed ecosystems, particularly forests (The Union of International Associations - UIA, Accessed, 2021).

Both the UN Member States adopted the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development in 2015, which offers a shared blueprint for stability and prosperity for people and the world now and in the future. The 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) are at its heart, and they are an urgent call to action for all countries - developed and emerging - to work together in a global partnership. They understand that eradicating poverty and other forms of deprivation must be combined with efforts to improve health and education, minimize inequality, and boost economic development – all while combating climate change and protecting our oceans and forests (UN, Assessed 2021). Environmental insecurity is addressed in two of the targets (Target 11: Sustainable Cities and Communities and GOAL 13: Climate Action). According to the UN, environmental security is threatened by an increase in fossil fuel investment, a reduction in disaster risk strategies, an increase in global temperature, with Greenhouse Gas emissions (GHG) still falling short of the 7.6% annual reduction needed to keep global warming below 1.5°C, and an increase in people living in slums, with over 90% of cases occurring in urban areas (UN, Assessed 2021).

The focus of this paper is on Nigeria's environmental instability. It is a well-known fact that Nigeria suffers from environmental instability. To do this work. Literature from the internet is included. Over 100 papers are found when the words "environmental insecurity in Nigeria" are typed into a search engine, but only sixty of the related sources are used. The project aimed to examine Nigeria's environmental insecurity.

The Case of Nigeria

Some of the environmental insecurity (Figure 1) are examined below.



Source: Nenge (2021)

Figure 1: Pictorial Examples of environmental insecurity in Nigeria

The Death of Forests

Environmental degradation encompasses a long and growing list of large and multiple dysfunctions that feed off one another, raising the chain of vulnerabilities (White 1993). Deforestation, for example, causes land loss, rendering agricultural production unsustainable. This has an effect on food security as well as staple exports (and the balance of payments). Food poverty wreaks havoc on health and social stability, and it also leads to political upheaval. The latter encourages authoritarianism, aggression, and political fragmentation, as well as population displacement. Subtropical deforestation has had a devastating effect on parts of Africa, including Nigeria.

The Thinning of the Ozone Layer

The destruction of the protective ozone layer in the upper atmosphere is an environmental problem that has only recently become known. The unregulated use of PCBs and other industrial and household chemicals has resulted in this situation. The upper atmosphere's ozone layer has been reduced by 2% globally since the 1950s. Increased levels of surface exposure to solar and cosmic radiation, interference with natural photosynthesis in crops, disruption to fauna, extinction of ocean plankton - the primary source of the marine food chain - health threats, and climatic alterations have all resulted from this reduction (Head 1991). While the full long-term effect is still being investigated, the areas around Antarctica and the Arctic have been the most affected.

Air Pollution and Acid Rain

Another big technologically induced issue affecting air quality, especially in major cities, is carbon monoxide and sulphuric acid emissions. The emission is caused by a combination of combustion engine technology and the widespread use of carbon-based energy sources, as well as the smokestacks that are typical of industrial society. While virtually all major cities are affected, examples such as Los Angeles, Tokyo, Bangkok, Mexico City, and Santiago are well recognized. Carbon dioxide (CO₂), the primary greenhouse gas, has increased by 9% in global atmospheric concentration since the 1970s.

The developed nations, which account for slightly more than 15% of the global population, are and have been the largest contributors to carbon emissions, accounting for over 46% of total production. The burning of fossil fuels and the production of cement are the two main sources, all of which are closely linked to urbanization and industrialization. In 1989, it was estimated that every million dollars in GDP resulted in the release of an additional 327 tons of carbon into the atmosphere. On a per-capita basis, this equated to an average of 0.5 tons in low and middle-income countries and 3.36 tons in high-income countries. The global average per capita is 1.12 tons. When the population is taken into account, developed nations pollute the atmosphere six times more than the rest of the planet. Pollution in developing areas has continued to rise at a faster pace than in more industrialized areas as industrialization and urbanization grow. Although Europe, North America, Japan, and other advanced economies produce much more CO₂, less-developed nations pollute the air at a rate of 3.8 percent per year, or 7.6 times faster. The global average annual rise in these ozone contaminants is 1.8 percent (World Bank 1992). The immediate effect is increased health threats, such as respiratory diseases, as well as flora and fauna damage, not to mention global warming's long-term catastrophic consequences.

Another environmental threat, acid rain, is caused by air pollution. Sulphur emissions, the primary cause of acid rain, have been increasingly increasing across the world, with a clear correlation to carbon dioxide levels. Nearly 75% of Europe's forests are thought to be affected by sulphur depositions that are harmful to the environment. Water hyperacidity has had detrimental effects on flora and has resulted in the death

of freshwater lakes. Due to high acidity, 14,000 lakes in Canada are currently unable to support aquatic life. Acid rain has also caused damage to houses, transportation systems, and metallic structures in Northern Europe and newly industrializing countries, not just in natural habitats but also in buildings, transportation systems, and corrosion of metallic structures.

Freshwater Contamination and Depletion

Water quality, including contamination and degradation, is another field where inadequate technology and natural fragility collide. Industrial and waste discharges into waterways cause much more harm than the initial causes of pollution, endangering human health and disrupting fragile environmental balances in riverbeds and along coastlines. Water-related issues range from places where water is scarce (and likely to become scarce) to those where substantial pollution renders it unsafe for use or irrigation, to those where a high water level makes flooding and refuse discharge a constant threat. Low-income countries consumed about 498 m³, middle-income countries 532 m³, and high-income countries 1,217 m³ of water per capita in 1990. Water was used nearly 85 percent for irrigation, 8% for manufacturing, and 7% for domestic use in low and middle-income countries. The OECD used 39% of water for crop irrigation, 47% for industry, and 14% for domestic use.

Sub-Saharan Africa holds about 9% of the world's proven 40,856 km³ of freshwater, followed by East Asia and the Pacific (19%), South Asia (12%), the Middle East and North Africa (0.67%), and Latin America and the Caribbean (26%). The OECD countries, in turn, hold over 20% of the world's freshwater (World Bank 1992), while Eastern Europe, including the former Soviet Union, holds the remaining 13%.

Regulating water supplies is a critical and strategic problem for human protection. It has direct implications for human health, energy, and food security. Water is a resource that is unevenly distributed, but distribution isn't the main issue. Access to safe drinking water is a major issue for the majority of the world's population. This is where the problem arises. While consumption rises with urbanization and industrialization, water quality has generally deteriorated as a result of increased use, regardless of availability. As a result, who manages the resource and for what purpose is crucial.

Water conflicts between countries can become a source of conflict in the future. The Nile's siltation, erosion, and water-flow diversion have caused tension between Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan. Increased tensions between Iraq, Syria, and Turkey have resulted from reduced water flow and salinization of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. Syria, Israel, Jordan, and Lebanon are dealing with water flow and diversion issues in the Jordan and Yarnuk Litani rivers. These are only a handful of the more than a dozen legal battles raging through the country's major river systems (Renner 1989). What's essential to know is that such conflicts arise not only between nations, but also between racial, regional, and subnational groups, where conflicting loyalties and sovereignties make politics extremely volatile.

Land Degradation

Soil erosion, desertification, and salinization are three major concerns in a long chain of environmental problems. (In 1987, the worst cases of salinization, as determined by the percentage of irrigated land affected, were Egypt (30–40%), Syria (3–35%), Australia (15–20%), and the United States (20–25%).) The loss of arable land, which is directly linked to crop failure, drought, and forced migration, harms human welfare. East Africa and the Sahel countries have been particularly hard hit. Desertification, drought, hunger, population pressures, internal conflict, fuel shortages, and political inefficiency have strained already fragile ecosystems, resulting in millions of deaths and major population displacements. Deserts and soil erosion, on the other hand, are spreading all over the world in areas with fewer dysfunctions than those described earlier.

Desertification has many triggers, many of which include a synergistic and destructive combination of natural cycles and human activity. Overcultivation, erosion, overgrazing, and unskilled irrigation are the most direct causes. Changes in the three interlocking factors of population, environment, and socioeconomic conditions influence these triggers (Grainger 1982). While drought can set off a chain of events that leads to desertification, the former is caused by climatic change, while the latter is caused by human behavior. Desertification directly impacted one-sixth of the world's population, 70% of all drylands, and 25% of the world's landmass in the mid-1970s (Spooner 1982). Every year, erosion destroys potentially productive lands the size of a small nation. Since land reclaiming is a time-consuming and expensive process, the amount of land available for agriculture on a per capita basis is slowly decreasing as the population grows and water supplies dwindle. Desertification, coupled with city development that encroaches on prime agricultural land and natural reserves, is reducing the accessibility of a critical resource for food security. Reduced productivity and, finally, the formation of wastelands are signs of land degradation. Although the world's population has grown by 1.6 billion people in the last 20 years, soil erosion has resulted in the loss of nearly 500 billion tons of topsoil (Brown et al., 1993).

Damage to the Oceans

Abuse of the oceans and seabeds is a major and likely permanent environmental problem. One of its manifestations has been the uncontrolled disposal of human and industrial waste, as well as the general discharge of toxins that endangers aquatic life, human health, and food sources. Maritime spills from oil tankers and cargo ships, such as the well-publicized Exxon Valdes accident off the coast of Alaska, and defense-related disasters, such as nuclear submarines sinking in the Baltic, have become commonplace. Extensive nuclear testing was carried out across the seas before the signing of nuclear test-ban treaties, and nuclear waste made its way into seabeds. There is almost no area on the planet that is immune to these major threats.

There's also the issue of overfishing and unregulated commercial exploitation of natural stocks to consider. The "Blue Revolution," which was once thought to hold the secret to feeding the earth, has now become a major cause of ocean pollution due to

gross mismanagement of the sea commons. From the mid-century to the late 1980s, catches grew at a rate of nearly 4% per year, but they have since decreased in both relative and absolute numbers. According to estimates, worldwide fish availability will decrease by 7% per capita over the next four years (Brown et al. 1993). Ecological issues turn into significant dysfunctions in the food chain and the entire regional ecosystem, as shown by the extinction of cod off the coast of the Canadian Maritime Provinces and a variety of fish, crustaceans, and mollusks off the coast of southern South America. It leads to the loss of traditional sources of income, high unemployment, large-scale forced migration, and the extinction of populations.

The Climate Change and Sustainability

Nigeria has a tropical climate with rainy and dry seasons that differ by area. For most of the year, the southeast is hot and humid, but the southwest and inland are dry. The wet season in the south lasts from March to November, however, in the far north, it lasts only from mid-May to September.

Nigeria is threatened by climate change in a variety of ways. Due to its geography, environment, vegetation, soils, economic structure, population and settlement, energy demands, and intensive agriculture, Nigeria, according to Adebimpe (2011), is highly vulnerable to the impact of climate change on several fronts. According to Watson and McMichael (2001), where there is a nut's highest sensitivity to climate change as well as a nut's most resistance to climate change, vulnerability is greatest.

Desertification and Famine (Drought)

The interaction of millions of people with their environment has left an indelible mark on the landscape. Desertification is a major issue in Nigeria, which has been exacerbated by large-scale water storage and irrigation projects. According to estimates, Nigeria loses 0.6 kilometers of land every year due to desertification (Norwegian Society for the Conservation of Nature, 2015). According to Omofonmwan and Osa-Edoh (2008), Nigeria has a total land area of 983,213 km² occupied by about 120 million people. The consequences of man's interaction with his environment include urbanization, deforestation, desertification, overpopulation, and various forms of pollution. Drought, food shortage exacerbated by rainfall anomalies, and flooding, to name a few examples, are all signs of climate change's effects in Nigeria. Over-flooding is a major issue in vulnerable areas like the coastal and delta regions, which has resulted in the adrift of many people in the Niger Delta region (Olmos, 2001). Drought affects the entire country, unlike desertification, which is limited to the northern portion. With its year-to-year variations in rainfall, drought is an important factor in desertification. In Nigeria, there is evidence of a cyclical climate trend, with years of low rainfall overlapping with years of high moisture stress. Droughts were reported to have occurred frequently in the past in various parts of Nigeria, with some of them, especially in the 19th century, culminating in famines. The amount of rainfall dating back to the beginning of the century shows significant variations in rainfall received in various parts of Nigeria, with several years experiencing less than average rainfall. For solutions to desertification and famine in Nigeria, Ezegwu (2014) recommended a creative project like the Great Green Wall is

encouraged for arid zones where desertification is a threat. Farmers should be able to plant improved species with high adaptive capacity. Efforts should be made to conserve soil and water. Surface runoff water will be collected and made available for agriculture using the pit planting technique. In arid areas, irrigation needs to be improved and widely promoted.

Ecological Problems

These issues have now been exacerbated by the advent of new environmental threats that are global in scope and whose consequences endanger humanity's very existence (Salau, 1993). These global environmental issues, the most serious of which are global warming, ozone depletion, and biodiversity destruction, have vividly highlighted the fact that mankind's fate is intertwined because we all share the same starship, the Planet. These global environmental challenges would have a far-reaching effect on Nigeria, necessitating Nigeria's participation in the quest for solutions alongside other nations.

Gully, Soil, and Wind Erosion

The gully erosion problem in Nigeria is already raging since even before 1980, and it impacts both large and small towns. It is an environmental, cultural, social, and human catastrophe that has resulted in soil degradation, the loss of lives, and the destruction of huge amounts of money's worth of property. According to Unah (2020), gully erosion, a more advanced type of land degradation, is wreaking havoc in southern Nigeria (Figure 2). The cause of gully erosion has many reasons, but one of the most important is climate change. In Nigeria, the consequences are obvious: loss of farmland and vegetation, isolation of villages, and death. Locals are now pleading with the government to help them solve the crisis. Desertification and aridity are major environmental issues in Nigeria's northern regions, while southern Nigeria's heavy torrential rainfall produces an atmosphere conducive to catastrophic soil erosion (Igwe, 2012; Obi and Okekeogbu, 2017). To prevent erosion, the followings are needed:

- By planting trees on barren ground.
- To avoid soil erosion, use mulch and rocks to protect the plants and grass underneath.
- Mulch matting can be used on the slopes to help prevent erosion.
- To keep any water or soil from washing away, stack a collection of fiber logs.
- A slope-side wall can help keep the soil from eroding.
- Every home should have a proper drainage system in place so that water drains into appropriate water collection systems.



Figure 2: A typical example of the problem of erosion in the Eastern part of Nigeria
Source: Unah (2020)

Wind erosion is more common and widespread in the country's far north, but it is restricted in time and space in the rest of the country.

Water Pollution

The water supply has been contaminated. Nigerians are well aware of the country's drinking water shortage. When you look at the current state of available water, the number of bacteria and synthetic chemicals present would astound you. Due to waste, high levels of harmful chemicals such as metals and pesticides have been found in Nigeria's water sources. Underground water is also being contaminated by seepage from waste dump sites. This is a significant health risk. Bad water quality has an effect on people, the economy, and the environment (Odume and Slaughter, 2017). Due to a lack of accessible, safe, and healthy drinking water, as well as poor sanitation and hygiene, Nigeria is projected to lose about USD 1.3 billion. Why is this happening in a country with plenty of water? Nigeria is experiencing a "global water crisis," or a failure to plan, use, and protect water supplies in a way that promotes economic growth and environmental protection (Odume and Slaughter, 2017).

Pollution is another major source of water scarcity in Nigeria. Sometimes, waste is dumped in rivers and streams. Rainwater transports toxins into towns, contaminating drinking water sources. Bad water quality has an effect on people, the economy, and the environment. In Nigeria, typhoid fever, diarrhoea, and dysentery are the most common diseases caused by polluted water. These pathogens kill people and cost a lot of money to the economy. In the Niger Delta, contamination from oil mining

activities is a major concern. Reduced fish harvests and habitat loss have resulted, with the most vulnerable bearing the brunt of the consequences.

Nigeria's water management system needs to be overhauled to address the issue of water pollution. To begin, a larger group of people should be involved. Providing clean drinking water necessitates science, strategy, and practice. The federal, state and local governments should collaborate to update and tighten water quality requirements. In Nigeria, a water quality management network and database are also needed. It is important to increase public awareness of the value of water and participation in water supply schemes (Odume and Slaughter, 2017).

Air Pollution

Air pollution is described as the presence of contaminants in the atmosphere that are harmful to human and other living beings' health, or that affect the climate or materials. Different forms of air contaminants include gases, particulates, and biological molecules. Polluted air enters our lungs and travels through our bloodstream to our internal organs, including the brain. This can lead to severe health problems such as asthma, heart disease, and even cancer, as well as a decrease in life quality and years. Air pollution is caused by solid and liquid particles, as well as some gases trapped in the air. These particles and gases come from a variety of places, including car and truck exhaust, factories, dust, pollen, mold spores, volcanoes, and wildfires. Air pollution hotspots have been identified in Nigeria's major cities, including Lagos, Kano, and Port Harcourt. Air pollution in Nigeria is exacerbated by biomass fuel combustion in vehicles, waste gases, domestic cooking stoves, and factories. Pollutants in the air, such as particulate matter (PM), can cause mild to severe respiratory illness in susceptible people (Sogbanmu et al., 2020). Some of the air pollution control devices or methods developed in Nigeria include a chemical process absorption column for removing carbon dioxide from power plant flue gas emissions, a hybrid of incineration and anaerobic digestion with a 75.7-93.3 percent global warming potential reduction compared to landfilling with energy recovery, and an Adaptive Neuro-Fuzzy Inference System (Sogbanmu et al., 2020). Others include research institutes, non-profits, and the structured private sector. Policy reforms, systematic and rigorous stakeholder engagement and policy implementation approaches are needed to monitor emission sources and mitigate the environmental and human health effects of air pollution. This is in line with the theme of air pollution for the 2019 United Nations World Environment Day, as well as UN Sustainable Development Goal 13 (climate action) (UN, 2020).

Oil Spillage

In 1989, there was an oil spill in Alaska. It has the potential to be remembered as one of the worst oil spills in history. In the Niger Delta, there has been an Exxon Valdez leak for the past 50 years. As a consequence, the Niger Delta has an unenviable reputation of being one of the most polluted areas on the planet. More than 70% of the Niger Delta's population is reliant on natural resources. They are, respectively, fishermen and farmers. In 2011, the United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP) published a study on the effects of oil pollution in Ogoniland, a delta area heavily

impacted by spills. According to the UNEP, people in Ogoniland have lived their whole lives surrounded by pollution. Benzene levels were found to be 900 times higher than WHO guidelines. They also found oil in the soil five meters beneath the surface. The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) proposes establishing a one-billion-dollar fund to kick-start the world's largest clean-up initiative. Shell and ENI, two oil companies, are the worst offenders in the Niger Delta. Over 600 spills are recorded by these companies each year. They claim that spills are dealt with quickly and correctly, but according to the UNEP report, this is not the case.

Biodiversity

More than 65 percent of Nigerians rely on the natural world and its wealth to survive. Agriculture, agriculture, forestry, and manufacturing are examples of this. 70-80 percent of Nigeria's original forests have disappeared due to deforestation, agriculture, urbanization, road expansion, and industrial growth. As a result, many of the plants and animals that depend on these forests have died. As a consequence of the anticipated effects of climate change, these losses are expected to increase (Norwegian Society for the Conservation of Nature, 2015). Nigeria has a well-organized system of nature preserves, game reserves, and national parks, in addition to a forest protection program, but the bulk of maintenance is performed at the state level. The protected system lacks law enforcement and infrastructure, and breaches of protected land are normal. Nigeria works with Cameroon, Chad, and Niger to monitor wildlife in the Lake Chad Basin. Furthermore, the country is a signatory to the African Convention on Natural Resources and Environment (Norwegian Society for the Conservation of Nature, 2015). In many parts of the world, farmers have been practicing environmental protection for decades. Some of their strategies include planting several crops in a single field at the same time to cover the ground more evenly and thus reduce erosion and increase fertility; planting and maintaining farmland trees and hedgerows to reduce erosion; applying manure to farmland to conserve soil fertility; and, in some areas, such as the Jos Plateau, terracing steep slopes.

Epidemics

Diseases that were once thought to be in a state of declines, such as tuberculosis, cholera, malaria, and typhoid, are making a comeback as public health spending is cut across the board. More concerning is the fact that many disease strains that have been successfully managed with antibiotics for the past 50 years are now showing signs of drug resistance.

Although the virtual eradication of smallpox a decade ago was a triumph of technology, international collaboration, and modern medical methods, the return of other pestilences points in the opposite direction. Cholera cases were registered in 68 countries in 1991. In children and babies, diarrheal diseases are still the leading cause of death and morbidity. This equates to 1.5 billion disease episodes and 3 million deaths among children under the age of five. As a result, malaria had spread and its prevalence had grown over the previous decade.

Another real and present danger in Nigeria is the spread of disease. Epidemics are characterized by a complex pattern of interactions embedded in pathogenic factors, population patterns, cultural norms, and public policies, with the result being health insecurity. Diseases that were once thought to be in a state of declines, such as tuberculosis, cholera, malaria, and typhoid, are making a comeback as public health spending is cut across the board. More concerning is the fact that many disease strains that have been successfully managed with antibiotics for the past 50 years are now showing signs of drug resistance.

In 1991, 1.5 billion people, or one-quarter of the global population, lacked access to basic health care. Every year, approximately three million children and half a million women die from preventable causes such as a lack of clean water, information, immunization, and proper health care during pregnancy, childbirth, and infancy (UNDP 1991).

The AIDS epidemic, maybe more than any other manifestation of human insecurity, exemplifies the essence of today's collective vulnerability. Even though the nightmare scenarios about the disease's spread that emerged in the mid-1980s failed to materialize, the fact remains that AIDS cases have multiplied at an unprecedented pace. In 2008, the official total number of people with AIDS was 2.99 million (Male-1.38-Female-1.61), according to Aboje (Assessed, 2021). More than 380,000 people were believed to have been infected with AIDS (adult-740,000, children-92,000). While new infection then was 380,000 (adult-323,000, children-57,000).

In the week ending February 21, the Nigerian Centre for Disease Control (NCDC, 2021) reported two new confirmed Lassa fever cases, bringing the total number of confirmed cases in the country to 102. There have been three more confirmed deaths, bringing the total number of deaths in the first seven weeks of 2021 to 22. In total, 8 states have registered at least one confirmed case across 32 LGAs in 2021, with Edo (49%) Ondo (25%), and Taraba (11%) states accounting for 85 percent of all confirmed cases (NewsDesk, 2021).

On the 14th of April 2021, 89 new confirmed cases of COVID-19 were registered in Nigeria. In 36 states and the Federal Capital Territory, 164000 cases have been confirmed, 154270 cases have been discharged, and 2061 deaths have been recorded. Lagos (19), FCT (15), Adamawa (12), Akwa Ibom (10), Cross River (9), Rivers (6), Ogun (6), Kano (5), Kaduna (4), and Osun (4) are among the 89 new cases recorded (3). In Nigeria, 89 new confirmed cases of COVID-19 were reported on April 14, 2021. 164000 cases have been reported, 154270 cases have been discharged, and 2061 deaths have been registered in 36 states and the Federal Capital Territory. There are 89 new cases in Lagos (19), FCT (15), Adamawa (12), Akwa Ibom (10), Cross River (9), Rivers (6), Ogun (6), Kano (5), Kaduna (4), and Osun (4). (3). The Nigerian government has taken bold measures in these directions to stop the virus from spreading: Members of the public are encouraged to take the following steps to reduce the chance of coronavirus spreading:

- Hands should be washed often with soap and water.

- Cover the mouth and nose with a handkerchief or tissue paper while sneezing or coughing. You could cough into your elbow if you don't have a handkerchief.
- Stay away from people who are coughing or sneezing and have respiratory problems.
- Avoid self-medicating. If you experience any of the symptoms mentioned above, seek medical attention immediately.
- Healthcare staff should always observe traditional infection prevention and control procedures when attending to patients and taking a travel history (Akeregha et al., 2020).

Also, the World Health Organization (WHO) sent over 4 million Coronavirus vaccine jabs to Nigeria as part of the global Covax program (Dewast, 2021). The head of the NCDC encouraged people to set their emotions aside and get inoculated. He also asked religious leaders, traditional rulers, non-governmental organizations, and the media to help with the initiative.

Industrial waste

Social shifts have resulted from global human migration. The problem is that people trigger housing issues in their search for a better life. As a result, a large number of people are compelled to live near industrial areas. As a result, they are forced to drink tainted water, breathe polluted air, and consume nitrate-rich food. Bad solid waste disposal endangers residents' health, leading to diseases like bronchitis and cancer.

High levels of industrial discharge destabilize nature's ecological balance. The microbial degradation of waste in water bodies affects fish and other aquatic species that require oxygen for survival, resulting in oxygen depletion (Ajero and Ukaga, 2006). The socio-economic structure of a region is broken in the most extreme cases. Because of the magnitude of the problem, industrial industries employ waste managers to focus solely on the question of proper and effective waste disposal. Industrial waste management encompasses the collection, transportation, refining, or disposal of industrial waste, as well as its management and control. Lagos is taking steps to improve its waste collection quality, which is currently ranked 42nd out of 42 cities in Sub-Saharan Africa. To resolve the issue, the government has launched the "Cleaner Lagos Initiative" (CLI). 'The plan reflects a strong dedication to redefining the state's solid waste management,' according to the governor's statement. Strong waste management, collection, storage, disposal, recycling, and transportation are all covered.' Lagos' stated aim, according to Alamba (2018), is to become "Africa's greenest city by 2029" by hiring and educating 27,500 Community Sanitation Workers and providing over 100,000 additional waste collection bins in the city.

Environmental pollutants from improper treatment of hazardous waste, odour, climate change, and noise pollution are just a few of the city's environmental concerns. Small and very small service industries, such as garages and mechanic workshops, as well as other small and very small industries that produce significant amounts of hazardous waste in Ogba, Lagos metropolis, include woodworking, textile plants,

metalworking, car repair, and petrol stations, all of which discharge oil and grease (Odunola et al., 2015).

Noise Pollution

Noise pollution is an unseen but harmful threat. The most common health problem caused by noise is noise-induced hearing loss (NIHL). High blood pressure, heart disease, insomnia, and depression can all be caused by loud noise. People of all ages may be affected by these health problems, but children are especially vulnerable. Nigerians are unaware that noise pollution and sustainable cities are related, so noise pollution control receives little to no publicity (Oyedepo, 2013). On land and at sea, noise pollution has the potential to harm people and animals. Noise pollution is becoming more prevalent in Nigeria today, and people are being forced to accept it as a way of life and an agreed practice (Pam and Garba, 2019). One of the state capitals, Akure, is particularly noisy. This was verified in a study conducted by Abulude et al. (2018), who discovered that the grinding machine had the highest noise level (105.73.2-116.13.7dBA), followed by a generator (91.02.8 98.82.8dBA) and phone ringing sound (91.02.8 98.82.8dBA) (70.61.2-89.22.4dBA). These noise levels are rated as highly dangerous and extremely dangerous, respectively. According to Adebisi and Abulude (2019), the industrial, stadium, mechanic workshop, and church areas created the most noise, and football viewing centers add to the risk (Abulude et al., 2021).

The Noise Regulations 2009 of the National Environmental Standards and Regulations Enforcement Agency list the maximum permissible noise levels from different locations, such as residences, mixed-use residential and commercial properties, factories, construction sites, places of entertainment, religious worship centers, and many others. The main objective of the noise regulations is to ensure a better environment for all Nigerians, the tranquility of their surroundings, and their mental well-being by controlling noise levels and, more broadly, to raise the people's standard of living by recommending the allowable maximum noise levels a facility or activity to which a person may be exposed, as well as to provide for the protection of the environment, the tranquillity of their surroundings, and to provide for the protection of the people's psychological well-being.

The permissible level of noise for residential, semi-residential, and small-scale commercial premises during the day is 50 to 60 decibels, and it is 30 to 50 decibels at night. The period between 6:00 a.m. and 10:00 p.m. is known as daytime, while the period between 10:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m. is known as night. This time frame considers typical human activity. A decibel is a unit of noise measurement. The threshold of hearing, or the lowest sound volume that can be detected, is represented by zero on a decibel scale (Admin, 2019).

No individual shall emit, cause to be emitted, or permit the emission of noise resulting from any action or operation specified in the regulation if the noise is a disturbance to the receptor or in the neighborhood for more than two minutes or is within the

prohibited period in a residential area or Noise Control Zone as established by the Agency in consultation with State and Local Governments (Admin, 2019).

Plastic Pollution

The accumulation of plastic items in the atmosphere harms biodiversity, wildlife habitat, and humans. Furthermore, the chemical composition of most plastics makes them resistant to many natural degradation processes, making them slow to degrade (Figure 3). According to reports, the United Nations Environment Programme has declared war on plastic waste. By 2022, the war will be focused on the causes of aquatic pollution, microplastics in cosmetics, and unnecessary single-use plastic waste.



Figure 3: The menace caused by plastics in the environment. Source: Abulude (2018)

The accumulation of plastic items in the atmosphere harms biodiversity, wildlife habitat, and humans. Furthermore, the chemical composition of most plastics makes them resistant to many natural degradation processes, making them slow to degrade (Figure 3). According to reports, the United Nations Environment Programme has declared war on plastic waste. From 2022, the target will be aquatic contamination, microplastics in cosmetics, and excessive single-use plastic waste. Fish eat the nets, and fish are consumed by men, so any toxin produced by the traps will be consumed by men in a cycle. As a result, customers suffer negative health consequences (Fish and man). The use of existing plastics in a modern concept has not helped to reduce the number of plastics, so recycling has not helped to reduce the number of plastics (Abulude, 2018).

Hazardous compounds are present in plastic materials used to package foods for human consumption. Plastics are not biodegradable in most cases. Composed of chemicals that can leach into water it breaks down into microbeads that invade the fish's body, but the fish are consumed before the user ingests the plastic. Plastic particles have been found in the stomachs of marine birds, causing them to feed and die. A natural compound used to make common plastic food containers and baby bottles, as well as to line tin cans, interacts with cell division in female mice's eggs.

Chemical, physical, and biological contaminants may affect the quality and utility of water and other resources. Industrial processes in the plastics industry can result in polluting effluents and the use of harmful intermediates, which can be dangerous if inhaled. Plastics are used in medical devices such as prosthetics, artery replacements, and “soft” and interocular lenses because they are relatively inert biologically.

Steps have been taken around the globe to curb or mitigate the impact of plastics. For instance, the DGrade Company in Dubai is working to find a viable use for the used plastic and caps by converting them into fiber for the manufacture of fabric, which has resulted in the creation of many jobs. On this note, Nigerian scientists should figure out how to make long-term use of this threat.

Conclusion

Environmental insecurity exists in Nigeria, according to the observations of this review, as evidenced by harmful issues in the air, water, soil, and even food. Efforts should be made to remove or mitigate the danger inside and around us. The SDGs' clarion call should be pursued in order for the Nigerian people to live healthy lives by 2030 or earlier.

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